Growing Tensions in South China Sea

7/27/2019 Growing Tensions in South China Sea

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break out, but since the 1995 MischiefReef incident between China and thePhilippines, despite frequent flare up oftensions, the region has been largelystable.

South China Sea is seeing the unintendedconsequences of Obama administrationsPivot to Asia policy (Clinton 2011). Underthis policy, recognizing the shift in globalpower alignments the US intends toaugment its political and militaryinvolvement in the South China Sea. AsHillary Clinton stated:

The region is eager for our leadership

and our business -- perhaps more sothan at any time in modern history. Weare the only power with a network ofstrong alliances in the region, noterritorial ambitions, and a long recordof providing for the common good.Along with our allies, we haveunderwritten regional security fordecades -- patrolling Asia's sea-lanesand preserving stability -- and that inturn has helped create the conditions

for growth (Clinton 2011).

This has had the preliminary effect ofstirring up long standing disputes in theregion like the Senkaku/Diaoyuai disputeas well as territorial claims in the SouthChina Sea. US allies and partners in theregion look at the greater American focusas an opportunity to be more assertive ontheir respective claims albeit through non-military means. In response, Beijing hassignaled its intentions by aggressive

enforcement of its claims. The mostsignificant among these is theinauguration of Sansha City on Woody

Island in the Spartlys, laying claim tonearly two million square kilometers of theSouth China Sea. This is not to argue thatthe Chinese policy towards the region isseeing any major shift as China has

always had the most expansive claims inSouth China Sea. One may, however, bewitnessing an urgency in the strategiesthat Beijing employs to push its claims.

II

South China Sea: Geo-Strategic

Significance & the Multiple

Claims

The parties to the dispute include China,Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei and

Taiwan. The Chinese and Taiwaneseclaims are identical, claiming practicallyall of South China Sea. The Chinese claimruns along the nine dashed line as shownin the image below.

It is not clear in Chinese c laims whetherthey include all of the maritime area

South China Sea is seeing the unintended

consequences of Obama administrations Pivot

to Asia policy. Under this policy, recognizing the

shift in global power alignments the US intends

to augment its political and military

involvement in the South China Sea

2GROWING TENSIONS IN SOUTH CHINA SEA

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Chinas Nine Dash Line in the South China Sea

Source: http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/disputes

-in-the-south-china-sea/


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within this line as Chinese territory or doesthe claim refer to exclusive economicrights. The former claim would haveserious implications for freedom ofnavigation in the South China Sea.

Additionally, the latter, has implicationsfor defining the EEZ claims of the othercompeting nations as well as their accessto resources of the South China Sea.China seems to be moving towardsasserting indisputable sovereignty overthe South China Sea.

Vietnam stakes ownership over theParacel Islands that China physicallyclaimed in 1974. Both China and

Vietnam also claim the Spratly Islandsfurther south of the Paracel Islands. Chinaand Philippines disagree over ownershipof islands in the Spratlys and those closerto the Philippine coastline. Philippinesclaims of exclusive economic zone (EEZ)as defined under the UN Convention onthe Law of the Seas (UNCLOS) is in contestwith Chinas territorial claims. Malaysiaand Brunei have EEZ claims to themaritime resources of the South C hina

Sea.

Geo-strategic significance

The South China Sea region sits astridecrucial sea-lanes of communication fromthe Persian Gulf and Africa to the PacificOcean. Energy supplies from the PersianGulf region for China, J apan, South

Korea, Malaysia, Indonesia and Australiaare dependent on stability and freedomof navigation in the South China Sea. TheMalacca Strait, as the entrance to theSouth C hina Sea is vital to maintainingsmooth energy supplies to all countries inthe region.

South China Sea is also emerging aspossible major source of oil and gas forthe countries in the region. According toUS Energy Information Administration,South China Sea has approximately 11billion barrels of oil and 190 trillion cubicfeet of natural gas in proved and

probable reserves (Energy InformationAdministration Country Briefs: South ChinaSea 2013).

As estimated by the U.S. Geological

Survey in 2012, the region mightadditionally hold 12 billion barrels of oiland 160 trillion cubic feet of natural gas(Contested areas of South China Sealikely have few conventional oil and gasresources 2013). The area is currentlyunderexploited because of territorialdisputes and lack of technological orcommercial feasibility. Most of theproven and currently operational energydeposits lie along shorelines of states and

largely in the undisputed territories. Underthe UNCLOS, countries with habitableislands can extend their claims to anyenergy resources in the waters

IPCSISSUEBRIEF#213,MAY2013

Conflicting Claims

Source : ht tp ://www.economist .com/blogs/

analects/2012/08/south-china-sea

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surrounding them. This struggle is,therefore, over controlling a larger shareof the South China Sea and therebyestablishing control over the probablereserves.

With rapid development in blue waterextractive capabilities by energy firms inthe past one decade, the struggle tocontrol the energy deposits in the SouthChina Sea has heated up (Klare 2012).Chinas state-owned Oil Company(CNOOC) started deep sea drillingoperations in May 2012, 320 kilometressoutheast of Hong Kong at a water depthof 1,500 meters in the South China Sea

(Kate 2012). Significantly, according tolatest EIA analysis, the contested areas,especially those around the Spratly andParacel Islands are not likely to haveprobable reserves (Contested areas ofSouth China Sea likely have fewconventional oil and gas resources 2013).

The conflict also involves competingclaiming over Exclusive Economic Zonesas defined under the UNCLOS. The Ushaped Chinese c laim line as seen in the

image above claims all of South ChinaSea as Chinese territory. This claim deniesthe other littoral states such as Philippinesand Vietnam their 200 nautical miles EEZ.

Over the past two decades, as theChinese economic and military muscle inthe region has grown, its neighbours havestepped up their own efforts to press theirclaims in the region. Nationalistic feelingsin the littoral nations with regard to these

territorial claims are on the rise. Therehave been street protests in 2012 most

notably in China, Vietnam, and thePhilippines with the issue also getting ahigh degree of attention in the socialmedia. The tone of these protests isstridently nationalist and in support of

strong defense of territorial claims by therespective governments. While in Vietnamand Philippines, the popular discourse isdominated by Chinas behaviour as a bigbrother in the region, Chinese popularopinion reflects a strong sense ofentitlement and some victimization byneighbouring countries. The strongoutpouring of the nationalist sentiment isalso reflected in the recent foreign policybehaviour of respective states. There has

been a marked rise in the use ofaggressive rhetoric as well as display offorce in the South China Sea as discussedbelow.

III

Creeping Occupation: Recent

Changes and Implications

China has been accused since the 1990sof pursuing a policy of creepingoccupation of marine feature to enforceits territorial claims (Snyder, Glosserman &Cossa 2001). In 1995, China andPhilippines clashed over Mischief Reef,after discovery of some structures built bythe former on islands claimed by thelatter. While the Chinese c laims haveattracted the most attention, all parties to

the dispute have sought to extend andsolidify their claims over time. This includesthe Itu Aba island in the Spratlys currentlyunder Taiwanese control. Taiwan hasofficially included Itu Aba Island in itsterritory by extending its localadministration to the island. It has also hasbuilt an airstrip on the tiny island to landmilitary planes. Itu Aba is also claimed byVietnam that protested the constructionof the airstrip in 2008.

The Chinese claims being the mostcomprehensive in scope, all otherclaimants are in direct contest with China

The conflict also involves competing claiming

over Exclusive Economic Zones as defined under

the UNCLOS. The U shaped Chinese claim

line as seen in the image above claims all of

South China Sea as Chinese territory. This

claim denies the other littoral states such as

Philippines and Vietnam their 200 nautical

miles EEZ


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and therefore share a common interest incontaining Chinese expansion in the sea.Other parties in the dispute accuse Chinaof using force to extend its claims byintimidation and physically occupying

marine features in the South China Sea.Some of the recent instances of show ofaggressive behaviour by China includecutting underwater cables survey vesselsbelonging to Petro Vietnam (Page 2012).

The first incident happened in May 2011followed by one in December 2012. Boththese incidents attracted internationalattention as China objected to the USissuing statements on them. In J une 2012China also announced the auction of oil

blocks that Vietnam claimed fell within itssovereign territory (Vietnam decries'illegal' South China Sea oil bid 2012).Vietnam has witnessed rare nationalisticprotests in response to these incidents.Along with its disputes with Vietnam,China has a major showdown with thePhilippines disputed maritime features.

Chinas dispute with Philippines took anurgent turn when the two clashed in April

2012 over Scarborough Shoal, 124nautical miles of Luzon Island in NorthernPhilippines. The incident involved asstandoff between a Philippines Navalfrigate and a Chinese Marine Surveillanceship over the presence of Chinese fishingboats off the coast of Philippines. Theincident set off strong protests inPhilippines reviving memories of Chineseoccupation of Mischief Reef in 1995. Theincident came just before a US-Philippines

scheduled military exercise to promoteinteroperability. Manilas was dissatisfiedwith the mild US statement on theScarborough Shoal advocating restrain.Domestic popular opinion in Philippinesdemanded that the US take a moreactive role in the protection on Manilasterritorial claims under Mutual Defense

Treaty of 1951(Representative reports ofdomestic public opinion in Philippines onthe incident 2012)

While the incident was resolveddiplomatically, it led to Philippines takingits case to the International Tribunal of the

UNCLOS, or ITLOS. In January 2013, Manilaapproached ITLOS with the argumentthat since C hina c laims virtually all of theSouth China Sea, its claim is unlawfulunder UNCLOS. Manila also accusedChina of building structures onsubmerged marines features that are notislands, but part of the Philippinescontinental shelf or international seabed(Mabasa 2013).

China has refused to engage with thisTribunal on the grounds that the Tribunaldoesnt have jurisdiction to try this dispute

(J ieyu 2013). China insists on only bilateralnegotiations in the South China Sea andhas agreed only to a non-binding ASEANCode of Conduct negotiated in 2002.China has accused Philippines ofinternationalizing a bilateral dispute andhas also asserted that this is incontravention with commitments underthe ASEAN Code of Conduct. The Tribunalis, however, not dependant on Chineseassent to carry out its task and this creates

a situation where China might be forcedto reject any unpalatable outcome of thisarbitration in the face of internationalcensure. The ITLOS arbitration has takenthe issue out of the immediate sphere ofChinese influence to the internationalstage where China faces a morecomplex foreign policy challenge inpressing its claims in the South China Sea .

Manilas decision to take the dispute to

the ITLOS also signals the lack of faith inASEAN as the preferred multilateralframework within which disputes in the


The Chinese claims being the most

comprehensive in scope, all other claimants are in

direct contest with China and therefore share a

common interest in containing Chinese

expansion in the sea. Other parties in the dispute

accuse China of using force to extend its claims

by intimidation and physically occupying marine

features in the South China Sea.

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South China Sea may be resolved. ASEANas a consensus based multilateral forumhas played a limited role in negotiatingthe South China Sea disputes. China haseffectively prevented any binding multi-

lateral engagement within the ASEAN onthe South China Sea. While the ASEANDeclaration on the Conduct of Parties inthe South China (2002) providesguidelines for competing nations in theSouth China Sea, but the non-bindingnature renders it ineffective. It was in thiscontext that the US called for a code ofconduct to be concluded prior to the ARF

summit in J uly 2012.

ASEAN Foreign ministers meeting failed toagree on a joint communiqu owing todifferences on the South China Sea issue.

This was the first time in the 45-year historyof the ASEAN that members failed toreach a consensus. Philippines accusedCambodia of sabotaging the consensusprocess to Chinas advantage. Thishighlights the deepening divisions withinthe ASEAN that plays out to Chinaseventual advantage in pushing forbilateral negotiations with each of theclaimants. Meanwhile, the Chinese pushin the South China Sea has solidified with

the inauguration of Sansha City onWoody Island in the Paracel Island.

IV

Sansha City & The Chinese

Roadmap

Along with a more aggressive posture inconfronting claims of its neighbor, China

has also sought to change the situationon the ground. In J uly 2012, Chinaformally inaugurated Sansha CityPrefecture, a newly established city, withits capital on Woody (Yongxing) Island inthe Paracel Islands. This is arguably inresponse to Vietnam passing a law in

J une 2012 declaring all of Paracels andSpralys to be its territory. Sansha City is apart of Chinas southern most province,Hainan. Sansha is officially responsible for

administering Spratly Islands, ParacelIslands and Macclesfield Bank. Rejectingcriticism about Sanshas inaugurationbeing an expansionist move, China refersto it as a readjustment by the Chinesegovernment to existing administrativebodies, which is an issue within China'ssovereignty" (Establishment of Sansha Citywithin sovereignty 2012).

With the establishment of Sansha, Chinas

historical claims in the South China Seahave solidified. China now officially claimsan area of about two million squarekilometers of water surrounding the new

Sansha City

Source: Beijing Review Vol. 55 No. 27 July 5,2 0 1 2 , h t t p : / / w w w . b j r e v i e w . c o m . c n /

C o v e r _ S t o r i e s _ S e r i e s _ 2 0 1 2 /

red_flag_over_sansha_city.htm


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city as under its own administration(Xinzhen 2012). The actual land area ofthe city is less than three squarekilometers (Cronin & Dubel 2012).Following the inauguration of Sansha, in

December 2012 China passed aprovincial law in Hainan enabling its shipsto patrol the area between Sansha andHainan Island. The law authorized theHainan border police to board or seizeforeign ships that illegally enter theprovince's waters and could order themto change course or stop sailing (Yiming &Qian 2012). This has also been backed upby stationing a Marine Surveillancedetachment at Sansha in March 2013 to

carry out routine patrols in the waters offSansha, effectively covering the wholeSouth China Sea (China marinesurveillance detachment stationed inSansha City 2013).

In establishing Sansha, Beijing has madeno bones about the intent of this action.China intends Sansha as a real political,economic and social and defensemaneuver that will strengthen Chinas

historical territorial claims, provideprotection for Chinese fishermen and actas hub for attracting companies todevelop oil and gas resources in theSouth China Sea (Xinzhen 2012). TheChinese commitment to developingSansha can be gauged by the fact thatthere is no fresh water on the island andall of it has to be shipped to the localpopulation of about a 1,000 residents,from Qinglan port in Hanhai Island of

Hainan province, which is nearly 13 hoursaway.

China also announced the establishmentof a military garrison in Sansha. Themilitary implications of this are debatableat this stage. Since 1990, Woody(Yongxin) Island has had an airstrip thatcan be used by military aircraft. Thisimproves Chinas reach in the SouthChina Sea with Sansha being launch pad

for islands further south, i.e., the SpratlyIslands that China is in dispute withVietnam and Philippines. Given Chinaswell-established naval superiority in this

region, China already possesses the abilityto defend its claims in the South ChinaSea. The establishment of a militarygarrison is, therefore, more symbolic thanan operational upgrade.

Contrary to what has been suggested inthe past by some scholars, Chinas latestpush in the South China Sea does notseem to be an outcome merely ofbureaucratic politics but a concertedpolicy at the highest levels to take a hard-line approach on Beijings territorial claims(Garver 1992). This is also reflected in the

Chinese dispute over the Diaoyutai/Senkaku islands with Japan in the EastChina Sea. Recent flare up of bordertensions between China and India isseeing a similar push from the Chinesegovernment on its territorial claims. Whilethis is not to argue that China is not willingto resolve matters in a peaceful manner,it does point to the more muscularapproach in consolidating territorialclaims.

Finally, the US is neither a new player inthe region nor a does it make a majordeparture under its pivot to Asia in itsforeign policy for the South China Sea.However, having declared itself as aPacific nation that has core interests inthe region, the US has stated its intentionto involve itself more in regional matters.Despite the preliminary stirring of tensionsas an outcome of greater US focus in the

region, the US and China are likely toreach some accommodation inbalancing their respective interests in the


In establishing Sansha, Beijing has made no

bones about the intent of this action. China

intends Sansha as a real political, economic and

social and defense maneuver that will strengthen

Chinas historical territorial claims, provide

protection for Chinese fishermen and act as hub

for attracting companies to develop oil and gas

resources in the South China Sea

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2013

Page, Jeremy, Vietnam Ac cuses Chinese Ships,Wall Street J ournal, 3 Dec., 2012

Snyder, Scott, Brad Glosserman, & Ralph A C ossa,Confidence Building Measures in the South ChinaSea Issues & Insights, No. 2-01, Pacific Forum CSIS:Honolulu, Hawa ii Aug. 2001.

Xinzhen, Lan, Red Flag Over Sansha City, BeijingReview, No, 27. 5 J ul., 2012.

Yiming, Huang & Wang Qian Patrols in Hainan getmore clout China Daily 28 Nov. 2012.

China marine surveillance detachment stationedin Sansha City, China Daily, 19 Mar. 2013

Establishment of Sansha City within sovereigntyC hina Daily, 26 J ul. 2012.

EIA Brief Today in Energy, Contested areas ofSouth China Sea likely have few conventional oiland gas resources, 3 Apr. 2013. Apr. 20 2013

Energy Information Administration C ountry Briefs:South China Sea, 7 Feb. 2013.

Representative reports of domestic public opinionin Philippines on the incident

Vietnam decries 'illegal' South China Sea oil bid,BBC News Asia 27 J un. 2012.

South China Sea. However, given UScommitment to allies and partners in EastAsia and Southeast Asia, this is a complexequation. Southeast Asia is heavilydominated by China in economic,

military and political terms and the US willhave to carve out its rebalance or itsincreased role in the face of Chinesedominance. This might actually tie thefate of bilateral disputes in the region tomovements in US-China relations and vice-versa.

References

Clinton, Hillary, America's Pacific Century, ForeignPolicy. Nov. 2011.

Cronin, Richard & Zach Dubel, Sea Of Absurdity:Sansha, Chinas New Island City Stimson C entreResea rch Pages, 5 Sep . 2012

Garver, John W, China's Push through the SouthChina Sea: The Interaction of Bureaucratic andNational, The China Quarterly, No. 132 (Dec.,

1992), pp. 999-1028.

J ieyu, Li, No lega l basis for Philippine maritime suitG lob al Times, 25 Ma r. 2013.

Kate, Daniel Ten, Cnooc Deploys Oil Rig asWeapon to Assert China Sea Claims Bloomberg,10 May 2012

Klare, Michael T, Island Grabbing in Asia, ForeignA f f a i r s, 4 Se p . 2 01 2 .

Lan Xinzhen, Red Flag Over Sansha City, BeijingReview, No, 27. 5 J ul. 2012.

Mabasa, Roy C, Tribunal appoints 3 UNCLOSmembers to hear, arbitrate Philippine claim 25Apr.

GROWING TENSIONS IN SOUTH CHINA SEA

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Growing Tensions in South China Sea

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