GRA}rT SAFF is a doctoral candidate in the Department of...

Hooshang AmirahmadiGrant Saff

1992) and indirect literature (Malecki 1991). Much of theformer literature touched on science parks within thebroader context of technology and economic develop-ment, whereas much of the latter literature focused onparticular themes or aspects. Although the literature isvery detailed and thorough, until recently there hasbeen little attempt to provide a comprehensive synthe-sis and evaluation of what science parks are, why theyare established, how and where they evolve, whetherthey are successful in achieving the goals for which theyare designed, and what the future holds for these parks.

One reason there have been few such comprehensiveand critical evaluations of science parks is their diver-sity in form and function. Science parks differ in sizeand structure, in the amount and type of employmentthey provide, and in goals and development histories.Despite these differences, the parks exhibit enoughcommon characteristics (such as their predominantfunction) for them to be categorized as "science parks."

This article aims to provide a comprehensive over-view of the debates and issues concerning science parksto provide a basic synthesis, to point to areas that need

HooSHANG AMIRAHMADI is professor and chair of the Depart-ment of Urban Planning and Policy Development at Rutgers, theState U71~iversity of New Jersey, where he also serves as director ofMiddle l:astern Studies.

During the 1980s, many policymakers facing decreasing rev-enues and increasing unemployment looked to technology-leddevelopment to pump new life into their sagging regional andnational economies. One of the ways they attempted to pro-mote this high-tech strategy was through the creation ofscience parks. But although these parks have demonstratedsome potential for enhancing economic growth, they arehardly the economic quick fixes some policymakers believethem to be: successful parks often have taken a decade or moreto become economically viable, their failure rate is high, andtheir regional and national economic impacts have been exag-gerated. State or governmental support is essential to thesuccess of a science park. This assistance may take manyforms-from direct state subsidy, to provision of infrastruc-ture, to simply directing government-related research anddevelopment contracts to science park tenants. Locating apark near certain urban features-good transportation link-ages, a high-quality residential environment, a university,and a pleasant working environment-is also essential. Sci-ence parks are not, in themselves, the answer to promotingregional or national high-technology-led economic develop-ment, but they can be one of a number of options available toplanners and policymakers as part of a well-thought-out andcoordinated development strategy built on regional or na-tional strengths, rather than artificial supports for costly anduncertain high-technology strategies.

GRA}rT SAFF is a doctoral candidate in the Department of UrbanPlannin~~ and Policy Development at Rutgers, the State Universityof New Jersey.

Since the early 1980s, the subject of science parks hasgenerated a vast amount of both direct (Gibb 1985;Monck et al.1988; Goldstein and Luger 1991; Massey et at.

JOUT7:!a1 afPlanning Literature, Vol. 8, No.2 (November 1993).Copyri~~ht @ 1993 by Sage Publications, Inc.

108 Journal of Planning Literature

further research, and to offer an assessment of the effi-cacy of science parks.

The article is divided into four parts. Part 1 reviewsdefinitions of science parks and establishes a workingcharacterization. Part 2 sets out the origins and devel-opment of these parks. The first section of part 2 focuseson the development of science parks in the UnitedStates, which contains over half of the science parks inthe world. The second section looks at developments inthe rest of the world. Part 3 sets forth the rationale forthe development of science parks, with special empha-sis on the rapid growth of science parks in the 1980s.Part 4 is a critical evaluation of the achievements andfuture role of these parks.

literature (see for example, Goldstein and Luger 1989,1990,1991; Malecki 1991) is not emphatic enough aboutthis distil1.ction. For the purpose of this article we defineresearch parks as a subset of science parks that haveformal links to a university and where the primaryactivity of the majority of tenants is research and devel-opment (R&D). As such, statistics with regard to scienceparks cited in this article do not disaggregate researchparks from the umbrella term of science parks.

Monck et al. (1988) choose the purely functionaldefinition of science parks, developed by the UnitedKingdom Science Park Association (UKSPA), as the onethat COmE!S closest to capturing the diversity of scienceparks. UKSPA defines a science park as a property-based iniliative that includes the following features: (a)it has formal and operational links with a university,other higher-education institution, or research center;(b) it encourages the formation and growth of knowledge-based bill,inesses and other organizations normally res-ident on site; and (c) it has a management functionactively engaged in the transfer of technology and busi-ness skills to the organizations on site and also attemptsto link the parks to a higher-education institution-es-pecially on issues of science and technology (Monck et a1.1988, 64; see also Massey and Wield 1992, 412). Thisdefinition, like the one developed by Allesch, is difficultto sustain in the United States where links betweenscience parks and universities are not always as formalas this definition implies. Moreover, in many respects,the definition seems closer to the characterization of aresearch park than a science park. The term properiy-based initiative makes the definition particularly vagueand Opel\S the door for confusion with other types ofparks or economic activity locations.

Many authors (see Joseph 1989; Goldstein and Luger1991; Malecki 1991) use the terms science park and re-search p~rrk interchangeably. In Joseph's view, theseparks promote the growth of large technology-orientedcomplexes (TOCs). He identifies four types of TOCs,distinguished by the factors that contributed to theirinitial dE~velopment (1) TOCs whose growth is princi-pally the product of locally initiated firms and spin-offs,such as Boston's Route 128 and Silicon Valley; (2)research-oriented TOCs usually restricted to a park site,such as Research Triangle Park in North Carolina; (3)TOCs initiated by attracting manufacturing facilities ofhigh-technology companies, as in Phoenix, Arizona;and (4) TOCs that result from large expenditures ofgovernIJt\ent funds, as represented by U.S. space anddefense expenditures in Houston, Texas Goseph 1989,173). These archetypes may overlap, and a single TOCmay contain elements of more than one model. Scienceparks have been established that incorporate all of thesemodels, but only in Joseph's second model are science

'TOWARD A CHARACTERlZA110N OF SaENCE PARKS

There is no single definition of a science park. Al-though this is not surprising given the diverse formsand characteristics that science parks exhibit, the lack ofunanimity on a definition has nevertheless createdsome conceptual confusion within the literature. Writ-ing about science parks in Germany, Allesch (1985)offers a fairly precise definition. He distinguishes be-tween research parks, innovation centers, and scienceparks. A research park is one in which young firms ordetached sections of large companies carryon researchand development in relatively close cooperation with anearby university or research establishment and wherethe development of prototypes, but not mass produc-tion, is allowed. An innovation center provides newhigh-technology firms with an optimum chance of sur-vival and development by offering an extensive rangeof services, proximity to university institutions, and thepossibility of integration into the local and regionalinnovation network. Science parks, on the other hand,are a new way of locating industries: existing firms ininnovative technology areas are offered attractive sur-roundings and proximity to research establishments.

Allesch's definition of science parks has two limita-tions. First, it excludes the possibility of new firms(start-ups and spin-offs) forming within the parks.This omission is significant because one of the pri-mary rationales for the promotion of science parks is theimpetus they generate for small-firm formation. Sec-ond, it is difficult to sustain his distinction betweenscience parks and research parks in practice. In reality,many parks include a combination of the three catego-ries set out by Allesch.

The theoretical distinction between science parksand research parks is important, however, becausesome of the literature for the United States treats thelatter as a distinct subset of science parks (see Everhartn.d.; Fusi 1991), whereas others use the terms inter-changeably (Goldstein and Luger 1991). Most of the

Science Parks 109

based cln a lack of extensive empirical investigation ofthe more hidden preconditions and outcomes. Theyargue that science parks are "symbolic of somethingwider than themselves; they are a condensation of anumbe]~ of broader issues. In particular, they are sym-bolic of a view. ..of the relation between science, soci-ety, and space" (412). The archetypal science park isbased on three elements: first, a linear model of scientificinvesti~ration and industrial innovation; second, partic-ular characteristics of spatial form and content; andthird, it is a property development. The importance ofthe property development characteristic is that evenwhen a public sector-private sector partnership is estab-lished, Ihe profit motive of. the latter continues as thedriving force. They argue that each of these elementshas potential consequences and causal powers that arequite different from those put forward by policymakers,and thalt these potential consequences are often detri-mental to the objectives that science parks are estab-lished .to achieve. Massey and Wield (1992) argue,therefore, that although science parks may in part produceIheir popularly expected outcomes, they also produce lessvisible c:onsequences, such as social inequity, uneven de-velopment, and hindrance of industrial regeneration.

To capture the diversity of science parks and avoidthe prevailing conceptual confusion, it would seem thata charal:terization of science parks is needed that is asinclusive as possible without becoming totally mean-ingless. Such a characterization would include bothpreconditions for the establishment of the parks andtheir e)C:pected outcomes. As far as possible, we haveused ou.r characterization (given below) as the guide forconsidering the origins and development of scienceparks. IOn occasion, the terminology of the originalauthors is used to avoid distorting their intentions. Notealso thalt this broader characterization allows for moreinclusiveness than those developed in the works re-viewed so far. This fact is reflected in the use of Fusi's(1991) estimated number of science parks in the UnitedStates of 285, rather than the number given by Goldsteinand Lul5er (1991) for research/science parks of 116.

Scier\ce parks are a type of business park where theprlmar;f activity of the majority of the establishments isindustry-driven R&D. As such, mass production andbasic rlesearch usually are not undertaken in theseparks. ,~other attribute of science parks is their inte-grated :spatial structure. Various elements are logicallyconneclted and interdependent in terms of both socialand tec:hnical division of labor. Thus it is no wonder thatscience parks are often both perceived and marketed assingle entities rather than TOCs (although science parksare Oftl~ a part of TOCs). Science parks are also ex-pectedto generate new high-tech firms through spin-offor other forms of new investments. Most science parks

parks explicitly established to promote either regionaldevelopment, R&D, high-technology-led growth, or acombination of these three.

Goldstein and Luger (1989, 1990) provide a moresatisfactory definition. They define a science/ technology /research park as a business park where the primaryactivity of the majority of establishments is researchand/ or new product or process development-distinctfrom manufacturing, sales, headquarters, or other sim-ilar business functions. Typically, the proportion of apark's workforce made up of scientists or engineerswith advanced graduate degrees is used as a proxy formeasuring R&D activity. The advantage of Goldsteinand Luger's definition is that it allows science parks tobe distinguished from areas with spatial concentrationsof high technology that are not organized under a singleentity (and which Joseph calls TOCs), such as Boston'sRoute 128. Goldstein and Luger exclude business incu-bators (unless the organizations occupying the incuba-tor are engaged primarily in R&D activity) andtechnology centers from their definition. The main pur-pose of technology centers, according to Goldstein andLuger, is the coordination of technological develop-ments and technology transfer among universities andother research organizations.

Malecki (1991) also uses the terms research parks andscience parks interchangeably and defines them as po-tential cores of new Silicon Valleys. This definition isbased on their function as potential core areas for re-gional development. He also develops a working defi-nition based on the physical characteristics of the parks:

Given the clean office and research atmosphere of R&Dfacilities, many of them have settled into the suburbanoffice and industrial parks that are now a commonplacelocation for economic activity in metropolitan areas.Whether called science parks, research parks or technol-ogy parks, these more specialized developments cater tothe preference for campus-like setting with low-density,often dispersed, building sites. (p. 308)

The use of the terms science parks, research parks, andtechnology parks interchangeably illustrates the diffi-culty in making concrete distinctions between the dif-ferent types of parks.

A more recent conceptualization adopts what iscalled a "critical realist" methodology (Massey et al.1992; Massey and Wield 1992). According to this con-ceptualization, no causal relations are assumed to existbetween science parks, what it may take to establishthem, and what may result as a consequence of theiroperations. This is a response to the more establishedconceptualization that argues for causal links betweenthe preconditions for the formation of science parks andtheir expected outcomes. According to Massey andWield (1992), this popular characterization often is


also feature a parklike, low-density landscape. Linkswith a research facility (a university or institute, forexample) are often a precondition for the establishmentof science parks. Further, the labor market should offera highly skilled workforce or, at the least, the potentialfor attracting such skills. As property developments,science parks normally remain based on a profit motive,even when created through a partnership between theprivate and public sectors. Finally, we include all sci-ence parks that are perceived by the tenants, develop-ers, policymakers, and the public as being science parks.Although the last point might seem tautological, it isimportant not to exclude parks that see themselves asscience parks but that might not fit the tighter defini-tions developed by Allesch (1985) or Monck et aI. (1988),among others.

TABLE 1. Leading Countries in Number of Science Parks,1991

1. United States2. United Kingdom3. France4. Canada5. Japan6. Australia

2856543382922

SOURCE: Fusi (1991, 610).

nationals, like Hewlett Packard and IBM, to small, re-cently established, high-technology enterprises. Giventhis diversity, this section can do no more than give avery schematic history of the development of scienceparks. We focus on their development within the UnitedStates because this is where the concept originated, andit is where approximately one-half of the world's sci-ence parlcs are found.

Science Parks in the United States

ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF SCIENCE PARKS

During the 1980s, science parks were a rallying sym-bol for beleaguered regions, local governments anduniversities faced with a changing national and worldeconomy, the decline of manufacturing industry, andsevere cuts in central government funding. The per-ceived high-tech success of regions such as Silicon Val-ley in California, Research Triangle Park in NorthCarolina, and Boston's Route 128 assumed mythicalproportions, and localities all over the world vied witheach other to replicate their success. High-technology-led 4evelopment was seen as the vehicle for renewedeconomic growth, with science parks being the meansof drawing these firms into a locality. Goldstein andLuger (1989) comment that there was nearly a 300 per-cent increase in the number of parks in the United Statesbetween 1982 and 1989. This rapid rate of growth wasnot confined to the United States. In Britain, for exam-ple, the number of parks grew from two in 1972 tosixty-five in 1991 (Fusi 1991).

Science parks display an astonishing degree of diver-sity in virtually all aspects. In employment size, theyrange from parks with less than one hundred workersto Research Triangle Park's thirty-two hundred. Inphysical dimensions, they range from under three acresto over more than sixty-five hundred acres. They differin organization and ownership: most, but not all, arelinked to a university; some are publicly owned, andothers operate as private developments (Goldstein andLuger 1990). In a review of 116 research parks in theUnited States, Goldstein and Luger (1991) found that 25percent were units of public or private universities, 16percent were owned by state or municipal govern-ments, 23 percent were nonprofit corporations or foun-dations, 15 percent were owned by for-profitcorporations, and the remaining 21 percent were jointpublic-private ventures. Types of firms found in scienceparks also vary, ranging from R&D divisions of multi-

The United States has by far the greatest number ofscience parks in the world, with 285 (see Table 1). It alsohas six of the top ten parks in terms of the number ofemployees (see Table 2). Geographically, the parks arespread 1:hroughout the continental United States,with a disproportionate share located in the south(see Table 3).

According to Goldstein and Luger (1990), about 40percent of the parks with tenants in 1985 were locatedin large metropolitan regions (over SOO thousand pop-ulation), about 50 percent were located in small metro-politan areas or nonmetropolitan places (under 200thousand population) with at least one major researchuniversity or federal research complex, and the remain-ing 10 percent were located in small to medium-sizedcenters (under 500 thousand population) without amajor research institution. They note that the numberof parks being developed without links to a major re-search fclcility is increasing. This observation reinforcesthe need expressed in the previous section for attempt-ing to clarify the position of research parks vis-a-visscience parks.

HistOlriCally, the establishment of science parks in theUnited ~;tates has conformed to two main patterns. Thefirst is ti\e spontaneous development of high-technologyagglomt~rations within which science parks have beenestablisJ:\ed, such as that developed around Boston'sRoute 128 (conforming to category 1 in Joseph's [1989]typology). The second is the deliberate creation of largeresearcl\ or science parks designed to boost the fortunesof partic:u1ar regions, universities, or both. The StanfordResearch Park and Research Triangle Park in NorthCarolina fall into this latter category (conforming tocategory 2 in Joseph's typology).

Science Parks 111

TABLE 2. Ten Largest Science Parks-Number of Employees, 1991

32,00026,00018,00017,90015,SOO14,SOO9,6006,0004,9004,000

1. Research Triangle Park, North Carolina2. Stanford Research Park, Palo Alto, California3. Cummings Research Park, Huntsville, Alabama4. Akadem Gorodok Science City, Novosibirsk, Russia5. Tsukuba Science City, lbaraki, Japan6. Sophia-Antipolis Science Park, Valbonne, France7. University Research Park, Charlotte, North Carolina8. University City Science Center, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania9. Rennes Atlante, Rennes, France

10. Central Florida Research Park, Orlando, FloridaSOURCE: Fusi (1991, 613).

TABLE 3. Leading States in Number of Science Parks, 1991

1. California 312. Florida 223. Michigan 174. New Jersey 165. Colorado 146. New York 137. Texas 138. Georgia 129. Ohio 12

10. Maryland 11SOURCE: Fusi (1991,614).

Route 128 is a major peripheral highway built duringthe 1950s, and it lends its name to the entire Boston-areaelectronics complex (Malecki 1986). Covering a thirty-mile radius from the center of Boston, the area em-ployed approximately 250 thousand people in theelectronics and related industries in 1983 (Monck et al.1988). Monck et al. place the locus for this growth on theformation of high-technology businesses by facultymembers of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology(MI1). They also note the role played in the area by thelocation of a single big firm, Digital Equipment corpo-ration. Markusen et al. (1986) note the crucial role attrib-uted to commercial spin-offs from research undertakenat the area's major universities, much of it funded bydefense contracts. Malecki (1986) agrees and commentsthat the presence of MIT alone does not explain thegrowth of high-technology firms along Route 128-rather, it is the combination of top universities in thearea that is responsible for attracting academics, stu-dents, and firms. Malecki also notes the role that exist-ing cultural and residential facilities, such as goodschools and universities, played in foste:ring growth.

In the initial stages of development, state and gov-ernment policies were of little importance in contribut-ing to Boston's high-tech success (Malecki 1986). Ofmore importance was the historical innovation of firmslocated in Boston and its suburbs, which dates back to

before World War II. This innovation enabled the areato benejfit from defense contracts both during and afterWorld War II. In 1986, Massachusetts had the highestper capita level of military research in the country(Maleclci 1986). Local government policy was support-ive to tile extent that it permitted the development ofindusmlal parks along Route 128. At the state level,Massachusetts attempted to match the programs ofother re!gions competing for high-technology industry(Maleclci 1986). The state lowered the personal tax bur-den, backed a university-industry cooperative micro-electroI1lics center and, on a more subtle level, usedpublic expenditures to support the attractive residentialand recireational environment of the Boston area.

Botkin (1988) draws three lessons that should serveas warrlings for other regions seeking to emulate thedevelopment of Route 128. First, building a high-technology region takes time. Second, government pol-icies an,d incentives are needed more in the depressionpart of the business cycle than in the inception point;such incentives are probably more effective at these lowpoints because it is easier for government to soothepeople than to stimulate them. Third, high tech is nomore stable or unstable than other industries.

The first generally accepted science park was theStanforld Research Park in Palo Alto, California, con-ceived in 1951. The park was the brainchild of FrederickTerman (nicknamed the "godfather of Silicon Valley,"see Lar:.on and Rogers [1988]), a professor of electricalengineE~ing at Stanford University, who attempted tofind a "lay to make money for the university and im-prove its international reputation. The park, situated onuniversity land, began functioning in 1952 and is cred-ited as the catalyst behind the economic developmentof wha1t has come to be known as Silicon Valley. Since1952, tl1le park has grown into a complex of nine millionsquare feet, occupied by fifty-nine businesses employ-ing tw,enty-eight thousand workers (Goldstein andLuger 1991). In the early 1980s, Silicon Valley, of whichthe park is part, was one of the fastest growing regionsin the lJnited States, creating about forty thousand new


jobs per year (Larson and Rogers 1988). Terman is alsocredited with giving a start to Hewlett-Packard in 1938,by advancing $538 to the embryonic firm so that it couldstart production of a variable frequency oscillator. Hewas rewarded for his foresight when the Hewlett-Packard Corporation chose to locate in the researchpark-a decision that has benefited the park in terms ofincome, prestige, and employment.

Monck et al. (1988) maintain that the initial successof the research park was premised on the contributionmade by a single large firm, Fairchild, that settledwithin the parkin 1957. Unlike!'.1:IT and the Boston area,the Stanford faculty has been the source of relativelyfew spin-offs (Malecki 1986). Most spin-offs developedfrom former Stanford students who went to work atfirms such as Fairchild and Hewlett-Packard. Malecki(1986) also comments that, as with Route 128, the stateand local government had little role in the successfuldevelopment of Silicon Valley's high-technology activ-ity. The role of local government has been confined tofacilitating development by the annexation and rezon-ing of land, extension of utilities, creation of industrialparks, and road construction. Like Route 128, however,federal government defense contracts have been impor-tant for the development of the area.

Larson and Rogers (1988) identify six factors thatwere essential to the rise of Silicon Valley: (1) availabil-ity of technical expertise, (2) availability of preexistinginfrastructure, (3) availability of venture capital; (4) jobmobility, (5) information exchange networks, and (6)spin-offs from existing firms. These six factors, com-bined with those identified by Monck et al. (1988) andMalecki (1986), provide a fairly comprehensive list ofthe policies and factors necessary for the promotion ofhigh-technology-led development.

Vogel and Larson (1985) provide a very useful anal-ysis of how Research Triangle Park in North Carolinawas established. Its history is worth detailing becauseit has served as the role model for science parks aroundthe world. After World War II, North Carolina's tradi-tional industries (furniture, textiles, and tobacco) en-tered a period of relative decline. An alliance ofbusinessmen and state politicians pushed for the estab-lishment of a research park based on the examples ofStanford Research Park and Boston's Route 128. Fromits outset in the early 1950s, the group attempted to getacademics from North Carolina's three universities(Duke, the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill,and North Carolina State) interested in the project. Theidea was to establish a sixty-seven-thousand-acre re-search park to attract companies that wanted to expandresearch activities in areas in which the universities hadgreat strength. After an attempt by commercial devel-opers ("Pinelands") failed in 1958, a nonprofit founda-

tion funded by public donations was set up by a coali-tion of b'usinessmen and politicians under the nameResearch Triangle Park to market the concept.

Research Triangle Park consists of three parts: (1) anonprofit: foundation with tax exempt status owned bythe universities; (2) the park, a profit-making subsidiaryof the foundation with profits from sales and rentalsgoing to the foundation to fund further research; and(3) the nonprofit Research Triangle Institute, estab-lished as a research organization independent of thefoundation and the profit-making part of the park(Vogel and Larson 1985; see also Goldstein and Luger1991). The attractions were to be the park's relationshipwith the three universities, the parklike atmosphere(which did not allow any manufacturing facilities andallowed 1tenants to cover a maximum of 10 percent ofthe land with buildings), and the provision of infra-structure by the state. Initial progress in attracting com-panies was slow, and it took until 1965 for the park tobegin to break even. Partly on the insistence of ffiM, thepark's rule about the percentage of land that could becovered with buildings was eased from 10 to 15 percent,and the area allotted for production was expanded. Itwas only through state action, however, that the parkbecame viable. State government spent large sums ofmoney to improve the regional infrastructure, such asconstructing a new highway and building an airport.The legislature also passed a community college act toprovide local skilled workers for the new firms.

Nortl1l Carolina's low unionization rates (amongthe lowest in the country) also helped the park attracttenants. Firms were able to take advantage of below-average labor costs for R&D workers. The federal gov-ernment provided help by establishing the NationalInstitute of Environmental and Health Science in thepark in 1965, and by 1981 the federal government hadsited five federal laboratories within the park. It wasonly wh,en ffiM decided to move into the park in 1965,after seven years of negotiation, that its success wasassured. The park has grown into the largest sciencepark in the world in both employment and physicalsize. It currently employs thirty-two thousand people,covers an area of twelve million square feet, and in 1987its annual payroll was more than $1 billion (Hayes1987).

The three examples cited above have certain com-monalities. In each case, the relationship between thepark or area and the local research universities was animportant catalyst for development. Although the de-gree to which firms continued to have close ties withuniversiities is a subject of debate, there is little doubtthat these links were important in the initial phases ofdevelopment. A further commonality is that the parkswere established in so-called high amenity areas that

Science Parks 113

tity forrllation occurred. One important implication ofSaxenia:Il's work is that before planners attempt to es-tablish l:egional or national policy guidelines for high-tech gn)wth, they should undertake microstudies ofindivid11al areas to assess the local attitudes towardstate intervention. This will not only allow planners andpolicym.akers to anticipate possible sources of opposi-tion but will also allow them to tailor plans to fit indi-vidual regional circumstances.

It is iJmportant to note that, in the United States, thestate rather than federal government has played the keyrole in promoting science parks. This generally has beendone thJrough the provision of infrastructure and land,tax brecW and tax holidays, promotion-primarilythrougl1l marketing campaigns and lobbying-andother fiscal and physical incentives. Malecki (1991) seesan increiasing trend toward public-private partnershipsin economic development and in the establishment ofscience parks in particular. For example, Connecticuthas bac],ed the New Haven Science Park, centered atYale Urliversity, with $4.4 million (see also Kysiak1989; McQueen 1988). One reason for this trend is thebudget (:runch in the 1980s that fell heavily on local andstate go"ernments as well as universities. Many univer-sities dE!veloped science parks to increase revenues.Typicall:y, this has involved making underused univer-sity lancl available for the development of the park (seeEverhartn.d.). As Malecki (1991) points out, this seldomhas beerl done without the support of local city or stategovemn1ents. Everhart notes that Northwestern Uni-versity is in the process of developing a $400 millionresearch park in Evanston, lI1inois scheduled for com-pletion in 1997. This is a joint venture between theuniversity, a prominent local developer, and the city ofEvanston. Everhart estimates that the city will gain $10million Jper year in property taxes alone, or about one-sixth of the 1990 municipal budget. This type of part-nershiF' is becoming the norm in science parkdevelopment, but it is usually the state or city author-ity-ratl1er than the university-that takes the lead.

The f.ederal government has given only indirect sup-port through defense or other contracts, expendituresfor R&I::I (in 1985,59 percent of this expenditure was ondefense..related R&D [see Malecki 1991]) or the siting offederal agencies within these parks. Given the highlevel of defense spending in the United States, thisindirect role must have had a substantial effect on manyof the rutmS located within the parks. There seems to bea correlcltion between the siting of federal facilities andthe gro,~th of adjacent science parks. The CummingsReseardlt Park in Huntsville, Alabama, is home to theAlabama Space and Rocket Center; the Central FloridaReseardlt Park in Orlando is near the John F. KennedySpace Center in Cape Canaveral. Both the Stanford

provided attractive living environments for highlyqualified research workers. Another commonality is therole that a single large firm played in guaranteeingeconomic success: Digital Equipment Corporation inBoston, Fairchild at Stanford Research Park, and IBM atResearch Triangle Park. State government assistancewas crucial to the success of the parks and economicdevelopment of their surrounding areas. Finally, in allthree cases, individual initiative provided the startingpoint and set the foundation for their eventual growthand sustainability.

The physical layouts of the Stanford Research Parkand Research Triangle Park have become the norm forscience park development throughout the United Statesand the rest of the world. This generally consists of aparklike environment of low-density and well-designedoffice facilities, often including recreation facilities foremployees. As competition to attract firms has in-creased among parks, facilities have become more elab-orate. The San Diego Tech Center, for example, boasts aJapanese teahouse, two tennis courts, two sand volley-ball courts, a large heated swimming pool, a weightroom, jacuzzis, an aerobics center, and a jogging track-all free to employees at the center (Nunes 1985).

There is, however, one crucial difference among thethree main examples cited above. Route 128 was a spon-taneous outgrowth of economic conditions, local eco-nomic policy, a preexisting culture of innovation, andthe convergence of world-class universities. StanfordResearch Park and Research Triangle Park, in contrast,were planned creations and designed to foster technol-ogy, innovation, and regional economic growth. m thecases of both Route 128 and Stanford Research Park, theexisting urban agglomerations played an importantrole in attracting high-technology firms with a mini-mum of state investment. At Research Triangle Park,however, the amenities, facilities, and infrastructurehad to be provided at a substantial cost to the state.From the perspective of national policy, this suggeststhat in most cases, existing urban agglomerations aremore efficient and cost-effective locations for the establish-ment of science parks than remote and peripheral areas.

Saxenian (1989) emphasizes the very different atti-tudes toward state intervention held by the high-techindustrialists of Route 128 and Silicon Valley. She arguesthat the Route 128 industrialists repeatedly clashedwith the local public sector and that they remain ideo-logically opposed to government intervention of almostany sort. mdustrialists in Silicon Valley, however, wereexplicitly committed to cooperation with local govern-ment and consistently supported an active state role inplanning regional development. She ascribes this differ-ence in attitude primarily to the political environmentin which the processs of interest org~ation and iden-


hi~;h-technology companies formed by individual en-trepreneurs. InI986, 53 percent of all high-technologycompanies operating in the region had been in op-eration for five years or less. These firms were gen-erally smaller than older firms and accounted for 24percent of high-technology jobs. Of high-technologyfimlS, 75 percent were indigenous, created by localentrepreneurs. These small firms, however, arebeing bought out increasingly by multinationalfirms, indicating a likely change in the pattern out-lined above.

3. Type of activities. The types of high-technology firmsvary widely, with electronics being the single largestsector (21 percent). R&D accounts for the main func-tion of these fimlS (42 percent), followed by manu-facturing (37percent).

4. University links. Over half of the firms surveyedpresently maintain, or had maintained, links withlocal research bodies-90 percent of these beinguniversity departments.

5. Elnpioyment impacts. Between 1979 and 1987, therewas a net employment growth of six thousand jobsout of a total local labor force of 120,000. This growthmust be judged against a 27 percent manufacturingjob decline since 1979. The bulk of this employmenthas been in highl~ skilled technical, research, ormlanagerial positions. In 1986, semiskilled and un-skilled manual labor accounted for only 11 percentof the TOC workforce.

6. uJCal multiplier effects. There have been considerablemultiplier effects for three reasons: first, Cambridgehigh-technology firms sell the bulk of their productsoutside the local economy; second, significant localpurchasing and subcontracting linkages exist; andtl\ird, the above-average salaries and wages paid tothe workforce in local TOC companies produce ahigher effective demand, which translates into ahigh local multiplier. Based on work by Moore andSpires (1986), Keeble estimates a local employmentmultiplier for the high-technology sector of approx-imatelyone indirect job for every new high-technologyjob created.

Research Park and the University Gty Science Center inPhiladelphia have benefited from federal spending, onnuclear research and medical technology, respectively.

The correlation between federal R&D spending, par-ticularly defense-related R&D, and the success of sci-ence parks has not received adequate attention in theexisting literature, and it is an area that would profitfrom further investigation. If defense spending has beencrucial for the success of either science parks or individ-ual firms located in these parks, then the implicationsof decreased defense spending on the future of scienceparks is in need of urgent study.

Science Parks in the Rest of the World

After the United States, the United Kingdom has thesecond largest number of science parks. These parksand related high-technology growth centers have beenthe subject of a number of studies (see Currie 1985; Hallet al. 1987; Keeble 1989; MacDonald 1987; Massey et al.1992; Massey and Wield 1992; Monck et al. 1988; Segal1986,1988; Segal Quince Wicksteed 1985). In 1991, therewere sixty-five science parks in the United Kingdom,containing more than one thousand tenants and em-ploying some fifteen thousand people (Fusi 1991).Using the more rigorous UKSPA definition, Massey etal. (1992) count only thirty-eight science parks. Theyexcluded many parks because of the lack of a formallink with an academic establishment. The first sciencepark in the United Kingdom was established by Cam-bridge University in 1973. The growth of the park wasslow, with only seven firms located in the park by 1978.The park greatly expanded in the mid-1980s, however,growing to sixty-eight firms by 1986, and has provideda catalyst for the growth of high-technology companiesin the Cambridge region (the so-called Cambridge phe-nomenon). By January 1986, an estimated 16,500 work-ers were employed in approximately 350 high-technology companies in southern Cambridgeshire,providing 11.4 percent of the total employment in thearea (Keeble 1989, 158).

The development of the Cambridge TOC (whichincludes the Cambridge Science Park) illustrates certaincharacteristics pertinent to the history and develop-ment of science parks worldwide. Keeble (1989) identi-fied six characteristics important to the growth of theCambridge TOC:

The characteristics identified by Keeble are useful foridentifying the origins, size, linkages, types, and age offirms ftlat locate in science parks. His findings with regardto the efficacy of science parks must be viewed cautiously.Keeble himself warns that "the cost-effectiveness of ascience park policy must, however, be carefully evaluatedin each specific regional context, because as Segal stresses(1988), science parks are not a sufficient or even necessarycondition for local technology-based development" (168).Jowittl:1988), who studied a science parkin Bradford, WestYorks11Lire-which enjoys none of the locational or institu-tional advantages of Cambridge--condudes that thechanCES of its success are small

The level of local multipliers will also vary to aconsiderable degree. Massey et al. (1992) argue that thetechnological multipliers from science parks are rela-

1. Recent growth. Despite the establishment of the sci-ence park 1973, Cambridgeshire experienced a netdecline in high-technology manufacttIring employ-ment during the period between 1971 and 1981.Since 1981, there has been a turnaround, with anaverage of thirty new high-technology firms peryear establishing in the area.

2. Entrepreneurship, independence, and age. Most of thefirms in the Cambridge TOC are relatively young

Science Parks 115

development and job creation, the industries of theregion Lost more than 131 thousand employees between1978 allld 1988-a drop of 16 pezcent. Such an interpreta-tion implies that the growth of high-tech industry in de-clining regions is unlikely to offset overall trends of jobloss.

Perrin (1988) also argues that Sophia-Antipolis rep-resents an example of a "territorial type" technologypolicy in that it was promoted at a local (territorial) levelrather Ihan at the state level. This interpretation differsfrom tl\at of Dyckman and Swyngedouw (1988) whoargue that French policy was part of a "modernization"strategy. The development of Sophia-Antipolis remainsatypical from the French norm in science park develop-ment, ~'Ihich could account for some of the difference ininterp~etation. Unlike Sophia-Antipolis, most scienceparks in France are situated near major urban areas.Moreo,rer, unlike the United States, French technopoleshave aJ.ways enjoyed the support of both national andlocal governments (hence a combination of the "terri-tory" and the state). Furthermore, although Perrin ar-gues that there was no officially accepted theory behindthe promotion of technology centers, this is unlikelygiven Ihe genesis of growth pole theories in France.According to Malecki (1991), the two main factors influ-encing high-tech government policy in France havebeen the desire for the decentralization of industry fromParis and the lingering memories of the growth poletheories of the 1950s (see also Goldstein and Luger1990).

Among the leading industrial countries, Japan hasthe mo:st ambitious plan for deliberate high-technologydevelolpment (Glasmeier 1988; Kawashima and Stohr1988; Malecki 1991; Markusen 1991; Masser 1990; Onda1988; 11atsuno 1986, 1988). In 1983, the Ministry of Inter-natioruu Trade and Industry (Mm) embarked on theTechnolpolis Program in an attempt to steer dynamic orpropulsive high-technology industries toward particu-lar regjlons to generate regional self-sustaining growthand reduce regional inequalities. This policy reflected atrend u'Japanese planning dating back to themid-1960saimed at promoting regional development. TheTsukuba Science City, modeled after Research TrianglePark, ~'Ias founded in 1963 and is a direct precursor ofthe Te4:hnopolis Program. Science City is located 60kilometers north of Tokyo and is now home to twouniversities and fifty national research institutes(Malecki 1991). The 1983 technopolis law specified thesite lo<:ation criteria to be used by MITI, including (1)proxinrity to a city of at least 150,000 people, to provideurban iservices; (2) proximity to an airport or bullet trainstation; (3) an integrated complex of industrial, aca-demic, and residential areas; and (4) a pleasant livingenvironment (Malecki 1991, 301). The selected citiesprovid.e infrastructure for the science park with very


limited financial assistance from the central govern-ment. In 1983, fourteen sites were selected by Mm. By1990, this list grew to twenty-six, few of which are in thepoorest regions. This limits the program's usefulness inequalizing regional resources.

Impressed with the potential of high-technology-leddevelopment, many newly industrializing countries(NICs), or aspirant NICs, have developed science parks.Parks in countries such as Singapore, Taiwan, SouthKorea, Hong Kong, and Otina have been initiated nor-mally through direct government promotion. The Sin-gapore government, for example, has a $2 billionnational technology plan (for 5 years) beginning in 1991("Singapore Government Commits to R&D Growth"1992). This money is set aside to facilitate industry-driven R&D by providing inputs such as training, schol-arships, and foreign recruitment that the private sectoris unable (or unwilling) to provide. The governmentprovides tax breaks, grants, financial incentives, andinfrastructure to encourage R&D by the private sector(domestic and international). The R&D expenditure inthe one-million-square-foot science park totaled $86million in the 1990-91 fiscal year. Private sector interests(mostly foreign-owned multinational corporations[MNCs]) accounted for about 60 percent of the park'stenants. The Singapore government hopes to upgradethe country's knowledge base and skill level, especiallyby improving knowledge of process R&D through in-creased interaction with the MNCs. The ultimate aim ofthe government is to improve the country's competi-tiveness in international export markets.

To summarize the origins and development of sci-ence parks, after a slow start, the concept took off in the1980s and science parks were developed all over theworld. Although their growth and development havevaried by country and by case, all science parks appearto be based on the common belief that rapid economicgrowth is possible through high-technology-led devel-opment. Among the factors that have been importantfor the successful development of science parks are (1)appropriate state and federal policies that promote sci-ence parks, (2) establishment within or adjacent to ex-isting urban agglomerations, (3) proximity to high-quality residential environments, (4) a preexisting cultureof innovation, (5) proximity to at least one major uni-versity, (6) existence of high-quality infrastructure andcommunication and transportation networks, (7) anexisting pool of skilled labor, (8) presence of at least onemajor firm in the park, (9) availability of venture capital,(10) spin-offs from existing firms, and (11) job mobility.Although a combination of these factors provides theoptimum conditions for the successful development ofscience parks, the examples examined thus far demon-strate that in practice this seldom occurs.

RA110NALE FOR niB ESTABLISHMENT OF SCIENCE PARKS

As delt\onstrated earlier, there is no singular ratio-nale for tile establishment of science parks beyond thebelief tha't it is a good vehicle for promoting economicgrowth at both the national and regional level. Differentcountries and regions have developed different concep-tions of how science parks can best promote economicgrowth. For example, Japan sees science parks as a wayof promoting regional equality; Singapore views themas a way of promoting national technology-led devel-opment; and regions in the United States and the UnitedKingdom often have seen them as a mechanism toovercomE~ the collapse of traditional economic sectors.This fuzziness, perhaps, is what accounts for their pop-ularity with policymakers, who often see science parksas a panacea for solving a wide range of divergenteconomic:, social, and development problems. Policy-makers l1lope science parks will cure economic prob-lems by providing employment, generating regionalmultipliers, promoting exports and foreign investment,increasing the R&D capacity of the country, promotingtechnolol'?;Y development, and increasing investment.They a}&o look to science parks to promote regionalequality, upgrade the skills of the local workforce, in-crease re'l/enue to the university, and perhaps even im-prove tble mental health of those employed in thetranquil surroundings. Although this assessment mayseem cyrlical, it reveals two underlying issues: first, itraises thE~ question of the degree to which science parkscan deli"er on some of these expectations. Second, itpoints to the deep underlying malaise that affected theregional (and national) economies of most of the worldduring tile 1980s and the restructuring movement thatfollowed,.

Monck et al. (1988, 73-78) identify a number of rea-sons why science parks were promoted in the UnitedKingdoDrl during the 1980s: the collapse of many matureindustriE~s led to a rapid rise in unemployment; severefinanciaJ, cutbacks in university funding forced institu-tions to :look at other ways of increasing finances; newtechnolclgies, such as microprocessors, arose and in-creasingly matured; cutbacks in R&D spending by largefirms lecL to the growth of small, high-technology firms;govemnlent policy shifted toward entrepreneurship;and baI1lk5 offered improvements in services to smallfirms. r,.,j[ost of these reasons are equally applicable out-side of the United Kingdom.

Gold:stein and Luger (1989) offer two additional rea-sons for the development of science parks in the UnitedStates:

First, there has been growing consensus among state andlocal policy officials and academics that a region's long-term E!Conomic prospects will depend on its ability togenerclte and sustain a concentration of business enter-

Science Parks 117

prises capable of developing new products (or processes)than can penetrate international markets. ...Fearing thatthey only would be able to attract "loser" industries, stateand government officials sought ways to stimulate pro-ductivity growth and innovation in the existing indus-tries and to generate new business in the high-technologysector. These officials believed that science park develop-ment could help them achieve those objectives. ...Thesecond reason for the widespread adoption of scienceparks during the past five to 10 years has been the world-wide publicity given to ...Silicon Valley and the Re-search Triangle of North Carolina. Both of these USregions experienced considerable growth in the 1979-82period while much of the rest of the United States sufferedthrough a severe recession. (P. 5)It seems in many cases, however, that policymakers

had no clear idea of what they hoped to achieve bypromoting science parks. The economic coordinator ofBradford City Council (U.K) commented that the coun-cil had very little idea what they were getting them-selves into when they decided to have a science park inBradford: "no in depth studies, no academic research,just an idea. Let's have a Science Park in Bradford"(Massey et al. 1992, 21). Such lack of clarity over goalsmakes an evaluation of the performance of scienceparks rather difficult to measure; nevertheless, we at-tempt to do so in the following section.

highly E!lusive process, not readily subject to deliberateplanning" (19). Glasmeier (1988) reaches a similar con-clusion with regard to the Japanese Technopolis Pro-gram. ~5he argues that too many sites have beendesignated as technopolises for the program to succeed.This "b.mdwagon effect" reflects the political difficul-ties thai: governments have in excluding particular re-gions. Sine also points out that preexisting industrial andsocial a!~glomerations are likely to be a greater factor ininfluenc:ing firIns in their site selection than are incen-tives gi"en at the tecl:u1opolis sites.

In a ,generally favorable review of the TechnopolisProgran1, Masser (1990) examines the experience of theNagaoka Technopolis. In his view, this technopolis hasbeen reJlatively successful, and he estimates that fortynew £inns were attracted to the area within a five-yearperiod. The population in the technopolis zone in-creased from 180 thousand to 631 thousand, and thelocal economic base (measured in terms of the value ofindustrial shipments) increased from 227 billion yen in1980 to :1,116 billion yen in 1988. Masser points out thata key reason for Nagaoka's success has been the avail-ability clf serviced industrial land within easy access ofTokyo-iust over a 9O-minute train ride away. He con-cedes, h,owever, that the area was having difficulty at-tracting key personnel by 1988 and recommends thatmore calSe studies be examined before any definitiveconclusilons can be made about either Nagaoka's expe-rience or the success of the Technopolis Program can bemade.

In her study of the Technopolis Program, Markusen(1991) questions whether high-tech activity can ever bedecentr.ilized. She argues that, at best, there is only amodest amount of detachable high-tech production-and eve:rl R&D activity-that can be relocated to periph-eral sites. She also comments that the total number of"tecl:u1ovilles" a country can support is as important aconsideration as where they should be located.

Marlc:usen (1991) does not believe that Japan's Tech-nopolis Program has staved off the continued concen-tration of economic activity in Tokyo or spawned newindeperldent and self-sustaining centers of innovation;she does argue that the policy has altered the develop-mental landscape in Japan in a number of ways, how-ever. Fjlrst, it has institutionalized the competitionbetweeIl prefectural governments for industrial andresearcl\ satellites-resulting in the weakening of em-phasis on previous prefectural priorities such as im-provins; the quality of life and environmental concerns.Second" the policy has set out a vision of exurbanizedeconomlic activity as a blueprint for future Japanesedevelopment and promoted a few pioneer cases as pro-totypes. These peripheral sites have not taken on thecharactE~ of the locality and remain artificial re-creationsof a suburban form of residential and work space famil-

EVALUA11NG mE PERFORMANCE OF SCIENCE PARKS

The performance of science parks can be evaluatedin two ways. The first is to examine the degree to whichan individual park is successful in itself. This success isusually measured in the number of firms or employeesin the park, vacancy rates, turnover rates, and profits. Asecond and more fundamental way of evaluating per-formance is to measure success against some form ofexternality-increased employment in the region or in-creased exports out of the region, for example. What iscrucial in an evaluation of science parks is the degree towhich these benefits at the local level generate nationalgrowth. It is difficult, therefore, to abstract develop-ments at the regional level from their effects at thenational level. Moreover, these two types of evaluationare linked, and it is difficult to distinguish between theirimpacts. Nevertheless, policymakers (as opposed to de-velopers) have focused on the second type of evaluationand the impacts on regions and the nation.

The two most ambitious attempts to use scienceparks as part of a national developm~t strategy forregional development have been the Technopolis Pro-gram in Japan and the French technopole strategy. Hall(1991) sees both of these attempts at decentralized de-velopment and regional equality as conspicuous fail-ures. He maintains "that all evidence to date seems toindicate that the genesis of innovative milieux is a


iar from the outer areas of Tokyo. Third, the policymanages to package a program of regional develop-ment as a national initiative without making any sub-stantial financial commitment (most of which is borneby the prefectural governments themselves). Further,the tax breaks provided by the prefectural governmentshamper the revenue-raising capacity of the prefecturesto provide for social services and future infrastructure.Fourth, the investment on the part of the prefectures ishighly speculative-reproducing in regional space apublic sector version of the land speculation that drove,and subsequently ruined, the real estate market inTokyo and Japan in general. Finally, the TechnopolisProgram has kept some Japanese companies from relo-cating to other countries by giving them incentives torelocate to cheaper areas within Japan itself. Markusen(1991) concludes that the Technopolis Program maysucceed in decentralizing the less innovative compo-nents of high-tech activity in Japan but that it is unlikelyto contribute to regional equalization of incomes be-cause the growth will be concentrated heavily in a fewlocales.

Similarly, Jowitt (1988) is skeptical of the chances ofscience parks promoting regional development. Heaptly quotes the remarks of a recent commentator:

"[There are] symptoms of panic. ..in the present scram-ble by local authorities, by quasi-public agencies and bythe public sector to make a Disraelian leap in the dark forthe science and technology shore. Indeed, those parts ofthe UK most affected by economic decline. ..are ...clutching at high technology, more particularlyscience and technology parks, as their sole panacea forfuture survival. ..the point is lost that without the sup-port of a genuine regional economic planning frameworkthey have no future-the market is working too stronglyagainst them." (p. 135)

Jowitt also argues that only the better off regions standany chance of promoting high-technology-led develop-ment. In the less competitive regions, he proposes thateconomic development be premised on a diversifiedeconomy based on a slimmed-down and technologi-cally assisted manufacturing base; the continued devel-opment of the service sector, especially by expandingtourist and leisure services; and a small dash of high-technology. The appropriateness of such advice wouldseem to be dependent on the region under review.

Jowitt (1988) is undoubtedly correct in noting that thereare definite national costs in pursuing high-technology-led growth in too many regions at once or in laggingareas. The competition among regions for sites can beexpensive and wasteful, and the better-off regions al-ways win. Further, incentives and subsidies providedby both national and local governments are generallyself-defeating from a national perspective. As Addleson

and Tomlinson (1985) argue, if a region or business hasto be subsidized to survive, then the "value added" inproduction is negative. In other words, the value of itsinputs taken out of the economy is greater than what-ever it puts back into the economy. To sustain thissituation, resources have to be drawn from other areasand reallocated to the subsidized region. With the redis-tribution of resources (and incomes) there is a corre-sponding decline in activity and employment in thoseareas from which resources were drawn. It would,therefoI1e, seem that science parks should be promotedonly in iueas that do not require state or local govern-ment support in excess of the benefits they can provide.Goldstein and Luger (1991) make the point that

Those regions in greatest disb'ess that potentially couldbenefilt the most from the presence of a viable researchpark (that is, through manufacturing job creation viaforward linkages, productivity enhancement via technol-ogy trclnsfer and diffusion, and overall wage increases inthe local labor market) are also where research parks arenot likely to be feasible. These include older manufactur-ing re~;ions and nonmetropolitan areas without an exist-ing R8tD concentration. (P. 48)

It is precisely the areas Goldstein and Luger identify ashaving the least chance of establishing successful sci-ence parks that have touted science parks as a way outof their current economic malaise. Further, it is arguedby Massey and Wield (1992) that these less fortunateregions have to offer substantial incentives to the pri-vate sec:tor to entice them into setting up science parks:

The public sector in this context classically takes theentefF'rising, risk running role usually ascribed to entre-prenel~rial (private) capitalism. The result is that publicmone~'{ from local taxes is used to subsidize profits madethroUI~h property investment by financial institutions.But, aJi if this were not enough, there is also a further resultin thai: the aims of the science park for the agents involvedin the partnership of its development are, of course, verydiffer.~t. Although the private sector's aim is to make aprofit, the aim of the public sector is local economicregeneration. The effect of public-private partnership,howe'ver, is that the aims of the public sector are inexora-bly s\Jlbordinated to those of the private sector. (p. 420)

Although the universal application of their argumentwith regard to public-private partnerships is in need offurther investigation, there is little doubt that the con-tradicti,on that Massey and Wield highlight is likely tobe an important impediment to the success of scienceparks 115 a policy tool in many declining or stagnantregioru,. Given all the above, science parks do not qual-ify as a viable development strategy for most regions(Goldstein and Luger 1990).

Wh.~n examining the regional impacts of scienceparks, it is essential to consider whether science parkspromote new firm formation, and whether the types of

Science Parks 119

firms attracted to science parks promote regional devel-opment. Monck et al. (1988) emphasize that

to demonstrate the benefits [of a science park], it has to beshown not only that, for example, firms have establishedin the park, but that these firms either would not havebeen established if the park had not existed, or that theywould have had to locate elsewhere-and that the alter-native location would have imposed costs upon the firmin such a way as to impair its performance. (p. 89)

Such benefits are notoriously difficult to measure. Nev-ertheless, Monck et al. attempt to do so, arguing that thegrowth of science parks in the United Kingdom has ledto the formation of more high-technology firms thanwould otherwise have been the case. A UKSPA surveyfound that two-thirds of U.K. science park establish-ments previously had been located elsewhere (Masseyet al. 1992). Although this number is not insubstantial,Massey et al. argue that it does not wholly corroboratethe popular image of science parks. Malecki (1991) takesa substantially similar view, arguing that parks them-selves do not increase the propensity of new firms to form.

The case of Research Triangle Park confirmsMalecki's point. Despite its reputation, Research Trian-gle Park has not been an unqualified success. Unlikemore spontaneous developments such as Silicon Valley,the park's growth has occurred largely through attract-ing new firms from outside the region rather thanthrough new-firm formation or spin-offs. Goldstein andLuger (1991) estimate that 47 percent of R&D organiza-tions in the park probably would not have located inRaleigh-Durham if Research Triangle Park did not exist,and they argue that the park has had a substantialpositive economic impact on the immediate region(Durham, Orange, and Wake counties). They estimatethat "the total number of jobs in the region for whichResearch Triangle Park was responsible--that is, thatwould not be in the region if the park had not beencreated-is estimated to be 52,000. This represents 12.1percent of the total regional employment in 1988" (88).They also found that the park helped increase theregion's per capita personal income and decrease in-come inequality in the region. In contrast, studies of thecounties affected by the Stanford Research Park foundan increase in regional income inequality from the mid-1960s, although there is no hard evidence linking thepark to this decline (see Goldstein and Luger 1991;Saxenian 1984). Further, according to Goldstein andLuger (1991), Research Triangle Park and new businessgrowth within the region have prov~ded jobs dis-proportionately to professionals and managers, al-though they comment that there is no evidence that anyother occupational groups are worse off because of thepark. Vogel and Larson (1985,261) note,however, thatResearch Triangle Park has had only a modest impacton the state as a whole and that very few ripple effects

have bE!eI\ felt outside of the region. According to 1990U.S. cerlSUS data, 1989 wages within the state were 85.6percent of the national average in 1989, and per capitaincome was 86 percent of the national average. Goldsteinand Luger (1991) argue that the potential of ResearchTriang1~ Park to achieve statewide economic develop-ment dlepends on the ability of state government andlocal school boards to improve the overall educationaland skiJlllevels of the non-university-trained labor forceof the sltate:

The e):pectation that the manufacturing production facil-ities olfhigh-tech corporations will be induced to locate inother Jparts of the state in order to have good access to theR&D i!ctivity in the Triangle region, a major premise forthe crl~ation of the Research Triangle Park, just will notmaterialize until the state has a labor force that is capableof OpE!rating and maintaining increasingly sophisticatedequiplment in the new knowledge-based economy of the1990s and beyond. (p.99)

This is equally applicable to other areas with similarskill anld development profiles.

The types of firms attracted to science parks are oftenunsuited for promoting regional development. Mostscience parks attempt to attract as many firms devotedto R&D' as possible. In her analysis of Japan's Technop-olis Program, Glasmeier (1988) argues that the focus onR&D efitablishments is not likely to lead to integratedor propulsive industry-led growth. She comments thathigh-tei:hnology establishments behave like other man-ufacturing enterprises and thus develop few local link-ages. 11:1is skepticism of R&D as a propulsive industryis share~d by Oakey (1991), who maintains that there isa weak link between R&D investment and a commer-cially s\lccessful product and that there is no correlationbetweeJn R&D investment, turnover, and employmentgrowth. Goldstein and Luger (1990) are less emphaticabout tl1is relationship, arguing that the level of activityfrom R4~D depends on the size of the firms in the park:spin-ofJf activity is higher when the park has a largerpropor1tion of relatively new, small and medium-sizedfirms r~lther than R&D branches of large multilocationalfirms. j~ such, the recruiting policies of the park playavery iIJrlpor1tant role in setting the conditions for re-gional :growth. Goldstein and Luger (1989) note, how-ever, tl1lat science parks located in regions with a priorconcentration of R&D activity are more likely to besuccessiful than those locating elsewhere.

The degree of interaction between universities andfirms ll1 science parks has been overestimated by poli-cymak4&S. In a study of sixteen Australian science parks,Joseph (1989) concluded that the level of interactionamong firms within the parks was low, as was theirintereslt in research. Joseph also found little contact withthe universities-a finding supported by MacDonald(1987) and Currie (1985). In his study of science parks


in the Cambridge area of the United Kingdom, Keeble(1989) found that over one-half of all firms presentlymaintained, or had maintained, links to the university.This does not, however, indicate the degree of closenessthat many policymakers and developers believe exists.Although the links between tenants of science parksand universities is a matter of dispute, it is clear that inmost cases a university has been beneficial in attractingtenants to the parks. Goldstein and Luger (1991) arguethat parks owned or operated by universities are morelikely to generate growth than are parks with less for-mal links to universities. The results of their researchalso indicates that regions with parks that also con-tained research universities had better employmentgrowth than those that did not.

When considering the impact of science parks onboth national and regional development, it is importantto recognize that their success rate does not appear tobe high. A 1983 study of science/technology parks inthe United States found failure rates of 50 percent (Joseph1989). Although this percentage may be disputed, there islittle doubt that the policy of promoting high-technology-led economic development must be viewed as a long-term process rather than the quick fix that many localgovernments and developers have made it out to be.The most successful parks, such as Research TrianglePark and the Cambridge Research Park, took more thana decade to become really viable. Goldstein and Luger(1991) suggest that the probability for success is fargreater for older parks than those of more recent vin-tage. They comment that when it comes to the establish-ment of successful research parks, "the early bird getsthe worm" (74). This implies that for many areas, espe-cially in the United States, the chances of new parksbeing successful are not great. Malecki (1991) concludesthat science parks

are an attractive but highly uncertain policy. They oftenpresent little more than a theme for real estate or prop-erty sales and occupancy. This may attract some firms,but parks themselves do not increase the propensity ofnew firms to form. ...It is not surprising then, that so fewscience parks in the USA and elsewhere have been suc-cessful, nor that the most successful are in large urbanareas. ...Given the "right" conditions, however, scienceparks can add measurably to regional economic develop-ment. (p. 310)Although Goldstein and Luger (1991) do not differ

on the whole from Malecki's conclusion, their studyoffers a more positive evaluation of the contribution ofresearch parks to regional economic growth. They mea-sured success by looking at "the difference in totalemployment growth rates-both after and before a parkhad been established-between counties with a re-search park and a control group of counties (without apark) having the same metropolitan status, population

size, and location as the counties containing researchparks" (.59). Of the forty-five research parks they stud-ied, thirty-two were situated in counties that grew fasterthan did! their control group counties in the years afterthe parks were established. They advise caution whenanalyzirlg these findings, however, because they lookedonly at 'the employment growth rate for the first fiveyears after park creation; and, because they could notcontrol for all conceivable rival factors, they almostcertainl)r classified some parks as successful whosecounties. would have grown relative to their respectivecontrol !~OUPs even without a research park.

We aJ:gue that two crucial determinants enhance thechances for successful science parks: state or govern-ment policy and location (see also Amirahmadi 1992).SuccessJ:u! science parks received fairly large degrees ofeither l(xal or national government assistance. Thisassistanlce has taken diverse forms, from direct statesubsidiE~S in Singapore to the provision of infrastructurein Nort1\ Carolina. Although government assistance isessential to the success of these parks, it is clear that bothlocal an,d national policies to promote science park de-velopment have drawbacks. National policies, likeJapan's, are open to abuse as politicians try to curryfavor in various regions. The often vicious competitionamong regions to attract firms is costly to all-the re-gion thalt wins, the regions that lose, and the country asa whoIE~. A well thought-out national technology planis more efficient than a piecemeal competition betweenregions. The Singapore approach of using science parksto advance the nation's human resources, increase itstechnoliDgical edge, and improve its international com-petitiveness is a case in point-although it is still tooearly to judge the success of this approach.

Location refers to the park's proximity to either ex-isting urban agglomerations or to particular urban fea-tures-Jl1amely, a high-quality infrastructure, such asgood tI'ansportation linkages (including proximity toan airport); a high-quality residential environment; auniversity; and a pleasant work environment. Giventheir iIrlportance to a park's success, it is not surprisingthat most publicity brochures for science parks high-light these features (see for example, Equitable Real Es-tate 1991). Malecki (1991) concurs with this view:

Only metropolitan regions and their bundle of amenitiesand iJnfrastructure are even potential locations for newfirm Icormation. The complex and dynamic advantagesassociated with urban size-face-to-face communication,pools of workers or potential to attract and keep them-outw,eigh the largely aesthetic attributes of a science park.Policies have been unable to create the critical mass nec-essar:'f to attract and keep professional workers, except inlarge urban areas. (p. 310)The success of science parks has been mixed. Re-

search Triangle Park, for example, has provided em-

Science Parks 121ployment to skilled graduates and attracted firms intothe region, but this success has come at a hefty cost tothe state. Perhaps more important, the benefits have notbeen shared by either the bulk of the state's workforceor the region as a whole. These parks also offer noguarantee of promoting high-technology-led economicgrowth, at either the national or regional level. To do so,they must generate greater multipliers, more spin-offs,and more linkages with the surrounding areas.

The value of science parks as successful vehicles forhigh-technology-led growth outside the major indus-trial powers is highly debatable. It is more likely thatscience parks in the NICs and other industrializingcountrie!s will replicate the Australian case in whichmultinational corporations moved into the scienceparks primarily because of the status attached to thepark. In Australia, these firms developed few links witheach other, with local firms outside the parks, or withlocal universities. In such circumstances, the benefits tothe host country must be questioned-especially giventhe vast sums of money many governments such asSingapore, are spending on attracting these firms. Theapplicability of science park development for the NICsand for less developed countries has not been fullyexplorec! in the existing literature and needs furtherresearch.

Anotl.ler area that could profit from further researchare studies of the linkages between science parks anddefense-related R&D. This issue is neglected in the lit-erature cand is likely to be crucial when considering thefuture prospects of science parks. There is also a needfor com]parative studies of science parks in differentcountries. A comparative study of the United States andthe Unit:ed Kingdom would be of particular benefitbecause these two countries have the greatest numberof science parks and also have similarly high propor-tions of defense-related R&D.

Science parks in themselves are not the answer topromotil'lg regional or national high-technology-ledeconomic development. They are, however, one of theoptions available to policymakers as part of a well-thought.-out and coordinated development strategy.Such a strategy must build on regional or nationalstrengths rather than artificial supports for costly anduncertai:n high-technology strategies. Yudken andBlack (1~}90) suggest that these strategies should targetnational needs and then the federal gQvernment shoulddevise policies that mobilize market resources to con-front critical social needs. They recommend that thesepolicies should (1) provide incentives for industries toconduct basic research; (2) improve technology transfer;(3) produce desired products; (4) support job trainingand education; and (5) maintain health, safety, and en-vironmental standards (276).

It is p,ossible for nations or regions to promote devel-opment within science parks at minimal fiscal cost.Govemrnent (state or federal) R&D facilities could besited within selected parks, or government agenciescould contract with firms located within the parks.Because science parks often enjoy more locational andresearch advantages than do firms located outside ofparks, ttlis could be a good strategy for maximizing thebenefits derived from government research expendi-tures. Incentives could also promote R&D linkages be-

CONCLUSIONS

AlthOUgh the concept of science parks has merit, it isnot the panacea for development that many policymak-ers and developers make it out to be. Many parks,including North Carolina's "successful" Research Tri-angle Park, have been established in areas that do notconform to most of the factors considered ideal forscience park development. In such cases, only verygenerous state support and vigorous marketing haveattracted tenants to the parks. At the regional level, thecosts of such efforts often outweigh the benefits. Masseyet al. (1992) make the point that investment in scienceparks actually contributed to increased regional in-equality in the United Kingdom. Because the greatestchances for successful science park development are inthe most advanced parts of a country, this is not an issuethat can be lightly dismissed. As such, the question ofwhether science parks exacerbate regional inequality isan area deserving of further investigation.

A key assumption behind the promotion of scienceparks is that a concentration of R&D leads to the devel-opment of a strong regional multiplier or that R&D is apropulsive industry. But, in general, the link betweenR&D investment and a commercially successful prod-uct is weak, and there is little correlation between R&Dinvestment and employment growth. This raises a seri-ous question about the utility of science parks in pro-moting both regional development and increasing thediffusion of new technology. Even when science parkshave promoted local employment, the benefits havebeen shared unevenly. Further studies of whether themain multiplier effects from science parks are techno-logically or income-driven is of great importance. Ifincome-driven multipliers predominate, as Massey et a1.(1992) argue, then it is likely that science parks willcontribute to regional income inequality rather thanameliorate it.

Science parks employ workers with relatively highlevels of academic qualifications-the vast majority ofwhom are men (Massey et al.1992). Yet, with the excep-tions of Massey et al. (1991) and Goldstein and Luger(1991), the gender issue of science park employment isconspicuously absent from most of the literature. Mas-sey et al. (1992) note that there is a clear gender issuethat needs further investigation.

122 Journal of Planning Literarnre

tween firms located within the parks. Such policiesshould be directed at only a limited number of strategi-cally sited science parks, however, so that the benefitsaccruing from the policy are not diffused. It is alsoimportant that planners undertake local microstudiesof the regional economy and political culture to assesslocal attitudes toward state intervention. This will notonly allow planners and policymakers to anticipatepossible sources of opposition but will also allow themto tailor plans to fit individual regional circumstances.

Planners must recognize that a science park is not acure-all for an ailing regional economy. To be successful,any planning policy that relies on a science park musthave concrete policy goals for the park at the outset. Theexperience of the Bradford City Council, which pro-moted a science park with no clear understanding ofwhat the park could achieve, must be avoided. Plannerscan playa key role in avoiding such experiences byundertaking the microstudies suggested above, readingthe relevant literature, and advising policymakers ac-cordingly. Such a course would not only increase theeffectiveness of science parks as a policy tool but alsoallow for an easier appraisal of their performance byproviding concrete goals against which to measureperformance.

These are only preliminary suggestions, and theyrequire further investigation. The focus for future re-search should be aimed at overcoming the gaps in theliterature highlighted in this article and studying themix of federal and state policies needed to create aviable national strategy for economic development.Such strategies should incorporate the use of scienceparks, where appropriate, but only with a clear under-standing of their problems and limitations.

The authors are grateful to students in Hooshang Amirahmadi's1992 summer class for comments on an early draft of this article andto Alexis Gevorgian for assistance in collecting research materialson the developers' perspective on science parks.

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