1. NAVAL WAR COLLEGENewport, R.I.GOOD NEIGHBOR 21 AND THE ROLE OF BRAZIL byGuilherme Wagner de Azevedo Cordeiro Lieutenant Commander, Brazilian NavyA paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of National Security Decision Making.The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.Signature:25 April 2005 Theodore Wu, Professor

2. Abstract GOOD NEIGHBOR 21 AND THE ROLE OF BRAZILThe paper will address the fact that sociopolitical stability in the Latin Americacannot be taken for granted. There are non-traditional security issues that can pose threats tothe United States or to its interests in the future.The U.S. foreign policy should change the way it sees Latin America and work onchanging the way the United States is seen in the region. This paper will argue that a 21stcentury version of the Good Neighbor policy can make such change of mindsets possibleand that the best way to start it is turning Brazil from part of the problem into part of thesolution. The countrys pivotal state role will facilitate the completion of the change. i 3. AzevedoINTRODUCTION Since the United States took over the most influential role in Latin America fromEurope after World War I, it has been a commonplace to see the region as U.S. backyard.The relative calm and peace of Latin America in comparison with a global securityenvironment marked by threats such as terrorism and weapons mass destruction (WMD)proliferation are the U.S. excuses for not working on a long-term agenda for the region. Withthe exception of major current concernsimmigration, cartels and guerrillas in Colombia,transnational crime, Cubas Fidel Castro and Venezuelas Hugo Chavezthe policy for theregion is on the edge of neglect because there are neither records of WMD use noroperational activities of terrorism targeting the United States. Keeping a reactive strategy for the next decades can prove to be a mistake. If U.S.foreign policy does not use the tools of diplomacy to address the causes of uncertainty in theregion, maybe solving eventual crisesdirectly or indirectly, after they startcan becomemore costly and divert important resources badly needed in other theaters. Besides that, theU.S. influence in the region can be challenged by China and European Union (EU) if theymanage to establish strategic partnership as result of successful public diplomacy efforts.This scenario will probably change if the United States really intends to approach thenegotiations of the Free Trade Area of Americas (FTAA) in a multilateral way. Besides Castro and the immigration issues from Central America and Caribbean, themajor sources of uncertainty are related to South America. Countries followed theprescriptions of globalization, issued by intergovernmental (IGO) and nongovernmental(NGO) organizations with U.S. influence, but the majority of population in South Americahave not benefited yet. Each country that experienced military dictatorship returned to1 4. Azevedo democratic rule in a different pace. Social inequality, poverty and unemployment mixed withweak institutions favor charismatic leaders who usually blame United States for everythingthat goes wrong and provide fertile ground for destabilizing non-state armed groups(revolutionary guerrillas, organized crime gangs and drug cartels). In the South American context, United States could gain a lot from working togetherwith Brazil. Sharing borders with all but two countries in the continent, Brazil is a majoreconomic power, is historically successful in and committed to negotiated solutions throughinternational institutions and, since the end of the authoritarian regime, follows aconstitutional principle of regional integration1.STABILITY It is not a matter of defending Dependency Theory but economy in its most recenttrendglobalizationis responsible for a great part of the social problems and of the failureof institutions and governments in Latin America. In the 1990s, countries of the region followed much of the WashingtonConsensustrade liberalization, openness to foreign capital, privatization of stateenterprises, competitive exchange rates and deregulationbut failed to be that assertiveabout fiscal discipline and public spending. Although these reforms seemed to improvemacroeconomic marks, poorly coordinated structures and financial crises deteriorated theinitial benefits before people could perceive them. United Nations conducted a poll in 18countries of the region in order to judge how local populations see the civilian-ruleddemocracy. The results showed that almost 55% of all Latin Americans would prefer anauthoritarian regime to a democratic government if authoritarianism could solve countrieseconomic problems2.2 5. AzevedoThe stability in the region as a whole is apparent. The removal of EcuadorianPresident Lucio Gutierrez can be seen as a sign that general situation did not improved a lotsince, for example, the day President Fernando de la Ra had no choice but to resign afterviolent popular riots and demonstrations in 2000. The leaders of Andean countries are aboutto live the worst of both worlds: lack of popular support and increasing activity ofdestabilizing non-state actors such as the well known Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias deColombia (FARC - Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) which has control of part ofColombian territory. Although restricted to those sectors directly involved with the continent, nationalsecurity system (NSS) participants are starting to voice their considerations about the existentand the potential situations. General Bantz J. Craddock, United States Army, Commander,United States Southern Command, concluded this way his statement to Senate ArmedServices Committee last March:We cannot afford to let Latin America and the Caribbean become a backwater of violent, inward-looking states that are cut off from the world around them by populist, authoritarian governments. We must reward and help those governments that are making difficult, disciplined choices that result in the long-term wellbeing of their people. The challenges facing Latin America and the Caribbean today are significant to our national security. We ignore them at our peril.3BRAZIL PART OF THE PROBLEM Even with strong bureaucratic resistance to reforms and generalized corruptionwithmoney from drugs business in most of the cases4among politicians, judges and lawenforcement agencies, a serious risk to democratic institutions is unlikely. The mostorganized social movementMovimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra (MST -Landless Workers' Movement)is responsible for occupation, sometimes with violence, offarms and public buildings in the cities. The intelligence community, led by Agncia3 6. Azevedo Brasileira de Inteligncia (ABIN Brazilian Intelligence Agency), pays close attention toMST and other similar movements. In terms of violent actions, the major security threat is posed by organized crime andits heavily armed groups. Because of the countrys continental dimensions, their destabilizingpotential is concentrated in major cities. Their actions include drugs and arms trafficking,bank robbery and kidnappings. Because of the great volume of drugs that passes through itsterritory on the way to the United States, Brazil has been mentioned in the AnnualPresidential Determinations of the Major Illicit Drug-Producing and Drug-Transit Countriesfor 20055. The porosity of Brazilian borders in the Amazon region allows FARC to use them asroutes for smuggling of arms and drugs. The ties between FARC and the drug lords are veryclose. A sinister example of that is the joint venture of recruiting retired soldiers andcorporals of the Brazilian special operations forces6. The relatively new Ministry ofDefenseit was created in 2000faces the huge challenge of projecting power in such avast region and, at same time, attending requests for assistance from other ministries. Tomake matters worse, since the end of military rule in 1985, the defense budget has decreasedconstantly. The most significant security trouble is economic stability. After solving thehyperinflation problem in 1994, Brazilian financial authorities kept an austere monetarypolicy with very high interest rates. This and the privatization process attracted volatilecapitalsknown also as hot money, funds invested in assets that can be bought and soldquicklyto the economy but it did not increase domestic savings or investments ininfrastructure. Brazil decided March this year not to renew the credit deal with the4 7. Azevedo International Monetary Fund (IMF) because macroeconomic indicators show some favorableconditions for development. However, IMF directors noted that public debt was still highand sensitive to global financial conditions7. Directly linked to the failure in achieving sustainable growth is the social apartheid.The differences between classes are huge and evident. It is improbable but not impossiblethat the combination of very high levels of social inequality and violent crime can be used asan argument for the rise of populist groups which sell the idea of the benevolentdictatorship. Still in the economic field, Brazil is turning out to be a good negotiator ininternational trade. En blocMercado Comum do Cone Sul (MERCOSUL - CommonMarket of the Southern Cone) and the developing nations Group of 20 (G20)8or alone,Brazils recent victories were against U.S. interests to some extent. Last September, forexample, World Trade Organization (WTO) ruled against farm subsidies paid by UnitedStates (cotton) and European Union (sugar). Brazilian government is putting a lot of effort in strengthening the commercial tieswith other developing regions around the world in an attempt to exert some kind ofleadership in trade issues. It is also working on bilateral MERCOSUL-European Union freetrade agreement and taking advantage of fact that China is courting Latin Americadiplomatically and economically. The administration of the ports at both ends of the PanamaCanal is done by a Hong Kong company9. Chinese President Hu Jintao visited the region lastNovember and sealed agreements that sum 30 billion dollars in investments in Brazil andArgentina in the next ten years. 5 8. AzevedoGOOD NEIGHBOR 21 According to backyard mentality, Latin American countries have no decisive rolein the International Political System (IPS). The United States should not take this for grantedand run the risk of losing their support. On trade, for example, the notion that geographicproximity between markets is not so important anymore is degenerating to a globalizationclich but it is being proved true with the growing Chinese and E.U. interest in the continent. The policy for the region is changing to accommodate to the new world economicorder. At least in theory, the United States sees multilateralism as fundamental to thenegotiations of the FTAAa free trade area from Alaska to Tierra del Fuego10. But there are things that need to be changed: the tone of U.S. foreign policy and theway it is perceived by IPS actors. The reports by Government Accountability Office (GAO) and other groups thataddress U.S public diplomacy and strategic communication11 point out the lack of strategicdirection and barely mention Latin America, exception made to the usual suspects (Cubaand Colombia). Domestically, the various actors have little or no interest in other Latin Americaissues than immigration, drugs, Cuba, Colombia and, more recently, Venezuela. Then, it is advisable to launch a cultural offensive on both international and domesticsystems in parallel with the commercial talks that permeate current relations. This was donesuccessfully in the 30s and 40s of the last century under the Good Neighbor policy. Itseems appropriate to study and adapt it to the reality of the new century in some sort ofGood Neighbor 21 as an alternative to the backyard model. As it happened in the periodbetween Great Depression and World War II, the United States needs regional support to 6 9. Azevedo face challenging times ahead.Historical precedent. President Franklin D. Roosevelt continued the implementation of the"Good Neighbor" policy, initiated during his predecessors term12, in relation to LatinAmerica, when the active U.S. intervention of late 1800s and early 1900s gradually gaveplace to the search for hemispheric solidarity against external threats. In his inaugural addresson assuming the Presidency for the first time, Roosevelt declared:In the field of world policy I would dedicate this Nation to the policy of the good neighborthe neighbor who resolutely respects himself and, because he does so, respects the rights of othersthe neighbor who respects his obligations and respects the sanctity of his agreements in and with a world of neighbors.13 In the following years, the U.S. foreign policy for the region was based in activeparticipation of the President and the Cabinet-level authorities in addressing relevant issuesof the agenda such as trade and defense. Latin American countries welcomed this sense ofimportance and became more supportive. As another characteristic of what would be called later soft power, PresidentRoosevelt, created in August 1940, the Office of the Coordinator of the Inter-AmericanAffairs (OCIAA) which outpoured U.S. propaganda at Latin America to counteract thefascist influence. The policy was directed also towards internal audiences in order to closethe gap between the stereotypes and the perception of the reality of Latin America. TheOCIAA produced its own movies14 and sponsored artistic projects about life and people ofthe region. As proof of how this period brings good memories there even after sixty years,the Brazilian cartoon character created by Walt Disneya parrot called Jos Cariocais stillvery popular. The move from gunboat to good neighbor policy finally paid off after Japaneseattack on Pearl Harbor. Most nations of the region aligned with the cause of the Allies and7 10. Azevedo made available huge amounts of raw materials needed for U.S. industrial war effort. Thepartnership with Brazil provided bases to U.S. Navy anti-submarine campaign in southAtlantic, facilities needed for the airway to North Africa and troops for the campaign in Italy.After the war, however, the plans for the region changed to the unilateral containmentof the communism and protection of U.S. interests, many of them bought or acquired infavorable conditions as result of the partnership principle of Good Neighbor policy.How the United States sees Latin America.Due to the fact that NSS just cares about the region in very specific subjects, it isdifficult to believe that the other domestic politic system (DPS) actors are going to actdifferently. The overall attitude is negativeexcept the news about odd or exotic situationsthat confirm the stereotypesand cannot be confronted because there are not efforts topresent the positive side.The Department of Defense focuses on "ungoverned spaces" in Latin AmericaAmazon forest and triple border Brazil-Argentina-Paraguayand how they can be used byterrorists against the United States. Other concerns made public are the drug trafficking,political revolutionary movements and their association. In the last years, an old nemesisgot a friend: Fidel Castro and Hugo Chavez are the btes noires of the continent.Immigration is other topic discussed by different NSS and DPS actors. There isalways a possibility that terrorist can enter, legally or not, in the United States but the mainissue is economic and affects a lot of constituencies around the country. The message passedout is well known: illegal immigrants work for less money, pay no taxes and remit billions totheir countries of origin.Another major concern that is publicized is the role of Latin American countries in8 11. Azevedo production and trafficking of drugs. The slow pace of the FTAA negotiations gives time and the benefit of the doubt to theinterest groups make their case about the economic damages to the Congress, the media andthe public. Good Neighbor 21 opinion-making strategy should explore the advantages in thelong term of having the potential of Latin American on U.S. side instead of spendingresources in the solution of sporadic crises. It is neither difficult nor so expensive job. It wasdone before when the DPS actors worked to turn declared enemies of the past into closestallies. If it is possible to show U.S. audiences that, despite all casualties and resources spent,Iraqi people are doing a good job and deserve continued help, it does not seem impossible topresent the positive side of Latin America. It is just about fighting the ignorance. Somepoints that can be considered are: to learn from the experience of private sector and NGOs, tocelebrate the heritage of millions of U.S. citizens, to honor countries of origin of popularidols, to stimulate social and cultural exchanges, to publicize Latin American breakthroughsand to overcome opposition from interest groups. The creation of a specific agenda is not necessary. In fact, the Department of StatesBureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs has its origins in the OCIAA.How Latin America sees the United States. In a world where cable television (TV) and internet provide real time coverage of theevents, the hegemonic power is under continuous scrutiny. Latin American audiences watch all that with an extra dose of skepticism because theregion deals directly with U.S. foreign policy since early 19th century. The United Statessupported the independence movements around the region and promptly recognized the new 9 12. Azevedo nations but failed to show consistency with the very democratic ideals it lives by and thatinspired those countries. The United States has intervened militarily in tens of occasions,provided military aid and advice to countries in civil war or unrest and supported, overtly ornot, coups dtat and authoritarian regimes. In other words, mere speeches about spreadingdemocracy and free trade have no effect on the regions public. On economy, the memories about globalization are not the best, which can beharmful to FTAA implementation. The developed countries, in defense of the interest of theircorporations, pension funds and banks, pushed Latin American countries into theliberalization part of the Washington Consensus with no major concerns about the reformsneeded, profited from that and, when some of these countries bankrupted, criticized localgovernments for their structural failure. The local media compares U.S. foreign policy in different regions and present thesituations where it seems myopic to the public. This was recurring in the coverage of thebuildup to invade Iraq, the invasion, the failure in finding WMD stockpiles, the insurgencyand the consequent changes of rationale for invasion. This controversial attitude fuels the general notion, used by leaders from differentsides of political spectrum, that U.S. interests are responsible for everything that is not goingwell in their countries. The democratically-elected governments of socialist background keepa very pragmatic and orthodox approach to the relations with the United States but theyfollow a light version the Yanqui, go home playbook to win public support. Good Neighbor 21 should be a coordinated effort of public diplomacy and strategiccommunications. Part of this effort seems symbolic but it would be very effective incaptivating the audiences around the continent. Latin Americans are very proud of their 10 13. Azevedo countries and they really appreciate when their representatives seem important in theconcert of nations. A simple photo-op with two presidents can bring good mood inbilateral relations. Exchange of visits between senior officials is also very well received. Thiskind of events could happen more often in U.S.-Latin America relations, mainly in FTAAnegotiations.FTAA discussions will be a great opportunity to have the rest of continent but Cubaon U.S. side. It will be demanding but, if the U.S. negotiators are well prepared, skilled indealing with people and knowledgeable about the cultural diversity of their counterparts, theeffort will be worth it.An important portion of the public opinion is exposed to U.S. entertainment and newsmedia by cable and internet. United States could stimulate the initiatives of the NGOs, IGOsand private sector to provide internet access and use it as tool for education and publicaffairs. Education reform is something needed in the entire region and the U.S. help can beremembered by the students when they become voters or, better than that, leaders in theirsocieties. BRAZIL PART OF THE SOLUTIONAs it happened about seventy years ago, Brazil is the best candidate to test GoodNeighbor 21. The difference now is that, if Brazil passes and other countries follow behind,the bond forged will not be broken so easily.In the context of international security, all military programs of nuclear research butthe submarine propulsion were canceled. The country is a member of the InternationalAtomic Energy Agency, Missile Technology Control Regime and Brazilian-ArgentineAgency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials, and signatory of the Non-11 14. Azevedo Proliferation Treaty and of Treaty of Tlatelolcowhich establishes a nuclear weapons-freezone in Latin America. The Amazon region is one of the top priorities of the Brazilian government. TheMinistry of Defense determined the Army to deploy units at points of Colombian border in afocus shift from potential Argentine aggression to drug traffickers and guerillas threat. TheBrazilian Navy patrols the rivers, keeps Marines units in the region and takes part in socialactions. The Air Force has the mandate to enforce the Lei do abate (destructive shootinglaw) if the aircraft pilot does not obey all the standard interception procedures. The Sistemade Vigilncia da Amaznia (SIVAM Amazon Surveillance System) is to be commissionedin 2006. In emergencies such as forest fires, floods and toxic spills, the Armed Forces are thefirst representatives of State to reach the scene of action. Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay formed the 3 + 1 Group on Tri-Border Area Securityto discuss and analyze preventive actions against terrorism and other transnationalcrimes15. The money from drugs is a very destabilizing factor in Brazil. Anti-drug initiativesthat do not threaten sovereignty will be welcome by Brazilian government. In terms of population, Brazil is one of the world's largest democracies. It has heldfour presidential elections since the end of military rule. In the last two, the votes of themore than 100 million voters were cast in electronic voting machines. Coordinate actions of Ministrio Pblico (Federal prosecutors) and Polcia Federal(Federal Police) against corruption and financial crimes are very popular, more frequent andeffective. In the region, Brazil changed from a historic isolationism in relation to the Spanish-12 15. Azevedo speaking America to a strong advocacy of South American integration. The foundation ofMERCOSUL and, more recently, of the South American Community of Nations signals theregions desire to be stable and democratic. Brazil plays also an important role inguaranteeing governance. It helped Paraguay (1996) and Argentina (2000), sponsored theFriends of Venezuela initiative (2002) and offered political asylum to Ecuadorian President(2005) to give an end to institutional crises in these countries.Economy and trade are areas where the United States is currently willing for amultilateral approach.Brazilian economy shows signs of steady recovery after years of incremental GrossDomestic Product. Brazil is considered a superpower in agriculture, which is a point ofattrition in bilateral relations. Its industry is diversified and creative with increasingcompetitiveness. Empresa Brasileira de Aeronutica (EMBRAER Brazilian AeronauticsCompany) is one of the best examples of that. It exported training aircrafts to UnitedKingdom and France, created the first ethanol-fueledtaking advantage of the abundance ofthis fuel in Brazilseries production aircraft in the world and one of its jet aircrafts will bethe airborne platform for Aerial Common Sensor (ACS) program for the U.S. Army.Besides the products and services that Brazil can offer, the trade negotiators are doingtheir part in making the country a global trader. They manage to find in what areas the offerof one party is complementary to the need of the other. Brazil, alone or with MERCOSUL, isworking on bilateral agreements with other developing countries and blocsEU, China,India, South Africa, Chile and Andean Community.Brazil and the United States are co-chairs of the final phase of the FTAAnegotiations. Taking care to not upset Brazilian neighbors, this can be the best opportunity to 13 16. Azevedo start a real strategic partnership and expand it to the rest of continent. Points of disagreementsuch as U.S. farm subsidies and Brazilian intellectual property legislation are controversialbut need to be addressed in a long term perspective and in a multidisciplinary way. Thecountries will be open to that if they fight the mutual skepticism. Although timidly, Brazil isworking to prove that it deserves respect as a serious nation. It is U.S. time to prove that itcan be admired again and deserves the leadership role.CONCLUSION The alliances are not real if there is skepticism about U.S. attitude despite the sharingof the same values. If other urgent issues shift attention from Latin America to the point thatregional allies feel neglected, they will support someone else, not necessarily other U.S. ally.The United States passed through similar situation in the past and the Good neighborpolicy, implemented after much negotiation, created the best environment ever in theAmericas and formed the indispensable alliance that allowed the final victory that time. Atthis globalized beginning of the 21st century, the United States should do it overstartingwith the South American greatest power, Brazilrather than keep a reactive posture andspare itself of unnecessary harm. 14 17. Azevedo Appendix A Notes1 International Relations Principles, Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil, article 4 (1988)2 United Nations Development Program, Democracy in Latin America: towards a citizens democracy. (Buenos Aires: 2005), 131.3General Bantz J. Craddock, United States Army, Commander, United States Southern Command, Posture statement, U.S. Congress, Senate, Armed Services Committee, Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2006, Hearings before the Armed Services Committee, 109th Cong., 1st sess., 15 March 2005.4 Whitehead, 129.5 Annual Presidential Determinations of Major Illicit Drug-Producing and Drug-Transit Countries. White House Releases. 16 September 2004. [11 November 2004]6 Depois do trfico, a guerrilha, O Globo, 4 February 20027 International Monetary Fund, Public Information Notice No. 05/41. (Washington, D.C.: 25 March 2005).8 There is another G20. It is the group composed by the industrial nations, emerging market countries and the European Union.9Panama Country Analysis Brief, Country Analysis Brief. November 2004. [20 April 2005]10The FTAA: An Integral Part of the Summit of the Americas, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, Department of State. 6 March 2001 [24 April 2005]11 Government Accountability Office. Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Science, State, Justice, and Commerce, and Related Agencies, Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives: U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY. Interagency Coordination Efforts Hampered by the Lack of a National Communication Strategy. (Washington, DC: 2005), 31.12Although President Roosevelt made the policy known to the public, President Hoover coined the expression and put the policy into practice by pulling back troops from Nicaragua and planning the withdrawal from Haiti.A-1 18. Azevedo13President Roosevelt's Inaugural Address Character above all. Presidential links. [12 April 2005]14Some movies available online on 15 Communiqu of the 3 + 1 Group on Tri-Border Area Security Counter-terrorism Office releases, Department of State. 6 December 2004 [24 April 2005] A-2 19. AzevedoAppendix BBibliographyPike, Fredrick B.. FDR's Good Neighbor Policy: Sixty Years of Generally Gentle Chaos. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1995.Skidmore, Thomas E.. Brazil: Five Centuries of Change. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.________ and Peter H. Smith. Modern Latin America. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001.Welles, Benjamin. Sumner Welles: FDR's Global Strategist: A Biography. New York: St.Martin's Press, 1997.Whitehead, Laurence. Democratization: Theory and Experience (Oxford Studies in Democratization) New York: Oxford University Press, 2002.B-1