GOVT 498 Mullikin Paper

TIP OF THE SPEAR:

PLA Special Operations Forces

Figure 1: A soldier from the "Sharp Sword of Southern China" SOF unit during a training exercise.

Andrew Mullikin

Prepared for: Dr. Philip Karber, Georgetown University

2012.05.10

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The highest form of generalship is to balk the enemy's plans…1

—Sun Tsu

I. Introduction

Special operations forces (SOF) are present in the majority of the world’s

finest militaries, from American Special Forces ODAs and Navy SEAL platoons to the

British SAS Regiment and the Korean Special Forces Brigades. Their training

regimes, individual members’ high degree of self-‐motivation, and unconventional

mission set distinguish all of these units. In his thesis on the People’s Liberation

Army (PLA) special operations forces for the Naval Postgraduate School, Smith

describes the common threads woven through all SOF, writing:

[T]he visual image and understanding of dedicated SOF remains predictably uniform. Dedicated SOF usually operate in relatively small units that can achieve with a few what conventional forces might not be able or willing with many; dedicated SOF are composed of highly-trained, skilled and motivated operators who underwent grueling ‘rights of passage’ to gain admission into their particular units and often operate without the benefits of external support; dedicated SOF usually get the best most high-‐tech equipment and weapons that their countries can offer, but are fully capable of working the low-‐tech end of the spectrum; dedicated SOF operators are physically, mentally and spiritually tougher than most and are assigned the most difficult and dangerous missions to accomplish, often within enemy-controlled territory, so are usually considered the ‘elite’ of their respective military services.2 [Emphasis added.]

Essentially, all special operations units are constituted and trained to act as both the

vanguard of a conventional fighting force and a reliable, readily deployable force for

1 Sun Tsu, Art of War, (Giles translation; London, UK: British Museum, 1910) at < http://www.textfiles.com/etext/NONFICTION/suntx10.txt > [Accessed: 2012.05.10] 2 Xavier G. Smith, Special Operations Forces in the People’s Liberation Army and the Development of an Integral Unconventional Warfare Mission, Naval Postgraduate School, June 2005, p. 1.

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unconventional operations. In keeping with the Sun Tsu quote above, special

operations units are trained to disrupt the enemy’s plans, acting as a force multiplier

on complex battlefields.

Yet, despite their reputation for superior training and battlefield efficacy, SOF

have only recently been incorporated into major strategic military operations

within the US defense establishment; prior to the September 11th, 2001 attacks,

special operations units were usually disdained by higher command, the leaders of

which were generally drawn from conventional forces that found “operators”

undisciplined and lacking a sufficient military bearing. All of this changed during

the US engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan, as SOF found their skills highly sought-‐

after in conflicts that required unconventional means to achieve tactical goals in an

asymmetric environment. As American special operations units have become more

frequently utilized, their status within the overall US military has expanded

significantly, to the point that President Obama’s most recent national security

strategy explicitly calls for an increase in the number of SOF units despite cuts in the

Department of Defense’s budget and in the number of conventional troops

employed by the US military. Warfare is rapidly evolving, and Lind and his

coauthors at the Marine Corps Gazette were correct when they wrote: “The fourth

generation battlefield is likely to include the whole of the enemy’s society…

[requiring] even the lowest level [of military units] to operate flexibly on the basis of

the commander’s intent.”3 Special operations forces are capable of that autonomy,

and they are rapidly becoming critical tools in modern warfare.

The PLA appears to have taken notice of this shift in the paradigms of war. At

the end of the 1980s, the Chinese leadership in Beijing recognized the waning utility

of a “people’s war” strategy and began to develop a new concept of “local wars

under high-‐tech conditions,” in which smaller, better-‐equipped and more highly-‐

trained forces were believed to have a greater impact on battlefield success than

3 William Lind, et. al. “Fourth Generation Warfare” Marine Corps Gazette 1989.10, p. 23.

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larger, less professional forces. Speaking in the terms of Lind and his coauthors, the

PLA was attempting to leap from a military largely designed to fight first-‐generation

wars that relied upon sheer mass to the fourth-‐generation warfare described above.

The development of a PLA SOF capacity logically followed in their attempts to build

a competitive twenty-‐first century military.

In the following paper, I submit an in-‐depth overview and analysis of PLA

special operations units, including sections covering the units’ initial development

and force structure, training and equipment, and the way the PLA leadership has

deployed their SOF forces and integrated these units into their overall strategic

plans, especially with regards to their ongoing dispute with Taiwan. Throughout the

paper, I compare PLA SOF units to their most prominent Western counterparts,

including US Army Special Forces (Green Berets), US Navy SEALs, and the British

Special Air Service (SAS). I close with a brief discussion of the degree to which

American “SOF Truths” are compatible with perceived Chinese strategic values, and

thus the degree to which PLA SOF units will be utilized in the overall strategy of the

PRC.

My research results in several major conclusions, namely that, despite the

PLA’s attempts to build a special operations capability on par with that of the United

States, their relatively amateurish level of tactical proficiency, obsession with

developing new hardware rather than investing in human capital, and complicated

command structure has resulted in a special operations community with major

organizational problems. These conclusions are discussed in detail in the final

section of the paper.

II. Early Development and Force Structure

Beijing established its first true special operations forces in the late 1980s,

and the development of these units was prioritized following the First Gulf War in

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1991, during which Coalition forces deployed special operations units with

outstanding success. According to Henderson:

Major transformations in China’s elite special forces began taking place in the late 1980s and early 1990s. [Since then] The People’s Liberation Army, or PLA, has concentrated on selecting the highest quality individuals within the military, providing them with the most advanced equipment available, and training them in a wide range of military disciplines.4

Despite the fact that the PRC’s dedicated SOF units are not even a half-‐century old,

China has had extensive historical experience with special operations tactics. Early

ad hoc units were used with notable success during the Japanese occupation of

WWII, when temporary “composite” teams were constituted from conventional PLA

units for a broad variety of special operations taskings, including “long-‐range

penetrations, tactical reconnaissance, raids on vital enemy positions, [and] prisoner

rescue.”5

The “major transformations” of the late 1980s were brought on by three

basic driving factors: (1) A doctrinal shift in the way the Chinese perceived warfare,

from a concept of “people’s war” to a more offensively-‐oriented, technology-‐heavy

concept of “local limited war”; (2) the modernization and professionalization of the

PLA following the disastrous punitive war against Vietnam in 1979; and (3) the

Western military success during the First Gulf War. Smith describes the PLA

reaction to this conflict writing:

The doctrine of Local Limited War was upgraded to Local War Under High Tech Conditions to address the dominance of American technology in every facet of the conflict and to emulate it on a smaller scale within select units of the PLA. The creation and development of

4 Scott J. Henderson, In the Shadow: Chinese Special Forces Build a 21st-‐Century Fighting Force, Special Warfare, July-‐August 2006, at <fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/ChinaSF.pdf> [Accessed: 2012.05.10], p. 30. 5 Op. Cit. Smith 2005, p. 2.

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a dedicated PLA SOF capability got a boost from the First Gulf War. As a result PLA SOF contingents emulate American dedicated SOF units in many regards, particularly in the emphasis on using high-‐technology gear to give itself a qualitative advantage over its adversaries.6

The first PLA special operations unit in Guangzhou was, according to Smith:

“designed and trained to support the contemporary doctrine of Local Limited War

by serving as a limited and relatively inexpensive alternative to modern high-‐tech

force projection tools that the PRC did not have at the time.”7 Thanks largely to the

success of this experimental unit (metrics to measure these successes have not been

disclosed by the PLA), additional SOF groups were stood up around the country in

the early 1990s.

Under the current PLA special operations force structure, each military

region is assigned one special operations group, which according to Henderson have

reportedly ranged from “battalion to division size.”8 The blog “China Arsenal” offers

a second estimate of PLA special operations units, stating that PLA operators are

organized into “brigade equivalents,” each divided into three battalions of about

1,000 soldiers each.9 Given these varied numbers it is difficult to ascertain the exact

size of the PLA special operations units; according to Smith, the PLA has the second-‐

largest SOF element of any Asian country, with somewhere between 25,000 and

30,000 operators on hand. (North Korea reportedly has 100,000 special operations

soldiers.) This overall number includes “as many as 25,000” PLA Special Forces;10

these forces are the primary subject of this paper simply because they are the units

for which the most reliable information is available. However, in addition to these

troops—which are similar to US Army Rangers in terms of both organization and 6 Op. Cit. Smith 2005, pp. 5-‐6. 7 Ibid, p. 28. 8 Op. Cit. Henderson 2006, p. 31. 9 China Arsenal, China’s Special Forces and Elite Units, 10 December 2009, at <http://china-‐arsenal.blogspot.com/2009/12/chinas-‐special-‐forces-‐and-‐elite-‐units.html> [Accessed: 2012.05.10] 10 Op. Cit. Smith 2005, p. 36.

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mission-‐set—the PLA maintains other branch-‐specific special operations units. The

PLA Marine Corps has a SOF detachment numbering roughly 1,500 total operators

organized in four battalions and capable of amphibious operations similar to the

missions of both modern MARSOC operators and the Navy’s disbanded Underwater

Demolition Teams; likewise, the PLAAF has a smaller organic special operations unit

with airborne and air assault capabilities.11 These numbers do not include the

variety of “special mission units”—similar to the US Army’s 10th Mountain

Division—that perform tasks including rapid reaction and amphibious landings. It

is also unclear to what degree the capabilities of these different units overlap, given

the maritime and airborne capabilities of the larger PLA SOF groups.

The following table provides some basic information regarding the locations

and classifications of PLA SOF:

Organization of the PLA Special Forces Groups12

Military Region Group Army Unit Name

Beijing 38th Divine Sword

Shenyang 39th Tigers of the Northeast

Lanzhou Unknown Tigers of the Night

Jinan 54th Eagle

Nanjing Unknown Flying Dragons

Guangzhou 42nd Sharp Sword of Southern

China

Chengdu 13th Falcons of the Southeast

11 Op. Cit. Smith, 2005, pp. 38-‐40. 12 Reproduced (with slight modifications) from: Jens Hohmann, “PLA Special Operations Forces – Overview”, GlobalDefence.net, 11 February 2008, at <http://www.globaldefence.net/artikel-‐analysen/sondereinheiten/asien/5909-‐china-‐pla-‐special-‐operations-‐forces-‐english-‐version.html?start=1> [Accessed: 2012.05.10]

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In addition to this information, Henderson offers some brief background on each

PLA SOF group:13

The Beijing Military Region’s Recon and Strike Force: trained to assault

airfields and eliminate command-‐and-‐control elements using helicopters and

powered parachutes. Known to target key enemy infrastructure including

communications centers, radar systems, and ammunition depots. They are

considered to be endurance swimmers who are proficient at underwater

demolitions and can pilot boats.

The Nanjing Military Region’s Flying Dragons: in 1997, carried out a simulated

attack on a concealed enemy airfield in the Zijin Mountains of Nanjing.

During the exercise, the group used UAVs to relay battlefield intelligence

back to headquarters and assaulted the site using “parawings” and

helicopters.

The Guangzhou Military Region’s Sword of Southern China: capable of carrying

out long-‐range airborne operations, underwater crossings, and capturing

beachheads. Soldiers of the unit cross-‐train in multiple subject areas of the

PLAN and PLAAF. The unit additionally employs several hundred personnel

trained to fly aircraft, perform “stunt driving,” and pilot boats.

The Jinan Military Region’s Black Berets/Heroic Falcons: trained in special

reconnaissance and in amphibious warfare.

The Shenyang Military Region’s Fierce Tigers of the Northeast: a marine

special-‐forces unit trained to perform airborne and commando “SEAL type”

assault operations on airfields, command-‐and-‐control sites, and radar

warning sites using powered parachutes and SCUBA equipment. Members

undergo extensive survival training in jungle, desert, mountain, and urban

conditions.

The Chengdu Military Region’s Falcons of the Southwest: uses high-‐tech

equipment to carry out special combat reconnaissance. Credited with 13 Op. Cit. Henderson 2006, p. 33.

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attaining amazing results in: reconnaissance, airborne insertion, surprise

attacks, and emergency evacuations.

The Chengdu Military Region’s Hunting Leopards: carried out an antiterrorism

exercise in 2002 in the Xiling Mountains; may have ties to the People’s Armed

Police force.

The Daggers (military region unknown): amphibious unit, formed in 2001;

described as “one of the ace cards” for dealing with Taiwanese independence.

In 2004, carried out an exercise involving the capture of a coastal island in

which the unit set up an “electronic interference system,” followed by the

arrival of armed helicopters and airborne troops. The unit destroyed the

island’s airport, oil-‐storage facilities, command center and ammo dumps.

The island was then secured for follow-‐on forces by removing the enemy’s

biological and chemical weapons.

According to Smith, PLA special operations units fall under the direct command and

control of the Central Military Commission (CMC); however, there are no references

to a unified Chinese SOF command—which would be analogous to the United States’

JSOC or US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM)—that would both coordinate

all SOF activities and advocate on the behalf of the PLA SOF community within the

CMC. Furthermore, the PLA’s special operations units lack organic transportation

units that would be comparable to the American 160th SOAR Regiment or the Navy’s

Special Boat Unit, meaning that all PLA SOF must coordinate their operations

carefully with assets from the PLAN and PLAAF. This situation is very similar to the

status of American special operations units prior to the creation of JSOC in

December 1980, indicating a relatively uncoordinated PLA SOF community.

III. Training and Equipment

Training is a key component of all SOF units. Most selection courses—

including the US Army’s Special Forces Assessment and Selection course, the Navy’s

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Basic Underwater Demolitions/SEAL training, and the British Special Air Service

course simply called “Selection”—test the candidates’ ability to endure grueling

physical hardship and intense mental stress. The PLA special operations training

regimes are no different:

The PLA has placed a high degree of emphasis on the physical and mental abilities of the candidates: The training can be grueling, and those who are found to be unsuited are cut from the program immediately. The dropout rate during initial training is said to average between 50 and 90 percent.14

These training programs can last for as many as three years, and include extensive

physical conditioning and training in airborne and nighttime operations, in addition

to specific environment training (i.e. desert, mountain, jungle, etc.).15 Multiple

online videos display clips

from various PLA SOF training

evolutions; several

screenshots from these videos

are included here to provide

examples of this training. For

example, Figure 2 shows PLA

SOF candidates from an

unknown unit performing “log PT”, a standard training evolution, variations of

which are used heavily by American SOF training programs. Other videos show

Chinese SOF units training in cold weather environments, such as that

demonstrated in Figure 3. Again, these practices have parallels in American SOF

14 Op. Cit. Henderson 2006, p. 30. 15 Op. Cit. Smith 2005, p. 36.

Figure 2

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training, where units are conditioned to operate effectively in cold-‐weather

environments.

The majority of this basic assessment or qualification training is just a

preparation for the advanced operations these units execute in the field. PLA SOF

units spend considerable time in advanced tactical training, not unlike the SEAL

Qualification Training undertaken by

all BUD/S graduates. Again, like their

American counterparts in the SEALs

and Army Ranger battalions, PLA SOF

units focus on close-‐quarters battle

(CQB) drills, which involve clearing

houses or other targets rapidly and

with extreme precision; figure 4 shows

a small Chinese SOF element taking

down a simulated target

using standard CQB

tactics.

However, it is at

this point that a clear

distinction can be made

between the PLA units

and similar American SOF

troops. Despite their

intense training regimes

and high training attrition

rates, PLA SOF units

appear significantly less competent in executing tactical exercises than do American

SOF. Furthermore, their training locations appear to be very basic, especially

compared to the complex, real-‐world training compounds used by American SOF

Figure 3

Figure 4

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units to develop CQB tactics (see figure 5 for

an example of an Army Special Forces

“shooting house”). These shortcomings in

training will almost certainly directly

translate to decreased combat effectiveness.

In terms of equipment, PLA special

operations are again quite similar to their

American counterparts. Smith writes:

PLA SOF is often on the leading edge of technological and tactical innovation within the Chinese military and receives the best most sophisticated equipment that the PRC can produce, buy or steal… [Including] the new Type 95 5.8mm modular weapon system.16

Other PLA SOF equipment includes the “PPC,” a portable parachute capable of

transporting a soldier and his full combat load up to forty-‐five miles using an

internal motor capable of speeds of between 11 and 21 miles per hour, despite

being as light and as quiet as a traditional parachute. Chinese special operations

units have also taken advantage of new “backpack” UAV technologies, which provide

units with real-‐time “over-‐the-‐next-‐hill” combat intelligence.17 (As discussed in the

preceding section, the Nanjing MR’s “Flying Dragons” SOF unit is reported to have

used these devices with stunning success in assaults on a simulated mountainous

terrorist compound.)

All of this information confirms that the PLA is obsessed with military

hardware, even in its special operations forces. Despite their grueling assessment

and selection training, PLA SOF are relatively poorly trained tactically, and their

leadership seems to value equipment over operational capabilities.

16 Op. Cit. Smith 2005, p. 34. 17 Ibid, p. 35.

Figure 5

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VI. Mission Set and Operational Deployments

In the seminal text The Science of Campaigns, which details a variety of PLA

operational plans, special operations forces are considered “force multipliers,”

affecting battlefield posture and pushing forward campaign progress; in their efforts

to achieve these goals, special operations units are ordered:

[T]o raid the enemy’s vital area targets, paralyze the enemy’s operational systems, reduce the enemy’s operational capability, and interfere, delay and disrupt the enemy’s operational activities in order to create favorable conditions for the main force force-‐units.18

These requirements demonstrate that PLA SOF units are primarily organized for

direct action (DA) raids. While special reconnaissance (SR)—a key role of many

American SOF—is treated as a core competency of PLA SOF units, it is outweighed

by “raid attacks,” “sabotage attacks,” and “raid-‐harassments,” all of which fit with

the traditional responsibilities of US direct action units. However, the PLA also

includes “special technical warfare,” such as cyber-‐warfare, that US special

operations units are not tasked to execute. Another paper, published by two

Chinese military commentators, holds that the PRC classifies special operations as

those adhering to:

[D]etailed battle theories, such as special forces reconnaissance, attacks and sabotage, and comprehensive battle theories, such as integrated land-‐sea-‐air-‐space-‐electronic combat, all-‐dimensional simultaneous attacks, nonlinear combat, no-‐contact long-‐range warfare, asymmetrical combat, large-‐scale night combat and ‘surgical’ strikes.19

This analysis confirms Smith’s assertion that PLA special operations units are

primarily “a reconnaissance and raiding force, one capable of supporting 18 战役学 [Science of Campaigns], edited by hang Yuliang, (English translation; Beijing, PRC: National Defense University Press, 2006), p. 202. 19 Henderson 2006 p. 30.

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conventional operations or conducting them, albeit on a smaller scale and higher

intensity than the conventional military.”20 This is in sharp contrast to the

unconventional warfare capabilities of the US Army’s Green Berets, which are

organized specifically to provide training and other support to foreign militaries and

insurgent groups. In other words, the PLA special operations forces are trained to

execute the same missions as only about half of the US special operations forces,

primarily the Army Rangers and Navy SEALs.

In terms of operational deployment, PLA SOF are relatively unproven, in

large part thanks to the PLA’s limited international military footprint; this severely

constrains the degree to which Western analysts are able to compared these units to

their American or British counterparts. Among those that have been deployed, SOF

units from the People’s Liberation Army Navy are among the most prominent of the

Chinese SOF community, serving aboard commercial vessels in an anti-‐piracy

capacity. Their initial deployment was announced in late 2008, when Chinese

officials dispatched a small fleet of three warships to the Gulf of Aden to combat

Somali pirates. The three ships were equipped with “guided missiles and cannon,

[in addition to] two helicopters and a detail of special forces.”21 These units have

seen some (albeit limited) combat action, with one commentator reporting:

On February 6 [2009], seven embarked special operations forces organized crew members of Oriental Oil Explorer 1 [a PRC against an oncoming pirate speedboat, fired three warning shells, and prepared to fight when the speedboat, deterred, sped away.

While this action is significant in that it is the first operational deployment of a

Chinese special operations unit, and the first time a modern Chinese warship

deployed in a combat operation outside of East Asia, the operational experience

20 Op. Cit. Smith, 2005, p. 57. 21 “China ready to use force on Somali pirates,” Channel News Asia, 23 December 2008, at <http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific/view/398100/1/.html> [Accessed 2012.05.10]

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itself is relatively limited, especially when compared to American SOF deployments,

even those not in support of the wars in Afghanistan or Iraq.

Given the very low degree of operational use of the PLA special operations

units, the majority of the open-‐source information regarding these units’

operational readiness focuses on military exercises rather than combat

deployments. In addition to joint readiness exercises with the PRC’s allies

throughout the region—in which special operations units often play a key role in

assaulting headquarters elements and other key strategic targets22—the PLA has

also tasked its special operations units with specific strategic objectives in a

potential conflict with Taiwan. The perceived role of “The Daggers” SOF group has

already been discussed, but in addition to that specialized unit, PLA SOF have spent

considerable time preparing for an invasion of the island. According to an analyst

with The Jamestown Foundation:

In a Taiwan conflict, PLA special operations units would probably play a particularly important role in strategic reconnaissance and battle damage assessment (BDA) missions by supplementing China’s growing space-‐based and airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. For example, SOF units could provide targeting data for precision strikes against critical military targets such as Taiwan’s major airbases or other government and military facilities. … Potential direct action missions would include attacks on Taiwan’s airbases, command and control facilities, ISR assets, and key logistics and transportation targets such as major highways and bridges. PLA SOF could also support the efforts of main forces by seizing control of ports or airfields to facilitate their arrival on the island.23

22 The PLA At Home and Abroad: Assessing the Operational Capabilities of China’s Military, ed. Roy Kamphausen, David Lai, and Andrew Scobell. US Army Strategic Studies Institute, 2010.06, at <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub995.pdf> [Accessed: 2012.05.10]. 23 Michael S. Chase, “Chinese Special Operations Forces: ‘Lessons Learned’ and Potential Missions,” The Jamestown Foundation, 2007.05.09. At <http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=4033&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=197&no_cache=1> [Accessed: 2012.05.10]

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While the overall capabilities of the Chinese special operations forces are unclear at

best, these units could have a major impact on the outcome of a conflict with

Taiwan, if their capabilities are as comprehensive as their military exercises

indicate. According to Henderson, the PLA may “infiltrate, or special-‐forces units

into Taiwan to capture or kill key government leaders” in the days just before the

outbreak of conventional war between the two states.24 Such a strategy has the

potential to decapitate Taiwan’s leadership; given the PLA SOF core competencies in

direct action raids, they appear to have—at least on paper—the ability to execute

such an assault relatively easily.

Regardless of these capabilities and shortcomings, Smith’s analysis of the

current PLA special operations force structure is that, for the time being, it is exactly

what the Central Military Commission wants it to be:

It is an interim and relatively inexpensive (though limited) power projection tool that the PRC can use while it continues to slowly modernize and acquire more conventional, expensive and technologically advanced power projection capabilities (long-‐range fighter-‐bombers, nuclear submarines, aerial refueling, modern C4ISR). PLA SOF’s emphasis on DA, SR and IW make it directly attributable to the contemporary doctrine of Local War Under High Tech Conditions.25

Given that the PLA special operations forces were initially constituted as a low-‐cost

alternative to high-‐tech weapons systems (which the Chinese can now easily afford)

it remains to be seen whether these capabilities will be improved or expanded.

24 Op. Cit. Henderson 2006, p. 31. 25 Op. Cit. Smith 2005, p. 41.

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V. Conclusion: The Strategic Implications of PLA Special

Operations Forces

The United States Special Operations Command—the organization that

essentially coordinates the role of American SOF within the overall military

structure—has released five “SOF Truths” that are used to succinctly describe the

fundamental beliefs of special operations personnel. They are: (1) Humans are

more important than Hardware; (2) Quality is better than Quantity; (3) Special

Operations Forces cannot be mass-‐produced; (4) Competent Special Operations

Forces cannot be created after emergencies occur; (5) Most Special Operations

require non-‐SOF assistance. Given what we know about the PLA special operations

forces, how closely does their strategic role fit with these basic principles?

Working backward, we see that the PLA’s organizational structure does not

appear to provide their special operations units with a high degree of non-‐SOF

support. PLA special operations units lack organic transportation elements, and are

controlled directly by the Central Military Commission, likely a decision effected

more by politics than in the best operational interests of the state or the units. This

seems to have created a relatively isolated organizational structure. On the other

hand, the next three major points are closely followed: PLA SOF are subjected to

rigorous training programs—which weeds out all but the top tier candidates,

emphasizing quality over quantity—and their establishment as part of an ongoing

military modernization program was pragmatic, not reactionary. It is the first point,

then, that is most problematic—even in the PLA’s best-‐trained units, human capital

is outweighed by technology, a point that is emphasized by the special operations

units’ focus on technology-‐driven insertion and extraction at the expense of

developing their tactical skills once on-‐target. This framework of analysis thus begs

the question, should we even categorize these troops as “special operations forces”

or simply as better-‐equipped, more rigorously trained units with specialized

missions?

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While this last assertion is without doubt an overreaction to the reality facing

these units, it is critical for US strategic planners to examine the way SOF units fit

within the overall PLA strategic posture, and the ways in which they will likely be

used in potential conflicts. To achieve this goal we must first examine exactly what

the PLA hopes to achieve with its military modernization programs. According to

Smith:

Local War Under High Tech Conditions emphasizes a violent, lightning-‐fast regional conflict that is over in a short amount of time; PLA SOF units are tailored to fit within that doctrine, focusing their efforts on DA [direct action] and SR [strategic reconnaissance] mission capabilities and the ability to strike hard and fast in support of the current military doctrine and PRC power projection objectives.26

Given this goal, even a somewhat sub-‐par SOF community should be capable of

executing those missions for which they have been stood up. Provided the Chinese

military establishment maintains its current strategic outlook, effectively preparing

for any conflict with the PRC must involve preparing to counter their special

operations forces.

From this research, we can draw several conclusions from the current force

structure and tactical posture of Chinese SOF units.

C1: PLA special operations units are relatively similar to their

American/NATO counterparts in terms of their selection and equipment.

The PLA has successfully modeled their SOF training after that of their American

counterparts, incorporating extensive physical and psychological assessment in

these training programs, and equipping each unit with the most advanced weapons

and equipment available.

26 Op. Cit. Smith 2005, p. 6.

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C2: Despite these similarities, PLA SOF are shockingly one-dimensional in

terms of mission requirements and are relatively poorly trained

tactically, at least when compared to American SOF.

PLA SOF training styles and facilities are kept highly classified—however, what

information is available indicates that both are sub-‐standard when compared to

other premier special operations units. Their mission set, too, is very one-‐

dimensional; as opposed to American SOF, which are capable of nine primary

mission types, PLA SOF are highly trained in only direct action, special

reconnaissance, counter-‐terrorism, and information warfare. Other key SOF

capabilities—including foreign internal defense and unconventional warfare—

appear to be left out of the PLA SOF doctrine.

C3: Future development of PLA SOF will likely be limited by the lack of a

central organizational group comparable to the US Special Operations

Command; furthermore, this disconnect will likely limit the combat

utility of PLA SOF.

Many of the recent successes of American SOF units are directly attributable to the

establishment of Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), the organization that

coordinates all of the United States’ special operations forces. According to Gen.

Stanley McChrystal, former commander of JSOC and a major driver of organizational

change within the US special operations community, the vast majority of American

SOF successes would not have been possible without JSOC’s strategic role.27 The

lack of a comparable organization to direct PLA SOF units, combined with those

units’ incredibly confusing organization—with each unit having both tactical

specialties and a regional designation—will likely set the stage for future

operational failures not unlike Operation Eagle Claw.

27 Conversation with the author, 2012.02.03.

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C4: The PLA continues to value hardware over human capital, even in their

most highly trained military units.

The earlier discussion of PLA SOF training and equipment encompasses this point in

full; these units’ training exercises appear more focused on leveraging technology to

achieve tactical objectives instead of providing operators with the skills and

experience to achieve these same objectives in austere environments. The

implications of this training philosophy remain to be seen, but given the experience

of other special operations units the Chinese special operations units are unlikely to

achieve a high degree of success in actual combat environments.

C5: Despite their shortcomings, PLA SOF units are especially well prepared

for offensive military action against Taiwan; furthermore, the

organization and training of “The Daggers” indicates that the PLA is

specifically developing forces capable of executing a complex attack on

the island.

PLA SOF are specifically preparing to execute attacks against at least the United

States’ allies, and likely to execute similar attacks against American targets in East

Asia. Given the special relationship between the US and Taiwan, it is critically

important that American strategists appreciate the capabilities of the PLA’s special

operations units and work to mitigate these capabilities in any potential conflict

scenarios between the PRC and the US.

This essay, and others that study Chinese special operations forces, is

significantly limited by the lack of reliable information on a small community, the

actions of which are kept highly compartmentalized. Further research is required to

develop an accurate picture of Chinese SOF capabilities, and the strategic

implications of their presence on the battlefield. However, any information that can

be gleaned on this subject is critical in our attempts to study the units that will most

likely play a major role in any conflict between China and her rivals in Asia or

around the world.

Mullikin 20

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