Guerrero v. Guerrero, Alaska (2015)

7/25/2019 Guerrero v. Guerrero, Alaska (2015)

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Notice: This opinion is sub ject to correction before publica tion in the PACIFICREPORT ER .

Readers are requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk of the Appellate Courts,

303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878, email

[email protected].

THESUPREMECOURTOFTHESTATEOFALASKA

PAMELALEAGUERRERO,

Appellant,

v.

JUANJOSEGUERRERO,

Appellee.

)

) SupremeCourtNo.S-15340

SuperiorCourtNo.3AN-09-05651CI

OPINION

No.7050September18,2015

)

)

)

)

)

))

)

AppealfromtheSuperiorCourtoftheStateofAlaska,Third

JudicialDistrict,Anchorage,CatherineM.Easter,Judge.

Appearances: MichaelGershel,Anchorage,forAppellant.

GuyGautreau,Anchorage,forAppellee.

Before:Fabe,ChiefJustice,Winfree,Stowers,Maassen,and

Bolger,Justices.

WINFREE,Justice.

I. INTRODUCTION

Ahusbandandwifedissolvedtheirmarriage,agreeingthatthewifewould

receivethemaritalhomeandaportionofthehusbandsmilitaryretirementbenefitsand

thatthewifewouldremovethehusbandfromthemaritalhomemortgage.Twoyears

laterthewifesoughtaqualifiedretirementordertoeffectuatethepropertydistribution.

Followingaprotracteddisputeoverthewifesentitlementtotheretirementandthe

wifes failureto removethehusbandsname from the maritalhomemortgage, the


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superiorcourtrefusedtoissueaqualifiedorderbecausethehusbandsretirementpay

consist[ed]entirelyofVAdisabilitycompensationandretirement[pay]forphysical

disabilityandunderfederallawthedisabilitycompensationisnotdivisiblemarital

property.Thesuperiorcourtalsoorderedthewifetoremovethehusbandsnamefrom

themortgagewithin60days. Whenthewifedidnotcomplythecourtforcedthehomes

sale.Thesuperiorcourtthenawardedthehusbandprevailingpartyattorneysfeesunder

AlaskaCivilRule82.

Thewifeappeals, primarilychallenging thesuperior courts refusal to

dividethemilitaryretirementandthecourtsforcedhomesale.Althoughweaffirm

thosedecisions,wereversetheaccompanyingrefusaltoreopenthemaritalproperty

divisionandremandforfurtherproceedings.Wethereforealsovacatethesuperior

courtsprevailingpartydeterminationandattorneysfeesaward.

II. FACTSANDPROCEEDINGS

JuanandPamelaGuerreromarriedin1997,divorcedin2005,remarriedin

2006,anddissolvedtheirsecondmarriagein2009.DuringthemarriagesJuanwasa

uniformed servicememberheserved intheMarines fromAugust 1988 through

August1992andintheArmybetweenNovember1993andJanuary2012.

InMarch2009JuanandPamelaeachappearingprosepetitionedfor

dissolutionoftheirmarriage.ThepetitionincludedagreementsthatJuanmustallocate

fiftypercent(half)ofhismilitaryretirementbenefitstoPamela...dueto13totalyears

contributedtothemarriageandthatPamelawouldbeawardedtheirhome.InMay

PamelaandJuanappearedincourtbeforeamaster.Pamelaagreedto refinancethe

maritalhomewithin18monthstoremoveJuanfromthehomesmortgage. Theystatedthattheyweresatisfiedwiththepropertydistributionandagreedthat50percentof

[Juans] military retirement benefits during the 13 total years of marriage will be

awardedto[Pamela].Themasterclarifiedthateventhoughtheyhaddivorcedandthen

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remarried,theyagreedthatPamelawouldreceivehalfofthemaritalportionofJuans

militaryretirementover the durationofbothmarriages. InJune the superiorcourt

granted the dissolution, finding [t]he written agreements between the petitioners

concerning...divisionofproperty,includingretirementbenefits,andallocationsof

obligationsarejust.

InJuly2011Pamela,appearingprose,soughtaqualifiedordertodistribute

Juansmilitaryretirement. Juan,alsoappearingpro se,assertedthat(1)theparties

dissolutionagreementfailedtotakeintoaccountthatthesecondmarriagewasonly41

months,and(2)Pamelahadfailedtorefinancethemaritalhomemortgageasrequired

bythedissolutionagreement. Pamelarespondedthatshewasunabletorefinanceorsell

the marital home due to the housing market and that the master did take into

considerationthetemporarybreakinmarriage.

InNovemberJuanreceivedaletternotifyinghimthathewasretiredfrom

theArmyforpermanentphysicaldisabilityeffectiveJanuary2012Juanhadsustained

seriouscombat-relatedinjuriesinIraqin2007,andasaresultofthoseinjuriesJuans

lowerrightleghadbeenamputatedinSeptember2010.InDecemberJuanslawyer

enteredhisappearance. ShortlythereafterPamelamovedfordocumentationofJuans

militarydisabilityrating,explaining:[Pamelas]retirementawardiscontingenton

[Juans] disability rating. Paperwork must be sent to [the Defense Financing and

AccountingService(DFAS)]inorderfor[Pamela]toreceiveretirementbenefits.

InJanuary2012PamelamovedforJuantodirectlypayherforhershare

ofhismilitaryretirementbenefitsbecauseDFASisnotrequiredtobeginpaymentsto

theformerspouseuntilninety(90)daysafterreceiptofanacceptableorderorthestartofretiredpay. Juanopposed,arguingtheremedywhich[Pamela]ishererequesting,

isthat[Juan]pay[Pamela]hershareoftheretirementbenefitspriortohisreceiving

thosebenefits.Thisissimplywithoutmerit.[Juan]cannotsplitmaritalproceedswhich

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hehasnotyetreceived.(Emphasisinoriginal.)JuanexplainedthatPameladoesnt

requireacourtorderforanyoftheseissues.Rather,allshehastodoisfilea[form]with

DFAS once this court issues its final orders and she can receiveher ordered funds

directlyfromDFAS.

ThemasterorderedJuantoprovideanydocumentsevidencingthestatus

ofhisdisabilityratingwiththeUnitedStatesMilitary.Juansdocumentsincludedan

Armyorderstating[y]ouarereleasedfromassignmentanddutybecauseofphysical

disabilityincurredwhileentitledtobasicpayandunderconditions thatpermityour

retirementforpermanentphysicaldisability. TheArmyordercharacterizedJuans

disabilityas70%andnotedthatthestatuteauthorizingretirementwas1201. 1

Pamelas lawyer entered an appearance in February. Responding to

Pamelasdiscoveryrequests,JuanprovidedhisretireeaccountstatementfromDFAS.

ThestatementnotedthatJuansmonthlygrosspaywas$4,449,hismonthlyVeterans

Affairs(VA)waiverwas$1,424,Juanwasexemptedfromtaxesduetohisdisability

status,andJuansmonthlyconcurrentretirementdisabilitypaywas$1,789.

InAprilthemasterheldahearing.Thepartieslawyersexplainedthatthey

hadbeenworking on dividing Juans military retirementusing a qualified military

retirementorder(QMRO),butthattheycouldnotagreeonindemnificationlanguagethat

arguablycouldbeinterpretedtoallowsomeonetocomebackandgetdisabilitypay

whensomeonesretiredpayisreduced.Pamelaslawyeralsoexpressedconfusion

aboutJuansretirement,explaining:

[W]edontknowwhat[Juan]isgetting. Wedont know

whenhesgettingit. Wedontknowhowitscomposed.I

asked[Juanslawyer]andwithallduerespectto[Juans

See 10U.S.C. 1201 (2012) (authorizing the armedservices toretire

disabledservicemembers).

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lawyer],itseemsitwasconfusingtohimaswell. SoIthink

[Juan] on the record can set us straight as to what hes

getting,whatitcomprisesand,frankly,ifheintendstotake

any of this disposable retirement pay and turn it into

disabilitypay....

Thepartiesalsostatedtheirpositionsonthemaritalhome:Juanslawyer

assertedthatPamelawasorderedtosellthehome.Shehad18monthsfromMayof09

andthatwasneverdone.PamelaslawyerarguedthatPamelawasnotordered tosell

thehouse,shewasorderedtorefinancethehouseandthere[were]anumberofthings

thatwerepreventingtherefinancealldirectlyfrom[Juan]. Specifically,hedidnotgive

heraquitclaimdeedsothehousecouldntberefinancedwithoutthat.

Pamelaassertedthatwhenthepartiesagreedtodissolvethemarriageshe

understoodthatJuansretirementwouldbesplit50/50. Pamelaexplainedthatshehad

aQMROpreparedbyanexpertandthatshehopedthecourtwouldsigntheorderand

submitittoDFAS.Pamelaalsonotedthatatthetimeofthehearingshedidnotknow

howlongJuanhadbeenreceivingretirementbenefits,howmuchhewasreceiving,and

fromwhatsource.Finally,Pamelaassertedthatshewasunabletosellorrefinancethe

maritalhome.

JuanrespondedthatPamelahadfailedtoremovehisnamefromthemarital

homemortgagewithinthe18monthsrequiredbythedissolutionorder.Juanasserted

thathereceivedbasicallynothinginthedissolutionagreement.Juanalsoexplainedthat

he received a 70% Army medical retirement ($4,445 monthly) and a 100% VA

retirementbenefit($3,213monthly).Juanstatedthatapproximately$1,450waswaived

fromhisArmymedicalretirementbutthathewouldeventuallyreceivethatmoneyfrom

theVA.JuanslawyerexplainedthattheVAdisabilitypaywasnotdivisiblebya

QMRObutthat100%oftheArmyretirementwasdivisible.AndJuanexplainedthat

his70%Armydisabilityratingentitledhimto70%ofhis$6,444basepaybutthatifhe

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hadretiredbasedonyearsofservicealoneandwithoutthedisabilityhewouldonlyhave

beenentitledto50%ofhisbasepay.ThusJuanassertedthatonly50%ofhisbasepay

wasdivisibleunderaQMRO.

AfterthehearingthepartiessubmittedcompetingQMROs.Pamelas

QMROincludedaprovisionproviding:

If the Service Member takes actions that reduce[] his

disposableretiredpayandtherebyreducespaymentstothe

Former Spouse by the Designated Agent, the Service

MembershallmakedirectpaymentstotheFormerSpousein

anamountsufficienttocompensatetheFormerSpousefor

suchreductionimmediatelyuponnoticeofsuchreduction,

andshallalsomakeupanyarrearagesininstallmentsnotless

inamountorlongerintermthantheperiodoverwhichthe

arrearagesaccrued.

JuansQMROdidnotcontainthisprovision,andheargued:

Atthetimeofthedissolution,itwasneveragreedto

by Juan that any changes in his disability pay would

automaticallybetranslatedintoadditionalpayforPamela. It

was never negotiated, is a new argument, and it is not

conceded to now. In fact, Pamela alreadywill receive a

greater percentage of Juans retirement pay since hisdisabilityraisedhisretirementpayamountfromthenormal

50%ofbasepay,to70%ofbasepay.

InJuly2012 Pamela, once again pro se, submittednotice tothecourt

allegingthatJuanunilaterallyconvertedallremainingdisposableretirementpayto

disabilityfollowingtheApril24thhearing.Pamelasupportedherassertionwithaletter

fromDFASexplainingthat[t]heentireamountof[Juans]retired/retainerpayisbased

ondisability,thustherearenofundsavailableforpayment.InresponseJuanclaimedthathetooknosuchactiontoconvertorchangeanyportionofhismilitarybenefits.

InNovember2012 the partiesagain appearedbefore the master. The

masterexplainedthathewasconfusedbecauseJuansretirementorderstatedthatJuans

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disabilityratingwas70%buttheletterPamelareceivedfromDFASexplainedthatJuan

wasahundredpercentdisabled.JuanexplainedthattheArmyratedhimat70%

disabilityandthattheVAratedhimat100%disability. JuanfurtherexplainedtheArmy

ratingmeantthattheArmyhadconcludedJuanwasentitledto70%ofhisbasepayat

thetimeofmedicalretirementandthattheVAratingmeantthatJuanqualifiedfor

whatevertheamountisthattheygiveforahundredpercent.AndJuanassertedthat

allof themoneyhereceived, fromtheArmyandfromtheVA,wasdisability pay.

Pamela insisted that Juan had elected to waive retired pay and that this decision

preventedDFASfromsendingheraportionofJuansretirement.

Themasterissuedareportrecommendingthatthesuperiorcourtrequire

Pamelatorefinancethemaritalhomeanddenyhermotiontodividetheretirement. The

master explained that Juans retirement is completely classified as disability pay.

Disabilitypayisnotdividablebythecourtasitisnotamaritalasset.

Pamela objected to the masters report and subsequently moved for

permanentalimonyandsurvivorbenefits.Thesuperiorcourtissuedanordertreating

Pamelasmotionasamotionfor[AlaskaCivilRule]60(b)(6)relieffromjudgment.

ThecourtexplainedthatthepartieshadintendedtosplitJuansretirement,butbecause

Juansretirementpaywasentirelydisabilitypayitwasnotsubjecttodivision.Thecourt

found that the retirement pay was a fundamental underlying assumption of the

dissolutionthathadbeendestroyed.Thecourtalsofoundthatthepropertydivisionwas

poorlythoughtout,thatthedissolutionwasnotreachedwiththehelpofcounsel,andthat

theretirementwasthepartiesprincipalasset.ThecourtthereforegrantedRule60(b)(6)

relieffromtheoriginalpropertydistributionandorderedthepartiestosubmitbriefingtohelpthecourtequitablydividetheirmaritalproperty.

Pamela argued that Juan chose a disability retirement and unilaterally

destroyedtheportiontheyhadagreedshewouldreceive.Pamelarequestedthatthe

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courtconsiderissuingaqualifiedorderorawardingherpermanentalimony.Pamelaalso

arguedthatthedissolutionagreementrequiredonlythatsherefinance,itdidnotrequire

thatshesellthemaritalhome. Pamelafurtherassertedshewasunabletorefinancethe

homebecauseshedidnotreceiveadequatechildsupport,thehomehadnoequityupon

dissolution,andsellingthehomewouldforcebothpartiestoincuradditionalfinancial

distressatthistime.Pamelafinallysubmittedalistofmaritalassetsanddebtsatthe

timeofthepartiesdissolution.

Juanacknowledgedthathereceiveddisabilityretirementpayinsteadof

regularretirementpay.HearguedthatheshouldberequiredtopayPamelaonlya

portionoftheamountofmoneyhewouldhavereceivedifhehadretiredbasedonyears

ofservice. Butheassertedthatforpurposesofthemaritalpropertydistributionthe

superiorcourtshouldhaverecognizedthepartiesoriginaldivorceandcalculatedthe

marriageasonly41monthslong.Juanalsoarguedthatthe18monthsPamelareceived

toremovehisnamefromthemaritalhomehadexpiredandthatPamelasinabilityto

refinance themaritalhomeandremovehisnamehadnegative ramificationsforhis

credit. Juanalsosubmittedapropertyspreadsheet,valuingthemaritalestateatthetime

ofthepartiesdissolution.

InAugust2013PamelaandJuanappearedbeforethesuperiorcourt. The

courtexplainedthatifitcoulddeterminePamelasretiremententitlementbasedonthe

originalagreementthenitwasinclinedtoreverseitsdecisiontoreopentheproperty

distribution.PamelaagreedthatshewasonlyaskingthecourttoaddressJuansmilitary

retirementandthatshewasnotaskingthecourttoreopenthepropertydistribution.

Shortlyafterthehearingthesuperiorcourtissuedanorder,concludingthatfederallawexpresslyexcludesfrom[divisible]disposableretirementpayVAdisability

compensation and retirement for a physical disability and that Juans military

retirement pay consists entirely of VA disability compensation and retirement for

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physicaldisability,leaving$0ofmaritalpropertyforastatecourttodivide.Thecourt

reverseditsRule60(b)(6)ruling,findingthatnofundamentalunderlyingassumptionof

thepropertydivisionhadbeendestroyed.ThecourtnotedthepartieshadagreedPamela

wouldreceiveaportionofJuansretiredpay,butduetohisinjurieshisretirementpay

wasalldisabilitypayandnotdivisible.ThecourtrejectedgrantingPamelaalimony

because calculating what [Juan] may have received in retirement had he not been

disabledandcouchingitasspousalsupportisnotonlyspeculativebutalsoviolatesthe

spiritof federallaw. Finally, thecourtgavePamela60 daysafter the evidentiary

hearingtorefinancethemaritalhomeandremove[Juans]namefromthemortgageor

listthepropertyforsalewithalicensedrealtor. ThecourtorderedJuantomotionthe

courtforaclerksdeedconveyingthepropertytohimtomarketandsellifPamela

failedtocomply.

PamelamovedforreconsiderationandforaquitclaimdeedfromJuan

releasing his interest in the marital home. She argued that the only blockade to

removing[Juans]nameis[Juans]un-cooperationinsigningtheQuitClaimDeed.

Juanopposed,arguingthatthereisnocourtorderinexistencerequiringJuantosigna

quitclaim deedand that signing a quitclaimdeed would not improve the current

situationwiththe...property,infacttheresultwouldbetogivetotalautonomyover

the...propertytoPamela,...shehasalreadydefiedacourtorderrequiringhertosell

[theproperty]foroverthreeyearsandcounting.Juanthenmovedforaclerksdeedso

hecouldselltheproperty,andthesuperiorcourtgrantedhisrequest.Pamelamoved

againtorevisitthemilitaryretirement,andthesuperiorcourtdeniedthismotion.

ThesuperiorcourtawardedJuanAlaskaCivilRule82prevailingpartyattorneysfees. First,thecourtawardedJuan20%ofhisreasonableattorneysfeesfor

litigationthroughtheevidentiaryhearingandthecourtssubsequentorder. Then,after

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denyingPamelasfinalmotiontorevisitthemilitaryretirement,thecourtawardedJuan

fullfeesforrespondingtothatmotion.

III. STANDARDOFREVIEW

We construe property settlement agreements in divorce actions in

accordancewithbasicprinciplesofcontractlaw.Questionsofcontractinterpretationare

revieweddenovo.2 Wereviewfactualfindingssupportingapropertydivisionfor

clearerror. Wereviewdenovowhetherthesuperiorcourtapplied thecorrectlegal

rule.3

Wereviewatrialcourtsdecisiontodividemaritalpropertythrougha

qualified order for abuse of discretion.4 But we review a trial courts attempts to

effectuateasettlementagreementunderthesamereviewprinciplesweapplytocontract

disputes.5Wethereforereviewthesuperiorcourtsrefusaltoissueaqualifiedorderde

6novo.

2 Glover v. Ranney,314P.3d535,539(Alaska2013)(quotingHartley v.Hartley,205P.3d342,346(Alaska2009)).

3 Id. (footnote omitted) (citing Young v. Lowery, 221 P.3d 1006, 1010

(Alaska2009)).

4 See Tillmon v. Tillmon,189P.3d1022,1031-32(Alaska2008)(Thetrial

courtdidnotabuseitsdiscretioninentering[the]proposed[qualifiedorder]....The

courtdidnotabuseitsdiscretionbyusingthe[qualifiedorder].).

5

Krushensky v. Farinas,189P.3d1056,1060-61(Alaska2008).6 See id.(Likewise,inenteringthebenchorderthatapprovedinclusionof

[qualifiedpre-retirementsurvivorannuities]inQDROs,itappearsthesuperiorcourtwas

attemptingtogiveeffecttothepartiesagreementasmemorializedinthefinalproperty

order.Wethereforegivethatbenchorderdenovoratherthandeferentialreview.).

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WereviewforabuseofdiscretionanorderdenyingaRule60(b)motion.7

And[w]ereviewasuperiorcourtsissuanceofanorderpermittingthesaleofproperty

usingthe...abuseofdiscretionstandard. 8

Anawardofattorneysfees,includingasuperiorcourtsprevailing-party

determination,isalsoreviewedforabuseofdiscretion.Wereviewdenovowhetherthe

superiorcourtappliedthelawcorrectlyinawardingattorneysfees. 9

IV. DISCUSSION

A. TheMilitaryRetirementDecisions

Militaryretirementbenefitsmaybeavailablefordistributionasmarital

propertyunderacomplexfederalframework.Becausethepartiesvariousarguments

tothesuperiorcourtwerenotalwaysconsistentwiththeapplicablefederallaw,we

providelegalbackgroundbeforeanalyzingtheirdispute.

1. Militaryretirementpayanddisability

Generallyauniformedservicemembermayrequesttoretireandreceive

longevityretirementbenefitsaftercompleting20yearsofcreditableservice.10Longevity

7 Young v. Kelly,334P.3d153,157(Alaska2014)(citingFrost v. Ayojiak,

957P.2d1353,1355(Alaska1998)).But see Heber v. Heber,330P.3d926,930

(Alaska2014)(explainingdenialsofRule60(b)(4)motionsseekingrelieffromvoid

judgmentsarerevieweddenovobecausevalidityofajudgmentisstrictlyaquestionof

law (quotingLeisnoi, Inc. v. Merdes & Merdes, P.C.,307P.3d879,884(Alaska

2013))).

8 Watega v. Watega,143P.3d658,663(Alaska2006).

9 Lee v. Konrad,337P.3d510,518(Alaska2014)(footnoteomitted).

10 See 10U.S.C.3914([A]nenlistedmemberoftheArmywhohasatleast

20,butlessthan30,yearsofservice...may,uponhisrequest,beretired.).

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retirement benefits awards are a function of retired base pay11 and 2.5 times the

memberscreditableyearsofservice. 12Butifamembersuffersaphysicaldisability

duringserviceandasaresultisunfittoperformArmyduties,theArmymayretirethe

memberwithdisabilityretirementpay.13Werefertothislatterformofretirementas

Chapter61disabilityretirement. 14

WhenamemberreceivesaChapter61disabilityretirement,thedisability

ratingisstatedasapercentagee.g.,70%disabled. 15 AmemberretiredfromtheArmy

forpermanentphysicaldisabilitymaydeterminemonthlyretirementasafunctionof

retiredbasepayandeitherthedisabilityratingpercentageor thecreditableyearsof

11 Retiredbasepayisthemembersaveragemonthlysalaryearnedduringthe

membershighest36months. See 10U.S.C.1407(b) ([T]heretiredpaybaseor

retainerpaybaseofapersonunderthissectionisthepersonshigh-threeaverage.);

10U.S.C.1407(c)([T]hetotalamountofmonthlybasicpaytowhichthememberwas

entitledforthe36months...forwhichthemonthlybasicpaytowhichthememberwas

thehighest,dividedby...36....).

12 Themembershigh36monthsalaryismultipliedbyapercentage2.5

timesthememberscreditableyearsofservicestatedasapercentageinorderto

determinemonthlyretiredpay.See10U.S.C.1401(a);10U.S.C.1409(b)([T]he

percentagetobeused...istheproduct(statedasapercentage)of...[2.5]and...the

membersyearsofcreditableservice....).

13 See10U.S.C.1201(a)(Uponadetermination...thatamember...is

unfittoperformthedutiesofthemembersoffice,grade,rank,orratingbecauseof

physicaldisabilityincurredwhileentitledtobasicpay...,theSecretarymayretirethememberwithretiredpaycomputedunder[10U.S.C.1401]....).

14 See 10U.S.C.ch.611201-1222.

15 See10U.S.C.1216a.

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servicepercentage.16Thememberisentitledtobepaidundertheapplicableformula

thatismostfavorable.17

Chapter61disabilityretirementisnottheonlyformofdisabilitypayment

availabletoveterans.Memberswhoaredisabledasaresultofaninjurysufferedor

aggravatedinthelineofdutyalsoareentitledtoDepartmentofVeteranAffairsdisability

(VA disability).18 A membersentitlement toVAdisabilitydoes not depend on a

Chapter61decisiontoretirethememberforpermanentphysicaldisability.19Unlikethe

membersChapter61 disability rating a ratingbasedon themembersabilityto

performArmyduties20themembersVAratingcoversalldisabilitiessufferedinthe

lineofdutyandmaydifferfromtheChapter61rating. 21AmembersVAdisability

16 10U.S.C.1401(a)(citing10U.S.C.1201,1204).Whencomputing

retirementasafunctionofthemembersdisabilityrating,thedisabilitypercentageused

maynotexceed75%.Id.

17 10U.S.C.1401(b).Forexample,amemberretiringafter22yearsof

servicewouldbeentitledto55%ofthemembersretiredbasepay(22x2.5=55). If

thatmemberhadbeenretiredbytheArmyduetoapermanentphysicaldisabilityandhadreceiveda60%disabilityrating,thenthememberwouldbeentitledtoreceive60%of

retiredbasepay.See10U.S.C.1401(a)(citing10U.S.C.1201,1204).Andifthat

samememberwereretiredbytheArmyduetoapermanentphysicaldisabilitywitha

40%disabilityrating,thenthememberwouldstillbeentitledto55%ofretiredbasepay

becausepaymentsarecalculatedusingtheformulathatismostfavorabletothemember.

See10U.S.C.1401(b).

18 38U.S.C.1110(2012).

19 See id. See also38U.S.C.1114(compensationtable).

20 10U.S.C.1201.

21 38U.S.C.1110.See also Myers v. United States,50Fed.Cl.674,690

n.41(Fed.Cl.2001).

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paymentisafunctionofthemembersVAdisabilityratingandthemembersnumber

andtypeofdependents.22

HistoricallyamembersreceiptofVAdisabilitypaymentswascontingent

onthememberwaivinganequalamountofretiredpay.23Buttwoprogramsnowprovide

forconcurrentreceiptorrepaymentofwaivedretiredpay.24Combat-relatedspecial

compensation(CRSC)allowsveteransdisabledincombattoreceivecompensationin

lieuofretirementpaymentsuptotheamountwaivedtoreceiveVAdisabilitybenefits.25

Concurrent retirement and disability pay (CRDP) is a phase-in program allowing

qualifyingdisabledveteranstoreceiveVAdisabilitypaywhilewaivingincrementally

smalleramountsofretirementpayandprovidingforreceiptoffullretirementforall

qualified disabled veterans pay by 2014.26 Both programs include exceptions for

22 38U.S.C.1114-1115.

23 38U.S.C.5304-5305.Membershaveincentivetowaiveretiredpayfor

VA disability payments because VA disability payments are not taxed. 26 U.S.C.

104(a)(4).

24

See10U.S.C.1413a-1414.25 See 10U.S.C.1413a(a)(TheSecretaryconcernedshallpaytoeach

eligiblecombat-relateddisableduniformedservicesretireewhoelectsbenefitsunderthis

sectionamonthlyamountforthecombat-relateddisabilityoftheretireedetermined

under subsection (b).); 1413a(b) ([T]hemonthly amount tobe paid aneligible

combat-relateddisableduniformedservicesretireeundersubsection(a)foranymonth

istheamountofcompensationtowhichtheretireeisentitledundertitle38forthat

month,determinedwithoutregardtoanydisabilityoftheretireethatisnotacombat-

relateddisability....Theamountpaidtoaneligiblecombat-relateddisableduniformed

servicesretireeforanymonth...maynotexceedtheamountofthereductioninretiredpaythatisapplicabletotheretireeforthatmonthundersections5304and5305oftitle

38.).

26 See 10U.S.C.1414(a)([A]memberorformermemberoftheuniformed

(continued...)

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membersretiredbytheArmyunderChapter61,limitingCRSCtoanamountequalto

the members longevity retirement27 or requiring waiver of concurrent retired pay

exceedingtheamountthememberwouldhavereceivedfromalongevityretirement. 28

2. Equitablydividingmilitaryretirementpay

The Uniformed Services Former Spouses Protection Act (USFSPA)

providesthat statecourtsmaytreatdisposable retired paypayabletoamember...

eitheraspropertysolelyofthememberoraspropertyofthememberandhisspousein

accordancewiththelawofthejurisdictionofsuchcourt.29 USFSPAdefinesdisposable

retiredpay:

26 (...continued)

serviceswhoisentitledforanymonthtoretiredpayandwhoisalsoentitledforthat

monthtoveteransdisabilitycompensationforaqualifyingservice-connecteddisability

...isentitledtobepaidbothforthatmonthwithoutregardtosections5304and5305

oftitle38. DuringtheperiodbeginningJanuary1,2004,andendingonDecember31,

2013,paymentofretiredpaytosuchaqualifiedretireeissubjectto[aphase-inschedule]

....).

27 See 10U.S.C.1413a(b)(3)(A)(Inthecaseofaneligiblecombat-related

disableduniformedservicesretireewhoisretiredunderchapter61ofthistitle,theamountof[CRSC]...foranymonthmaynot,whencombinedwiththeamountof

retiredpaypayabletotheretireeafteranysuchreductionundersections5304and5305

oftitle38,causethetotalofsuchcombinedpaymenttoexceedtheamountofretiredpay

towhichthememberwouldhavebeenentitledunderanyotherprovisionoflawbased

uponthemembersserviceintheuniformedservicesifthememberhadnotbeenretired

underchapter61ofthistitle.).

28 See 10U.S.C.1414(b)(1)(Theretiredpayofamemberretiredunder

chapter61ofthistitle...issubjecttoreductionundersections5304and5305oftitle

38,butonlytotheextentthattheamountofthemembersretiredpayunderchapter61ofthistitleexceedstheamountofretiredpaytowhichthememberwouldhavebeen

entitled under any other provision of law basedupon the members service in the

uniformedservicesifthememberhadnotbeenretiredunderchapter61ofthistitle.).

29 10U.S.C.1408(c)(1)(emphasisadded).

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[T]hetotalmonthlyretiredpaytowhichamemberisentitled

less amounts which

....

(B)aredeductedfromtheretiredpayofsuchmember

asaresultofforfeituresofretiredpayorderedbyacourt-

martialorasaresultofawaiver of retired pay required by

law in order to receive compensation under title 5 or title 38;

(C) in the case of a member entitled to retired pay

under chapter 61 of this title, are equal to the amount of

retired pay of the member under that chapter computed using

the percentage of the members disability on the date when[ ]the member was retired....30

InMansell v. Mansell theUnitedStatesSupremeCourtappliedUSFSPA

toretiredpaywaivedinordertoreceiveVAdisabilitybenefits,holdingthatUSFSPA

doesnotgrantstatecourtsthepowertotreataspropertydivisibleupondivorcemilitary

retirementpaythathasbeenwaivedtoreceiveveteransdisabilitybenefits.31 We

appliedMansell inClauson v. Clauson,notingthatstatecourtsdonothaveanypower

toequitablydivideveteransdisabilitybenefitsreceivedinplaceofwaivedretirement

pay.32ButweclarifiedthatneithertheUSFSPAnorpriorSupremeCourtdecisions

requireourcourtstocompletelyignoretheeconomicconsequencesofamilitaryretirees

decisiontowaiveretirementpayinordertocollectdisabilitypay.33Wetherefore

consideredtheeconomicconsequencesofadecisiontowaivemilitarypayinorderto

receivedisabilitypayinClauson themembersformerspousewasbarredfrom

30 10U.S.C.1408(a)(4)(emphasisadded).

31 490U.S.581,594-95(1989).

32 831P.2d1257,1262(Alaska1992).

33 Id.at1263.

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receivinganagreeduponshareofthemilitaryretirementbenefitsandaffirmedthe

superiorcourtsdecisiontograntthespousesRule60(b)(6)motionreopeningthe

partiespropertysettlementagreement.34Wefinallyexplainedthatwhenreopeninga

propertydistributiontrialcourtsmaynotsimplyshiftanamountofpropertyequivalent

tothewaivedretirementpayfromthemilitaryspousessideoftheledgertotheother

spousesside....Disabilitybenefitsshouldnot,ineitherformorsubstance,betreated

asmaritalpropertysubjecttodivisionuponthedissolutionofmarriage. 35

InYoung v. LoweryweaffirmedourClausondecisionandheldthata

courtmaynotequitablydividetotalretiredpay;itmayequitablydivideonlytheamount

ofretired pay remainingafter the court deductswaived retiredpay and the costof

purchasingsurvivorbenefits.36Wealsoheldthatthetrialcourtmayexpresslyorder

[the servicemember] not to reduce his disposable retiredpay and require [him] to

indemnify[theformerspouse]foranyamountsbywhichherpaymentsarereduced

belowtheamountsetonthedatetheamendedqualifiedorderisentered.37

3. UnravelingJuansretirementpay

Inthesuperiorcourtthepartiesmayhavebeenconfusedaboutthenature

ofJuansretirementbenefitsandwhethertheyweredivisibleinwholeorinpart. The

undisputedevidenceintherecordestablishesthefollowing:JuanwasChapter61retired

for permanent physical disability under 10 U.S.C. 1201; the Army rated Juans

permanent disability at 70%; because Juans 70% disability rating exceeded his

34 Id.at1261-64.

35 Id. at1264.

36 221P.3d1006,1011(Alaska2009).

37 Id.at1012-13.

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retirementpaymultiplier38JuanwasentitledtohavehisChapter61disabilityretirement

paycalculatedusinghisdisabilityrating;39Juansretirementbasepaywas$6,355,and

hisgrossChapter61retirementpaywas$4,449.40 Juanalsoreceivedatleast$3,213in

monthlyVAdisabilitypayments,andhismonthlyVAwaiverwas$1,424.41

4. Thesuperiorcourtsretirementbenefitsrulings

The masters report explained that Juans retirement is completely

classifiedasdisabilitypay.Disabilitypayisnot[divisible]bythecourtasitisnota

maritalasset.Andthesuperiorcourtexplainedthat[b]ecauseof[Juans]disability,

thegovernmentclassifiesallofhisretirementasdisabilitypay,leavingzerodisposable

retirementpayforastatecourttodistributeinadivorce.

PamelaassertsthatthesuperiorcourtisincorrectbecausebasedonJuans

ownpaystatement,itappearsthatatleastaportionofJuanspaywasdivisibleandthat

38 Juansexactretirementpaymultiplierisnotclearfromtherecord,butbased

on23yearsofserviceitcouldnothaveexceeded57.5%. AndJuantestifiedthathetook

acareerservicebonusin2004thatpaidhim$30,000butdecreasedhisretirementpay

multiplierby10%to47.5%.

39 See 10U.S.C.1401(b)(Ifapersonwouldotherwisebeentitledtoretired

paycomputedundermorethanoneformula...,thepersonisentitledtobepaidunder

theapplicableformulathatismostfavorabletohim.).Basedonapproximately23years

ofserviceJuanslongevity-basedretirementpaymultipliercouldnothaveexceeded

57.5%,butJuans70%disabilityratingprovidedforhisreceiptof70%ofhisretired

basepay.See10U.S.C.1401(a).

40 JuansChapter61paywasbasedonhis70%disabilityrating$6,355x

.70=$4,449.

41 JuanhadtowaiveaportionofhisChapter61disabilitybecauseChapter61

paymentsmayonlybereceivedconcurrentlywithVAdisabilitypaymentsuptothe

amountofretiredpaytowhichthememberwouldhavebeenentitledunderanyother

provision of law based upon the members service in the uniformed services if the

memberhadnotbeenretiredunderchapter61ofthistitle.10U.S.C.1414(b)(1).

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Pamelawouldbereceivingsomeofthesefundsifthetrialcourthadissuedaqualifying

order. Pamela specifically argues that Juan received CRDP42 and that CRDP is

divisibleupondivorce.

ButCRDPdoesnotchangethenatureofJuansChapter61retirement

benefit.JuansbenefitscomefromtwosourcesChapter61disabilityretirementand

VAdisabilitypayments.Neithersourceisdivisibleupondivorce.USFSPAexcludes

fromdisposableretiredpayallChapter61retirementbenefitsequaltotheamountof

retiredpay...computedusingthepercentageofthemembersdisability.43 Andaswe

heldinClauson v. Clauson,statecourtshavenopowertoequitablydivideVAdisability

benefits.44VAdisabilitybenefitsarenotretiredpayanddonotfallwithinUSFSPAs

definitionofdisposableretiredpay. 45

JuansChapter61retirementpaymentswerecomputedusingthepercentage

ofhisdisabilityratingandarenotdivisible: Juanwas70%disabled,andhisgross

retiredpaywas70%ofhisretiredbasepay.AndcontrarytoPamelasassertionthat

CRDPisdivisibleupondivorceJuanwasreceiving$1,789CRDPtheCRDP

portions of Juans Chapter 61 payments are not divisible.46 CRDP provides for

concurrent receipt of VA disability benefits and military retirement pay.47 If the

concurrentlyreceivedretirementpaymentsaredisposableretiredpayunderUSFSPA,

42 See supra note26(explainingCRDP).

43 10U.S.C.1408(a)(4)(C).

44 831P.2d1257,1264(Alaska1992).

45 Id. at1262-64;10U.S.C.1408(a)(4)(B).

46 See10U.S.C.1408(a)(4)(C).

47 10U.S.C.1414.

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thentheretirementpaymentsaredivisible.Chapter61disabilityretirementpayments

computedbasedonamembersdisabilitypercentagearenotdisposableretiredpayunder

USFSPAevenwhenreceivedconcurrentlywithVAdisability.48 DFASrecognized

thatJuanreceivednodisposableretiredpayandnotifiedPamelathat[t]heentireamount

ofthe members retired/retainer pay isbased ondisability,thus thereareno funds

availableforpaymentundertheUSFSPA.

BecauseJuansmilitarybenefitsconsistentirelyofChapter61retirement

andVAdisability,thesuperiorcourtdidnoterrwhenconcludingthatnoneofJuans

militarybenefitsweredisposableretiredpay.

5. Pamelasrequestedpresumption

Pamela argues that we should establish a presumption that military

qualifyingordersshallcontainindemnityprovisions,toprotecttheformerspousefrom

apost-decreewaiverofmilitaryretiredpay.Pamelacorrectlynotesthatwehave

approvedtheuseofindemnityclausesinQMROs.49 Butwehaveonlyapprovedtheuse

ofindemnityclausestoreimbursespousesforreductionsindisposableretirementpay

48 10U.S.C.1408(a)(4)(C).

49 See Glover v. Ranney,314P.3d535,543(Alaska2013)(Ratherthan

improperlydividingwaivedbenefits,theorderawards[thewife]hertimerulepercentage

ofdisposableretirementpaywhilerequiring[thehusband]toindemnify[her]forany

subsequentunilateralactionstodecreasethetotalmonthlypensionpayoutamounts. Thesuperiorcourtdidnoterrtheordercomplieswith[USFSPA]andourprecedent.);

Young v. Lowery,221P.3d1006,1012-13(Alaska2009)(Butthe trialcourtmay

expresslyorder[thehusband]nottoreducehisdisposableretiredpayandrequire[him]

toindemnify[thewife]foranyamountsbywhichherpaymentsarereducedbelowthe

amountsetonthedatetheamendedqualifiedorderisentered.).

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duetomembersunilateralwaiverofdisposableretirementbenefitsinexchangeforVA

disabilitypayments. 50

Inthiscase,despitePamelascontraryassertions,Juandidnotunilaterally

waiveanydisposableretiredpay.Juanassertedthathetooknosuchactiontoconvert

orchangeanyportionofhismilitarybenefits.TherecordsupportsJuansassertion.

WhenJuanwasChapter61retiredbythemilitary,themilitaryhadtofindthatJuanwas

unfittoperformthedutiesof[his]office,grade,rank,orratingbecauseofphysical

disability.51Juanwasretiredwitha70%disabilityratingandwasawarded70%ofhis

retirementbasepaydespiteJuansyearsofserviceotherwiseentitlinghimtonomore

than57.5%ofhisbasepay.Asexplainedabove,theentiretyofJuansretirementpay

wasbasedonhisChapter61disabilityratingandonhisVAdisability,andunder

USFSPAthismoneyisnotconsidereddisposableretiredpay.52UnlikeVAdisability

whichamembermayelect,53amemberdoesnotunilaterallychoosetobecomeChapter

61 retired. Rather, Chapter 61 retirement for permanent disability isbasedon the

Armys determination that the members permanent injuries are so severe that the

memberisunfittoperformArmyduties. 54Andwhenamemberwaivesaportionof

Chapter61disabilitypaytoreceiveVAdisability,itisnotawaiverofdisposableretired

50 See Glover,314P.3dat543;Young,221P.3dat1012.AndinClauson v.

Clauson,wefocusedonthemilitaryretireesdecisiontowaiveretirementpayinorder

tocollectdisability.831P.2d1257,1263(Alaska1992).

51 10U.S.C.1201(a).

52 See supra PartIV.A.4.

53 See 38 U.S.C. 5100 ([T]he term claimant means any individual

applyingfor,orsubmittingaclaimfor,anybenefitunderthelawsadministeredbythe

Secretary.).

54 10U.S.C.1201(a).

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pay. Rather it is awaiver of one typeof payment that is not considered disposable

retiredpayChapter61disabilityinexchangeforanotherVAdisability.

Pamelafailstorecognizethedistinctionbetweenamemberunilaterally

decidingtowaivedisposableretiredpayinexchangeforVAdisabilitybenefits,anda

member receivingonlytwo typesofnondisposable retired payafter themember is

Chapter61retiredbytheArmy.ThemajorityofcasesPamelacitessupportingher

indemnificationargumentexplicitlyaddresswaiverofdisposableretiredpayforVA

disabilityasopposedtoamemberreceivingandwaivingaChapter61disability

retirementandtheyassertthatindemnificationisproperbecauseitwouldbeunfair

toletthememberunilaterallywaivedisposableretiredpay. 55

55 See, e.g.,Danielson v. Evans,36P.3d749,751,755(Ariz.App.2001)

(addressing non-disability retirement pay waived in order to receive disability

benefits);Surratt v. Surratt,148S.W.3d761,767(Ark.App.2004)([Themember]

could not, by later waiving those benefits in order to receive disability payments,

unilaterallydeprive[hisformerspouse]ofherproperty.);Blann v. Blann,971So.2d

135,137(Fla.App.2007)([T]hetrialcourterredinconcludingthattherewasno

authority toenforce the consent final judgmentbyordering the former husband to

indemnifytheformerwifeafterhewaivedaportionofhismilitaryretirementpaysothathemightreceiveveteransdisabilitybenefits.);In re Marriage of Neilsen & Magrini,

792N.E.2d844,849(Ill.App.2003)(Basedontheforegoingpersuasiveauthority,we

believe that a partys vested interest in a military pension cannot be unilaterally

diminishedbyanactofamilitaryspouse....);Bandini v. Bandini,935N.E.2d253,

264(Ind.App.2010)(Fortheforegoingreasons,weholdthatamilitaryspousemay

not,byapost-decreewaiverofretirementpayinfavorofdisabilitybenefitsorCRSC,

unilaterally and voluntarily reduce the benefits awarded a former spouse in the

dissolutiondecree.);Dexter v. Dexter,661A.2d171,175(Md.Spec.App.1995)(We

hold that the voluntary waiver of appellants Army retirement pension was underMarylandlawabreachofcontract,forwhichthemeasureofpastdamagesistheamount

thereceivingspousewouldhavereceivedhadtheappellantnotcommittedthebreach.);

Krapf v. Krapf,786N.E.2d318,325(Mass.2003)(Whilenotdispositiveonthismatter

offirstimpressioninMassachusetts,wenotethatmanyotherStateappellatecourtshave

(continued...)

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Wedonot adoptan indemnification presumption in this casebecause

waiver of Chapter 61 retirement benefits is not waiver of disposable retired pay.

Requiring indemnification when a member is Chapter 61 retired is akin to an

unacceptabledivisionofretirementbenefitswhicharenotdisposableretiredpaya

divisionforeclosedbyUSFSPA,Mansell,andClauson.56

6. ThesuperiorcourtsQMROruling

Pamela argues that the trial court erred when it declined to enter a

qualif[ied] order apportioning Juans military retirement benefits. She notes that

grantingaQMROisaministerialactthatgiveseffecttoacourt-approvedproperty

settlement.PamelaalsoarguesthatifthecourthadissuedaQMROthenshemighthave

received retirement payments. She finally argues that even if the court correctly

55 (...continued)

orderedsimilarreliefagainstmilitaryretireeswhowaivethemilitaryretirementbenefits

pledgedtoaformerspouseunderaseparationagreementinordertoobtainVAdisability

payments.);Megee v. Carmine,802N.W.2d669,682(Mich.App.2010)(Wehold

thatamilitaryspouseremainsresponsibletocompensate[a]formerspouse...whenthe

militaryspousemakesaunilateralandvoluntarypostjudgmentelectiontowaivethe

retirement pay in favor of disability benefits contrary to the terms of the divorce

judgment.);Shelton v. Shelton,78P.3d507,508(Nev.2003)(Rolandelectedtowaive

allhismilitaryretirementbenefitsforanequivalentamountoftax-exemptdisabilitypay

asfederallawallows.);Hisgen v. Hisgen,554N.W.2d494,496(S.D.1996)(We

considerwhetheracourtmayrequireaformerspousetopayaspartofaproperty

divisionanamountequivalenttoone-halfofamilitaryretiremententitlementwhensuch

spouse haswaivedretirementbenefits to receivea corresponding sum inveterans

disabilitypayments.);Johnson v. Johnson ,37S.W.3d892,897(Tenn.2001)(We

holdthatwhenan [agreement]dividesmilitaryretirementbenefits,thenon-militaryspousehasavestedinterestinhisorherportionofthosebenefits....Thatvested

interestcannotthereafterbeunilaterallydiminishedbyanactofthemilitaryspouse.).

56 10U.S.C.1408(a)(4);Mansell v. Mansell,490U.S.581,594-95(1989);

Clauson v. Clauson,831P.2d1257,1264(Alaska1992).

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concludedthatshewouldreceivenodirectpaymentsfromDFAS,thefailuretoissuea

QMROwasstillreversibleerror.

Wehaveexplainedthataqualifiedordersimplyenforcesacourtorder

callingfordivisionofretirementbenefits.57 AsJuannotes,therecordestablishesthat

aQMROwouldnot have resultedin anypayments toPamela directly fromDFAS

becauseJuansbenefitswereentirelybasedonhisdisability.Andasexplainedinthe

previous subsection, requiring Juan to directly indemnify Pamela because he was

Chapter61retiredbytheArmyviolatesUSFSPA,Mansell,andClauson.58 Wetherefore

concludethatthesuperiorcourtdidnoterrwhenrefusingtoissueanineffectualorder.59

7. ThesuperiorcourtsRule60(b)ruling

Pamelaarguesthatthesuperiorcourterredwhenitdeclinedtoprovide

[her]withanyoffsetforthebenefitsshelostduetoJuansreceiptofdisabilitybenefits.

AlthoughsheassertsthatthiscaseisnotgovernedbyRule60(b)becauseshewasstill

seeking...issuanceofthequalifyingmilitaryorder,shealsoarguesthatshewas

entitledtoanadjustmenttothepropertydivision,followingJuanswaiverofretirement

payandthatthefailuretoaddressPamelaslossofallinterestintheretirementbenefits

constitutedanabuseofdiscretion.AtonepointPamelahadaskedthesuperiorcourt

foraspousalsupportawardinlieuofJuansmilitarybenefits.Pamela,atthetime

57 Zito v. Zito,969P.2d1144,1146(Alaska1998).

58 10U.S.C.1408(a)(4);Mansell,490U.S.at594-95;Clauson,831P.2d

at1264.

59

TheprovisionthatPamelarequestedbelowrequiredindemnificationwhentheServiceMembertakesactionsthatreduce[]hisdisposableretiredpayandthereby

reducespaymentstotheFormerSpouse.ButJuansChapter61retirementisaresult

oftheArmysdeterminationregardinghisabilitytoperformhisduties,andnotbased

onanyunilateralwaiverofretiredpay.ThusthespecificQMROPamelasoughtwould

nothaveresultedinherreceiptofanyofJuansmilitaryretirementbenefits.

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litigatingprose,thusappearstohaveattemptedtorequestamodificationoftheparties

dissolutionagreement,andweconsiderthisarequestforRule60(b)(6)relieffrom

judgment.60

Rule 60(b)(6) is a catch-all provision, justifying relief from property

settlementagreementsunderextraordinarycircumstances. 61

Inthecontextofapropertydivisionpursuanttoadivorce,

fourextraordinarycircumstancesmayjustifyreliefunder

Rule60(b)(6):(1)thefundamental,underlyingassumption

of the dissolution agreement has been destroyed; (2) the

parties property division was poorly thought out; (3) the

propertydivisionwasreachedwithoutthebenefitofcounsel;

and (4) the property in dispute was the parties principal[ ]asset.62

The four factors are not strictly necessary conditions but, rather, are particular

instantiationsoftheequitablefactorsrequiredtoovercometheprinciplethat,atsome

60

See OLink v. OLink,632P.2d225,227-28(Alaska1981)(treatingrequesttomodifydivorcedecreeasrequestsforrelieffromjudgmentunderCivilRule60).

WeconsiderPamelasrequestforspousalsupportaRule60(b)(6)motioninspiteof

PamelasownlawyerscontraryassertionsonappealandPamelasstatementstothe

superiorcourt.Pamelawasprosewhensherequestedspousalsupport,andshewaspro

sewhensheinformedthesuperiorcourtthatshedidnotwanttoreopentheentire

property. Weinterpretthepleadingsofproselitigantsleniently.DeNardo v. Calista

Corp.,111 P.3d 326, 331(Alaska2005). It isclearthatPamelarequestedspousal

supportintheeventshewasunabletoreceiveheragreeduponshareofJuansmilitary

retirement.ItisnotclearthatPamelaunderstoodherstatementstothesuperiorcourtto

meanshewasrelinquishingherrequestforspousalsupportinlieuofJuansmilitaryretirement.

61 Sandberg v. Sandberg,322P.3d879,888-89(Alaska2014).

62 Cook v. Cook,249P.3d1070,1084(Alaska2011).

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point, litigationmustbebroughttoan end.63Trialcourtsshouldusethesefactors

whenappropriate,butshouldalsobearinmindtheflexiblenatureofRule60(b)(6),

keepinginmindthat[t]hebroadpowergrantedbyclause(6)isnotforthepurposeof

relievingapartyfromfree,calculated,anddeliberatechoiceshehasmade... .64

The superior court applied the Rule 60(b)(6) factors and initially

concludedthatreliefwaswarrantedbecause:

(1) [Juans] retirement was a fundamental, underlying

assumptionoftheGuerrerosdissolutionagreementanditis

destroyed, (2) the parties property division was poorly

thoughtoutbecauseitentirelyfailedtodisposeof[Juans]

retirement, (3) neither party had legal counsel when they

entered into the dissolution agreement, and (4) [Juans]retirementwasthepartiesprincipalasset.

ButthesuperiorcourtlaterreverseditsinitialRule60(b)(6)rulingbecauseuponfurther

review [the court] does not find that a fundamental underlying assumption of the

dissolution agreement is destroyed. The superior court noted had the Court not

reversedits[Rule]60(b)order,theCourtwouldhavereconsideredtheentire2009

propertydistribution.

TherecordestablishesthatbothpartiesbelievedPamelawasentitledto

receivesomeportionofJuansmilitarybenefits.WhileJuandisputedthetotalamount

of his benefits Pamela would receive, Juan consistently recognized Pamela should

receivesomeportionofhismilitarybenefits. Thusitwaserrorto determinethat a

fundamentalunderlyingassumptionofthepartiesagreementhadnotbeendestroyed.

DuetoJuansChapter61retirementbytheArmyhereceivednodisposableretiredpay,

63 Sandberg,322P.3dat889(quotingClauson,831P.2dat1261).

64 Id.(alterationinoriginal)(quoting OLink,632P.2dat229-30).

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andthisdestroyedthepartiesexpectationthatPamelawouldreceivesomeportionof

Juansmilitarybenefits.

Thesuperiorcourtsearlieranalysisoftheotherfactorsalsoispersuasive.

Thepropertydivisionwaspoorlythoughtout.DespiteknowingthatJuanwasseriously

injuredin2007,thepartiesfailedtorecognizethepossibilitythatJuanwouldreceiveno

disposableretiredpay,operatingundertheassumptionthatPamelawouldbeableto

receiveJuansmilitarybenefits.Andneitherpartywasrepresentedbycounselwhen

theydissolvedtheirmarriageandsettledtheirproperty.Finally,Juansretirementwas

thepartiesprincipalasset. 65

Juanarguesthatthesuperiorcourtconcludedthatthepropertydistribution

wasstillequitable,despitethenon-divisibilityofretirementpay,consideringthatthe

2009dissolutionwasexceptionallyfavorabletoPamela.ButasPamelacorrectlynotes,

thesuperiorcourtneverengagedinanequitabledivisionanalysis,andwithouttaking

additional testimony regarding marital property and property values the court had

insufficientevidencetoconductsuchananalysis.

Becauseitwasanabuseofdiscretiontorefusetoreopentheproperty

settlementagreementand conducta full equitabledivisionanalysis, we reverse the

Rule 60(b)(6) decision and remand for further proceedings and a marital property

distribution.Wereiterateour Clausonholdingthatonremandthesuperiorcourtmay

notsimplyshiftanamountofpropertyequivalenttothe...retirementpayfromthe

militaryspousessideoftheledgertotheotherspousesside. 66ButwenotethatJuans

andPamelas financialconditions,includingJuans receiptofhismilitarydisability

65 Theparties2009dissolutionagreementwasnotdetailedanddidnotreveal

theequity,ifany,intheirrealproperty. Butin2009Juanwasverycloseto20yearsof

serviceandaguaranteedArmyretirement,avaluableasset.

66 Clauson,831P.2dat1264.

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retirementbenefits,mustbeconsideredwhenequitablydividingthemaritalestateand

whendecidingwhethertorequirealimony.67

B. TheForcedSaleOfTheMaritalHome

1. ThesuperiorcourtsrefusaltorequireJuantosignaquitclaimdeed

UnderthedissolutionagreementPamelareceivedthejointlyownedmarital

home.AttheirdissolutionhearingJuanandPamelaagreedthatshewouldrefinancethe

homeandremoveJuansnamefromthemortgage. Pamelaassertsthat[a]spartofthe

propertydivision,Juanwastoquitclaimtheproperty.Shearguesthatthesuperiorcourt

erredbyrefusingtoforceJuantosignaquitclaimdeed.Andshefurtherarguesthat

Juansfailuretoprovideheraquitclaimdeedmadeitimpossibleforhertorefinancethe

homeandremovehisnamefromthemortgage.

But Pamela fails to point to any agreement or any statement of law

supportingherpositionthataquitclaimdeedwasaconditionprecedenttoherremoving

Juansnamefromthemortgage.AndPamelasowntrialtheoryandtestimonyprovided

thesuperiorcourtwithextrinsicevidencethatthepartiesdidnotintendthataquitclaim

deed was a condition precedent.68

Pamelas lawyer first mentioned the lack of a

quitclaimdeedinApril2012,farpastthe18-monthdeadlinethatthepartiesagreedto

in2009. Buteventhenherlawyerdidnotassertthataquitclaimdeedwasacondition

precedenttoherobligationtorefinance. Thelawyerinsteadagreedwiththecourtthat

onewayinprocedureistodeliverthequitclaimdeedatclosingoftherefinance,not

67 AS25.24.160(a)(2)(D),(a)(4)(D).

68 Hartley v. Hartley,205P.3d342,347(Alaska2009)(Acourtmustresolve

anyambiguityincontractlanguagebydeterminingthereasonableexpectationsofthe

contractingpartiesinlightofthelanguageofanydisputedprovisions,otherprovisions,

relevantextrinsicevidence,andcaselawinterpretingsimilarprovisions.(quoting

Keffer v. Keffer,852P.2d394,397(Alaska1993))).

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before,toprotect[Juans]interest.Andwhenquestionedatthathearingregardingher

failuretoremoveJuansname,Pamelatestifiedthatthehousewouldnotsellandthatshe

couldnotrefinanceduetoherdebttoincomeratio.

BecausethepropertysettlementdidnotexplicitlyrequireJuansquitclaim

asaconditionprecedenttoPamelasobligationtorefinancethehouse,becauseextrinsic

evidenceestablishesthatPameladidnotconsiderJuansquitclaimobligationacondition

precedent,becausethequitclaimdeedcouldhavebeentenderedataclosing,andbecause

thereisevidencethatPamelawassimplyunabletorefinancethehome,weconcludethe

superior courtdid notabuse its discretion when refusing to require Juan tosign a

quitclaimdeed.

2. Thesuperiorcourtsforcedsaleofthehome

Pamelaarguesthatthesuperiorcourterredwhenprovidingfortheforced

home salebecauseitwasJuanand the trialcourt itself that had createdthe

putativeneedforthesale.Sheassertsthatthecourtsrefusaltoorderaquitclaimdeed,

thecourtsdecisionon Juans retirement benefits, andJuans alleged child support

arrearspreventedherfromrefinancingthehome.Pamelasassertionsdonotestablish

thatthesuperiorcourterred.

InherbriefPamelanotesthattheforcedsaleofahomeiswithinthetrial

courtspower,inordertoeffectuatethetermsofapropertydivision. 69Shenonetheless

argues that such an extreme step was not appropriate in this case. But Pamelas

argumentdoesnotaddressherfailuretorefinancethehomeorrequestanyformofrelief

withintheagreedupon18months. Sheonlysoughtthecourtshelpin2011whilethe

partieswerelitigatingthemilitaryretirementbenefitissue.

See Worland v. Worland,240P.3d825,829(Alaska2010).

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AftermorethanfouryearsPamelahadfailedtorefinancethehome,andthe

superiorcourtprovidedherwithafinal60days. RegardlessofPamelaslater-asserted

reasonsforherfailuretorefinance,Pamelahadnotfulfilledhercontractualobligation

andhadnotinitiallyjustifiedherfailuretoperform.Andasexplainedabove,Juanwas

notobligatedtoprovideaquitclaimdeed;nordidthesuperiorcourtsmilitaryretirement

decision,afterJuanwasChapter61retiredin2012,preventPamelafromrefinancingthe

homebetween2009and2011.

BecausePamelafailedtoseekanyreliefwithinthe18monthsprovided

underthepropertysettlementagreement,weconcludethatthesuperiorcourtdidnoterr

whenorderingtheforcedsaleofthehome.

C. TheAttorneysFeesAwards

BecausewereversethesuperiorcourtsRule60(b)(6)decision,wevacate

the attorneys fees awards. The superior court may make a new prevailing party

determinationandattorneysfeescalculationattheconclusionoftheproceedingson

remand.

V. CONCLUSION

WeAFFIRMthesuperiorcourtsdecisionnottodivideJuansmilitary

disabilityretirementpayandnottoissueaQMRO.WeAFFIRMthesuperiorcourts

decisiontoforcethesaleofthemaritalhome.Becauseexceptionalcircumstancesjustify

reopening the marital property agreement, we REVERSE the superior courts

Rule60(b)(6)decisionandREMANDforanequitablemaritalpropertydistribution;and

weVACATEtheattorneysfeesawards.

-30- 7050

Guerrero v. Guerrero, Alaska (2015)

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