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Transcript of Governance, Multilevel Governance and Europeanization European Social Policy Course 4 May 2009 J. R....
Governance, Multilevel Governance and Europeanization
European Social Policy Course4 May 2009J. R. Grote
Governance, MLG and Europeanization 2
Governance
Where does it come from? What does it mean? How has been conceptualized? What are the nain types? Which are the scientific disciplines devoted to its study? Is there something like an overall definition that would be
shared by everybody? What are its pre-requisites and what its obstacles? What is it expected to achieve?
Governance, MLG and Europeanization 3
Worldwide governance indicatorsThe most widely diffused notion of the governance term is probably the various governance indices produced by international organizations to measure the performance and development capacity of countries in the first, the second and the third world. The aim is, in most cases, to arrive at something being called “good governance”.Most of these studies make use of compound indices whose number, in principle, is unlimited. For example: Gross Domestic Product Levels of Poverty Levels of Education Government effectiveness Rule of law Political stability and so forth
Whether this really adds up to reflect governance and governance capity is questionable. Yet, at least, it provides for interesting comparative information that has not been available in previous periods
Governance, MLG and Europeanization 4
Control of corruption 2007Political stability 2007
Voice and accountability 2007
Governance, MLG and Europeanization 5
Government effectiveness 2007 Rule of law 2007
Regulatory quality 2007
Governance, MLG and Europeanization 6
Governance is a method/mechanism for dealing with a broad range of problems or conflicts in which actors regularly arrive at mutually satisfactory and binding decisions by negotiating with each other and cooperating in the implementation of these decisions.
Governance as institutional cybernetics or governance as an emergent phenomenon that develops behind the backs of the people. Governance as a quasi-natural response to increasing problems of coping with complexity in politics, in technology, in social life, etc. Governance as a self-equlibrating process.
Governance: design or emergence?
Governance, MLG and Europeanization 7
John Stuart Mill, 1862. Considerations on Representative Government. New York: Harper & Brothers.
Central question: To what extent are forms of government a matter of choice?
“All speculations concerning forms of government bear the impress, more or less exclusive, of two conflicting theories respecting political institutions; or, to speak more properly, conflicting conceptions of what political institutions are. By some minds, government is conceived as strictly a practical art, giving rise to no questions but those of means and an end. Forms of government are assimilated to any other expedients for the attainment of human objects. They are regarded as wholly an affair of invention and contrivance. Being made by man, it is assumed that man has the choice either to make them or not, and how or on what pattern they shall be made. (…) To find the best form of government, to persuade others that it is the best; and, having done so, to stir them up to insist on having it, is the order of ideas in the minds of those who adopt this view of political philosophy. They look upon a constitution in the same light (difference of scale being allowed for) as they would upon a steam plow or a threshing machine.
Governance, MLG and Europeanization 8
To these stand opposed another kind of political reasoners, who are so far from assimilating a form of government to a machine that they regard it as a sort of spontaneous product, and the science of government as a branch (so to speak) of natural history. According to them, forms of government are not a matter of choice. We must take them, in the main, as we find them. Governments can not be constructed by premeditated design. They “are not made, but grow”. Our business with them, as with the other facts of the universe, is to acquaint ourselves with their natural properties, and adapt ourselves to them. The fundamental political institutions of a people are considered by this school as a sort of organic growth from the nature of life of that people; a product of their habits, instincts, and unconscious wants and desires, scarcely at all of their deliberate purposes. Their will has had no part in the matter but that of meeting the necessities of the moment by the contrivances of the moment (…). It is difficult to decide which of these doctrines would be the most absurd, if we suppose either of them held as an exclusive theory. But, though each side greatly exaggerates its own theory, out of opposition to the other, and no one holds without modification to either, the two doctrines correspond to a deep-seated difference between two modes of thought; and though it is evident that neither of these is entirely in the right, yet it being equally evident that neither is wholly in the wrong, we must endeavour to get down to what is at the root of each, and avail ourselves of the amount of truth which exists in either.”
Governance, MLG and Europeanization 10
The variety of mechanisms for the governance of sectorsby P.C. Schmitter
Up to now, scholars have emphasized the importance of simple dichotomies
Charles Lindblom: Market and State Oliver Williamson: Hierarchy and Market Hybrid forms may exist according to these authors, but they
are regarded as intrinsically unstable
Schmitter argues that there are many of such hybrids and that they may be more stable than suggested by the standard literature
Alliances Networks
Governance, MLG and Europeanization 11
Figure 1 distinguishes between a vertical axis: two generic types of exchange) and a horizontal axis: three means of enforcing whatever
mechanism comes about)
The figure generates six partially overlapping boxes:
Markets [spontaneously equilibrating (unvisible hand)], Hierarchies [based on enforcement mechanisms
(guarantee of property rights) which can be internalized within a company],
Communities [self-equilibrating (normative consensus among their members)],
States (or public hierarchies) [external units of enforcement par excellence and have a sovreign status]
Alliances Networks.
Governance, MLG and Europeanization 14
However, the problem can also be addressed from the more encompassing perspective of Overall Modes of Societal Order in modern societies and nation states.Several of such modes have been said to exist and are frequently addressed by different social science disciplines:- The Market- The State- The SocietyWhile state and market are generally accepted as ordering mechanisms by virtually all scholars, it happens that some use the notion of Civil Society (rather than just society) while others insert Networks into the menu of orders. Others again have suggested that the market and the state are complemented by the Community as a third and the Association as a forth mode of societal order.Independently from what is ultimately prefered, the most important thing is that, to speak of governance, these orders need to overlap to some extent thus partly complementing and partly contradicting each other.
Governance, MLG and Europeanization 15
Is Governance able of solving the problems resulting from the incompatibility or complementarity of different types of orders? (from Streeck/Schmitter‘s essay on PIGs)Modern societies, polities and economies can only be analyzed
in terms of a specific mix of these institutions and principles. Each of them can in principle undermine but also strengthen the existence of adjacent institutions and principles.
Communities can undermine markets (informal collusion, clientelist arrangments) but can also encourage mutual confidence and good faith necessary for stable economic exchange.
Markets can decompose community bonds and erode common values but can also provide for opportunities for extended reproduction.
Governance, MLG and Europeanization 16
State intervention can distort markets but can also provide for a legal framework that guides and makes economic exchange viable.
Free contracts and competition may contradict state policies but even the most etatist state requires markets as a supplementary mechanism of allocation.
State growth and government intervention may lead to a disintegration of communities but, at the same time, communities without a state would always be in danger of losing their identity and independence.
Communitarian tribalism can frustrate the development of a stable nation state while, at the same time, a state without some degree of spontaneous solidarity among its citizens is no more than a bureacratic or military conspiracy.
Governance, MLG and Europeanization 17
While until this point, hardly anybody would have a problem with the description of virtues and vices of these three modes of societal order, Streeck and Schmiiter are convinced that there is a forth mode which has so far been largely neglected
Streeck and Schmitter introduce an additional and distinct institution (including these institutions‘ guiding principles) which they call „Association“.
„Association“ is more than a transient amalgam of the three other orders and is capable of making a lasting and autonomous contribution to rendering the behaviour of social actors reciprocally adjustive and predictable. The guiding principle of interaction and allocation of this mode of societal governance is „organizational concertation“.
But let us have a look at the other principles as well:
Governance, MLG and Europeanization 18
Three or four modes of societal order: Communities, Markets, States – and Associations?
Communities Markets States Associative order (PIG)
Coordination Spontaneous solidarity
Dispersed competition
Hierarchical control
Intra/ inter-organizational Concertation
Main actors Families Firms/ parties Bureaucratic agencies
Associations, movements
Entry conditions Ascriptive member status
Abiltiy to pay, eligibility to vote
Legal authorization
Capacity to disrupt and compromise
Exchange medium
Esteem Money/ votes Coercion Mutual recognition
Exchange product
Compacts Contracts/ political positions
Regulation Pacts
Resources Trust, respect Pol. and econ. entrepreneurship
Legitimate control
Guaranteed access
Motives of actors
Esteem of followers
Profit/ electoral victory
Careers, bureaucratic stability
Organizational development
Cleavages Natives vs. foreigners
Sellers vs. buyers, parties vs. voters
Rulers vs. ruled
Members vs. leaders vs. state interlocutors
Pay-offs Mutual affection, collective identity
Material prosperity, citizen accountability
(External) security
Social peace
Governance, MLG and Europeanization 19
Both in practice (empirical manifestations of it) and in theory (analytical reflection on it), governance needs to be/ can be:
- approached from (at least) three analytical angles in a simultaneous fashion.- understood in terms of an emergent phenomenon that tends to develop everywhere within a given political system and tends to achieve equilibrium points which reflect highly specific situations in political, societal and in economic terms- understood in terms of deliberate design. i.e. as a program or strategy elaborated by political practitioners and political analysts
State
CommunityMarket
(Association)
Governance, MLG and Europeanization 20
S
M
A C
The number of potential hybrids and of their concrete overlap areas is in principle unlimited
Communitarian markets, New Public Management, social economy, associative democracy, public-private partnerships, etc.
Governance, MLG and Europeanization 21
Scientific „order and disorder“
Political Science
SociologyEconomics
Organization theory
In a situation where everything overlaps and depends on each other, theestablished disciplines dealing with these systems might run into problems.It is today hardly imaginable that any single of these disciplines will be ableto dealing with the complexity characterizing any single of their analytical targets.Hence the need for inter-disciplinary research!
Governance, MLG and Europeanization 23
There is of course also a network component involved in discussions of governance. Imagine the people represented below were political institutions, organizations and different organizational layers that are formally divided by specific tasks and duties (e.g. the president, ministerial offices, and public and private organizations attached to these offices).
Governance, MLG and Europeanization 24
Rectangular matrix of advise relations (14 x 14)
director
head of division
book-keeper
secretaries
“To whom do you turn with questions relevant to your work?”
or:
“To whom do you turn for information of strategic importance?”
Governance, MLG and Europeanization 27
Status indices
head of division
secretaryhead of divisiondirectorhead of divisionhead of divisionsecretarysecretarybook keeperbook keeperbook keeperbook keeperbook keeperbook keeperbook keeperbook keepersecretary
Governance, MLG and Europeanization 28
Governanceby Anne Mette Kjaer
On paradigm shifts and the meanings of governance:
GOV in Public Administration/ Public Policy GOV in International Relations European GOV (and MLG) GOV in Comparative Politics and economic development GOV in Processes of Democratization and Transition GOV and the World Bank
Governance, MLG and Europeanization 29
I. Paradigm shift in public policies
From hierarchy, sub-ordination and top-down control
towards
Policy networks network management, self-organizing networks
Meta-governance Managing the rules (of formulation, decision-making
and implementation) and coordinating them across policy domains
Coordinating the plurality of hierarchies, markets and networks across domains
Governance, MLG and Europeanization 30
II. Paradigm shift in international relations
From the neo-realist assumption of states as the most important actors in world politics
versus
a growing importance of multinational actors and transnational networks
a growing importance of international regimes
Governance, MLG and Europeanization 31
III. Paradigm shift in European integration studies
From a focus on European integration and institutions (as the explanandum)
towards
a focus on EU policy-making, its effects on domestic policies and on the management of complex inter-relationships in
policy-making across all levels (subnational, domestic, supranational)
Governance, MLG and Europeanization 32
IV. Paradigm shift in political economy
From the neo-liberal position (the state should have no role at all and leave development to the market)
towards
a heterarchic conception of governance as the management of self-organizing networks that involve a plurality of organizational forms such as the state, the market or networks
Governance, MLG and Europeanization 33
V. Paradigm shift in democratization/ transition research
From modernization and early transition theories (determinism and presumption of the existence
of only one single path-way of development towards democracy)
towards
institutional & governance approaches that allow for a more open-ended vision and argue that institutions circumscribe political agency
in as much as agents themselves are capable of altering institutions
Governance, MLG and Europeanization 34
VI. Paradigm shift in the international economy
From a selective policy followed by the World Bank (granting help to those that already have „good
governance“)
towards
a critique of the WB‘s dependency on its largest shareholder (the US)
a focus on accountability versus a global public
Governance, MLG and Europeanization 36
“Attributive” requisites of governance arrangements (from PC
Schmitter, 2002) a. List of potential “pro-governance”
policies supported and implemented by public authorities
b. List of necessary attributes on the part
of (organized) civil society
c. List of principles for the chartering, composition and decision-rules of governance arrangements
Governance, MLG and Europeanization 37
I. “Pro-governance” policies
1. freedom of association, petition and assembly2. legal recognition3. special fiscal treatment4. arenas for functional representation5. guarantees of access to decision-making6. protection from non-intromission in internal affairs7. subsidization with public funds8. obligatory membership and/ or member
contributions9. legal extension of contracts10. devolved responsibility for policy
implementation
Governance, MLG and Europeanization 38
II. Attributes of (organized) civil society
1. class, sectoral, professional or corporate consciousness
2. voluntarism3. “moral sentiments”4. sociability5. trust6. altruism or “other-regardingness”7. universalism8. sense of personal efficacy9. organizational skills
Governance, MLG and Europeanization 39
1. mandated authority (clearly circumscribed mandate [by the EU] establishing its composition and rules)
2. sunset principle (not for an indefinite period; pre-established date of expiry with possibility of renewal)
3. functional separability (no overlap in tasks with existing [EU] institutions)
4. non-supplementarity (no displacement of existing [EU] institutions)
5. request variety ([E]GA can narrow or widen the range of participants and modify internal rules as long as it does not violate the general charter)
6. anti-spill-over (no [E]GA should exceed the tasks for whose solution it has originally been designed)
III. Principles for the chartering, the composition and the decision-rules of Governance Arrangements
a) Chartering
Governance, MLG and Europeanization 40
1. rights (membership in a national political community)2. spatial location (all those living on a regular basis within
a demarcated territory)3. knowledge (person or organization possessing
indispensible knowledge for solution of problem)4. share (holders of property rights in those assets being
affected by [E]GA)5. stake (all those that could materially or spiritually be
affected by operation of [E]GA)6. interest (anybody representing a constituency who
demonstrates sufficient awareness about the issue at stake)
7. status (each organization having an official status in the representation of social, economic or political categories)
b) Composition
Governance, MLG and Europeanization 41
“primary” citizens:
1. rights holders = citizens/voters
“secondary” citizens:
2. space holders = residents3. knowledge holders = experts4. share holders = owners5. stake holders = beneficiaries AND victims6. interest holders = spokespersons7. status holders = representatives
Composition … continued (different types of “holders”)
Governance, MLG and Europeanization 42
1. “putative” equality (irrespective of size, each participant should be considered as equal – no first, second, third class participants)
2. horizontal interaction (avoidance of hierarchy such as stable delegation of tasks, formalized leadership, etc.)
3. consensus principle (no majority voting, no imposition but deliberation, persuasion and regular interaction)
4. open-door (possibility of exit-option without subsequent retaliation)
5. proportionality (outcomes are roughly proportional to the specific assets of each participant)
6. shifting alliances (avoidance of rigid cleavages; permanent re-composition of groups and actors)
7. checks and balances (no decision on matters concerning outside organizations)
8. reversibility (no decisions that cannot be annulled by “right” holders, i.e. citizen/ voters
c) Decision rules
Governance, MLG and Europeanization 43
Multilevel Governance (MLG)
1. MLG visualized
2. MLG and jurisdictions
Governance, MLG and Europeanization 44
A simple circuit of functional political exchange
State authoritiesRepresentatives of labor unionsRepresentatives of business associations
Governance, MLG and Europeanization 45
A simple circuit of territorial political exchange
Government at level A
Government at level A
Government at level A
Governance, MLG and Europeanization 46
A more complex representation of Multilevel Governance and of the positioning of different
actor categories
Sub-national(regional, local)
National
International
suprantional
government
NGOsassociations
Governance, MLG and Europeanization 47
Type I GovernanceThe intellectual foundation for Type I governance is federalism, which is concerned with power sharing among a limited number of governments operating at just a few levels. Federalism is concerned chiefly with the relationship between central government and a tier of non-intersecting sub-national governments. The unit of analysis is the individual government, rather than the individual policy. In the words of Wallace Oates (1999, 1121), dean of fiscal federalism, "The traditional theory of fiscal federalism lays out a "general normative framework for the assignment of functions to different levels of government and the appropriate fiscal instruments for carrying out these functions." The framework is system-wide, the functions are bundled, and the levels of government are multiple but limited in number.
Unraveling the Central State, but How? Types of Multi-Level Governanceby Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks
Governance, MLG and Europeanization 48
Type II GovernanceAn alternative form of multi-level governance is one in which the number of jurisdictions is potentially vast rather than limited, in which jurisdictions are not aligned on just a few levels but operate at numerous territorial scales, in which jurisdictions are task-specific rather than general-purpose, and where jurisdictions are intended to be flexible rather than durable. This conception is predominant among neoclassical political economists and public choice theorists, but it also summarizes the ideas of several scholars of federalism, local government, international relations, and Europeanstudies.
Governance, MLG and Europeanization 49
Type I governance constrains the number of jurisdictions according to the following design principles:
Nonintersecting memberships. Jurisdictional memberships at the same territorial level do not overlap. Nonintersecting membership limits the need for jurisdictional coordination horizontally at any level and, vertically, across levels.
Cascading jurisdictional scale. The territorial scale of jurisdiction decreases sharply across levels. European Union countries have between two and five subnational levels, described by the European Commission in terms of a common rubric, the Nomenclature des unitis territoriales statistiques (NUTS) (Eurostat 1999, 27). The median population represented in the first level, NUTS 1 jurisdictions, is 3.89 million; that in the second level, NUTS 2 jurisdictions, is 1.42 million; NUTS 3 jurisdictions have a median population of 369,000; the median population in NUTS 4 is 48,000; and at the lowest level, NUTS 5, it is 5,100. In the United States, the corresponding median population is 3.76 million for states, 69,600 for counties, and 8,800 for subcounties. A cascading jurisdictional scale spreads governance across vastly different scales but limits the total number of sub-national levels to three, four, or, at most, five tiers.
Governance, MLG and Europeanization 50
General-purpose jurisdictions. A logical corollary is that authoritative competencies are bundled into a small number of extensive packages at each level. Type I governance disperses authority across widely different levels and constrains the number of levels by making the jurisdictions at each level multipurpose.
Systemwide architecture. The pyramidal structure of Type I governance lends itself to hierarchical direction. Most Type I governance systems are bound together by a single court system with ultimate authority to adjudicate among contending jurisdictions.
Governance, MLG and Europeanization 51
Type II governance is alternative to Type I.
It limits coordination costs by constraining interaction across jurisdictions. Type II governance sets no ceiling on the number of jurisdictions but spawns new ones along functionally differentiated lines. As a result, externalities across jurisdictions are minimized. This is an exact corollary to Herbert Simon's (1996,178) notion of "nearly decomposable“ structures. Simon argues that tasks within an organization should be distributed so that the share of internal interactions within constituent units is maximized and the share of external interactions minimized. The idea, applied to jurisdictional design, is to distribute tasks so that the short-run behavior of actors across different jurisdictions is more or less independent from that of others, while their long-run behavior is connected only in the aggregate.'‘ How can decomposability be attained in policy provision? How, in other words, can one break up policymaking into discrete pieces with minimal external spillover?
Governance, MLG and Europeanization 52
The following design principles characterize Type II governance.
Functional specificity. Specific, functionally distinct competencies are hived off and insulated. In this way, externalities-and therefore interdependence-among jurisdictions are minimized. The assumption that all significant costs and benefits are internalized within the jurisdiction is a foundation of Type I1 governance theory, including Tiebout's (1956) theory of jurisdictional competition, Buchanan's (1965) theory of clubs, and Oates‘ analysis of metropolitan competition (Oates and Schwab 1988).
Flexible, policy-specific, architecture. Type I1 governance is designed with respect to particular policy problems-not particular communities or constituencies. Institutional design-the scope of a jurisdiction, its mode of decision making, adjudication, and implementation-can thus be adapted to particular policy problems.
Governance, MLG and Europeanization 53
The two types of governance share one vital feature: They are both radical departures from the centralized state. However, they diffuse authority in contrasting ways. Type I governance bundles competencies in jurisdictions at a limited number of territorial levels. These jurisdictions form part of a system-wide plan: They are mutually exclusive at each territorial level, and the units at each level are perfectly nested within those at the next higher level. Jurisdictional design generally corresponds to communal identities: Each jurisdiction caters to an encompassing group or territorial community. These jurisdictions are oriented to voice rather than to exit. Type I governance reflects a simple design principle: Maximize the fit between the scale of a jurisdiction and the optimal scale of public good provision while minimizing inter-jurisdictional coordination by (a) creating inclusive jurisdictions that internalize most relevant externalities and (b) limiting the number of jurisdictional levels.
Governance, MLG and Europeanization 54
Type II governance also limits the transaction costs of inter-jurisdictional coordination, but it does so in a fundamentally different way, by splicing public good provision into a large number of functionally discrete jurisdictions. But these jurisdictions do not conform to an overarching blueprint. Rather, each is designed to address a limited set of related problems. Type II jurisdictions are task-driven. Hence, the same individual may be part of several overlapping and intersecting jurisdictions. Membership in Type II jurisdictions tends to be conditional and extrinsic. Type II jurisdictions are often designed to have low barriers to entry and exit so as to engender competition among them.
Governance, MLG and Europeanization 55
3. Europeanization
1.Conceptualizing and measuring it
2. Europeanization in comparative perspective
Governance, MLG and Europeanization 59
Democracy in Europe. The EU and National Policy
Makingby Vivian A.Schmidt
1. Policies
Governance, MLG and Europeanization 60
3. Patterns of policy formulation and implementation
Member states along a continuum from statist to corporatist processes
Governance, MLG and Europeanization 68
Simple and compound polities along a continuum betweenmajoritarian and proportional electoral systems
Governance, MLG and Europeanization 69
Percentage of people who said they were “very“ or “fairly satisfied“ with their domestic political system
Governance, MLG and Europeanization 70
Percentage of people who said they trusted the European Union
Governance, MLG and Europeanization 71
Percentage of people who feel their country‘s membership in the European Union is a “good thing“
Governance, MLG and Europeanization 72
Percentage of people who see themselves as both their nationality and European
Governance, MLG and Europeanization 73
Percentage of people who feel their country benefits from EU membership
Governance, MLG and Europeanization 76
Simple and compound polities along a continuum betweenunitary, regionalized and federal structures
Governance, MLG and Europeanization 78
The differential effect of the EU on national executives‘ powers, projection of preferences and compliance patterns related to institutional structure