G&O Comparative Political Communications

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NORRIS:COMPARATIVEPOLITICALCOMMUNICATIONS 1/30/20095:01PM

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Comparativepoliticalcommunications:CommonframeworksorBabelianconfusion?

PippaNorris(HarvardUniversity)

ReviewArticleforGovernmentandOppositionJudith.Squires@bristol.ac.uk1/30/20095:01PM

Draft1[7411words]

Daniel C. Hallin and Paolo Mancini, Comparing media systems: three models of media andpolitics.

Communication, society, and politics. 2004, Cambridge,UK;New York: CambridgeUniversity

Press,342pp.

JesperStrmbckandLyndaLeeKaid,Eds.Thehandbookofelectionnewscoveragearoundtheworld.

ICAhandbookseries.2008,NewYork:Routledge,450pp.

Katrin Voltmer, Ed. Mass Media and Political Communication in New Democracies. 2006, London:

Routledge.262pp.ISBN0415459710.

RichardGunther and AnthonyMughan. Eds. Democracy and the Media:A Comparative Perspective.

2000.Cambridge,UK;NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress.496pp. ISBN0521888437.

Frank Esser and Barbara Pfetsch. Eds. Comparing Political Communication: Theories, Cases, and

Challenges. 2004. Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press. 418pp ISBN

0521535409.

In 1975, a review of the literature on comparative political communications by Blumler and

Gurevitch could only identify a few crossnational studies, concluding that the subfield was in its

infancy,lackingasharedconsensusaboutthecoretheoreticalfocus,aswellasanaccumulatedbodyof

empiricalstudies.[1] Twodecadeslater,theyobservedthatworkcontinuetoremainpatchy,although

the study was progressing to late adolescence.[2] Since then, the comparative literature has

undoubtedlygrown substantially,asexemplifiedby thebooksunder review,especially crossnational

studiesofthestructure,contents,andeffectsofthemassmediawithinEuropeanUnionmemberstates.

Despite these encouraging signs, many edited volumes published on comparative political

communications continue to follow the older Grand Tour travelogue tradition (if its chapter 4, its

Belgium)

by

presenting

separate

national

case

studies,

loosely

integrated

around

some

common

organizationalsubheadings [3].Bycontrast toequivalentsubfields incomparativepoliticalscience

and more than three decades after Blumler and Gurevitchs original plea arguably comparative

politicalcommunicationshasstillnotyetfloweredfullyintomatureadulthood.

Why?Whatarethemajorbarriers?Andwhatarethemostpromisingavenuesfordevelopment

forthecomparativestudyofpoliticalcommunications? Thecontemporarystateofthesubfieldcanbe

illustratedbydeconstructingaseriesofrecentvolumes,includingHallinandMancinisproposedrevised


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typologyofmediasystems [4],aswellaseditedcollections includingJesperStrombackandLyndaLee

Kaidsexaminationofelectionnewscoverageworldwide[5],GuntherandMughanandKatrinVoltmers

studiesofpoliticalcommunications inyoungerandolderdemocracies,andEsserandPfetschsgeneral

reflectionsonthestateofthesubfield.

Thebrief

review

of

these

volumes

suggests

that,

in

contrast

to

progress

in

some

other

fields

of

comparativepolitics, the subfieldofcomparativepolitical communicationshasnotyetdevelopedan

extensivebodyof literatureestablishinga rangeof theoretically sophisticated analytical frameworks,

buttressedbyrigorouslytestedscientificgeneralizations,commonconcepts,standardized instruments,

and shared archival datasets,with the capacity to identify common regularitieswhich prove robust

acrosswidelyvariedcontexts.Thebulkofallpoliticalcommunicationsresearchisconductedwithinthe

contextoftheUnitedStates,anationcharacterizedbyanatypicalmediaandpoliticalsystem inmany

important regards. As a result, the common linga media which does emerge from the American

literatureoftenaddstothegeneralconceptualfog,ascolleaguesdiligentlyhuntforpoorlydefinedfuzzy

phenomena such as personalization, professionalization, gameframes, or media logics, the key

questionbeing

understood

as

whether

political

communications

in

country

Xis

or

is

not

becoming

more

like the United States (for good or ill), rather than generating more fruitful insights, imaginative

hypotheses,and interestingobservations forcomparisonacrossawide rangeofstates,regimes,eras,

andcontexts.Theunfortunateresultofthis legacy isthat itstillremainsdifficult, ifnot impossible,to

compare political communications systematically across national borders. Despite some genuine

advances in the research literature, such as those reviewed in the Esser and Pfetsch volume,many

scholarsremainstrandedinBabel,withouttheoreticalmaporconceptualcompass.

Tosupportthesearguments,toavoidredherrings,andtoclearawaytheunderbrush,letusfirst

clarifythemeaningofthecomparativestudypoliticalcommunicationsandthenreviewthestateofthe

art

concerning

attempts

to

classify

media

systems,

before

finally

extracting

what

we

know

about

contemporarypoliticalcommunicationsfromthesevolumes.

Thecomparativestudyofpoliticalcommunications

In many subfields, comparative politics has been advancing by leaps and bounds in recent

years,asillustratedbythecontemporarystateoftheartintheOxfordHandbookofComparativePolitics

[6]. During earlier decades, studies commonly drew upon a deep knowledge of specific languages,

historiesandcontextsto illuminateparticularcountriesorregions.Thisoldertraditionpersistsbutthe

lastdecadehasalsowitnesseda torrential floodof largeNcrossnationaldatasets,especiallymacro

levelindicatorsofthequalityofdemocraticgovernance.[7]Crossnationalsurveysofpublicopinionare

nowwidely

available,

expanding

their

coverage

to

many

developing

societies.[8]

Methodological

advances include recognition of the value of mixed research designs. These combine the external

validity, rigor,andgeneralizabilityderived from largeNquantitativecomparisonswith thevirtuousof

specific qualitative case studies, describing the local processes underlying the broader patterns. [9]

Fuzzy logichelpsdevelop innovative typologies. [10] Innovativequasiexperimentaldesigns,especially

controlledstudiesofspecificpolicyreforminterventions,generatecompellingresults.Theglobalization

of political science strengthens professional intellectual networks across national borders, especially


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within Europe. More open societies, linked with processes of democratization and development,

facilitate the diffusion of political science worldwide. Funding councils prioritize crossnational

collaboration. Educational mobility for graduate students within Europe encourages growing

internationalizationof theprofession. In the subfieldofcommunications,globalizationhas stimulated

literatures examining the phenomenon of transnational broadcasting, cultural economics[11], and

globalmedia.[12]

For

all

these

reasons,

and

many

more,

during

the

last

decade

contemporary

theorizing

aboutmanycentralphenomenaincomparativepoliticsmovedclosertowardsachievingtheelusivegoal

ofdevelopingfromthestudyofnationstothestudyoftypes[13,14]. Atthesametime,theimpactof

these changes has been uneven across the discipline. Certain subfields such as the study of

democratization,political institutions,politicaleconomy, international relations, andpolitical culture,

have been transformed by these developments farmore than others and arguably the comparative

studyofpoliticalcommunicationscontinuestolagbehind.

Whatcountsasfallingwithintherealmof comparativepoliticalcommunications?Andwhy is

comparativework important? In thebroadest sense, allnormative and empirical analysisofpolitical

communicationsis

comparative,

ifthis

is

understood

to

mean

contrasting

different

units,

whether

types

ofmediachannels (TVversus the Internet),programgenres (newsorsoaps), ideal types (the rolesof

journalists as watchdogs or advocates), audiences (young versus old), media effects (framing and

agendasetting), or timeperiods (the golden age of network TV versus the cable era). In this

platitudinous sense, all analysis in the social sciences needs comparison of observations falling into

categoriestomakeanysenseoftheworld.

The heart of the comparative study of political communications, however, is conventionally

understoodtofocusmorenarrowlyuponcontrastingspatialunits,usuallycomparingnationstatesbut

also, alternatively, local communities, media markets, or global regions, such as Europe or Latin

America.

American

scholars

commonly

take

it

for

granted

that

all

work

on

foreign

countries

is,

somehow,automaticallycomparative(see,forexample,theclassificationofbookreviewsintheAPSR).

Notso;liketwohandsclapping,therehastobemorethanonespatialunittocompare.

Moreover,intheirchapterintheEsserandPfestchvolume, GurevitchandBlumlersuggestthat

afurtheressentialdistinctionneedstobedrawnbetweencrossnationalstudieswhichuseotherplaces

asa convenientwayof testingpropositions thatwouldotherwisehavebeenexaminedathome (for

example,dopatternsofinternetuseinAmericahold,say,inSwedenorGermany),andmoreambitious

comparative research,which seek to understand how varying contexts (such as those generated by

different types of state regimes and political institutions, cultural regions, levels ofdevelopment, or

mediasystems)shapeprocessesofpoliticalcommunications.Throughsystematiccomparison,scientific

researchaboutpoliticalcommunicationsseekstomakedescriptiveorexplanatoryinferencesbasedon

empirical observations about the known facts, using transparent and public procedures, under

conditionsofuncertainty, toexplain factswedonotknow. Todo this,comparative frameworkscan

either adoptwhat John StuartMill identified as the logic of the most similar strategy (appleswith

apples), seeking to analyze the mass media while controlling for certain shared cultural, social or

regime characteristics,oralternatively the mostdifferent strategy (appleswithoranges), seeking to

maximize contextual variations when identifying regularities in the phenomenon under


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examination.[15]Comparativeresearchdesignscanalsochoosetofocus indepthuponafewselected

casestudies, ideally illustrating broader theoretical frameworks and conceptual typologies.

Alternatively, they candraw contrastswithina limitednumberofunits (suchasacrossE.U.member

states).OrelsetheycanadoptlargeNcomparisonsseekingregularitiesoverspaceandtimearoundthe

world.Oftenconvenience frameworksarecommonlyused, suchascomparing thecountries included

withinspecific

cross

national

survey

datasets,

or

the

network

of

colleagues

participating

in

aspecific

researchproject,withoutagreatdealofthoughtabouttheconsequencesofsuchdecisionsforscientific

inference. Not surprisingly, this practice often causes considerable confusion, since the ability to

generalizemorebroadlyfromanyresearchdependsuponthewaythatthegeographicunitsselectedfor

comparisonreflectalargeruniverse,justassurveyresearchdependsupontherigorofselectingsurvey

respondentsdrawn from a random sampleof thepopulation.Casestudieswith a limitednumberof

cases, suchascontrastsdrawnbetweenjournalism ina fewcountries,areparticularlyproblematic in

this regard, if the findings are interpreted as representing the largeruniverseof, say,postindustrial

societies. Given this understanding, the heart of the challenge facing comparative political

communications, it is argued, lies in resolving complex conceptual, data andmethodological issues,

whichcontinue

to

hinder

theoretical

and

empirical

progress.

Ifwecanovercomethese,theadvantagesofcomparativeresearchdesignsaremany,asEsser

andPfetschemphasize intheiroverview. [16]First,thisprocessexpandsthecontextualenvironments

forobservations,allowingbroadergeneralizationstobeestablishedinthesocialsciences.Thisreduces

nationalidiosyncrasiesinthesearchforbroaderregularitiesoverplaceandtime.Throughthisprocess,

theories couched in universal terms, based on observations derived from one or two cases, can be

shown to reflectexceptionaloutliers.Thisprocess revealsparochialismandhighlights theunderlying

causalfactorstakenforgrantedwithinanyparticularenvironment.Individuallevelsocialpsychological

behavioralstudies,inparticular,commonlyassumethatcertaingeneralrelationshipsexist,forexample

concerningthe

impact

of

negative

news

on

voter

turnout,

or

agenda

setting

effects

on

policy

priorities,

wheninfacttheseindividuallevelresultsmaybeheavilyconditionedbythespecificsocial,cultural,and

institutional context. Crossnational research is also potentially valuable for public policymaking, by

highlighting alternative interventions, strategies, and reforms which can inform the policymaking

process, adapting best practices to local needs. The discussion about the comparative method by

contributors intheEsserandPfetchvolume,notablychaptersbyKleinsteuber,andbyWirthandKolb,

usefullysummarizestheseissuesandalsoreviewstheprosandconsofalternativeresearchdesignsand

methodsusedinthecomparativestudyofpoliticalcommunications.

Classifyingmediasystems

Oneoftheperennial issues inthecomparativestudyofpoliticalcommunicationshasbeenthe

attempt to establish suitable theoretical models, conceptual tools, and classificatory frameworks.

Indeedoneof themost important limitson thesubfieldhasbeen the lackofaconsensusabout the

core theoretical concepts and standardized operational measures. These are the essential building

blocks and analytical tools for research, which help to reduce the cacophonous Babel. Ever since

Aristotle, analytical typologieshave always been a vital part of comparativepolitics.Other subfields

established standard conceptual classifications which are widely used as the common basis for


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comparison,exemplifiedbyGiovanniSartoriscategorizationofpartysystems,[17]MauriceDuvergers

classification of plurality and proportional representation electoral systems,[18] (subsequently

developedbyDouglasRae andothers) [19], andArend Lijphartsdistinctionbetweenmajoritarianor

consensus democracies.[20] Each of these paradigmatic frameworks has been amended and refined

numerous timesover theyears, identifying subcategoriesanddevelopingmoreeffectiveoperational

measures,with

the

original

ideas

providing

the

foundation

for

subsequent

intellectual

development.

A

broad consensushasdevelopedover theyears,allowing common standardizedmeasures tobeused

across diverse studies. By contrast, the conceptual and typological models used in political

communicationshaveusuallybeenheavilynormative,difficulttooperationalizeandmeasure,andwith

restrictedapplicabilityforworldwidecomparisons.

Butwhatshouldbeincludedasaneffectivetypologyofmediasystems?Onedifficultywhichis

immediatelyencountered is todefinewhatunitsshouldbecompared,since themassmedia includes

multiple outlets broadsheet and tabloid daily local and national newspapers, books and printed

periodicals, radioand televisionbroadcasts,aswellas thecomplexandevergrowing rangeofnewer

informationand

communication

technologies

which

are

merging

delivery

platforms.

Even

the

simple

conceptofmasscommunications,whichusedtobeexemplifiedbyterrestrialbroadcasts,hasdissolved

morerecentlywiththeexpansionof interpersonalandgrouptogroupnetworks(are blogsaformof

masscommunications ifnoonereadsthem?)Theconceptofa systemsuggestsjoinedup interaction

amongdisparateparts(thehipboneconnectedtothethighboneetc.),sothatitbecomesconfusingifa

media system isdefinedbyvirtueof its separate components, suchas theexistenceofpublic sector

broadcasting or strong links between parties and newspapers,whichmay, in fact, be unconnected.

Moreover there may be one system identified for national newspaper markets and another for

national television broadcasting, so how can we define a media system across such disparate

phenomena? Indeed many standard attempts to do so, by bringing in concepts such as party

parallelism,in

fact

try

to

define

asystem

of

political

communications,

which

is

avery

different

animal.

Misleading conceptual classifications canprovide culturally stereotypicalblinkerswhichhinder rather

than help, by obscuring the real commonalities and contrasts in the cases under study (apples are

misclassifiedasoranges).

TheoriginsofcomparativeworkonmediasystemscanbetracedtotheseminalFourTheoriesof

the Press published in 1956 by Siebert, Peterson and Schramm [21]. An early attempt to develop

conceptualmodelsdescribinghowmedia systems functionedworldwide, the frameworkwasheavily

influencedby theColdWarera.The study theorized thatmedia systems areembeddedwithin their

broader social and political context, although in practice they focusedmainly upon the relationship

betweenthe

state

and

the

mass

media,

and

on

this

basis

they

identified

several

distinct

normative

ideal

typesforhowthepressshouldfunction. Thekeycontrastwasdrawnbetweentheauthoritarianmodel

(including the SovietCommunist variant),where thepresswas regarded as subservient to the state,

versus the libertarian (and the subcategory of the social responsibility model), where the media

functionedindependentlyasaclassicFourthEstate,freeofgovernmentcontrol.Thedegreeoffreedom

ofexpressionisacriticalaspectofmediaindependence,withthelibertarianmodelseenasexemplified

bythefreemarketofideasamongrivalcommercialnewspapersandbroadcastersintheUnitedStates,


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with public service broadcasting reflecting the social responsibilitymodel, in stark contrast to state

ownedandrunSovietmedia.Giventheabsenceofrivalframeworks,theseconceptualmodelsproved

highly influential,even though the ideas cameunder sustainedattackover the years.The fallof the

BerlinWalldroveanothernail inthecoffinofthe Sovietmodel.[22]Theabsenceoftheorizingabout

therangeofmediasystemsfoundinthedevelopingworldbecameincreasinglyapparent.[23]Moreover

thesimple

bright

distinction

between

commercial

versus

state

broadcasters

became

increasingly

fuzzy

withthegrowingcommercializationofEuropeanpublicbroadcasting,and indeedtheexpansionofPBS

and NPR in the United States, and many scholars cast doubt on the utility of the pure social

responsibilityandlibertarianmodels.

In the light of the critiques, there have beenmany attempts over the years tomodify and

improvetheoriginalSiebert,PetersonandSchrammframework,suchasthatproposedbyBlumlerand

Gurevitch.[2]Oneofthemostambitiousattempts,attractingwidespreadattention,hasbeendeveloped

morerecentlybyHallinandMancini.[4]Theauthorsrestrictthefocustoclassifyingmediasystems in

18nationswithinNorthAmericaandWesternEurope,emphasizing that this facilitatescomparisonof

likewith

like,

covering

many

established

democracies

and

post

industrial

economies,

without

claiming

thatsimilar idealtypescannecessarilybe identifiedelsewhere.HallinandMancinisuggestthatmedia

systems in thecountriesundercomparisoncanbeclassifiedbasedon fourmajordimensions: (1) the

degreeofstateinterventioninthemediasystem,especiallyviapublicservicebroadcasting,aswellasby

legal regulationand subsidies; (2) theextentofpoliticalparallelism, referring tohow farnewsmedia

outletsarepartisanormoreneutral,andhowfarmediasystemsreflectpartysystems;(3)thehistorical

development of media markets, especially the legacy of this process for contemporary newspaper

circulation rates; (4) theextentofjournalisticprofessionalism. Theauthorsbelieve that thesecriteria

cluster together, at least loosely, into distinct types, suggesting a threefold classification of media

systems.TheyidentifyaLiberalmodel,whichtheysuggestprevailsinAngloAmericancountries(Britain,

theUS,

Canada

and

Ireland),

characterized

by

commercial

media

and

market

mechanisms.

By

contrast,

the Democratic Corporatistmodel,which is thought to prevail across the consensus democracies in

northern Europe (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and

Switzerland),emphasizesthelinksbetweencommercialmediaandorganizedsocialandpoliticalgroups,

withinthecontextofanactivebutlimitedroleofthestate.Lastly,thePolarizedPluralistmodel,which

theysuggesttypifiesMediterraneanEurope(France,Greece,Italy,PortugalandSpain),integratesmedia

intopartypolitics,withaweakercommercialmediaandastrongerroleforthestate. Theremainderof

thebookdescribeseachofthesemodels inmoredepth, toseehow fartheconcepts fittheeighteen

casesundercomparison.HallinandManciniconcludethat,althoughtheLiberalmodelhasdominated

mediastudies,thePolarizedPluralistmodelprobablyprovidesamoreaccuratedescriptionofjournalism

inmany

parts

of

the

world.

Thebookusefullyprovides an ambitious attempt to reformulate and classifymedia systems.

Likerecentworkseekingtoidentifyvarietiesofcapitalism,HallinandManciniattempttoreformulate

thedistinctions inmediasystemsamongtheuniverseofWesterndemocracies.Thetypologyhasbeen

usedbyotherscholarsbothtounderstandcontrastswithinthecountriesincludedintheoriginalstudy,

justasinjournalisticculturesandelectioncoverage,aswellastoconsideritsutilitywhenanalyzingthe


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media inother regionsand typesof regime, suchas inRussiaandChina.Nevertheless theHallinand

Manciniframeworksuffersfromseveralmajorshortcomingswhichneedtobeaddressedbeforewecan

concludethatthisprovidesanappropriateconceptualtypologyforthesubfield.

First,andperhapsmost importantly, it isnotapparentwhetherthe fourdimensions identified

byHallin

and

Mancini

are

indeed

the

critical

ones

which

define

the

major

contrasts

today

among

contemporary media systems (oreven,moreaccurately,political communication systems).Thereare

twopotentialdangerstoanyclassificatoryschema,whichhavetosteersuccessfullybetweentheSyllaof

minimalismand theCharybdisofmaximalistconcepts.Minimalistor thinnernotions focusattention

uponjustafewelementsofpoliticalcommunicationsbuttheymaytherebyexcludecertainpotentially

importantaspectof thephenomenonunder study.By focusinguponanarrow rangeofbenchmarks,

minimalist approaches reduce the risksof including theoretically irrelevant attributes and redundant

elementsintocompositemeasures.Theyaremoreelegantandparsimonious.Bycontrast,maximalistor

thickernotionsprovide a richer andmore comprehensivedefinitionof thephenomenon,providing

greatermeasurementvalidity,butat thesame timecertainaspectsmaybedifficult tooperationalize

withany

degree

of

consistency.

This

makes

it

more

difficult

to

replicate

studies,

an

essential

test

of

the

robustness of any results. Unfortunately, the Hallin and Mancini framework appears to suffer

simultaneouslyfrombothproblems.

Forexample, certainessentialdimensionsof anymedia systems aremissing.The framework

emphasizestheimportanceofthehistoricaldevelopmentofmasscirculationnewspapers,asoneofthe

fourdimensionsusedforclassification.Thisclearlyhasan impactuponthecontemporarystructureof

thenewsindustryevidentindifferentnations,andthustherelianceupontheprintorbroadcastmedia

fornews,justas the roleofpublicbroadcastingcorporationsestablishedduring theprewaryearsof

radiobroadcasting continues to shapemodern television.Nevertheless if the larger theoreticalpoint

concerns

national

variations

in

access

to

different

types

of

mass

communications,

then

the

major

lacunae in the discussion, indeed the 800 pound gorilla in the room, concerns the role of new

information and telecommunication technologies, which are not featured anywhere as part of the

classification.Itiswellestablishedthattherearemajorcontrasts,evenwithinpostindustrialsocieties,

inthespreadanduseofallsortsofelectronictechnologies,fromthegeneraluseofcomputersandthe

Internettothediffusionofmobile (cell)phones,textmessaging,onlinesocialnetworks,blogging,and

TVteletext.ThereareimportantcontrastsincontemporaryInternetaccessevenamongcloselyrelated

countries, forexample,Eurostatestimates that in2008more thaneightoutof tenhouseholdshave

InternetaccessinSwedenandtheNetherlands,comparedwithjustfouroutofteninItalyandonethird

in Greece. [24] The contrasts worldwide are, of course, even broader. Surprisingly none of these

differencesfeature

in

any

of

the

classifications

proposed

by

Hallin

and

Mancini;

indeed

throughout

the

book, it isdifficulttofindevenapassingmentionofanyofthese importantformsof informationand

communication.Itappearsasthoughjournalismandthemediasystemsarefrozeninthemidtwentieth

century. It could perhaps be suggested that the diffusion of new information and communication

technologiesoften reflectsotherdivisions inmedia systems,but this argument at least needs tobe

articulatedfortheexclusiontobejustified.


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Other importantdimensionsofmedia systems are alsoomitted from theHallin andMancini

classification. For example, although the role of the state ownership and subsidies of themedia is

regardedasimportant,there islittleexplicitacknowledgmentofthe importanceofpressfreedomand

minimalcomparisonof the legal frameworkguaranteeing freedomofexpression.Nowperhaps this is

notregardedascentraltoanystudyclassifyingmediasystemswithinestablishedWesterndemocracies

butas

soon

as

the

research

travels

further,

even

among

the

twenty

five

member

states

of

the

European

Union,thisimmediatelybecomesacriticaldimensionforcomparingmediasystems.Moreoveritseems

perverse toexclude the inclusionofpress freedom inanyclassificationofmediasystems,sincemany

institutionshavedeveloped a rangeof crossnational indicators, such as thoseprovidedby Freedom

House,IREX,ReporterswithoutBorders,andCIRI. Issuessuchaspoliticalparallelismmayindeedprove

moreimportantthanpressfreedomforclassifyingmediasystems,butagainthisargumentwouldneed

sustainingratherthanbeingassumedbydefault.

Moreover there are also problems about operationalizing the components of the proposed

schema,andthusgeneratingscientificallyreplicablestandardsandmeasures.Theevidencepresented

byHallin

and

Mancini

remains

descriptive,

drawing

upon

their

reading

of

selective

historical

examples,

limiting how far their classification can be replicated by other scholars. There are also many

impressionisticreasonstoquestiontheproposedcategorizationsandanypotentialmisclassificationsof

specificcasessowdoubtaboutthevalueoftheoverallschema.ForanyonefamiliarwiththeUKmedia,

for example, onmany key aspects it seems utterly dissimilar to themedia in theUnited States. As

ScammellandSemetkonote,It(Britain)shareswiththeU.S.acommitmenttofreemarkets,freedom

ofspeech,andselfregulationastheguidingprinciplesfornewspapers.ItshareswithnorthernEuropea

history of highly partisan newspapers and regulated television markets, dominated by wellfunded

public service broadcasters.[5] Since the 1950s, Britain has had a dual system of broadcasting,

dominated by standards and ethos established by the British Broadcasting Corporation, with the

commercialsector

heavily

regulated

to

maintain

high

standards

of

public

broadcasting.

American

television, aside from minority and underfunded PBS and the anorak channels, CSpan, is

predominatelycommercial.ElectionnewsTVandradiobroadcasts inBritaindisplay internaldiversity,

with stopwatchbalance regulated andmonitored acrossparty coverage. Electionnews coverageon

American TV channels such as Fox News and talk radio disregards all these principles. American

presidentialelectionsonTVareheavilyaddriven.InBritain,nopartiescanbuyanyTVadvertizingand

thefreepartypoliticalbroadcastsareanopportunityformostvoterstoslipoutandputonthekettle.

MostAmericannewspapersaremainlyregionalandmetropolitan,asbefitsafederalstate.MostBritish

newspapersarenational,asbefitsaunitarystate.TheoverwhelmingmajorityofAmericannewspapers

arerespectablequalitybroadsheets,apartfromahandfulofsupermarkettabs.Thelargestcirculation

papersin

the

UK,

such

as

The

Sun,

are

popular

down

market

tabloids.

American

regional

newspapers

follow the traditionofbalancedop eds,observingprinciplesof internalpluralism, in the attempt to

reflect abroad bipartisanship. Britishnewspapers havebecome less overtlypartisanover the years,

neverthelessanyonepickingupleadingpaperssuchasTheGuardianortheDailyTelegraphcanusually

identifyquiteeasilywhichpartytheysupport,evenoutsideofelectioncampaigns.TheBritishpress(but

nottelevision)hasexternalpluralism;theideathatthepress isneutralorinformationorientedcannot

be seriously sustained. American reporters and broadcasters are often professionally trained with


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journalism degrees and media studies, in longstanding university departments reflecting these

disciplines. In Britain, until relatively recently, journalism was an apprenticeship with onthejob

vocationaltraining,andeventodaytherearerelativelyfewjournalismormediastudiesdepartmentsin

theleadinguniversities.Inshort,mediasystemsinBritainandtheUnitedStatesseem,atfirstglance,to

have almost nothing in common.And if the logic is faulty in these particular cases, then this raises

doubtsabout

other

classifications,

for

example

whether

there

are

really

closer

similarities

between

GermanyandNorway,orbetweenGermanyandFrance.Withoutanyrigorousprocess fortestingthe

classification independently,when by establishing certain standardized indicators or a set of explicit

decision rules, the categorization proposed byHallin andMancini remains fuzzy, impressionistic and

unscientific.

This leads naturally to the third point: the authors provide a general overview, rather than

attemptingtooperationalizeeachofthefourdimensionswithempiricalindicators.Yetitisimportantto

measurethecoreconceptsifwearetotestrigorouslyhowfarthedifferentdimensionsactuallycluster

togetherinmeaningfulwaysandifwearetoexaminethesystematicconsequencesarisingfromany

differencesin

media

systems,

which

should

be

the

major

point

of

the

classificatory

exercise.

Many

other

attempts at comparing mass communications have also focused upon categorical approaches,

suggestingthatmediasystemscanbeclassifiedintodistincttypesoncetheycrossaspecificthreshold.

But itseemspreferabletoconsiderutilizingcontinuous indicators,suchasthoseconcerningaccessto

differentformsofmasscommunications,measuresoflevelsofpressfreedom,orclassificationsofstate

ownership,implyingsubtlegradations inlevelsofmasscommunications.Foreitherapproach,weneed

to consider the major sources of random and nonrandom measurement error arising from these

decisions that could potentially bias estimatesof effects and generatemisleading comparisons. Two

criteria validity and reliability are particularly important for evaluating the construction of any

empirical indicators in the social sciences. Valid empiricalmeasures accurately reflect the analytical

conceptsto

which

they

relate.

Reliable

empirical

measures

prove

consistent

across

time

and

place,

using

data sourceswhichcanbeeasily replicated toallow scholars tobuildacumulativebodyof research.

Scientificresearchmakesitsprocedurespublicandtransparent,includingthestepsinvolvedinselecting

cases,gatheringdataandperforminganalysis.

ItremainsunclearwhethertheconceptsproposedbyHallinandMancinicanbeclearlyrelated

tobroadertheoreticalconcerns inmasscommunications,aswellasoperationalizablewhenappliedto

research. Potentially some of the four dimensions can be measured, at least imperfectly, through

various indicators,butnotall.Thedegreeofstate intervention inbroadcastinghasbeenof increasing

interesttoeconomists, inaccountsabouthowmediacompetitionrelatestogovernmenttransparency

andcorruption.

The

degree

of

state

intervention

in

major

media

firms

has

been

gauged

for

97

nations

worldwide by Simeon Djankov and colleagues, monitoring the number or state and commercial

television channelsand theiraudience share,aswellas thenumberof stateownednewspapersand

theirshareof readership [25].Timeseriesdata fornewspapercirculation ratesandnewspaper titles,

includingforthemajortabloidsandbroadsheetpress,arealsoeasilyavailablefromUNESCOforallthe

countriesundercomparison,althoughtheseriesremainssomewhatdatedandUNESCOisintheprocess

of establishing new datasets and collecting more comprehensive standardized cultural indicators.


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ThereforetwooftheHallinandMancinibuildingblockscanbemeasuredfromtheexistingdatasets.By

contrast, it remain unclear howwe can operationize political parallelism, in terms of how far the

partisanshipofthemassmediareflectthepartysystem.Thisrequiressystematiccontentanalysisdata

which could classify thepartisanbias in themedia, amassiveundertaking,not leastbecausemedia

partisanship varies even within particular countries by type of media outlet (local and national

newspapers,radio,

television,

and

websites),

by

different

newspaper

sections

(editorial,

front

page),

andamongnewsandcurrentaffairschannelsandprograms(suchasFox,CNN,PBSandCSPAN),aswell

asover time. Since partisanship is alsooften in the eye of thebeholder, any crossnational content

analysisofarepresentativesampleofmediaoutlets isalsoopentoproblemsof interpretation.Expert

surveyswouldbeanotherwaytotrytocollectdata,similartoexpertscalesofpartysystems,although

thediversityofmediaoutletsmakesthismorechallenging.Theavailablecontentanalysisdatasetsalso

have problems ofmethodological standardization, transparency and replicability, so that each study

commonly reinvents thewheel.We lackacommonarchive forcontentanalysisdatasets,suchas the

standardized resources available for the analysis of social surveys.As Kaid and Stromback conclude,

after seeking to compare patterns such as the degree of negativity or personalization in campaign

coverage:There

do

not

seem

to

be

any

standardized

instruments

and

coding

instructions.

The

unfortunateendresultisthatitisoftendifficulttocomparetheelectionnewscoverageacrossborders,

and although the terminology used is often similar, the extent to which the empirical results are

comparable is often uncertain.[5] Moreover, the extent of journalistic professionalism is also

challenging to monitor with any degree of reliability, although surveys of news professionals are

graduallyexpandinggloballytofillthegaphere.Someappropriateproxyaggregateindicatorscouldalso

be collected, for example by examining the existence of journalism training departments and

accreditationprocessesused indifferentcountries.Ratherthantryingtofitdisparatephenomena into

broadercategories,wherethereareseriousdangersoferrorsintroducedbymisidentifyingcases,itmay

bepreferabletoutilizecontinuousmeasureswhichgaugescalesfordifferenttypesofmediaindicators,

whetherconcerningaccessanduse,pressfreedom,mediaownership,orrelatedindices.

Comparingelectionnewsinyoungerandolderdemocracies

Turning to theothereditedvolumesunder review, these illustrate thecontemporarystateof

theart.ThecollectionassembledbyStrmbckandKaid focusesonhow the structure,contentsand

effectsofelectionnews coveragevaryacross twentytwocountries.This isan important topicwhich

illustratesboththestrengthsandweaknessesofthesubfield.Ifthere isanyareawhereweshouldbe

able todevelop some strongand robustcrossnational findings, then this is it.Electionnewsattracts

considerable attention in political communications, as illustrated by the wide range of literature

summarizedin

this

volume,

whether

concerning

the

regulatory

legal

framework

and

structure

of

the

massmedia,thecontentsofelectionnewscoverage,andtheeffectsonthepublic.Thereisagreatdeal

ofusefuldescriptiveinformationaboutthesematterscontainedinthebookand,moreover,theeditors

aretobeapplaudedfor includingmiddleincomedevelopingcountries,suchasSouthAfricaand India,

as well as the usual suspects. The contributors are all internationally wellknown researchers, with

expertiseoneachnation.Unfortunately thecollection remains largely stuck in theolder comparative

tradition; separate chapters present a countrybycountry Grand Tour of election news, rather than


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providingasyntheticsynthesisorganizedbytopic(suchascomparisonsoftheroleofopinionpolls,the

partisanshipofthepress,thelegalregulationoftelevisioncampaignbroadcasts,theimpactofelection

newsonvotingchoice,andsoon).Asaresult,althoughthevolumepresentsastimulatingtravelogue,

where you can visit and learn a lot about each country, the net result for comparative political

communications isunfortunately less thanthesumof itsparts.Thereaderneedstoputtogetherany

generallessons

derived

from

the

cases.

In part this is because the loose theoretical and organizational framework proposed by the

editors in the introduction remains too underdeveloped to generate interesting generalizations,

imaginativepropositions,andpotentiallyunexpectedfindings intheconclusions.Toooftentheresults

areof the itdependsvariety. For instance, the editors suggest that the typeofelectoralandparty

system in each country might provide some potentiallytestable contrasts in election news media

coverage, suchas in thedegreeofpartisanbias in themedia,but they then suggestsomanyunder

theorizedlinkagesbetweentheelectoralsystemandthemediasystemthatbythislogicalmostanything

couldbeexplainedorexplainedaway. Doesamajoritarianelectoralsystemencourageamorepartisan

press

or

aless

partisan

one?

Does

amultiparty

system

facilitate

less

negative

news

(because

of

the

need forparties towork together in coalitiongovernmentsafterpollingday)ormorenegativenews

(becauseofthedegreeofideologicalfragmentationacrossthepoliticalspectrum)?Withoutdeveloping

astrongerandmorerigoroussetoftheoreticalpropositions linkingthetypeofpolitical institutionsto

electionnews, itbecomesdifficultforcontributorstotestcommonpropositionsandfortheeditorsto

drawtogetheranysystematic lessonsfromtheseparatechapters. Intheconclusion,theeditorsmake

an attempt to identify some common threads emerging from the chapters, but too often the

generalizations are either at a level which is platitudinous and selfevident (Media matters), or a

productofthespecificresearchdesignandcomparativeframeworkused inthevolume,orelsesimply

of the weak it depends variety. Hence, for example, the editors conclude that Mediated

communicationclearly

dominates

the

channels

of

information

and

persuasion

in

these

countries

(p.421)but indeedthestudyneversoughtto lookat lowincomedevelopingcountrieswherethismay

notbethecase,nor indeed tocomparetheroleofthemassmediawiththe impactof interpersonal

communications, such as local party and candidate canvassing, community rallies, retail politics by

passing thenewsmedia,andmodern formsofsocialnetworkingonline.Withoutadirectcomparison

between mediated and interpersonal forms of communications, we cannot make any claims about

which is most important for voting choice, campaign knowledge, partisan loyalties, political

mobilization,andsoon.Themostubiquitouschannelsofcommunicationsarenotnecessarilythemost

influential ones. We also learn from the conclusion that in almost every case under comparison,

television isthedominantchannelforcommunication,butagain isderivedfromfocusingcomparison

uponindustrial

and

post

industrial

economies,

and

the

more

interesting

question

is

the

relative

importanceofdifferentmediachannelsupondifferent typesofattitudesandbehaviors,bothamong

elitesand citizens.Manyof theothergeneralconclusions in thevolume, forexampleconcerning the

degreeofmediabiasincampaigncoverageoranyagendasettingeffectsonpolicyissues,restsheavily

upon evidence and secondary literature derived from theU.S. case, not from broader patterns and

contexts.


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Even the commonplace claim in the conclusion that election campaigns have become

increasingly mediatized, or whether a process of mediazation of politics has occurred in post

industrial societies,meaning that themassmediahavebecome increasinglyprominent actors in the

politicalprocess,isnotselfevident.Totesttheevidenceforthisthesissystematicallywewouldneedto

gatherevidence for theactivityofall themajoractors in thisprocess, suchas thedirect channelsof

partyvoter

communications

through

traditional

forms

of

local

campaigning,

as

well

as

through

the

innovative linkages provided via new ICTs. Rather than a steady development involving progressive

mediazationofelectioncampaigns,asproposedbytheeditors, insteadtherecouldbedistinctstages

oftraditional,modern,andpostmoderncampaigns.Understoodinthislight,somecontemporaryshifts

in postmodern campaigns reemphasize traditional facetoface interpersonal communications, as

exemplified by some of the contemporary techniques used to link together activists by theObama

campaign. Multiple actors are engaged in campaigns, and communication scholars ideally need to

integrateevidencederivedfromtheactivitiesofparties,candidates,andactivists,themassmedia,and

the electorate for a comprehensive understanding of this process. Indeed, mediacentric claims by

media scholarsareoften framed at such ahigh levelofabstraction that they are cannotbeused to

generateinteresting

and

testable

mid

level

propositions

which

could

be

confirmed

or

refuted

with

empirical evidencederived from varyingnational contexts, thereby extendingnew knowledge in the

comparativesubfield.

Lastly,theeditedvolumesbyGuntherandMughan,andbyKatrinVoltmer,presentstudiesof

politicalcommunicationsacrossarangeofyoungerandolderdemocracies.TheVoltmerbook,aproduct

ofanECPRworkshop,coverscasesdrawnfromacoupleofmediumincomedevelopingcountries(South

Africa and Taiwan), aswell as Latin America and Eastern Europe. The book is loosely organized by

arrangingchaptersinthematicsections,ratherthanaroundregionalculturalareas. Thevolumefocuses

uponcasestudiesoftheroleofthemassmediaintheprocessofdemocratization.Thecollectionagain

containsuseful

information

but

most

of

the

contributors

present

single

nation

studies,

including

almost

onethirdofthechaptersdevotedtoRussia,withsomelimitedcomparisonofLatinAmerica,andafour

nation comparison of newer democracies (Uruguay, Chile, Hungary and Bulgaria) by Voltmer and

SchmittBeck.Atightersetofresearchissues,andtheselectionofamorerepresentativesetofcasesof

youngerdemocracies fromallworldregions,wouldhaveboundthecasestogethermore logicallyand

allowed a more consistent comparative framework. The older volume by Gunther and Mughan

considerssimilar issuesofthechangingrelationshipbetweenthemassmediaanddemocracy,but it is

more systematic in the thematic framework set by the editors in the introduction and conclusion.

Chapterscontrastdevelopments inthisrelationship intencountries, includingolderdemocraciessuch

asTheNetherlands,BritainandGermany,aswellasnewerdemocraciessuchasHungaryandChile.But

theconclusion

suggests

that

the

search

for

cross

national

regularities

across

these

cases

more

often

revealsacomplexrealitywhichdefiessimpleanalysis.Themaintrendswhichemergeareagainthose

whichcanberegardedasconventional;televisionhasbecomethepredominantsourceofnationaland

internationalnewsacross thecasesundercomparison;politicianshavebecome increasinglyawareof

thepowerof television and sought toadapt itsuses to theirpurposes;but theeffectsof themedia

remain highly conditional upon institutional and cultural contexts, such as legal regulations,


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technological developments, and regime characteristics. In short, in some frustration the editors

cautiouslyconcludewithmediaeffectsthatitvaries.

Themainlessonfromthebriefreviewofsomeoftherecentworkinthesubfieldisthatthese

books do advance the subfield in certain important ways but we probably need substantial

improvementsin

research

designs

before

we

can

establish

abody

of

more

systematic

knowledge.

The

theoretical frameworks need revising with sharper, cleaner and more precise concepts. The cross

national aggregate indiceswhich are emerging need to be utilizedmore fully, so that standardized

measuresbecomewidelyusedandtestedacrossawiderangeofcontextsandstudies.Thesearch for

typological schema and categorical classifications of media systems or political communication

systems should perhaps be abandoned, although we should still develop sharper typologies of the

separate components within systems. Any crossnational studies need to think hard about the

selectionofcases,sothatwemovefromadhocconveniencecomparisonstowardsaclearersampleof

nationswithin awelldefined universe. Andwe need to establish archives of common datasets, for

example using standardizedmeasures to content analyze election news, to accompany the growing

rangeof

cross

national

social

surveys

which

now

include

measures

of

media

use.

All

of

this

is

adaunting

andsubstantialresearchagendabutthis isnecessarytomakesubstantialprogress inthesubfield,to

retreatfromBabel,andtoconstructamorescientificfootingforthewholeenterprise.


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