Globalization, Domestic Politics, And Terrorism in the Kingdom of Thailand

7/31/2019 Globalization, Domestic Politics, And Terrorism in the Kingdom of Thailand

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Globalization, Domestic Politics, and Terrorism in the Kingdom of

Thailand

Richard ORourke

Webster University

July 29 th , 2012


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Globalization, Domestic Politics, and Terrorism in the Kingdom of ThailandRichard ORourke

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Introduction

The management of globalization has been driven by the assumption that free enterprise backed

by liberal democracies will ultimately promote a more equal distribution of wealth and resources,

resulting in a seemingly natural path towards global prosperity and peace. The 20 th century,

however, has seen its share of international conflict, and the United States entered the 21 st

century with wars in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Analysis of these state conflicts become more

complicated in that they are the result of attacks carried out by the Al Qaida terrorist network an

organization of non-state actors targeting major symbols of global economic and political power.

Dubbed the global war on terror , this conflict has led to scholarly debate regarding the

management of globalization and resistance to it by those rendered powerless. In only a few

years following the Al Qaida attacks on the United States, a campaign of terrorism arose in

Thailands Southern Pattani Malay-Muslim region that has taken over 5,000 lives since 2004. In

April of 2012 alone, terrorist bombings in the region have killed over 100 people and have

seriously injured hundreds more.

The thesis question guiding this research is: Did international pressure on the Kingdom of

Thailand to support the global free enterprise system lead to terrorism in its Southern Patani

region? The thesis proposed in this research paper will argue that Thailands support for

globalization has been inextricably linked to domestic politics, which resulted in a concentration

of economic-politico power in the Kingdom. Resistance to this power has been the main cause

of terrorist insurgencies in Thailands southernmost Malay-Muslim community.


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First, this research paper will argue that 19 th century British colonialism put pressure on

Thailand to modernize at a rapid pace, resulting in nationalistic Thai cultural reforms and a

concentration of domestic royal power. After the Southern Pattani region was annexed by the

kingdom in 1909, Malay-Muslim resistance to the authority of a Thai nation-state remained

central to the terrorist cause.

Second, it will argue that international pressure during the Cold War in the 1940 s began a new

era of Thai nationalism and a concentration of domestic political power. As a result, resistance

to the central Thai nation-state in the Southern Muslim-Malay community was further

strengthened. The terrorist insurgencies that followed cont inued until the 1980s , only ceasing

after the establishment of a Southern regional political network that gave more autonomy to its

Malay-Muslim provincial communities.

Finally, the third argument will illustrate how Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, who came to

power as a result of the 1997 East Asian economic crisis, used the global war on terror to tighten

security on the Southern Pattani region. Rather than combat terrorism, Thaksins motive was to

dismantle the Southern political network for his own power gains. As a result, Malay-Muslim

resistance to the central Thai nation-state unraveled further, leading to the bloodiest Southern

terrorist insurgency in the kingdoms history to date.


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Concept Definitions

Southern Pattani Region : A region bordering Malaysia in Thailands south that was once part

of the Malay Patani sultanate and considered the center of Islamic scholarship in Southeast Asia

(Connors, 2006). The region was annexed by Thailand in 1909 through the Anglo-Siamese

Treaty, which excluded any representation of the affected Malay-Muslims residents (Baker &

Phongpaichit, 2005). The region was ultimately renamed Pattani to better fit Thai script ( Baker

& Phongpaichit, 2005). The Southern Pattani region is now residence to almost 3 million

Malay-Muslims who form an 80 percent majority in its Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat provinces

(Perkasa, 2010).

Globalization : The unification of world cultures throughout modern history by means of

international trade, immigration, and information exchange (Giddens, 2000). Economically, it is

a process of de-nationalizing markets in order to promote the service of common welfare by

increasing interdependencies between national states (Mangra & Stanciu, 2012). Politically, it is

the universalization of liberal ideology backed by democratic forms of government (Fukuyama,

1993).

Nationalism: A set of ideas and sentiments used to create a sense of solidarity through national

identity in the society of a state (Greenfeld, 1996). While modern societies are considered

nations, societies that do not view themselves as nations are considered to be not yet modern(Greenfeld, 1996). Historically, nationalism was an attempt by modern elites to recapture the

allegiance of the masses, which required coercive state powers to promote a uniform identity of

the nation (Bauman, 1992).


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Instead, Koehene (1984) believes that cooperation between states based on common interests is

possible as our global interconnectedness in areas such as trade, finance, health, and

communications demonstrate, making international institutions and rules more common (p. 7).

While Koehene (1894) was more focused on cooperation between advanced industrialized

countries, he was open to the possibility of cooperation between developing states where

common interests are greatest and the benefits of international cooperation may be easiest to

realize (p. 7 .).

Methodology

Qualitative methods will be used in this research paper to examine the political and economic

effects of globalization on Thailands Southern Pattani region from books available in the

Webster Thailand campus library, Webster University eLibrary and Academic Search Complete

database.

A historical perspective on Thailands nationalistic campaigns will come from literature

regarding the expansion of European colonization in the early 19 th century, American Cold War

politics in the 1940s, and the East Asian Economic crisis in 1997. Next , this research will offer

a literature review of the terrorist insurgency in the Thai Southern Pattani region since 2004.

Western and Thai historians will offer key historical perspectives, most notably Chris Baker,

Pasuk Phongpaichit, Noel Battye, Thak Chaloemtiarana, Paul Handley, Keith Watson, and

Daniel Fineman. Articles on Thailands history and terrorism in the southernmost region will

include journals such as Social Research, Journal of Theology, Foreign Affairs, Historical


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Journal, Critical Asian Studies, and Revista Academiei Fortelor Terestre . The literature review

will focus on noted Western and Thai authors on both terrorism and the Southern Pattani region,

most notably Joshua Kurlantzick, Duncan McCargo, Giles Ungpakorn, and Stanley Hoffman.

Main Arguments

British Colonization and Royal Thai Power Concentration

Opening trade relations with Great Britain during the 19 th century was the first significant move

towards international cooperation in the Kingdom of Thailand. The historical chain of events

that followed can be considered the beginning of Thailands cooperation with the global free

enterprise system. While this led to greater economic advantages for Thailand, then known as

the Kingdom of Siam, international pressure to modernize led to widespread territorial disputes

and cultural grievances. Today, the latter is often cited as the main catalyst for terrorist uprisings

in the Southern Pattani region.

Free trade between the East and West was initially challenged by the Qing Dynasty of China,

which disagreed with the United Kingdom on notions of international cooperation and trade,

resulting in the First Anglo-Chinese War in 1829 (Tsang, 2007, p. 29). After British military

forces defeated China in 1842, regional cooperation between Asia and the United Kingdom

seemed inevitable (Tsang, 2007, p. 29). During the reign of Thailands King Mongkut, the

Bowring Treaty was signed in 1855 in order to change the Thai royal tax system and replace its

monopolies with free trade (Taylor & Lennon, 2012, p. 176). This treaty was named after John

Bowring, a British superintendent of trade in China who once declared that , free trade is Jesus

Christ, and Jesus Christ is free trade (Todd, 2008, p. 385).


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In order to stimulate modernization at a rapid pace, King Mongkut encouraged Christian

missionary activity by opening up Western style schools (Watson, 1980, p. 2). Members of the

Thai royal family studied English and modern forms of Western knowledge in order to

communicate more effectively during trade and diplomatic relations. Western education

remained limited to the elite royal Thai class, and King Mongkut sent a number of his children to

Europe to further their studies (Watson, 1980, p. 2 .).

In the perspective of neoliberal international relations theory, Thailand was now constrained by

economic interconnectedness and international institutions, bringing new forms of liberal

democratic ideals to the kingdom. As a result, pressures from the West to promote trade with the

East led to a modern Thai state under the administrative leadership of Western-educated Thai

elites (Chaloemtiarana, 2007, pp. 114 - 115). Rise of this newly formed economic and political

elite class put the Thai kingdom on a fast track towards modernity and global economic

interconnectedness. However, the kingdom was now run by a group of royal Thai elites best

described by C. Wright Mills (1956) as a concentrated force with the ability to modify a

decentralized education system in pursuit of nationalist loyalties, cause a military crisis in the

state when armies are no longer willing to serve them, and create economic catastrophes on an

international scale (pp. 6 - 7).

Of significant importance to the Southern Pattani region at this stage was the introduction of

Western political geography in the Thai kingdom. Traditional emphasis in Thailand on personal


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relationships between neighboring rulers was replaced with Western notions of territory,

sovereignty, and borders (Baker & Phongpaichit, 2005, p. 58). As a result, territorial disputes

and revolts against this new Thai administration began to erupt (Baker & Phongpaichit, 2005, pp.

57-58). Conflict extended to all the way to the Southern Malay-Muslim Pattani state soon after it

was annexed by Thailand in 1909 through the Anglo-Siamese Treaty (Baker & Phongpaichit,

2005, pp. 57-58).

Prior to 1909, Thailand did not exert any direct central control over the Pattani region. Instead,

a tributary system was practiced that allowed the region to self-rule and maintain a strong

Islamic cultural identity (Tan-Mulling, 2009, pp. 923 - 924). After 1909, political boundaries

were set based solely on geography rather than ethnic communities (Tan-Mulling, 2009, pp. 923

- 924). Royal Thai troops were sent with cannons and Gatling guns to maintain order wherever

resistance surfaced, resulting in the imprisonment of the local Pattani Malay-Muslim ruler

(Baker & Phongpaichit, 2005, p. 58). Thai rule over the Pattani region continued to be

reinforced by religious and ethnic persecution of Malay-Muslim leaders, resulting in a series of

insurgencies (Ahmed & Akins, 2012).

At this time, Thailand was under the rule of King Vajiravudh. His reign lasted from 1885 to

1925, and it was marked by reforms to enhance ideas of nation, religion, and k ing with a new

tricolor flag colored white for Buddhism, blue for King, and red for the blood that Thai people

should be willing to sacrifice in defense of the nation (Handley, 2006, p. 107). In response to

media criticism of these reforms, the king passed a stringent press law and prosecuted scores of

Bangkok publishers for libel, sedation, and lese-majesty (Handley, 2006, p. 107). In addition,


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Thai military rulers undertook campaigns to unify the Kingdoms culturally diverse people and

establish the central region as the national culture (Tan-Mulling, 2009, p. 924). A nationwide

parliamentary group dubbed the Wild Tigers Corp was also established, directly answerable to

King Vajiravudh (Handley, 2006, p. 36). The Wild Tigers Corp quickly became a new elite

force rivaling the civil service, resulting in plots to overthrow the monarchy, an overspending on

royal military pursuits, and fiscal mismanagement during a global economic meltdown in the

1920s (Handley, 2006, p. 36).

Nonetheless, King Vajiravudh responded to early rebellions in the Southern Pattani region by

granting religious and cultural autonomy and rights to the Malay majority, resulting in a period

of relative peace (Ahmed & Akins, 2012). However, his reinforcement of Thai nationhood and

authority would reignite tensions in the Southern Pattani region following the rise of Prime

Minister Plek Phibun Phibunsongkhram in 1932 (Ahmed & Akins, 2012).

The Cold War and Prime Minister Phibun Phibunsongkhram

While pursuing military and legal studies in Paris, Plek Phibun Phibunsongkhram and his

classmate Pridi Banomyong plotted the Siam Revolution of 1932, an almost bloodless coup of

the royal Thai government (Baker & Phongpaichit, 2005, p. 116). Pridi became the first Prime

Minister and he drafted an economic plan that urged the nationalization of all land in order to

bail out a depressed Thai economy (Baker & Phongpaichit, 2005, p. 120). The ruling King

Prajadhipok, who retained royal powers under the newly formed constitutional monarchy,

considered the plan a Stalinist form of extreme communism. An Anti-Communist Act soon


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followed, and this forced Pridi into exile, dismantling his cabinet in the process (Baker &

Phongpaichit, 2005, p. 120).

Phibun saw a different role of the state, one marked with the duty for changing individuals

through education, law, and cultural management (Baker & Phongpaichit, 2005, p. 120). He

took over Pridis position as Prime Minister, and held this position between 1938 to 1944 and

1948 to 1957. During the second term, Phubun began a new era of cultural reforms backed by

anti-communist laws in an effort to protect free trade and a nationalist Thai state (Streckfuss,

2010). He subsequently renamed Siam to Thailand, and the Pattani region would fall victim to

Thai cultural reforms in pursuit of nationalism and free enterprise, leading to more bloodshed in

the South.

While the Soviets were perceived at the time as being expansionist revolutionaries, the United

States sought to establish a general setting of international politics during the Cold War (Nye,

2009, p. 147). In Thailand , Phibuns top political priority and foreign policy was to obtain

foreign weapons , and Americas decision to provide them wedded the U.S. to his government

(Fineman, 1997, pp. 66-67).

After receiving support from the United States to halt the spread of communism in 1948,

Phibun brought billions of U.S. dollars in American military aid to Thailand, giving further

support to his repressive military regimes (Fineman, 1997, p. 2). Laws were passed that required

the use of the word Thai to describe various ethnic groups in official documents, and


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communism was simply defined as any ideological threat to his vision of Thai cultural values

and national identity (Chaloemtiarana, 2007, pp. 235 236).

In Pattani, Phibun sent a cultural police force to ensure that Malay-Muslims wore Western-style

clothing, consumed meals with Western utensils while sitting at tables, discontinued the use of

Malay language and script, and abolished Islamic legal traditions (Pertama, 2010, p. 63). Such

rules also applied to the Islamic clergy, but Buddhist monks were allowed to continue all Thai

traditions with impunity (Pertama, 2010, p. 63).

The resulting cultural backlash came to a head early in his second term when hundreds of

Malay-Muslims and dozens of Thai police officers were killed during a violent uprising in the

Southern Pattani village of Dusan Nyor (Pertama, 2010, p. 63). Scholarly debate continues,

however, over whether this Southern uprising was against the Phibun government, the Chinese

Communist Party of Malaya, or both (McCargo, 2007, pp. 16-22). In any case, government

attempts at cultural reforms to combat communism led to distrust on both sides, and the incident

remains a symbol for Muslim-Malay disdain for Thai state authority (McCargo, 2007, pp. 16-

22).

Militant separatist groups in Southern Thailand continued to emerge in the 1950s and 1960s,

reaching their height in the 1970s (Connors, 2006). Violence in the 1970s was linked to a

Muslim separatist group named the Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO), and this

group still remains central to insurgencies in Pattani today (Kurlantzick, 2005, pp. 11 12).

However, the PULO has never been interested in advancing any Islamic religious cause. Instead,


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it remains a group of Malay-Muslim nationalists with demands for an independent southern state

(Kurlantzick, 2005, pp. 11 12).

Peace in the south was restored in the 1980s under the leadership of Prime Minister Prem

Tinsulanonda. Having been raised in the Southern Songkla region of Thailand, Prem understood

the importance of promoting Malay-Muslims to bureaucratic positions (McCargo, 2007, pp. 39-

40). In addition to regional developmental funds, Prem established a strong local Pattani

network of patronage loyal to his Democratic Party, allowing the military to be informed of

separatist movements well in advance (McCargo, 2007, pp. 39-40). In addition, Prem

established the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre (SBPAC) in 1981, which

effectively responded to grievances and reports of injustice at the local level (McCargo, 2007,

pp. 39-40).

Asian Economic Crisis, Global War on Terror, and Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra

Peace in the Southern Pattani region would come to an abrupt halt following the rise of

entrepreneur Thaksin Shinawatra as Prime Minister in 2001. His term would overlap with the

September 2001 terror attacks in the U.S. and October 2002 terrorist bombings in Bali,

Indonesia. Coupled with a weakened economy following the 1997 East Asian economic crisis,

Thailands move to join the international anti -terrorist coalition can be attributed to the most

violent Southern Pattani terrorist insurgency in Thailands history.

The economic conditions in Thailand that gave rise to Thaksin Shinawatra essentially set the

stage for violence in Pattani. Since the 1960s, Thailand was part of an East Asian economic


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trend commonly known as the Asian Miracle , and it was among eight High-Performing Asian

Economies (HPAEs) who were able to achieve remarkable economic growth since the 1960s .

John Page, former chief economist and director of poverty reduction at the World Bank, wrote in

his 1994 report The East Asian Miracle: Four Lessons for Development Policy that, export

strategies have been the most generally successful selective approach used by the HPAEs and

hold the greatest promise for other developin g economies (p. 265). Rather than domestic GDP

growth, Page (1997) attributes export-orientated policies with internationally competitive firms

as the single most important measure for market success (p. 265 ).

However, the Southern Pattani region did not share these economic gains with the rest of

Thailand. By the year 2003, nearly half of all Thai Southerners living below the poverty level

resided in the predominantly Malay-Muslim provinces of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat

(McCargo, 2007, pp. 97 98). The Southern Pattani region also fared poorly when compared to

neighboring Malaysia (Stiglitz, 2002; McCargo, 2007).

The 1997 East Asian Economic Crisis hit Thailand particularly hard, and the IMF was quick to

blame Thai and East Asian neighboring governments for this crises. While attributing the era of

extreme market growth to minimalist governments, the IMF began blaming those very same

governments for the markets ultimate failure (Stiglitz, 2002, p. 90). As for the Asian Miracle, it

was no miracle at all. Government enforced economic policies and market intervention allowed

these nations to save at high rates and invest well (Stiglitz, 2002, p. 91). However, the IMF

proposed a combination of much higher interest rates with cutbacks in government spending and

increased taxes for market recovery (Stiglitz, 2002, p. 96).


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An influx of multinational retailers soon spread throughout the Thai kingdom and grabbed

major shares of its retail market (Baker & Phongpaichit , 2008a, p. 102). With big domestic

capital groups and local operators crippled by the crisis, coupled with lax regulation at the

national level that favored foreign capital, multinational groups were able to move in and

virtually dominate the Thai retail market (Baker & Phongpaichit , 2008a, p. 103).

The only industry that did remain strong domestically was telecommunications, particularly the

market for mobile phones and communication services (Baker & Phongpaichit, 2008a, p. 105).

Thaksin Shinawatra, who was able to become one of the richest entrepreneurs in the country,

levied cost advantages in the industry to earn mega profits with his Advanced Info Services

(AIS) mobile phone firm during the market boom of the early 90s. In 1997, the Shinawatra

group fared much better in exchange losses than its industry rivals (Baker & Phongpaichit,

2008a, p. 110). After sales of his shareholdings to a Singaporean government telephone

monopoly, Thaksin was able to invest in new technologies, improve his communications

services, and even buy up some of his rivals (Baker & Phongpaichit, 2008a, p. 110).

Meanwhile, the Democrat Party-led government in Thailand was relying on International

Monetary Fund (IMF) policies to deal with the economic crisis, which initially failed to bring the

country out of a depression (Hewison, 2010). As a result, the Democrat Party was charged with

selling out to foreign interests and an elite Thai class of neoliberal supporters (Hewison, 2010).

In turn, Thaksin saw a political opening, and he formed the Thai Rak Thai ( Thais Love Thais )


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party in July 1998 with a focus on enabling Thailand to keep up and be competitive with other

countries (Baker & Phongpaichit, 2008b, p. 64).

During the 2001 elections, Thaksin was dramatized in the media as a self-made Thai

businessman who grew up economically disadvantaged, and he promised to rescue local Thai

businessmen from the economic crisis (Baker & Phongpaichit, 2008b, p. 64). Thaksins Thai

Rak Thai party promised poverty reduction through farmer debt moratorium, soft loans for rural

communities, and a universal health care program (Hewison, 2010). His election was victorious

in 2001 and, after delivering on his campaign promises, he won a landslide re-election victory in

2005.

The September 11, 2001 Al Qaida terrorist attacks on the United States gave Thaksin another

political opening. Joshua Kurlantzick, American Journalist and Fellow for Southeast Asia at the

Council on Foreign Relations, wrote in his 2005 The New Republic journal article Paradise

Lost that, After September 11, Thaksin apparently sensed an opportunity to consolidate his

gains. He capitalized on newfound fear of terrorism, perhaps figuring that the United States

would not censor him if he rolled back democratic freedoms (p. 12).

Kurlantzick illustrates how Thailand was considered a major hub for terrorism financing and

planning by the international community, and the United States pressured Thailand to open a

joint counterterrorism center in Bangkok. In addition, Thaksin committed Thai troops to the war

in Iraq to rally further support for the U.S. State Department (2005, p. 11). Believing that the

U.S. would not take notice, he argues that Thaksin began to consolidate his political power by


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unleashing a war on drugs that gave security forces the authority to shoot anyone involved in

narcotics (2005, p. 11).

Since the narcotic trad e is heaviest along Thailands southern border, many civilians in the

south fell victim to Thaksin security forces. Kurlantzick argues that the United States did not in

fact take notice. Instead, its focus was on military basing rights to counter terrorism, Thai

military commitment to the war in Iraq, and new a U.S.-Thailand free trade agreement in

exchange for this commitment (2005, p. 11).

In 2004, insurgents raided an army camp and killed four soldiers in the Southern province of

Narathiwat. Kurlantzick explains that Thakins unrivaled consolidation of political power

allowed him to react with impunity, and he began rallying Buddhist sentiment against Muslim

southerners (2005, p. 12). In addition, his security forces arrested countless civilians and used

torture during interrogations (2005, p. 12). Kurlantzick sees this same pattern across Asia,

arguing that, pseudo -authoritarian leaders have taken advantage of the war on terrorism to

consolidate their power, undermining the federalism and liberalization that took hold across the

region in the 90s ( 2005, p. 13).

Duncan McCargo, professor of Southeast Asian politics at the University of Leads, argues in

his 2007 book Rethinking Thailands Southern Violence that the 2004 insurgency was the direct

result of Thaksin s anti-terrorism security measures, which resulted in a number of extrajudicial

disappearances in the Southern Pattani region (p. 4). During that same year, the region witnessed


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the killing of several Thai soldiers, the seizure over 400 weapons, and twenty school burnings

(McCargo, 2007, p. 4).

In 2004, Thai security forces also killed several demonstrators during a peaceful protest outside

a police station in Tak Bai, Narathiwat. Under a security order from Thaksin, McCargo explains

how the Thai military rounded up over a thousand men from the streets and piled them into

trucks; seventy- eight apparently suffocated on the way to military camps ( 2007, p. 37). The rest

of that year was marked by murders, daily explosions, and the death of a respected judge, a

deputy governor, numerous police and military personnel, teachers, and general civilians

(McCargo, 2007, p. 37).

However, Thaksin had another agenda in the South that had little to do with combatting

terrorism. McCargo argues that ; the South is the principle site for Thaksins attempts to wrest

control of Thailand from the old power networks that dominated the country prior to 200 1

(2007, p. 37). These networks were operating through proxies led by Prem Tinsulanond, former

Prime Minister who was serving as a close political adviser to the ruling King Bhumibol. Since

the 1980s, Prem worked through a series of weak coalition governments in order to preserve

royal influences in the South (2007, p. 37). As explained earlier in this research paper, Prems

southern network and the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre (SBPAC) led to an

era of relative peace since the 1980s. Thaksin, as McCargo (2007) argues , was instead set on

securing control over the entire political process through his own tightly managed political

networks in the South.


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Thaksin was unsuccessful in dismantling these southern networks, and his attempt resulted in a

royal military junta coup in 2006. Giles Ungpakorn, noted political Thai activist and professor,

argues in his 2007 book A Coup for the Rich that major forces behind this coup were, anti -

democratic groups in the military and civilian elite, disgruntled business leaders and neo-liberal

intellectuals and politicians (p. 7). The coup also led to a redrafting of the constitution in order

to strengthen political and economic power positions of Prems elite royalist faction in the South

(Ungpakorn, 2007, p.7).

Ungpakorn (2007) argues that the new military appointed cabinet after the coup was, stuffed

full of neo-liberals , most notably Finance Minister Pridiyatorn Devakul who championed

neoliberal fiscal discipline and was opposed to public health spending (p. 10). Pridiyatorn

imposed a 23% budget cut in the universal health care scheme while military spending was

raised by 30% (Ungpakorn, 2007, p. 10). D ubbed Tank Liberals by Ungpakorn (2007), it was

a parliament of elite autocrats who, claimed to be following the Kings philosophy of

Sufficiency and the importance of not being greedy all the while drawing upon multiple

salaries undoubtedly funded by the savings from cutting the pro-poor policies of the Thaksin

government (p.11).

Stanley Hoffmann, Harvard University professor and noted author on war and international

politics, considers these types of terrorist insurgencies a new paradigm for globalization. In his

2002 Foreign Affairs article Clash of Globalizations , he takes a critical look at neoliberal

theory and considers new realities for the globalized free marketplace. First, rather than state on

state war, war within states are on the rise, as seen in the former Yugoslavia, Iraq, Afghanistan,


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much of Africa, and Sri Lanka (Hoffman, 2002, p. 2). Next , he illustrates how a states foreign

policy is now shaped by domestic politics, and even in undemocratic regimes, xenophobic

passions, economic grievances, and transnational ethnic solidarity can make policy making far

more complex and less predictable (Hoffman, 2002, p. 2).

Hoffman (2002) argues that; if glob alization often facilitates terrorist violence, the fight

against this war without borders is potentially disastrous for both economic development and

globalization (p. 4). The antiterrorist measures that states employ can restrict financial flows,

and the beneficiaries become poorer states that are now able to tighten controls on their own

people, products, and money new reasons to violate individual rights in the name of defense

and security (Hoffman, 2002, p. 4).

Conclusion

Globalization has undoubtedly fostered cooperation between states, advancing areas of trade,

finance, and democracy around the world. However, globalization can also be inextricably

linked to domestic politics, making them unpredictable and more instable. As this research has

argued, international pressure during the course of globalization has resulted in a concentration

of economic-politico power in the Kingdom of Thailand. Resistance to this power has been the

main cause of terrorist insurgencies in its southernmost Malay-Muslim Pattani region.

Beginning with 19 th century British colonialism, pressure on Thailand to modernize resulted in

nationalistic Thai cultural reforms and a concentration of domestic royal power. Malay-Muslim

resistance to the Thai nation-state remains central to the terrorist cause. Further international


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pressure during the Cold War began a new era of Thai nationalism and the concentration of

domestic political power. Again, separatist factions in the Southern Muslim-Malay community

resisted.

Finally, a combination of economic turmoil in Asia and Americas global war on terror allowed

Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra to challenge the Southern regional political network for his

own power gains. Malay-Muslim resistance to the central Thai authority unraveled further,

leading to the bloodiest Southern terrorist insurgency in the kingdoms history. Although t he

debris has been cleared from the 2006 royal army coup that followed, periodic resurgences of the

southern terrorism continues to create a sense of anxiety across the kingdom today.

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Globalization, Domestic Politics, And Terrorism in the Kingdom of Thailand

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