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The Cyprus problem and EuropeansecurityHeinz Kramer aa Senior Researcher at the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik ,Ebenhausen, GermanyPublished online: 03 Mar 2008.

To cite this article: Heinz Kramer (1997) The Cyprus problem and European security, Survival:Global Politics and Strategy, 39:3, 16-32, DOI: 10.1080/00396339708442924

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The Cyprus Problem andEuropean SecurityHeinz Kramer

The Cyprus question has again become a focus of international attention afterhaving been a side issue for almost three years. In the first half of 1997, new UNSecretary-General Kofi Annan undertook great efforts to bring the repres-entatives of both Cypriot communities, the President of the (Greek Cypriot)Republic of Cyprus, Glafkos Clerides, and the President of the self-declared'Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus' (TRNC), Rauf Denktash, to thenegotiating table.1 Their meeting in upper New York state from 9-13 July 1997was their first direct contact in nearly three years. The Secretary-General'sefforts have been strongly supported by parallel endeavours undertaken by thegovernments of the United States and the United Kingdom as well as theEuropean Union (EU).

The round of meetings that started in July may be the last chance to find apeaceful solution to the Cyprus issue for some time. If the two communities failto reach an agreement, it will not result merely in the continuation of the statusquo. Because of the EU's March 1995 decision to begin accession negotiationswith Cyprus in early 1998, the current situation will change, whatever happensin the talks. Failure to reach a settlement could lead to disruption of the strategicpattern in the Aegean and eastern Mediterranean region, with seriousconsequences for Europe's future security.

To prevent such a deterioration, the UN, the US government and importantEU member-states must intensify their efforts at keeping the present round oftalks going until a solution has been found. Time is pressing, because in early1998 a chain of events can be foreseen that could negatively influence thereadiness of the leaders of both Cypriot communities to continue with nego-tiations if, by then, no promising outlook for the final result had beenestablished. The EU must underpin its intention to start membership negotiationswith Cyprus with a substantial package of political and financial pre-accessionaid to both communities. It must especially send a convincing signal to theTurkish Cypriots that EU membership would not be to their politicaldisadvantage. In this respect it would be useful to give Turkey a clear signal thatit is considered a candidate country for EU membership the same way as aremany of the new central and east European democracies.

Heinz Kramer is a Senior Researcher at the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik,Ebenhausen, Germany.

Survival, vol. 39, no. 3, Autumn 1997, pp. 16-32.

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The Cyprus Problem and European Security 17

Cyprus'Narrow Window of OpportunityThe EU's March 1995 announcement that it would begin negotiations onCyprus' membership six months after the conclusion of the 1995-96 Inter-governmental Conference (IGC) increased the pressure over the Cyprus issue.By announcing intended negotiations with Cyprus, the EU hoped to encourageall parties concerned to look seriously for a solution to the problem. Turkey,however, in an immediate reaction to the EU's step towards Cyprus, declaredthat it would begin the process of integrating Northern Cyprus into Turkey themoment EU membership negotiations with the Greek Cypriot governmentstarted.2 In summer 1996, tensions on the island turned into violent clashesbetween Greek and Turkish Cypriots on the 'Green Line' separating the twocommunities, causing the death of five people on both sides. Throughout 1996,relations between Greece and Turkey were strained after the Kardak/Imia crisisthat almost brought the two countries to war over some rocky islets in theAegean in late January 1996.3

international boundariescapital cityBritish Sovereign Base AreaUN Peacekeeping Force inCyprus Buffer Zone/'Green Line'

UN Headquarters

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18 Heinz Kramer

These events occurred in an environment characterised by continuing arma-ment in the Greek part of the island. For Greek Cypriots, armament is supposedto serve as an effective deterrent to the large numbers of Turkish troops(estimates range from 30,000-45,000 heavily armed men) based in the northernpart of the island since 1974. Within the framework of the military cooperationagreement concluded between Greece and the Republic of Cyprus in 1993, amilitary airport is being built near Paphos, where Greek fighter planes will bebased upon completion at the end of 1997. Furthermore, at the beginning of1997, the Greek Cypriot government announced its intention to purchase modernS-300 anti-aircraft missiles from Russia capable of attacking Turkish warplanesover the Turkish mainland; these missiles should be deployed from mid-1998.There is also talk of buying T-80 combat tanks from Russia. In total, theRepublic of Cyprus plans to purchase $3.4 billion-worth of modern weaponsystems by 2001.4

Ankara has responded by declaring that it intends to prevent the deploymentof missile systems, even if this means using force. Furthermore, the Turkishsecurity guarantee for the northern part of the island was confirmed in a jointstatement on 20 January 1997 by Turkish President Suleyman Demirel andTurkish Cypriot leader Denktash.5 These developments lend some credibility tothe assumption that a new military conflict on and around Cyprus would assumelarger dimensions than the Turkish invasion of 1974. Above all, in contrast to1974, a general military confrontation between Greece and Turkey may be moredifficult to prevent. Although such a scenario may have some deterrent effect onTurkey, this is by no means certain given the high probability of a Turkishvictory on Cyprus in any military conflict.6

The rising tension and the approaching start date for EU entry negotiationsinduced the British government to nominate its former ambassador to the UN,Sir David Hannay, as a special representative to Cyprus in summer 1996. Histask was to facilitate negotiations through talks with the parties on the island andwith the governments in Athens and Ankara. In early 1997, new US Secretary ofState Madeleine Albright also announced her intention to deal with the problem,although without yet being able to offer a formulated policy. US efforts -initially restricted to sending State Department officials on special diplomaticmissions to the region were upgraded in June 1997 by the nomination offormer Bosnia negotiator Richard Holbrooke as President Bill Clinton's specialenvoy to Cyprus. In addition, the presidencies of the EU had started to nominatespecial envoys to Cyprus since early 1996, replacing the so-called 'CyprusObserver of the European Commission', who had been appointed in 1994.Hence, by spring 1997, a comprehensive multinational diplomatic mechanismhad been established that tried to enable another promising approach to thesolution of the Cyprus problem.

The representatives of the two ethnic communities on Cyprus responded tothese developments by sending signals, both to the international community andtheir respective peoples, that suggested a willingness to hold talks with the otherside. They also set out their starting positions for the possible round of

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negotiations, with the Greek Cypriot side presenting itself in a more open andconciliatory way than the leadership of the Turkish Cypriots or Ankara.7 Allsides, however, carefully avoided any departure from their well-known positionson the substantive questions that would have to be addressed in the bilateraltalks. Both sides have so far maintained their opposing points of view, whichhave proven insurmountable in the past. The result of the first round of talksbetween Clerides and Denktash on 913 July did not show much readiness tomove on either side. But time is pressing because of forthcoming events that mayprevent either side from compromising and make agreement even more difficultthan it is today.

Negotiations on EU membership will probably begin in January or February1998. A postponement is unlikely because the IGC concluded on schedule withthe Amsterdam summit of June 1997. Presidential elections scheduled forFebruary 1998 in the Republic of Cyprus, and the domestic constraints of theSimitis government in Greece, suggest that Greece and Greek Cypriots will exertconsiderable pressure on the EU to commence negotiations as announced. Theycan expect broad backing from the traditionally supportive European Parliamentfor their demand. If, by then, talks and negotiations between the two sides onCyprus have not shown enough progress to expect a successful result, Turkeyand the Turkish Cypriot community may begin the announced process of formalintegration of Northern Cyprus into Turkey.8

During the Republic of Cyprus' election campaign, to begin in late 1997,serious negotiations with the Turkish Cypriots seem unlikely because any movewould be considered electioneering. Whoever is elected could then try to usetheir election success and EU membership negotiations to consolidate the GreekCypriot position on the international stage. Willingness to compromise with theTurkish Cypriot side may be minimal, especially if formal integration ofNorthern Cyprus with Turkey begins in reaction to the commencement of EUmembership negotiations.

In April or May 1998, the deployment of the Russian S-300 missiles couldbegin. Turkey will probably try to prevent the transport of the missiles and othersystem components by sea. If that is unsuccessful, or if the systems are broughtto the island by another means, pre-emptive Turkish military action against themissile sites cannot be ruled out. An escalation of the conflict would be almostinevitable, with the imminent danger of a Greek-Turkish war. Russia could alsobe directly involved because the missiles will be accompanied by Russianmilitary experts who will supervise the deployment and train the Greek Cypriots.

If there were early elections in Turkey in spring 1998, given the currentgovernment's narrow support, Cyprus could become a key nationalistic issueduring an election campaign. This, too, would reduce the possibility of com-promise with the Greek Cypriot side. At present, Turkey's domestic instabilitydoes not bode well for Cyprus negotiations. Any government in Ankara musttake care not to appear too conciliatory towards the Greek side if it wants toavoid attacks from the opposition for 'betraying the national cause'.

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Areas for NegotiationA fundamental change in this negative perspective can only occur if a solutionto the Cyprus problem is found. Four sets of problems are of crucial importance.

First, the constitutional order of 1960 has to be revised to establish afunctioning system of separation of powers that satisfies each community's needfor self-governance and the common state's need for efficient government.Given the experiences with the existing constitution during the early 1960s, theissue of how to protect the interests of the smaller Turkish community withoutgiving it a veto position over common policies is essential.

Second, the territorial division has to be altered to bring it more into line withthe share of each community in the island's population. Not only do the twosides have to agree on what percentage of the overall territory each should get,but they must also agree on the exact delineation of the borderline between thetwo zones. Issues such as economic viability and land ownership also have to betaken into account. In this area, the issue of the so-called 'Anatolian settlers'poses a special problem. After the establishment of the separate Turkish state inthe north, up to 40,000 Turks from the mainland came to Cyprus and took overproperty left by Greek Cypriots who had fled to the south. Thus the populationin the Turkish-dominated part of the island grew considerably, leaving open thequestion of whether these people can be considered Turkish Cypriots.9

The Anatolian-settlers issue also touches the basic freedoms that constitutethe third set of problems to be solved. Rules have to be established to regulatefreedom of movement, freedom of settlement and freedom of property acquisi-tion on the entire island, taking into account the imbalance in population strengthand economic wealth between the Turkish and the Greek Cypriot communities(see Table 1). The Turkish side has to be protected against the possibility of aGreek Cypriot 'buy-out', and a solution has to be found - repatriation orcompensation - for the Greeks who were forced to leave the north in 1974.

Finally, and perhaps most important, the issue of security for all Cypriots hasto be addressed. A solution must be found that ensures the observation of agreedrules and that effectively prevents clashes between the two communities and/orinterventions by non-authorised third parties. Given the deep mutual mistrust onboth sides, only the establishment of an internationally managed and guaranteedsecurity system on and for the island seems to be a viable solution to thisproblem. The presence of Turkish and Greek troops constitutes a special sub-issue in establishing an effective security regime.

; Table 1 Republic of Cyprus and TRNC indicators

j 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996I Population (thousands)I Greek Cypriots 611 624 634 642 645

TRNC inhabitants 174 177 179 181 c. 200>GDP(inUS$m) ;I Republic of Cyprus 6,870 6,540 7,270 7,900 8,300j TRNC 584 622 741 766

Source: IISS

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For over 30 years, the efforts of the UN and other parties to solve the Cyprusproblem have been thwarted by the inability of both communities' repres-entatives to reach a viable compromise on any of the above questions. Both sideshave long agreed that a solution can only be found within the framework of abicommunal, bizonal Cypriot federation with one nationality and one sover-eignty. This formula, however - repeated in numerous UN resolutions and otherinternational declarations - assumes that the island's constitutional, territorialand economic problems can be resolved, which has always proved impossible.Even if the principle of a bicommunal federation is agreed, agreement betweenGreek and Turkish Cypriots on all four sets of problems remains distant.10

Main Actors and InterestsAlthough mainly third parties, such as the EU, the UN or the US, are pressing theissue, a solution ultimately depends on those directly involved agreeing to thenecessary compromises. The key actors are the two communities on the island,and Greece and Turkey. More recently, the EU has become involved in the issuebecause of the intended accession negotiations for Cyprus, and its specialrelations with Greece - an EU member - and Turkey, with which it is linked byan Association Agreement that could lead to membership.

Greek CypriotsThe Greek Cypriot side's position is that Greek Cypriots represent the over-whelming majority of the island's population (about 80%) and that Cyprus,therefore, is a Greek island." Even if today's Greek Cypriots, perhaps with theexception of Orthodox Church representatives, no longer link demands for adirect union with the 'mother country' (Enosis) to their population's dominance,their numerical majority is still a key factor in the rejection of equal status forTurkish Cypriots. In negotiations, the Greek Cypriots refuse all measures thatcould acknowledge recognition of equality for the Turkish Cypriot part.According to the Greek Cypriot position, the population divide should also bereflected in the constitution and in the division of territory. Greek Cypriotscategorically reject a special role for Turkey in Cyprus.

The Greek Cypriots are supported in their beliefs by the internationalcommunity, which accepts the government on the Greek part of the island as thelegitimate representative for the whole of Cyprus. Consequently, resolving theproblem for the Greek Cypriots would require overcoming the island's divisionthat resulted from the Turkish invasion of 1974. Greek Cypriots call for thevarious elements of the basic freedoms to be restored as fully as possible, anextensive restitution of property rights for Greek Cypriots, and territorialdivision in a way that reflects the numerical strength of both communities.

However, Greek Cypriots, in a special understanding of minority rights,accept that the Turkish Cypriots should be slightly over-represented, bothterritorially and politically. They are willing to grant the Turkish Cypriots fullself-administration for the internal affairs of their zone, while insisting on astrong central authority over affairs concerning the whole island. The decision-

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making process of this authority would ultimately be determined by the GreekCypriot majority.

On security matters, the Greek Cypriots will only discuss an internationallyguaranteed status that is ensured by an appropriate international militarypresence. Indeed, Greek and Turkish forces could participate in an internationalforce, but scope for military intervention should be specifically excluded fromany guarantee. Greek Cypriots desperately want to prevent Turkey from onceagain exploiting its military superiority in relation to the island. Both com-munities should only maintain a police force large enough to uphold law andorder in their respective zones.

In sum, Greek Cypriot ideas for resolving the Cyprus problem amount toestablishing a federal state with a strong central authority decisively influencedby the Greek majority, with ethnically determined separate federated states forTurkish and Greek Cypriots restricted to narrow areas of self-rule. Consistentwith this concept is the idea of EU membership with unrestricted application ofthe basic EU freedoms of movement of goods, people and capital on the entireisland. Ideally, security on and for the island could be ensured by troops from theWestern European Union (WEU) on the basis of an EU guarantee after Cyprus'accession to the EU.

Turkish CypriotsIdeas for a solution on the Turkish Cypriot side are mainly determined by thewish to retain the post-1974 situation as much as possible.12 The TurkishCypriots' perception of the conflict is characterised by the conviction that twocompletely equal communities exist on the island and that the smaller TurkishCypriot group's existence is threatened by the larger Greek Cypriot group'sclaims for power. Consequently, Turkish Cypriots demand a solution based ontwo equal and separate states which only forfeit the most necessary powers, suchas security and foreign policy, as well as a common legal framework and overalleconomic policy guidelines, to a common central authority within the frameworkof a federation. All federal bodies must reflect the principle of equality, whichmeans an effective right of veto for the Turkish side if there is a majority ofGreek Cypriot representatives.

The principle of equality also indirectly determines the Turkish Cypriots'position on the territorial issue. Here the Turkish Cypriot side emphasises theproblem of economic viability for their state within a bizonal federationframework. The territorial concessions they offer are minor regarding both thedivision of the total area and the delineation of borders. Turkish Cypriots do notwant a resettlement of mainland Turks who settled in the northern part of theisland after 1974.

For Turkish Cypriots, the basic freedoms - with the exception of freedom ofmovement and inter-zonal trade relations - are to be restricted because of theassociated danger of dominance by the larger community over the smaller one.Only after a long trial period of co-habitation within a federation is a gradualeasing of restrictions conceivable. Restoring Greek Cypriot property rights in the

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north is also seen to be impossible: instead, compensation for lost property hasbeen offered during the various rounds of talks between the leaders of bothcommunities.

Despite their strong insistence on self-determination and equality, the TurkishCypriots know that they cannot defend themselves on their own. In order toprevent the Greek Cypriot hope of realising their majority claims by use of force,as they repeatedly tried to do from 1950-74, Turkish Cypriots insist on anunlimited role for Turkey as guarantor within any framework of internationalagreements. For this reason, the ongoing presence of Turkish troops, albeit inreduced numbers, is considered essential in the northern part of the island.

Relatively satisfied with the island's current division, the only incentive forthe Turkish Cypriots to change the present situation is their relatively pooreconomic situation compared to the Republic of Cyprus.13 In addition to theirexcessive public spending, the causes of the TRNC's economic problems areprimarily the international boycott and the macro-economic problems of theTurkish economy, with which Northern Cyprus is so closely linked (in partbecause of the boycott). For Turkish Cypriots, therefore, the main enticement forrestoring the island's unity via EU membership is to acquire the level ofprosperity of the Greek Cypriot south.

For a small group of Turkish Cypriots, rejecting the current 'Anatolisation' ofNorthern Cyprus could also play a role in accepting a change in the status quo.These Turkish Cypriots expect that an end to the island's division would reduceTurkey's current domination of Northern Cyprus. Such motives in no way,however, outweigh the Turkish Cypriot interest in Turkish protection against aGreek Cypriot position of dominance on the island.

For the Turkish Cypriots, Cyprus' accession to the EU can only be realised ifboth communities approve it in separate ballots. Such consent is presently onlyconceivable if Turkey is admitted to the EU together with Cyprus. All otherschemes for Cypriot EU membership are seen as an effective union with Greeceand, hence, as a violation of the international agreements of 1959 and 1960 thatled to the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus.14

In sum, the Turkish Cypriot ideas for solving the Cyprus problem involveestablishing a federation of two basically equal states equipped with extensivepolitical rights and linked by a weak central authority. In this authority, bothcommunities would cooperate on an equal basis. The island's security would beensured by foreign powers, including Turkey, which would retain the right tostation troops in the Turkish zone.

GreeceTo most Greeks, Cyprus is a Greek island. All Greek governments, therefore,irrespective of their party, must unconditionally support the interests of GreekCypriots. Greece has, however, officially abandoned the aim ofEnosis after theexperience of 1974, when attempted Enosis during the time of the militaryjunta's rule in Athens led to the Turkish intervention. The island's independenceis therefore no longer questioned by Athens. Moreover, from the Greek view-

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point, the Cyprus problem is closely connected to bilateral disputes with Turkey.It forms an essential part of the overall Greek threat scenario.15

Every Greek government therefore tries to use Cyprus as an instrument in itsrelations with Turkey, which is perceived as the main threat to Greece. Due tothe power imbalance favouring the Turkish side on Cyprus and in the Aegean,the internationalisation of the problem appears a promising strategy to Athens.The Greek government has succeeded in making Cyprus an onerous element ofEuropean relations with Turkey within EU institutions, just as the Greek lobbyin the US knows how to impede US relations with Ankara by using the Cyprusfactor in, for instance, preventing the delivery of contracted arms sales toTurkey.

For all these reasons, Cyprus is an important topic in Greece's domesticpolitical debate. Just as a concession to Turkey over the vital issues in theAegean conflict would quickly earn a Greek leader the reputation of betrayingnational interests, so a willingness to compromise over the Cyprus problemwould be a political disadvantage for any government in Athens. In each case theopposition would try to capitalise on it and would probably succeed.

This situation, in connection with the upcoming election campaign in theRepublic of Cyprus, implies that Athens and Clerides will show little inclinationfor concessions towards the Turkish Cypriots. They will instead press for EUmembership for the Republic of Cyprus alone in the hope that this may increaseinternational pressure on the Turkish side in the longer term.

TurkeyOn the question of Cyprus, Turkey sees itself as a guarantor of the regulationscontained in the agreements concluded in London and Zurich in 1959, whichended British rule on Cyprus and established the Republic of Cyprus as acommon state of and for both communities. In fact, Turkey interprets its role asbeing the lone protector of the Turkish Cypriot community. It does not want tohave this position undermined by a solution to the Cyprus problem.

The Turkish government also has a security interest in maintaining the strongposition it acquired on Cyprus in 1974. With effective control over NorthernCyprus because of its troops based there, control of the passage to and from thebay of Iskenderun and Mersin by Turkey is also assured. Such control isimportant in ensuring the security of southern Turkey. This area would gainadditional significance if Turkey's aspirations for an oil pipeline from theCaspian region to Ceyhan harbour materialise.15 It is quite unlikely, therefore,that the Turkish military leadership would approve any solutions to the Cyprusquestion that would undermine this strategic advantage.

There are at least two important political groups in Turkey prepared to giveconsolidation of the status quo precedence over a solution to the Cyprus problemvia restoration of a common state for both communities: Bulent Ecevit'sDemocratic Left Party (Demokrat Sol Partisi - DSP>, the major partner of PrimeMinister Mesut Yilmaz in the present coalition government, and NecmettinErbakan's Islamic Welfare Party (Refah), the largest opposition party. Ecevit and

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Erbakan were, in fact, partners in the coalition government that undertook theinvasion of Northern Cyprus in 1974. For them, solving the Cyprus question liesin the recognition of the separate Turkish Cypriot state by the internationalcommunity, not in unifying Cyprus. Both parties - whose attitude towards theEU ranges from the reserved to the negative - are also prepared to accept thenearly inevitable split in relations with the EU that would result from thisposition.

For the rest of Turkey's leading political groups, the EU factor plays anunwelcome role in their Cyprus policy. First, they understand the connectionbetween Cyprus and the development of EU-Turkish relations, even if they donot officially recognise it in contacts with Brussels. Second, they try to use thisconnection to Turkey's benefit when they declare, while referring to the Londonand Zurich agreements, that Cyprus' membership of the EU is only permissibleif Turkey is admitted at the same time.17 But it is also clear to them that Turkishadmission to the EU is only possible if there is a commonly agreed solution tothe Cyprus problem, as Greece will only give its consent to Turkish membershipif this happens.

All Turkish parties and groups essentially equate a 'commonly agreedsolution' with the fulfilment of Turkish Cypriot ideas. Given the current unstablepolitical situation in Turkey and the preponderance of the military leadership inTurkish security policy, it is likely that Ankara will encourage Denktash tomaintain his hardline stance and make no hasty concessions. The currentpreference among Turkey's political elite is to accept a final division of theisland with the resulting rift in relations with Europe, rather than to concede tothe Greek idea of a unified Republic of Cyprus dominated by Greek Cypriots.

The European UnionThe EU has long pursued a policy of non-involvement in the Cyprus problem.18It repeatedly made statements within the framework of European PoliticalCooperation (EPC) calling for an end to the island's partition on the basis of UNresolutions, but it has not taken any action itself in this direction. Since Greece'sadmission to the EU in 1981 and the establishment of the customs union withCyprus in 1987, it has become increasingly difficult for the EU to uphold thispolicy. The nomination of an EU observer to the talks between the communitiesthat took place under UN auspices in summer 1993 was the first sign of greaterEU involvement. The EU has been in the process of taking on a special role inthe Cyprus question since Cyprus was put on an equal footing as a membershipcandidate with the central and east European states at the European Council inCorfu in June 1994.

What remains unclear, however, is how EU will combine its own interestswith those of Greece and the Cyprus issue. It seems that the Union has beendriven more by Greek pressure and reactions to events such as the conclusion ofthe customs union with Turkey than by a well-defined Cyprus policy of its own.EU activities, nevertheless, have raised Greek and Greek Cypriot expectationsthat they will succeed regarding the political future of the island. EU member-

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ship appears to them to be a clever way to implement basic freedoms in themedium term, with the consequence of an effective Greek Cypriot dominance onthe whole island.19 The EU thus finds itself faced with the dilemma of beingobliged to negotiate over membership for the island without having its ownapproach to solving the Cyprus problem.

European Union Options for Cyprus MembershipLess than six months before the beginning of membership negotiations withCyprus, there still appears to be no detailed concept for them. Perhaps this isbecause the EU and its members have still not given up hope of a prior solutionto the Cyprus problem. But membership negotiations will have to begin evenwithout an agreement. The European Commission seems to support a having theTurkish Cypriot side's presence at negotiations from the outset, but there is noindication how this could be achieved. Member-states are divided on how toconduct negotiations. Three different options are possible, each of which wouldhave very different implications.

The standard procedure. Negotiations could be conducted with the repres-entatives of the Republic of Cyprus on the assumption that the result wouldapply to the whole island, perhaps with a certain delay if necessary. Thisprocedure would have the advantage of being consistent with the internationallegal understanding regarding Cyprus during the last 30 years negotiationswould take place with the only legitimate representative of the island. Thiswould also correspond to the position officially taken by Athens and the GreekCypriots. It would also lead to relatively smooth negotiations which could besuccessfully concluded quickly.

The main disadvantage of this option is that the Turkish Cypriot communitywould be excluded. As such, the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey would not onlyprotest, they would also reject the federation plan and withdraw from UNmediation efforts. It is unrealistic to expect that Turkish Cypriots, due to theconsiderable economic advantages of eventual EU membership, could beinduced to agree to a federation solution consistent with Greek Cypriot ideasafter entry negotiations were concluded. On the contrary, the island would mostlikely be divided for the foreseeable future.

Negotiations with the Greek Cypriots alone would, hence, most likely makeimpossible the application of the results of the negotiations to the entire island.The Greek Cypriots and Athens, however, would call for exactly this in theexpanded EU, and demand that the Union and its members create thecontractually agreed membership of the whole island by applying appropriatepressure on Turkey and Turkish Cypriots. The EU would be constantly remindedthat Turkey illegally occupies a part of the Union's territory. Under theseconditions, EU-Turkey relations would deteriorate, and Ankara mightunilaterally terminate the customs union. NATO could also be affected by thisdeterioration of EU-Turkey relations. The functioning of the Alliance in theregion would become even more complicated than it already is.

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These likely negative developments would be mitigated, at least in theirinternal impact on the EU, if the admission of the Republic of Cyprus to the EUwas accompanied by the latter's recognition of the island's division. However,as such an internationally binding agreement is impossible because of Greekresistance, its functional equivalent must be sought. Such a result could lie inofficially limiting the applicability of the negotiations' results to the Greek partof the island, and making expansion to the whole island dependent on theseparate consent of the Turkish Cypriots.

Negotiating with a mixed Cypriot delegation. Another way to approach theissue of accession negotiations would be the EU's insistence on a mixeddelegation of Greek and Turkish Cypriots. The EU could also stipulate that bothcommunities would have to accept the result of the negotiations.

This option probably offers the only possibility of securing EU membershipfor the entire island. It would also guarantee the complete application of theacquis communautaire - the accepted body of EU legislation - on the whole ofCyprus in the medium term, even though there would initially have to benumerous exceptions. At the same time, it would realise the global community'sposition that there is one sovereign state on Cyprus with two equal communities,but one nationality.20

Cohabitation without mutual mistrust and fear appears to be conceivable onlyin the larger context of the EU. To that end, however, the EU must develop intoan 'even closer union of its peoples', as is foreseen in the 1991 MaastrichtTreaty. Yet there are many doubts regarding its ability to achieve this because ofthe present tendency towards greater differentiation and a strengthened inter-governmentalism during the integration process of a future EU of more than 20member-states.

The main obstacle to the mixed-delegation option is the reluctance of bothsides to accept it. The Turkish Cypriots do not seem ready to engage innegotiations with the EU if there is no clear perspective of a parallel membershipof mainland Turkey. For the Greek Cypriots and Greece, this approach wouldimplicitly recognise the separate Turkish Cypriot state and depart from theinternational consensus as laid down in the various UN resolutions. Conse-quently, the Greek Cypriots could only accept Turkish Cypriot participation inaccession negotiations as part of a common delegation under the leadership ofthe only internationally recognised government on Cyprus. Participation ofTurkish Cypriot representatives in the membership negotiations would,therefore, only be possible if there was a prior solution to the Cyprus problem.This solution must also include the types of representation that the re-established(or new) Cypriot state has in its relations with the EU.

It is, however, beyond the EU's political scope to produce a solution to theCyprus problem. Because any EU suggestion for solving the Cyprus issue isregarded as biased by the Turkish Cypriots and Ankara, the EU's contributionmust be limited to supporting the efforts of third parties. In doing so, it shouldconcentrate on strengthening the channels of direct or indirect communication

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28 Heinz Kramer

between the two communities, as well as on pointing out the long-termadvantages connected with membership for both groups. It could also offer acomprehensive package of pre-accession aid to both sides consisting of measureswith which the process of rapprochement on the island could be promoted.

Parallel membership negotiations with Greek and Turkish Cypriots.Alternatively, the EU could start parallel accession negotiations with bothCypriot communities, consciously leaving open the international status ofNorthern Cyprus. The relevant negotiation results would have to be coordinatedand harmonised in a 'common document' to make EU membership of the entireisland possible, without officially questioning the status quo.

This option has the advantage of permitting tailor-made membership solutionsfor the Greek and Turkish parts of the island. In this way, negotiations with bothcommunities would not be dependent on solving the Cyprus problem in advance.In the common document, realistic prerequisites for overcoming the divisionunder the new circumstances of EU membership of a divided but in totalityadmitted Cyprus could be achieved through rules for the progressive applicationof the acquis communautaire between both parts of the island.

Implementing this option would, however, require the EU to depart from theinternational consensus on Cyprus, which only permits legally binding agree-ments of a third party with the Republic of Cyprus. The Europeans would alsohave to revise their own basic position on Cyprus. It seems improbable thatGreece would approve such a move, nor would the Greek Cypriot governmentagree to it. The reaction of the Turkish Cypriot side is difficult to predict.

Because of the necessary EU internal consensus on commencing membershipnegotiations, Greece could obstruct the implementation of this option as well asthat discussed immediately above, even if all other member-states accept it. AsAthens has additional means of leverage over its EU partners, for example byblocking EU enlargement to Eastern Europe, the negotiations might not happenbecause of a lack of internal EU consensus. It is therefore vital for the other EUmembers to explain to Athens that they are not ready to accept a negotiationresult that would be contrary to the Union's security and stability interests in theregion.

Dangerous LinkagesThe disruptive political potential of Cypriot EU accession negotiations is notrestricted to the island and its immediate environment; there are more far-reaching implications. The Greek government has already declared that it willblock the process of EU enlargement eastwards if there is no agreement on thebeginning of membership negotiations with the Republic of Cyprus. Athenscould also apply pressure by refusing to ratify the result of the IGC concluded inAmsterdam in June 1997 if its partners do not accept its ideas on membershipnegotiations with Cyprus.

The EU must thus weigh the disadvantages of a delay in enlargement, or adelayed implementation of the IGC's results, against what would probably

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The Cyprus Problem and European Security 29

follow in the eastern Mediterranean region - and in its relationship with Turkey- if membership negotiations with Cyprus are conducted according to GreekCypriot demands.

For Greece, the risk of 'blackmailing' its EU partners affects not only otherEU members, but also the ten Central and East European candidate states. ThusAthens would not only suffer from internal EU pressures if it blocks enlarge-ment; its relations with a number of neighbouring states would also sour. It is,however, doubtful that they would induce Greece to modify its position onCyprus membership, because the expected domestic political penalty would betoo heavy for any Greek government to bear. As Greece would, moreover, be ina position to impair considerably the orderly working of the EU in other areas,its partners would ultimately agree to opening accession negotiations withCyprus.

In addition, Athens may also hope to gain extra support from the EU inGreek-Turkish disputes after the EU applies the Greek line on Cyprus member-ship. The Greek government believes that the Union must side with it and theprospective new member Cyprus in any future disputes in the region onceaccession negotiations begin, even if the Cyprus problem has not been resolved.For Athens, then, the issue of Cyprus' membership is also part of its Turkeypolicy.

If the EU does back Greece, Turkey and Turkish Cypriots might start formalintegration of TRNC into Turkey and finalise the separation of the island.Turkey's relations with the West could undergo a process of re-evaluation,including the Turkish position on NATO's future development. The disregard ofTurkish Cypriot interests in the membership negotiations would be seen byAnkara as further proof of the exclusion of Turks from Europe's emerging neworder. A revival of the Turkish link between NATO enlargement and EUmembership is conceivable as a last, desperate attempt to revive Turkey'sposition before it is permanently excluded from Europe.21

Nor can it be ruled out that the Turkish government would threaten toterminate the customs union. This could spell the beginning of a final turn awayfrom Europe, with a withdrawal from the Council of Europe and perhaps evenfrom NATO. Such moves could be accompanied by the creation of a specialsecurity relationship with the US, thus damaging transatlantic relations. Pro-ceeding with Cyprus' EU membership without considering Turkish and TurkishCypriots' interests would undermine Turkey's Western-oriented elites, includingthe military leadership, and the electoral prospects of anti-Western, Islamist andnationalist parties would rise. In the longer term, such developments wouldalmost certainly endanger Turkey's bonds with the West and could trigger adramatic change in the strategic situation in the eastern Mediterranean andbeyond.

ConclusionThe emerging risks concerning Cyprus require the EU and its leading member-states, the US and the UN to intensify their efforts to reach a solution to the

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Cyprus problem. To achieve this, the activities of the various Cyprus repres-entatives must be closely coordinated, and discussions in the EU-US SeniorLevel Group strengthened.22 Europeans and Americans should make it clear toall parties concerned that sticking to hardline positions will have negativeconsequences. A breakdown of negotiations over Cyprus followed by EUaccession negotiations with only one side would create a situation in the regionfrom which no party could gain advantage. The likely deterioration of thestrategic situation in the eastern Mediterranean would be too high a price for allto pay.

Greece and Turkey should exploit the recent thaw in their relationship, asmanifested in the bilateral 'non-aggression' agreement signed at the NATOsummit in Madrid on 8 July 1997.23 This could include measures such asestablishing a 'hot-line' between the capitals, reducing the offensive options ofthe Turkish 'Aegean army', and Greek restraint regarding the delimitation of itssea borders. Turkey could help to ease Greek feelings of insecurity bystrengthening its posture as a status-quo country; Ankara should thus stopquestioning Greek sovereignty over some rocky islets near the Turkish coast.Furthermore, both countries should convince their respective communities inCyprus that, this time, readiness for compromise is the rule of the negotiatinggame. Athens and Ankara must refrain from any activities, including declaratorypolicies, that could hamper the smooth start of accession negotiations, even if nosolution to the Cyprus problem is in place.

The EU should improve the Cypriot communities' readiness for compromiseby offering substantial financial and political support for both overcoming theexisting division after an agreement has been reached between the Greek and theTurkish Cypriot side and to help prepare each community for later EUmembership of the entire island. One element of that support should be apackage of pre-accession aid. It should contain measures to improve the pre-conditions for later EU membership in both parts separately, but also measuresdesigned to help overcome the island's division in the longer term. To this end,special emphasis should fall on strengthening elements of civil society thatcontribute to the reunification of the island's communities. The EU could alsoassist the Turkish Cypriot community's readiness for compromise by offeringTurkey a clear and unequivocal perspective of EU membership, includingupgrading its associate-member status of the WEU to full-member status. At thesame time, the EU should make it clear that it is not prepared to commencemembership talks with Cyprus if the purchase of Russian missile systems is notcancelled.

The Union should be prepared to postpone the accession negotiations if thereis no likelihood of resolving the Cyprus problem. In any case, negotiationsshould not be concluded until a solution has been found. Given the serioussecurity risks for future regional development and its own interests in the region,the EU should not engage in a process whose security-policy effects it cannotcontrol. As in Central and Eastern Europe, EU enlargement in the Mediterraneanmust lead to a gain in stability and security and not the opposite.

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Notes1 For details, see Kofi Annan's report to

the UN Security Council on the UNoperations in Cyprus and his letter to thePresident of the Security Councilconcerning his mission of good offices inCyprus, UN Documents S/1997/437 andS/1997/480 respectively.2 For details about the EU's decision-

making on opening accessionnegotiations with Cyprus and its links tothe EU-Turkey customs union, seeClement H. Dodd, The Cyprus Issue: ACurrent Perspective (Huntingdon:Eothen Press, 1995), pp. 18-21.3 See Briefing, 5 February 1996; and

IISS, 'Cyprus: Prospects for aSettlement', Strategic Comments, vol. 2,no. 8, October 1996.4 Gernot Hhler, 'Auf der geteilten Insel

dreht sich die Rilstungsspirale immerschneller', Handelsblatt, 13 January1997, p. 2.5 For details of the Turkish reaction, see

Turkish Daily News (Electronic Edition),9, 10 and 14 January 1997. For the textof the Joint Declaration of 20 January,see http://www.mfa.gov.tr.6 Turkey's military superiority and the

limited value of the S-300 in changingthe balance have also been underlined byDan Lindley, UNFICYP and a CyprusSolution: A Strategic Assessment(Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Insti-tute of Technology Defense and ArmsControl Studies Program, May 1997).7 One example of this was Denktash's

negative reaction to an apparent GreekCypriot offer to re-establish the 1960regime on the island within a bizonalframework, that is, a reinstatement of theTurkish Cypriot politicians in theirpositions as laid down in the constitutionof 1960, without removing thedemarcation line. But the offer, made ina press interview with the Greek Cypriotspokesman, Yiannakis Cassoulides, wasnever turned into an official offer byAthens. See Turkish Daily News

(Electronic Edition), 21 and 22 March1997.8 At present, the TRNC is formally

independent, although economically,financially and militarily its existencedepends on the support of mainlandTurkey - the only country that officiallyrecognises the TRNC as a sovereignstate.9 Barbara Hahn and Ronald

Wellenreuther, 'DemographischeStrukturen in der Trkischen RepublikNordzypern', Orient, vol. 33, no. 4,1992, pp. 613-33.10

An overview of the various efforts toreach an agreement between the twocommunities is given by A. J. R. Groom,'The Process of Negotiation, 1974-1993', in Clement H. Dodd (ed.), ThePolitical, Social and EconomicDevelopment in Northern Cyprus(Huntingdon: Eothen Press, 1993).11 This position is implicit in past roundsof negotiations under UN auspices. Alsosee 'Outline Proposal of the CypriotGovernment for the Establishment of aFederal Republic and for the Solution ofthe Cyprus Problem' in the HellenicFoundation for Defense and ForeignPolicy (ed.), Yearbook 1989 (Athens:ELIAMEP), pp. 291-304.12

The Turkish Cypriot position can, forexample, be found in Rauf R. Denktash,The Cyprus Triangle (Nicosia: Rstem,1988).13

For an overview of the economicsituation, see Werner Gumpel,'Economic Performance andCompetitiveness in the Turkish Republicof Northern Cyprus', in Heinz-JrgenAxt and Hansjrg Brey (eds), Cyprusand the European Union: New Chancesfor Solving an Old Conflict? (Mnchen:Sdosteuropa-Gesellschaft, 1997), pp.74-88; and Brey, 'EconomicPerformance and Competitiveness: TheRepublic of Cyprus' in ibid., pp. 55-62.14

On this position, which is fully backedby Turkey, see Necati M. Ertekn (ed.),

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Le Statut des Deux Peuples Chypre(Lefkosa/Nicosia: L'Officed'Information Publique de la RepubliqueTurque de Chypre-Nord, 1996).15

See Yannis Valinakis, 'Greek SecurityPolicy in the Perspective of the CFSP', inHeinz-Jrgen Axt (ed.), Greece and theEuropean Union: Stranger amongPartners? (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1997),pp. 199-239.16

Andreas Andrianopoulos, 'The LongArm of Oil Interests', Transitions, vol. 4,no. 1, June 1997, pp. 36f.17

They derive this position from thewording of article I (2) of the Treaty ofGuarantee, which stipulates that Cypruscan only become a member of a politicalor economic union of which both Greeceand Turkey are also members. See, fordetails, Ertektin, Le Statut des DeuxPeuples.18

Constantine Stephanou andCharalambos Tsardanides, 'The ECFactor in the Greece-Turkey-CyprusTriangle', in Dimitri C. Constas (ed.),The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the 1990s

(London: Macmillan, 1991), pp. 207-30.19

Tozun Bahcheli and Nicholas X.Rizopoulos, 'The Cyprus Impasse. WhatNext?', World Policy Journal, vol. 13,no. 4, Winter 1996-97, p. 31.20

This position is, however, sometimeslegally contested. See, for instance,Christian Rumpf, 'Verfassung undRecht', in Klaus-Detlev Grothusen,Winfried Steffani and Pavlos Zervakis(eds), Zypern, Sdosteuropa-Handbuch,vol. 8 (Gttingen: Vandenhoeck undRuprecht, 1997).21

Turkish politicians and officials, in thepast, have established a link betweenNATO enlargement and Turkey's EUmembership that has been regarded byAnkara's partners as a threat to vetoNATO's development. See Briefing, 23December 1996, p. 3.22

The Senior Level Group wasestablished by the New TransatlanticAgenda of 3 December 1995 during theEU-US summit in Madrid.23

See Turkish Daily News (ElectronicEdition), 10 July 1997.

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