Edited by Hooshang Amirahmadi and Nader Entessar Iran and...
Transcript of Edited by Hooshang Amirahmadi and Nader Entessar Iran and...
-
Edite
d by
Hoo
shan
g Am
irahm
adi
and
Nad
er E
ntes
sar
Iran
and
the
Arab
Wor
ld
e A
rab
Iti)rl
d ac
ldre
sse
,, 11
1,-
mos
t ,Ii
Nil
and
•,10
.1 4
0,00
.1
Mid
dle-
Eas
t pol
itics
, With
.1 1
,001
1;10
0n tk
k I,
tiro
1 G
ulf
stat
es c
ombi
ned,
lit
rill
0141 t,,i„
()ti
ed l
eade
rshi
p po
siti
on i
n th
,.
, I4
II l
it
sert
ion,
Ira
n m
ust b
e a
part
01
,110
ham
t k
oh
k
e M
iddl
e E
ast i
n ge
nera
l, `i
,i le
an,
it en
eral
ref
usal
to
disc
tiss
its
hoe
nu
m,
taks
thro
ugh
this
bar
rier
01
so, i
t„
III1
.1,k
,h,
tions
with
Syr
ia, 1
,eba
nkm
, 11,
al, 1
1.N
',mid
i A1,
11.1
.1. ,
110
the
Gul
f C
oope
rati
on C
ount
11
I he
. 1 ,,
11
11
,111
,-
)la
tin
g
the
New
Worl
d (
)Ilk
' 11)
ill.
111(1
is
(cha
rd W
. Run
let.
Pro
fess
or o
f Il
ihto
ly,, t
'olt
i ^10
,4 I
111
%1 1
,
,b r
elat
ions
arc
cru
cial
tor
und
erst
andi
ng
the
kJai
leM
pOta
ty
e M
iddl
e E
ast.
To
date
, no
mon
ogra
ph h
as n
ettle
d th
is i
Mpti
f
desp
ite
the
Iran
--Ir
aq w
ar, I
ran'
s ro
le i
n th
e L
ehru
nin,
and
ar
t for
rad
ical
Isl
amic
Ret
ires
in t
he A
tah
0,1
11
ba
n an
ti th
e ad
mir
ably
fill
s th
is la
cuna
. In
a se
rot i
rn 1
•,,1
es
sio
Mat
imp
act o
f id
eolo
gy, U
nite
d St
ates
po
ll,
‘.
I.-I
mam
s w
ith
ates
on
Iran
ian•
Ara
b re
lati
ons,
die
s ‘,
,Ini
nt.
Iii
4 11
111
at
the
pros
pect
s fo
r co
nfli
ct a
nd s
ulho
ns i
n O
W /
,‘!■.1
,S
O /
1+4n
'ma
rid is
mus
t rea
ding
1 /
a th
ose
seek
nit,
' .1
niil‘
11)
1111
1111
/1:1
1',1
\
g of
Mid
dle
Eas
t pol
itic
s.'
■ ,rie
Dav
is, P
rofe
ssor
of
Polit
ical
St i
s nc
r, R
utyc
i.. i
!ffi
vet
sity
.
T
r• e
s •
• t
Plkerta
•
-
Also
edi
ted
by H
oosh
ang
Amir
ahm
adi a
nd N
ader
Ent
essa
r
REC
ON
STR
UC
TIO
N A
ND
REG
ION
AL
DIP
LOM
AC
Y IN
TH
E PE
RSI
AN
GU
LF
Also
by
Hoo
shan
g Am
irah
mad
i
REV
OLU
TIO
N A
ND
EC
ON
OM
IC T
RA
NSI
TIO
N:
The
Irani
an E
xper
ienc
e PO
ST-R
EVO
LUTI
ON
AR
Y IR
AN
(co
-ed
itor)
TH
E U
NIT
ED S
TATE
S A
ND
TH
E M
IDD
LE E
AST
(ed
itor)
U
RB
AN
DEV
ELO
PMEN
T IN
TH
E M
USL
IM W
OR
LD (
co-ed
itor)
Also
by
Nad
er E
ntes
sar
KU
RD
ISH
FR
INO
NA
TIO
NA
LIS
M
MID
DLE
EA
ST P
OLI
TIC
S PO
LITI
CA
L D
EVEL
OPM
ENT
IN C
HIL
E A
STU
DY
ON
CH
INES
E FO
REI
GN
PO
LIC
Y
Iran
and
the
Ara
b W
orld
Ed
ited
by
Hoo
shan
g A
mira
hmad
i A
ssoc
iate
Pro
fess
or a
nd D
irect
or, M
iddl
e E
aste
rn S
tudi
es P
rogr
am
Rut
gers
Uni
vers
ity, N
ew J
erse
y
and
Nad
er E
ntes
sar
Pro
fess
or o
f Pol
itica
l Sci
ence
S
prin
g H
ill C
olle
ge, A
laba
ma
St. M
artin
's Pr
ess
New
Yor
k
-
138
Iran
and
the
Arab
Wor
ld
9.Ch
eryl
Ben
ard
and
Zalm
ay K
halil
zad,
'Th
e G
over
nmen
t of G
od'
— Ir
an's
Isla
mic
Rep
ublic
(Ne
w Yo
rk: C
olum
bia U
nive
rsity
Pre
ss, 1
984)
. 10
.R.
K. R
amaz
ani,
Revo
lutio
nary
Iran
: Cha
lleng
e and
Res
pons
e in
the M
iddl
e Ea
st (B
altim
ore a
nd L
ondo
n: Jo
hns H
opki
ns U
nive
rsity
Pre
ss, 1
986)
. 11
.Ro
bin
Wrig
ht, I
n th
e N
ame
of G
od: T
he K
hom
eini
Dec
ade
(New
Yor
k:
Sim
on an
d Sc
huste
r, 19
89),
pp. 1
08-
29.
12.
Erik
R. P
eter
son,
The
Gul
f Coo
pera
tion
Cou
ncil:
Sea
rch
for U
nity
in a
D
ynam
ic R
egio
n (B
ould
er an
d Lo
ndon
: Wes
tvie
w P
ress
, 198
8), p
p. x
viii,
13
4-7.
13.
In 1
983,
the G
CC S
upre
me C
ounc
il Co
mm
uniq
ué ca
lled
'on Ir
an to
resp
ond
posit
ively
to [t
he 3
1 Oc
tobe
r 198
3 UN
Sec
urity
Cou
ncil]
reso
lutio
n an
d no
t to
thre
aten
the f
reed
om o
f nav
igat
ion
in th
e Gul
f and
its s
traits
'. In
1985
, ho
wev
er, G
CC ru
lers
stat
ed th
at th
e w
ar sh
ould
end
'in
a m
anne
r tha
t sa
fegu
ard[
ed] t
he le
gitim
ate ri
ghts
and i
nter
ests
of th
e two
side
s'. T
his w
as as
lu
cid
a pro
noun
cem
ent a
s the
GCC
wou
ld m
ake i
n ve
ntin
g its
mem
bers
' di
sple
asur
e with
Sad
dam
Hus
sein
but
it w
as en
ough
. See
'Doh
a Sup
rem
e Co
uncil
Sum
mit:
Fin
al Co
mm
uniq
ue',
FBIS
— M
EA-V-
83-21
8, 9
Nov
embe
r 19
83, p
p. C3
—C4
; and
'Mus
cat S
upre
me C
ounc
il Su
mm
it: F
inal
Com
mun
i-qu
e', F
BIS
— M
EA-V-
85 -2
15 ,
6 Nov
embe
r 198
5, pp
. C1—
C2.
14.
Mar
tin K
ram
er, 'T
rage
dy in
Mec
ca',
Orb
is 32
:2 (S
prin
g 19
88),
pp. 2
32-7
. 15
.Is
lam
and
Rev
olut
ion:
Writ
ings
and
Dec
lara
tions
of I
mam
Kho
mei
ni,
trans
-lat
ed b
y Ha
mid
Alg
ar (B
erke
ley, C
A: M
izan
Pres
s, 19
81),
p. 1
96. T
he an
ti-Sh
ia tra
ct, A
l-Khu
tut a
l-Ari
da li
-U
sus A
llati
Qam
a Al
ayha
Din
as-
Shia
al-
Ithna
Ash
ariy
a (T
he B
road
Lin
es o
f the
Fou
ndat
ions
on
whi
ch th
e Sh
ia
Relig
ion
Aros
e) is
auth
ored
by
Muh
ib ad
-Din
al-K
hatib
. Firs
t pub
lishe
d in
19
60, i
t rem
ains a
wid
ely d
istrib
uted
anti-
Shia
polem
ic.
16.
Ali S
haria
ti, H
ail (
Bedf
ord,
Ohi
o: F
ree I
slam
ic Li
teratu
re, 1
978)
, p. 1
09.
17.
As q
uoted
in K
ram
er, o
p. ci
t., p
. 243
. 18
.Di
lip H
iro, H
oly
War
s: T
he R
ise o
f Isla
mic
Fun
dam
enta
lism
(Ne
w Yo
rk:
Rout
ledge
, 198
9), p
p. 2
17-1
9.
19.
As q
uoted
in K
ram
er, o
p. ci
t., p
. 245
. 20
.Le
Mon
de, 2
5 Au
gust
1987
, p. 1
. 21
.W
alter
de B
ock a
nd Je
an-C
harle
s Den
iau, D
es A
rmes
Pou
r L' I
ran:
L' I
rang
ate
Euro
peen
(Par
is: G
allim
ard,
198
8), p
p. 2
14-1
7.
22.
Shire
en T
. Hun
ter, I
ran
and
the W
orld
: Con
tinui
ty in
a R
evol
utio
nary
Dec
ade
(Blo
omin
gton
and
Indi
anap
olis:
Indi
ana U
nive
rsity
Pre
ss, 1
990)
, pp.
63-
78.
8 Ira
nian
—Sa
udi A
rabi
an
Rel
atio
ns si
nce
the
Rev
olut
ion
Hoo
shan
g Am
irahm
adi
Until
the e
nd o
f the
US-
led w
ar ag
ainst
Iraq,
the r
elatio
nshi
p be
twee
n th
e Isl
amic
Repu
blic
of Ir
an an
d the
Kin
gdom
of S
'a'ud
i Ara
bia r
emain
ed te
nse
and
unfri
endl
y. W
hile
tensio
n als
o ex
isted
betw
een
the t
wo n
ation
s dur
ing
the r
eign
of th
e late
Sha
h M
oham
mad
Rez
a Pah
lavi,
it wa
s now
here
clos
e to
the e
ssen
tially
antag
onist
ic • r
elatio
ns th
at de
velo
ped
betw
een
the t
wo
coun
tries
in th
e afte
rmath
of t
he R
evol
utio
n in
197
9.
The I
raqi
inva
sion
of Ir
an o
n 22
Sep
tem
ber 1
980
and
the s
ubse
quen
t eig
ht-y
ear w
ar b
etwee
n th
e two
coun
tries
bec
ame a
noth
er tu
rnin
g-po
int i
n th
e wor
seni
ng re
latio
ns b
etwee
n th
e Isla
mic
Repu
blic
and
the S
audi
Kin
g-do
m. F
rom
that
mom
ent,
the e
ssen
tially
ideo
logi
cal c
ontes
t gra
duall
y de
-ve
lope
d in
to p
oliti
cal c
onfro
ntat
ion
on se
vera
l fro
nts.
The r
elat
ions
hip
beca
me e
ven
mor
e ten
se w
hen
a Sau
di-`e
ngin
eere
d gl
ut' in
198
5-6
led to
a sh
arp
drop
in O
PEC
oil p
rices
, with
extre
mely
neg
ative
cons
eque
nces
for
the I
rani
an w
ar ec
onom
y.
This
deter
iora
ting
relat
ions
hip
reac
hed
its lo
west
poin
t in
1987
whe
n a
polit
ical
dem
onstr
atio
n by
the
Irani
an p
ilgrim
s in
Mec
ca tu
rned
into
a
bloo
dy co
nfro
ntat
ion
with
the S
audi
pol
ice.
At t
hat p
oint
ver
bal a
buse
in
tensif
ied fr
om b
oth
sides
and
dipl
omati
c rela
tions
wer
e sev
ered
. The
late
Aya
tolla
h Ro
uhol
lah
Kho
mei
ni ev
en p
rocl
aim
ed S
audi
Ara
bia a
s the
Is-
lamic
Repu
blic'
s main
enem
y alth
ough
Iran
was
in th
e mid
st of
its w
ar w
ith
Iraq.
The
Islam
ic lea
ders
in T
ehra
n als
o be
gan
to ca
ll th
e Kin
gdom
by
its
old
nam
e, Hi
jaz, q
uesti
onin
g th
e leg
itim
acy
of th
e Hou
se o
f Sau
d's ru
le in
Isl
am's
birth
plac
e. Ira
n—Sa
udi r
elatio
ns im
prov
ed sl
ight
ly un
der t
he le
ader
ship
of th
e pra
g-m
atist
Pres
iden
t Ali
Akba
r Has
hem
i Raf
sanj
ani b
egin
ning
in 1
989.
Afte
r th
e cea
sefir
e with
Iraq
in A
ugus
t 198
8 and
the d
eath
of A
yato
llah K
hom
eini
in 1
989,
the I
slam
ic Re
publ
ic be
gin
to re
defin
e its
fore
ign
polic
y fro
m th
e ea
rlier
conf
ront
ation
al ap
proa
ch to
ward
a m
ore m
oder
ate an
d co
oper
ative
on
e with
the s
tates
in th
e reg
ion.
Th
is ch
ange
notw
ithsta
ndin
g, Ira
n—Sa
udi A
rabi
a rela
tions
rem
ained
tens
e an
d un
frien
dly
until
the U
S-le
d w
ar ag
ains
t Ira
q w
as su
cces
sful
ly co
n-
139
-
140
Iran
and
the
Ara
b W
orld
elud
ed. S
ince
then
, som
e of
the
mos
t tro
ublin
g is
sues
bet
wee
n th
e tw
o re
gim
es h
ave
been
reso
lved
. The
se in
clud
e th
e di
sput
es o
ver t
he M
ecca
de
mon
strat
ion
and
OPE
C le
ader
ship
. Dip
lom
atic
ties
wer
e re
store
d in
Mar
ch
1991
. Som
e ve
ry im
porta
nt is
sues
, how
ever
, rem
ain
unre
solv
ed fo
r the
tim
e be
ing.
Am
ong
them
are
the
futu
re le
ader
ship
and
secu
rity
of th
e Pe
rsia
n G
ulf a
nd th
e tra
ditio
nal s
ourc
es o
f ten
sion
bet
wee
n A
rabs
and
Iran
ians
. Th
is c
hapt
er p
rese
nts a
n ov
ervi
ew o
f Ira
nian
—Sa
udi A
rabi
an re
latio
ns
sinc
e th
e R
evol
utio
n in
197
9 an
d fo
cuse
s on
the
fact
ors
unde
rlyin
g th
e te
nsio
n be
twee
n Te
hran
and
Riy
adh.
I ar
gue
that
thre
e m
ajor
forc
es w
ere
the
mos
t res
pons
ible
for t
he c
onfro
ntat
ions
bet
wee
n th
e tw
o re
gim
es: i
deo-
logi
cal a
nd c
ultu
ral d
iffer
ence
s; str
uggl
e fo
r OPE
C le
ader
ship
, and
que
st fo
r su
prem
acy
in th
e Pe
rsia
n G
ulf.
A c
ompl
ex o
f oth
er fo
rces
will
be
show
n to
ha
ve in
fluen
ced
Iran—
Saud
i rel
atio
ns in
the
post-
revo
lutio
nary
per
iod,
mos
t no
tabl
y th
e U
S pr
esen
ce in
the
regi
on a
nd th
e Ira
n—Ira
q w
ar.
In th
e fo
llow
ing
page
s, th
e fir
st se
ctio
n fo
cuse
s on
the
OPE
C fa
ctor
. The
ne
xt s
ectio
n fo
cuse
s on
the
ideo
logi
cal a
nd c
ultu
ral r
oots
of t
he te
nsio
n be
twee
n th
e tw
o re
gim
es in
Teh
ran
and
Riy
adh.
In th
e th
ird se
ctio
n, th
e Pe
rsia
n G
ulf f
acto
r and
the
US
role
in Ir
ania
n—Sa
udi A
rabi
an re
latio
ns a
re
disc
usse
d. T
he c
hapt
er is
then
con
clud
ed w
ith a
few
rem
arks
abo
ut re
cent
ch
ange
s in
the
rela
tions
bet
wee
n th
e tw
o na
tions
and
the
pros
pect
for t
he
futu
re.
THE
OPE
C F
AC
TOR
To a
ppre
ciat
e th
e im
porta
nce
of th
e O
PEC
fact
or in
Iran
—Sa
udi A
rabi
a re
latio
ns, o
ne m
ust t
ake
note
of t
he fa
ct th
at m
ost m
oder
n se
ctor
s of t
he
Irani
an e
cono
my
depe
nd o
n th
e w
orld
mar
ket f
or so
me
65 to
75
per c
ent o
f th
eir v
ario
us in
puts,
from
raw
mat
eria
ls to
tech
nolo
gy. T
hese
impo
rts m
ust
be p
aid
for b
y oi
l rev
enue
whi
ch c
onst
itute
s ov
er 9
0 pe
r cen
t of t
he
coun
try's
fore
ign
exch
ange
ear
ning
s. O
il is
. in
shor
t, th
e ec
oncm
y's r
eal
lifel
ine.
Yet
Iran
has
onl
y lim
ited
cont
rol o
ver t
he p
rodu
ctio
n, e
xpor
t and
pr
ice
of it
s oil,
as t
hey
are
larg
ely
dete
rmin
ed b
y ch
ange
s in
the
wor
ld o
il m
arke
t and
with
in O
PEC
. The
two
fact
ors
are
inte
rrel
ated
and
wor
ked
toge
ther
to c
rippl
e th
e Is
lam
ic R
epub
lic's
oil-e
arni
ng c
apab
ility
. To
beg
in w
ith, i
n th
e af
term
ath
of th
e 19
73 A
rab
oil e
mba
rgo,
the
Wes
t be
cam
e inc
reas
ingl
y oi
l-con
scio
us. T
he U
nite
d St
ates
led
the c
rusa
de ag
ains
t O
PEC
whi
ch b
egan
with
the
crea
tion
of th
e In
tern
atio
nal E
nerg
y A
genc
y (IE
A) i
n 19
74. E
xcep
t Fra
nce,
all
maj
or o
il-co
nsum
ing
natio
ns in
the
Wes
t pa
rtici
pate
d in
this
new
'car
tel o
f oil
com
pani
es'.'
The
carte
l's m
ain
task
w
as to
cre
ate
a su
rplu
s of
ene
rgy
by a
com
bina
tion
of s
ever
al m
eans
Hoo
shan
g A
mira
hmad
i 14
1
incl
udin
g re
duct
ion
in d
eman
d, d
evel
opm
ent o
f new
ene
rgy
sour
ces,
and
the
engi
neer
ing
of th
e oc
casio
nal g
lut.
In re
trosp
ect,
this
polic
y w
as q
uite
succ
essf
ul. I
n 19
85, d
eman
d fo
r oil
in
the
non-
Com
mun
ist w
orld
was
5 p
er c
ent l
ower
than
it w
as in
197
3. F
or
OPE
C, th
e de
clin
e w
as e
ven
mor
e se
vere
. By
1986
, OPE
C ha
d lo
st so
me
20
mill
ion
barre
ls a
day
of it
s pot
entia
l pro
duct
ion,
of w
hich
14
to 1
5 m
b/d
had
been
take
n aw
ay b
y no
n-O
PEC
prod
ucer
s inc
ludi
ng th
ose
in th
e N
orth
Sea
. 2 In the meantime, the world oil market was flooded by oil from Saudi Arabia
and
the
new
OPE
C co
mpe
titor
s, re
sulti
ng in
a m
ajor
ove
rsup
ply
or g
lut b
y 19
85.3
With
in O
PEC,
Iran
was
the
bigg
est l
oser
. Its
shar
e of
OPE
C pr
oduc
-tio
n an
d ex
ports
of c
rude
oil
decl
ined
from
19.
1 pe
r cen
t and
18.
2 pe
r cen
t in
197
6 to
14.
1 an
d 13
.4 in
198
5 re
spec
tivel
y. P
art o
f thi
s dec
line,
how
ever
, re
sulte
d fro
m th
e Ira
n—Ira
q w
ar an
d an
earli
er d
elib
erat
e gov
ernm
ent p
olic
y to
redu
ce d
epen
denc
y on
the
oil s
ecto
il Th
e sh
rinki
ng d
eman
d an
d ex
pand
ing
com
petit
ion
com
bine
d w
ith m
is-
take
n O
PEC
polic
ies a
nd w
hat I
hav
e el
sew
here
cal
led
'the
Saud
i fac
tor'
to
caus
e th
e 19
86 c
rash
in o
il m
arke
ts; o
il pr
ices
dec
lined
from
abo
ut $
28 p
er
barre
l in
mid
-Jan
uary
198
6 to
$10
per
bar
rel b
y th
e firs
t wee
k of
Apr
il 19
86.
Inde
ed, r
eal,
that
is th
e in
flatio
n-ad
juste
d, p
rices
wer
e ev
en lo
wer
, abo
ut $
4 to
$5
per b
arre
l. O
PEC
rem
aine
d in
atte
ntiv
e to
tran
sfor
mat
ions
occ
urrin
g in
th
e w
orld
oil
mar
ket a
nd, a
s a re
sult,
did
not
ado
pt a
long
-term
stra
tegi
c pe
rspe
ctiv
e in
the
pric
ing
of it
s oil.
Inste
ad o
f int
erve
ning
in th
e m
arke
t to
regu
late
its p
rices
at a
stab
le le
vel a
nd in
rela
tion
to su
pply
—de
man
d fo
rces
, O
PEC
deci
ded
to ta
ke a
dvan
tage
of s
hort-
term
gai
ns in
pric
es.
From
the p
ersp
ectiv
e of I
ran—
Saud
i rel
atio
ns, h
owev
er, i
t is t
he im
pact
of
the
Saud
i fac
tor o
n th
e w
orld
oil
mar
ket t
hat i
s mos
t sig
nific
ant.
Follo
win
g th
e 19
73 o
il pr
ice-
hike
; the
intra
-OPE
C p
ower
stru
ggle
gre
w, o
ver O
PEC
le
ader
ship
. As a
con
sequ
ence
, the
org
anisa
tion
beca
me
incr
easin
gly
polit
i-ci
sed.
Fro
m th
e ve
ry b
egin
ning
the
two
mai
n co
ntes
tant
s wer
e Ir
an a
nd
Saud
i Ara
bia.
The
'stru
ggle
for t
he le
ader
ship
of O
PEC
rem
aine
d a
dorm
ant
issu
e un
der t
he ti
ght m
arke
t of 1
979-
1980
. It w
as o
nly
in s
oft m
arke
t pe
riods
(for
insta
nce,
197
4-19
78 a
nd 1
981-
1985
) tha
t thi
s stru
ggle
cre
ated
co
nsid
erab
le in
tra-O
PEC
tens
ions
.' 5
Afte
r the
Iran
ian
Revo
lutio
n, S
audi
Ara
bia
beca
me
the
abso
lute
'sw
ing.
pr
oduc
er' o
f OPE
C, a
pos
ition
that
con
tribu
ted
to it
s gro
win
g po
wer
with
in
the
orga
nisa
tion
in th
e su
bseq
uent
yea
rs. T
he K
ingd
om u
sed
its n
ew-fo
und
pow
er to
mak
e ec
onom
ic a
nd p
oliti
cal g
ains
and
frie
nds.
In p
artic
ular
, it
used
its p
ower
with
in O
PEC
to re
gula
te o
il pr
ices
acc
ordi
ng to
the
eco-
nom
ic n
eeds
and
requ
irem
ents
of it
s Wes
tern
frie
nds,
the
Uni
ted
Stat
es in
pa
rticu
lar.
The
Saud
is al
so u
sed
thei
r eco
nom
ic p
ower
to u
nder
min
e po
st-re
volu
tiona
ry re
gim
es, i
nclu
ding
Iran
.
-
142
Iran
and
the A
rab
Wor
ld
Hoo
shan
g Am
irahm
adi
143
This
Saud
i pol
icy
was
par
t of a
larg
er m
utua
l com
mitm
ent t
hat
had
deve
lope
d be
twee
n th
e Kin
gdom
and
the U
nite
d St
ates
beg
inni
ng i
n th
e m
id-1
970s
. In
Terz
ian'
s wor
ds:
A ne
w str
ateg
ic tr
iang
le ha
d em
erge
d on
the i
nter
natio
nal s
cene
— O
PEC
at th
e m
ercy
of S
audi
Ara
bia;
Sau
di A
rabi
a al
igne
d w
ith th
e U
nite
d St
ates
; the
Uni
ted
Stat
es co
mm
itted
to th
e pro
tect
ion
of R
iyad
h —
and
O
PEC
was t
o re
mai
n a
priso
ner o
f thi
s tria
ngle
thro
ugho
ut th
e fol
lowi
ng
year
s, es
capi
ng o
nly
than
ks to
exce
ptio
nal —
and
ephe
mer
al ci
rcum
-sta
nces
.6
Thus
, fol
lowi
ng th
e Ira
nian
Rev
olut
ion
in 1
979,
acc
ordi
ng to
Moh
amm
ad
Faro
uk A
l Hus
sein
i:
Saud
i Ara
bia
was c
alled
upo
n by
the i
nter
natio
nal c
omm
unity
to in
crea
se
its p
rodu
ctio
n in
orde
r to a
llevi
ate t
he ad
vers
e effe
ct th
at m
ight
hav
e bee
n en
gend
ered
by
a w
orld
ene
rgy
crisi
s. Pr
oduc
tion
was
acc
ordi
ngly
in-
crea
sed
to 9
.5 m
b/d
in 1
979,
9.9
mb/
d in
198
0 an
d 9.
8 m
b/d
in 1
981.
7
Ara
mco
was
alr
eady
, in
late
197
8, p
rodu
cing
som
e 2.5
to 3
mb/
d m
ore
than
its p
rodu
ctio
n ea
rlier
that
yea
r. As
was
late
r rev
ealed
by
a US
Sen
ate
repo
rt, A
ram
co's
max
imum
pro
duct
ion
capa
city
was
abo
ut 9
.3 m
b/d
and
the o
verp
rodu
ctio
n ha
d 'c
ause
d ir
repa
rabl
e dam
age a
nd re
duce
d th
e ulti
-m
ate r
ecov
ery
rate
of o
il in
pla
ces '
.8 A
lthou
gh th
e Sau
dis'
over
prod
uctio
n po
licy
had
begu
n in
the m
id-1
970s
, it b
ecam
e a w
ell-e
stab
lishe
d pr
actic
e on
ly a
fter t
he Ir
ania
n oi
l wor
kers
wen
t on
strik
e in
1978
, cau
sing
an a
lmos
t co
mpl
ete h
alt i
n th
e cou
ntry
's oi
l exp
orts
. Th
e Sau
di K
ingd
om a
lso tr
ied
to k
eep
a lid
on
oil p
rice
s. H
owev
er, d
ue
to th
e sof
t mar
ket c
ondi
tion
prev
ailin
g in
197
9-80
, the
se S
audi
'mal
icio
us
tact
ics'
prov
ed la
rgel
y in
effe
ctiv
e. A
s was
not
ed b
y Fe
shar
aki a
nd Is
aak:
In 1
979,
the S
audi
s ini
tially
kep
t the
ir p
rice
s at $
18/b
arre
l—$4
/bar
rel
belo
w si
mila
r-qu
ality
crud
e — b
ut sp
ot p
rice
s ros
e to
$45/
barr
el. T
he
Saud
is we
re fo
rced
, ste
p by
step
, to
raise
their
pric
es to
$24
/bar
rel,
then
$2
6, $
28, a
nd $
30, a
nd fi
nally
to $
32/b
arre
l in
Dece
mbe
r 198
0. S
till t
heir
pric
es w
ere $
3-4/
barr
el b
elow
sim
ilar-
qual
ity cr
ude.
9
Acco
rdin
g to
Ter
zian,
'thi
s gap
bet
ween
Sau
di p
rices
and
thos
e of o
ther
pr
oduc
ers r
epre
sent
ed a
loss
of o
ver
$23
000
mill
ion
over
the
peri
od
Febr
uary
197
9 to
Sep
tem
ber 1
981.
..'.1
9 The
low
er p
rice
s of S
audi
oil
also
le
d to
wid
espr
ead
corr
uptio
n am
ong
top-
rank
ing
Saud
i per
sona
litie
s, in
-cl
udin
g so
me m
embe
rs o
f the
roya
l fam
ily. T
he tw
o m
ost i
mpo
rtan
t cas
es
invo
lved
the n
otor
ious
Pri
nce M
oham
med
bin
Abd
ul A
ziz,
Kin
g K
halid
's el
der
brot
her,
and
Pri
nce
Band
ar b
in F
aisa
l bin
Sau
d (p
rese
ntly
Sau
di
Amba
ssad
or in
the U
S). B
oth
are r
epor
ted
to h
ave a
ppro
ache
d oi
l com
pa-
nies
, offe
ring
them
low
er-p
rice
d oi
l in
exch
ange
for m
ulti-
billi
on-d
olla
r co
mm
issio
ns.1
1 W
hate
ver t
he co
st, b
y 19
81, S
audi
Ara
bia
had
'succ
eede
d in
impo
sing
its
will
on
the
othe
r O
PEC
mem
bers
, for
cing
them
to r
ealig
n pr
ices
at t
he
low
ered
Sau
di sc
ale'
.12 I
n an
inte
rvie
w w
ith N
BC te
levi
sion
on 1
9 A
pril
1981
, Ahm
ed Z
aki Y
aman
i, th
en S
audi
Oil
Min
ister
, sai
d th
at th
e cur
rent
oil
glut
was
'eng
inee
red'
by
his G
over
nmen
t to
stab
ilise
the w
orld
oil
pric
e.13 Another source also q
uoted the Minister for expressing a similar idea: 'we en
gine
ered
the g
lut a
nd w
ant t
o se
e it i
n or
der t
o sta
biliz
e the
pric
e of o
il'.1
4 It was following this policy that the Saudis found themselves in opposition to
the o
ther
12
mem
bers
of O
PEC
durin
g th
e Org
anisa
tion'
s six
tieth
mee
t-in
g in
Gen
eva
on 2
5-7
May
198
1.
Whi
le th
is Sa
udi p
olic
y ha
s bee
n In
flict
ing
real
wou
nds o
n O
PEC
(for
ex
ampl
e, pr
ices c
olla
psed
in F
ebru
ary`
198
2), t
he K
ingd
om in
trod
uced
an
even
mor
e 'm
alici
ous'
tact
ic in
198
5. T
his n
ew p
olicy
is k
nown
as `
netb
ack'
de
als,
or a
s som
e hav
e rig
htly
calle
d it,
'a p
rice
war
'.15
Unde
r the
net
back
pr
icin
g ar
rang
emen
ts, o
il co
mpa
nies
buy
ing
Saud
i oil
wer
e gua
rant
eed
prof
its a
t the
refin
ing
stag
e by
inde
xing
the c
rude
oil
pric
e to
the m
arke
t va
lue o
f the
pro
duct
s mad
e fro
m it
: The
net
back
mec
hani
sm, t
here
fore
, re
duce
d th
e risk
of t
he v
olat
ile o
il m
arke
t. Un
der s
uch
a lu
crat
ive a
rran
ge-
men
t for
the o
il co
mpa
nies
, Sau
di A
rabi
a ha
d no
diff
iculty
in in
crea
sing
its
prod
uctio
n an
d ex
port
s and
floo
ding
the o
il m
arke
t. In
deed
, by
the e
nd o
f 198
5 its
pro
duct
ion
had
doub
led
and
its ex
port
s m
ore t
han
doub
led. S
pecif
ically
, Sau
di o
il ex
port
s ros
e fro
m 2
.5 m
b/d
in th
e fa
ll of
198
5 to
4.5
mb/
d in
early
198
6 an
d clo
se to
6 m
b/d
in th
e sum
mer
of
that
year
. As a
resu
lt, 't
he p
oten
tial w
orld
over
-supp
ly of
oil,
as ea
rlier
in th
e ye
ar, b
ecam
e an
actu
al o
ver-
supp
ly .
. :.
16 It
was
in th
e afte
rmat
h of
this
deve
lopm
ent t
hat O
PEC
term
inat
ed it
s pol
icy
of fi
xing
its o
il pr
ice a
nd o
f re
stri
ctin
g pr
oduc
tion
to th
e lev
el o
f wor
ld d
eman
d af
ter a
ccou
ntin
g fo
r no
n-O
PEC
oil.
The
se ch
ange
s the
n se
t the
stag
e for
the b
ig cr
ash
of 1
986,
w
hich
had
, str
ange
ly en
ough
, occ
urre
d in
less
than
two
mon
ths a
fter I
ran
had
take
n th
e Ira
qi p
ort o
f Faw
follo
wing
a su
rpris
e maj
or o
ffens
ive.
At th
e tim
e, th
e Sau
dis r
emai
ned
very
conc
erne
d ab
out t
he fa
te o
f Ira
q, w
hich
in a
se
nse w
as co
nnec
ted
to th
eir o
wn
fate
. G
ener
ally
spea
king
, whi
le al
l OPE
C m
embe
rs su
ffere
d fr
om th
e dec
lin-
ing
oil m
arke
t and
of t
he S
audi
pol
icies
, the
Isla
mic
Repu
blic
was i
mpa
cted
th
e mos
t. In
the w
ords
of I
ran'
s Dep
uty
Fore
ign
Min
ister
, the
Sau
dis'
polic
y de
alt a
'sev
ere b
low
to O
PEC'
and
the K
ingd
om w
as 'g
uilty
of t
he g
reat
est
trea
son
ever
com
mitt
ed ag
ains
t the
oppr
esse
d an
d de
priv
ed co
untr
ies .
..'.
17
The
Rep
ublic
was
invo
lved
in a
war
for
whi
ch it
had
no
inte
rnat
iona
l
-
144
Iran
and
the
Arab
Wor
ld
supp
ort a
nd ha
d inh
erite
d an e
cono
my t
hat w
as in
deep
crisi
s and
high
ly
depe
nden
t on
oil r
even
ue. M
oreo
ver,
the S
audi
pol
icie
s wer
e not
just
desig
ned t
o 'cri
pple
the I
slam
ic reg
ime e
cono
mica
lly' b
ut al
so to
stren
gthe
n its
enem
y, Ira
q. Th
e Sau
dis w
ere 'fi
nanc
ing I
raq's
war e
ffort'
from
the s
tart
and i
n a va
riety
of w
ays,
inclu
ding
unila
teral
trans
fers
in ca
sh an
d in k
ind,
cred
it ar
rang
emen
ts, an
d loa
ns. 1
8 In
a sin
gle y
ear i
n 19
81, f
or in
stanc
e, Sa
udi A
rabi
a, alo
ng w
ith K
uwait
, Qata
r, an
d th
e Uni
ted A
rab
Emira
tes,
`pro
vide
d Iraq
with
fina
ncial
assis
tance
, in t
he fo
rm of
an in
teres
t free
loan
of
$30,0
00 m
illion
' . To
achi
eve m
axim
um de
struc
tive e
ffect,
the S
audi
polic
y was
also
coor
-di
nated
with
the U
nited
Stat
es' d
estab
ilisin
g ca
mpa
igns
and
econ
omic
sanc
tions
again
st th
e Isla
mic
Gove
rnm
ent i
n the
after
math
of th
e Am
erica
n ho
stage
dram
a in T
ehra
n. Fo
r exa
mpl
e, on
5 Ju
ne 19
84, a
Sau
di F
-15 s
hot
down
an Ir
anian
F-4
Pha
ntom
, an
even
t whi
ch, a
ccor
ding
to E
lizab
eth
Gam
len, h
appe
ned a
s 'A
dire
ct co
nseq
uenc
e' of
the S
audi
air c
over
by 'th
e US
oper
ated a
nd co
ntro
lled A
WAC
S.' 2°
Ira
n was
perh
aps f
ortu
nate
that
the o
il pr
ice cr
ash o
f 198
6 was
equa
lly
harm
ful t
o the
Ame
rican
oil i
ndus
try in
Tex
as. A
s a re
sult,
and a
ccor
ding t
o Ja
mes
Bill
, 'Ira
n's an
d Am
erica
's in
teres
ts co
nver
ged o
n thi
s iss
ue'. 2
1 The
US
then
pre
ssur
ed th
e Sau
dis t
o sig
n an
agre
emen
t with
Iran
on
lowe
r pr
oduc
tion
and
stabi
lise o
il pr
ices a
t $18
per
bar
rel i
n Au
gust
1986
. The
Ne
w Yo
rk T
imes
wa
s blu
nt ab
out t
his U
S ap
proa
ch to
the S
audi
s: In
the S
prin
g of
198
6, G
eorg
e Bus
h tra
veled
to S
audi
Ara
bia t
o pl
ead
with
the
wor
ld's
bigg
est o
il ex
porte
r to
stop
flood
ing
the
mar
ket.
Mr.
Bush
told
the S
audi
s tha
t the
ir ov
erpr
oduc
tion,
by dr
ivin
g dow
n the
pr
ice, w
as je
opar
dizin
g the
Am
erica
n oil
indu
stry,
in tu
rn un
derm
inin
g th
e nati
on's
econ
omic
stren
gth a
nd se
curit
y.22
The S
audi
s also
cam
e und
er p
ress
ure f
rom
oth
er O
PEC
and
non-
OPEC
pr
oduc
ers,
notab
ly E
gypt
, whi
ch w
as al
so su
fferin
g fro
m lo
wer o
il pr
ices
and l
oss o
f oil
reve
nue.
Saud
i Arab
ia co
ntin
ued t
o und
ermin
e the
Islam
ic Re
publ
ic in
the p
eriod
fo
llowi
ng th
e Iran
—Ira
q war.
As w
as w
idely
repor
ted in
the
New
York
Tim
es,
along
with
Kuw
ait, th
e Unit
ed A
rab E
mirat
es, Q
atar a
nd Ir
aq, th
e King
dom
stepp
ed up
its o
il pr
oduc
tion a
lmos
t imm
ediat
ely af
ter th
e cea
sefir
e betw
een
Iran a
nd Ir
aq on
20 A
ugus
t 198
8.23
By ea
rly O
ctobe
r, Sa
udi p
rodu
ction
had
reac
hed
5.7
mb/
d, w
ell ab
ove i
ts OP
EC q
uota
of 4
.3 m
b/d.
The
Sau
dis
claim
ed th
at th
ey w
ere p
rotec
ting t
heir
mar
ket s
hare
from
Iran
's po
ssib
le in
cursi
on, a
pre
text t
hat s
oon
beca
me u
nten
able.
The
Islam
ic Re
publ
ic co
ntin
ued t
o pro
duce
at le
ss th
an it
s OPE
C qu
ota o
f 2.4
mb/
d thr
ough
out
1988
.
Hoo
shan
g Am
irah
mad
i 14
5
Mea
nwhil
e, the
Sau
di Go
vern
ment
and i
ts all
ies in
Arab
OPE
C rai
sed t
he
ques
tion o
f pro
ducti
on pa
rity b
etwee
n Iran
and I
raq as
a co
nditi
on fo
r a ne
w OP
EC ac
cord
on pr
ice an
d pro
ducti
on. T
his w
as ra
ther
an un
fair
dem
and,
since
Iraq
's sh
are h
ad al
way
s bee
n lo
wer
and
Iran
has a
muc
h bi
gger
ec
onom
y and
a po
pulat
ion fo
ur ti
mes l
arger
than t
hat o
f Iraq
. Nev
erthe
less,
after
an in
itial
perio
d of r
esist
ance
, Iran
gave
in, o
nly to
find
that
the S
audis
ha
d ano
ther
plan
in th
eir ba
g: al
mos
t im
med
iately
the K
ingd
om at
tempt
ed
to sa
botag
e the
OPE
C ag
reem
ent b
y co
nditi
onin
g its
impl
emen
tatio
n to
se
ttlin
g cer
tain p
oliti
cal d
isput
es be
twee
n itse
lf an
d the
Islam
ic Re
publ
ic.
To ba
ck up
this
new
dema
nd, th
e Sau
dis th
reaten
ed to
lowe
r the
ir oil
price
s, a p
ositi
on th
at on
ly le
d to
wid
espr
ead
prot
est b
y ot
her m
embe
rs of
the
orga
nisa
tion.
24 Th
e Sau
dis'
anti-
Isla
mic
Rep
ublic
pol
icie
s did
not
alw
ays g
o un
an-
swer
ed. T
o con
front
the S
audi
s in O
PEC,
Iran
tried
, som
etim
es su
cces
s-fu
lly, t
o crea
te a u
nited
fron
t with
the '
radica
l stat
es' w
ithin
OPE
C (A
lgeri
a an
d Lib
ya).
The I
slam
ic Go
vern
men
t was
also
succ
essfu
l in a
pply
ing,
at tim
es, a
n agg
ress
ive p
ricin
g stra
tegy i
n spo
t mar
kets
and i
n mak
ing e
xten
-siv
e bart
er de
als w
ith E
aster
n Eur
opea
n nati
ons.
In 19
82, f
or ex
ample
, Iran
an
noun
ced t
hree
succ
essiv
e pric
e-cu
ts in
less
than
thre
e wee
ks an
d its
oil
price
was
betw
een $
4 and
$5 lo
wer t
han t
he pr
ice fo
r com
parab
le Sa
udi o
il.
Even
the U
nited
Stat
es, w
ho ha
d onc
e boy
cotte
d Iran
ian oi
l, too
k adv
antag
e of
the s
ituati
on an
d pur
chas
ed th
e che
ap Ir
anian
oil t
o buil
d up i
ts res
erves
. It
seem
ed as
if th
e Rep
ublic
had a
desig
n to p
araly
se th
e 'Sa
udi O
PEC'
. In
resp
onse
to Ir
an's
price
-cut
s, th
e Sau
dis s
urpr
ised e
very
one i
n the
oil
mar
ket w
hen t
hey o
ffere
d to c
ut th
eir pr
oduc
tion i
n ord
er to
boos
t pric
es.
But I
ran d
id no
t giv
e in a
nd th
e cou
ntry
's oi
l rev
enue
incr
ease
d in i
ts po
st-rev
olutio
nary
peak
s in 1
982 a
nd 19
83 ($
20 bi
llion
and $
20.4
billio
n res
pec-
tivel
y). I
t mus
t be n
oted
, how
ever
, tha
t at t
he ti
me,
Iran
was
mak
ing
prog
ress
in th
e war
, a de
velo
pmen
t tha
t was
clos
ely w
atche
d by t
he S
audi
G
over
nmen
t. It
was
not
, how
ever
, unt
il Ira
n ha
d re
take
n th
e City
of
Khor
ram
shah
r fro
m th
e occ
upyi
ng Ir
aqis
on 24
May
1982
that
the S
audi
s to
ok th
e Isla
mic
Repu
blic
serio
usly
. Su
rpris
ed by
the s
udde
n Iran
ian su
cces
s in t
he w
ar, th
e Sau
dis pa
nicke
d, of
ferin
g Ira
n luc
rativ
e com
pens
ation
for w
ar da
mag
e and
coop
erati
on in
re
gion
al af
fairs
. The
Islam
ic Re
publ
ic wa
s, ho
weve
r, in
a to
tally
diffe
rent
m
ood.
Con
fiden
t of i
ts ne
wfou
nd m
ilitar
y po
wer a
nd as
sure
d by
its i
n-cr
ease
d oi
l rev
enue
, the
Rep
ublic
had
dec
ided
to co
ntin
ue th
e war
unt
il Sa
ddam
Hus
sein
was
ove
rthro
wn an
d its
allie
s pun
ished
. In
Ayato
llah
Khom
eini's
wor
ds, `
Jang
, jan
g to r
at.' a
Fitn
ah' (W
ar, w
ar un
til th
e rem
oval
of th
e plot
). Ira
n reb
uffed
a se
cond
Sau
di me
diatio
n to e
nd th
e war
.whe
n in
May
1985
the S
audi
. Fore
ign M
inist
er tr
avell
ed to
Teh
ran o
n beh
alf of
the
-
146
Iran
and
the
Ara
b W
orld
Islam
ic Co
nfer
ence
Org
anisa
tion
(ICO)
and
the G
ulf C
oope
ratio
n Co
uncil
(G
CC).
Mea
nwhi
le, t
he R
epub
lic's
polic
y to
war
d Sa
udi A
rabi
a, as
dec
lare
d by
M
oham
mad
Gha
razi,
then
Iran
ian O
il M
inist
er, w
ould
cons
ist o
f 'iso
latin
g Sa
udi A
rabi
a, co
mpe
lling
her
to b
ehav
e as o
ne m
embe
r am
ongs
t oth
ers'.
Bu
t, he
cont
inue
d, 'O
ur st
rugg
le wi
th R
iyad
h wi
ll no
t tak
e plac
e on
the o
il m
arke
t, it
is a p
oliti
cal s
trugg
le. O
nce S
adda
m H
usse
in h
as fa
llen,
man
y pr
oblem
s will
be r
esol
ved.
' 25 In
retro
spec
t, th
is pr
oved
wish
ful t
hink
ing
on
the p
art o
f the
lead
ersh
ip in
Teh
ran,
who
coul
d no
t see
the l
arge
r pol
itica
l ec
onom
y of t
he M
iddl
e Eas
t and
its p
lace w
ithin
the c
apita
list w
orld
syste
m.
As i
s wel
l-kno
wn
by n
ow, t
he•U
nite
d St
ates
inte
rven
ed in
the w
ar o
n th
e sid
e of I
raq,
initi
ally c
reati
ng a
stalem
ate, t
hen f
orcin
g the
Islam
ic Re
publ
ic in
to a
situa
tion
wher
e it h
ad to
acce
pt a
less t
han
optim
al co
nditi
on to
end
the w
ar. T
he Is
lamic
leade
rship
had
ende
d th
e hos
tage d
ram
a in
an ex
actly
sim
ilar f
ashi
on.
IDEO
LOGI
CAL
AND
CULT
URAL
FA
CTO
RS
The f
act t
hat t
he S
audi
s con
tinue
d to u
nder
min
e the
Islam
ic Re
publ
ic in
the
perio
d fo
llowi
ng th
e cea
sefir
e betw
een
Iran
and
Iraq
indi
cated
fund
amen
tal
disa
gree
men
ts be
twee
n th
e two
regi
mes
ove
r the
ir id
eolo
gica
l and
cultu
ral
orien
tation
s. In
parti
cular
, Iran
—Sa
udi r
ivalry
over
religi
ous l
egiti
macy
prov
ed
tenac
ious
and
dam
agin
g to
bot
h sid
es. W
hile
the I
slam
ic Re
publ
ic co
nsid
-er
ed th
e Sau
dis'
Vaha
bism
as an
'Am
erica
n br
and
of Is
lam', t
he K
ingd
om
was v
ery
hosti
le to
the r
evol
utio
nary
spiri
t of A
yato
llah
Khom
eini's
Islam
. Th
is id
eolo
gica
l div
ision
had
ove
rsha
dow
ed th
e tra
ditio
nal S
hia—
Sunn
i di
visio
n be
twee
n th
e two
coun
tries
. The
Islam
ic re
gim
e in
Tehr
an w
as al
so
inim
ical t
o th
e Sau
dis f
or th
eir cl
ose f
riend
ship
with
the U
S. T
his r
elatio
n-sh
ip w
as co
nsid
ered
una
ccep
table
since
the S
audi
s wer
e de
fact
o gu
ardi
ans
of Is
lam's
holie
st pl
aces
, Mec
ca in
par
ticul
ar.
Sign
ifica
nt cu
ltura
l and
nat
iona
listic
diff
eren
ces a
lso d
ivid
e the
two
natio
ns. S
hi'is
m in
Iran
is cl
osely
iden
tified
with
Iran
ian n
ation
alism
whi
le th
e Vah
abi S
unni
sm p
rovi
des l
egiti
mac
y to
the S
audi
s' ve
rsio
n of
Ara
b na
tiona
lism
. The
Ara
b cu
lture
is p
redo
min
antly
Islam
ic, w
hile
that
of Ir
an
is a m
ixtu
re o
f its
pre-
Isla
mic
Zor
oastr
ian
and
Isla
mic
cultu
res.
The t
wo
natio
ns al
so sp
eak
diffe
rent
lang
uage
s, ha
ve d
iffer
ent c
alend
ar y
ears,
and
celeb
rate
diffe
rent
holid
ays.
Their
food
, mus
ic an
d dre
ss ar
e also
diss
imila
r. Th
ese a
nd ot
her d
iffer
ence
s hav
e res
ulted
in di
fferin
g nati
onal
iden
tities
and
natio
nalis
tic p
urpo
ses a
nd ri
valri
es. T
hus,
it is
no w
onde
r tha
t the
Iraq
i
Hoo
shan
g Am
irah
mad
i 14
7
lead
ersh
ip sh
ould
justi
fy it
s inv
asio
n of
Iran
in te
rms o
f 'Pe
rsia
n ra
cism
', `P
ersia
n co
loni
alism
' and
'Per
sian
expa
nsio
nism
'. Th
e Sau
dis a
lso ec
hoed
sim
ilar v
oice
s and
acted
acco
rdin
gly.
For
exam
-pl
e, lik
e the
Iraq
is, th
ey ca
ll th
e Per
sian G
ulf t
he 'A
rab G
ulf'
and t
he Ir
anian
K
huzi
stan
prov
ince
, is k
now
n to
them
as A
rabi
stan'.
The
y al
so ac
cuse
d Ira
n fo
r its
'racis
t' and
'exp
ansio
nist'
pol
icy fo
r the
war
with
Iraq
, ign
orin
g th
e fac
t tha
t the
Iraq
i lea
dersh
ip w
as ag
gres
sive a
nd ex
pans
ioni
st by
desig
n an
d id
eolo
gy. W
orst
yet,
they
supp
orted
Iraq
's ter
ritor
ial cl
aim ag
ainst
Iran
and h
elped
the I
raqi
regi
me t
o dism
embe
r the
coun
try du
ring t
he-w
ar. T
his
Saud
i pos
ition
rem
ains u
ncha
nged
des
pite
Iran's
prin
cipled
stan
d ag
ainst
Iraq's
inva
sion
of K
uwait
and
its su
ppor
t for
the a
nti-I
raqi
coali
tion.
Iron
i-ca
lly, K
uwait
also
took
a sim
ilar p
ositi
on, a
polic
y tha
t bac
kfire
d two
year
s lat
er w
hen
Iraq
inva
ded
Kuwa
it.
The i
deol
ogica
l con
front
ation
in th
e con
text o
f cul
tura
l diff
eren
ces g
radu
-all
y tu
rned
into
pol
itica
l con
front
ation
betw
een
the t
wo re
gim
es o
n m
any
front
s. Th
e Rep
ublic
attem
pted
to ex
port
its re
volu
tion
to th
e neig
hbou
ring
state
s and
beg
in su
ppor
ting
anti-
gove
rnm
ent a
nd S
hia m
ovem
ents
in th
e Ar
ab w
orld
, inc
ludi
ng S
audi
Ara
bia.
The S
audi
s res
pond
ed by
assis
ting I
raq
in it
s war
again
st Ira
n and
by im
posin
g res
tricti
ons o
n Ira
nian
pilg
rims.
The
two c
ount
ries a
lso to
ok th
eir st
rugg
le to
Afg
hani
stan,
wher
e the
y sup
porte
d riv
al m
ujah
edin
gro
ups f
ight
ing
the c
entra
l gov
ernm
ent a
nd th
e Sov
iet
Unio
n. Th
e Sau
dis a
lso fi
nanc
ed ce
rtain
Iran
ian op
posit
ion g
roup
s and
back
ed at
lea
st on
e co
up p
lan to
ove
rthro
w th
e Isla
mic
Repu
blic.
Thu
s, ac
cord
ing
to
Sam
uel S
egev
(a fo
rmer
Isra
eli in
tellig
ence
offi
cial),
at le
ast f
our g
over
n-m
ents
were
coop
erati
ng in
the p
lanni
ng o
f a c
oup
to ov
erth
row
the I
slam
ic Re
publ
ic in
198
2. T
he p
lan,
whi
ch ai
med
at re
storin
g th
e thr
one f
or th
e Sh
ah's
son,
was
org
anise
d by
Isra
eli ar
ms m
erch
ants
and
the t
hen
Defe
nce
Min
ister
Arie
l Sha
ron,
fina
nced
by
the
Saud
i Gov
ernm
ent (
at so
me
$800
mill
ion)
, bac
ked b
y the
CIA
(und
er th
e dire
ctorsh
ip of
Will
iam C
asey
), an
d bas
ed in
the S
udan
unde
r the
lead
ersh
ip of
Ja`fa
r Num
eiri.
The p
lot w
as
canc
elled
beca
use o
f the
chan
ge in
gove
rnm
ent i
n Isra
el af
ter th
e mas
sacr
e at
the S
abra
and
Shati
la Pa
lestin
ian re
fuge
e cam
ps.2
6 Th
e mos
t im
porta
nt p
oliti
cal c
onfro
ntati
on b
etwee
n th
e two
state
s, ho
w-ev
er, t
ook
plac
e on
the
stree
ts of
Mec
ca. A
yato
llah
Kho
mei
ni h
ad o
n va
rious
occ
asio
ns ca
lled
for t
he S
audi
peo
ple t
o ris
e up
again
st th
eir le
ad-
ersh
ip, b
ut su
ch c
alls
alm
ost a
lway
s fel
l on
deaf
ear
s: th
ere
was
one
ex
cept
ion.
In N
ovem
ber o
f 197
9, a
grou
p of
seve
ral h
undr
ed re
ligio
us
peop
le, m
ost a
llege
dly
Shia,
seize
d th
e Gra
nd M
osqu
e in
Mec
ca to
forc
e ch
ange
s on t
he S
audi
king
. The
y wer
e qui
ckly
and m
ercil
essly
subd
ued a
nd
-
148
Iran
and
the A
rab
Wor
ld
destr
oyed
by th
e Sau
di po
lice a
nd tr
oops
. Ira
n alle
ged t
hat A
mer
ican t
roop
s an
d ad
vise
rs ha
d he
lped
in th
e ope
ratio
n.
Iran
then
trie
d to
mak
e ha
jj (th
e ann
ual M
uslim
pilg
rimag
e to
Mec
ca)
into
a re
ligio
us—
polit
ical e
vent
and
to p
oliti
cise p
ilgrim
age.
Each
yea
r the
ha
jj br
ings
a lar
ge n
umbe
r of M
uslim
s to
Mec
ca in
ord
er to
show
solid
arity
an
d com
mon
purp
ose.
View
ing t
he ri
tual
as a
polit
ical—
relig
ious
even
t, th
e la
te A
yato
llah
Kho
mei
ni u
rged
pilg
rims t
o ho
ld an
ti-A
mer
ican
and
anti-
impe
rialis
t pol
itica
l dem
onstr
ation
s in
the n
ame o
f bar
a'at
az m
oshr
ekee
n (li
bera
tion
from
infid
els)
. The
Sau
dis d
isput
ed th
is in
terp
reta
tion
and
re-
spon
ded b
y add
ing n
ew re
strict
ions
on Ir
anian
pilg
rims,
resu
lting
in cl
ashe
s in
seve
ral y
ears
that
left a
few
Irani
ans d
ead.
The
hajj
conf
ront
ation
reac
hed
its cl
imax
on
31 Ju
ly 1
987,
whe
n Sa
udi t
roop
s kill
ed so
me 4
50 Ir
ania
n pi
lgrim
s dur
ing
a pol
itica
l rall
y.
Shoc
ked b
y the
even
t, th
e late
Aya
tolla
h blam
ed th
e US
and d
eclar
ed th
at th
e Sau
dis w
ere I
ran's
num
ber o
ne en
emy,
alth
ough
Iran
at th
e tim
e was
in
the m
idst
of it
s war
with
Iraq
. Afte
r som
e pol
itica
l man
oeuv
ring,
Iran
ians
were
bann
ed fr
om pi
lgrim
age i
n 198
9 and
the w
ar of
wor
ds be
twee
n the
two
regi
mes
reac
hed
a new
leve
l of h
ostil
ity. T
he S
audi
s had
alre
ady
brok
en
dipl
omati
c rela
tions
with
Iran
in A
pril
1988
. The
lead
ersh
ip in
Teh
ran
also
bega
n ca
lling
Sau
di A
rabi
a by
its o
ld n
ame,
Hijaz
, im
plyi
ng th
at th
e Hou
se
of S
aud
did
not h
ave t
he le
gitim
acy
to ru
le in
the b
irthp
lace o
f Isla
m.
THE
PERS
IAN
GULF
FAC
TOR
The I
rani
an—
Saud
i Ara
bian
tens
ion
also
refle
cts th
e two
coun
tries
' clai
ms
over
the
lead
ersh
ip o
f the
Per
sian
Gul
f and
its s
ecur
ity. I
ran
has l
ong
cons
ider
ed it
self
a lea
der i
n the
Per
sian G
ulf,
a clai
m th
at is
large
ly ju
stifie
d. It
is th
e lar
gest
coun
try in
the G
ulf a
rea w
ith a
popu
latio
n al
mos
t sev
en
times
that
of S
audi
Ara
bia.
Iran
also
has
the l
onge
st co
astli
ne w
ith th
e Pe
rsian
Gul
f com
pare
d to a
ny G
ulf s
tate i
nclu
ding
Sau
di A
rabi
a. M
oreo
ver,
Iran
owns
man
y isl
ands
in th
e Gul
f, in
cludi
ng Q
eshm
, the
larg
est o
ne, a
nd
cont
rols
the S
trait
of H
orm
uz, t
he P
ersia
n G
ulf's
mos
t stra
tegi
c poi
nt an
d th
e Sau
dis'
maj
or o
il ex
ports
out
let.
It is
corre
ct, t
here
fore
, tha
t the
Gul
f sh
ould
be c
alled
(and
reco
gnize
d in
terna
tiona
lly as
) the
Per
sian
Gulf.
His-
toric
ally,
too,
Iran h
as of
ten be
en th
e stro
nges
t stat
e and
a lea
der i
n the
area
. In
deed
, eve
n du
ring
its g
olde
n da
ys, t
he O
ttom
an E
mpi
re w
as u
nabl
e to
subo
rdin
ate Ir
an, w
hich
rem
ained
stro
ng an
d in
depe
nden
t. Th
e Sau
dis a
lso co
nsid
er th
emse
lves
a lea
der i
n th
e Ara
b Gu
lf sta
tes, a
cla
im th
at wa
s leg
itim
ated i
n the
after
math
of th
eir in
volv
emen
t in t
he 19
62
civil
war i
n Ye
men
and
its n
egot
iated
conc
lusio
n in
196
8. S
audi
Ara
bia i
s
Hoo
shan
g Am
irahm
adi
149
also t
he la
rges
t am
ong t
he st
ates i
n the
Ara
bian
Pen
insu
la an
d has
by fa
r the
gr
eates
t eco
nom
ic po
wer t
here
. It s
its o
n so
me 6
6 bi
llion
bar
rels
of p
rove
n oi
l res
erve
s, a s
ourc
e tha
t the
Sau
dis h
ave t
ried
to u
se si
nce t
he se
llers
' m
arke
t in
the 1
970s
to d
omin
ate re
gion
al po
litics
. Yet,
com
pare
d to
Iran
, Ira
q, S
yria
and
Egyp
t, Sa
udi A
rabi
a see
ms s
till t
o re
main
a m
inor
forc
e in
the r
egio
n, th
eir va
st oi
l wea
lth no
twith
stand
ing.
The S
audi
s are
parti
cular
ly
weak
mili
tarily
and
polit
ically
, a fa
ct wh
ich w
as w
ell-d
emon
strate
d by
the
Kuwa
it cr
isis.
They
had t
o call
upon
the U
S to
com
e to t
heir
defe
nce w
hen
Sadd
am H
usse
in's
arm
y to
ok o
ver K
uwai
t. Th
e pol
itica
l pow
er o
f its
oil
wealt
h ha
s also
pro
ven
weak
in th
e 198
0s b
uyer
s' m
arke
t. Ho
weve
r, wh
at ha
s em
bold
ened
the S
audi
s in
rece
nt y
ears
is th
e spe
cial
relat
ion
that
they
hav
e dev
elope
d wi
th th
e Uni
ted S
tates
, par
ticul
arly
sinc
e th
e Rev
olut
ion
in Ir
an. T
he A
mer
ican
inte
rest
in S
audi
Ara
bia o
rigin
ally
gr
ew w
hen
the
coun
try e
mer
ged
as a
forc
e fo
r mod
erat
ion
durin
g th
e pa
rticip
ation
neg
otiat
ions
(whi
ch in
crea
sed
owne
rship
of t
he o
il sta
tes in
up
strea
m p
rodu
ction
to a
majo
rity
shar
e) an
d du
ring
the T
ehra
n ne
gotia
-tio
ns (f
ollo
wing
whi
ch oi
l pric
es qu
adru
pled
in 19
74).
In su
bseq
uent
year
s, th
e Sau
dis b
ecam
e a m
oder
ating
forc
e with
in O
PEC
and a
trus
ted fr
iend o
f th
e Wes
t. Sa
udi m
oder
ation
and o
il we
alth a
lso as
sisted
the s
tate i
n gain
ing
cred
ibili
ty as
an in
term
ediar
y in
a re
gion
torn
by
extre
mist
s, co
nflic
ts an
d po
verty
. The
Am
erica
n—Sa
udi s
pecia
l rela
tion
reac
hed
a tur
ning
-poi
nt in
th
e afte
rmath
of t
he Ir
anian
Rev
olut
ion.
The
anti-
Amer
ican
and
anti-
Saud
i sta
nd of
the I
slam
ic Re
publ
ic be
cam
e a un
ifyin
g fac
tor b
etwee
n the
US
and
Saud
i Ara
bia.
Mea
nwhi
le, d
irect
US in
volv
emen
t in
the P
ersia
n Gu
lf in
crea
sed
in th
e af
term
ath of
the S
hah's
depa
rture
, whi
ch co
incid
ed w
ith th
e Sov
iet U
nion
's in
terv
entio
n in
Afg
hani
stan.
The
Sha
h's d
epar
ture
had
mad
e the
'Nix
on
Doc
trine
' larg
ely
obso
lete
and
crea
ted
new
secu
rity
conc
ern
for t
he U
S.
Thes
e dev
elop
men
ts al
so p
rom
pted
the C
arte
r adm
inist
ratio
n in
198
0 to
de
clare
the M
iddl
e Eas
t an
area
'vita
l' to
Amer
ican
inter
ests,
a de
clara
tion
that
beca
me k
nown
as th
e Car
ter D
octri
ne.
Acc
ordi
ngly
, the
US
expr
esse
d its
will
ingn
ess t
o ta
ke m
ilita
ry ac
tion
again
st 'an
y ou
tside
forc
e to
gain
cont
rol' o
f the
Per
sian
Gulf.
" Alre
ady
in
1979
and
follo
wing
the t
akeo
ver o
f the
Am
erica
n Em
bass
y in
Teh
ran
by
radi
cal M
uslim
stud
ents,
the P
entag
on h
ad an
noun
ced
the f
orm
ation
of t
he
Rapi
d De
ploy
men
t Joi
nt T
ask
Forc
e (of
som
e 100
000
mar
ines
). Th
is wa
s lat
er ex
pand
ed in
to th
e US
Cent
ral C
omm
and,
whi
ch ai
med
at o
rgan
ising
th
e Per
sian
Gulf
Arab
state
s int
o a U
S-led
mili
tary
allian
ce.
The A
mer
ican
adm
inist
ratio
n ha
d als
o be
gun
a sea
rch
for n
ew al
lianc
es
that
coul
d res
ist po
ssib
le So
viet
or Ir
anian
expa
nsio
n in t
he ar
ea. A
s par
t of
this
new
strate
gy, t
he U
S als
o be
gan
to st
reng
then
frien
dly
states
such
as
-
150
Iran
and
the A
rab
Wor
ld
Saud
i Arab
ia. T
hus,
in hi
s Stat
e of t
he U
nion
Add
ress o
n 23
Janu
ary 19
80,
Pres
iden
t Car
ter no
ted th
at th
e Uni
ted S
tates
was
read
y to c
oope
rate
with
th
e stat
es in
the M
iddl
e Eas
t to m
eet t
he 'n
ew th
reat' (
prim
arily
Iran
) to t
he
secu
rity o
f the
Per
sian G
ulf.2
8 Sub
sequ
ently
, in N
ovem
ber 1
981,
and o
nly
two m
onths
after
the o
utbrea
k of t
he Ir
an—
Iraq w
ar, S
audi
Arab
ia alo
ng w
ith
Kuw
ait,
Bahr
ain,
Qat
ar, t
he U
AE
and
Om
an ag
reed
to si
gn a
mut
ual
secu
rity
pact
. Thi
s was
real
ised
in M
ay 1
981
in th
e for
m o
f the
Gul
f Co
oper
ation
Cou
ncil
(GCC
), an
orga
nisa
tion t
hat l
ater b
ecam
e kno
wn fo
r its
uneq
uivo
cal s
uppo
rt of
Iraq
in it
s war
again
st Ira
n. Th
e GCC
's em
phas
is on
Islam
as th
e bas
is of
its u
nity
was
an in
dica
tion
that
the o
rgan
isatio
n ha
d be
en fo
rmed
to co
unter
the I
slam
ic Re
publ
ic's
thre
at to
the G