Getting more bang for the EU s buck in the Arab...

Getting more bang for the EU’s

buck in the Arab Mediterranean

countries

Ana Martiningui

Research and Communications Manager, Education For Employment

Europe

Salvatore Nigro

Global Vice-President, Education For Employment; and CEO, Education

For Employment Europe

SAHWA Policy Paper, 12. 2016. Education For Employment Europe

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Contents

Introduction………………………………………………………...…………3

1. It’s also about the jobs……………………………………………….…….5

2. Education as a problem not as a solution…..……………………………..7

3. European instruments and initiatives……………………………………10

Conclusions and recommendations…………………………………………14

References……………………………………………………………………19


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Introduction

A stable, economically-successful and developed neighbourhood has been a stated strategic

priority of the European Union (EU) for many years. In 2003, the EU launched the European

Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) to govern its relations with 16 of its closest neighbours to the

east and south, including the eight Arab Mediterranean countries (AMCs) – Algeria, Egypt,

Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Syria and Tunisia –, with the objective of building a

“ring of friends” and “strengthening the prosperity, stability and security of all” (European

Commission, European Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations, Overview; Bildt,

2015). However, despite some positive achievements, on balance the EU’s strategy seems to

have backfired. Currently, almost all of Europe’s closest neighbours, in particular to the

south of the Mediterranean (but also many to the east), face serious challenges that both the

region’s governments and the international community are struggling to solve, with

subsequent spillovers into EU member states. To quote former Swedish Prime Minister Carl

Bildt, “as we look at the situation now, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that we are

surrounded not by a ‘ring of friends’ – but by a ‘ring of fire’” (Bildt, 2015).

In the Middle East and North of Africa (MENA), to different degrees, there is a crisis

wherever we look – religious turmoil and profound sectarian strife, economic hardship,

social unrest, power politics, proxy wars, failed and failing states, conflict, violence and

fundamentalism, humanitarian crises, and rampant (youth) unemployment. These crises have

also resulted in a sudden, massive increase in the number of refugees settling in many

AMCs or using them as platforms to pursue their journey towards Europe, putting further

pressure on the region’s already strained economies, on EU member states, and on the EU

itself.

To respond to these and other evolving challenges, the EU’s approach toward these

countries must also evolve. The ENP offered “money, markets, and mobility” – the 3 Ms –

but not membership in return for adopting the EU acquis (the body of common rights and

obligations that is binding on all EU member states) (European Commission, 2016). But, as

it turned out, there were too few incentives and too many conditions, which some countries

were unwilling and sometimes incapable of meeting. Following the Arab uprisings, the ENP

was reviewed in 2011 and again in 2015 in an attempt to offer a more “differentiated


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approach to […] neighbours [that] respect[s] their different aspirations and better answer[s]

EU interests and the interests of its partners” and to achieve “increased ownership by partner

countries and member states” (EU Neighbourhood Info Centre, The European

Neighbourhood Policy). However, since then (and after around €20 billion committed by the

EU until 2020), the AMCs, with a few exceptions, do not seem to be faring much better.

While the EU's urgent need and instinct to contain and manage the influx of hundreds of

thousands of refugees, the economic and institutional crises that affect many of its member

states, the uncertainty brought about by the Brexit vote, rampant (youth) unemployment

within its own borders, as well as several other ills, combined with member states’ own

individual national priorities, are likely to take precedence, EU policymakers must not forget

that European well-being depends, in large measure, on the stability of others, not least

because the proximity of the MENA region exposes the EU to the instability that stems from

there.

In her strategic assessment in preparation for the 2016 EU Global Strategy on Foreign and

Security Policy, entitled “The European Union in a changing global environment: A more

connected, contested and complex world”, EU High Representative Federica Mogherini

acknowledged that, regarding the MENA, the “EU needs to tackle the immediate challenges

in its South by sharpening its tools [… and …] to respond to old and new conflicts and help

address the root causes of resentment through tailor-made responses” (EEAS, 2015a).

In the MENA region, massive youth unemployment has been identified as one of the main

root causes of the area’s many problems, with youth unemployment rates more than double

the global average. Over 25 million young men and women between 15 and 24 years old

(the age group defined as “youth” by the United Nations) are unemployed, and a growing

percentage are not in education, employment or training (NEETs), which hinders economic

growth, development, and stability, with dire consequences for the region and for Europe

and beyond (World Bank, World Development Indicators).

Drawing on the extensive field research conducted by the SAHWA Project and additional

research made by the authors, as well as on lessons learnt from the implementation of youth


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education for employment projects on the ground, this Policy Paper focuses on the youth

unemployment crisis in five AMCs – Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon, Morocco and Tunisia –,

exploring some of the overarching European instruments and initiatives in these countries,

with a view to offering practical region-wide policy recommendations for EU policymakers

in an attempt to make the EU’s approach to some of its southern neighbours much more

“tailor-made”.

1. It’s also about the jobs

According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), we are

witnessing the highest levels of displacement on record: 65.3 million people have been

forced from home, of which nearly 21.3 million are refugees (defined by the UNHCR as

persons fleeing armed conflict or persecution) (UNHCR, Figures at a Glance). The

International Organisation for Migration (IOM) estimates that over one million people

arrived in Europe by sea in 2015, and almost 35,000 by land; other thousands have died on

their journey (BBC News, 2016). In 2015, the number of first-time asylum (a form of

protection given by a state on its territory based on the principle of non-refoulement and

internationally- or nationally-recognised refugee rights) applicants in the EU-28 was almost

1.26 million, more than double the 563,000 registered in 2014 (this excludes repeat

applicants, thus more accurately reflecting the number of newly-arrived persons applying for

international protection). Of those, more than four in five (83%) were under 35 years old,

while nearly three in ten (29%) were minors aged less than 18 years old. Only six in every

thousand (0.6%) were 65 years of age and older (Eurostat, March-April 2016). Syria is the

largest source of refugees, totalling 4.9 million at the end 2015, and Syrians remained the

main group of asylum seekers worldwide, with 373,700 new applications registered during

2015 (UNHCR, Facts and Figures about Refugees).

The Syrian conflict, in particular, but also the intensification of several other conflicts in the

MENA, as well as in neighbouring areas such as Afghanistan, the Sahel, the Horn of Africa

and northern Nigeria, have led millions to flee their homes, many to fragile or economically

weak countries such as Lebanon and Tunisia, or to use these and other AMCs as gateways to

Europe. UNHCR figures indicate that 39% of the world’s displaced are being hosted in the


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MENA region. Lebanon, in particular, has received over one million refugees, equivalent to

one-quarter of the country’s population – the largest level among neighbouring countries

(UNHCR, Figures at a Glance; World Bank, World Development Indicators).

But not all who leave their homes are escaping conflict. Many young men and women

decide to migrate to seek better job and living opportunities elsewhere. As of 2015, the

number of international migrants (persons who choose to move not because of a direct threat

of persecution or death, but mainly to improve their lives by finding work, or in some cases

for education, family reunion, or other reasons as defined by the UNHCR) worldwide stood

at almost 244 million (United Nations Population Division, 2015). Of these, almost three-

quarters (or 177 million) are of working age (IOM Slovak Republic, Migration in the

World). In a comprehensive survey of 10,000 young people in Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon,

Morocco, and Tunisia as part of the SAHWA Project, 86% of respondents cited a lack of

professional opportunities, lower income, and poor living conditions as reasons for wishing

to emigrate. In relation to choosing where to emigrate to, most respondents cited rich job

opportunities in the host country as the main decision driver, with France being considered

the most attractive (SAHWA Youth Survey, 2015).

At 32% in 2014, youth unemployment in the AMCs is among the highest in the world – it is

more than double the global average of 14% and considerably superior to the 25% registered

in the EU-28. Countries like Egypt have a record high of 42% and a staggering 64.8% in the

case of young females. Plus, at country level, more often than not the youth unemployment

rate has been double that of total unemployment. In some states, such as Lebanon and Egypt,

the youth unemployment rate is more than three times that of total unemployment (World

Bank, World Development Indicators). The population of the AMCs is also one of the

youngest in the world, with nearly one in five people being between 15 and 24 years old

(compared with one in eight in the EU-28) (Eurostat, 2014; CIA World Factbook). These

figures imply that around 15 million young men and women in the eight AMCs alone find

themselves out of a job, compared with the same number for the 28 EU member states as a

whole (World Bank, World Development Indicators). Another common characteristic

throughout the AMCs is the high incidence of informal or low-quality jobs. In Egypt, for

example, 91% of young workers are informally employed (Said, 2015).


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Inactivity during youth has a negative impact on employability, future earnings, and access

to quality jobs. It is estimated that people who begin their careers without work are likely to

suffer a wage penalty of up to 20%, lasting for around 20 years. This seems to worsen with

the length of joblessness and is handed down to the next generation (The Economist, 2013).

In Egypt, 88.5% of the total unemployed suffer from long-term unemployment (defined as

unemployed persons with continuous periods of unemployment extending for a year or

longer) (World Bank, World Development Indicators). Also, after years of searching for

employment with no success, many young people may become discouraged and decide to

leave the labour force – in the AMCs, already two out of three working-age youths do not

participate in the labour market and, in some countries, one in four (or 25%) are NEETs,

compared with around one in eight (12.9%) in the EU-28 (World Bank, World Development

Indicators). According to the European Training Foundation (ETF), NEETs represent “one

of the most serious social problems in the AMCs, as the exclusion of young people from the

labour market contributes to high levels of poverty and lost opportunities for economic

growth” (ETF, 2015).

In addition to representing a huge loss of productive capacity, as it increases the dependency

on older generations, this can also lead to frustration, which in turn becomes a potential

source of social unrest, violence, fundamentalism, or a motive to emigrate as the SAHWA

Youth Survey has found.

2. Education as a problem not as a solution

It is estimated that 40 million new jobs need to be created per year until 2030 to keep pace

with the growth of the working-age population worldwide (ILO, Decent work and the 2030

Agenda for sustainable development). In the MENA region alone, there is a need for 5

million new jobs per year, requiring sustained annual growth rates of at least 6.5% (World

Bank, 2014), over three times the regional average for 2015 (2.9%) (World Bank, World

Development Indicators).

That said, companies working in the region are having difficulties filling positions and jobs


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that have already been created. While in most advanced economies (including in the EU-28)

the jobless rate for people with less than a secondary-school education is twice as high as for

those with university degrees (The Economist, 2013), in the AMCs unemployment tends to

increase as education increases. In Egypt, unemployment among diploma-holders (those

with post-secondary or tertiary education) is eight times higher than among those that have

only completed primary education. The situation is far worse for young females, where

unemployment among women with degrees is 30 times higher than among those with

primary education. In some countries, such as Palestine, unemployment among female

diploma-holders surpasses 90%, compared with 2% among those with primary education

(World Bank, World Development Indicators).

The quality of education remains an unrelenting problem, despite significant improvements

and increased government spending in past decades. As the AMCs become more and more

involved in the global economy, there has been a major shift in the skills in demand, but

regional educational systems are failing to keep pace in preparing students to successfully

find and maintain a decent job or be able to offer their services as self-employed

professionals. Universities continue to focus on preparing students for civil service jobs even

as private-sector companies are reportedly struggling to find skilled workers to fill

vacancies. A report by employment services firm Manpower indicates that over one-third of

employers worldwide have trouble filling positions (The Economist, 2012). A 2013 study by

McKinsey & Company found that less than 50% of employers consider graduates

adequately prepared (Mourshed, 2013). Along the same lines, a 2010

PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) survey reveals that almost 90% of Arab CEOs believe that

the limited supply of candidates with the right skills is one of the biggest challenges for

businesses in the AMCs today (PwC, 2010).

At the same time, young people’s aspirations are growing and changing. Students

themselves find that their education is not in line with market needs. Interviews in Morocco

as part of the SAHWA Project revealed that university curricula are mainly theoretical, with

no practical applications or tests, and are devoid of soft skills or personal development, areas

that are highly valued in today’s business environment. Demotivation often occurs, not only

in terms of looking for employment, but also in terms of wanting to get an education. In


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Egypt, many young people end up wishing they had never spent their money on an

education that yields no employment, and would rather have saved it to cover the needs of

their families. In Tunisia, most of those fortunate enough to get a job end up working in

areas very much unrelated to their fields of study. In Lebanon, focus groups revealed a lack

of access, inadequate materials, unprepared lecturers, and a large degree of discrimination

based on political affiliation and socio-economic or religious backgrounds. Similarly,

interviews in Algeria showed that those who do find a job are often faced with below-the-

market conditions. This is especially the case for young women, as a result of which many

prefer not to participate in the labour market (SAHWA Ethnographic Fieldwork, 2015a;

2015b; 2015c; 2015d; 2015e).

Education in the AMCs has become part of the problem instead of being part of the solution.

There is a persistent gap between the skills acquired at schools and universities and the

requirements of businesses, with women being particularly affected.

Unemployment among young females is almost double that of young males in places like

Algeria and Egypt, for example. Plus, the unemployment gender gap has been widening in

the past decade. In the case of Algeria, it grew from 3.3 percentage points in 2004 to 14.4 in

2014 (World Bank, World Development Indicators). In the 2015 Global Gender Gap

elaborated yearly by the World Economic Forum (WEF) – which ranks 145 economies

according to how well they are leveraging their female talent pool – the five AMCs analysed

in this Policy Paper were all at the bottom of the list: Tunisia (127th

), Algeria (128th

), Egypt

(136th

), Lebanon (138th

), and Morocco (139th

) (WEF, 2015). In addition to having fewer

opportunities than men, many women choose not to join the labour market or exit early due

to family obligations, inflexible work arrangements, poor salaries or other reasons. In the

next decades, it is estimated that 50 million women will come of working-age in the region

(Barry, 2015). Yet, four out of five working-age women do not participate in the labour

force, constituting 80% of the AMCs’ inactive population (World Bank, World

Development Indicators). This is seriously affecting the region’s potential for social and

economic development and represents an enormous loss of human capital utilisation and

returns from education (Mohammed Bin Rashid Al Maktoum Foundation and PwC, 2008).


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All this has given rise to a spiralling youth unemployment crisis that will affect many

generations to come and which the region’s economies and the international community are

increasingly struggling to address. Considerable resources have been invested at national

and international levels, but given the nature and magnitude of the problem, current

initiatives are not producing the necessary results to make a significant impact.

3. European instruments and initiatives

Creating more and better jobs is a priority for the EU, both internally and in its relations

with its neighbours. In particular, the revised version of the ENP recognises “youth

employment and skills” as “key” to southern neighbours’ “stabilisation” and “economic

development” (EU Neighbourhood Info Centre, The European Neighbourhood Policy). This

is reflected in all ENP Action Plans (AP) signed between the EU and its neighbours (of the

AMCs analysed in this study, only Algeria has not yet signed but is currently negotiating an

AP), setting out an agenda of political and economic reforms and serving as the political

framework guiding the priorities for cooperation.

The European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI), currently the ENP’s funding mechanism,

has €15.4 billion for 2014-2020 (compared to €11.2 billion in the previous 2007-2013

period), the bulk of which (up to 80%) is used for bilateral cooperation under these APs (EU

Neighbourhood Info Centre, The European Neighbourhood Policy). This is complemented

by regional and multilateral cooperation initiatives, including neighbourhood-wide

cooperation, cross-border cooperation (CBC), and regional cooperation. Southern

neighbours represent the bulk of EU aid under the ENI, with an indicative allocation of

between €7.5 and €9.2 billion foreseen for the region for 2014-2020.

At regional level, some initiatives in the area of youth education and employment with

southern neighbours worth mentioning include, inter alia: the Euromed Youth Programme

(since 1999), with hundreds of projects in the region, including in Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon,

Morocco and Tunisia; Erasmus+, which in 2014 awarded 65 scholarships to AMC master’s

students and 11 fellowships (European Commission, 2014); and the Youth mobility and

regional integration of Maghreb countries project, benefitting, among others, Algeria,


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Morocco, and Tunisia (see EU Neighbourhood Info Centre, Regional Cooperation Projects,

for a more extensive list).

Regional cooperation in the southern neighbourhood also includes activities financed

through the EU Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis and the North Africa

window of the Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing root causes of irregular

migration and displaced persons in Africa. The latter, which includes

Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia, aims to foster stability and address the root causes of

destabilisation, displacement and irregular migration by promoting economic and equal

opportunities, security and development. However, the fund considers North African states

as countries primarily “of destination and transit rather than of origin for migrants” and thus

actions undertaken there focus more on improving migration management rather than

tackling the drivers of irregular migration, such as youth employment, as it does in the Horn

of Africa, the Sahel region and Lake Chad area, considered countries of origin (DG

DEVCO, EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa).

In terms of cross-border cooperation – launched in 2004 to promote cooperation between an

EU country and a neighbourhood country sharing a land border or sea crossing – since

December 2015 the ENI CBC “Mediterranean Sea Basin” Programme, in particular, intends

to create economic opportunities and jobs to reduce high rates of unemployment. It has four

thematic objectives. First, “Business and SMEs development”, by supporting start-up

enterprises and enhancing Euro-Mediterranean value chains and clusters. Second, “Support

to education, research, technological development and innovation”, focusing on

technological transfer, commercialisation of research results and links between industry and

research. Third, “Promotion of social inclusion and fight against poverty”, including issues

such as support for NEETs as well as for actors from the social and solidarity economy. And

fourth, “Environmental protection, climate change adaptation and mitigation”. Over €209

million have been granted by the European Union to the programme for 2014-2020, which

represents a fifth of the total CBC financial allocation (€1 billion). While this implies that it

is the largest from a financial point of view of the 16 programmes to be implemented under

CBC, it is but a grain of sand in terms of the resources needed to solve the youth

unemployment problem in the region (ENI CBC Med Programme). Italy also has a CBC


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sea-crossing programme with Tunisia to promote economic, social, institutional and cultural

integration. However, no similar individual programmes exist with other AMCs (European

Commission, European Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations, Cross Border

Cooperation).

Bilaterally, education and employment are included in all country programmes; however,

despite being a stated priority, very few actually fall within this category, except for in

Lebanon (EU Delegation to Lebanon). In Tunisia, for example, only 1 of the 48 (2%) EU-

supported programmes currently listed by the EU Delegation in Tunisia falls under social

cohesion and employment, and only one is dedicated to professional training (EU

Delegation in Tunisia). Plus, there are hardly any youth-specific programmes listed at

country-level (most are multi-country and sometimes multi-regional) or programmes

specifically designed to improve the role of women in these countries (EU Neighbourhood

Info Centre, Country Cooperation Projects).

All five AMCs analysed in this study also receive additional funding through thematic

cooperation programmes, such as the European Instrument for Democracy and Human

Rights or the thematic programme Civil Society and Local Authorities, but these are mainly

in the area of human rights, the environment or civil society, not education and employment.

While many experts attest to the positive impact of the EU’s approach in the region – it has

encouraged economic governance standards in Morocco, such as competition law and

transparency requirements; it has helped bring about some convergence in energy

regulations north and south of the Mediterranean; it has encouraged dialogue between

hostile actors in Tunisia and Egypt; it has put in place an education system for refugees in

Lebanon and Jordan as a response to the Syrian crisis –, they also agree that it has simply

not been enough to prevent states from falling apart and exporting instability across borders

(Youngs, 2015; DG DEVCO, 2014).

Sometimes, it has been the case that EU-level policies toward the region have come into

conflict with those of member states, leading to a zero-sum approach that has all but helped

the countries of the region. Conversely, at times countries have simply refused EU


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cooperation while at others they have accepted the EU’s money but then not carried out the

expected reforms – the latest ENP progress reports indicate that all countries have made only

modest progress in implementing the ENP Action Plan, and the unemployment situation in

all AMCs under review has worsened (EEAS, 2015b).

Seemingly, there are simply too many priorities, sometimes diluting the effectiveness of the

European investment, with too few incentives. For years EU policymakers (and the

international community at large) have acted upon the belief that the MENA region would

react to calls for democracy and human rights above all else, and events such as the 2011

Arab revolutions seemed to confirm such credence. And while it is true that the region’s

populations would like to live in a freer and more just place, at present this is rather low on

their list of priorities. According to results of the SAHWA Youth Survey, less than 1% of

the young people interviewed cited political and security circumstances as a reason for

wishing to leave their countries (SAHWA Youth Survey, 2015).

There is little doubt that youth’s frustration with unemployment and the lack of

opportunities was among the main factors that triggered the protests. In fact, since the

beginning of the financial crisis, social unrest (calculated here as the number of protests as a

percentage of the total number of events) has shot up by almost 10%, demonstrating that

social unrest tends to increase as joblessness persists and the risk is more acute in places

where youth unemployment is high or rising rapidly, such as the AMCs (ILO, 2015).

Moreover, recent research reveals that unemployment is one of the main sources of

resentment among young people, the very thing that the EU has pledged to address. A poll

conducted in 2016 of 3,500 young people in 16 countries by PR firm Asda’a Burson-

Marsteller revealed that young people believe the lack of jobs and opportunities to be the

main reason why disenchanted youths are pushed into the arms of jihadists (The Economist,

2016).


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Conclusions and recommendations

It is clear that what affects the MENA region reverberates very intensely in the EU and its

member states. Beyond the more immediate security concerns, the EU also depends on the

region for a significant share of its energy needs (especially Algeria, which ranked as the

EU’s third largest energy provider in 2014) and trade ties are increasingly important.

Bilateral trade between the EU and Lebanon has been growing steadily over the years, with

an average annual growth of 12.7% since 2008. Also, the EU is the largest trading partner

for Tunisia (accounting for 62.8% of its trade in 2015), Morocco (55.7%), Algeria (54.1%),

and Egypt (covering 22.9% of Egypt's trade volume in 2013) (European Commission,

Trade). Moreover, southern neighbours represent more than half of the total ENI Budget for

2014-2020 (€7.5–9.2 billion). Under the previous European Neighbourhood Partnership

Instrument (ENPI), the ENP’s funding mechanism for the period 2007-2013, the EU had

already made available over €9 billion for the southern neighbourhood region (European

Commission, European Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations, Southern

Neighbourhood).

So how can the EU more effectively channel its resources to mitigate youth unemployment

in these countries, and hence also serve its own interests? While recognising that the latest

renewed focus of the ENP since 2015 still needs time to show its impact, and without aiming

to cover the full spectrum of measures needed in these countries, the following

recommendations could be useful in helping the EU get more bang for its buck in the Arab

Mediterranean countries:

1. Better align EU and member-state policies. A crucial question to improve the

effectiveness of the European approach in the AMCs is to ensure better coherence

between EU-level policies and the national priorities of its member states. It is not a

question of one overriding the other, but of making sure that they are complementary.

The EU cannot solve the many challenges of the region by itself, and there are limits to

its leverage, but a combined approach, with the full weight of and ownership by EU

member states, will be much more efficient in engaging southern neighbours to carry out

the reforms needed.


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2. Reduce the number of priority sectors and increase flexibility of funding. Most EU

initiatives in the region have too many priorities, fragmenting the effort and sometimes

diluting the effectiveness of the European investment. To maximise its impact, instead of

having hundreds of overarching objectives, thematic objectives, priority areas, priority

sectors, priority sub-sectors and so on, the EU should concentrate its resources on fewer

areas that have been identified as the underlying cause of the region’s many other

problems the EU is trying to solve. Increasing flexibility in terms of the use of funds to

better adapt to the changing needs of the region would allow to cover some of the areas

that might be left out, should the need arise.

3. Give more priority to education and employment. Youth unemployment has been

identified as one of the main underlying causes of the region’s many problems, with

inadequate education seriously aggravating the situation. High youth unemployment was

one of the main triggers of the Tunisian revolution of January 2011 that led to the Arab

uprisings. As such, bilateral, regional, and cross-border cooperation should place greater

emphasis and allocate more funding to education and employment initiatives, in

particular those that attempt to bridge the persistent skills gap.

4. Invest more in self-employment and entrepreneurship initiatives. More investment

should be made not only to encourage self-employment and entrepreneurship (in

particular in areas such as ICT, where the fast-changing market environment requires

rapid skills innovation), but also to build young people’s confidence by showing how

they can succeed with good initiatives and ideas without needing large investments or

access to capital. Self-employment and entrepreneurship create new companies, open up

new markets, and nurture new skills. Economic growth and job creation in the AMCs

(but also in other regions) could be spurred with greater support for the growth of

enterprises. The EU should invest in initiatives that help create the foundations for an

entrepreneurial career, but especially that help support it afterwards.

5. Recognise AMCs as countries of origin not only of destination. While traditionally

North African countries have been a prime destination for migrants from other parts of


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the African continent, in the past few years they have also become an important source

of migration, in particular towards Europe. Apart from the obvious case of Syria, more

and more young people from the AMCs are leaving their homes not only to flee conflict

but also to look for a better future elsewhere. For example, the SAHWA Youth Survey

revealed that 52.8% of young Tunisians would like to emigrate (SAHWA Youth Survey,

2015). The EU should thus adapt its instruments, such as the EU Emergency Trust Fund

for Africa, to begin considering North African countries also as countries of origin of

migrants and thus tackle the drivers of irregular migration accordingly. In addition,

treating these countries as countries of destination only and concentrating efforts on the

migrant communities there might alienate the local population and lead to further

frustration.

6. Invest more in women-specific initiatives. In the AMCs, women are increasingly more

educated than their male counterparts, yet youth unemployment among females is twice

as high as that of males and women’s participation in these countries’ economic and

political life is marginal. In addition to fostering dignity and financial independence, it is

believed that raising the rate of female labour force participation (FLFP) and advancing

women’s equality could add $300 billion (or 11%) to the MENA region’s GDP by 2025

(Woetzel, 2015). The EU should thus include more women-specific programmes in its

bilateral, regional, and cross-border cooperation with the region, working also with

governments to incentivise the private sector to improve conditions for women in these

countries.

7. Work to better regulate private-sector engagement both in Europe and in the AMCs.

Cooperation with the private sector is key to efficiently address the problem of youth

unemployment in the region. In the AMCs, companies present in the area should

increase cooperation with schools and universities, for example by contributing to design

curricula, engaging as lecturers and guest speakers, offering training, internships,

apprenticeships, and mentoring as part of courses, job shadowing, participating in career

fairs, and committing to hire students upon graduation, among many other kinds of

involvement. At home, EU companies’ investment in unemployment programmes in the

AMCs is scant to non-existent. While it is true that there is a need to focus on youth


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unemployment within the EU’s own borders, it is important to remember that

unemployment in the AMCs has a direct impact on the EU and its member states, both

economically and in terms of security. Thus, the EU should promote greater investment

by European companies, either through their corporate social responsibility (CSR)

budgets or foundations.

8. Work more with educational institutions to improve education.

The EU must work with national governments and educational institutions to foment a

closer relationship between education and work. The lack of such links has been proven

to be one of the major causes of unemployment in the AMCs. And change must be

fomented at all levels. It is necessary to include career planning and guidance in

secondary school curricula; to take into account current and future market needs when

designing university programmes; to shift from an overly theoretical focus to one centred

on developing more practical skills that are applicable in the job market; and to pay

attention to vocational education and training by broadening its scope to also include soft

skills, as demanded by today’s labour market, and devoting efforts to eliminate the

stigma associated with this sector, which is vital to the economy.

9. Invest more in organisations working on youth education and employment.

Significantly higher investment is needed in tailor-made and demand-driven youth

education for employment programmes that can equip those that have already graduated

with the necessary skills to compete in the job market. There are already several NGOs

undertaking programmes in the region in close cooperation with international and

national institutions, as well as the private sector. But more support for such

organisations is warranted, especially to scale up pilot initiatives that have already

proven successful.

10. Invest in technology to scale up programmes. Applying all this at the scale necessary to

impact positively on the region’s youth employment perspectives is a very costly

endeavour. To massively scale up these efforts, technology can play a vital role. The

rapid development of e-learning and blended learning approaches and platforms,

“serious games” and other kinds of simulations can help by offering tailored, practical


18

experience to large numbers at comparatively low costs. Technology is also making it

easier to take work to people who live in work-deprived areas. Here, the EU could be of

tremendous value, providing not only financial support but also the necessary

technology, and could leverage the partnerships with large IT companies working in

those markets.


19

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The SAHWA Project (“Researching Arab Mediterranean Youth: Towards a New Social Contract”) is a FP-7 interdisciplinary cooperative research project led by the Barcelona Centre for International Affairs (CIDOB) and funded by the European Commission. It brings together fifteen partners from Europe and Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries to research youth prospects and perspectives in a context of multiple social, economic and political transitions in five Arab countries (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt and Lebanon). The project expands over 2014-2016 and has a total budget of €3.1 million. The thematic axes around which the project will revolve are education, employment and social inclusion, political mobilisation and participation, culture and values, international migration and mobility, gender, comparative experiences in other transition contexts and public policies and international cooperation.

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