Gizem Cakmak Greek -Turkish Relations in the Post Helsinki Period

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Greek -Turkish Relations in the post Helsinki Period: Is Europe a framework providing

dtente?

Gizem akmak

Abstract

This paper aims to examine the role of European Union in Greek-Turkish relations while

asking the question: Is Europe a framework providing dtente in Greek-Turkish relations?

Since 1996, with the efforts of Simitis government, there has been acceleration in

Europeanization of Greek Foreign Policy. Greece has shifted her position towards Turkey

from conditional sanctions to conditional rewards. The aim was to transfer the conflicts

of Greek-Turkish relations under the umbrella of European Union and make them the issuesof European Union. In 1999, Turkey and Greece were faced with successive earthquakes

which led to the mutual sympathy between Turkish and Greek societies and created the

atmosphere of friendship. Thanks to the euphoria of rapprochement and shift in the Greek

foreign Policy, Greece has lifted her historic opposition for Turkeys EU membership in

Helsinki Summit. Turkey, who became an associate member in 1963, had has the longest

association period among the candidate countries. Turkey was left outside in 1997 at

Luxembourg Summit, where Cyprus was accepted as an official candidate. Thus, Helsinki

Summit can be regarded as a turning point in both Greek-Turkish and EU relations.

This paper argues that the European Union used to be a framework providing dtente in

Greek-Turkish relations. However, the accession of Cyprus to the Union without reaching a

solution in the island stands as an obstacle on Turkish accession. From the thirty five chapters

that are subject to negotiations, eight chapters are frozen due to the Turkeys obligation to

fully implement the Additional Protocol which means opening her ports and airports to

Cyprus. Since 2005, no significant progress was made in the negotiations. Also, the form of

membership and the deadline for Turkish accession seems uncertain. Currently, Greece is

fighting with the debt crisis which also shakes the Euro-zone. On the other hand, Turkey with

the growing self-confidence in her foreign policy made effort to increase her role in the region

by focusing less on the EU and to accession process. It can be stated that The European Union

has lost its significance on the Greek-Turkish Relations as a framework providing dtente.


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Br ief H istory of Turk ish-Greek Relations

Turkish- Greek relations remained problematic and conflicting until 1999. The relations

between Greeks and Turks were characterized by mistrust, suspicion and threat perception.

Mutual suspicion and the threat perception associated with the other side have grown day to

day. The national education system in Greece as well as Turkey, and the media played a

significant role in establishing mutual suspicion and prejudices among societies.

Only the short periods of interaction and cooperation in the beginning of the 1930s and after

the World War II were experienced. A spirit of reconciliation was reached in the beginning of

the 1930s, thanks to the efforts of Ataturk and Venizelos. This period was followed by thedtente period after the World War II when the two countries became the members of the

NATO, namely the Western Alliance. In those dtente periods, there was a common

perceived threat which led to the rapprochement; Italy and the Soviet Union respectively.

Under the patronage of the US, Greece and Turkey became the important actors in

containment of the Soviet Union with their strategic location in the Southeastern Europe.

Greece and Turkey were enjoying the funds coming from the United States in the name of

Marshall Aid. The past rivalries were set aside under the umbrella of NATO until the

emergence of Cyprus issue in the middle of the 1950s.

Cyprus had been occupied by Britain since 1878 and formally became a colony in 1925.

Growing nationalism in the island, especially among the Greek Cypriots created a new

demand for the union (enosis) of the island with Greece. According to Coulombis, The first

part of the 20thcentury was an age of fierce nationalism and Cyprus was not left unaffected.

Nationalism as a powerful mobilizing political and psychological forces began to spill over

from the Turkish and Greek main-lands into the Greek and Turkish communities in Cyprus.1

The Cyprus conflict has turned into an issue between Greece and Turkey in the middle of the

1950s. In 1960 Cyprus was announced as an independent state according to an agreement

signed between the guarantor powers of Great Britain, Greece, and Turkey. However, the

inter-communal violence between 1963 and 1967 had reached to the peak level. In 1974,

Turkey by using its rights from the guarantor agreement intervened to the island in the name

1Theodore A. Couloumbis, The United States, Greece and Turkey: A Troubled Triangle (New York: Praeger

Publishers, 1983), 27.


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of protecting Turkish Cypriots from the violence. This led to the partition of the island and

Greeces withdrawal from the NATOs military flank. The military junta in Greece has come

to an end and the power passed to the civilian politicians.

Since then, numbers of initiatives by the United Nations were failed and the Cyprus problem

remained unsolved and reached a deadlock. Thanks to the nationalist foreign policies in

Turkey and Greece, the Cyprus issue remained as the main obstacle on reconciliation between

the two countries.For most of the 20th century, relations between Greece and Turkey were

defined by the high politics, where the national security interests dominate the agenda of the

foreign policies such as Cyprus and the Aegean disputes.

Cyprus issue together with the continuing dispute over competing rights in the Aegean Region

opened the era of cold war in Greek-Turkish relations. Since the early 1970s, the most

important issues concerning the Aegean Sea were the delimitation of continental shelf and

territorial waters in the Aegean Sea, the control of airspace, and the militarization of the

Aegean Islands. The two countries could not reach any solution concerning the Aegean

dispute over thirty years of conflict. Even the proposed ways of solving the dispute differ

from one country to the other. Greece wants to carry the mutual conflicts into the

International Court of Justice (ICJ) where Turkey is in favor of bilateral negotiations and

talks.

There was a military takeover in Turkey in 1980, all the political parties were banned and the

military took the power in their hands until 1983. Only after 1983, the free elections could be

held and civilian government could be formed. Thanks to the high pressure from NATO,

military government in Turkey lifted Turkeys veto on Greeces return to NATOs military

flank. In return, bilateral negotiations on the Aegean Disputes were to be held between the

two countries. Relying on the verbal soldier promise of General Rogers, Kenan Evren, the

head of military junta lifted the veto and Greece returned to the military wing of NATO after

six years. In the 1980s, despite the a short-lived rapprochement period between Papandreou

and zal, the Cyprus issue and Aegean disputes remained unsolved and occupied the agenda

of Greece as well as Turkey.

The era between 1974 and 1996 as the Cold War Years between Greece and Turkey, which

carried the potential for an armed conflict between the two countries2Also, especially the last

2Alexis Heraclides, Yunanistan ve Doudan Gelen TehlikeTrkiye: Trk-Yunan likilerinde kmazlar ve zm

Yollar, (stanbul: letiim Yaynlar, 2002), 29. [Ellada kai Eks Anatolon Kindinos]


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decade of the 20th

century has been a problematic and conflicting period in Turkish-Greek

relations. The sovereignty question over the Kardak / Imia islets brought Turkey and Greece

to the brink of war in 1996. The confrontation over the Russian S-300 surface-to-air missiles

in Cyprus, the opposition of Greece to Turkeys European Union application, and the calan

affair in 1999, among other events, made the 1990s a particularly turbulent period. In 1990s,

with the emerging new world order, the minority rights issue became prominent in

international platforms. By benefiting from this international sensibility, the Greek Orthodox

Minority in Istanbul and the Turkish / Muslim Minority in Greece started to raise their voices

in international arenas.

In 1999, Turkey experienced a disastrous earthquake in the Marmara Region (the cities of

zmit, stanbul, Sakarya and Yalova) which cost 20.000 lives. Greece was the first among the

countries which went for aid with well-equipped rescue teams, doctors, foods and medical

supplies. The ruined cities after the disaster were broadcasted in Greek televisions, and those

views together with the cries and screams of the victims led the Greek public to grow more

empathy towards the Turkish people. For many years, Turks were taught and screened as

barbaric nation and national enemy in Greece and regarded as rude warriors and

uncivilized invaders.3This time the picture of the Turk was totally different who was crying

in front of the ruins hopelessly. They were normal human beings suffering. Thus, for the first

time, the image of the Turk became blurred and the Greeks, instead of celebrating the

Turkish disasters (as one would have expected given the level of enmity), they lent them their

support.4The image of Greeks in Turkey was not better. This aid surprised the Turks who

have believed for many years that the Greeks hate Turks and wanted to harm Turks whenever

it is possible. Normally the Greeks were perceived as unfaithful, unreliable, cunning, and

insatiableand the spoiled children of the West.5

In only a month, in September 1999, this time Athens was hit by an earthquake. This time

Turkish rescue team- AKUT went to Athens immediately and their services were appreciated

3 See: Hercules Millas, National Perception of the Other and the Persistence of Some Images, in Turkish-

Greek Relations: The Security Dilemma in the Aegean eds Mustafa Aydn and Kostas Ifantis (London: Routledge,

2004).4Alexis Heraclides. 2011. The Essence of the Greek-Turkish Rivalry: National Narrative and Identity,Hellenic

Observatory Papers on Greece and Southeast Europe, GreeSE Paper 51: 25

http://www2.lse.ac.uk/europeanInstitute/research/hellenicObservatory/pdf/GreeSE/GreeSE51.pdf (accessed

January 13, 2012)5

Millas, Hercules, National Perceptions of the Other and the Persistence of Some Images in Ayidin Mustafa &Kostas Ifantis (eds), Turkish-Greek Relations: The Security Dilemma in the Aegean, (London, Routledge, 2004),

pp. 54


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by Greeks. The mutual sympathy that emerged between the societies after the earthquake in

Turkey was reinforced.

This exchange of sympathy and improved relations with the public support was called

earthquake diplomacy between Greece and Turkey.6 The earthquake diplomacy provided

the public support which is vital for long-term reconciliation in Greek-Turkish relations.

However, at governmental level the reconciliation had already been started when George

Papandreou was assigned as the Greek Foreign Minister and when he had found himself a

moderate counterpart, Turkish Foreign Minister smail Cem. This time, with a public support

in Greece as well as Turkey, there has been acceleration in the cooperation among non-

governmental organizations, universities, and municipalities. There has also been a significant

increase in the volume of business transactions and businessmen on both sides who have been

seeking new opportunities and ways of expanding trade activities. Rather than focusing on

traditional, historical conflicts of High Politics such as Aegean Disputes, the Cyprus Issue,

and Issues of Minorities which are regarded as national problems, both countries decided to

cooperate in low politics. Those issues of low politics were culture, tourism, cooperation on

crime, human trafficking, and illegal immigration.

The most significant step in Greek Foreign Policy regarding Turkey was taken at the

Helsinki Summit on December 1999. The historic Greek veto over Turkeys membership was

lifted and Turkey was accepted as an official EU candidate. Since 1999, Turkey and Greece

enjoy the rapprochement period while improving their relations at the societal level as well as

the governmental level.

Turkey, Greece and the EEC/EU

In Turkey, the roots of Westernization can be traced back to the late Ottoman Period. Among

the Turkish political elites, westernization was regarded as synonymous with modernization,

and as reaching the highest point of civilization. Republic of Turkey, from the very beginning

of its emergence, turned its face to the West and westernization was declared as an official

6For the term Earthquake or Sismic Diplomacy See: Erik Siegl, Greek-Turkish Relations- Continuity or

Change?, Perspectives: Central European Review of International Affairs, no.18 (2002): 40-52. Dimitris Keridis,

"Earthquakes, Diplomacy and New Thinking in Foreign Policy," The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, no.30(2006):1, and Bahar Rumelili, The European Unions Impact on the Greek-Turkish Conflict: A Review of the

Literature, Working Papers Series in EU Border Conflicts Studies,No.6 (January 2004).


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state ideology. Thus, joining the family of Europe has been the major objective of Turkish

political elites among decades.

Turkey applied for membership to the European Economic Community in July 1959, shortly

after the creation of the ECC and the Greeces application. The Agreement Creating an

Association between the Republic of Turkey and the European Economic Community (the

"Ankara Agreement") was signed on 12 September 1963. This agreement, which entered into

force on 1 December 1964, aimed at securing Turkey's full membership in the EEC through

the establishment in three phases of a customs union which would serve as an instrument to

bring about integration between the EEC and Turkey.7Turkey was the second country to sign

a European association agreement, normally seen as a prelude to membership.8An Additional

Protocol was signed in November 1970 and the conditions for Turkeys prospective customs

union with the ECC were presented.

The years between 1973 and 1980 cannot be used efficiently by Turkey due to the domestic

political problems.Turkey, instead of being in search of closer ties with Europe to balance

Greek application in 1975, preffered to move away from the relationship.In October 1978, the

Ecevit government imposed a unilateral freeze on the Association, reneging on the

commitment to proceed to the next round of tariff cuts.9 Since Greeces application for

membership in 1975 until the date it became officially a member of the Community in 1981,

five different governments were formed in Turkey. Those governments were not powerful

enough to take a huge step about EEC membership during the heavy unstable political

conditions in Turkey. There was a widespread belied among the governments that the

association with the European Community could damage Turkeys economy.

In 1980, the military intervened in politics and in 1982 the Association was suspended by the

European Community. The newly imposed constitiution was much more restrictive than the

previous constitiution and was not in line with the European democracy standards. The

interpretations and the application of this constitution created problems between Turkey and

the European Union in the 1990s and the 2000s.

7 Turkish Ministry of EU Affairs, History of Turkey and the EU Relations,

http://www.abgs.gov.tr/index.php?p=111&l=2( accessed April 14, 2012)8Murat Metin Hakk, Turkey and the EU: Past Challenges and Important Issues Lying Ahead, Turkish Studies

7, no. 3 (2006): 4519Susannah Verney, National identity and political change on Turkeys road to EU membership, Journal of

Southern Europe and the Balkans 9, no. 3 (2007):214
http://www.abgs.gov.tr/index.php?p=111&l=2http://www.abgs.gov.tr/index.php?p=111&l=2http://www.abgs.gov.tr/index.php?p=111&l=2


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Turkey could return to the democracy in 1983 and the multi-party elections were held.

Another three years were to pass before the Association Agreement began to operate again,

with an Association Council meeting held at ambassadorial level in 1986. 10 Thus, Turkey

could apply for full membership in 1987, on the basis of the EEC Treaty's article 237 which

gave any European country the right to do so.11

The Prime Minister zal played significant role on Turkeys application as he was different

from the traditional former politicians and wanted to bring new openings in Turkeys political

and economic relations with the world. Being the member of the European Economic

Community was regarded as a necessity for Turkey politically as well as economically.

Turkeys application was forwarded to the Commission; this confirmed the Turkish eligibility

for membership and recognition as a European country. 12In 1989 Turkeys application was

rejected by the European Commission. The Commission while rejecting the Turkeys

application claimed that there is a substantial economic and development gap between Turkey

and the Community, and cited Turkeys disputes with Greece, the Cyprus issue and the level

of democracy.

To appease Turkeys discontent for the polite rejection of its EEC membership application in

1989, the European Commission initiated a renewed effort to accomplish a customs union

between Turkey and the European Economic Community.13 The European Community

regarded Turkey as a startegic huge market and wanted to improve economic cooperation.

However, the funds provided from the Community to Turkey were blocked by Greece again.

10Ibid.

11Turkish Ministry of EU Affairs, History of Turkey and the EU Relations,

http://www.abgs.gov.tr/index.php?p=111&l=2( accessed April 14, 2012)12

The Council forwarded Turkey's application to the Commission for the preparation of an Opinion. This has

reconfirmed Turkey's eligibility, given that a similar application by Morocco was turned down by the Council on

the grounds that Morocco is not a European country.13

Ioannis N. Grigoriadis, The Changing Role of the EU Factor in Greek-Turkish Relations (Symposium Paper,London School Of Economics And Political Science, Hellenic Observatory, 1st PhD Symposium on Modern

Greece: Current Social Science Research on Greece, London, 21-06-2003):2.
http://www.abgs.gov.tr/index.php?p=111&l=2http://www.abgs.gov.tr/index.php?p=111&l=2http://www.abgs.gov.tr/index.php?p=111&l=2


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Greece applied for accession to the newly established European Economic Community

in June 1959, and signed an Association Agreement with the EEC as early as 1961. The

Athens Agreement was aiming Greeces accession to ECC within the 22 years. The

agreement was frozen between 1967 and 1974 due to the existence of military junta in

Greece. With the restoration of democracy in 1974, European welcomed Greece back, and in

early 1975 Greece applied for full membership.

The Turkish government regarded the Greek accession application as a political act aimed at

getting a new international platform against Turkey.14 Stephanou and Tsardines claimed that

Turkey by sending a survey ship to explore the east Aegean continental shelf in mid-July

1976 was trying to provoke a crisis between Greece and Turkey. By this way, Turkey could

make visible the dangers of accepting Greece as a member state to the Community. 15

European Community was not in favor of being sided or involved in Greek-Turkish disputes

before the Greek entry.

Greeces desire for being a full member to the European Community was mainly security

driven, and a need for protection against the Turkish threat. NATO, due to its pro-Turkish

stance in the Cyprus crisis, lost its credibility among Greeks. Thus, Greece started to look for

the alliance alternatives. Prime Minister Karamanlis made effort to convince European leaders

for Greek membership. The commission regarded the Greek application as primarily political,

and as a guarantee of safeguarding democracy in Greece. As such, for the EC, the admission

of Greece was a political responsibility which we cannot refuse, except at the price of

denying the principles on which it is itself grounded. 16According to Pettifer, in the minds of

most European leaders, there was a substantial element of Philhellenism. Greece was seen by

these committed Philhellenists as the source of most civilization in Europe at an intellectual

level, and deserving privileged treatment within the union in its drive to re-establish

democracy.17Soon in 1981, Greece joined the EEC as its tenth member.

14 The Economist, 21 June 1975 quoted in Susannah Verney, National identity and political change on Turkeys

road to EU membership,Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans 9, no. 3 (2007):21415

Constantine Stephanou and Charalambos Tsardines, The EC and Greece-Turkey-Cyprus in The Greek-

Turksh Conflict in the 1990s: Domestic and External Influences, ed. Dimitri Constas ( London: MacmillianPublishing, 1991),209.16

European Commission 1978, quoted in Susannah Verney, Greece and European Community, 261.

*Philhellenism refers to the Love of the Greek culture.17

James Pettifer, Greek Political Culture and Foreign Policyin Greece in a Changing Europe: Between

European Integration and Balkan disintegration? eds. Kevin Featherstone and Kostas Ifantis (Manchester:Manchester University Press, 1996), 18.

Philhellenism refers to the Love of the Greek culture.


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Greeces accession to the European Economic Community in 1981 negatively affected

Turkeys relations with the Community and later with the European Union. The rule of

unanimity in the EEC decision-making process provided Greece with leverage in influencing

Turkey-EEC relations.18Greece succeeded to prevent and block the financial aid for Turkey

provided from the community. The period between 1987 and 1995 can be marked as the

period of Greeces isolationist policies towards Turkish membership.

According to Yannas, since becoming a full member of the EEC in 1981, Greece tried to

persuade the other EEC member states that the upgrading and / normalization of EEC- Turkey

relations cannot proceed without substantial progress being made on issues that are of vital

importance to Greece, that is, settlement of Greek Turkish disputes over the air space and

continental shelf of the Aegean Sea and the resolution of the Cyprus problem. 19 The veto

power that Greece had with the membership and the unanimous nature of the Community

decisions turned to a situation that Turkeys way to Europe passes through Athens. Greece

started to impose the policy of conditionality towards Turkey and strengthened her

bargaining power. Greece managed to transfer the Turkish- Greek issues to the Community-

wide concern and succeeded to internationalize the Cyprus issue. Also, she was successful in

receiving the Communitys solid support for her position in Cyprus.20

In the beginning of the 1990s, dissolution of Soviet Union and the collapse of the communist

systems brought significant challenges for Greece as well as Turkey. Especially, Greece was

affected from dissolution of Yugoslavia rather than the Soviet Union because the new states

emerged in Balkans and created instability. The name dispute over Macedonia with

FYROM, the problems with Albania and the bloddy war in Bosnia put Greece in a troubled

position within the European Union. Greek pro-Serb stance over the Bosnian war was harshly

criticized by the Europeans and her insistence over the name issue with FYROM could never

been understood by the European partners. Greece by blocking the consensus within the

Union and by using arbitrary vetos was labeled as the black sheep and awkard squard by

the other European member states.

18Ioannis N. Grigoriadis, The Changing Role of the EU Factor in Greek-Turkish Relations (Symposium Paper,

London School Of Economics And Political Science, Hellenic Observatory, 1st PhD Symposium on Modern


http://www2.lse.ac.uk/europeanInstitute/research/hellenicObservatory/pdf/1st_Symposium/GrigoriadisIoanni

s.pdf (accessed April 1, 2012)19

Prodromos Yannas, The Greek Factor in EC- Turkey Relations in Greece and EC Membership Evaluated,eds. Panos Kazakos and Panagiotis C. Ioakimidis ( London:Pinter Publishers, 1994), 215.20

Ibid, 216.
http://www2.lse.ac.uk/europeanInstitute/research/hellenicObservatory/pdf/1st_Symposium/GrigoriadisIoannis.pdfhttp://www2.lse.ac.uk/europeanInstitute/research/hellenicObservatory/pdf/1st_Symposium/GrigoriadisIoannis.pdfhttp://www2.lse.ac.uk/europeanInstitute/research/hellenicObservatory/pdf/1st_Symposium/GrigoriadisIoannis.pdfhttp://www2.lse.ac.uk/europeanInstitute/research/hellenicObservatory/pdf/1st_Symposium/GrigoriadisIoannis.pdfhttp://www2.lse.ac.uk/europeanInstitute/research/hellenicObservatory/pdf/1st_Symposium/GrigoriadisIoannis.pdf


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Turkey, contrary to the expectations, did not loose its strategic importance with the end of the

Cold War. The Gulf War and the new international challenges which the United States

involves, kept Turkeys position as an important player in the region. After the collapse of

the Soviet regimes, the Turkic World which was under the Soviet domination has opened up

as a new focus of attention to the Turkish policy makers. zal saw Central Asia as a new

opportunity to expand Turkeys influence which could enhance the Turkeys strategic

importance. Thus, the problematic relations with Europe could be balanced. This move was

perceived as a threat by Greece as sounds expansionist and as an aim targeted greater Turkish

influence.

The 1990s were also important years in terms of both deepening and widening of the

European Community. The European Union officially came into being on 1 November 1993,

when the Maastricht Treaty entered into force. It was a big step taken by the Community on

the way of political union in addition to economic and monetary integration. The Maastricht

Treaty created a European Union composed of three pillars: The European Community, the

Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) which

meant judicial cooperation between states in criminal matters. 21The Treaty of Maastricht

represented a new stage in European integration since it opened the way to political

integration. The Treaty introduced the concept of European citizenship, reinforced the powers

of the European Parliament and launched the economic and monetary union (EMU).

Moreover, the EEC became the European Community (EC). 22

In 1993, the Copenhagen criteria which set the conditions for EU membership were resumed

in the EUs Cophenagen Summit. According to the Presidency Conclusion of the Summit;

Membership requires that the candidate country has achievedstability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law,

human rights and respect for and protection of minorities, the

existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to

cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union.

Membership presupposes the candidate's ability to take on the

21 Karen E. Smith, European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007), 26.

22The Summaries of EU legislation, The Treaty of Maastricht accessed June 12, 2011.

http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/economic_and_monetary_affairs/institutional_and_economic_framework/treaties_maastricht_en.htm
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/economic_and_monetary_affairs/institutional_and_economic_framework/treaties_maastricht_en.htmhttp://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/economic_and_monetary_affairs/institutional_and_economic_framework/treaties_maastricht_en.htmhttp://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/economic_and_monetary_affairs/institutional_and_economic_framework/treaties_maastricht_en.htmhttp://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/economic_and_monetary_affairs/institutional_and_economic_framework/treaties_maastricht_en.htmhttp://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/economic_and_monetary_affairs/institutional_and_economic_framework/treaties_maastricht_en.htm


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obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of

political, economic and monetary union.23

Turkey, in order to be the member, had to fulfill the political accession criteria by

democratization and institutional reforms. The European Union was in favor of further

economic integration with Turkey by realizing the Custom Union Agrrement. Due to the

Greek veto it could only be achieved on 6 March 1995 when Greece lifted its veto against the

Turkey-EU customs union agreement and the release of EU funds for Turkey provided for by

the Fourth Additional Protocol.24Greece while opening the way for Turkeys custom union

aggrement put the precondition that the accession negotiations between Cyprus and the

European Union would be guaranteed. This Greek move can be regarded as a milestone or U

Turn in Greek Foreign Policy towards Turkish accession. However, it can also be stated thatthe shift was a product of traditional conditionality policy of Greece; guaranting Cyprus

membership in exchange for lifting her veto over Turkeys custom union aggrement.

The customs union agreement between Turkey and the European Union came into force on 1

January 1996. In Turkey, it was regarded as the first step for further political integration and

the membership of the European Union. It was commonly believed that economically, the

customs union aggrement would bring stability and increase the foreign investments and the

competition with the European companies.

Following the customs union aggrement of the EU with Turkey, Turkish-Greek relations

became tense again due to the sovereignty conflict over Kardak / Imia islets in the Aegean

Sea. Two countries almost came to the brink of an armed conflict which could only prevented

by the US intervention. It paved the way for the 1997 Madrid Declaration where the two

states committed themselves not to use violence and undertake unilateral actions. 25

The Simitis government in Greece put modernization and Europeanization as the priorities in

their agenda and wanted to transfer Greece into the core of Europe from being a peripherial

country within the EU. Simitis was in favor of developing closer relations with Turkey and

used the Ocalan incident to rectify the nationalist-populist figures that involved this incident

23Presidency Conclusions, Copenhagen European Council 1993, 7.A.iii

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/enlargement/ec/pdf/cop_en.pdf( accessed April 11, 2012)24

Grigoriadis, The Changing Role of the EU Factor, 3. 25Bahar Rumelili, The European Unions Impact on the Greek-Turkish Conflict, Working Papers Series

in EU Border Conflicts Studies, no.6 (2004): 4
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/enlargement/ec/pdf/cop_en.pdfhttp://www.europarl.europa.eu/enlargement/ec/pdf/cop_en.pdfhttp://www.europarl.europa.eu/enlargement/ec/pdf/cop_en.pdf


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from the government and opened the way for the modernization.26

In 1999, Greece lifted her

historic veto over Turkeys EU membership by realizing that the Europeanization of the

Greek-Turkish disputes would serve better Greek interests. A Turkey on the path to Europe

would be more inclined to accept Greeces conditions than a Turkey which was not politically

engaged with Europe. Greeks believed that the EU would play a transformative role in

bilateral relations than to keep Turkey out of the Union, which would leave Greece with an

erratic, unpredictable but still powerful neighbor.27 EU accession process would transform

Turkey to a less threatening country and would lessen the power of the military. The mutual

conflicts between Turkey and Greece will be transferred to the European Union framework

and would be solved during the accession negoatiations.

It can be stated that until 1999, the European Community / Union failed to have a positive

impact on the Turkish-Greek conflicts and could not succeed to create detente between

Turkey and Greece. Before Greeces accession to European Community, during the Cyprus

crisis in 1974, Karamanlis who was aware of conflict with Turkey would hamper Greeces

membership of the EEC, settled a policy of deterrence against Turkey. Also, in the 1976 crisis

over the Aegean continental shelf, Karamanlis chose to deal with the crisis by taking the issue

to the United Nations Security Council and the International Court of Justice, rather than by

military means.28

The second crisis over the Aegean continental shelf in 1987 was restrained, this time due to

the Turkeys application to the European Community. Prime Minister of Turkey zal was

aware that improved relations with Greece were necessary to prevent a Greek veto and to

strengthen Turkeys membership prospects in the EC.29He made effort to open the way for

dialogue with his Greek counterpart Papandreou hoping that the spirit of dialogue would led

Greece to lift her veto on Turkeys membership. All those policy formations considering theEuropean Union necessities, remained very limited. The EU could not be a framework for

providing Turkish- Greek detente.

26Turkeys public enemy number one and the head of the PKK, which had been waging a separatist

insurgency against Turkey since 1984, Turkeys public enemy number one was apprehended by Turkey afterspending a week as a guest at the Greek Embassy in Kenya.27

James Ker-Lindsay, The Policies of Greece and Cyprus towards Turkeys EU Accession, Turkish Studies 8, no.

1(2007):73.28Rumelili, The European Unions Impact, 6.

29Ibid, 7.


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Following the crisis in 1987, Papandreou and zal met in World Economic Forum in Davos

in 1988. However, this sprit of dialogue remained short lived and resultless as there was no

public support for the rapprochement. Greece by putting forward the Cyprus dispute vetoed

Turkeys accession to the Community.

In the 1990s, the European Union emerged as a more active player in the international

relations and left its abstaining position in conflict resolutions. Conflicts between Turkey and

Greece were expected to mediate by the NATO or the US involvement. Kardak / Imia crisis

can be regarded as an example to the American involvement in which the conflict was ended

with the personal involvement and efforts of the US President Bill Clinton.

In the 1990s, as Greece has already been a member, the European Union only could use its

sanction mechanisms on Turkey to resolve the Turkish-Greek disputes. Also, with Greeces

membership, the EC has technically lost its third party capacity in Greek-Turkish disputes.30

In 1999, when Turkey was given the candidacy, Cyprus accession was already guaranteed by

2004 and unilateral pressures were putted on Turkey as a condition. Muftuler Bac states that

Greece, which opposed Turkeys candidacy in Luxembourg, gave in at the 1999 Helsinki

summit partly because the EU inserted in the Helsinki conclusions that Cypruss membership

did not necessitate a settlement over the division of the island.31 The conclusions of the

Helsinki summit put some conditions on Turkey with articles 4 and 9 emphasizing the fact

that Turkeys eligibility for EU membership after Helsinki depended on resolving two issues:

its border conflict with Greece, and the Cyprus dispute. Article 4 states that The European

Council will review the situation relating to any outstanding disputes, in particular concerning

the repercussions on the accession process and in order to promote their settlement through

the International Court of Justice, at the latest by the end of 2004.32According to Article 9 (a)

of the Helsinki Conclusion,

The European Council welcomes the launch of the talks aimed at a

comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem on 3 December in

30Ibid,9.

31Meltem Mftler Ba and Aylin Gney, The European Union and the Cyprus Problem 19612003,Middle

Eastern Studies 41, no.2 (March 2005): 289.32

Council Of The European Union, Helsinki Summit Conclusions Article 4,http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/ACFA4C.htm(accessed January 7,

2012)
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/ACFA4C.htm%20%20(accessed%20January%2011http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/ACFA4C.htm%20%20(accessed%20January%2011http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/ACFA4C.htm%20%20(accessed%20January%2011


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New York and expresses its strong support for the UN Secretary-

Generals efforts to bring the process to a successful conclusion.33

On 12-13 December, during the Copenhagen Summit, Greece was among the few members of

the European Union who supported and pushed to give an early date to Turkey to begin

accession negotiations. Greece, acting together with Italy and Spain, argued that the

European Union should reconsider Turkeys progress in the implementation of the

Copenhagen criteria within 2003, so that Turkeys EU accession negotiations could start in

2004.34This support was a product of the shift in Greek foreign policy from the exclusion of

Turkey from the European Union to the belief that Turkey inside the Union constituted a

lesser threat for Greece. Also, at the Copenhagen Summit, it was declared that the

negotiations with Cyprus had come to an end, and Cyprus would be a full member by 1 May

2004.35This led Turkey to accelerate efforts to reach a solution regarding the Cyprus issue.

The conservative and pro-European governments of the Justice and Development Party and

its leader Tayyip Erdogan, together with other senior members of the government, have

encouraged Turkish Cypriot Leader Denkta to strive to reach a settlement before Cyprus is

admitted as an EU member in May 2004.36It was a move to secure Turkish accession to the

EU by removing Cyprus as a possible obstacle to Turkeys membership.

In the post-2002 era, with the Europeanization efforts of the Justice and Development Party

government in Turkey, some steps were taken to make the necessary reforms for the EU

membership. According to ni, Justice and Development Partys Europeanization efforts

33Council Of The European Union, Helsinki Summit Conclusions Article 9 (a),

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/ACFA4C.htm (accessed January 11,

2012)34

Ioannis N. Grigoriadis, The Changing Role of the EU Factor in Greek-Turkish Relations (Symposium Paper,London School Of Economics And Political Science, Hellenic Observatory, 1st PhD Symposium on Modern


http://www2.lse.ac.uk/europeanInstitute/research/hellenicObservatory/pdf/1st_Symposium/GrigoriadisIoanni

s.pdf (accessed February 1, 2012)35

See Article 1 of Copenhagen European Council Presidency Conclusions: The European Council in Copenhagen

in 1993 launched an ambitious process to overcome the legacy of conflict and division in Europe. Today marks

an unprecedented and historic milestone in completing this process with the conclusion of accession

negotiations with Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, the Slovak

Republic and Slovenia. The Union now looks forward to welcoming these States as members from 1 May 2004.

http://ec.europa.eu/research/era/docs/en/council-eu-27.pdf (accessed January 14, 2012)36

Tzn Baheli, Turning a New Page in Turkeys Relations with Greece? The Challenge of Reconciling Vital

Interests, in Turkish-Greek Relations: The Security Dilemma in the Aegean, eds. Mustafa Aydn and KostasIfantis (London: Routledge, 2004), 115.
http://www2.lse.ac.uk/europeanInstitute/research/hellenicObservatory/pdf/1st_Symposium/GrigoriadisIoannis.pdfhttp://www2.lse.ac.uk/europeanInstitute/research/hellenicObservatory/pdf/1st_Symposium/GrigoriadisIoannis.pdfhttp://www2.lse.ac.uk/europeanInstitute/research/hellenicObservatory/pdf/1st_Symposium/GrigoriadisIoannis.pdfhttp://ec.europa.eu/research/era/docs/en/council-eu-27.pdfhttp://ec.europa.eu/research/era/docs/en/council-eu-27.pdfhttp://ec.europa.eu/research/era/docs/en/council-eu-27.pdfhttp://www2.lse.ac.uk/europeanInstitute/research/hellenicObservatory/pdf/1st_Symposium/GrigoriadisIoannis.pdfhttp://www2.lse.ac.uk/europeanInstitute/research/hellenicObservatory/pdf/1st_Symposium/GrigoriadisIoannis.pdf


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were aiming to protect religious conservatives from the pressures of the secular state elites.

Similarly, secularists have conceived of EU membership as a means of protecting and

consolidating the secular, Western-oriented character of Turkey, hence, as a medium of

preventing further Islamization of Turkish.37

The period between the summer of 2002 until October 2005 (marking the formal opening up

accession negotiations) can be marked as the golden age period when the passage of dramatic

reform package from the Parliament.38 The Justice and Development Party government, in

spite of the initial reservations when their Islamist background is concerned, acted as a reform

oriented party during the golden age. The Brussels decision of 2004 clearly underlined the

pace of transformation and reform that Turkey had experienced during this golden age

period.39

During this period Turkey and Greece have enjoyed the dtente and spririt of reconciliation

due to the Europeanization efforts in both countries and the high public support for the

rapprochement. The civil society dialogue has increased since 1999 with the mutual

sympathy emerged as the product of the earthquakes in Turkey and Greece. This time the

demand for rapprochement came from the societal level and civil society actors started to play

important and independent role in Turkish-Greek relations. The European Union has apositive impact in this dialogue by promoting democratisation and civil society activity in

Greece and in Turkey.40The EU has begun to have a more direct connecting role through the

Civil Society Development Program (CSDP) initiated by the Representation of the European

Commission to Turkey. The CSDP has a special Turkish-Greek Civic Dialogue component,

where the aim is to strengthen dialogue, networking, and partnerships specifically between

civil society initiatives in Greece and in Turkey.41

With the sprit of Europeanization in Turkey and Greece, cooperation between the Turkish and

the Greek NGOs has risen dramatically. Also, there have been important attempts in both

countries to change the historical perception of other by cleaning up humiliating and

nationalist discourse from the schoolbooks. For many years, Greeks were regarded as

37Ziya ni, Contesting for Turkeys Political Centre: Domestic Politics, Identity Conflicts and the Controversy

over EU Membership, Journal of Contemporary European Studies 18, no. 3(2010):36138

Ibid, 363.39

Ibid.40Rumelili, The European Unions Impact, 17.

41Ibid.


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unfaitfull, unreliable and spoiled while Turks were presented as barbaric, uncivilized and

expansionist warriors.

In spite of the fact that the EU remained ineffective in resolving Turkish- Greek disputes, it

played a significant role on promoting the civil society and by pressurring both Greece and

Turkey it provided improvement in minority rights, especially in Greece.42

For many decades the Lausanne minorities ( Greeks in Istanbul and the Muslim / Turks of

Greece who were excluded from the compulsary exhange of population) were regarded as the

Trojen Horse of their kin states and faced with numeorus human right violati ons. In the

1990s, with the changing world order, and the growing sensitivity about the minority issues

led Greece to take positive step on improvement the conditions of Muslim / Turkish minority

in Greece. This liberalization process from the beginning of 1990s and continuing to the

present directly linked up with the growing activism of European institutions around human

rights and minority protection.

In 1998, the racist and discriminative article of Greek citizenship was removed. 43 The

Council and Europe and the European Union played significant role on this removal. Removal

of Article 19 also does not mean that there would be no automatic restitution of Greek

citizenship for the more than 60,000 people who had been stripped of it on the grounds of

Article 19. A person who wanted to get his / her citizenship back was given the chance to

apply for citizenship through the normal, long and unpredictable naturalization process.

Greece needs further improvements for providing the regaining citizenship for Article 19

victims.

Turkeys human right violation record has been one of the most examined and debatable issue

in Turkish- EU relations. The improvement in minority rights in Turkey only could be

provided since 1999 with the European Union candidacy. Until 1999, with the repressive

policies of the governments, a high percentage of the non-Muslim minorities of Lausanne

treaty have left the country. The Copenhagen Criteria in 1993 pointed out that respect for

minority rights is a prerequisite for the EU membership. Since 1999, many reforms were

42By bounding the scope of this paper, only the Lausanne Minorities ( Greeks in Istanbul and Muslim/ Turks in

Northern Greece) were mentioned.43Article 19 of the Citizenship Code that gave state authorities the discretion to rescind Greek citizenship from

non-ethnic Greeks who left the country with no intention of returning.


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achieved for improving the minority rights. However, it can be stated that as in the Greek

case, further improvements are vital for reaching the European standards in minority rights.

As a product of Europeanization of minority rights in Turkey, the Constitution was amended

in the direction of expanding fundamental rights and freedoms including minority rights.

Seven reform packages attempted to achieve Turkeys convergence with the Copenhagen

Criteria. In 2002 the right of non-Muslim foundations to own immovable properties and to

dispose of them freely was recognized, and in 2003 the right of non-Muslim communities to

build places of worship subject to the approval of the competent administrative authorities

was recognized. Teaching as well as broadcasting of Kurdish and other minority languages

was also allowed.44

The years 1999 and 2005 can be regarded as the period when Europe had been a framework

providing dtente between Turkey and Greece. The europeanization efforts in both countries

triggered the rapprochement and several improvements in the low politics were reached as a

product of the europeanization. Cooperation between the non-governmental organizations,

improvement in minority rights, avoiding further conflicts in the governmental level can be

counted as the positive improvements. From the Greek side, Europe was regarded as a

framework that would make Turkey more liberal, less threatening and aggresive. Turkey, with

a desire of the full membership implemented some important reforms. As a result of these

reform packages, the European Commission in its Progress Report on Turkey in October 2004

noted that Turkey was sufficiently fulfilling the political aspects of the Copenhagen

criteria and accession negotiations could commence with Turkey.45

The year 2004 was a critical year in Turkey and the EU relations. The UN imposed Annan

unification plan was rejected by the Greek Cypriots, who had already been guaranteed EU

membership by 1st May. 76% of Greek Cypriot voters rejected the Plan, while 65% of

Turkish Cypriot voters accepted it.46 The Annan Plan required the emergence of a United

Cyprus Republic which would be an independent state in the form of an indissoluble

44Ioannis Grigoriadis, On the Europeanization of Minority Rights Protection: Comparing the Cases of Greece

and Turkey, Mediterranean Politics 13, no.1 (2008):36.45

The Council on 3 October 2005 decided to open accession negotiations with Turkey unanimously.

Meltem Mftler Ba, Turkeys Accession to the European Union: The Impact of the EUs Internal Dynamics,

International Studies Perspectives 9 (2008): 207.46Carol Migdalovitz, Cyprus: Status of U.N. Negotiations and Related Issues, CRS Report for Congress (2007)

http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33497.pdf(accessed January 14, 2012)
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33497.pdfhttp://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33497.pdfhttp://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33497.pdf


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partnership, with a federal government and two equal constituent states, the Greek Cypriot

State and the Turkish Cypriot State.47

Turkish and Greek government actively supported the Annan Plan despite the strong

nationalist criticism in the domestic sphere. However, Greek Cypriots who had already

guaranteed the EU membership voted against the plan and by 1stMay 2004, they became a

member of the European Union.

Since 2004, the Cyprus issue has become the issue of the European Union rather than being a

dispute between Greece and Turkey. The accession process of Turkey is stucked because of

Cypruss efforts to put more sanctions on Turkey, and Turkeys insistence on refusing to open

ports to Cyprus which is not recognized by Turkey. Greek Cypriots are no more in need of

Greeces international advocacy of the Cyprus issue. As an EU member, they can advocate

their own national interests independently. However, despite the support they gave to the

Annan Plan and their efforts to reach a settlement, the international isolation of the Turkish-

Cypriots is still continuing. According to ni, The EUs failure to deal with the Cyprus

conflict problem on an equitable basis was increasingly interpreted even among key members

of the pro-EU, pro-reform coalition in Turkey as yet another case of unfair treatment.48

The Cyprus problem is still the most important obstacle on Turkeys membership. Before

opening the accession negotiations, Turkey accepted the EU demand to extend its Customs

Union Agreement to the new members. Thus, Turkey signed a legal document that would

open its ports and harbors to vessels from Cyprus in July 2005. 49 Instead of the removal of

occupation forces from Cyprus and recognition of the Republic of Cyprus, the only condition

the EU imposed on Ankara was that it had to sign a protocol extending the customs union

with the EU to the ten new member states prior to 3 October 2005. In August 2005, the

Turkish government signed the protocol by emphasizing that formal recognition of Cyprus

would only be possible after a political settlement on the island. Turkey refused to recognize

the Republic of Cyprus, which does not represent the whole population of Cyprus. Turkey is

insisting that unless the EU lifts the isolations to Northern part of the island, the protocol

would not be implemented.

47 See: Annan Plan, Foundation Agreement Article 2 (a), (2004)

http://www.hri.org/docs/annan/Annan_Plan_April2004.pdf(accessed January 14, 2012)48ni, Contesting for Turkeys Political Centre,365.

49Mftler Ba, Turkeys Accession to the European Union,208.
http://www.hri.org/docs/annan/Annan_Plan_April2004.pdfhttp://www.hri.org/docs/annan/Annan_Plan_April2004.pdfhttp://www.hri.org/docs/annan/Annan_Plan_April2004.pdf


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In order to conclude the negotiations, 35 chapters has to be closed. Chapters of the acquis can

only be opened and closed with the approval of all member states, and chapters provisionally

closed may be reopened. The Turkish side is being asked to solve the Cyprus issue in order to

unfreeze the eight chapters frozen due to the Additional Protocol crisis. The EUs passive

policy after the Annan Plan referendum on Cyprus further exacerbated the problem since it

left the Turkish side deeply disappointed.50No new chapters of the aquis were opened in 2011

and very little progress appears to have been achieved within the chapters already under

negotiation.51

Also, the stance of France and Germany concerning the Turkish accession created discontent

in Turkish government and the public. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan said there is a

black campaign led by France and Germany to destroy Turkish determination to become a

member of the European Union.52European credentials particularly in the core EU countries

such as France and Germany has helped to create a serious nationalistic backlash in Turkey

and strengthened the hands of anti-EU, anti-reform groups both within the state and the

society at large.53 The proposed privelaged partnership rather than full membership

triggered the Euroskepticism in Turkey, this debate has taken a new turn with the French

President Nicholas Sarkozys declaration that Turkeys place is not in Europe.54

This

stance reinforced the widespread belief in Turkey that the EU is a Christian Club and there is

no place in Turkey within the EU. The Euroskeptics in Turkey believe that there is an unfair

threatment against Turkey and due to this unfairness the country will never be able to

become a full member of the Union.

50 Muzaffer Vatansever, Turkish-Greek relations: One step forward, two steps back, Hurriyet Daily News,

http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=turkish-greek-relations-one-step-forward-

two-steps-back-2011-05-01(accessed April 12, 2012)

51Vincent Morelli, European Union Enlargement: A Status Report on Turkeys Accession Negotiations, CRS

Report for Congress: Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress ( 2011): 10

http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22517.pdf( accessed March 8, 2012)52

France and Germany accused of Black campaign against Turkeys EU bid, Hurriyet Daily News, May 12,

2011.53

ni, Contesting for Turkeys Political Centre,364.

54Mftler Ba, Turkeys Accession to the European Union, 201.
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=turkish-greek-relations-one-step-forward-two-steps-back-2011-05-01http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=turkish-greek-relations-one-step-forward-two-steps-back-2011-05-01http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=turkish-greek-relations-one-step-forward-two-steps-back-2011-05-01http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22517.pdfhttp://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22517.pdfhttp://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22517.pdfhttp://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=turkish-greek-relations-one-step-forward-two-steps-back-2011-05-01http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=turkish-greek-relations-one-step-forward-two-steps-back-2011-05-01


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In Greek side, Greek Foreign Policy has been shadowed by the debt crisis since 2008. Since

then, Greek governments gave all their focus to overcoming the crisis. Greeces relationship

with the European Union has regressed to an unequal economic partnership, with the EU as

the lender and Greece as the borrower.

According to Economides, today, Greece is in need of a foreign policy. In effect it does not

have one.55 The main issues of Greek Foreign Policy remained the same for the decades;

Turkey, Cyprus and FYROM. However, there has been no significant improvement in those

issues that have benefited Greek interests. The hard security issues with Turkey remained the

same, the FYROM name dispute could not be solved, even though Cyprus become a member

of the European Union, the de facto partition of the island and the presence of the Turkish

military in Cyprus continues.

Economides states that the EU, which has, to some extent, shielded Greek interests from

being undermined by these issues, has also not proved a strong enough incentive for those

three states to be more amenable to a long-term accommodation with Greece. Thus, contrary

to Greek expectations, the European Union could not provide a solution ground for the

Cyprus issue, resolving Aegean disputes with Turkey, and the name dispute with FYROM

and Greece could not reach the desired outcomes.56There is also growing Euroskepticism in

Greece due to the EU and IMF imposed austerity measures. Many discussions have gained

momentum since the breakout of the Euro Debt crisis in Greece. People in Europe have

started to question the future of European integration, especially the Euro zone. Henkel claims

that, students in Athens, the unemployed in Lisbon and protesters in Madrid not only

complain about national austerity measures, but also protest against Angela Merkel. 57In their

view, instead of uniting Europe, the Euro increases friction by making a powerful country

more powerful while small countries get weaker day by day without a national monetary

policy.

55Sypros Economides, Greece Needs but does not have a Foreign Policy, Cambridge Papers in Modern Greek,

No. 18 (2011)

http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/greeceatlse/2011/10/13/greece-needs-but-does-not-have-a-foreign-policy/(accessed

April 13, 2012)

56Ibid.

57

Hans Olaf Henkel, A Skeptics Solution: Breakaway Currency, The Financial Times, August 29, 2001.http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/6cf3e4f0-cf40-11e0-b6d4-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1dz9LcyGl (accessed

November 16, 2011)
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/greeceatlse/2011/10/13/greece-needs-but-does-not-have-a-foreign-policy/http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/greeceatlse/2011/10/13/greece-needs-but-does-not-have-a-foreign-policy/http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/6cf3e4f0-cf40-11e0-b6d4-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1dz9LcyGlhttp://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/6cf3e4f0-cf40-11e0-b6d4-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1dz9LcyGlhttp://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/6cf3e4f0-cf40-11e0-b6d4-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1dz9LcyGlhttp://blogs.lse.ac.uk/greeceatlse/2011/10/13/greece-needs-but-does-not-have-a-foreign-policy/


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On the other hand, while Europe is in recession, Turkey became one of the fastest growing

economy in the world. Politically, Turkeys role as a regional power is increasing as Turkey

started to mediate the conflicts in the Middle east. There is a widespread belief that Turkeys

need for the European Union is decreasing and also with the growing Euro-scepticism the EU

started to be seen as an unattractive, crisis-ridden Project.58

The frustration of Turkish society and the political elites resulting from the unfair treatment

of the EU, has turned to be a self-esteem that place the European Union as dispensable for

Turkey. However, the Minister of EU Affairs Egemen Ba emphasized the significance of

the EU membership by stating;

Turkeys position is not driven by economic interests, we never saw

the EU in this way. For us, Europe is the most extensive project for

peace in all of human history. When we look at the member countries

of the European Union, we find that peoples who have waged war for

centuries now live in peace within the EU.

The fact is due to the economic crisis, Europes international image and ability to attract other

countries to its own economic and political model is deeply damaged.59 According to

Tapnar, as Turkish people see the mess in Europe and the relative stability of their own

economy, the Turkish public opinions already low level of enthusiasm for EU membership is

now probably going even lower.60The crisis is not the only factor in this Euroskepticism in

Turkey, also the exclusionary policies of France and Germany (Sarkozy and Merkel) played

significant role. According to surveys, public support in Turkey for EU membership has

declined almost 30 percent and the majority of people think Turkey will never be accepted as

an EU member. This dismal projection inevitably undermines the role of the EU in the

Turkish foreign-policy-making agenda.61The European Unions contribution to the deadlockin Cyprus by accepting it as a full member before reaching settlement and also the Unions

58ni, Contesting for Turkeys Political Centre,364.

59mer Tapnar, The end of the EUs soft power?, Todays Zaman, May 17, 2010.

http://www.todayszaman.com/columnist-210375-the-end-of-the-eus-soft-power.html( accessed April 14,

2012)

60Ibid.

61Ibid.
http://www.todayszaman.com/columnist-210375-the-end-of-the-eus-soft-power.htmlhttp://www.todayszaman.com/columnist-210375-the-end-of-the-eus-soft-power.htmlhttp://www.todayszaman.com/columnist-210375-the-end-of-the-eus-soft-power.html


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failure to realize its commitments to Turkish Cypriots created discontent in the Turkish

public.

Especially since 2008, the EU lost its impact on Turkish- Greek relations. This study

suggests that the EU should open the way to the frozen negotiations with Turkey, being aware

of the fact that the negotiation process will benefit further democratization in Turkey. The

Union should provide objective grounds for Turkish accession process and made effort to

reach a solution in Cyprus by not only putting conditions on Turkey, also wholeheartedly

contributing to the process. The EU also should benefit from Turkeys cultural and religious

links with the Middle Eastern countries to become more influential actor in world politics.

Turkey also should reconsider that the European Union is a political integration project and

could not be reduced to an economic community. It is the most successful peace project in

history, and is indispensable for Turkeys future.

Greece and Turkey should improve governmental and societal dialogue by creating new areas

of cooperation. The task groups should be established or better served to find solutions to the

issues of high politics such as the Aegean disputes. The EU which aims to be more effective

in international problems should play more significant role on resolving the disputes between

Greece and Turkey.

Gizem Cakmak Greek -Turkish Relations in the Post Helsinki Period

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