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BathPapersinInternationalDevelopmentandWellbeing

No:57/2018

DigitisingSocialProtectionPayments:Progressandprospectsforfinancialinclusion

GianlucaIazzolino

Firoz Lalji Centre for Africa, London School of Economics

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©GianlucaIazzolino,2018All rights reserved.Attention isdrawn to the fact that copyrightof thisworkingpaperrestswiththeauthorandcopyrightofanypreviouslypublishedmaterials includedmayrestwiththirdparties.Acopyofthisworkingpaperhasbeensuppliedonconditionthatanyonewhoconsults itunderstands that theymustnotcopy itorusematerial from itexceptaspermittedbylaworwiththeconsentoftheauthororothercopyrightowners,asapplicable.Publishedby:TheCentreforDevelopmentStudiesUniversityofBathCalvertonDownBath,BA27AY,UKhttp://www.bath.ac.uk/cds

ISSN2040-••3151

SeriesEditor:SarahWhite

TheCentreforDevelopmentStudiesattheUniversityofBathisaninterdisciplinarycollaborativeresearchcentrecriticallyengagingwithinternationaldevelopmentpolicyandpractice.

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UNIVERSITYOFBATHCENTREFORDEVELOPMENT

STUDIESBATHPAPERSININTERNATIONALDEVELOPMENTAND

WELLBEINGNO.57–MAY2018

DigitisingSocialProtectionPayments:Progressandprospectsforfinancial

inclusion

GianlucaIazzolino

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1 Introduction

Over thepastdecade, thediffusionofdigital technologiesacrossemergingeconomieshasspurredexpectationsoftransformativechangeinseveralfields,fromagriculturetohealthtoeducation.Theadoptionofinnovationssuchastheinternetandmobiletelephonyisregardedbymanygovernmentsanddevelopmentagenciesasanopportunitytorevampstrategiestoadvancehumandevelopmentthathavehithertofallenshortofdeliveringontheirpromises.Atthesametime,privateactorsseethepenetrationofdigitalconnectivityattheBottom-of-the-Pyramid(BoP)asalevertoexpandtheircustomerbase.Whethertheseaspectsarealignedorincontrastwitheachotherstillremainstobeseenandisatthecentreofaconversationinvolvingavarietyofstakeholders.Thisworkingpaperseekstoengagewiththeabove-mentioneddebatebyteasingouttherelationshipbetweenthenewandfastemergingpossibilitiestomakesocialprotectionpaymentsthroughdigitaldeliverymechanisms and the related pursuit of the policy goal of financial inclusion. Its aim is toprovideanoverviewofdominantperspectives,policiesandoperationalandregulatoryapproachesthatareshapingexistinginitiativestodigitisesocialprotectionprogrammesacrosstheGlobalSouth.It focusesonGovernment-to-person(G2P)transfersandreviewsbothgreyandacademic literaturetotakestockofhowitaddressesthefollowingquestions:

• TowhatextentdothetransformationsbroughtaboutbythedigitisationofG2Pprogrammescontributetofacilitatingpoorandvulnerablepeople’saccesstoformalfinancialservices?

• Whatarethekeyoperationalandregulatoryissuesemergingfromtheevidencebase?

It isbasedon the reviewof107works (peer-reviewedarticles, industry reports,policypapersandblog posts) discussing specific aspects of financial inclusion and digital G2P programmes andanalysingcasestudies.ThematerialsweremostlysourcedfromacademiconlinelibrariesandGoogleScholar,usingprimarily thekeywords “financial inclusion” “digitalG2P”, “digital socialprotection”.Further keywords used for the search were: “digital financial services”, “DFS”, “digitisation” and“payment ecosystem”. Moreover, the websites of the following organisations working on digitalfinancial services and social protection were consulted: Bill andMelissa Gates Foundation, CGAP,BetterthanCashAlliance,GSMA,FSDAfrica,MastercardFoundation,WorldBankandUNCDF.The category of social protection encompasses both government and donor-supported initiativesaddressingpoorandvulnerable individualsthroughtransfersaimedatsmoothingconsumptionandincreasing resilience against livelihood risks1. Their long-termgoal is to empower socially excludedandmarginalizedindividuals(DevereuxandSabates-Wheeler,2007).Cashtransfersareatypologyofpaymentsperformedbybothstateandnon-stateactorsinasituationofemergency(suchasintheaftermath of a humanitarian disaster or during a drought) or as a part of a broader social policystrategy.Theycanbeeitherconditionalonthefulfilmentofspecificrequirements(suchaseducation,healthandnutrition)oronthebeneficiariesprovidinglabour(CCT);orunconditional(UCT).Theycanalso be either universal or specifically targeting population segments considered particularlyvulnerable. During the 1990s and 2000s, cash transfers have gradually drawn the interest ofpolicymakersanddevelopmentpractitionersasacost-effective instrument to“decreasechronicorshock-inducedpoverty,addresssocial riskandreducingeconomicvulnerability” (Samson,2010:2),takingover thephysicaldeliveryof food topoorhouseholdsas thedominantapproachwithin thepolicy field of social protection. This shift has been driven by a growing awareness that, among

1 Social protection is typically divided into two subfields: social insurance and social assistance. The formerincludescontributoryprogrammesaimedatmitigatingtheimpactofrisks.Thelatterencompassesschemestoreduceinequalitiesandsustaintheconsumptionlevelsofpoorhouseholds(Skoufiasetal.,2010).Mostoftheexamplesusedinthispaperfallinthesocialassistancecategory.

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vulnerablepopulations,cashtransferspresentlesslogisticalchallengesthanfooddelivery(Radcliffe,2016), increase theagencyand reduce the stigmaofmarginalised individualsandenhance incomeforpoorhouseholds,withpositiveeffectsoneducation,nutritionandhealth,and,ingeneral,ontheachievementofabroadrangeofdevelopmentoutcomes(Arnoldetal.,2011;BabajanianandHagen-Zanker,2012;Barcaetal.,2013;Dissanayakeetal.,2012).G2Ppayments,thefocusofthisworkingpaper,concernthetransferofsocialbenefitsperformedbythestate2.However, theprivatesectorplays a critical role in the digitisation of these programmes, providing technical and operationalcapabilitiestocreateandmanagethenecessaryinfrastructure.This changing configurationof public-privatepartnerships (PPP) raises questionson theownershipandusageofbeneficiaries’dataforeitheradministrativeorcommercialpurposes.Thesegoalshavebeen increasingly entangled. Indeed, in recent years, the social protection agenda has intersectedwith that of financial inclusion. This concept has gained centre-stage following the 2005 UNInternational Year of Microcredit (UNCDF, 2006) and has since become integrated into thedevelopmentstrategyofmostemergingeconomies.Thecoreaimoffinancialinclusionistofacilitate‘access for all to a wide range of financial services – savings, credit, insurance, and payments –provided responsibly and sustainably by a range of providers in a well-regulated environment’(Porter,2015).Thepoliciesandtheapproachestoachievethisgoalarecurrentlyatthecentreofaconversation involving a variegated assemblage of players (Schwittay, 2011): state governments,central banks, development agencies, the payment industry, telecommunication companies,consultative organisations such as Alliance for Financial Inclusion (AFI), CGAP, Better Than CashAllianceandGSMA.Thisconversationrevolvesaroundtheideathathavingaccesstoformalfinancialservices has the potential to help build resilience to cope with sudden economic shocks, smoothconsumptionandlaythegroundworkforupwardsocialmobility(Demirguc-Kuntetal.,2014;Smithetal.2015;ZinnsandWeil,2016)3.Theinfluenceofcorporate-philanthropicentitiessuchastheBilland Melinda Gates Foundation and MasterCard Foundation (Gabor and Brooks, 2016) over thedebateon financial inclusionhas translated intoanemphasison the roleof innovation inbringingfinancialservicestothepoor(Becketal.,2015;Owens,2013;DuncombeandBoateng,2009).The convergence of social protection and financial inclusion thus takes place against a backdropshaped by a reappraisal of current approaches to cash transfers, the rapid diffusion of digitalinnovationsacrosstheGlobalSouthandthegrowingcommitmentofresourcestofinanciallyincludethe38percentoftheworld’sadultpopulation(particularlywomen,informalworkers,ruraldwellers)withlimitedornoaccesstoformalfinancialservices(Demirgüc-KantandKlapper,2012;JohnsonandWilliams,2016;Schwittay,2011,2014).Severalcountriesarecurrentlyrollingoutpilotinitiativestoshift frommanual todigitalG2Pdisbursement,withmixed results4.Given theearly stageof theseprogrammes, the evidence base is still limited.However, it offers insights that can help anticipatefuturetrendsandidentifypossiblechallenges.Chapter2discussesthelinkofdigitalG2Pandfinancialinclusionbyexaminingtheargumentbehindcash transfers, the shift to digital payments, the benefits of digital G2P for efficiency andtransparencyandtheopportunitiesandlimits inadvancingafinancial inclusionstrategyashitherto2G2Ppaymentsincludealsograntdisbursements,salaryandstipendpayments.3Theprinciplesofthefinancialinclusionagendaareenshrinedinthe‘Mayadeclaration’,subscribedin2011byregulatoryinstitutionshavefrom76countriescommittingtosupportfinancialliteracy,digitalfinancialservices(electronic payments,mobile financial services and agent banking), ‘proportional’ financial sector regulationandFIdata.4AccordingtotheGSMA,theMNOindustryassociation,mostdigitalG2Pinitiativesarecurrentlybeingrolledout in South Asia (53%), followed by Sub-Saharan Africa (28%) and Latin America & the Caribbean (19%)(Schulist,2016). Inninedevelopingcountries, twothirdsormoreof therecipientsofG2Ptransferpaymentsarereportedtoreceivetheirpaymentsintoanaccount,whilein15developingcountriestherateisbetween40and61%(Demirguc-Kuntetal.,2015).

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emergedfromtheevidence.Chapter3focusesontheoperationalaspectsofdigitalG2P,discussingthe infrastructure throughwhich the payments aremade and the identity of the beneficiaries areverified, new frameworks of public-private partnerships (PPP) and the construction of a digitalpayment ecosystem. Chapter 4 gleans the main regulatory issues in digital G2P programmes andaiming at facilitating the processing and the transfer of the payments while fulfilling Anti-MoneyLaundering/Combating the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) requirements and safeguardingcitizens’rights.Theconclusionsofferinsightsforfurtherresearch.2 DigitalG2Pandfinancialinclusion

2.1 FrommanualtodigitalIn recent years, cash transfers have emerged as a key policy instrument to advance the socialprotectionagendaofmanydevelopingeconomies.ArecentODIreviewoftheimpactofcashtransferprogrammes has counted about 130 low- andmiddle-income countries that have implemented atleast one unconditional cash transfer (UCT) programme, while 63 countries run at least oneconditionalcashtransfer (CCT)programme(Bastaglietal.2016).Thenumberofprogrammes isonthe rise in Sub-Saharan Africa, where there are currently 40 countries with at least one UCTprogrammes,upfrom20in2010(Honoratietal.,2015).Theevidencecollectedsofarpointsatalinkbetweencashtransfersandreductioninmonetarypovertyandshowinganoverall improvementinhealth services, dietary diversity and anthropometric measures, although to different extentsaccording to the programme (Bastagli et al., 2016). The preliminary impact assessments of theseprogrammes also highlight the positive effect of cash transfers on savings, on livestock ownershipand/orpurchase,anduseand/orpurchaseofagriculturalinputs,althoughthispositiveimpactis“notuniversaltoallprogrammesortoalltypesoflivestockandinputs”(ibid.:8).But the importance of cash transfers is not limited to smoothing consumption and increasingresilience to temporaryshocks.Brune (2016), for instance, suggests thatcash transferscansustainself-reliance and create a pathway out of poverty. Drawing on the example of Bangladesh RuralAdvancementCommittee's(BRAC) IncomeGenerationforVulnerableGroupDevelopment(IGVGD)5Programme, Barrientos and Scott (2008) argue that, when linked to savings and credit, socialtransfers can enable recipients to invest in human capital (through investments in health andeducation) and economic capital (through the accumulation of assets)6. Moreover, as argued byPriyadarshee et al. (2010), by guaranteeing a regular inflow of money, cash transfers have thepotential to “make thepoor attractive customers tomicrofinanceprogrammesandother financialservice providers” (325). This argument directly links cash transfers to the provision of financialservices, suggesting that beneficiaries of social payments are less risky borrowers for financialservicesproviders(FSPs),andthereforearebestplacedtoaccessformalfinancialservices.

5Oneofthefirstprogrammestolinksocialprotectiontomicrofinance,IGVGDwasinitiallyestablishedin1975asVulnerableGroupFeeding(VGF).Itwasthenrevisedin1985withthehelpofBRACtoincludemicrocredit.Itis jointly led by the government of Bangladesh, theWorld Food Program (WFP) and the Bangladesh RuralAdvancementCommittee(BRAC)andtargetspoorruralwomenbylinkingfoodgrainassistancetoskilltrainingand financial services in the formof savings and credit.Over a ten years period,more than two-thirds of amillionwomenwhohavebenefittedfromtheprogrammehave“graduated”fromabsolutepoverty,becomingmicrofinanceclients.(Hashemi,2001)6Theevaluationoftheseinitiatives,however,isnuancedandshowsthatseveralfactorsareatplay.StudiesontheimpactofBrazilCCTBolsaFamiliaonwomen’sintra-householddecisionmaking,forinstance,havestressedamajorgapbetweenurbanandruralareas,highlightingthat,whileinthecitiesCCTappearstostrengthentheagencyoffemalebeneficiaries,theoppositeoccursinthecountryside(SuarezandLibardoni,2008;deBrauwetal.,2013).

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Morerecently,cashtransferproponentshaveemphasisedtheroleofG2Ppaymentsinencouragingmore ‘virtuous’ financialbehaviours.Reflectingthegrowing influenceof the ‘nudgetheory’ (ThalerandSustein,2008)onpublicpolicy,thisperspectivesuggeststhatsocialtransfersmitigatethementalfatigue induced in the poor by hard financial trade-off decisions (Fernald and Gunnar, 2009) andcontributetobehaviouralchangesbyhelpingrecipientsdevelopthehabitofsaving(ZimmermanandHolmes, 2012; Arnold and Rhyne, 2016). Some initiatives have explicitly associated cash transferswith financial literacy initiatives, not only to induce the recipients to save but also to direct themtowards uses of the grants deemed more profitable and sustainable by the implementers of theprogramme(DFID,2009).The delivery of cash through traditional channels, however, presents several challenges. Themanagement and administration of cash payments in challenging environments appear prone toinefficienciesduetoduplicates,corruptionorghostbeneficiaries.Thehiringofadditionalstaffandsecuritytoperformandprotectthetransportanddisbursementofthemoneyweighsonthebudget(see for instance Jackelenetal., 2011).Moreover,mostmanual cash transferprogrammes requirerecipients to travel to specific distribution points for them to collect their allowance. This entailscostsforbeneficiariesintermsoftransportandlostlabourtimeandputatdisadvantagethosewithmobilityissues(VincentandCull,2011).Asmanualmethodsof cash transfer have showndownsides, policymakers andpractitioners havestarted contemplating more innovative approaches. The backdrop of this reappraisal of theproceduresandtechnologiestodelivercashisthedramaticdiffusionofICTsacrosstheGlobalSouth.The construction of strategic infrastructures, such as overseas fibre optic cables (Graham et al.,2015), and the falling cost of digital technologies have made the internet and mobile phonesincreasingly accessible toanunprecedentednumberof individuals and firms (Murphyet al., 2014;Carmody, 2012). Leveraging the expectations of greater efficiency and transparency afforded bydigitaltechnologies,governmentsandhumanitarianorganisationshavepilotedinitiativestoreplacethetraditionaldisbursementofcashwiththetransferoffundsinanelectronicformat.Stateagencieshave partnered with established financial institutions, such as banks, and new types of financialserviceproviders,suchasmobilenetworkoperators(MNO),toexplorethepossibilitytofunnelG2Ppaymentsdirectlyonaccountsaccessibletothebeneficiariesbyusingeitherdebitorsmartcards7or,incontextsinwhichmobilemoney8serviceswerealreadypopular,aSIMcard.Acombinationofmultiplefactorsliesbehindtheinteresttowardsthedigitisationofsocialprotectionprogrammes.Most policy-related literature on social protection highlights the advantages for thestate and for the beneficiaries, while the one on financial inclusion emphasises the long-termimplicationsofcashtransfersforintroducingthebeneficiariestoawiderangeoffinancialservices.2.2 BenefitsforthestateandcitizensThemostcitedbenefitsforthestateareefficiencyandaccountability.Cashtransfersareexpensiveprogrammes, for stateswith lean budgets and those facing donor fatigue. The costs are not onlyrelated to the transfers themselves but also to their management, and often spike beyond whatinitially planned because of leakages derived by duplicates, inefficiencies and fund diversion. Theorganisationalandtechnologicalarrangementsonwhichdigitalcashtransfersrelycanenhancethegovernment’s capability to acquire data (Taylor and Schroeder, 2014) and to verify that each7Asmartcardisaplasticcardwithanelectronicchiprecordingbiometricandotherdata.ItdoesnotrequiretherecipienttohavetorememberaPINnumbertoperformoperations,withbenefitsforthosewith limitednumeracyorliteracy.Thesmartcardmayfunctionalsooffline.8Kendalletal. (2012)definemobilemoneyas “anetwork infrastructure for storingandmovingmoney thatfacilitatestheexchangeofcashandelectronicvaluebetweenvariousactors”(49)

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payment is well targeted. As the transfer of electronic funds is essentially an information on thevalue, the recipient and the sender of a payment, digital technologiesmake it possible to track apayment through the simultaneousemissionofmetadata related, for instance, to the sendingandreceivingdevices,theirgeographicallocationandthefulfillmentofspecificrequirements,suchastheentry of a PIN. The adoption of digital technologies is thus seen as instrumental to help poorcountries and international developmentorganisations improve the implementationof their socialprotectionagenda(Hanlonetal.,2010).The greater visibility of transaction flows depends on the digitisation of the recipients’ data, thecreationofde-duplicationchecks,thesetupofadigitalmanagementinformationsystems(MIS),andtheimplementationofauthenticationmechanismsforbeneficiariesthrougheitherbiometrics,whereavailable, or card and personal identification number (PIN) readers (UNCDF, 2017). Lindert et al,(2007), for instance, suggest that the usage of a swipe card and agent banking to transfer socialpayments of the Bolsa Família social welfare programme to over 12.4million beneficiaries acrossBrazilhasreducedadministrativecostsfrom14.7percentto2.4percentofthetotalgrantvalue.InMexico,shiftingtodigitalpaymentshassavedthegovernmentnearly1.3billionUSDeachyearonitsspendingonwages,pensionsandsocialwelfare(Radcliffe,2017).InSouthAfrica,accordingtoCGAP(2011),administrativecostsofdeliveringsocialtransfersfortheSouthAfricanSocialSecurityAgencywerecutby54%whenthepaymentswerereroutedthroughcommercialbankaccounts,accessiblethrough debit cards. The positive assessment of these experiences has encouraged moregovernments toconsider integratingdigital technologies in theirG2Pprogrammes.Drawingontheoutcomesofapilotproject,forinstance,Nepal’sMinistryofFederalAffairsandLocalDevelopment(MoFALD) has estimated that the digitisation of the national SSA payment systems will cut theoperationalcostsbymorethan60%,fromtheactualNPR1,332,085,514million(USD12.483million)toNPR475.09million(USD4.467million)(UNCDF,2016).Proponents of digital payments point at benefits for the citizens in terms of governmentaccountability and lower transaction costs, both physical (cost ofmovement), financial (what theyhave to pay for this) and economic (such as the opportunity costs of time use). Government’saccountabilityisapressingissueincontextsinwhichcorruptionisperceivedaswidespread.ThefunddiversionthatoftenmarresmanualG2Pprogrammesrisksexacerbatingcitizens’distrusttowardsthegovernmentandunderminespoliticalparticipation.Byproducingadigitalrecordwhichcanbelaterused for reconciliation, electronicdisbursements are seen in the literature as away to reduce therequestofkickbacksbyofficials inexchange for the release thepayment (GelbandDecker,2011).Forinstance,Muralidharanetal.(2014)arguethat,inIndia,shiftingfromamanualdeliveryofsocialsecurityallowancestoadigitalone,usingsmartcards,hascuttheincidenceofbribedemandsfromgovernment officials by almost 50%, from 3.8% for manual cash payments to 1.8% for digitalpayments.InArgentina,theintroductionofanelectronicbenefitscardforallthebeneficiariesoftheJefewelfare programme has reduced the rate of participants admitting to paying a bribe to localofficialsfrom3.6percentto0.3percent(Pickensetal.2009;Smithetal.2015).TheassessmentofdigitalcashtransferprojectsinNigerandHaiti,twocountriesthatpresentseveralchallengesatinfrastructuralandsecuritylevel,hashighlightedfurtheradvantagesfortherecipientsof the payments in terms of lower travel expenses and increased security (Aker et al., 2015; BFA,2013).FollowingtheimplementationofacashtransferprogrammeinNiger,forinstance,Akeretal.(2015)observed that thedeliveryviamobilephone reduced travelandwaiting timeby75%whencomparedtomanualdelivery.Beneficiaries,mostlywomen,saved40minutesfortheoveralltravel.Thestudysuggestedthattheeconomicvalueofthesavedtimecouldbedevotedtootherproductiveactivities and was enough to feed a family of five for a day (ibid.). These conclusions can begeneralised to rural settings where infrastructures are poor or absent and travelling to deliverypoints,oftenlocatedinregionalcapitals,isacostlyandtime-consumingendeavourforrecipientsofcash payments. Receiving the payment directly on a mobile handset, and cashing out throughauthorisedmerchants or roving agents,would save thebeneficiary resources that canbedirected

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towards consumption or income generating activities. Moreover, travelling to remote or crime-ridden areas ismost of the time a source of concern for themost vulnerable individuals, such aswomen,who are often the designated recipients of cash transfers, particularly so once they havepickedthecashandcarrieditbackhome.Thecaseofregularcashpayments,inwhichthedatesandlocationsofthedistributionarefixed,presentsfurtherrisks.Digitalaccountsandmobilewalletsoffergreater security by reducing the need to carry cash. An assessment conducted in Haiti byMercyCorps,anINGO,onTiManmanCheri,agovernment-ledconditionalcashtransferprogrammetransferringcashto75,000mothersofschoolchildrenusingmobilemoneypaymentsthroughMNODigicel’s TchoTcho Mobile, found that security was one the main perceived benefits for therecipients,alongwithconvenienceandtrust(Zimmermanetal.,2014).Also, improving the delivery of cash transfer through electronic means is suggested to lead to agreater preparedness in case of humanitarian emergency. Several studies have pointed at the keyroleofdigitalsocialprotectionprogrammesinbuildingupthecapabilitiestocopewithunexpectedevents such as natural disasters and other types of humanitarian emergencies. A report by theInternationalRescueCommittee (IRC) (2016)argues that there isa strongcorrelationbetween theefficiencyofemergencycashtransfersandlevelsofpreparedness9.2.3 LinkingcashtransferstofinancialinclusionBesides the immediate advantages of digital G2P for smoothing consumption and increasingresilience to shocks, digital payment proponents suggest that cash transfers have the potential toadvanceafinancial inclusionagenda(Smithetal.,2015).Demirguc-Kuntetal. (2015)estimatethat“shifting the payment of government wages and transfers from cash into accounts could cut thenumberofunbankedadultsby160million—or8percent.”G2P,and,morebroadly,bulkpayments,are seen as an “on-ramp” to financial inclusion (Klapper and Singer, 2014; Owens, 2013) becausethey rest on a technological infrastructure and arrangements that enable beneficiaries to gainfamiliarity with DFS. Pickens et al. (2009) argue that, by requiring a ‘landing spot’ to deposit andadminister funds for the beneficiaries, digital cash transfer programmes may facilitate financialinclusionbyallowingasaferandmoreaccessiblestorageof fundsand increasing the transactionalcapabilityoftheusers.Thelandingspotofthesocialpayments,whetherabankaccountoramobilewallet,setupwiththesupportofthestatetoreceivepayments,isseenbyFSPsasanopportunitytobuildarelationshipwiththerecipientsand informand introducethemtoawiderangeof financialservices, such as savings accounts, utility bill payments, internationalmoney transfers, credits andinsurance (ibid.). Delivering payments directly into mobile wallets or bank accounts helps buildfamiliaritywithdigitalmeansofpayment,thuspavingthewaytotheadoptionofmoresophisticatedproducts.InBrazil,forinstance,15%of14millionfamiliesfromtheBolsaFamiliasocialcashtransfersprogramme receive payments on a no-frills account set up with one of the contractors of thegovernment Caixa bank. As reported by Bold et al. (2012), 40% of Bolsa Família recipients havestartedusingat leastoneotherproductofthebank.CGAP(2009)arguesthatdigitalcashtransfers“createthebasis todeliver financialservices torecipientsviabranchlessbankingchannels,suchasdebitcardsandmobilephones.”Whiletheassessmentsofcashtransferprogrammesthathaveshiftedfrommanualtodigitaldeliveryappear to corroborate the expectations of greater efficiency, efficacy and transparency for stateagencies and improved security for the recipients, the literature on the relationship betweendigitisation of social protection and financial inclusion provides contradicting examples. As mostprogrammes have been ongoing for not long or are currently in a pilot stage, the evidence is still

9IRCusesapreparednessframeworktoassessthepreconditionsnecessaryformakingacounty’se-paymentecosystemreadytosupportcashtransfersatscaleinemergencyresponse.

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limited and inconclusive. For instance, while the evaluation of a G2P program in Peru found nocorrelationbetweendigitalpaymentsandsavingbehaviour,inMexicotheassessmentofaG2PCashTransferprogrammeestablisheda linkbetween improvement in savingsandaccess toATMscards(Barry, 2018). In Pakistan, the evaluation of BISP programme found that, although G2P paymentssmooth the consumptionof the recipients, increase their collateral to obtain informal store creditfrom local shopkeepers and provide them with seed capital for small investments, there is littleevidenceof increasedformalfinancial inclusionandregularusageofbankingservices(eventhoughdigitalpaymentsareroutedthroughabankaccount)(ibid.).ArecentCFIstudychallengesthebeliefin a linear relationship between digital social protection programmes and financial inclusion,suggestingthat,“currently,thereislittleindicationthatG2Ppaymentsdoresultinincreasedfinancialinclusion throughany sortofdirectmechanism related to thedeliveryof thosepayments throughformalfinancialserviceproviders”(Stuart,2015).Analysing thedataof theWBGlobal FindexDatabase2014, theWorldBankGroupCommitteeonPaymentsandMarket Infrastructures(2015) foundthata linearrelationshipbetweencashtransferandgreateraccesstotransactionaccountscanbeappliedonlytosomecountrieswithaccount-basedcash transfers, namely Argentina, Botswana, Brazil, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. In other countries,namelyBelarus,Botswana,MalaysiaandMongolia,atleast50%oftherecipientswithdrawthefundsonly gradually, when they are needed. AWorld Bank report (2015) suggests that individuals whoopenedtheirfirstaccounttoreceiveapaymentaremorelikelytobeconductingtransactionswithaformalfinancialinstitutionthanindividualswhohadnoaccountandreceivedtheirpaymentincash(WorldBank,2015).Moreover,beingamongthebeneficiariesofcashtransfersmight,insomecase,help be better positioned to get loans from banking or microfinance institutions as it provides acollateral(Priyadarsheeetal.2010).However,theregistrationofeitherabankaccountoramobilewallet does not seem to ensure per se greater access to financial services, such as loans ormortgages,forwhichcollateralsarerequiredinmostcases.2.4 LimitedevidenceSo far, the likelihood thatowninganaccountmight inducebehavioural changes leading to regularsavings, greaterexpenditure inhealth, educationand investment in income-generatingactivities isbasedonhypothesis.Butthehypesurroundingthemomentousdiffusionofmobilephonesandthepopularityofmobilemoneyinsomeemergingeconomieshasseepedintothediscussion.Althoughacknowledging that technological innovations arewidening the repertoireof options andmethodsavailabletopolicymakerstoreachthetargetpopulation,Bastaglietal.(2016)observethat“theuseofmobilepaymenttechnologiesmayreduceopportunitiesforphysicalinteractionwithbeneficiaries,reducingtheopportunitiesfordeliveryofcomplementaryinterventions,messagingandmonitoring.”The crucial role of social networks to copewith financial needs (Bold et al., 2012; Kusimba et al.,2016; Johnson,2014; IazzolinoandWasike,2015)combineswith thedeep-rooteddistrust towardsformalfinancialinstitutionsandtherelianceoncashasameansofpaymentthatenabletodiversifystoragesofvalue.Thishelpsexplainwhy,veryoften,theaccountsattachedtolandingspotsforthepayments remain inactive (Stuart, 2015; Bachas et al, 2014) or have a ‘dump and pull’ use.Beneficiariestendtowithdrawthewholeamountassoonasthepaymentsreachtheiraccount,evenwhen the programme allows them to save, because most beneficiaries do not perceive anyadvantagetosecureotherservicesfromtheFSPwhichfunneltheirpayment(Almazan2013).The beneficial implications of digital cash transfer on the financial inclusion of a favourite targetpopulationofsocialprotectionprogrammes,poorwomeninruralareas,arealsodebated. In India,forinstance,wheremostcashtransferprogrammesaredesignedforwomen,astudybytheCentreforEquityStudiesanalysedthereasonsbehindthefailureofaconditionalmaternitybenefitschemenamed Indira Gandhi Matritva Sahyog Yojana (IGMSY), in which cash was directly transferred toaccountsofbeneficiaries(pregnantandlactatingmothers).Thestudyfoundthatthebanksincharge

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of the payments applied to women different requirements than to men, such as denying zerobalanceandkeeping insteadaminimumdeposit (Falcaoetal.,2015).Thisdiscriminationreflectsabroader gender gap in financial inclusion (World Bank, 2016).Widespread lack of identity papersamong women is considered by the report a major barrier to access entitlements via banks.Situationsofgatekeeping inwhichwomenbeneficiarieshave todependon local leadersandmalerelatives to withdraw their grants are not uncommon (Stuart, 2017). Other barriers derive fromculturalandreligiousfactors:inmanysocieties,womenarestronglyreluctanttointeractwithmalebanking agents, also to deepen their knowledge of financial services (Scharwatt andMenischetti,2014).Moreover, theacademic literatureonmobilemoneystresses the fact that this innovationhasonlypartiallyallowedovercomingsomelimitationsderivedfrompoorinfrastructure(EtzoandCollander,2010).ThisappearsparticularlytrueinthecaseoftheG2Pprogrammes,whoseperformancemostlydepends on state-provided infrastructures like electricity, transportation, and roads. An efficientinfrastructure is therefore seen as a crucial element to “expand into the frontier” (Kimenyi andNdung’u,2009),aconceptencompassingruralpopulation,women,and,morebroadly,allswathesofthe population with low levels of DFS readiness10. The presence, the functioning and themaintenanceofinfrastructureinruralareas,wheremostG2Ppaymentbeneficiariesarelocated,is,therefore,acrucialaspecttoaccountforinmanagementofsystemsbothtoperformthepaymentsandverify the identityof thebeneficiaries (GilmanandShulist, 2015).Despite theassumptionsonthegreaterreliabilityofdigitalmeansofpaymentthanmanualdisbursement,theevidencesuggeststhat the capacity to respond to shocks of different nature varies according to the context. Forinstance, after Typhoon Haiyan ravaged the Philippines, the e-payment infrastructure was sodamagedthatthegovernmenthadtoresorttomanualcashtransferstotherecipients inthemostaffectedareas(O’Brienetal.,2018).

3 Operationalissues

3.1 InfrastructuresofpaymentThechoiceof thedelivery channel throughwhichG2Ppaymentsare funnelledmostlydependsoninitial infrastructure installation and recurrent operating costs, along with contextual specificitiessuch as population density and payment recipients‘ concentration.11 The administration and

10ReadinessisconsideredacriticalfactorforDFSuptake(LeachandMensah,2016).Theconceptreferstothepreconditionsnecessarytoprogressonthecustomerjourneyforaspecifictypeoffinancialaccount.Differentpreconditions are required to start the customer journey for different types of financial accounts. DFSreadinessencompassessixcomponentsthatmayfacilitateorhinderthecustomerjourney:havinganationalIDto comply with KYC requirements, numeracy, literacy, mobile phone ownership, SMS texting abilities andeducation.ThesecomponentsofreadinesscorrelatewithDFSownershipandusage.11AtoolkitdevelopedbyISPA(2015)identifiesthefollowingtypesofelectronicchannels:• E-vouchers: unique serialised vouchers recorded in a database which can be redeemedelectronicallyinexchangeforcashorgoodsbymerchants,oftenusingamobilephonetoprocessthetransactions and verify their validity of the vouchers. Typically used for one-off or short-termpayments,andtradedinexchangeforgoodssuchasagriculturalinputs,fertiliser,andgrain;• Payment cards: different types of payment cards, divided into: prepaid cards; reloadable;Magneticstripedebitcards(towithdrawcashatanATMandtopayforgoodsandservicesatretailoutlets using a POS device); Smart cards (powered by amicroprocessor ormemory chip, possiblypersonalizedwiththeholder’sbiometricinformationsuchasafingerprintorphoto);• Mobilemoney:e-moneystored inadigitalwallet. Following thesuccessofSafaricom’sM-Pesa11 in Kenya, mobile money payments have catalysed the interest of government bodies and

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distributionofcashtransfersrequiretheconstructionofaninfrastructuretoestablishauniquelinkbetweenacustomerandanaccount;tokeeptrackoftransactionstowardsoroutofanaccount;andtocollectandtransfertransactionsdetailstoanauthorizingentity.These‘paymentrails’(Mas,2015)enabletodigitiseandtransfervalueandincludeawidearrayofcapabilities,spanningfrom“sendingmoneyhome,payingforagoodorabill,pushingmoneyintomyorsomeoneelse’ssavingsaccount,fundingawithdrawalatanagent,orrepayingaloan”(ibid.).Digitaltechnologiesplayacriticalroleinincreasing the speed and the effectiveness to provide payment and reconcile payees’ details,improvingidentityverificationsolutionsandaccountingtechniques(VonthronandAlmazan,2014).Akeyconstrainttotheuseofdigitaleco-systemsisthelimiteddiffusionofidentitydocuments,suchasnationalIDandvoterIDcard.Recentyears,however,haveseenthesignificantdiffusionofdigitalbiometric systems, or advanced human recognition (AHR). Between 2005 and 2010, the biometricmarket has grown by 34 percent per year in developing countries,mostly for creating beneficiaryregistries and authenticating cash or in-kind transfers (Gelb and Clark, 2013). The integration ofbiometric systems of identification into cash transfer programmes is largely seen by policymakersandpractitionersasasolutiontotheproblemofduplicatesandghostbeneficiaries,amajordrainofresources in cash transfers usingmanual delivery of payments due to the difficulties to verify theidentityofthelegitimaterecipientsofthesocialgrants.Most systems are based on fingerprints or iris recognition and have been used sometimes inconjunctionwithsmartcardstoauthenticaterecipientsatthepointofservice.Forinstance,inIndia,thegovernmentlaunchedin2013theDirectBenefitTransfer(DBT)programmetoreplacetraditionalcashtransferschemesbasedonthemanualdistributionofmoneyandtransfergovernmentbenefitsdirectly into recipients’bankaccounts in43of its686districts.Thegoalof theprogrammewas tominimise delays in the payments and better target the beneficiaries while reducing the risk ofduplication and leakages (Bhatia and Baba, 2017). To tackle the widespread lack of identificationdocuments (only 40% of the Indian population has a birth certificate (UNICEF, 2013)), DBT buildsupontheso-calledJAMtrinity,an initiativethat includesthefinancial inclusioncampaignJan-DhanYojana,theworld’slargestbiometricIDsystemUniqueIdentificationUID/Aadhar,andmobilephonenumbers.Aplatform links thebankaccountsof thebeneficiaries, theirunique12-digit IDnumbers(distributedto1billionIndiansasofApril2016)andtheirmobilephonenumbersandallowstoapplyDBT toall governmentprogrammes (536 schemesacross65ministriesanddepartments) involvingcashtransferstoindividualbeneficiaries12.Also,inPakistan,theWatansmartcardprogrammewasbuiltupontheexistinginfrastructureoftheNationalDatabaseandRegistrationAuthority(NADRA)tosuccessfullyprovidereconstructiongrantsto 1,5million families severely affected by flooding (Hunt et al., 2011). Also, the country’s largestprogramme, BISP (see Box 2), was built upon the National Economic and Social Registry but thehumanitarian agencies because of the capacity they offer to track payments, thus contributing toreducingleakages.• Nophysicalpaymentinstrument:Insomecases,atransactionsuchasafundwithdrawalcanbecompletedbyenteringbiometricinformationonaPOSdevice.12 As of December 2016, though, only 84 schemes were using DBT. Moreover, the preliminaryassessmentsoftheprogrammehavehighlightedanumberofobstaclesimpingingontheattainmentofthefinancialinclusiongoal,suchas:

• Lackofadequatebankinginfrastructure,as,inIndia,thereare10.5bankbranchesforevery100,000adults;

• TheslowprocessoflinkingAadhaarnumberstobankaccounts:althougharound75%oftheIndian population has been enrolled, only 48% of bank accounts opened through thegovernment’sfinancialinclusionprogramarelinkedtoAadhaar.

• PoorNetworkConnectivity:thediffusionofmobilephoneandnetworkcoverageisstillpatchyacrossthecountry).

• LackofGrievanceRedressalMechanism(SharmaandNair,2016).

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systemiscurrentlybeingoverhauled inordertorelyuniquelyonbiometrics (thusdoingawaywithsmart cards) to verify the identity of the beneficiaries. This change is expected to address issuescommonly faced bywomen, such as having amale relative picking up the grant on behalf of therecipient or handing over the card and PIN to the agent to perform the operation, as it requiresagents to register the thumbprint of the recipient in a centralized database and disburse eachpaymentuponbiometricidentification.TheunderlyingexpectationdrivingthisinnovationisthatthebiometricsshiftwillfacilitatethecustomerjourneytowardsmoreadvancedDFS(Stuart,2015).In some cases, the implementers of biometric technology have modified their approach afterencountering unexpected operational issues. In South Africa, for instance, social grants wereoriginally disbursed through an off-line card-based system and mobile biometric ATMs (Gelb andClark,2013).Later,though,theFSPsinchargeoftheoperationsdeemedexcessivetheoverheadcostof providing payment points, including through dedicatedmobile ATMs. The payments were thusrouted through bank accounts, allowing for greater savings on the operational costs. In theDemocraticRepublicofCongo (DRC),aprogrammeofdemobilisationgrants toex-guerrilla fightersshifted from an approach based on pay points to another using mobile ATM because partnermerchants inchargeofdisbursingthepaymentswereconstantlyshortofcash(ibid.). InafewG2Pprogrammes, biometrics technologies are also used to verify conditionality, such as schoolattendanceandhealthclinicvisits.InMexico,theMexicanNationalCommissionofSocialProtectioninHealth(CNPSS)planstolinkanewbiometricdatabasecalledSistemaNominalenSalud(SINOS)inwhich are enrolled all the beneficiaries of Seguro Popular (the national health plan) and of thenational cash transfer programmeOportunidades to verify, via fingerprints, that beneficiaries arecomplyingwithhealthcarerequirements(ibid.).However, despite the declared aim of harnessing the potential of biometrics to extend socialprotectionandrender‘legible’tothestatesegmentsofthepopulationpreviouslyinvisible,insomecase this goal hasproved tobe controversial. The abovementionedbiometricAadharprogrammehasbeen the targetof over 30 challenges in the Indian SupreCourt by activistsmostly concernedwith privacy violation anddenial of rights (Bhuyan, 2018). Thedeployment of theprogrammehasbeenmarredsofarbyseveralreportsofbreaches intothedatabaseandtheftofbiometricdataofoveronebillionpeople(Safi,2018).Besidesputtingprivacyatrisk,activistsalsofearthatthesystemmight entrench the identity of members of lower castes. For instance, BezwadaWilson, nationalpresident of the Safai Karmachari Andolan, the organisation representing safai karmacharis, ormanual scavengers, and a petitioner in a Supreme Court case against Aadhar, argues that, since[Aadhaar facilitates]keeping identity forever“inyourAadhaar,myoccupation,where Icomefrom,everything will be there. Once you get the data, you can segregate in any way by means oftechnology.(Deshmane,2017)3.2 NewframeworksforPPPThe routing of social grants to the bank or mobile money accounts of the recipients requirestechnical and organisational arrangements based on expertise and technical capabilities that stateactors often lack. By ushering in new approaches to the provision of a broad range of services,current experiences of digitisation highlight new reconfigurations of public-private partnerships(PPP), inwhich theprivate sector takes over functionswhichwerepreviously aprerogativeof thestate. According to the recommendation of a report by the World Bank, BTCA and the Bill andMelindaGatesFoundation,“[p]ublicandprivatesectorscanconvergearoundapaymentplatform,and enable innovation and competition in additional financial services” acting as a “catalyst offinancialinclusion[that]willfosteradoptionofbasicfinancialservicesatalargescale.”(KlapperandSinger,2014:iv).

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FSPsplayacriticalroleinprovidingthecapabilityforthemanagementandthedistributionofdigitalcashtransfersandrelievingcivilservantsfromperformingdisbursementoperations.JanisandShah(2016)pointoutthat,inthemosteffectiveandefficientG2Pdigitisationprogrammes,suchasBrazil’sBolsaFamiliaandSouthAfricanSocialSecurityAgency(SASSA)grants, thestatehas filledtechnicaland organisational gaps by resorting to existing payment providers and leveraging theirinfrastructure.Bycontrast,whengovernmentshavesought todeliver thepaymentsby itself,costshave increased. This was the case for Colombia’s CCT programmeMas Familias en Acción (ibid.).Initially in charge of the distribution of cash, the Colombian government in 2009 opened savingaccountsfortheprogrammebeneficiariesatagovernmentbank.However,thebankprovedunabletocopewiththedemandforcash,dueto its limitedagentdistributionnetwork,andwasforcedtorely on a third party. The costs skyrocketed and, according to a 2012 CGAP study, 11.3% of theprogramme budgetwas swallowed by administrative costs. In comparison, similar programmes inBrasilandSouthAfrica,whichusedprivateserviceproviders,sawbetween1.2%and2.4%usedfordelivering the payments. Later, in 2012, the Colombian government started also using BancoDavivienda’s mobile money platform DaviPlata to pay 900,000 beneficiaries of Mas Familias enAccióndirectlyintotheirmobilewallets(ibid.).The private sector has typically shied away from initiatives thatmight prove costly before turningprofitable. Private operators are expected to benefit from the provision of G2P payments in themedium/long-term,asadigitalpaymentecosystemtakesshape13.However,theyhavetofacesettingupcoststhatareoftendifficulttoafford(particularlyinhardtoreachareas),unlesstheyareofferedincentivesfromgovernments,rangingfromafavourablefeestructuretotaxbreakstoinvestmentsininfrastructures. According to Porteous (2012), in the early stage, the payment of fees from thegovernmentisthesinglemostimportantfactortomakethebusinessfinanciallyviablefortheserviceprovider.Theseexpectationstranslateintocallstopolicymakerstoaddressregulatoryissuestocutredtapesforprovidersandenhancecitizens’financialcapability,andworkwiththeprivatesectortodevelopinfrastructuresthatcanincreaseaccessinruralareas–thuscreatinganenablingenvironment.3.3 BuildingadigitalpaymentecosystemArecentITUreportsuggeststhatG2Ppaymentsareatenetofadigitalpaymentecosystem,shapedby initiatives to enable and encourage merchants to accept digital payments (ITU, 2016a). Theultimate goal of this ecosystem, such as envisaged by digital payment proponents, is to achieve acashlesseconomyinwhichcashisrenderedincreasinglyredundantbecauseelectronicpaymentsforgoodsandservicesarewidelyaccepted.Atthecentreofthediscussionondigitalpaymentecosystemthere is therefore the pursuit of strategies to reduce the number of cash-in/cash-out (CICO) toeventuallyreachastateofso-called“digitalliquidity”(ibid.).ThereportalsoliststhreemainbusinesscasesthatFSPsderivefromtheirparticipationinG2Pprogrammes:first,reapingrevenuesfromthefees charged to the government for the disbursement of the payments; second, selling differentdigital products; and third, acquiring detailed information on the financial behaviours andpreferencesofthecustomers.(ibid.)Oncemembersofpoorhouseholdshaveadigitalaccountwherethepaymentsaretransferred,theFSPinchargeoftheoperationscanoffertoupgradeitinordertoenableabroaderrangeoffinancialoperations (Radcliffe and Voorhies, 2012) and sell a number of products (such as contribution13TheGSMAcalculatesthat,intheearlystage(1-2yearsoperation),therevenuethatanMNOobtainfromDFSis0.2%ofthetotalMNOrevenuewhilethedirectcosts,includingagentcommissions,andindirectcostsarerespectively719%and107%ofthetotalmobilemoneyrevenue.However,inanestablished(over5yearsold)ecosystemtherevenuerisesto15%whilethedirectandindirectcostsfallrespectivelyto65%and20%.(VonthronandAlmazan,2014)

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pensionaccounts,insuranceproducts,andotherservices)tosupportthebeneficiaries’commitmenttosave(Choietal.,2004;Ashrafetal.,2010;Karlanetal.,2012;Karlanetal.,2014).Thisupgradewouldbeconsideredriskyineconomiesmassivelyreliantoninformalityandcashtransactions.Butadigital payment ecosystem renders transactions traceable and financial behaviours legible andpredictable(BTCA,2016).Digitalpaymentproponentsoftenportraytheconstructionofadigitalpaymentecosystemsasawin-win situation for both the state and the private sector (Almazan and Vonthron, 2014). Theadvantagesforregulatorsandstateagencies lie inthepotentialuseofthedatatrailsgeneratedbydigitalpaymentstopolicepreviouslyopaquechannelsandenforcefinancialintegrity;acceleratetheformalisation of the economy; and improve tax collection, particularly in contexts in which theeconomy is mostly informal (Demirguc-Kunt et al. 2015; de Koker and Jentz, 2012). For FSPs,digitisingpaymentsisexpectedtounlockthepossibilitytoextracteconomicvaluefromthesizeableamountofpersonaldatageneratedby theusers and to improvemarket segmentation inorder topredictfinancialneedsandbehaviours,identifyriskycustomersanddesigntailoredproducts(Aitken,2017). Recent advancements in data analytics have greatly improved the capacity to understandneedsandbehavioursofthecustomersinordertodeveloptailoredservices.Moreover,byusingthedigitaltrailsleftbehindbytransactionaldataandbyanumberofindicatorscapturedbyawiderangeofproxies(suchascontactsinsocialnetworksandGPSlocations),FSPsareexpectedtoderivecreditscorestominimisetheriskderivedfromlendingtoindividualswithanegativecredithistory(Aitken,2017;Kear,2018)14.Thispointsata situation inwhich theunproblematic viewofadigitalpaymentecosystem that, atonce,worksforthepoorwhilebenefitingtheprivatesectoriscalledintoquestion.FSPsaredrivenbythepossibilitytominimisethecosts(thankstostate’sincentivesandsubsidies)whilemaximisingtheprofits (by leveraging their technological capability). But inmarkets inwhich personal data are anincreasinglyprofitableresource,policymakersareincreasinglyfacedwiththechallengetodesignandimplement the regulatory instruments to protect the payments’ beneficiaries, and the citizens ingeneral, fromopaquebusinesspractices.Asanemerging strandof literatureonbigdata suggests,theinterestoftheprivatesectorandcitizensoftendiverge,particularlywhenthebusinessmodelsofFSPs is based on accessing, extracting and storing personal data (Pasquale, 2015; O’Neill, 2016;Srnicek,2016).ThechallengeforregulatorspresidingovertheimplementationofdigitalG2PprogrammeisthustoharmonisetheinterestsofFSPsandcitizens.4 RegulatoryIssues4.1 EnablingandSafeguardingMostpolicyreportsonthedigitisationofG2Pconsultedforthisresearchreviewemphasisetheneedfor governments and regulators (central banks and telecommunication authorities) to take a

14Faz(2014)arguesthatdataanalyticsenablesfinancialproviderstodevelop“secondgeneration”DFSbuildingtheirvaluepropositionononeormoreofthefollowingattributes:DigitalDataTrail,generatedforinstancebycall records, airtime purchases and other transactional data which provide an indication of an individual’sincome patterns, to apply for small and very short-term unsecured loans (for exampleM-Shwari in Kenya);Real-time customer interactions, helping providers stay close to customers at all times, and deliver usefulinformation at the moment it is needed; Smart and customized user interfaces helping customers betterunderstand products and make smarter choices; Location intelligence, helping infer the context of anindividual’s specific financial transaction,which can improveusability and reduce certain costs; Peer-to-peerconnectionsthroughvoice,text,andapps,whichcanstrengthenthemanagementoffinancialnetworks,sincesocialandfinancialnetworksofteninvolvethesameindividuals.

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proactiverole inshapinganecosystemfeaturing lowornofrictionfordigitalpayments,promotinginnovationandbalancingfinancialinclusionandintegrity(UNCDF,2014;diCastri,2013).DFSexpertsseeaclosepartnershipbetweengovernmentandDFSstakeholdersaskeytofacilitatethedigitizationofgovernmentservicesandpayments,suchassalariestocivilservantsandperson-to-government–P2G–transactions(ITU,2016a;ADB,2017).Besides the commitment to support the maintenance and expansion of the existing ICTinfrastructure,digitalpaymentproponentsexpectgovernmentstocraftapolicyframeworkaimedatminimisingtheeconomicbarriersthatmakelargevalue"bulk"paymentsimpractical;compensatingthe service providers managing and operating the payment of social grants; and mitigating thecharges to consumers for G2P payments (including cash-out fees). This strategy is buttressed byincentives to pay through digitalmeans and penalties to use cash (ITU, 2016a). A case in point isNigeria,wheretheCentralBank(CBN)in2012launched“CashlessNigeria”,atwo-prongedapproachwhich, on the one hand, established a daily limit on cash withdrawals and a service fee onwithdrawalsinexcessoftheselimits;ontheother,committedbankstoscaleupthedeploymentofpoint-of-service(POS)terminals(Loeb,2015).In a recently published paper, “Bulk Payments and the DFS Ecosystem”, ITU’s DFS Focus Group(2016b)pointattheneedforpoliciesbehindthedesignandtheimplementationofG2Psystemstoaddress simultaneously technical, logistical, and political challenges. The 2016 G20 High LevelPrinciples for Digital Financial Inclusion inspire the guidelines to balance incentives to innovation,safeguards for customers and the promotion of responsible practices. In fact, while a too strictregulationmightstiflecompetitionanderodetheprofitsforFSP,thusdeterringthemfrominvestingin innovation,atoolaxregulationmightunderminethesafetyandefficiencyofpaymentplatformsand expose customers to risks derived from themisuse of their data (Janis and Shah, 2016). Thepolicies hitherto designed and implemented to regulate digital G2P programmes can be roughlydividedintotwobroadcategories:

• Enablers – to extend the reach of FSPs in hard to reach areas - in particular, branchlessbanking-andpromotinginnovation;

• Safeguards – ensuring financial integrity through know-your-customer practices andprotectingcustomers.

Thefirstgroupincludespoliciesfocusingonimprovingbranchlessbanking;thesecondgroupfocusesonKnow-Your-Customer(KYC)andcustomerprotectionpolicies.4.2 FacilitatingBranchlessBankingBranchlessbankingrefersto“thedeliveryoffinancialservicesoutsideconventionalbankbranches,often using agents and relying on information and communications technologies to transmittransactiondetails – typically card-reading POS terminals ormobile phones” (CGAP, 2010).Widelyconsidered as a key factor behind the successful implementation of G2P programmes, branchlessbankingisseenbyFSPsandthinktankssuchasCGAPasatransformationgatewayfortheunbanked(Bold, 2011), facilitating access to customers considered unprofitable by formal brick-and-mortarbanksandthereforenotworthinvestingininfrastructuresandfinancialawarenesscampaigns.Inordertoachievethisgoal,theDFSsectorenvisagearegulatoryframeworkthatallowsnon-bankagents to perform financial operations and open accounts while upholding security standards inordertoincreasethenumberofservicepoints.Also,thisregulationshouldenableadiverserangeofplayers to contribute to innovating the payment ecosystem by providing payment services andissuing e-money (ibid.). As shown by evidence from different countries, regulations allowingbranchlessbanking throughnon-bankagents thusplay a critical role indetermining the successful

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implementationofdigitalG2Pprogrammes(Boldetal.,2012).In Pakistan, for instance, the success of the country’s flagship social protection scheme, BISP, hasbuilt upon a branchless banking regulation, approved in 2008, which allows mobile networkoperators to own financial institutions (CGAP, 2013; Smith et al. 2015). By acknowledging thepossibility for a broad and diverse range of FSP (mobile network operators, banks, micro-financeinstitutions,moneytransferoperators)toserveaschannelsforG2Ppayments,regulatorsareindeedadoptingaflexibleapproachtotakeintoaccountlocalspecificities.Inasimilarfashion,Brasil’sBolsaFamília cash transfer programme allows recipients to choose whether to receive the paymentthroughsmartcards,directdepositintoano-frillsbankaccount,orevenincash(CGAP,2011).Encouraginginteroperabilityamongdifferentplatformsandprohibitingagentexclusivity(sothatanagent can offer products and services from different operators) are also seen as key steps inregulatory policies that facilitate branchless banking (Klapper and Singer, 2014). Interoperability isbased on a view of the system as an open loop which all qualified participants can join (Bill andMelinda Gates Foundation’s Level One Project, 2016). It is seen by practitioners as a solution tosimplifythetaskofroutinepayments.FSPnetworksmightbeunequallydistributedontheterritoryand G2P recipients in areas not served by the government’s contractor would be penalised. AninteroperabledigitalpaymentmarketwouldallowcustomersofdifferentMNOs,orevenbankandMNOcustomers,totransfermobilemoneytoeachotheratnoadditionalfee.Theprohibitionofagentexclusivityallowsagentswhoarenotemployedbyaserviceprovidertosellproductsfromotheroperators.Whilethisprovisionfacilitatesthetransferofvaluetocustomersofdifferent MNOs, it has been sometimes contentious. Operators, in particular, have expressedconcerns that non-exclusivity might give too much negotiating power to agents (who could,therefore, put more efforts in marketing the services of the providers who offer the highestcommissions) (Greenacre andBuckley, 2014). Considered as a tenet of branchless banking, agentsarecriticaltoverifytheidentityoftherecipient,disbursethemoney,andhelpcustomersgetfamiliarwithdigitalproducts.ForDFSproviders,agentoutletsare“thefirstandmosttangibleservicetouchpoints formost customers” (MasandMcCaffrey, 2015), reaching segmentsof thepopulationwithlimitedaccesstofinancialservicessuchaswomenandruralresidents. Inmostcases,agentoutletsare linked to shops, from which they draw the cash necessary to pay the G2P beneficiaries(BersudskayaandMcCaffrey,2017).ForFSPs,agentnetworksareinstrumentaltoincreasetheprofitsfrom basic operations, such as CICO, in which cash is converted in e-money, or vice-versa, tocustomerregistration,tothesaleandso-called‘cross-selling’ofproducts,makingclientsawareof-andpersuadingthemtotry–otherproductsbeyondmobilemoney(Kendalletal.,2014).ForFSPs,investing in the expansion of agent networks is a risky endeavour, as the high investments oftenrequiredtofillgapsanddeficienciesintheexistingserviceinfrastructurefailtogenerateprofitsinareasonable time. The GSMA, for instance, estimates that the operational costs of agent networksrangebetween40-80%oftherevenuegeneratedfromthebusiness(AlmazanandVonthron,2014).Innovation, inbothtechnologyandbusinessmodels, isconsideredakeyfactorinshapingamarketfor advanced DFS, such as loans and insurance, that would yield greater profit margins. G2Pprogrammes are therefore seen by FSP as an opportunity to leverage their agent networks tonegotiate favourable fee schemes with the government, and thus reduce the risk of investing ingeographicalareaswithnoimmediateeconomicreturn.4.3 FinancialintegritymeetsfinancialinclusionIn an updated version of the 2010 High-Level Principles for Digital Financial Inclusion released in2016, the Global Partnership for Financial Inclusion (GPFI) singled out identity and consumerprotectionasthemostpressingissuesforpolicymakerstoaddressinordertoharnessthepotential

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ofdigitalcash transfers for financial inclusion.This two-prongedstrategy focuses,ononehand,ontechnological innovations; on the other, on the regulation to oversee the application of thesetechnologiesandtheuseofthedataextractedthroughthem.At regulatory level, KYC policies respond to the need to meet financial integrity requirements,particularly to sanitise financial chanels from the risk ofmoney laundering and terrorist financing(Koker and Jentz, 2013; Chatain et al., 2011; FATF, 2011). However, the attempt to align theobjectivesoffinancial inclusionandfinancial integrityischallenging,particularlyincontextssuchasruralareas,wheretoostringentrequirementscanpreventindividualslackingofficialIDfromopeninga digital account and accessing their funds. ITU (2016) points out that the national ID systems, acornerstone of KYC procedures to guarantee the transparency and the compliance of paymentschemes to international standards, is “inherently political”. The example of India’s Aadhar,previouslydescribed,isacaseinpoint.Inmostcountriesinwhichlargepartofthepopulation(andmost beneficiaries of social protection programmes) perform low-value transactions, a riskproportionateKYCsystemhasbeencreatedto loosenidentificationrequirementsandloweraccessbarrierstofinancialservices(diCastri,2013).InMexico,forinstance,theCentralBankhasadoptedin2011a tieredKYCapproach incorporatingdifferent levelsofsimplifiedaccounts,eachwith itsownrequirements and limits, leading to theopeningof 9.1million accounts in the following two years(Faz 2013). In Colombia, low-value accounts can be opened in remote areas (Almazan, 2013). TheStateBankofPakistanforinstancehasreducedtheKYCrequirementsforlow-balanceaccounts,thusfacilitatingtheregistrationandaccountopeningsfornewbeneficiaries.(CGAP,2013)In recent years, innovations in identity verification, based on biometrics, encryption, distributedledgers,andsmartdeviceshaveenablednewmodelsformanagingidentity.Behindthedevelopmentof these technologies there are often public-private partnerships, animated by the goal to offercountries lackinganational IDsystemthepossibilityof leapfrogging toa fullydigital infrastructure(Caribou,2016).Atthesametime,theinvolvementoftheprivatesectorintheconstructionandthemanagement of infrastructures underpinning the provision of public services (including socialprotection payments) raises new questions on the ownership and the use of citizens’ data whichshouldbeaddressedbyconsumerprotectionregulations.4.4 ProtectingcustomersConsumer protection is regarded by a number of organisations, such as Better than Cash Alliance(BTCA)andGSMA,asacriticalelementtobuildtrustintheservice,butonethathastobeproperlyharmonised to the development of a financial inclusion agenda. As a policy principle, consumerprotectionisbased,accordingtotheWorldBank(2012),onfivepillars:transparency,choice,redress,privacyandtrust.CGAPseesconsumerprotectionthroughthelensof‘customercentricity’,arguingthat poor consumer protection measures, particularly in the cases of recourse mechanisms andfraud,canundermineaG2Psystemandhaverepercussionsonconsumers’perceptionofDFS(Mazer,2014).15ArecentstudyoftheDFSlandscapeinIndonesia(Microsave,2017)arguesthatdigitalpaymentusersareparticularly concernedabout lackof clarityonDFS transaction charge, complainthandling andgrievance redressal mechanisms. In India, a country where the digitisation of social protectionprogrammes isat thecentreofanationaldebate (Srinivas,2017;CIS,2016), thediscussionon the

15ACGAPFocusNote(2015)examiningevidencefromconsumerresearchin16low-incomemarketsidentifiesseven key consumer risk areas that aprotection framework shouldaddress inorder to reinforce customers’trustintothesystemandthuspreparethegroundworkforasmoothdigitaltransitionofG2Pprogrammes:Inability to transactdue tonetwork/servicedowntime; Insufficientagent liquidityor float,whichalsoaffectsability to transact; User interfaces that many find complex and confusing; Poor customer recourse; Non-transparentfeesandotherterms;Fraudthattargetscustomers;Inadequatedataprivacyandprotection.

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designofanappropriateOmbudsmanframeworkpointsatagrowingconcernoverthedataficationof financial services16. Indeed, the collection of digital data derived from the use of DFS raisesquestions on data privacy and protection which have so far been little addressed by existingregulations (ChenandFaz, 2015). Evidence from the field suggests in fact that inmostdevelopingcountries DFS users have limited awareness of their data trail, often ending up relinquishingconfidential data to agents in order to access loans (Mazer et al., 2014). Moreover, a regulatoryframeworkfordatacollectionandusageappearsparticularlynecessaryagainstabackdropinwhichtheprivatesectoractsasanessential interfacebetweenthegovernmentandthecitizens,handlinghighly sensitive data that might increase its leverage over the state. This raises a fresh set ofquestionsonthetypeofregulatoryframeworksthatshouldbedesignedtohedgeagainsttheriskofsocialisingtheriskofinnovationwhileprivatisingtherewards(Mazzucato,2013).5 ConclusionsandsuggestionsforfurtherresearchDigitalG2Ppaymentsarearelativelynewphenomenonthatisdrawingtheinterestofpolicymakers,development practitioners and the private sector. Policymakers expect digital technologies toimprove theefficiencyand theaccountabilityof cash transferswhile reducing the financialburdenfor the state. At the same time, and along with development practitioners, they see DFS as anaccelerator of financial inclusion for citizens excluded from formal financial services. FSPs areattracted by the possibility to introduce customers to more advanced, and profitable, DFS andminimise the costs of investing in risky markets by leveraging the government’s help throughsubsidies,taxbreaksandinvestmentsininfrastructures.Thisphaseofthedebateismostlyspeculative.Whiletheassessmentsoftheprojectsrolledoutsofarseemtocorroborate theexpectationsofgreaterefficiency,accountabilityandsaving for thestate,thereseemstobeaflimsylinkbetweenthedigitisationofG2Ppaymentsandtheadvancementofafinancialinclusionagenda.Despitetheproliferationofdeploymentsaroundtheworldtoshiftfromamanual to an electronic delivery of social payments, the results have not yet matched theexpectations of greater uptake of financial services. There is very limited evidence that having a“landingspot”toreceiveapayment,intheformofabankaccountoramobilewallet,promptsthebeneficiarytousetheiraccountstoperformpaymentsorstoretheirsavings.Moreoftenthannot,“electronicdeliveryitselfdoesnotadvancefinancialinclusion,butitdoescreatethebasistodeliverfinancialservicestorecipientsviabranchlessbankingchannels”(Pickensetal,2009;seealsoSamsonetal.,2010).However, insomecases,acorrelationwasobservedbetweenthereceptionofdigitalpaymentsandtheusageofformalfinancialserviceswasobserved.Digital payment proponents emphasise that a strategic PPP finalised to the creation of a digitalpayment ecosystemwould enable the alignment of commercial and developmental goals. But theobjectivesofpublicandprivateactorsmightstarttodivergeinthefuture,assomemarketsegmentsappearmoreeagertoembraceDFSthanothers,thusprovidingincentivestoFSPstofocusonsomebeneficiaries who are considered “bankable” while neglecting others who stick to cash and toinformal financial institutions. This would reveal a rift in strategies to extend access to formalfinancialservicestothepoorandtheinherentcontradictionsof inclusionasintendedbythepublicand the private sector. These contradictions are likely to become evident in the operational andregulatory issuesexamined inthepaper.Thediscussionaroundtheseaspectsbringtothefore,ontheonehand, thepolicymakers’attemptstoreconcilethe inclusivegoalpursuedbythestatewiththe private sector’s need for a business case; on the other, the importance of contextual16Mayer-SchönbergerandCukier(2013)differentiatebetweendigitisationanddatafication:theformerreferstotheadoptionofadigitalsystemtostoreandprocessinformation;thelatterreferstothepotentialitiesforpredictiveanalyticsandvaluegenerationunlockedbythecouplingofdigitisationandenhancedcomputationalcapacity.

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characteristics inshapingthetrajectory,andaffecttheoutcome,ofG2Pprogrammes.Therelevantacademicliteratureisstillinconclusive,butthecurrentsituationcouldhelpprovideinsightsonfuturetrends.EvidencefromdigitalG2Pinitiativesaroundtheworldhighlightsthekeyoperationalaspectsthat all stakeholders involved in running the programmes (State, FSPs) have to face in order toensure a smooth and efficient running of the system. Operational requirements and issues arepertinenttothephysicalinfrastructureforbothtelecommunicationandcashdistribution;andtothenetworkofagentsinchargeofperformingbasicoperationsand,accordingtotheoperators’vision,accompanying the G2P beneficiaries along the customer journey, from OTC cash withdrawal to,possibly,theopeningofamobilewallettoexecutemoreadvancedoperations(BMGF,2016).On the other hand, there is a growing awareness among policymakers that current regulatoryframeworks are inadequate to address issues of customer protection, as the technologicalinfrastructureslaidoutbyFSPsallowincreasinglyextensivedataharvesting.Further research should follow up on the outcomes of current pilot projects to examine adoptionrates of formal financial services among digital cash transfer recipients, including gender andgeographic breakdowns, and whether divergence between the state and FSP in the notion ofinclusion leads,paradoxically, to theexclusionofpoorwhoappear less likely to shift fromcash toDFS. Eventually, the growing datafication of social protection programmes raises question on thechangingrelationshipbetweenthestateandtheprivatesectorinchargeofcollectingandprocessingpersonaldatathatrendercitizensmore‘legible’tocorporateactorsthantothestate.

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August2018)UNCDF, 2017, What youth in Nepal need is – “A digital piggy bank”. Available at:http://mm4p.uncdf.org/tags/nepal(accessed3September,2017)Villasenor,J.D.,West,D.M.andLewis,R.J.,2015,The2015BrookingsFinancialandDigitalInclusionProject Report: Measuring Progress on Financial Access and Usage, 8. Available from:http://doi.org/http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Reports/2015/08/financial-digital-inclusion-2015-villasenor-west-lewis/fdip2015.pdf(accessed5September,2017)Vincent, K., and Cull, T., 2011, Cell phones, electronic delivery systems and social cash transfers:RecentevidenceandexperiencesfromAfrica.InternationalSocialSecurityReview,64(1),37–51.Vonthron, N. and Almazan, M., 2014, Mobile Money Profitability: A Digital Ecosystem to DriveHealthy Margins. Mobile Money for the Unbanked, (November), 24. Available from:www.gsma.com/mmu(accessed3September,2017)Wright, G. A. N., 2017, Emerging Risks and Customer Protection in Digital Financial Services inIndonesia.MicroSave.Zimmerman, J., Bohling, K., andRotmanParker, S., 2014, ElectronicG2PPayments: Evidence fromFourLower-IncomeCountries.CGAPFocusNote93/2014.

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TheCentreforDevelopmentStudies(CDS),UniversityofBathTheCentreforDevelopmentStudiesaimstocontributetocombatingglobalpovertyandinequalitythroughprimaryresearchintothepracticalrealitiesofglobalpoverty;and,criticalengagementwithdevelopment practice and policy making. In December 2011, the Bath Papers in InternationalDevelopment(BPD)workingpaperserieswasmergedwiththeWellbeinginDevelopingCountries(WeD)WorkingPaperSeries,whichhasnowbeendiscontinued.Thenewseries,BathPapers inInternationalDevelopmentandWell-BeingcontinuesthenumberingoftheBPDseries.

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No.56Localcurrencyadoptionanduse:insightsfromarealistevaluationoftheBristolPound.Author(s):SusanJohnsonandHelenHarvey-Wilson

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No.51Theintrinsicandinstrumentalvalueofmoneyandresourcemanagementforpeople’swellbeinginruralKenya.Author(s):SilviaStorchi

No.50ChieftaincyandthedistributivepoliticsofanagriculturalinputsubsidyprogrammeinaruralMalawianvillage.Author(s):DanielWroe

2016

No.49Managingrelationshipsinqualitativeimpactevaluationtoimprovedevelopmentoutcomes:QuIPchoreographyasacasestudy.Author(s):JamesCopestake,ClaireAllanb,WilmvanBekkum,MogesBelay,TeferaGoshu,PeterMvula,FionaRemnant,ErinThomas,ZenawiZerahun

No.48Neo-developmentalismandtradeunionsinBrazil.Author(s):AndréiaGalvão

No.47Progressandsetbacksintheneo-developmentalistagendaofpublicpolicyinBrazilAuthor(s):JoséMarcosN.Novellli

No.45 Qualitativeimpactevaluation:incorporatingauthenticityintotheassessmentofrigourAuthor(s):SusanJohnsonandSaltanatRasulovaNo.44 FinancialCapabilityforWellbeing:AnalternativeperspectivefromtheCapabilityApproachAuthor(s):SilviaStorchiandSusanJohnson

2015

No.43 RelationalWellbeing:ATheoreticalandOperationalApproachAuthor(s):SarahC.WhiteNo.42 HumanitarianNGOs:DealingwithauthoritarianregimesAuthor(s):OliverWalton

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No.41 ‘Upliftment’,friendsandfinance:EverydayconceptsandpracticesofresourceexchangeUnderpinningmobilemoneyadoptioninKenyaAuthor(s):SusanJohnsonandFroukjeKrijtenburgNo.40 TowardsapluralhistoryofmicrofinanceAuthor(s):JamesCopestake,MateoCabello,RuthGoodwin-Groen,RobinGravesteijn,JulieHumberstone,SusanJohnson,MaxNino-Zarazua,MatthewTitusNo.39 Theologicalresourcesandthetransformationofunjuststructures:ThecaseofArgentineinformaleconomyworkersAuthor(s):SéverineDeneulin,CentreforDevelopmentStudies,UniversityofBathNo.38 ColonialityandIndigenousTerritorialRightsinthePeruvianAmazon:ACritiqueofthePriorConsultationLawAuthor(s):RogerMerinoAcuña,CentreforDevelopmentStudies,UniversityofBathNo.37 Micro-foundationsofproducerpowerinColombiaandthePhilippines:towardsapoliticalunderstandingofrentsAuthor(s):CharmaineG.Ramos,CentreforDevelopmentStudies,UniversityofBath

2014

No.36 “Whitherdevelopmentstudies?”ReflectionsonitsrelationshipwithsocialpolicyAuthor(s):JamesCopestake,CentreforDevelopmentStudies,UniversityofBathNo.35 AssessingRuralTransformations:PilotingaQualitativeImpactProtocolinMalawiandEthiopiaAuthor(s):JamesCopestakeandFionaRemnant,CentreforDevelopmentStudies,UniversityofBathNo.34 “Wedon’thavethisismineandthisishis”:ManagingmoneyandthecharacterofconjugalityinKenyaAuthor(s):SusanJohnson,CentreforDevelopmentStudies,UniversityofBathNo.33 Cancivilsocietybefreeofthenaturalstate?ApplyingNorthtoBangladeshAuthor(s):GeofWood,CentreforDevelopmentStudies,UniversityofBathNo.32 Creatingmorejustcities:TherighttothecityandthecapabilityapproachcombinedAuthor(s):SéverineDeneulin,CentreforDevelopmentStudies,UniversityofBathNo.31 Engagingwithchildrenlivingamidstpoliticalviolence:TowardsanintegratedapproachtoprotectionAuthor(s):JasonHart,CentreforDevelopmentStudies,UniversityofBathNo.30 CompetingvisionsoffinancialinclusioninKenya:TheriftrevealedbymobilemoneytransferAuthor(s):SusanJohnson,CentreforDevelopmentStudies,UniversityofBathNo.29 Can’tbuymehappiness:HowvoluntarysimplicitycontributestosubjectivewellbeingAuthor(s):NadinevanDijk,UnitedNationsResearchInstituteforSocialDevelopment,Switzerland

2013

No.28ChallengefundsininternationaldevelopmentAuthor(s):Anne-MarieO’Riordan,JamesCopestake,JulietteSeibold&DavidSmith,TriplelineConsultingandUniversityofBath

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No.27 FromtheIdeaofJusticetotheIdeaofInjustice:MixingtheIdeal,Non-idealandDynamicConceptionsofInjusticeAuthor(s):OscarGarza,CentreforDevelopmentStudies,UniversityofBathNo.26 UnderstandingPolicyandProgrammingonSex-SelectioninTamilNadu:EthnographicandSociologicalReflectionsAuthor(s):ShahidPerwez,CentreforDevelopmentStudies,UniversityofBathNo.25 Beyondthegrumpyrichmanandthehappypeasant:SubjectiveperspectivesonwellbeingandfoodsecurityinruralIndiaAuthor(s):SarahC.White,CentreforDevelopmentStudies,UniversityofBathNo.24 Behindtheaidbrand:DistinguishingbetweendevelopmentfinanceandassistanceAuthor(s):JamesCopestake,CentreforDevelopmentStudies,UniversityofBathNo.23 Thepoliticaleconomyoffinancialinclusion:TailoringpolicytofitamidthetensionsofmarketdevelopmentAuthor(s):SusanJohnson,CentreforDevelopmentStudies,UniversityofBath;andRichardWilliams,OxfordPolicyManagement,OxfordNo.22 ‘EverythingisPolitics’:UnderstandingthepoliticaldimensionsofNGOlegitimacyinconflict-affectedandtransitionalcontextsAuthor(s):OliverWalton,CentreforDevelopmentStudies,UniversityofBathNo.21 InformalityandCorruptionAuthor(s):AjitMishra,UniversityofBath;andRanjanRay,MonashUniversity,AustraliaNo.20 Thespeedofthesnail:TheZapatistas’autonomydefactoandtheMexicanStateAuthor(s):AnaC.Dinerstein,CentreforDevelopmentStudies,UniversityofBathNo.19 Patriarchalinvestments:Marriage,dowryandeconomicchangeinruralBangladeshAuthor(s):SarahCWhite,CentreforDevelopmentStudies,UniversityofBath

2012

No.18 Politicaleconomyanalysis,aideffectivenessandtheartofdevelopmentmanagementAuthor(s):JamesCopestakeandRichardWilliams,CentreforDevelopmentStudies,UniversityofBathNo.17Justiceanddeliberationaboutthegoodlife:ThecontributionofLatinAmericanbuenvivirsocialmovementstotheideaofjusticeAuthor(s):SéverineDeneulin,CentreforDevelopmentStudies,UniversityofBathNo.16 Limitsofparticipatorydemocracy:SocialmovementsandthedisplacementofdisagreementinSouthAmerica;and,Author(s):JuanPabloFerrero,DepartmentofSocialandPolicySciences,UniversityofBathNo.15 Humanrightstrade-offsinacontextofsystemicunfreedom:ThecaseofthesmeltertownofLaOroya,PeruAuthor(s):AreliValencia,UniversityofVictoria,CanadaNo.14Inclusivefinancialmarkets:IstransformationunderwayinKenya?Author(s):SusanJohnson,CentreforDevelopmentStudies,UniversityofBath;andStevenArnold,DepartmentofEconomics,UniversityofBath

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No.13 Beyondsubjectivewell-being:AcriticalreviewoftheStiglitzReportapproachtosubjectiveperspectivesonqualityoflifeAuthor(s):SarahC.White,CentreforDevelopmentStudies,UniversityofBath,StanleyO.Gaines,DepartmentofPsychology,BrunelUniversity;andShreyaJha,CentreforDevelopmentStudies,UniversityofBath

2011

No.12 TheroleofsocialresourcesinsecuringlifeandlivelihoodinruralAfghanistanAuthor(s):PaulaKantor,InternationalCentreforResearchonWomen;andAdamPain,AfghanistanResearchandEvaluationUnit

2010

No.11Côted’Ivoire’selusivequestforpeaceAuthor(s):ArnimLanger,CentreforPeaceResearchandStrategicStudies,UniversityofLeuvenNo.10 Doesmodernitystillmatter?EvaluatingtheconceptofmultiplemodernitiesanditsalternativesAuthor(s):ElsjeFourie,UniversityofTrentoNo.9 Thepoliticaleconomyofsecessionism:Inequality,identityandthestateAuthor(s):GrahamK.Brown,CentreforDevelopmentStudies,UniversityofBathNo.8 Hopemovements:SocialmovementsinthepursuitofdevelopmentAuthor(s):SéverineDeneulin,CentreforDevelopmentStudies,UniversityofBath;andAnaC.Dinerstein,CentreforDevelopmentStudies,UniversityofBathNo.7 Theroleofinformalgroupsinfinancialmarkets:EvidencefromKenyaAuthor(s):SusanJohnson,CentreforDevelopmentStudies,UniversityofBath,MarkkuMalkamäki,DecentralisedFinancialServicesProject,Kenya;andMaxNiño-Zarazua,IndependentConsultant,MexicoCity

2009

No.6 ‘GettothebridgeandIwillhelpyoucross’:Merit,personalconnections,andmoneyasroutestosuccessinNigerianhighereducationAuthor(s):ChrisWillott,CentreforDevelopmentStudies,UniversityofBathNo.5 Thepoliticsoffinancialpolicymakinginadevelopingcountry:TheFinancialInstitutionsActinThailandAuthor(s):ArissaraPainmanakul,CentreforDevelopmentStudies,UniversityofBathNo.4 ContestingtheboundariesofreligioninsocialmobilizationGrahamK.Brown,CentreforDevelopmentStudies,UniversityofBath,Author(s):SéverineDeneulinandJosephDevine,CentreforDevelopmentStudies,UniversityofBathNo.3 Legiblepluralism:ThepoliticsofethnicandreligiousidentificationinMalaysiaAuthor(s):GrahamK.Brown,CentreforDevelopmentStudies,UniversityofBathNo.2 Financialinclusion,vulnerability,andmentalmodels:Fromphysicalaccesstoeffectiveuseoffinancialservicesinalow-incomeareaofMexicoCityAuthor(s):MaxNiño-Zarazua,IndependentConsultant,MexicoCity;andJamesG.Copestake,CentreforDevelopmentStudies,UniversityofBathNo.1.FinancialaccessandexclusioninKenyaandUganda

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Author(s):SusanJohnson,CentreforDevelopmentStudies,UniversityofBath;andMaxNiño-Zarazua,IndependentConsultant,MexicoCity