Group of Twenty (G20) - LIMUN · The G20’s Energy Efficiency Action Plan was agreed upon by...

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LONDON INTERNATIONAL MODEL UNITED NATIONS 2016 .

Group of Twenty (G20) London International Model United Nations 17th Session | 2016

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Table of Content

Introductry Letter 3

Committee Chairs 4

Topic A: Implementing the Energy Efficiency Action Plan

Introduction 5

Past Action 5

Key Issues 6

Major State Actor Positions 7

Points a Resolution Should Answer 10

Further Reading 10

Sources 10

Topic B: The Threat of Instability in the Levant

Introduction 11

Past Actin 12

Key Issues 12

Major State Actor Positions 13

Points a Resolution Should Answer 16

Further Reading 16

Sources 16

Conference Information 17

Position Papers 18

Contact Details 19

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Introductory Letter

It is our pleasure to welcome you all to LIMUN 2016, and more specifically to the G20

committee! First of all, we want to congratulate you for being accepted to attend

LIMUN, the largest and perhaps most prestigious Model United Nations conference in

Europe. We believe that taking part in such a conference can broaden your horizons

and increase your cultural tolerance, whilst keep you up to date with current events

around the world. We are hoping for an amazing committee with active delegates,

fruitful debate, and resolutions which embody the potential to have a positive impact

on the world and fully address pertinent issues if implemented.

In order for the committee work to be an unforgettable experience a crucial

requirement is to be well-acquainted with the the rules of procedure and respect

diplomatic courtesy. Moreover, delegates must possess solid background knowledge

on the topics, not only by reading our study guides, but also from individual research.

We want to make sure that everyone is going to have a great time, so if you have any

inquiries or concerns, do not hesitate to contact us.

Sincerely,

Jackson & Michail


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The Committee Chairs

Director. My name is Jackson Webster, and I look forward to chairing you all this year

at LIMUN! I’m a third year student reading International Relations with a specialism in

the Middle East at the King’s College London Department of War Studies. I’m originally

from Manhattan Beach, California, where I began my MUN career seven years ago

in high school. Since then, I’ve participated mainly in regionally-specialized and

security-related committees at conferences on both coasts of the United States, in the

UK, in Europe, and in South Korea. I hope to serve in my country’s Foreign Service some

day, and thus am excited to see what you all have to say about the topics presented

in a high diplomatic forum with the prestige, importance, and relevance of the G20.

Additionally, my dissertation research concerns Turkish security policy, and thus it is

perhaps appropriate that the most recent G20 summit was held in Antalya, Turkey

with an agenda set by the Turkish executive, Recep Erdoğan. I am looking forward to

meeting you all and seeing what kinds of policies and solutions you bring to the table.

Assistant Director. My name is Michail Chatzis and I am a first year undergraduate

student at Imperial College London. My degree (Electrical and Electronic

Engineering) has no obvious link to Model United Nations but I am very passionate

about Economics and Politics. Hence, I take part in as many MUNs as time allows. I

come from Greece and I have been to many places around the world. I like travelling

because I love exchanging cultures and learning more and more about the

differences between them. MUN offers me the opportunity to travel and exchange

opinions on global issues with people of cultural backgrounds. I have been to more

than 7 MUNs in different cities including Thessaloniki (Greece), Athens (Greece),

Cambridge and The Hague. I also love playing the guitar and playing tennis. I am

looking forward to meet all of you at the conference.


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Topic A: Implementing the Energy

Efficiency Action Plan

Introduction

The Group of Twenty represents the world’s twenty largest economies, and hence

unsurprisingly also represents around 80% of the world’s energy consumption.

Therefore, at each year’s G20 Summit, there is an annual meeting of the energy

ministers from each member-state to discuss matters of energy usage, energy

production, and energy efficiency. As the world’s population has become more

concerned with the effects of pollution, traditional sources of fossil fuels have begun

to be depleted, and renewable energy has become a more economically viable

means of energy production, the G20 has taken increasing interest in ensuring energy

produced is used efficiently.

Additionally, G20 nations generally have large populations, and are therefore

concerned with the effects of population growth and increasing urbanisation and

how these trends will affect global energy consumption and the availability of

exploitable resources.

Past Action

The G20’s Energy Efficiency Action Plan was agreed upon by leaders present at the

2014 G20 Summit in Brisbane, Australia. The document serves mainly as an outline for

the integration of previously established cooperation forums, all pertinent to the

increasing of energy efficiency. Foremost amongst these forums is the International

Partnership for Energy Efficiency Cooperation (IPEEC) based as the International

Energy Agency (IEA) Headquarters in the 15ème Arrondissement of Paris, France.

Created at the 2009 G20 Summit in L’Aquila, Italy, the IPEEC Secretariat is tasked with

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liaising between various international organisations with an interest in the field of

energy, such as the Organisation for Economic Development (OECD) and the

Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). The IPEEC’s Enerdata

mechanism is an online cache of the G20 member-states’ policies, commitments, and

data concerning energy efficiency.

Key Issues

According to the IEA, “energy efficiency is a way of managing and restraining the

growth in energy consumption. Something is more energy efficient if it delivers more

services for the same energy input, or the same services for less energy input.” In Turkey

in 2015, the G20 energy ministers stated the benefits of increased energy efficiency as

“lower costs for households and businesses, greater economic productivity and

growth, strengthened energy security, and improved environmental outcomes.”

There are four main areas in which countries have begun combating energy waste.

The first, and most important, is energy waste in industry. The G20, as noted, represents

the world’s most developed and industrialized economies. Thus, the ways in which the

industrial complexes of these countries use energy has a disproportionately large

impact on overall global consumption as well as the environment, relative to these

states’ populations. Furthermore, industry is controlled by large, often multinational

corporate entities, and it is therefore far more practical to apply legally-binding

regulations to industrial energy usage than it is to the usage of billions of individual

citizens.

The second is transport. The transportation industry accounts for roughly 20% of all

energy use worldwide, and improving the energy efficiency of vehicles is vital to

decreasing the amount of energy required to power this sector. Heavy-Duty Vehicles

(HDVs) only comprise 10% of all vehicles in the global transportation industry, but

produce roughly half of the emissions. Trucks, buses, and construction equipment all

qualify as HDVs, and improving the efficiency of these vehicles is key to reducing

emissions. Though hybridization is currently in-vogue with both manufacturers and

consumers, there is doubt as to whether or not hybrid-synergy vehicles are actually

more environmentally friendly and energy efficient. Hybrids are clearly more energy

efficient on the consumer end, saving the individual driver thousands of dollars a year

on fuel costs through increased fuel efficiency. These savings have prompted cities

like London to convert their bus fleets entirely to hybrid models. However, hybrid

vehicle production can be highly environmentally damaging, as the chemicals used

in high-capacity battery production are harmful and extremely difficult to dispose of

responsibly. Additionally, many states like China still rely heavily on coal for electricity

production, so using large amounts of electricity is not necessarily environmentally

friendly, though mass coal energy production it is certainly more efficient that using

oil and gas.

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Home use constitutes the most commonplace -and perhaps most difficult to

regulate- uses of energy. Though much of the discussion around energy usage in

individual homes has trended towards the increased use of renewable technologies

like solar panels, the increasing of efficiency in individual homes truly relies on the

quality of appliance products available to the homeowner and individual choices

made by the homeowner in the use of his/her energy. Many nations have state-

owned or state-operated utility services which have begun to offer incentivised

pricing for households which use their energy more efficiently. Resource efficiency is

of particular concern to economies in regions which require the sustained use of

household environmental controls such as air conditioning and heating services. Such

climates include desert environments as well as northern countries with particularly

cold winters. If energy usage is to decline in these countries, heating and cooling

appliances must become more efficient, as homeowners have little choice when to

use and how much to use these appliances.

The final sector of concern for increasing energy efficiency is “networked devices”.

Referring to electronic and Internet-based technologies, the main energy waste

coming from these items results from lengthy stays in “standby” mode. Today, most

computers and smartphones -both those used by private citizens and those used to

business purposes- are rarely fully shut down and instead remain in “standby” mode

for most of their operational lifespans. While this “standby” mode doesn’t use nearly

as much energy as proper usage of these devices does, standing by still does

consume energy. The United Kingdom has focused its diplomatic efforts on the issue

of networked devices, as it and its allies have a vested interest in increasing the energy

efficiency of Internet-based devices consider they are leaders in the field.

Major State Actors Positions

United States: Since the election of Barack Obama in 2008, environmental issues have

become far more prominent in the national dialogue. Washington has invested

greatly in renewable energy, particularly in hybrid vehicles, wind, and solar power.

California has emerged as a world solar power leader, procuring roughly 25% of its

power from renewable resources, with roughly an additional 1.9% share for

renewables added each year. The geographic diversity of the United States is ripe for

efficient energy production, as it has areas which are suitable for the broadening of

the renewable energy market into solar, wind, and hydroelectric power. Washington

has additionally subsidized the development of fully-electric consumer vehicles from

companies such as Tesla. Abroad, the government of Barack Obama has made

climate change negotiations a priority, investing a great deal of time in the COP21

conference in Paris in 2015. However, domestic opposition from business interests, the

shale gas industry, and the significant populist element of the Republican right-wing

which denies climate change altogether. Although small (supported by roughly 16%

of suffrage-aged citizens), this climate-denial contingent nonetheless wields powerful

influence in Congress and mainly in Republican Party primaries, and will therefore

likely impact arguments by GOP candidates in the upcoming 2016 general election.

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United Kingdom: The United Kingdom’s focus has been on emissions and waste

generated from the production and use of “networked devices”. Additionally, Britain

has focused efforts on the transportation industry, with many of its cities including

London and Oxford moving to all-hybrid bus fleets, and a new focus on wind-power

generation in the Irish Sea. The United Kingdom has a strong oil industry lobby

originating from Scottish communities such as Aberdeen, but this community does not

resemble the climate-deniers of the American Republican Party but instead is mainly

focused on fighting for Scottish energy revenue repatriation. Much of the United

Kingdom’s energy usage is focused around the Greater London Area, as is much of

the country’s pollution. Heathrow International Airport -the busiest airport in Europe-

produces a significant portion of London’s pollution, and is set for possible expansion.

Furthermore, London will did meet emissions targets set by the EU for 2010, and will

likely not even meet these targets by 2030. The United Kingdom’s challenge

diplomatically is to reconcile its professed interest in climate change with its consistent

domestic choice of business concerns over efforts towards responsible energy use.

Canada: Energy policy in Canada is highly federalised, with much of the oversight

over production and distribution left to territorial governments. Environmental policy

therefore varies depending on which political party holds power in Ottawa, due to

differing regional power bases for each of the three main parties. The 2015 elections

saw the victory of Justin Trudeau of the center-left Liberal Party, who places high

importance on environmental concerns as part of his vision of a more ‘responsible’

government. Therefore, though the Conservative government of Stephen Harper was

beholden to energy industry interests based mainly in oil and gas producing states like

Alberta, Trudeau’s election will likely see a change in direction towards policies more

closely resembling the liberal, green-conscious states of Québec (his home

constituency), and British Columbia.

Australia: The Liberal Government of Australia has typically been averse to discussions

of climate change-related topics. The business-friendly image of the Liberal Party

depends on delivering a growth-oriented economy, an objective which is often seen

as at-odds with restrictions placed on businesses in the name of environmentalism.

Thus, much of the lack of progress on climate change at the 2014 G20 Summit was

based on Australia’s prioritisation of other issues, chiefly trade.

European Union: EU member-states are among the world’s leaders in both renewable

energy production and energy efficiency. Sweden has the second highest

percentage of renewable production compared to overall production behind

Norway; Spain became a leader in solar power with the first commercial solar energy

power tower in 2007; France is one of the world’s largest producers and exporters of

nuclear power; Germany and Denmark are world leaders in the use of sea-based

wind power generation. The European Union is primarily focused on increasing energy

efficiency through setting collective targets for energy usage in its member-states.

Considering the highly integrated infrastructure of the continent, as well as the post-

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industrial condition of many member-states, European regulation is generally

focused on the transportation sector. Public transport -rail, light rail, buses, air travel- is

generally much more energy efficient than automobiles, hence the EU has invested

greatly in rail infrastructure, particularly in ex-Soviet member-states such as Poland.

Saudi Arabia: The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is the second-largest producer of crude

oil in the world (behind the United States), and thus is focused on keeping global

demand for oil high. Efforts to conserve fossil fuels therefore do not greatly concern

Riyadh or Aramco (the Saudi state-owned oil company), and the Kingdom’s short and

medium term strategies revolve almost entirely around the extraction of fossil fuels.

Riyadh is however making strives to diversify its economy, as it is fearful of a global

collapse in the price of oil. This trend is evidenced by the Kingdom’s recent

construction of solar power infrastructure in the Arabian Desert.

China: The People’s Republic has the world’s largest industrial complex. Climate

change issues and issues of energy production are therefore both important for

Beijing, however the balance between maintaining industrial output and attempting

to reduce carbon emissions is a difficult one to strike. The Chinese Communist Party’s

(CCP) close attachment to China’s primarily state-run industries means that the state

has a great degree of regulatory control over industry, but industry also therefore has

a great influence on the decisions of the Party and the Politburo. China generally

takes a stance of indigence towards the West in particular, typically arguing that the

Western powers became post-industrialized first, and therefore do not need to

produce high amounts of carbon emissions to increase development, whereas China

needs to industrialize and in order to raise the living standard of its citizens as Europe

and America were able to it must pollute. On the other hand, energy efficiency is

perhaps the one area in which China would concede the most in terms of increased

efforts, as China is entirely reliant on coal and other fossil fuels for economic vitality,

and diversifying and better-using resources would greatly aid China in energy

independence.

Russia: Russia, like Saudi Arabia, is highly economically invested in the extraction and

export of fossil fuels. Therefore, the Russian Federation is interested in maintaining the

current global level of consumption. Higher consumption, regardless of environmental

impact, keeps prices high, which therefore supports Russian financial institutions and

key industrial interests such as Gazprom.

Turkey: As one of the world’s fastest-growing energy markets, Turkey is primarily

interested in autonomy, diversification, and energy security. With neighboring Syria

embroiled in civil war for almost five years, Turkey has become heavily dependent on

natural gas and hydroelectric power. While relations with Russia have been strained

recently, Moscow still provides much of Turkey’s gas supply and has until recently

pursued plans to build a pipeline through Turkey to Greece, called Turkish Stream.

Turkey has pursued a balance between its relations with Russia and with Europe as

part of Prime Minister Davutoğlu’s “Zero Problems with Neighbors” policy, though the

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Turkish public tends to lean towards closer cooperation with Europe and is

historically anti-Russian.

Points a Resolution Should Address The Framework already exists, therefore any resolution must consider

implementation steps as its primary goal, not simply a reiteration of the points made

in the Framework of 2014

Plans must include industrial, housing, networked devices, and transportation

concerns in order to be comprehensive

Plans must describe the future role of:

regional bodies (EU, ASEAN, AU, ECOWAS)

economic forums (WTO, G20, G8, OECD)

international energy forums (IEA, IAEA, IPEEC, OPEC)

Bear in mind that the G20 reaches decisions by consensus, not by majority or qualified

majority voting, and that a high level of compromise will thus be necessary to pass a

plan for implementation.

Further Reading

The G20 Energy Efficiency Action Plan (2014)

https://g20.org/wp-

content/uploads/2014/12/g20_energy_efficiency_action_plan.pdf

For the results of the 2015 COP21 proceedings in Paris, France:

http://www.cop21paris.org/

For a discussion of US policy:

http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/planetpolicy/posts/2015/11/24-us-voice-climate-

change-after-failed-diplomacy-sussman

For the relationship between religion and climate change:

http://www.economist.com/blogs/erasmus/2015/11/religion-and-climate-change

For the controversy over hybrid vehicles:

http://www.pitt.edu/~crf30/Writing3.pdf

Sources

http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkeys-energy-strategy.en.mfa

http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/07/saudis-solar-energy/395315/

https://g20.org/wp-

content/uploads/2014/12/g20_energy_efficiency_action_plan.pdf

http://www.pitt.edu/~crf30/Writing3.pdf

http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/planetpolicy/posts/2015/11/24-us-voice-climate-

change-after-failed-diplomacy-sussman

http://www.economist.com/blogs/erasmus/2015/11/religion-and-climate-change

http://www.ipeec.org/history.html

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/04/g20-energy-efficency-action-plan-

offers-little-no-action

https://g20.org/main-achievements-of-turkeys-2015-g20-presidency-2/

https://g20.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Communiqu---G20-Energy-Ministers-

Meeting.pdf

https://g20.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/G20-Toolkit-of-Voluntary-Options-for-

Renewable-Energy-Deployment.pdf

http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/jul/01/heathrow-expansion-risks-

deepening-londons-air-pollution-crisis

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Topic B: The Threat of Instability in the

Levant Introduction

At the 2015 G20 Summit held in Antalya, Turkey, the current set of conflicts in the

greater Levant region was, unsurprisingly, an integral part of Turkish President Recep

Tayyip Erdoğan’s conference agenda. The Middle Eastern actors in the G20 were

obviously concerned with the basic aspect of security, as the instability seen in Syria

and Iraq is not only ferocious, but has been sustained over many years of conflict. But

beyond these neighbourhood concerns lie larger problems for the G20 community as

a whole.

As the G20 member-states are also 20 of the most capable military actors in the world,

many are involved, tacitly involved, or are debating involvement in the current five-

year-long civil war in Syria which has spilled over into northwestern Iraq. The war has

produced concerning effects stretching well outside Syria, having created regional

economic woes, the largest refugee crisis since the Second World War, and having

taken over 200,000 lives. Foreign fighters from all over the world have flooded into the

region to fight with the Kurdish Peshmerga, the Sunni Syria Opposition, Hezbollah, and

jihadist organizations. Many of these foreign fighters originate from G20 nations like

Russian Chechnya, Great Britain, France, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia. Given Turkey’s

proximity to the conflict and the impact the conflict has had on Turkish politics and

the security of Turkish citizens, the conflict in Syria represented one of the first times the

G20 has begun to discuss a security issue such as a civil war, as the organization usually

devotes its efforts to economic and environmental concerns.


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Past Action

The G20 consists of state actors. The self-declared Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant

(ISIL) is an organization which bases its ideological legitimacy in a bloody disregard for

the norms of the Westphalian concept of nation-states. Thus, it is unsurprising that at

the Antalya conference, G20 member-states agreed that all parties present oppose

the barbarity of ISIL and wish to defeat the organization.

Further action becomes obstructed when the question of post-conflict political order

begins to enter the fold. Relations between the international pro-Assad camp and the

anti-Assad camp are not only strained over this question alone. The gap between

these blocs has also split over energy issues, nuclear proliferation concerns, the crises

in Ukraine and Gaza, and various other geopolitical disputes. Therefore, action at the

G20 Summit has been symbolic at best as the organization requires consensus for a

proclamation or plan to be agreed upon, not a simple majority like in national

parliaments or in the UN General Assembly.

Whilst the UN Security Council has agreed to landmark resolutions on the topic of ISIL,

no international body has been able to even begin the process of establishing

consensus on the future of the state of Syria more broadly. It is, however, generally

expected that the Iraqi government will retain at least broad control for the

foreseeable future over its former territory once ISIL is defeated with the exception of

areas controlled by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG).

Key Issues

Beyond the issues posed by the physical destruction and 250,000-head death-toll of

the conflict, the now five-year-long civil war in Syria raises three significant political

considerations for the G20 nations.

The first is the threat posed to G20 member-states’ citizens by extremist groups arising

from the conflict, such as ISIL. The group has already executed citizens of at least five

member-states (United States, United Kingdom, France, Japan, and China) in highly

publicized video broadcasts of beheadings. Additionally, G20 states such as France,

Germany, and the UK have experienced severe crises of internal youth radicalization

perpetrated by ISIL’s online actors, calling into question much of Europe’s modern

immigration and multicultural policies. The failure of “multiculturalism” to successfully

integrate many muslim immigrant communities in the United Kingdom, and the

increased ghettoization of immigrants into France’s impoverished banlieues, has

allowed for the rise of obstructionist, nativist, and xenophobic politicians such as UKIP’s

Nigel Farage and Front National’s Marine Le Pen. These states thus fear attacks from

marginalized and radicalized youth, such as those carried out in Paris in November

2015 by French nationals linked to the Islamic State. Additionally, Turkey and China

have witnessed a spike in unrest in recent years, as China attempts to incorporate its

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impoverished, muslim western regions, and as Turkey deals with the dual threat

posed by ISIL radicals and Kurdish marxist-separatists.

The second threat posed by instability is the damage to interstate relations caused by

proxy involvement in the current conflicts. Differences over levels of involvement in

the Syrian and Iraqi conflicts, as well as the post-conflict role of Syrian President Bashar

al-Assad, have been divisive in many G20 nations. These divisions run deeply between

G20 nations, particularly between Russia and countries which oppose the Assad

regime, such as the United States, its European allies, and the Gulf Monarchies lead

by Saudi Arabia.

Major State Actor Positions

United States: The United States, initially hesitant to involve itself in the Syrian Civl War,

began military operations against ISIL once the group crossed the border into Iraq and

took the city of Mosul. Since 2014, the US has been the leading member and by-far

largest contributor to the Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve

(CJTF-OIR), flying generally over 90% of the coalition’s combat sorties. The United

States has difficulty establishing a consistent policy towards the refugee crisis.

President Barack Obama has taken a specifically pro-acceptance stance towards

refugees, sighting a moral duty of the nation as well as adherence to international

law. However, this approach is generally unpopular with American citizens,

particularly in the wake of radical-related attacks in Boston, Paris, and now San

Bernardino. Republican presidential candidates have almost universally taken a

nationalist stance towards refugee policy, and this approach seems generally

popular amongst the American right-wing voter base. Despite this, House Republicans

were unable to block Democratic calls to accept between 10,000 and 20,000 Syrian

refugees into the country, a parcel number which is more symbolic than significant for

a nation of over 350 million citizens.

United Kingdom: The United Kingdom’s House of Commons voted to extend British

airstrikes from Iraq into Syria, a move which has shown resolve to British allies already

involved in the conflict like the United States and France, but is deeply controversial

in British domestic politics. Conflicts aside, this involvement has more importantly

highlighted the British military’s dwindling capabilities. With no operational aircraft

carriers, the British RAF’s only resources in the region are a squadron of six outdated

Tornado strike aircraft based in Cyprus. Thus, British involvement changes little in-

theatre, and the vote’s only result is allowing British aircraft to cross the now-imaginary

border between Iraq and Syria. The United Kingdom has agreed to accept 20,000

refugees. Whilst the acceptance of refugees is an act of solidarity with recipient allies

of the UK, and military action in Syria is an act of solidarity with NATO allies already

involved in the fight, Britain must constantly walk a line between its reluctant domestic

body politic and its disappointed friends abroad. Germany and Turkey have already

taken in more than tenfold the number of refugees Britain has been willing to accept,

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and the United States, France, Turkey, Jordan, and Kurdish Peshmerga are pulling

the weight of much of the military operations against ISIL.

France: Since the Paris attacks of November 2015 —the deadliest single terror attack

in Europe on recent record— France has become one of the most vocal members of

the anti-ISIL coalition. Though already heavily and successfully involved in the fight

against jihadis in the Sahel since 2013, France has doubled down on its military

commitments, nearly to the point of strategic overreach. The aircraft carrier Charles

de Gaulle has been sent to Syria to launch strike aircraft against ISIL, its first combat

deployment since 2011. The French approach to the instability mainly concerns two

targeted threats: ISIL's de facto capital of Raqqa, Syria, and the threat of home-grown

extremism. Post-Paris, the French have redeployed around 10,000 military personnel,

at least 5,000 of whom have been deployed to France-Métropole (France proper) to

aid the overstretched French Police and Gendarmes. François Hollande has proved

more open to working with the Russians to defeat ISIL than most other NATO allies, and

has also agreed to sell two Mistral-class helicopter carriers to Egypt, who is currently

fighting an ISIL-loyal low-level insurgency in the Sinai Peninsula. Despite concerns over

security following the attacks on Paris, Hollande has reiterated his promise to take in

tens of thousands of Syrian refugees in a bid to relieve the flow of refugees currently

headed for Germany.

European Union: The European Union has essentially failed as a policy mechanism for

coping with the flow of refugees. The Commission itself is unable to take strong

positions on any of the issues stemming from the Syrian crisis as the divide between

nations willing to accept refugees and those refusing to do so is simply too great. The

EU’s FRONTEX border control organization has been the primary monitoring force for

the flow of migrants across the Mediterranean Sea, but little has been done to change

the EU legislation which is complicating the process of travelling to Europe safely and

is therefore forcing migrants to make the dangerous ocean crossing.

Russia: Russia’s response to the crisis has been entirely military. After supporting the

Assad regime in the Security Council for 4 years, the Russians began airstrikes in Syria

against both ISIL and the armed opposition in mid-2015. Moscow has entirely refused

to take in Syrian refugees or to finance refugee camps in Lebanon and Jordan,

blaming the migrant crisis on European powers and therefore insisting they bear the

entire cost. Russia has successfully built an anti-ISIL consensus in the Security Council,

with the passing of a resolution which did not mention the fate of Bashar al-Assad.

Russia has insisted that Assad himself in addition to his government apparatus in

Damascus must be part of any solution in Syria, and that the government of Syria is

the legitimate representative of the Syrian people to the international community.

Russia has repeatedly defended itself against allegations that it has used banned

munitions, such as cluster bombs, in operations over Syria.

Turkey: Threats to Turkey are abound. Ankara suffered from ISIL-linked terrorist attacks

in October, and the Kurdish (PKK) insurgency in Turkey’s southeast has intensified,

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emboldened by the efforts of the Syrian Kurds (YPG) against the Assad regime

and ISIL. Turkey joined CJTF-OIR airstrikes against ISIL in August 2015, but has also take

the opportunity to strike PKK-tied Kurdish targets as well. This complicates Turkey’s

relationship with its NATO coalition partners, particularly the United States, which has

a longstanding relationship with the Iraqi Kurds (KRG) and has coordinated airstrikes

in Northern Iraq closely with KRG forces. As of December 2015, Turkey has 2,291,900

registered Syrian refugees, over twice the number estimated to arrive in all of Europe

over the next year. Turkey has therefore made the argument that it’s NATO allies have

a security-related obligation to take in refugees and relieve the pressure on Turkey’s

overflowing camps.

Saudi Arabia: Saudi Arabia initially joined CJTF-OIR, but has since diverted its military

efforts to its own intervention in Yemen against Iranian-backed Houthi rebels. The

Kingdom also led the creation of an Arab “Anti-Terrorism Coalition” in December 2015,

however this coalition does not include Iraq, the Arab government currently in actual

combat with ISIL forces. Saudi Arabia, like other Gulf states, is not party to UN

agreements on refugees, and thus any refugees residing within the Kingdom are not

“officially registered”. It is estimated that as many as 500,000 Syrians may currently

reside in Saudi Arabia, though their time of arrival and reasons for seeking refuge are

unknown. Gulf monarchies have flatly denied requests to establish refugee camps on

their soil.

China: China remains generally removed from the conflict in Syria, as China’s main

concern with Islamic extremism revolves around domestic threats posed by

disgruntled Muslims in China’s western regions. China has, along with the rest of the

P5, shown support for UNSC resolutions designed to combat ISIL, but has remained

generally silent on the Syrian Civil War more broadly. Simply put, China’s policy outside

of its own region is almost entirely economic in nature. That said, China has increased

its military cooperation with Russia in the Mediterranean, with the nations carrying out

exercises based out of the Russian naval base in western Syria. This naval base

represents the key Russian geopolitical interest in the Syrian conflict, and could prove

key to continued Chinese power projection in the Mediterranean as well.

Japan: Following ISIL’s killing of a Japanese aid worker last year, questions about the

fate of Japanese remilitarization were once again raised. Though Tokyo possesses a

modern army and the largest Navy in Asia, it is unable to deploy its forces in anger

abroad due to a clause written into its post-war constitution. The current government

of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has supported changing this clause in order to

“normalize” Japan’s status as a member of the international community. Thus far, no

change to the Constitution has been made.

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Points a Resolution Should Address

- The refugee crisis

• outlining responses to economic damages caused

• outlining member-state responsibilities in reference to this crisis

• outlining a long-term strategy for either repatriation or resettlement

- The security crisis

• the threat of non-state terrorist actors

• the future of regional energy security

• the threat of domestic “home-grown” radicalization

- The future outline of the region

• the future of post-conflict political control in Syria

Further Reading

For The UN High Commissioner for Refugees: http://www.unhcr.org

For the up-to-date in-theatre situation in Syria and Iraq:

http://www.understandingwar.org/

For the status of Syrian refugees in Europe: http://syrianrefugees.eu/

For up-to-date news on the actions of the CJTF-OIR (American-led coalition against ISIL):

http://www.centcom.mil/en/news

Two discussions of how the Syrian Civil War effects overall global order and the

international system by historian John Bew: http://www.newstatesman.com/world/middle-

east/2015/12/syrian-war-and-return-great-power-politics and

http://www.newstatesman.com/world/middle-east/2015/09/syrian-tragedy-and-

crumbling-world-order

Sources

http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-35111321

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/11856922/Russia-

refuses-to-help-Syrian-refugees.html

http://www.unhcr.org.uk/

http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=224

http://syrianrefugees.eu/

http://www.understandingwar.org/

http://www.centcom.mil/en/news

warontherocks.com

17


Conference Information When looking for information regarding LIMUN 2016 (and

subsequent editions) your first step should be to visit our website:

www.limun.org.uk

LIMUN in social media

Please follow updates from us through our social media channels:

London International Model United Nations (LIMUN)

@LondonMUN

When tweeting about this year’s conference (your preparations,

journey to/from London or when live-tweeting the events during the

conference itself) –

- please use hashtag #LIMUN2016

Agenda & Rules of Procedure

The agenda for the 2016 conference is available online at

www.limun.org.uk/agenda

The Rules of Procedure can be accessed here:

http://limun.org.uk/rules

18


Position Papers

What is a position paper?

A position paper is a statement of policy, which is intended to

communicate an overall position of a country on a particular topic

debated in the committee. Position papers should be brief and

outline the general policies rather than specific measures.

Each delegate should submit one position paper per topic to be

debated by the committee (note: most of the committees have

two proposed topics). Each paper should be approximately one

page per topic.

LIMUN offers a short guide on how to write a position paper. It is

available on our website:

http://limun.org.uk/FCKfiles/File/PP_Guide.pdf

Deadlines

The deadline for the submission of delegates’ position papers is 20

February 2016. Failure to submit by this deadline will render

delegates ineligible for Diplomacy Awards.

Positions Papers will have to be submitted in a publicly-accessible

Dropbox, to be provided by committee directors. At their

discretion, directors may provide feedback in individuals cases if so

requested.

The most worthy work submitted in a committee will earn the

delegate a Best Position Paper Award. The length of any one paper

should not exceed 500 words.

19


Contact Details

For any enquiries relating to your committee proceedings or if you

want to get in touch with your committee’s directors, or for

submission of position papers:

- please e-mail: [email protected]

Other enquiries regarding the Conference:

- please e-mail: [email protected]

Before contacting LIMUN please make sure you have read FAQ

section on our website: http://limun.org.uk/faq


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