Global Food Outlook 2020

8/3/2019 Global Food Outlook 2020

1/24


2/24

Copyright 2001 International Food Policy Research Institute.All rights reserved. Sections of this report may be reproducedwithout the express permission of but with acknowledgment to the International Food Policy Research Institute.

ISBN 0-89629-526-5


3/24

ContentsPreface v

Introduction 1Recent Trends in Food Supply and Demand 2

The World to 2020:Baseline Scenario 4

Alternative Futures 8

The Cost of Food Security 15

Conclusion 17

Notes 18


4/24


5/24

Preface

G

overnment officials and representatives of aid agencies are continually making decisions about how to spend

their resources.It is easy to lose sight of the fact that each decision to be made represents a fork in the road,

and each investment is a step in the direction of a future that will bring a healthy,sustainably produced diet tomore peopleor to fewer.

This repor t shows just how,and how much,certain policy decisions and social changes will affect the worlds

future food security. It projects the likely food situation in 2020 if the world continues on more or less its present

course,and it then shows how alternative choices could produce a different future. Even rather small changes in agri-

cultural and development policies and investments, it turns out,can have wide-reaching effects on the number of poor

and undernourished people around the world. A world of less poverty,greater food security,and a healthier environ-

ment is possible,but it will not come about without explicit policy steps in that direction.

2020 Global Food Outlook is the latest in a series of world food projections based on a model developed at IFPRI

beginning in 1992.The model has been updated and expanded periodically since then as a way of paint ing an ever-

clearer picture of the global food situation in 2020.More details about the simulations in this report are available in a

comprehensive monograph titled Global Food Projections to 2020: Emerging Trends and Alternative Futures.

Our thanks go to Rajul Pandya-Lorch for her intellectual support and editorial guidance during the preparation ofthis report and to Heidi Fritschel for editorial assistance.


6/24


7/24

The experience of the 1990s shows that using

short-term trends in global markets to make judgmentsabout long-term food security is next to useless. Indeed,year-to-year changes in prices and productionand theinfluence that these changes have on the attentiondevoted to the global food situationmay contribute tolong-term food problems by encouraging complacencyduring periods of strong harvests.To understand thefuture of food supply and demand and food security, it isessential instead to focus on long-term forces,such asincome growth,population growth,and technological

change in agriculture driven by investments in agricul-

tural research, irrigation,and roads.Throughout recent short-term changes in markets,

the long-term forces have consistently pointed toclear causes for concern.The worlds population isexpected to grow from 6 billion people in 2000 to 7.5billion people in 2020.Availability of land for farming ison the decline,and water for agriculture and otheruses is increasingly scarce.Together these and otherforces will challenge the capacity of the worlds foodproduction system.

C

oncern about the worlds future food security seems to run in cycles. In the mid-1990s world cereal

prices rose dramatically as cereal stocks fell sharply,and some observers foresaw a starving 21st century

world unable to meet growing food demands from a deteriorating natural resource base.W orries eased in the

late 1990s as global cereal production hit record levels in response to high prices and falling stocks, while

declining incomes due to the East Asian economic crisis reduced the demand for food commodities. As cereal

prices plummeted in response, the policy focus in much of the world shifted from concern over long-term

food supply and demand problems to concerns about subsidy provision to financially distressed farmers.

Introduction

IMPACT:A Model of the Worlds Food

We projected world food supply and demand, trade, prices, and food security to the year 2020 based on an

updated version of IFPRIs International Model for Policy Analysis of Agricultural Commodities and Trade

(IMPACT). IM PACT covers 36 countries or country groups and 16 commodities,including all cereals,

soybeans, roots and tubers,meats, and dairy products (accounting for virtually all of the worlds food and

feed production and consumption).The model is specified as a set of country-level demand and supply equa-

tions linked to the rest of the world through trade. Food demand is a function of commodity prices,per

capita income, and population growth. It includes fresh and processed food. Feed demand is a function of

livestock production, feed prices, and feeding efficiency. Crop production is determined by the area and yieldresponse functions.Area is projected as a function of crop price, investment in irrigation, and estimated rates

of loss of land to urbanization and land degradation.Crop yield is a function of crop price, input prices,

investments in irrigation, and yield growth due to technological change.Growth in productivity due to tech-

nological change is in turn estimated by its component sources including advances in management research

and, in the case of food crops, plant-breeding research. Other sources of growth considered in the model

include private-sector investments in agricultural research and development, agricultural extension and

education,markets,infrastructure, and irrigation.1


8/24

T

he world has experienced an unprecedented increase in population during the past century,with a billion

people added every decade during the last three decades alone.Dramatic shifts in production and

consumption of food have accompanied this population explosion, including a surge in grain production, a spec-

tacular rise in meat production and consumption,and the emergence of an increasingly vital role for interna-

tional t rade (Figure 1). High-yielding varieties of wheat and rice swept across much of Asia during the 1970s and

early 1980s,easing fears of imminent famine.Cereal yields have risen more modestly in recent years,but they

have still outstripped gains in other crops such as cassava,potatoes,and beans.

Recent Trends in Food Supply and Demand

Cereal grain production kept pace with rising popu-lations in some nations,such as India.Many other coun-

tries turned increasingly to imports to feed theirpeople,either because domestic production was toolow or because income rose far faster than population,escalating demand for food and feed grain.Argentina,Australia,Europe,and Nor th America responded with

a flood of exports.The volume of cereals traded inter-nationally more than doubled over 30 years to more

than 250 million tons by the late 1990s.Dur ing part ofthis period, particularly in the early 1980s,governmentsubsidies to farmers helped fuel cereal production inWestern Europe and Nor th America.Such subsidies ledto a glut of grain,driving down food prices on world

markets and leading to the emergenceof Western Europe as a significant netexporter of grain. In the late 1980s andthe 1990s,however,Nor th America andWestern Europe partially reduced subsi-dies (and revised the form of subsidyto less directly influence production

decisions), and growth in production ofcereals slowed.

Livestock consumed a growing shareof cereal production. Rising incomes inmany parts of the developing world fueleda boom in meat consumption,particularlyof poultry.Starting from very low levels,per capita consumption of meat in thedeveloping world more than doubledfrom 1967 to 1997,with even more spec-tacular increases in the consumption ofpoultr y.Nevertheless,a typical person in

the developing world still consumes onlya third as much meat,on average,as atypical person in the developed world.

Defying consistent predictions to thecontrary,both India and China havemanaged to satisfy the bulk of their owncereal market demandsthough in thecase of India, this situation has been duein large part to slow income growth andpolicies that raised food prices and

Population

300

250

200

150

100

50

0

1966=100

Figure 1 Population and global food production indices, 19661998

1966 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 1998

SOURCE: FAOSTAT at www.fao.org

Cereal Production

Meat Production

120

100

80

60

40

20

0

Millions

Figure 2 Malnourished children under age 5, 19701997

1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 1997

West Asia/North Africa Latin America

Sub-Saharan Afr ica

East Asia

South Asia

SOURCE: 19701995, L. Smith and L. H addad,Overcoming Child Malnutrit ion inDeveloping Countries: Past Achievements and Future Choices, 2020 Vision DiscussionPaper 30 (W ashington, D.C., IFPRI, 2000); 19961997, IFPRI IMPACTextrapolations.

2020GLOBALFOODO

UTLOOK

2


9/24

depressed food demand.Wor ldwide,prices for maize,rice, and wheat have each declined by 50 percent ormore over the last 20 years,and consequently food hasbeen available to satisfy the market demand for these

commodities.Meeting demand,however,does not neces-sarily mean assuring food security.When people lack themoney to buy this food, their needs are not translatedinto market demand.

Food insecurity remains persistent but not neces-sarily because of shortfalls in global food production.Significant improvements have been madethe propor-tion of children under the age of five who suffer frommalnutrition fell sharply from 45 percent in the late1960s to 31 percent in the late 1990s.However,becauseof population growth,the absolute number of malnour-ished children has fallen much less sharply,from 187

million to 167 million children during this period.EastAsia has led the way in tackling child malnutrit ion,whileprogress has been difficult to sustain in South Asia,whichsignificantly lowered the number of malnourished chil-dren during the 1970s but experienced an upturn duringthe first half of the 1980s (Figure 2).The situation isbleakest in Sub-Saharan Afr ica,the only region in whichboth the number and propor tion of malnourished chil-dren has been consistently rising in recent years.In aworld that has experienced astounding advances inknowledge and growth during the past century,one-third of all children in Sub-Saharan Africa continue to goto bed hungry and have their mental and physical devel-opment compromised by the ravages of hunger.


10/24

Will hunger persist for tens of millions of children for the foreseeable future?W ill the Earths natural

resource base be able to keep up with food demand from a steadily rising world population?The base-

line scenario described here gives our best estimate of the most likely world food situation in 2020 if govern-

ments make no major changes in their agricultural and economic policies and investments and if population

grows at the rate given in the United Nations medium projection.This scenario suggests that although overall

global food security may improve somewhat in the next two decades,millions of children will remain hungry

and in some regions food insecurity will be dire.

The World to 2020:Baseline Scenario

Although developing countries will

account for most of the increase in globaldemand for cereals,growth in theirdemand for cereals is not as rapid as itonce was.As population growth slows andpeople in developing countries diversifytheir diets away from cereals because ofrising prosperity and changing dietarypreferences,growth in cereal demand inthe developing world is projected todecline from 2.3 percent a year in197497 to 1.3 percent a year in19972020.Nevertheless, the absolute

increase in the demand for cereals during19972020 is expected to be as large asthe increase in demand during thepreceding 23 years (Figure 3).Developingcountr ies in Asia,because of their largerand more urbanized populations and rapideconomic growth,will account for half ofthe increase in global demand for cereals,with China alone accounting for one-quarter (Figure 4).

The worlds appetite for meat willjump enormously.Wor ldwide,demand for

meat is forecast to rise by more than 55percent (Figure 5) between 1997 and 2020,with most of the increase occurring indeveloping countries.China alone willaccount for more than 40 percent of thisincrease,compared with Indias 4 percent.Even though demand for meat will doublein South Asia,Southeast Asia,and Sub-Saharan Africa,per capita consumption ofmeat will remain far below levels in thedeveloped world.This gap suggests that

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

0

Millionmetrictons

1974

1997

2020

Figure 3 World demand for cereals, 1974, 1997, and 2020

DevelopedCountries DevelopingCountries World

664 560

11181208

1843

1675

2497

725 822

SOU RCE: IFPRI IMPACT projections, June 2001, and FAOSTAT (www.fao.org) for1974 data.

Figure 4 Regional shares of increased cereal demand, 19972020

DevelopedCountries

15%

India12%

China27%

Sub-SaharanAfrica11%

Latin America11%

West Asia/Nort h Africa

10%

Other Asian DevelopingCountries

14%

SOU RCE: IFPRI IMPACT projections, June 2001.

Total Increase: 654 million metric tons.

2020GLOBALFOODO

UTLOOK

4


11/24

people in these regions will have thepotential to consume considerablymore meat.

Poultry will account for 40 percentof the global increase in demand for meatto 2020,far higher than the 28 percentit accounted for in 1997, reflecting adramatic shift in taste from red meat tochicken (Figure 6).To fuel the explosiverise in demand for meat, farmers willincreasingly need to grow cereal cropsparticularly maizefor animal feedrather than for direct human consump-tion (Figure 7).

People in developing countries willalso increase their demand for otherstaple food commodit ies. In many parts

of Sub-Saharan Afr ica,roots and tubers,especially cassava,sweet potatoes,andyams,are a major source of sustenance.In the late 1990s, they accounted for 20percent of calories consumed in theregion,and even more in the diets of thepoor. In much of Asia and Latin America,roots and tubers are an important supple-mental source of carbohydrates,vitamins,and amino acids in food systems domi-nated by other commodities.Between1997 and 2020 total demand for roots

and tubers in the developing world willincrease by 55 percent (248 million tons).Sub-Saharan Africa is projected toaccount for 43 percent of this increaseddemand,indicating that roots and tuberswill continue to play a large role inpeoples diets there (Figure 8). Asia willalso account for a significant amountof the total increase,with East Asiaaccounting for 21 percent and SouthAsia 14 percent.

Even though growth in cereal demand

is slowing,farmers in developing countrieswill not be able to keep pace.In most ofthe developing wor ld, expansion of croparea will be severely limited.In parts ofAsia,almost all the suitable land is alreadyunder cult ivation, cities are encroachingon prime agricultural land,and land degra-dation is becoming an increasingly seriousproblem.Sub-Saharan Afr ica and LatinAmerica have more potential for areaexpansion.Farmers in Sub-Saharan Afr ica

350

300

250

200

150

100

50

0

Millionmetricto

ns

1974

1997

2020

Figure 5 World demand for meat , 1974, 1997, and 2020

DevelopedCountries

DevelopingCountries

World

77

32

111 109

208213

327

98114

SOU RCE: IFPRI IMPACT projections, June 2001, and FAOSTAT (www.fao.org) for1974 data.

Figure 6 Types of meat demanded globally, 1997, and increase, 19972020

Pork40%

Poultry28%

Sheep/Goat5%

Beef27%

Total meat demand: 208 million metr ic tons.

1997

Pork31%

Sheep/Goat5%

Beef24%

Poultry40%


Total meat demand increase: 119 million m etr ic tons.

2020

Increase in meat demand, 19972020


12/24

are projected to bring another 20 millionhectares of cereal production under theplow between 1997 and 2020,andfarmers in Latin America,8 millionhectares,but the rest of the developingworld will account for only another 13million hectares.

Because new agricultural land will bescarce,increasing cereal production willrequire increasing productivitythat is,getting greater cereal yields from a givenhectare of land.But increases in yields areslowing for all cereals and in nearly allregions. In Sub-Saharan Africa yields areprojected to recover from past stagnation(Figure 9).But yield growth rates in mostof the world have been slowing since the

early 1980s. In the developed wor ld theslowdown was primarily a result of policymeasures,as Nor th American andEuropean governments drew down cerealstocks and scaled back farm-price suppor tprograms in favor of direct payments tofarmers. In Eastern Europe and the formerSoviet Union economic collapse andsubsequent economic reforms furtherdepressed productivity. In developingcountr ies,particularly in Asia, the slow-down in cereal productivity growth

stemmed partly from growing watershortages,slowing public investment incrop research and irrigation infrastruc-ture, and heavy use of fert ilizers,water,and other inputs (which means that ittakes ever more inputs to sustain yieldgains).These forces are expected tofurther slow growth in cereal yieldsworldwide from 1.6 percent a year in198297 to 1.0 percent a year in19972020.

Greater yields will also be needed to

increase production of roots and tubersthroughout the developing world,and thearea planted to roots and tubers will actu-ally shrink significantly in the developedwor ld. In Sub-Saharan Afr ica,however,expansion of cultivated area will accountfor a projected 27 percent of additionalroots and tubers production there.

By 2020,with developing countr iesunable to fully meet their cereal demandsfrom their own production,international

Figure 7 Uses of cereal demanded by developing countries, 1997 and 2020

Total cereal demand: 1,118 million metric tons.

1997

Food67%

Other12%

Feed21%

Food62%

Other12%

Feed26%


Total cereal demand: 1.674 million metric tons.

2020

Figure 8 Regional shares of increased roots and tubers demand, 19972020

SOU RCE: IFPRI I MPACT projections, June 2001.

DevelopedCountries

2%

East Asia21%

Sub-SaharanAfrica43%

LatinAmerica

9%

South Asia14%

OtherDevelopingCountries

11%

2020GLOBALFOODO

UTLOOK

6


13/24

trade will play a larger role in providingfood to many regions of the globe.For tunately,cereal producers in theAmericas and in Europe appear ready andable to meet this demand.The UnitedStates will become an even more domi-nant force in agricultural markets,whileEurope will continue to be a major agri-cultural exporter (Figure 10).Net cerealimports by developing countr ies will morethan double to 2020 with Asian nations,particularly China,boosting their importsenormously.However,countr ies thatfalter economically,leaving them unable tomuster enough foreign exchange to payfor adequate food imports,will becomeincreasingly vulnerable to food shortages.

Sharp falls in food prices over the lasttwo decades were a great benefit to thepoor, who spend a large share of theirincome on food.But international cerealprices are projected to decline onlyslightly during the next two decades,asignificant break from past trends (Figure11).Shocks to agriculture,particularlyfailure to meet farmers needs for waterand other inputs,could push food pr icesup significantly.

Unfortunately, the prospects for

reducing child malnutrition are mixed.Overall, the number of malnour ished chil-dren is expected to continue its gradualdecrease,from 166 million in 1997 to 132million in 2020 (Figure 12).The number ofChinas malnourished children will fall byhalf, while India will experience slowerimprovement and will remain home to athird of all malnourished children in thedeveloping world. Sub-Saharan Africa,withits combination of high population growthand lagging economic performance,will be

caught in an increasingly perilous situa-tion.The number of malnourished chil-dren there is forecast to increase by 6million,or 18 percent, compared with1997.Sub-Saharan Afr ica is likely toremain ahot spot of hunger and malnu-tr ition for years to come.

4

3

2

1

0

Figure 9 Cereal yield growth rates by region, 19672020

East

Asia

SouthAsia

Southe

ast

Asia

Latin

Am

eric

a

Sub-

Saha

ran

Afric

a

WestA

sia/

North

Afric

a

Develop

ed

coun

trie

s

196782

198297

19972020

Percentp

eryear

Figure 10 Net t rade in cereals by region, 1997 and 2020

1997

2020

-75 -50 -25 0 25 50 75 100 125

USA

EU15

West Asia/North Africa

Latin America

Sub-Saharan Africa

China

Southeast Asia

South Asia

Million metric tons

300

250

200

150

100

50

0

US$/Metricton

1997

2020

Figure 11 Cereal prices by crop, 1997 and 2020

W heat Maize Rice Other CoarseGrains

100

80

60

40

20

0

Figure 12 Malnourished children by region, 1997 and 2020

SouthAsia

Southe

ast

Asia

Latin

Am

eric

a

Sub-

Saha

ran

Afric

a

WestA

sia/

North

Afric

a

SOURCES: Fig.9: IFPRI IMPACT projections, June, 2001, and FAOSTAT (www.fao.org)for historical data. Fig.10: IFPRI IMPACT projections, June, 2001. Fig.11: IFPRI IMPACT

projections, June, 2001. Fig.12: IFPRI IMPACT projections, June, 2001.

China

1997

2020

Millions


14/24


15/24

hood malnutrition as effectively as the rest of the devel-oping world is projected to do?Reversing the tide inSub-Saharan Africa enough to reduce the number ofmalnourished children in 2020 by one-third, from 33 to22 million,would require an increase in total investmentson roads, irrigation,clean water,education,and agricul-tural research of US$76 billion, to US$183 billion,between 1997 and 2020 compared with the baseline.Crop yields would have to grow at an annual rate ofaround 3 percent.Even more significantly, total grossdomestic product (GDP) would have to grow at anannual rate of 8 to 10 percent.

Such rates of growth,while spectacular,are notunprecedented.They occurred in Asia during the GreenRevolut ion. It is unlikely,however,that Sub-SaharanAfrica will follow the same path as Asia toward rapidagricult ural growth,because Sub-Saharan Afr ica faces

different constraints. Agroclimatic constr aints toproduction are more difficult t han in much of Asia, thecost of exploit ing water is higher,and transportationand communications infrastructure is far more limitedthan it was when the Green Revolution began in Asia.Still, the costs of not making the necessary investmentsin Sub-Saharan Afr ica will be tremendous,not only tothe region but also to the rest of the world. Sub-Saharan Africa is one of the last two bastions of hungerand malnutr it ion (South Asia is the other), and withoutprogress here, the world will make only a small dent inthe global burden of malnutrition.

Asian Giants Not Likely toDisrupt World Food MarketsIt is often suggested that India and China,home to morethan a third of the globes people,hold the fate of globalfood security in their hands.Shifts in food production orconsumer behavior in these countries,it is alleged,couldproduce enormous shifts in demand for food on globalmarkets,with effects reverberating throughout the world.

What would happen,for instance, if rapid growth inincomes caused Indians to consume more meat,as

income growth has done in other parts of the world?Asimulation of these events,however,proves surprisinglyreassuring.If, for instance,the average Indian respondedto growing prosperity by eating more meat,per capitameat consumption in India could reach 18 kilograms in2020,similar to levels in Indonesia and Pakistan and morethan twice the projections for India in the baselinescenario. Consumption of meat in China has grown atsimilar rates during the past decade.This meteoric rise inmeat consumption, from very low levels,would placeenormous demands on Indian agriculture and might, in

fact, prove self-limit ing.Rising demand for meat wouldhave to be met both by increased domestic productionand by expanded imports of meat.The demand for cerealfor livestock feed would put additional pressure on bothdomestic cereal production and cereal impor ts.Meatimports in 2020 would rise to 1.8 million metric tons(compared with 0.2 million metric tons in the baseline),and cereal imports to 26 million metric tons instead of 6million metric tons in the baseline.

The surprising aspect of this scenario, however,ishow little it would affect international prices for cerealsor meat. International food markets appear resilientenough to accommodate Indias increasing demands.Under this scenario, beef prices on international marketswould decline only by 2 percent between 1997 and 2020,rather than by 4 percent in the baseline scenario;wheatprices would decline by 3 percent, rather than by 8

percent;and maize prices would rise by 5 percent,instead of falling by 1 percent.But other vulnerabilities also exist in India and the

other Asian giant, China.Some observers believe thatboth countries will have great difficulty expanding agricul-tural production further,because of degraded land,watershortages,and growing competit ion with cities andindustry for land and water.They believe that environ-mental degradation, unsustainable groundwater extrac-tion for irrigation,and slowing agricultural investmentscould result in a sharper decline in agricultural growththan envisioned in the baseline scenario.W hat would be

the impact on world food markets if yields and cultivatedarea in India and China increased only half as rapidly asexpected?Some of the effects of this slowdown inproduction would tend to offset each other.Food short-ages would produce higher prices,bringing on a partialrebound in food production.The agricultural slowdownalso would depress economic growth and with it demandfor food, particularly meat.

Even so,both India and China would be forced toturn increasingly to food imports.Chinas cereal tradedeficit in 2020 would nearly double from 48 millionmetric tons under the baseline scenario to 89 million

metric tons,while India would shift from near self-suffi-ciency under the baseline scenario to imports of 30million.Indias small agricultural trade surplus in 1997would give way to a deficit of US$9.1 billion in 2020,while Chinas agricultural trade deficit would soar toUS$33.5 billion.Yet even rising imports of this magnitudewould not throw international cereal or meat marketsinto disarray or provoke devastating price increases.Wheat and maize prices would be higher by about 9percent each compared with the 2020 baseline projec-tion,and rice prices would rise 26 percent.


16/24

Slowing agricultural growth in India and China wouldleave 2 million more children malnourished in 2020 ineach of these two Asian giants,compared with the base-line scenario. In addition, this result assumes that Chinaand India would be willing and able to finance an enor-mous increase in food impor ts.Should these countriesresist such a growing dependence on foreign suppliersand attempt instead to protect and promote domesticproduction,domestic food prices could increase dramati-cally, further worsening child malnutr it ion.

Easing Population GrowthsBurden on Young ChildrenEver since Malthus,many have regarded rapid populationgrowth as one of the great underlying causes of hunger andenvironmental destruction.Yet birthrates have been

declining in recent years,pushing estimates of future popu-lation growth downward. If population grows at rates lowerthan projected under the baseline,what would be theimpact on the world food situation?The United Nations(UN) low estimate of population growth results in a totalworld population of 7 billion people in 2020,rather thanthe oft-quoted medium projection of 7.5 billionthenumber used in the baseline scenario. Replacing the UNmedium population growth assumptions with its low popu-lation growth assumptions in the model shows how slowerpopulation growth is likely to affect food security.

In the low population growth scenario, the number

of malnourished children under the age of five in thedeveloping wor ld declines dramatically (Table 1).Notonly is the population under five smaller,but per capitaconsumption of calories is higher thanks to lower foodprices and higher per capita incomes resulting fromlower population growth.Under this scenario per capitakilocalorie consumption increases by 88 kilocaloriesabove baseline levels.The number of malnourished

children in the developing world is projected to drop byan additional 29 million, to 102 million malnourishedchildren in 2020.

While this number is still unacceptably high,a 28percent decline in child malnourishment is truly remark-able.It reveals the extent to which high population growthin impoverished regions adds millions of children to popu-lations that are already highly food stressed and unable tocope with the additional burden.South Asia stands out inthis analysis:under the low population growth scenario,child malnutrition in that region drops 25 percent (16million children) below baseline 2020 levels.Slower popu-lation growth does not cure all ills,by any means.In Sub-Saharan Afr ica,the number of malnour ished childrenwould still increase slightly between 1997 and 2020,from33 million to 34 million,but the increase would be far lessthan projected under the baseline scenario.

Feeding People andFeeding LivestockThe high levels of meat demand in developed countries andthe rapid growth in meat demand in developing countrieshave caused concern that diverting cereals to feed livestockleads to an inadequate cereal supply for direct humanconsumption.Would improving feeding efficiencies (theamount of cereal required to produce a kilogram of ediblemeat) or dramatically reducing meat consumption in devel-oped countries release cereals for human food consump-

tion and significantly raise nutritional status in developingcountries?

From 1967 to 1982, feed ratios were constant: asmeat production increased,demand for feed increased bya directly propor tionate amount.Since then,however,meat producers have required substantially less feed foreach additional kilogram of meat produced.The reasonsare many.The most impor tant have probably been

Millions of malnourished children

REGION

SOUTH A SIA

SOUTHEAST ASIA

EAST ASIA

SUB-SAH ARA N A FRICA

LATIN AM ERICA

WEST A SIA /NORTH A FRICA

DEVELOPIN G COUN TRI ES

LOW UNPROJECTION

47.6

10.3

6 .2

33.7

1 .5

3 .0

102.3

MEDIUM UNPROJECTION

63.3

14.0

8 .5

39.3

2 .5

4 .0

131.5

DI FFEREN CE

15.7

3 .7

2 .3

5 .6

1 .0

1 .0

29.2

Table 1Child malnutrition under low and medium population projections, 2020

2020GLOBALFOODO

UTLOOK

10

SOURCE: IFPRI IMPACT projections, June 2001..


17/24

changes in genetics and in livestock management, includinghormone use.In addition, poultry,which convert feed intomeat more efficiently than livestock,have accounted foran increasing share of meat production.

Some of these phenomena are declining in impor-tance.Consumers in Europe and Nor th America areincreasing their demand for lean meat.Leaner animals areinherently less efficient converters of feed into meat. Inaddition, meat production in some developing countr iesis shift ing rapidly toward commercial enterprises,whichrely more heavily on cereal feed than do backyard orsmall-scale producers.Baseline projections for the future,therefore,assume that demand for feed will match meatproduction more closely than it has in recent years.

It is possible, however,that technological changes notaccounted for in the baseline scenario would cause feedratios to fall more rapidly,continuing the trend of recent

years.Under such a scenario, meat production wouldbecome cheaper and consumers would eat more ofthese meats. In addition,total demand for grain would fallbecause animals would eat less feedgrain.The price ofmaize, instead of holding steady,would fall by 28 percentrelative to the 2020 baseline scenario.

This shift in grain prices then would set off a cascadeof consequences.As demand for animal feed grows moreslowly, international flows of more affordable grainparticularly maizewould shift away from countries inEast and Southeast Asia that import large amounts ofanimal feed.The grain would flow instead toward South

Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa,where these cereals aremainly eaten by people. Net imports of cereals into Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia would increase by 89 and81 percent, respectively,compared with the baselinescenario.The less grain is demanded to feed animals inEast Asia and the Middle East, the more grain is availablefor consumers,particularly in Africa and South Asia.

Finally, in a surprising connection between differentcorners of the global economy, the change in feed ratioshas an effect on the number of malnourished children.Areduction of 3 million malnourished children relative tothe baseline scenario is not huge,compared to a global

total of 129 million malnourished children,but it is note-worthy.The effect is most significant in Sub-SaharanAfrica, the region with the most entrenched difficulties.Because maize, the most important source of animalfeed, is heavily used for food in Africa, less demand foranimal feed would translate directly into more food avail-able for people.Under this scenario, there would be 1.6million fewer malnourished children in Sub-Saharan Africain 2020 than under the baseline scenario.

Could a radical drop in per capita meat demand indeveloped countries also help reduce malnutrition?

Reduced demand for meat in developed countries wouldaffect food consumption in developing countries primarilythrough prices.Reduced demand for meat will directlyreduce the world price of meat,making meat moreaffordable for consumers in developing countries.Thisreduced meat demand and drop in meat prices will alsocause a direct reduction in meat production in bothdeveloped and developing countr ies,which will reducethe demand for cereals for animal feed.Reduced demandfor feedgrains will in turn cause a drop in prices ofcereals,inducing an increase in food demand for cereals.

A 1999 study using IMPACT explored in detail theimpact of a decline in per capita meat demand in devel-oped countries by one-half between 1993 and 2020.2

It found that 2020 prices for beef,pork,sheep and goatmeat,and poultr y would be 2231 percent lower than inthe baseline.The effects of reduced meat demand in

developed countr ies on cereal pr ices are,however,muchless pronounced.Prices for maize and other coarsegrainscommonly used for feedwould be 11 percentand 10 percent lower,respectively, in 2020 than in thebaseline scenario. Prices of wheat and rice would only be5 percent and 1 percent lower,respectively.The effectson wheat and rice are particularly small because althoughthese grains are the primary staple cereals in developingcountries,they make up only a small share of animal feed.Reduced demand for maize and other coarse grains forlivestock feed in developed countries does not translateinto greatly reduced prices for rice and wheat in devel-

oping countries.With the price changes that stem from cutting per

capita meat consumption by half in developed countries,each person in the developing world would on averageconsume about 13 percent more meat and 1.5 percentmore cereal than under the baseline scenario. Fallingmeat production in developing countries would lead to adecline of 33 million metric tons in feed demand.Thisdecline would offset the 13 million metric tons increasein food demand,leading to a slight drop in total demandfor cereals in developing countries compared with thebaseline.Because of lower cereal prices,developing-

country farmers would produce 27 million metric tonsless cereals than under the 2020 baseline,and cerealimports would increase by 11 million metric tons.

In the end,people in developing countr ies wouldconsume only 40 additional calories per capita in 2020 asa result of reduced meat consumption in developedcountries.The number of malnourished children in devel-oping countries would decline by 3.6 million children in2020 and by 1.2 million in Sub Saharan Africa.Thisimprovement in food security in developing countries ismuch smaller than many observers have predicted.


18/24

Productivity Growth and Food PricesAs already described, crop yields have been growing evermore slowly around the wor ld. Many yield gains inrecent decades have resulted from one-time advances,such as higher crop planting density,multiple harvesting,introduction of strains with greater fertilizer responsive-ness,and better management practices.Crop yields maybe approaching their physical limitations in some high-yield systems,primarily in developed countr ies,and themaximum yield potentials of rice and maize havechanged little over the past three decades.Environmental constraints add a layer of uncertainty toany prediction regarding future yields of intensively culti-vated crops.Some of the worlds most productive agri-cultural areas now suffer environmental repercussionsfrom intensive use of fert ilizer, irrigation, and pesticides.

What would happen if a combination of increased

environmental problems and reduced investment in agri-cultural research caused crop yields to grow more slowlythan in the baseline?Alternatively,what if the world foodsituation seized the attention of governments,interna-tional organizations,and private firms,unlockingresources for agricultural research and irrigation such

that crop yields increased more rapidly than in the base-line projection?

The low-yield scenario assumes that irrigationdoes not grow at all and that yield growth rates formeats, milk, and all crops decline by 50 percent fromthe baseline level in the developed world and by 40percent in the developing world.The high-yieldscenario assumes that irrigated area expands by 1percent per year over the baseline growth rate andthat yield growth rates rise by 20 percent from thebaseline level in the developed world and by 40percent in the developing world.

With slower growth in yields, supplies of foodwould be unable to keep pace with population andincome growth at prevailing prices.Food would becomescarce, result ing in sharply higher prices. In the low-yieldscenario, rice would be 46 percent more expensive in

2020,compared with baseline projections,and maizeprices 34 percent higher (Figures 15 and 16).Conversely, faster growth in yields would produce abun-dant food and falling prices.Maize prices would fall by30 percent compared with the baseline,and rice priceswould fall by 47 percent.

Changes in the growth of crop yieldshave dramatic effects on internationalcereal prices.Rice prices are particularlysensitive to slower yield growth becauseof the high proportion of rice produced inthe developing countries that are most

affected under this scenario. How fastinvestments in agricultural research andinfrastructure grow over the next fewdecadesand thus how fast crop yieldsgrowwill fundamentally determine theprice of food for the poor.

Trade LiberalizationIs ImportantMost governments have been unwilling toturn food production over to the forces of

the free market.They intervene in agricul-ture in countless ways to promotedomestic food production,to keepdomestic food prices low,or to reducedependence on foreign suppliers.Manyexperts have demanded at least the partialabolit ion of these measures,arguing thatthey produce inefficiencies that leave mostpeople worse off. Reducing agriculturaltrade distortions has been a major thrustof recent trade negotiations.

Low-yield scenario

500

400

300

200

100

0

US$permetricton

Figure 15 Rice prices under alternative scenarios, 19972020

1997 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020


Baseline scenario

High-yield scenario

Low-yield scenario150

125

100

50

25

0

US$permetricton

Figure 16 Maize prices under alternative scenarios, 19972020

1997 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020


Baseline scenario

High-yield scenario

2020GLOBALFOODO

UTLOOK

12


19/24

It is possible to simulate many of the effects ofremoving all agricultural subsidies and trade barriers,atleast on agricultural production.Although this simulationdoes not capture the possible effects of trade liberaliza-tion on other parts of the economy,such as industry, itcan provide some hints regarding the potential impor-tance of trade liberalization.

Because most subsidies and trade barriers promotehigher domestic production,full trade liberalization wouldgenerally cause agricultural production to fall somewhat,especially in the developed wor ld.Full liberalization wouldcause moderate increases in world cereal prices abovethe projected baseline level in 2020.World rice priceswould increase the most,by 14 percent above the base-line level in 2020,followed closely by wheat and maize,with price increases of 8 and 9 percent, respectively.Meatprices would respond to full trade liberalization with even

sharper price increases above baseline levels in 2020,withsheep and goat prices rising 19 percent and beef pricesrising 18 percent. Pork and poultry are less affected,withprice increases of 13 percent for both commodities.

More important, trade liberalization would generatesignificant net economic benefits.Taking into account thebenefits to producers and consumers and the tax savingsresulting from removals of subsidies,liberalizing tradefor the 16 commodities included in the model wouldgenerate global benefits of US$35.7 billion in 2020(Table 2). Both developed regions and developing regions

benefit,with the former gaining US$14.2 billion and thelatter US$21.5 billion.Although these gains are not largecompared with GDP, in many regions they are significantcompared with the value of agricultural production.Inpropor tion to their agricultural sectors, the biggestgainers would be Japan and South Korea (the latter isincluded in Other East Asia in the table).But the biggestabsolute gains would be in Sub-Saharan Africa,at US$4.4billion,or 10 percent of the value of production of thecommodities examined here.This gain arises partlybecause African farmers face less competition from subsi-dized exports from Europe and other developed coun-tr ies. It also,however, results from the removal of taxesthat most African governments impose on food produc-tion and consumption.These taxes tend to discourageinvestment by farmers and make food more expensivefor consumers.

This simulation captures only a portion of the poten-tial effects of trade liberalization. If removing tradebarriers stimulated overall economic growth by boostingindustrial production, it would also have large effects onagriculture and food consumption.

Policy Choices Make a Big DifferenceMost people,if given a moment to think about it,probablycould assemble a reasonable list of the factors that deter-mine how much food humankind has available to eat. Someof these forces are not under human control,such as the

REGION/COUNTRY

World

Developed count ries

United States

Europe ( EU-15 )

Japan

Developing countries

Latin A merica

West Asia/Nor t h A frica

Sub- Saharan A fr ica

China

Other East Asian countr ies

India

Other Sout h Asian count ries

Sout heast A sia

TOTALVALUE

(BI LLION S OF US$)

35.7

14.2

4 .3

4 .2

3 .0

21.5

3 .0

2 .3

4 .4

3 .6

2 .4

2 .1

1 .3

2 .5

SH A RE OF VA LUE OFAGRICULTURA L PRODUCTION

(%)

3.0

3 .0

2 .5

3 .0

22.3

3 .0

2 .1

5 .9

10.4

1 .3

36.7

1 .9

3 .3

3 .5

SHAREOF GDP

(%)

0.07

0.04

0.03

0.03

0.04

0.14

0.07

0.13

1.03

0.11

0.18

0.14

0.36

0.15

Table 2Effects of global trade liberalization on welfare, 2020

SOURCE:I FPRI IMPACT projections, June 2001.

GAIN S FROM GLOBAL TRAD E LIBERALIZ ATION

NOTE:Data represent net welfare effects if trade in the 16 commodities in IMPACT were liberalized.


20/24

weather.Many others are,at least to a degree.They includethe speed of population growth,the level of investment intechnologies that allow increased food production,and theability of farmers to take advantage of available methods forgrowing food.

But how much of a difference do these humanlycontrolled factors make?Put another way,how would theworld be different in 2020 as a result of a concentratedeffort to improve the global food situation?Howdifferent would that be from a world in which govern-ments,civil society,the private sector, and indeed allstakeholders devoted little attention to such issues?

Compare two alternative futures,an optimisticscenario characterized by increased attention to keydrivers of food security and a pessimistic scenario char-acterized by relative neglect of these key drivers.In thefirst, economic growth accelerates by 25 percent,

compared with the baseline projection,and populationgrowth rates decline.The number of people with accessto clean water and the number of women with accessto secondary education both increase by 10 percent.Depending on the region,agricultural yields increasebetween 10 and 20 percent faster than anticipated bythe baseline scenario.The area of irrigated landincreases substantially.

The second alternative foresees a reversal of thesedevelopments. Instead of accelerating,economic growthslows,while populations grow more rapidly.Access toclean water and to education declines.Agricultural yields

slow down, and no additional land is irr igated.Global cereal production in the more optimistic

scenario increases by 5 percent relative to the baselinescenario, whereas it decreases by 4 percent in thepessimistic scenario.Moreover, in the first scenario, food

becomes much cheaper.Rice, for instance,falls in price by44 percent compared with the 2020 baseline projection.In the pessimistic scenario, by contrast, its price rises by45 percent.These shifts in food production and pricesreverberate through world food markets.If food produc-tion should increase substantially,Asian countries wouldbecome less dependent on imports for their foodsupplies because they would be able to grow more oftheir own food.Sub-Saharan Afr ica,on the other hand,would import more,because food would become moreaffordable. If food production stagnated,on the otherhand,South Asias net imports of food would rise by 90percent.Sub-Saharan Afr ica would increasingly becomepriced out of wor ld food markets; the regions consumerswould need just as much food but would not have theincome to buy it.

The most dramatic result of this simulation is also

the most vital for humanity.The two alternatives for thefuture show enormous differences in the ability of fami-lies to feed their children.Under the optimisticscenario, the number of malnourished children in devel-oping nations would decline from 166 million in 1997 to94 million in 2020,well below the 132 million of thebaseline scenario. In China, this number would drop by80 percent over two decades.Latin America couldvirtually eliminate the scourge of malnutr it ion. In Sub-Saharan Afr ica,where childhood malnutr it ion is now onthe rise,progress would be less dramatic but stillsubstantial. Instead of increasing,as predicted by base-

line estimates, the number of malnour ished childrenwould decrease by 3 million (Figure 17).The centralcauses of this improvement in child malnutrition arethreefold: broad-based and rapid agricultural produc-tivity and economic growth, reduction in population

growth rates, and increased investmentin education and health.Each factoraccounts for about one-third of theimprovement in childhood malnutr it ion.

The pessimistic scenario, on theother hand,depicts a slowly unfoldingcatastrophe.Instead of substantial declines

in childhood malnutrition over the next20 years, the problem would becomeworse,especially in Sub-Saharan Africa,where the number of malnourished chil-dren would increase from 33 million to 49million.On a global scale, the developingcountries would be home to 178 millionmalnour ished children,compared with 94million in the optimistic scenario.This isthe human price of economic and agricul-tural failure.

100

80

60

40

20

0

Figure 17 Malnourished children in 1997 and 2020 under alternativescenarios

SouthAsia

Southe

ast

Asia

Latin

Am

eric

a

Sub-

Saha

ran

Afric

a

West A

sia/

North

Afric

a

SOU RCE: IFPRI I MPACT projections, June 2001.

Chi

na

1997

2020 Baseline Scenario

2020 O ptimistic Scenario2020 Pessimistic Scenario

Millions

2020GLOBALFOODO

UTLOOK

14


21/24

W

hat will it cost to generate the modest levels of agricultural production growth and human welfare

improvement envisioned by the baseline scenario?Investments by developing countries in five key

sectorsirrigation, rural roads, agricultural research,clean water provision,and educationare projected to

total US$579 billion between 1997 and 2020 (Table 3).These investments are certainly feasible.To put them

into context, if total government expenditures in the developing world stayed constant at 1997 levels, the

investments foreseen in the baseline scenario would amount to just 3.6 percent of total government spending

by developing countries from 1997 to 2020.

The Cost of Food Security

The economic burden represented by these invest-ments,however,varies significantly from region to region.South Asia and Latin America will have the highest total

expenditures,at US$148 billion and US$140 billionrespectively. Whereas Latin Americas annual investmentwill represent just over 2 percent of its total 1997government spending,South Asias investments willrepresent 11 percent.Sub-Saharan Afr icas investmentrequirements, totaling US$107 billion between 1997and 2020,will represent a sizeable 18.6 percent of 1997government spending on an annual basis.China willrequire investments totaling US$41 billion to achievebaseline results.

Of the five sectors, irrigation will account for 30percent of the total investment, with agriculturalresearch and rural roads accounting for another 21

percent each (Table 4).Educations share in investmentis the lowest,13 percent. Rural road construction will beparticularly impor tant in Sub-Saharan Afr ica and Latin

America,where it will represent 35 percent and 26percent of total investment in the five investmentsectors, respectively,because road construction willbe required to support relatively rapid area and cropyield growth in these regions.Even with these relativelyhigh levels of investment, Sub-Saharan Africa will stillhave an extremely underdeveloped transportationsystem,and further improvements will remain essentialdespite their expense.

Education will represent 27 percent of total invest-ment expenditures in West Asia and North Africa underthe baseline in large part because of rapid populationgrowth.Clean water,representing 15 percent of total

REGIONS

Latin A merica

West Asia/ Nor t h Afr ica

Sub- Saharan A frica

Sout h A siaIndia

Sout heast A sia

China

Developing Countries

BA SELIN E

140.4

80.5

106.9

148.2110.5

52.6

41.4

578.9

OPTIMISTIC

179.1

112.3

133.3

198.4137.8

69.7

83.5

802.4

PESSIMISTIC

75

52

63.9

70.354.5

27.1

26.8

322.7

BA SELIN E

2.2

2 .8

18.6

11.110.3

4 .2

1 .5

3 .6

OPTIMISTIC

2.9

3 .9

23.2

14.912.8

5 .6

3 .0

4 .9

PESSIMISTIC

1.2

1.8

11.1

5.3

5.1

2.2

1.0

2.0

Percent

AN NUA L INVESTMENT A S % OF 1997

GOVERNMENT EX PEN DITURE

Billionsof US$

Table 3Total projected investm ents,baseline, optimistic, and pessimistic scenarios, 19972020

SOURCE:Government expenditures are from World Bank 2000.

NOT E:In addition, international agricultural research expenditures by the CGIA R centers between 1997 and 2020 are projected to t otal US$ 9.65

billion for the baseline scenario, US$ 10.37 billion for the optim istic scenario, and US$ 7.53 billion for the pessimistic scenario.


22/24

Billions of US Dollars

2020GLOBALFOODO

UTLOOK

16

investment expenditures across the developing wor ld, isprojected to account for 35 percent of Chinas expendi-tures between 1997 and 2020.Agricultural research willaccount for particularly large shares of Chinas and WestAsia and North Africas total investment expenditures at35 percent and 31 percent, respectively,and relativelyhigh shares of Southeast Asias and Latin Americas totalinvestment expenditures at 27 percent and 26 percent,respectively.Public agricultural research will account foronly 7 percent of Sub-Saharan Africas total investmentexpenditures between 1997 and 2020.

Total investment under the pessimistic scenariodeclines to US$323 billion,a decline of 44 percent fromthe baseline level (Table 3).This savings comes at the costof leaving an additional 46 million children malnourishedin 2020.It is possibleindeed,it is necessary, for thehealth of millions of peopleto do even better.Thealternative future outlined in the previous section as theoptimistic scenario can be achieved if governments andthe private sector make a concerted effor t to financesignificantly larger investments.The optimistic scenariowould require a total investment amounting to a 39percent increase over baseline projections,or US$802

billion between 1997 and 2020.In the optimistic scenario, the largest single additionalinvestment is in irrigation. Spending on irrigation wouldalmost double compared with the baseline,amounting toUS$343 billion between 1997 and 2020.Spending oneducation would increase by 36 percent from the baselinescenario,with the increases concentrated in Latin Americaand Sub-Saharan Afr ica.Investment in rural roads wouldincrease by an addit ional 7 percent,with larger increasesprojected in Sub-Saharan Afr ica.

The most important result of this simulation isnot the exact distribution of the incremental investmentsamong these different areas.Equally impressive resultscan be achieved by investing additional money in roads oragricultural research, for instance, rather than in irriga-tion. Indeed,in combating childhood malnutr it ion, invest-ments in education and clean water are among the mostimportant factors, in addition to efforts devoted narrowlytoward increases in agricultural production.

What this simulation shows is that even this opti-mistic future can be achieved.It illustrates the totalinvestments required to make significant, even dramatic,improvements in the world food situation.These invest-ments represent less than 5 percent of governmentexpenditures in the developing world over the next 20years.This relatively modest level of commitment wouldincrease food security for millions more people than thebusiness-as-usual baseline scenario.

REGION/COUNTRY

Latin A merica

West Asia/Nor t h Afr ica

Sub- Saharan A frica

Sout h A sia

India

Sout heast A sia

China

Developing countries

IRRIGATION

44.8

17.9

28.1

61.3

42.5

18.6

3 .2

174.6

RURALROADS

36.7

7 .3

37.9

27.4

23.5

3 .9

6 .8

120.3

EDUCATION

12.1

21.5

15.7

14.5

10.5

6 .8

2 .4

75.9

CLEA NWATER

9.8

8 .5

17.3

27.0

18.4

9 .4

14.4

86.5

NATIONALAGRICUL-

TURALRESEAR CH

37.0

25.3

8 .0

18.0

15.6

14.1

14.6

121.7

TOTALIN VEST-MENTS

140.4

80.5

106.9

148.2

110.5

52.6

41.4

578.9

Table 4Investm ents in food security under the baseline scenario, 19972020

SOURCE:IFPRI IMPACT projections, June 2001.


23/24

T

he worlds decision makers face a fork in the road.This report shows some of the key policy and invest-

ment decisions that are likely to lead the world in the direction of food security for all and other

decisions likely to lead to increased poverty and malnutrition.Steps toward a future of global food security will

have enormous payoffs worldwide, offering all people a higher quality of life and greater economic potential. In

contrast, if decision makers fail to reform key policies or make adequate investmentsor even if they reduce

policy efforts slightly from those described in the baseline scenariothe costs in terms of human misery and

wasted potential will be enormous.

Conclusion

One theme echoed throughout this report is intenseconcern over the future prospects for Sub-Saharan

Afr ica.The pessimistic scenario described earlier,in fact,reflects a future that many experts see as the most likelyoutcome for Sub-Saharan Afr ica.Deteriorating naturalresources,stagnant technologies,and r ising populationdensities are common features of the rural landscapethroughout much of the Sub-Saharan Africa and will bealleviated only with a major structural transformationfrom subsistence agriculture to a commercialized andhighly productive agricultural economy capable ofsupporting a growing urban population.Equally importantare investments in social services,such as education andhealth,and broad-based economic growth.Withouteducation and health services, few positive changes arepossible or sustainable.Without economic growth in

rural areas as well as in the towns and cities, those whowant to or are forced to leave subsistence agriculture

will find few oppor tunities.Sub-Saharan Africa cannotafford to fall further behind in overcoming threats to thehealth and well-being of its children,but its leaders haveshown little sense of urgency and commitment to thechallenge of rural development to date.

Better policies and increased investmentsnot onlyin Sub-Saharan Africa,but also throughout the developingworldcan greatly improve food security for millions ofpeople.The future world will reflect, in profound ways,the choices made by national governments,nongovern-mental organizations,and private companies now and inthe coming decades.Those choices will build the worldthat we will face in 2020.


24/24

2020GLOBALFOODO

UTLOOK

18

Notes1.For details on the methodology,see Mark W.Rosegrant, Michael S.Paisner,Siet Meijer,and Julie Witcover,Global Food

Projections to 2020:Emerging Trends and Alternative Futures (Washington,D.C.:International Food Policy ResearchInstitute,2001).

2.Mark W.Rosegrant, N.Leach,and Roberta V.Gerpacio,Alternative Futures for World Cereal and Meat Consumption,Proceedings of the Nutrition Society 58,no.2 (1999):219234.

About the AuthorsMark W.Rosegrant is a senior research fellow in the Environment and Production Technology Division of the InternationalFood Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). Michael S.Paisner is a research assistant at the Carnegie Endowment for

International Peace.Siet Meijer is a senior research assistant in the Environment and Production Technology Division ofIFPRI.Julie Witcover is a graduate student at the University of California,Davis.

Global Food Outlook 2020

Documents

Transcript of Global Food Outlook 2020