Alaska v. ConocoPhillips, 3AN-10-05484 CI, (Alaska 2011) ConocoPhillips' Brief
Limeres v. Limeres, Alaska (2016)
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Transcript of Limeres v. Limeres, Alaska (2016)
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Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before publication in the P ACIFIC R EPORTER.
Readers are requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk of the Appellate Courts,
303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878, email
THESUPREMECOURTOFTHESTATEOFALASKA
RENEE.LIMERES,
Appellant,
v.
AMYW.LIMERES,
Appellee.
)) SupremeCourtNo.S-15489
SuperiorCourtNo.3AN-11-09292CI
OPINION
No.7081–February12,2016
)))))
)))
AppealfromtheSuperiorCourtoftheStateofAlaska,ThirdJudicialDistrict,Anchorage,AndrewGuidi,Judge.
Appearances:ReneE.Limeres,prose,Nenana,Appellant.David W. Baranow, Law Offices of David Baranow,
Anchorage,forAppellee.
Before: Stowers,ChiefJustice,Fabe,Winfree,Maassen, andBolger,Justices.
FABE,Justice. MAASSEN,Justice,withwhomWINFREE,Justice,joins,dissenting.
I. INTRODUCTION
Acouplewiththreechildrendivorcedafter15yearsofmarriage. In2012
thesuperiorcourtorderedthefathertopayroughly$1,500permonthinchildsupport.
Thischildsupportcalculationreliedonthesuperiorcourt’sfinding,basedontheparties’
testimonyattrial,thatthefather’sincomewas$40,000annuallydespitehisself-reported
financialdocumentsshowingsignificantlylessincome. Thefatherappealedandwe
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affirmedthesuperiorcourt’sfindingsandsupportorderinearly2014.1 Beforethat
appealwasresolved,thefatherseparatelymovedtomodifyhissupportobligation,filing
similarself-reportedfinancialdocumentsandarguingthathisactualincomewasless
than$10,000peryearasshownonhis2013taxreturn.Thesuperiorcourtdeniedhis
motiontomodifywithoutanevidentiaryhearing.Italsoawardedclosetofullattorney’s
feestothemotherdespitethefactthatsheraisedherfeerequestinheroppositiontothe
motiontomodifyandnevermadeaseparatemotionforfees. Thefatherappealsthe
denial ofhis motion tomodifyhis childsupportobligationwithoutanevidentiary
hearing. Healsoappealsthesuperiorcourt’sawardofattorney’sfeesintheabsenceof
amotionforfees.
Weaffirmthesuperiorcourt’sdenialofthefather’smotiontomodifychild
supportwithoutahearingandconcludethatanevidentiaryhearingwasnotrequired
becausethefatherpresentednonewevidencethatwouldrequireahearing. Butitwas
errortoawardattorney’sfeeswithouteitherrequiringthemothertofileamotionforfees
oradvisingthefatherthathehadarighttorespondtothefeerequestmadeinthe
mother’soppositionbrief. We thereforevacatethesuperiorcourt’sfeeawardand
remandtogivethefatheranopportunitytorespond.
II. FACTSANDPROCEEDINGS
Thisappealmarksthesecondtimewehavebeenaskedtoreviewthechild
supportdeterminationmadebythesuperiorcourtinthiscase. Theunderlyingfacts
remainthesameasthosewedescribedinthefirstappeal:
AmyandReneLimeresweremarriedin1997andhadthreechildrentogether.Amyisanattorney;Renehasmademoney
from a variety of self-employment activities, includingguiding, writing articles about the outdoors, and selling
1 Limeres v. Limeres,320P.3d291(Alaska2014).
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books.ThecoupleseparatedinJuly2011,andAmyfiledfordivorce.... Thecourtheldatwo-daydivorceandcustodytrialinJuly2012. Followingtrialitgrantedtherequesteddivorceandawardedsolelegalandphysicalcustodyofthethreechildren to Amy. Thecourt found that Rene’s netannualincomewas$40,000andthathewasobligatedtopaychildsupportof$1,514permonthretroactivetoAugust1,2011.... Renefiledamotionforreconsideration,whichthe[superior]courtdenied. Reneappeal[ed].[2]
AlthoughRenewasrepresentedbycounselduringtheinitialdivorceproceeding, 3hehas
representedhimselfinthesubsequentproceedings.
Inthefirstappeal,Renechallengedthesuperiorcourt’s“determinationof
hischildsupportobligations...[and]itsdenialofattorney’sfees,”amongotherissues.4
Weaffirmedthesuperiorcourt’sorderonallissues.5 Mostrelevanthere,weobserved
that“Renetestifiedattrialabouthis‘generationofsubstantialfunds,inthehundredsof
thousandsofdollars,intermsofbooksales,inventoryonhand,royaltiesandguiding
fees.’”6 Thenthreemonthsaftertrial,“Renesubmittedhis2011taxreturnsandaChild
SupportAffidavit thatshowed incomeof$8,426.82.”7 Facedwith this conflicting
evidence, the superior court found that Rene earned “at least $40,000 annually.”8
Reviewingforclearerror,wedeclinedtooverturnthesuperiorcourt’sfinding:“[G]iven
2 Id. at295.
3 Id. at302.
4 Id. at294-95.
5 Id. at295.
6 Id. at297.
7 Id.
8 Id. at296.
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Rene’searliertestimony,”weexplained,“wecannotsaythat thecourtclearlyerredwhen
itfoundhisyearlyincometobeapproximately$40,000despitewhathereportedonhis
incometaxreturn.”9 Wealsoconcludedthatthesuperiorcourtdidnoterrindenying
additionalattorney’sfeestoReneafteraninitialawardofinterimfees,inconnection
withthedivorceproceedings,underAS25.24.140(a)(1). 10
PriortoourMarch2014decision,Renefilednumerousmotionstostay
enforcementofthesuperiorcourt’ssupportorder,tomodifyhissupportobligation,and
toexpeditethesuperiorcourt’sconsideration.Thesuperiorcourtdeniedthesemotions.
InresponseRenefiledoveradozenmotionstoreconsider,whichthesuperiorcourtalso
denied. Mostrelevanthere,inJanuary2013Renefiledamotionformodificationof
childsupportbasedonhisallegedmaterialchangeofcircumstances. Renesupported
this motion withdocuments similar to those he had presented during the divorce
proceedingsjustafewmonthsearlier:Hefiledanewchildsupportguidelinesaffidavit
andhislatesttaxreturn(nowfor2012)showinganincomeof$5,770.93,allfromself-
reportedbusinessprofitsandhisPermanentFundDividend(PFD). Thesuperiorcourt
denied this motion for modification in July 2013. Rene’s subsequent motion for
reconsiderationallegedthathewasentitledtoanevidentiaryhearingontheevidencehe
hadpresented,butthetrialcourtdeniedreconsiderationinAugust2013.
Five months later, in January 2014, Rene filed a second motion for
modificationofchildsupport. Thatmotionisthesubjectofthecurrentappeal. Along
withthis2014motionformodification,Renealsofiledanothertaxreturnandchild
support guidelines affidavit, now showing his financial information for 2013 and
claiminganannualincomeof$7,120,entirelyfromself-reportedbusinessprofits.Rene
9 Id. at297.
10 Id. at302.
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also submitted a sworn affidavit alleging financial hardship in an effort “to enter
additionalevidenceintothe[r]ecordtosupport[his]claimthatthecurrentobligation
[was]notbasedonarealisticassessmentof[his]currentearningcapacity.”Theaffidavit
claimedthatRenehadnomorebookslefttosell“noranyfundstoprintmore”andthat,
becauseofchildsupportliensagainsthim,hislowcreditscoremadeitimpossiblefor
himtoborrowmoneytoprintmorebooks. Rene’saffidavitalsostatedthat,despitethe
factthathehad“aggressivelysoughtadditionalemploymentwitheverylocalbusiness,”
hehadonlybeenabletosecurepart-timeworkthat“barelypa[id]enoughfor[him]to
surviveon.”
AmyopposedRene’smotiontomodifyhissupportobligation. Inher
oppositionbriefshequestionedtheveracityofRene’sreportedincomeof$7,120from
his2013taxreturn,whichsheassertedwas“necessarilyinaccurateonitsface.” She
suggestedthatitwasnonsensicalforRenetobe “earn[ing]lessthanone-halftheAlaskan
minimumwagerateforasingleindividualworkingafull-time,40hourworkweek.”
AmyalsochallengedRene’sassertionthathehadnomorebookstosell,giventhatRene
hadreceivedthewholebookinventoryinthesuperiorcourt’spropertydivisionyet
reportednobooksaleprofitsonhis2013taxreturn. Amystatedthat“Renewould
apparentlyleaveittothisCourttodetermineonwhichoccasion(orboth)hedidperjure
himselfastothevalue/proceedsoftheseassets.” AmyconcludedbynotingthatRene’s
“allegedproofsofhismostrecentde minimis earnings...straincredibilitywellpastthe
burstingpoint.”
AmyalsoassertedthatRene’smotiontomodifysupportwas“devoidof
merit”and“frivolousinnature.”Amythusrequested,inheroppositionbrief,an“awardofactualattorney’sfees[underAlaskaCivilRule82]andadditionalsanctionspursuant
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toAlaskaCivilRule...11.”11 Amystatedthatshehadincurredattorneyexpensesfor
“[a] totalof2.5 hoursattorney timeat $225.00perhour . . . to pursue anddraft
oppositionandrelatedpleadings,foratotalof$562.50.” ButAmydidnotattachany
billingstatementstosupportthatfigure,nordidshefileaseparatemotiontorequest
attorney’sfeesasnormallyrequiredunderCivilRule82.RenedidnotrespondtoAmy’s
substantiveargumentsorthequestionofattorney’sfees.
On February 4, 2014, the superior court denied Rene’s motion for
modificationofsupport. Atthesametime,withoutrequiringthatAmymakeaseparate
motionforattorney’sfees,thecourtawardedAmy$500inattorney’sfeesbutdeclined
toimposeRule11sanctions“forthefilingofaplainlymeritlessandfrivolousmotion.”
Rene then filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that he was entitled to an
evidentiary hearingonhis motion tomodify support and contesting the award of
attorney’sfeesintheabsenceofamotionforfeesunderCivilRule82. Themotionfor
reconsiderationwasdenied,andRenenowappeals.
11 Incasesnotinvolvingamonetaryjudgment,CivilRule82generallyallowstheprevailingpartytorecoverpartialattorney’sfees. AlaskaR.Civ.P.82(b)(2). Therule allows enhanced fees upon consideration of certain factors listed in the rule,including full attorney’s fees for “vexatious or bad faith conduct” underRule82(b)(3)(G). CivilRule11requiresattorneysandunrepresentedpartiestocertifythatthepleadingsandmotionstheyfileare“notbeingpresentedforanyimproper
purpose,suchastoharass,causeunnecessarydelay,orneedlesslyincreasethecostof
litigation.” AlaskaR.Civ.P.11(b)(1). Wehaveinterpretedittoauthorizesanctionsagainstpartieswhoviolatetherule. Alaska State Emps. Ass’n v. Alaska Pub. Emps.
Ass’n,813P.2d669,671(Alaska1991)(citing Keen v. Ruddy,784P.2d653,658(Alaska1989)).
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III. STANDARDOFREVIEW
“Weuseourindependentjudgmenttodecidewhetheritwaserrornotto
holdanevidentiaryhearing.”12 Thisgeneralprincipleappliesequallyinthecontextof
motionstomodifychildsupport:“Wereviewdenovowhetheramovingpartyhasmade
aprima facieshowingsufficientto justifya custodyorchild supportmodification
hearing.”13 Thuswe“willaffirmadenialofamodificationmotionwithoutahearingif,
inourindependentjudgment,...theallegationsaresogeneralorconclusory...asto
createnogenuineissueofmaterialfactrequiringahearing.” 14
“Wereviewanawardofattorney’sfeesforabuseofdiscretion,”15soafee
award“willnotbedisturbedonappealunlessitis‘arbitrary,capricious,ormanifestly
unreasonable.’”16 However,“[w]hetherthesuperiorcourtappliedtheappropriatelegal
standardinitsconsiderationofafeepetitionpresentsaquestionoflawthatwereview
denovo.”17
12 Routh v. Andreassen,19P.3d593,595(Alaska2001); see also Hartley v.
Hartley,205P.3d342,346-47(Alaska2009).
13 Hill v. Bloom, 235 P.3d215,219 (Alaska2010)(alterationsomitted)(quoting Harrington v. Jordan,984P.2d1,3(Alaska1999)).
14 Id. (secondalterationinoriginal)(quoting Harrington,984P.2dat3).
15 Martin v. Martin,303P.3d421,424(Alaska2013)(citing McDonald v.
Trihub,173P.3d416,420(Alaska2007)).
16 Limeres v. Limeres,320P.3d291,296(Alaska2014)(quoting Fergusonv. Ferguson,195P.3d127,130(Alaska2008)).
17 Powell v. Powell ,194P.3d364,368(Alaska2008)(citing McDonald ,173P.3dat420).
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Finally,“[w]ereviewforabuseofdiscretion‘decisionsaboutguidanceto
aproselitigant.’”18 “Anabuseofdiscretionexistswhenapartyhasbeendeprivedof
asubstantialrightorseriouslyprejudicedbythelowercourt’sruling.” 19
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Rene’sMotionForModificationOfChildSupport,FiledOnlyFiveMonthsAfterTheDenialOfHisPreviousMotionForModification,
DidNotRequire ANew Evidentiary HearingBecause ItDidNot
ProvideSubstantiallyNewEvidence.
Renehasargued,bothinhismotionforreconsiderationbeforethetrial
courtandonappealhere,thatthesuperiorcourterredindenyinganevidentiaryhearing
onhismotiontomodifychildsupport. Becausethisargument raisesa legal issue
relatingtothenecessityofholdinganevidentiaryhearing,weaddressthisquestionde
novo.20
AlaskaCivilRule90.3(h),whichgovernsthemodificationofchildsupport
orders, provides for modification “upon a showing of a material change of
circumstances.”21 Therulestatesthat“[a]materialchangeofcircumstanceswillbe
presumedifsupportascalculatedunder[Rule90.3]ismorethan15percentgreateror
lessthantheoutstandingsupportorder.” 22 Buttheburdenisonthemovingpartyto
18 Greenway v. Heathcott , 294 P.3d1056,1062(Alaska2013)(quotingShooshanian v. Dire,237P.3d618,622(Alaska2010)).
19 Limeres,320P.3dat296(quoting Azimi v. Johns,254P.3d1054,1059(Alaska2011)).
20 Routh v. Andreassen,19P.3d593,595(Alaska2001).
21 AlaskaR.Civ.P.90.3(h)(1).
22 Id.
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makeaprimafacieshowingthatthispresumptionapplies.23 Thus,while“[t]rialcourts
must take [into account] all evidence necessary to accurately reflect the parties’
economic reality,”24 a motion to modify child support may be denied without an
evidentiaryhearingwhenthemovingpartyhas“notpresentedsufficientevidenceof
permanentlyreducedincometoshowamaterialchangeincircumstances.”25 Inother
words,wehaveemphasizedthat“[a]hearingisnotrequiredwhenthereisnogenuine
issueofmaterial fact. ‘Generalizedallegationsoffactual issues that other record
evidenceconvincingly refutes’ donotcreategenuineissuesofmaterial fact.”26 In
addition,wehaveheldthataparty’s“bareclaim,”eveninaswornaffidavit,doesnot
createadisputeofmaterialfact.27
Moreover, to create an issue of material fact, a party must present
substantiallynew evidenceshowingchangedcircumstances—notsimply“additional
23 See Hill v. Bloom,235P.3d215,219(Alaska2010)(reviewing“[w]hetheramovingpartyhasmadeaprimafacieshowingsufficienttojustify...achildsupport
modificationhearing”(firstalterationinoriginal)(quoting Harrington v. Jordan,984P.2d1,3(Alaska1999))).
24 Routh,19P.3dat595-96(quoting Adrian v. Adrian,838P.2d808,811(Alaska1992)).
25 Hill ,235P.3dat217.
26 Wilhour v. Wilhour ,308P.3d884,888(Alaska2013)(internalcitationandalterationomitted)(quoting Acevedo v. Burley,944P.2d473,475(Alaska1997)).
27 Epperson v. Epperson,835P.2d451,453&n.4(Alaska1992)(holdingthataparty’s“bareclaim”thatthecustodialparenthadlowlivingexpensesdidnotcreateagenuineissueofmaterialfact); see also Hill ,235P.3dat220n.11(“Withoutmoreinformation,. ..[a]bareassertion... isinsufficienttowarrantanevidentiaryhearing.”).
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evidencebolstering...previouslyadducedevidenceandarguments.” 28 Weaddressed
thisissuein Hill v. Bloom,acaseanalogoustothepresentone,whereaparentsimilarly
movedformodificationofchildsupportonthebasisofallegedlylow,self-reported
businessincomejustafewmonthsaftertheinitialchildsupportdetermination.
Inthatcase,Hillhadpresentedherlatestfinancialdocumentsshowinga
decreaseinincomefromthebusinesssheowned,andattrialshehadarguedthather
decreaseinincomewaspermanent. 29 Thetrialcourtfoundinsteadthatthedecreasewas
an“aberration”and orderedher to paychildsupportbasedonher earlier, higher
income.30Justfivemonthsafterthisevidentiaryhearing,Hillmovedformodification
ofherchildsupportobligations,arguingthathercontinuedlowincomeconstituteda
changedcircumstance.31 Hillsupportedthismotionwithaswornaffidavitandbusiness
summariesshowingherincomefortheprecedingsixmonths. 32 Yetthesuperiorcourt
foundthatthisevidencewasnotenoughtoconstitutenewinformationforthepurpose
ofrequiring anevidentiaryhearing—despite the fact that itwas technically new
evidence—becauseitwascompletelyconsistentwiththeinformationshehadrecently
presentedattrial.33 Weagreed: “ThisevidenceofHill’sactualincome. ..wasnot
presented to thesuperiorcourt in the [prior]hearing, so in thatsenseitwasnew
evidence,butitwasentirelyconsistentwiththeevidenceandargumentsthatHilldid
28 Hill ,235P.3dat219.
29 Id. at217-18.
30 Id. at218.
31 Id.
32 Id. at218,219.
33 Id. at218.
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presenttothecourtatthehearing,”andthusweheldthatthesuperiorcourtdidnoterr
indenyinganevidentiaryhearing. 34
Wealsoemphasizedthatonlyfivemonthshadpassedbetweentheinitial
childsupportdeterminationandHill’smotiontomodifychildsupportbasedonchanged
circumstances.35 Wesuggested that,withoutdrawing“abright lineestablishing a
minimumperiodoftimethatapartymustwait...before...fil[ing]amotiontomodify
support,”36 averyshorttimeframetendstomakeitlesslikelythatanewevidentiary
hearingwouldberequired.37 Accordingly,weheldthatthesuperiorcourthadnoterred
indenyingHill’smotionwithoutconductinganewevidentiaryhearing:
Given the relatively brief passage of time between theFebruary2008evidentiaryhearingandtheJuly2008motiontomodify,andgiventhattheevidencepresentedinsupportof the motion tomodify was essentially the same as theevidencepresentedintheevidentiaryhearing,wecannotsaythat the court clearly erred in concluding that Hill had
presentednonewevidenceforthepurposeofconsideringhermotiontomodifychildsupport.[38]
Theessenceofthisconclusionisthatnohearingisrequiredwhereapartyfilesevidence
attrialandthen,shortlythereafter,refilesthesameorsimilarinformationinanattempttoclaimchangedcircumstances.
34 Id. at219-20.
35 Id. at218,220.
36 Id. at218.
37 See id. at220(“Hill’sactualincomeforthefirsthalfof2008didnotmakeaprimafacieshowingformodificationofchildsupportgiventherelativelyshortamountoftimethatpassedbetweentheevidentiaryhearingandthemotiontomodify.”).
38 Id. at219.
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Thisanalysisappliesequallyinthecurrentcase. Renearguesthatthe
evidencehepresentedcreatesanissueofmaterialfactwithregardtohislevelofincome
andhisearningcapacity. Reneexplainsthatheprovided(1)a taxreturnandchild
supportaffidavitshowingthathisself-reportedannualincomewaswellbelowthelevel
determinedbythesuperiorcourt,and(2)anaffidavitattestingthathehadsoldoutofhis
supplyofbooks(aprimarysourceofincomeforhim),hadsustainedaleginjuryina
snowmobileaccidentthatreducedhisearningcapacity,andhad“aggressively”sought
employmentbuthadonlybeenabletosecureapart-time,minimum-wagejob. Rene
contendsthatthestatementabouthisbookinventory“wasnotseriouslychallenged”by
Amy,nordidAmypresenta“cogentargument...todispute”histestimonyabouthis
newpart-timejob.
Amy counters that Rene is not entitled to “repetitive and successive
hearings”ontheproperamountofchildsupport“simplybecausehehasprovided...tax
returnstothecourt.” Weagree. Under Hill v. Bloom,noneoftheevidenceRene
presentedwassufficienttocreateadisputeofmaterialfactbecauseitdidnotofferany
substantiallynewinformationbeyondwhathehadrecentlypresentedattrial.
First, the short timeline of Rene’s successive motions supports the
conclusionthatanewevidentiaryhearingwasnotrequiredhere. Inthatrespect,this
caseechoes Hill ’ssuggestionthatthe“briefpassageoftimebetweenthe...evidentiary
hearingandthe...motiontomodify”counselsagainstrequiringanewevidentiary
hearing.39 RenefiledhisfirstmotiontomodifychildsupportinJanuary2013,justtwo
and a half months after the initial trial and determination of child support in
November2012.Afterbriefingbytheparties,thesuperiorcourtdeniedRene’smotioninJuly2013. Reneimmediatelyfiledamotionforreconsiderationinwhichheargued
See id.
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thathewasentitledtoanevidentiaryhearing,whichthesuperiorcourtdenied. Justfive
monthsafterthat,inJanuary2014,Renefiledthemotiontomodifychildsupportthatis
nowbeforeusonappeal.Moreover,atthetimeoffiling—notwithstandingthelarge
numberofmotionsfiledintheinterveningperiod—onlyslightlymorethanayearhad
passedsincetheinitialdivorcedecreeandchildsupportorder.Theshortpassageoftime
betweeneachofthesestagesthuspointstowardtheconclusionthatanewhearingisnot
required.
Furthermore,theevidenceRenefiledwithhismotionwassubstantially
equivalenttotheevidencehehadrecentlypresentedattrial. First,thetaxreturnand
childsupportguidelinesaffidavitthatRenesubmittedwithhis2014motiontomodify
wereverysimilartothedocumentshehadsubmittedtothecourtinthedivorcetrialand
inhis2013motiontomodifysupport. Thenewlysubmittedtaxreturnandchildsupport
affidavitmirroredhisearliersubmissionsinbothcharacterandcontent:The2011tax
returnsubmittedinthedivorcetrialshowedatotalincomeof$8,427comingentirely
fromself-reportedbusinessprofitsandRene’sPFD,whilethe2013taxreturnshowed
atotalincomeof$7,120solelyfromself-reportedbusinessprofits.
Inadditiontothefactthattheamount ofreportedincomeishighlysimilar
acrosstheseyears,thenatureoftheincomeisalsoidentical,inthatRene’snon-PFD
incomeconsistsentirelyofself-reportedbusinessearnings. Totheextentthatitdiffers
atallfromhisearlierfilings,Rene’slatesttaxreturnactuallyprovideslessinformation
byfailingtoincludeaScheduleCshowingthedetailsofhisbusinessearnings. And
Rene’snewchildsupportguidelinesaffidavit,liketheaffidavithesubmittedduringthe
divorcetrial,simplymatchestheamountofincomereportedonthecorrespondingtaxreturn. So,likein Hill ,thisevidence“wasentirelyconsistentwiththeevidenceand
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arguments”thatRenedidpresenttothecourtattrial. 40 Thesuperiorcourthadalready
foundRene’sself-reportedtaxreturnandchildsupportaffidavittobelesscrediblethan
histestimonysuggestingamuchhigherincome,andweupheldthatfinding.41 Now,
becauseRene’sostensiblynewtaxreturnshows“essentiallythesame”amountand
source of income as the tax return already considered at trial, it fails to present
sufficiently new evidence to create a dispute of material fact warranting a new
evidentiaryhearing.42
NordoesRene’s supplemental affidavitprovidesufficientevidenceto
requireanewhearing.Wehavepreviouslyheldinthechildsupportcontextthat“acourt
maydenyahearingwherethemovingpartymakesonlybareassertions...thatfailto
createagenuineissueofmaterialfact.” 43 In Hill ,these“bareassertions”includedHill’s
swornstatementthatshehadbeendiagnosedwithakidneydisorderrequiringsurgery.
Becauseshedidnotprovideinformationaboutthecostsorrecoverytimeforthesurgery,
the court concluded that “Hill’s medical condition [did]not cross the evidentiary
thresholdtorequireanevidentiaryhearing.” 44 Here,similarly,Reneofferednoevidence
beyondhisownunsupportedassertionsthathehad“nomorebigbooks...left”tosell,
“nor any funds to print more,” and that he had “aggressively sought additional
employment”butcouldonlysecureapart-time,minimum-wagejob.
40 See id.
41 Limeres v. Limeres,320P.3d291,296-97(Alaska2014).
42 See Hill ,235P.3dat219.
43 Ward v. Urling ,167P.3d48,53n.18(Alaska2007); see also Hill ,235P.3dat220n.11.
44 Hill ,235P.3dat220n.11.
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WhilethedissentconsidersRene’sassertionstobehighlysignificant,it
fails to address or distinguish our conclusion in Hill v. Bloom that this type of
unsupportedclaimdoesnotjustifyanewhearing. ThedissentemphasizesthatRene’s
assertionsdifferedfromthemoregeneralizedstatementsthatfailedtojustifyahearing
inWard v. Urling .45 ButinWard wedidnotactuallydecidethequestionwhetheran
evidentiaryhearingwasrequiredorindicatewherethelinemightbedrawn. Insteadwe
simply“note[d]thatit[was]highlyquestionablewhetherWardwas...entitledtoan
evidentiaryhearing,”46 makingnofurtherpronouncementsastowhatwould justifya
hearing.In Epperson v. Epperson,similarly,weconcludedthatgeneralstatementswere
insufficienttojustifyahearingbutdidnotdrawahardlinebeyondwhichahearingis
required.47 Andin Hill weconcludedthateventhemorespecificcontentionsmadeby
Hillfailedtorequireahearing.48 SoalthoughRene’sstatementsaboutdiminishedbook
salesprovidedmoredetailthanthestatementsinWard and Epperson,Rene—like
Hill—providedlittle informationandnodocumentationto supporthisassertions.Thus,
weconcludethatRene’s“bareassertion[s],”madewithoutanysupportinginformation,
are“insufficienttowarrantanevidentiaryhearing.” 49
Renenowclaimsthathealsoofferedinformationaboutasnowmobile
injurythatforcedhimtomisspartofhisbook-sellingseason.Infact,Renemadethis
assertioninseveralaffidavitspertainingtothe2013motiontomodifychildsupport.By
45 Dissentat24-25.
46 167P.3dat53n.18.
47 835P.2d451,453,n.4(Alaska1992).
48 235P.3dat219,220n.11.
49 See id. at220n.11.
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contrast, his 2014 affidavit did not mention this fact, let alone provide further
informationtosupportit.Similarly,Renenowinvitesthecourt“tofullyinvestigate[his]
finances,”andhemadeasimilarofferinearlierproceedingsbeforethesuperiorcourt.
Butheneitherprovidedanyfurtherfinancialdocumentationnormentionedthisofferat
thetimeofhis2014motiontomodifysupport. Sotheseassertions,too,failtomeetthe
barforrequiringanevidentiaryhearing.
Insum,giventhesimilarityoftheevidencepresentedateachofthese
stages,coupledwiththeshortpassageoftime betweeneachstage,weconcludethatRene
wasnotentitledtoanewevidentiaryhearingatthetimeofhis2014motiontomodify
support.
B. ItWasErrorToAwardNear-FullAttorney’sFeesWithoutAMotion
ForFeesAndWithoutAdvisingReneOfHisRightToRespond.
Renealsoarguesthatitwasimproperforthesuperiorcourttoaward
near-fullattorney’sfeestoAmygiventhatshedidnotfileamotionforfeesasrequired
byAlaskaRuleofCivilProcedure82(c). Becausethisquestionrelatestothesuperior
court’sdecisionnottoadviseaproselitigantofhisrighttorespondbeforegranting
attorney’sfees,“[w]ereviewforabuseofdiscretion.”50
AsRene correctly noted inhis motion for reconsideration before the
superiorcourtandnotesagainonappealhere,CivilRule82(c)providesthat“[a]motion
isrequiredforanawardofattorney’sfeesunderthisruleorpursuanttocontract,statute,
regulation,orlaw.” Thisrequirementgivestheopposingpartyachancetorespondto
See Greenway v. Heathcott ,294P.3d1056,1062(Alaska2013)(citingShooshanian v. Dire,237P.3d618,622(Alaska2010)).
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50
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thefeerequest. Accordingly,“itiserrortoawardattorney’sfeesbeforetheopposing
partyhasanopportunitytorespond.”51
Rule82alsoprescribesaformulaforcalculatingattorney’sfees, specifying
thatacourtmayonlyvaryfromthestandardawardofpartialfeesafterconsidering
certainfactorslistedintherule.52 Aswerecentlyexplained,“[w]ehaveheldthatin
general,atrialcourthasbroaddiscretiontoawardRule82attorney’sfeesinamounts
exceedingthoseprescribedbythescheduleoftherule,solongasthecourtspecifiesin
therecorditsreasonsfordepartingfromtheschedule.”53 Yetwehavealsoclarifiedthat
“fullfeesmaynotbeawardedunderRule82(b)(3)exceptunderRule82(b)(3)(G),”54the
provisionfor“vexatiousorbadfaithlitigationconduct.” Therefore,“[a]Rule82(b)(3)
awardoffullfeesis‘manifestlyunreasonable’absentafindingofbadfaithorvexatious
conduct.”55
Here,Amymadenomotionforattorney’sfees.Instead,Amy’srequestfor
feeswascontainedwithinhermeritsbriefinoppositiontoRene’smotiontomodifychild
support.Amy’sopposition briefrequestedactualattorney’sfeesunderCivilRule82and
sanctionsunderCivilRule11.Italsobrieflystatedthatherlawyerhadworked“[a]total
of2.5hoursattorneytimeat$225.00perhour...foratotalof$562.50.” Thesuperior
courteffectivelytreatedthisrequestasanonconformingmotionforattorney’sfees,
51 Gallant v. Gallant ,945P.2d795,800(Alaska1997)(citing Bowman v. Blair ,889P.2d1069,1075(Alaska1995)).
52 See AlaskaR.Civ.P.82(b).
53 Kollander v. Kollander ,322 P.3d 897,907 (Alaska2014)(alterationsomitted)(quoting Johnson v. Johnson,239P.3d393,400(Alaska2010)).
54 Id. (quoting Johnson,239P.3dat403).
55 Id. (quoting Johnson,239P.3dat400).
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despitethefactthatnosuchmotionhadbeenmade,anditawarded$500ofactual
attorney’sfeestoAmy.56 Thusthesuperiorcourtawardednear-fullattorney’sfees
withoutanymotionforfees,andwithoutinformingRenethatitintendedtotreatthe
languageinAmy’sbriefasaseparatemotionforfees.
In Breck v. Ulmer weheldthatthecourtshaveadutyto“informaprose
litigantoftheproperprocedurefor theactionheor she isobviouslyattemptingto
accomplish.”57 Althoughoursubsequentcaselawhas“decline[d]toextend Breck to
requirejudgestowarnproselitigantsonaspectsofprocedurewhentheproselitigant
has failed to at least filea defective pleading,”58 wehavealso recognized special
circumstancesgivingrisetoaheighteneddutywhenthetrialcourtitselfdeviatesfrom
normalprocedures.Forinstance,in Bush v. Elkins,wherethesuperiorcourtremoved
a pro se litigant’s name from the casecaption and instructed him to cease filing
pleadings,weheld that“aduty to inform[theproseparty]ofhisabilitytofilea
response...arosefromthesuperiorcourt’sactions.” 59
56 AlthoughthesuperiorcourtfoundthatRene’smotionwas“meritlessandfrivolous,”itdeclinedtoimposeamonetarysanction. Itisunclearwhetherthephrase“meritlessandfrivolous”isintendedtoreflectafindingthatRene’smotionconstituted“vexatiousand bad faith conduct” justifying a possible full fee award underRule82(b)(3)(G). However,weneednotconsiderthatquestionherebecauseweconcludethattheenhancedfeeawardwasimproperonothergrounds.
57 Breck v. Ulmer ,745P.2d66,75(Alaska1987)(italicsomitted).
58 Bauman v. State, Div. of Family & Youth Servs.,768P.2d1097,1099(Alaska1989).
59 342P.3d1245,1254(Alaska2015).
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We considered the same question in Pedersen v. Blythe, a case that
presentedsimilarproceduralissuestothecurrentone.60 There,inrulingonamotionto
dismiss,thesuperiorcourtconsideredevidencebeyondthepleadings, therebyconverting
themotiontodismissintoamotionforsummaryjudgment,withoutinformingthepro
selitigantofthisproceduralshiftorgivinghimachancetoreply. 61 Weemphasizedthat
amotion forsummary judgment requires that opposingpartieshave a “reasonable
opportunity”torespond.62 Moreover,weexplained,“[t]he‘reasonableopportunity’is
particularlyimportantforproseparties,giventhattrialjudgesareobligatedtoinform
proselitigantsofproceduralrequirements”inthiscontext.63 Accordingly,weheldthat
“thesuperiorcourterredwhen,indecidingthemotiontodismiss,itconsideredmatters
outsidethepleadingswithoutadvisingPedersenofitsintenttodosoandgivinghima
reasonableopportunitytorespond.” 64
Amotionforattorney’sfeessimilarlyrequiresthat“theopposingparty[be
given]anopportunitytorespond.” 65 Yetinthecurrentcase,thesuperiorcourtconverted
Amy’soppositiontothemotiontomodifysupportintoamotionforattorney’sfees
withoutadvisingReneof“itsintenttodosoandgivinghimareasonableopportunityto
60 292P.3d182(Alaska2012).
61 Id. at185.
62 Id.
63 Id. (citingGenaro v. Municipality of Anchorage,76P.3d844,846(Alaska
2003)).
64 Id. at183.
65 Gallant v. Gallant ,945P.2d795,800(Alaska1997)(citing Bowman v.
Blair ,889P.2d1069,1075(Alaska1995)).
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respond.”66 Inlightofourcaselawonthisissue,weconcludethatitwaserrortoaward
attorney’sfeeswithoutamotionforfeesandwithoutnotifyingReneofhisrightto
respondtoAmy’srequestforfees.IfthesuperiorcourtchosetotreatAmy’smeritsbrief
asanonconformingmotionforfees,ithadadutytoinformReneofthisproceduralshift
andgivehimareasonableopportunitytorespond. 67
Rene’srighttorespondisparticularlyimportantinlightofthefactthat
AmyrequestedfullfeesunderRule82(c)andsanctionsunderRule11. Becausefull
attorney’sfeesareonlypermittedafterafindingof“vexatiousorbadfaithconduct,”
ReneshouldhavehadanopportunitytocontestAmy’sallegationthathismotionwas
“frivolous.” Indeed,therecordshowsthatRenedidcontestthisallegationinhismotion
forreconsideration,arguingthathismotionwas“areasonedandlegitimatecryfor
justice”andthatitwasnot“meritless”or“frivolous”becausehesubmitted“[s]ufficient
supportingevidence.” IfhehadbeenaffordedanopportunitytorespondtoAmy’s
requestforfees,Renemighthavemadethesesameargumentsinhisresponse. The
failuretoaffordRenethisopportunity,asReneargued,“representsa...violationofdue
process.”
Accordingly,wefindthatthesuperiorcourt’sfeeawardconstitutedan
abuseofdiscretion. Wethusvacatethesuperiorcourt’sorderofattorney’sfeesagainst
ReneandremandtogiveReneanopportunitytorespondtoAmy’srequestforfeesand
sanctions.
66
Pedersen,292P.3dat183.67 AlthoughAmycontendsthatthefeerequestinherbriefputRene“on
noticeoftherequestbeingmade,”thisargumentisbesidethepoint.EvenifRenecoulddiscernfromAmy’sbriefthatshewasrequestingfees,hehadnowayofknowingthatthecourtwouldtreatthisportionofthemeritsbriefasanindependentmotionforfees.
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Onremand,aftergivingReneanopportunitytorespond,thesuperiorcourt
may then decide whether an enhanced fee award is appropriate. In making this
determination, the superiorcourtshould follow the two-step process that wehave
describedinpastcases.Specifically,forafeeawardunderRule82(b)(3),thetrial“court
must first calculatewhataward isauthorizedunder the scheduleset forth inCivil
Rule 82[(b)(2)] and then state its reasons for deviating from that award.”68 A
Rule82(b)(3)awardoffullfeesismanifestlyunreasonableabsentafindingofbadfaith
orvexatiousconduct.69 Thesuperiorcourt’sdecisiononremand,therefore,shouldnot
only consider Rene’s response to Amy’s fee request but should also provide an
explanationforanyfeeawardthatdeviatesfromtheformulaspecifiedinRule82(b)(1).
Indeterminingwhethera litigant’sclaims“weremadevexatiouslyorinbad
faith,”wehavepreviouslyexplained,“[t]heissueisnotwhethertheywereultimately
unsuccessful,butwhethertheywerecollectivelyorindividuallysolackinginmeritthat
itispermissibleto inferthat[theparty]actedinbadfaithorengaged invexatious
litigationconduct.”70 SothefactthatRenedidnotprevailonthemeritsdoesnot
necessarilymeanhismotionwasfiledvexatiouslyorinbadfaith. Ifthesuperiorcourt
finds,evenafterconsideringRene’sresponse,thatthemotiontomodifysupportwas
vexatiousorinbadfaithwithinthemeaningofRule82(b)(3)(G),itshouldmakea
specificfindingtothateffect. Onlyaftersuchafindingwouldenhancedattorney’sfees
bewarranted.
68 Kowalski v. Kowalski,806P.2d1368,1373(Alaska1991)(citing Mullenv. Christiansen,642P.2d1345,1351(Alaska1982)).
69 Johnson v. Johnson,239P.3d393,400(Alaska2010).
70 Id. at401.
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V. CONCLUSION
WeAFFIRMthesuperiorcourt’sdenialofanevidentiaryhearingon
Rene’smotiontomodifychildsupport. WeVACATEthefeeawardandtheRule11
sanctionsandREMANDtothesuperiorcourttoaffordReneanopportunitytorespond
toAmy’srequestforfullattorney’sfeesandsanctions.
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MAASSEN,Justice,withwhomWINFREE,Justice,joins,dissenting.
Irespectfullydissentfromthecourt’sholdingthatitwasnoterrortodeny
anevidentiaryhearingonReneLimeres’smotiontomodifychildsupport.Ibelievethat
Renepresentedunrefutedevidencethatwassufficienttoraiseagenuineissueofmaterial
factaboutwhetherhehadsufferedapermanentreductioninhisincome. 1 Hewas
thereforeentitledtoahearing.
WhenRenefiledthemotiontomodify,hischildsupportwasbasedonthe
superiorcourt’s$40,000estimateofhis2011income. Aswedescribedinour2014
opinion, this estimate was based in large partonRene’s testimony at trial, which
conflictedwiththerelativelymodestincomeof$8,426.82disclosedbyhislate-filed
incometaxreturn.2 AtaninterimcustodyhearingRenehadestimatedhisannualincome
as$40,000or“closerto$38,000.”3 Attrialhetestified“abouthis ‘generationof
substantialfunds, in the hundreds ofthousands ofdollars, in terms ofbook sales,
inventoryonhand,royaltiesandguidingfees,andclaim[ed]tohaveprovidedatleast
$23,000.00,priortotheparties’separation,forthedirectneedsofthechildrenoverthe
courseofoneyear.’”4 Renewas“unwillingorunabletoprovidespecificsastothe
amountofmoneyhehadmadeinrecentyearsfromguiding,”buthedidgivenumbers
1 See Hill v. Bloom,235P.3d215,219(Alaska2010)(“We‘willaffirmadenialofamodificationmotionwithoutahearingif,inourindependentjudgment,thefactsalleged,evenifproved,cannotwarrantmodification,oriftheallegationsaresogeneralorconclusory...astocreatenogenuineissueofmaterialfactrequiringahearing.’”(alterationinoriginal)(quoting Harrington v. Jordan,984P.2d1,3(Alaska1999))).
2 Limeres v. Limeres,320P.3d291,296-97(Alaska2014).
3 Id.
4 Id. at297(alterationinoriginal).
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forhisbooksales,describingonebookthat“hesaidhadgeneratedbetween$273,000
and$364,000”ingrossrevenues;testifyingthat“thehardcovereditionofthesamebook
generatedrevenueof$22,000to$29,000”;andidentifyingtwootherbooksthathesaid
“generatedasmuchas$42,000and$17,000inrevenuesrespectively.” 5 Whatever
moneyRenemayhavemadefromguiding,itisclearthatthebooks—bothsalesofhis
owninventoryandroyaltiesfromsalesbyothers—wereasignificantsourceofincome
thathelpedjustifythesuperiorcourt’s$40,000estimate.
IagreethatRene’sJanuary2013motiontomodifychildsupport—with
whichhesimplysubmittedhis2012incometaxreturn,showinglittledifferencefromhis
reportedincomein2011—wasinadequatetoraiseagenuineissueofmaterialfactand
entitlehimtoanevidentiaryhearing. ButinhisJanuary2014motionRenepresenteda
differentcase.
By affidavit, Rene directly addressed his book-sales income source,
assertinginstraightforwardtermsthatitwasnolongerviable. Heattestedthathehad
“nomorebigbooks(AlaskaFishing)left,noranyfundstoprintmore”;thatbecauseof
damagetohiscreditrating“borrowingmoneytoprintmorebooksisnotanoption”;and
thathe“hadto‘giveaway’[his]latestbooktoaroyaltypublisherfor10%,”aratehe
impliedwastoo lowtogenerateanysignificant income. Idonotagreethatthese
statementsoffactwithclearfinancialconsequencescanbedismissedas“bareassertions
...thatfailtocreateagenuineissueofmaterialfact,”asthecourtdoestoday. 6
InWardv.Urling ,the“bareassertionsorgeneralizedallegations”thiscourt
foundlikelytobeinsufficienttojustifyahearingwerecharacterizedas“allegations
5 Id.
6 Opinionat14(alterationinoriginal)(quotingWard v. Urling ,167P.3d48,53n.18(Alaska2007)).
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[that]expressedlittlemorethan[thefather’s]ongoingdissatisfactionwiththecourt’s
previous factual findings pertaining to [the mother’s] income.”7 To support this
discussioninWard wecited Epperson v. Epperson,inwhichthefatherclaimedthatthe
motherhad“unusuallylowlivingexpenses”justifyingadeviationfromtheAlaskaCivil
Rule90.3childsupportformulabut“failedtosetforthspecificfactssubstantiatinghis
bareclaim,”nordidhe“specificallydispute”anyof theexpensesshelistedinher
financialdeclarationandChildSupportGuidelinesAffidavit.8 Here,incontrast,Rene
identifiedamajorsourceofhispastincomeandexplainedwhyitnolongerexisted;these
arenot“bareassertionsorgeneralizedallegations”likethosewehavefoundinsufficient
before.AndwhileRene’sstatementsoffactmaybesubjecttochallenge,Amyfiledno
evidenceinopposition,relyinglargely(asthecourtdoestoday)onthefactthatRenehad
attemptedmodificationbeforewithoutsuccess.9
BecauseRene’s2011incomewassubstantiallybasedontheavailabilityof
aparticularcommodity—books—forhimtosell,andbecauseheassertedbyaffidavit
thatthebooksweregoneandhelackedthefundstoprintmore,hedemonstrateda
genuineissueofmaterialfactastowhetherhisincomewaspermanentlyreduced. This
showingentitledhimtoanevidentiaryhearing. Ithereforedissentfromtoday’sopinion
affirmingthejudgmentofthesuperiorcourt.
7 Ward ,167P.3dat53n.18.
8 Id.; Epperson v. Epperson,835P.2d451,453n.4(Alaska1992).
9 AmycounteredRene’sclaimsaboutlostbook-salesincomesimplybyquestioningwhetherhecouldalreadyhavedepleted“theentiretyofthebookinventory”grantedhiminthedivisionofmaritalproperty. Evenifthisstatementfromanattorney’smemorandumhadevidentiaryvalue,itwouldsimplybetohighlightadisputeoverahighlymaterialissueoffact.
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