General Strategy Concepts and the Ecology of Strategy Discourses

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General Strategy Concepts and the Ecology ofStrategy Discourses: A Systemic-DiscursivePerspectiveDavid Seidl

Abstract

Drawing on Wittgenstein, Lyotard and Luhmann the article develops a systemic-discursiveperspective on the field of strategy and the respective role of general strategy concepts.The perspective suggests that the field of strategy should not be conceptualized as a uni-fied field but rather as fragmented into a multitude of autonomous discourses. Owing totheir autonomy, no transfer of strategy concepts across different discourses is possible.Instead, every single strategy discourse can merely construct its own discourse-specificconcepts. Different discourses, however, draw on the same strategy labels, which leadsto ‘productive misunderstandings’ (Teubner). On the basis of the particular perspectiveadvanced here, the entire field of strategy is re-described as an ecology of strategydiscourses.

Keywords: discourse, language game, social-systems theory, strategy as practice, strategyconcepts

Introduction

Under the label ‘strategy as practice’ there have recently been increasing calls forcloser attention to the ways in which strategizing in organizations is influencedby ‘macro-social’ structures (e.g. Whittington 2002a, 2002b, 2006; Johnson et al.2003; Jarzabkowski 2004, 2005; Wilson and Jarzabkowski 2004). Organizationsare perceived as part of a wider community made up of other organizations, con-sultants, business schools and business media, which bring forth and reproducedifferent strategic practices that influence the way in which the daily strategizingactivities are carried out. These calls have been accompanied by a growing inter-est in applications of general social theory to the field of strategy.

In accordance with the ‘practice turn’ in contemporary social theory (Brown andDuguid 2001; Schatzki et al. 2001; Orlikowski 2002) this has raised significantlythe attention given to the theory of social practices (so-called ‘praxiological’approaches), above all to the works of Giddens, Bourdieu and De Certeau (e.g.Hendry 2000; Whittington 2002a, 2006; Jarzabkowski 2004, 2005). Consequently,a particular praxiological perspective on strategy has been advanced: it distin-guishes conceptually between, on the one hand, an ‘organizational field of strategy’(Whittington et al. 2003) at a macro-level, which holds different management

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‘practices’ in store and, on the other hand, the concrete situated strategizing ‘praxis’(sometimes also called ‘practice’ – in singular) at the micro-level, which draws onthe macro-social practices. Such strategizing practices are, for example, simpletools, or techniques such as SWOT analyses, portfolio matrices, Porter’s five-forces framework, or more complex concepts such as TQM (Total QualityManagement), lean management, or core competences (see e.g. Rigby 2003). Inhis/her strategizing activities, the practitioner selects from this pool of practicesand applies them to his/her concrete situation. In its application, however, thepractice changes. Not only is the ‘practice-in-use’ (Jarzabkowski 2004) always acontext-specific interpretation of the abstract practice (cf. Orlikowski 2000;Ortmann and Salzmann 2002), but the practices are also often intentionally usedin ways which ‘may not comply with the objective purpose of a practice’(Jarzabkowski 2004: 544). In this perspective (with recourse particularly toGiddens’s [1984] concept of structuration), micro and macro contexts are con-ceptualized as mutually constitutive in the sense that the strategic practices areboth a medium for concrete strategizing activities and also their outcome.Whittington writes in this sense: ‘As they follow, synthesise or interpret thesestrategic practices, strategy practitioners reproduce, and occasionally amend thestock of practices on which they will draw in their next round of strategisingpraxis’ (Whittington 2002a: 2).

While the idea of recursivity between a macro-level stock of strategic prac-tices and their micro-level usage appears very appealing because of its simplic-ity, other currently prominent sociological approaches lead to very differentconceptualizations. There is, for example, a distinctive field of research basedon the social theory of Bruno Latour (1986), which tries to do away with thedistinction between macro and micro level and instead speaks of a networkof actors between which strategy concepts spread in the form of a translationprocess (cf. Czarniawska and Sevón 1996). Thus, it is not the case that practi-tioners draw on a stock of given management concepts and apply them to theirspecific situation. Instead, management concepts are actively translated fromactor to actor. Accordingly, one would not speak of the same strategy conceptbeing used in different strategizing situations, but rather of different translationsof the same concept.

There is another relevant field of research taking this line of reasoning a step fur-ther (e.g. Astley and Zammuto 1992; Kieser 2002; Nicolai 2004; Kieser andNicolai 2005). According to this, one would not even speak of a ‘translation’ of thesame strategy concepts from one context to another. These works emphasize theself-referential logic of discourses that make direct communication across differ-ent contexts impossible. They draw on the one hand on the concept of ‘languagegames’ by Wittgenstein (2001) and its further development by Lyotard (1986,1988, 1993), and on the other hand on Luhmann’s concept of self-referentiallyclosed communication systems (Luhmann 1995, 2003, 2005b). While these con-cepts have different theoretical underpinnings, they share a central idea: socialevents (conceptualized as communications) are fundamentally bound up with thespecific social context (conceptualized as language game or communicationsystem) in which they are embedded; the social event is only defined through itsspecific context. Because of that, a direct transfer of meaning from one context to

198 Organization Studies 28(02)



another is impossible. Thus, one cannot speak of different actors drawing on (as inthe praxiological framework) or ‘translating’ (as in the Latourian framework) thesame strategy concepts in their different social contexts. Instead, one has to treatthe strategy concepts in different contexts as different concepts.

In this article we want to explore the potential of this third line of reasoningfor advancing our understanding of the field of strategy. In particular, we expectto gain a different understanding of a common phenomenon, i.e. that the samethings can mean different things in different contexts. While this phenomenonis usually attributed to imperfections in communication, in the sense that withenough time and patience one could transfer the meaning from one context toanother, the proposed perspective suggests taking the different meanings withindifferent contexts as a constitutive feature of communication that cannot be over-come. Acknowledging this fact leads to a different appreciation of the underlyingprocesses of meaning creation. In particular, it focuses our attention on the cre-ativity at the heart of any contact between different discourses. In order to demon-strate this we will show how the existing accounts of strategy can be re-describedon the basis of this perspective.

This article is divided into five sections. In the first section the theoreticalconcepts of ‘language game’, ‘genre of discourse’ and ‘autopoietic communica-tion system’, as developed by Wittgenstein, Lyotard and Luhmann respectively,are presented and explained. In the second section these concepts are applied tothe strategy field. We describe the field of strategy as fragmented into a multi-tude of incommensurable discourses. In the third section we analyse the impli-cations of this perspective for the way in which ‘general strategy concepts’ mayinfluence an organization. The fourth section re-describes the concept of the‘organizational field of strategy’ as an ecology of autonomous discourses thatmutually stimulate each other. We conclude with a reflection on the implicationsof the proposed perspective for strategy research and practice.

Language Games, Genres of Discourse, AutopoieticCommunication Systems: Towards aSystemic-Discursive Perspective

In this section we will briefly introduce the theoretical approaches byWittgenstein, Lyotard and Luhmann. Despite their different theoretical under-pinnings all three of them share a particular line of reasoning that we may calla ‘systemic-discursive perspective’. We refer to all three of them rather thanfocusing on just one particular theory, as we want to demonstrate that this per-spective rests on a broad theoretical basis and not just on a single author’s work.

Wittgenstein’s concept of ‘language game’ has variously been drawn upon inthe management literature over the past years (e.g. Astley and Zammuto 1992;Mauws and Phillips 1995; Zbaracki 1998). One of its central assumptions is thatthe way we experience and engage with the world is conditioned by the lin-guistic context in which we are embedded. Wittgenstein distinguishes betweendifferent linguistic contexts, which he calls ‘language games’, according to theparticular conventions or rules that they contain, and which pertain to the way

Seidl: General Strategy 199



that language is used. Depending on the particular language game that one takespart in, the world is experienced differently. In other words, our comprehensionof the world is a result of a specific language game. Language games are notonly about the way we communicate about the world but they are also inti-mately bound up with our behaviours and actions, or what Wittgenstein termed‘life-forms’ (Wittgenstein 2001: 23).

A crucial point about the language-game concept, which is particularly rele-vant in the present context, is that different words or sentences are defined intheir meaning through the set of rules of the particular language game in whichthey are used. Thus words, sentences, concepts, etc. cannot be understood inde-pendently of the particular language game in which they are used.

Lyotard (1986, 1988, 1993) took up Wittgenstein’s concept of language gameand developed it further. Thereby he radicalized its basic idea. First of all, Lyotardmodified the underlying understanding of language: where Wittgenstein speaks ofintentional speech acts, Lyotard speaks of ‘phrases’ that ‘happen’ (1988), whichmeans that phrases are not produced by a subject or speaker. The particular mean-ing of a phrase is not given through the intention of the speaker but rather throughthe context of other phrases in which it becomes embedded. The second modifi-cation has to do with the rules that govern the way in which such phrases areformed and linked. In this regard he distinguishes between so-called phraseregimens and genres (synonym for ‘language games’). A phrase regimen is aset of rules for linking different phrases. Examples are argumentation, recog-nition, description, narration. Depending on the particular phrase regimen inplace, phrases are formed and linked differently. The genre, i.e. language game, isdefined as a set of rules for linking phrases of different regimens. Every genre hasa different set of rules.

The crucial point for the argument of this article is that genres are incom-mensurable and there are no further rules for linking phrases across differentgenres. Because of that, it is not possible to transfer a phrase from one genre toanother. Lyotard describes this situation as one of different ‘islands of lan-guage’. Phrases belong either to one or another genre but never to several at thesame time. As Lyotard writes, ‘There is no unity in language; there are islandsof language, each of them ruled by different regimes, untranslatable into theothers’ (Lyotard 1993: 20; emphasis added). Lyotard illustrates this ‘untrans-latability’ by analogy with the relation between different games or sports:

‘A move in bridge cannot be “translated” into a move made in tennis. The same goes forphrases, which are moves in language games; one does not “translate” a mathematicalproof into a narration. Translation is itself a language game.’ (Lyotard 1993: 21)

Thus, Lyotard emphasizes the incommensurability between different dis-courses. He makes it very clear that – in contrast to the Latourian translationmodel – inter-discursive translation is impossible.

Niklas Luhmann (1995, 2005b) – coming originally from a very differenttheoretical tradition – makes a similar point with his concept of autopoieticcommunication systems. In contrast to the language-game concept, however,his theory of autopoietic systems has only just started to be taken up in organi-zation and management studies (e.g. Hendry and Seidl 2003; Hernes and




Bakken 2003; Nassehi 2005; Seidl and Becker 2006). Similarly to Lyotard,Luhmann does away with the notion of the actor or subject producing (speech)acts. Instead he speaks of communicative events – which are analogous toLyotard’s phrases. Communicative events (or, for short: communications) areconceptualized as the unity of utterance, information and understanding. Thisunity cannot be produced by a human being on its own; a single individualmight produce an utterance containing a particular piece of information buthe/she cannot contribute the understanding as well. This means that it alwaystakes at least two individuals to co-produce this unity. Consequently, communi-cation is conceptualized as an emergent phenomenon arising from the interac-tion of different individuals.

Luhmann goes on to explain that the ‘understanding’ of a communication canbe retrospectively determined only from the reaction of ensuing communica-tions. Or, more to the point, the meaning of a communication is the differencethat it makes in following communications. However, whatever difference com-munications make with relation to other communications is not determined bythe focal communication itself but by the other communications. In this sense,Luhmann speaks of communications as the product of (other) communicationsand not of individuals: ‘Humans cannot communicate ... Only communicationscan communicate’ (Luhmann, 2002: 169).

On the basis of this insight, Luhmann unfolds his theory of autopoietic (i.e.self-reproducing) communication systems: every communication belongs to aparticular communication system (i.e. a network of communications) by whichit has been produced and in whose reproduction it takes part. Examples of suchcommunication systems are organizations or face-to-face interactions. Suchcommunication systems are operatively closed. By this he means that commu-nications are produced only by the particular networks of communications; theycannot be imported from outside those networks. Communication processes arestimulated or triggered from outside (in this sense the system can be said to beinteractionally open), e.g. a thought in the mind of an individual might stimu-late a communication, but it is the network of communication itself that, in reac-tion to it, produces – according to its own logic of reproduction – a particularcommunication. In other words, communication systems do refer to externalphenomena but they refer to them according to their own internal logic.

Analogously to Lyotard’s language-game concept, Luhmann assumes multipleparallel communication systems, each with a different internal logic, betweenwhich no communication can be transferred. A communication in one systemmight trigger a communication in another system, but the two communicationsin the two different systems have different meanings and as such they are differ-ent communications (Luhmann 1989).

In this review of the theories by Wittgenstein, Lyotard and Luhmann we havetried to point out a particular line of reasoning that all three of them share: thesocial world is made up of incommensurable discourses (conceptualized as ‘lan-guage games’, ‘genres’ or ‘communication systems’), between which no directexchange is possible. Elements of one discourse can neither be transferred nortranslated into elements of another discourse. A communication in one discoursecan merely cause (positive or negative) ‘perturbations’ in another discourse, but




it can never become a communication in the other discourse. This does notexclude the possibility that different discourses refer to elements of other dis-courses, but any such reference has to be treated as an internal construct of theparticular discourse. Even if it is the same human beings that ‘participate’ in thedifferent discourses, they cannot transfer meaning from one discourse to another.The meaning of ‘their’ communications is ultimately determined by the respec-tive discourse. For the conceptualization of the field of strategy this has signifi-cant implications, as we will show in the following sections.

Before that, however, we want to clarify an important point that could be eas-ily misunderstood. When we and the cited authors speak of ‘discourse’ here thisis not to be misunderstood as ‘talk’ vs. ‘action’. The term ‘discourse’ is used ina more fundamental way. The concept of discourse (as used here) and the con-cept of action are directly connected: all actions are embedded in a discursivecontext which defines the meaning of the action. In this sense, Wittgensteinspeaks of discourses being intimately bound up with particular types of acti-vities or ‘life forms’. Lyotard and Luhmann even go a step further and treat‘actions’ altogether discursively, suggesting that all actions have a discursiveaspect to them. This leads Luhmann to go so far as to replace the concept ofaction with the concept of communication. To sum up, we are referring to a dis-course-perspective, which allows us to understand social phenomena on thebasis of their integration into particular discourses.

The Multitude of Autonomous Strategy Discourses

As pointed out by many scholars (e.g. Whittington et al. 2003) the organi-zational field of strategy spans many different areas of society. On the basisof Luhmann’s classification of societal function systems (1982, 1989), we canidentify at least three systems in which strategy discourses take place: science,the economic system and the system of education. Each of these functionsystems possesses its individual code, according to which its communicationsare meaningful. Communications within the system of science, for example,carry the code true/false (Luhmann 1989, 1990). That is to say, in order to beconsidered part of a ‘scientific’ discourse, a communication has to refer to ear-lier scientific communications as either true or false; and it must also be possi-ble for ensuing communications to link up to this communication as either trueor false. In other words, the meaning of a communication within a scientific dis-course is basically its particular truth or falsehood, to which further communi-cations can refer in order to claim truth for themselves. This can be seen mostexplicitly in the way that scientific publications reference other scientific pub-lications in order to claim truth-value for themselves (cf. Kieser 2002: 208;Nicolai 2004: 956). In this sense, Astley and Zammuto (1992: 443) describe(organization) science as a ‘self-contained, closed system’. Whether a scientificcommunication is classified as ‘true’ or ‘false’ is itself entirely determined bythe criteria of the scientific discourse; a ‘true’ scientific communication, in thissense, is a communication that has been accepted by the other scientific com-munications as ‘true’ – it is a ‘coded truth’.




In contrast to the science system, the economic system is described by Lumannas guided by the code revenue/expense – or simply payment/non-payment(Luhmann 1988, 1989). An economic communication is, for example, the plac-ing of an order. In this case the meaning of the communication for further eco-nomic communications is not its truth or falsehood but its associated payment.Other economic communications connect to this communication with regard toits associated effects on payment. The order may be rejected by ensuing com-munications, if considered unprofitable, or, conversely, it may be accepted, ifconsidered profitable. Again, what qualifies as profitable/unprofitable is deter-mined entirely by the economic discourse itself.

For the system of education Luhmann has identified yet another coding,which can be described as positive/negative social selection (Luhmann 1989,2002). Examples of educational communications are writing an exam or con-tributing to a discussion in the classroom. The ultimate meaning of such com-munications is their effect on the process by which individuals will be selectedin the course of their educational, professional and social careers. Educationalcommunications are not geared towards truth or towards the increase of revenuebut towards social selection. Students are expected to communicate first andforemost in such a way as to increase their chances of getting good grades ratherthan to contribute to the advancement of the sciences or the increase of revenue.

Thus, according to Luhmann these three systems differ fundamentally in theway they process meaning. For each of the systems it is a different ‘differencewhich makes a difference’ (Bateson 1972: 315). Analogously to the way thatcomputers can distinguish only between 0 and 1, scientific discourses distin-guish only between true and false, economic discourses between payment/non-payment and educational discourses between positive and negative socialselection. Communications that are not encoded in this form have no informa-tion value to them – they make no difference.

From this conceptualization of the scientific, economic and educationalsystem as differently encoded discourses follows that also strategy discourseswithin these systems are fundamentally different. In the sciences, for example,strategy phenomena have to be treated in such a way as to allow statements thatcan be substantiated with earlier scientific research and that can be examinedaccording to scientific criteria as either true or false. Because of that, the scien-tific discourse of strategy is very much conditioned: science can research onlyaspects or topics that can be connected to earlier research; and it can only pre-sent results in ways that satisfy the established scientific criteria. As such, strat-egy research, as all scientific research, is ‘path dependent’ on existing researchand criteria (Kieser and Nicolai 2005: 276–77). As a consequence of this, sci-entific discourses on strategy are necessarily highly stylized (Astley andZammuto 1992): they construct abstract variables that are only scientificallymeaningful as they typically have very little to do with how the ‘same’ phe-nomena are treated elsewhere. See, for example, the way in which the conceptof ‘performance’ and ‘success factors’ is constructed in the management sci-ences (cf. March and Sutton 1997, Kieser and Nicolai 2005). In addition to theconstruction of idiosyncratic variables, the scientific discourse forces the com-munication also into an idiosyncratic way of relating its variables to each other.




For example, one assumes explicitly counter-factual situations and works withunrealistic ceteris paribus clauses (Luhmann 1989: 81). Thus, strategy phe-nomena are structured in such a way as to render them subject to the scientificcriteria for truth and falsehood.

In economic discourses, as defined by Luhmann, strategy communications arerelated to the payment code. A strategy either pays off or it does not. This is theonly information value that is meaningful to the economic discourse. Whetherany assumptions about correlations between variables are scientifically true ornot is not a difference that makes a direct difference to the economic system. Theeconomic system just calculates what costs and what revenues are associatedwith specific concrete strategies.

In the education system, as defined by Luhmann, strategy discourses aredirectly focused on the social-selection code. Strategy textbooks, for example,are written in such a way as to make it possible to teach them at school and to setexams on their content. One can even teach, as well as learn, things that in sci-entific discourses may not be considered ‘true’, or which in an economic dis-course would be considered to lead to losses. According to the specific logic ofthe education system, in principle any strategy textbook will do, as long as itallows examining students on the basis of its contents. Luhmann would argue thatin educational strategy-discourses whether the models of strategy are true orfalse, or whether strategy tools increase revenues or not, is of no direct informa-tion value. The only difference that directly makes a difference for the educa-tional discourse is whether the student has properly studied the required readingand has the ability to discuss it ‘intelligently’ in class (Luhmann 2002). This doesnot exclude the possibility that teachers also evaluate contributions by theirstudents according to whether those contributions are based on scientificallyaccepted knowledge. However, the reason for such evaluation is not that knowl-edge is considered true or false, but that it is taken as an indicator of the student’sabilities – i.e. it has a different meaning within the context of the educationalsystem. One might also find that the educational discourse coexists with a scien-tific discourse; e.g. a PhD course might comprise teaching and research.However, from a systemic-discursive perspective these would have to be treatedas two parallel discourses that function according to different logics, but whichnevertheless might mutually stimulate each other (cf. Luhmann 1989).

Thus, on the basis of this conceptualization, strategy discourses in the scien-tific, economic and educational systems have to be treated as fundamentallydifferent discourses, between which no transfer of meaning is possible. Thiscounters in particular the commonly held assumptions on the relation betweenmanagement science and management practice. Luhmann (2005a) writes that, inorder to transfer a scientific communication into a discourse within a differentfunction system, it would be necessary to transfer also the entire background oftheories on which the particular communication is based – and the theories onwhich these theories themselves are based. In other words, it would be necessaryto transfer more or less the entire scientific system into the other system. Buteven if this were possible, the meaning of the communication would be differ-ent, as the entire complex would be interpreted according to a different code.Hence, organization science is treated as an autonomous system that is clearly




separate from the economic discourses of consultants and business organizations(Astley and Zammuto 1992; Kieser 2002; Nicolai 2004). Even when it is thesame individuals who ‘participate’ in the different discourses they cannot trans-fer meaning from one discourse to another: that would be like switching from thegame of bridge to that of tennis, to use Lyotard’s example. Instead, their com-munications and actions are determined by the logic of the particular discoursein which they momentarily take part (cf. Wittgenstein 2001: 23; Luhmann2005b). Nicolai (2004) demonstrated this impressively in his study of Porter’swork, which is widely considered a prime example for applied strategy research.Rather than crossing the boundaries of the scientific and the practical discourses,the economics-based scientific parts and the ‘applied’ parts of Porter’s work standunconnected side by side.

Several authors have suggested distinguishing also between the consultingdiscourse and the managerial discourse within business organizations as differ-ent types of discourses that follow different logics (e.g. Mauws and Phillips1995; Kieser 2002). Although both systems may operate within the economicsystem they develop different ‘languages’ and different criteria of success thatcannot be translated into each other. In this sense there is a ‘communication bar-rier’ between the consulting discourse and the discourse within business orga-nizations, in the same way as there is a ‘communication barrier’ between othertypes of systems (Kieser 2002; Luhmann 2005a).

Mauws and Phillips (1995: 331) point out that, on the basis of the language-game concept, one could even conceptualize ‘management science’ and ‘man-agement practice’ as consisting of multiple language games (Mauws and Phillips1995: 331). With regard to the sciences, one may think of the many incommen-surable paradigms in organization and management theory (Burrell and Morgan1979). With regard to ‘management practice’, one may particularly distinguishbetween the different business organizations, each of which constitutes anautonomous, self-referential system that follows its own particular logic(Luhmann 1995, 2003; Kieser 2002). Every individual organization develops itsown history, on the basis of which its communications are (re)produced, and theindividual communications in particular are solely meaningful. Similarly, the con-sulting discourse can be understood as being fragmented into many differentautonomous discourses – for example, the different consulting traditions (Kirschand Eckert 2005: 371). Mauws and Phillips (1992) even go a step further, sug-gesting that we should conceptualize individual organizations and consulting dis-courses as sets of several autonomous language games. One could think here, forexample, of different business units within a multinational firm or of different‘strategy episodes’ (Hendry and Seidl 2003), such as away-days, which are dif-ferentiated from the ongoing processes within the organization. One could alsothink of a nesting of separate organizational discourses with different reach. Auniversity, for example, might have, on the one hand, an administrative discoursespecific to that university and, on the other hand, scientific discourses in whichseveral universities take part.

To what extent, or under what circumstances, individual organizations may beviewed as unified discourses can be left open at this point. The point we are tryingto make is that there is a multitude of different autonomous strategy discourses – in




contrast to the assumption that there is one unified discourse. This has importantimplications for the way in which an organization’s strategy can be influenced bygeneral strategy concepts propagated by institutions in its environment. We willconcentrate on this question in the following section.

The ‘Adoption’ of a General StrategyConcept as ‘Productive Misunderstanding’

On the basis of the systemic-discursive perspective advanced in this article,we have to re-conceptualize what we mean when we say that an organization‘adopts’ a general strategy concept. Because of the incommensurability of thedifferent strategy discourses, organizations cannot draw on any general strategyconcepts – as implied, for example, by Abrahamson (1991, 1996), Whittington(2006) and Jarzabkowski (2004). There cannot be such an input. Instead, anystrategy concept used within a particular organization has to be understood asthe organization’s own construct. Strategy concepts developed and propagatedin other discourses (e.g. in a consulting discourse or in a business school) canstimulate organizations to develop their own strategy concepts in response, butthey can never enter the organization as such (Luhmann 2000; 2005a).Consequently, what appears as the adoption of a general strategy concept wouldhave to be treated as an illusion based on the fact that organizations use thesame labels, or sets of labels, for their own constructs. If one finds that an orga-nization uses such labels, it is normally assumed that it has also adopted theassociated concepts (Nicolai 2004: 960; Brunsson and Olsen 1993: 87). In otherwords, different organizations might use the same labels for their strategy con-cepts, but the concrete practices behind the labels could be different. It hasbeen shown, for example, that the label ‘lean management’ has been used indifferent companies for very different practices (Benders and Bijsterveld 2000).As to the question of why organizations draw on such general strategy con-cepts/labels, explanations abound: internal and external legitimation (Meyerand Rowan 1977), complexity reduction (Kieser 2002) and ‘deparadoxization’of the paradox of strategic decision-making (Ortmann and Salzman 2002) aresome of the answers that have been offered to this question. Here, however, wewill leave this question open. Instead, in the following we will concentrate onthe ways in which organizations may construct their own strategy concepts onthe basis of general strategy labels.

As we have argued above, the same words have different meanings in differ-ent contexts or discourses. Thus, the transfer of a set of labels from one dis-course to another – e.g. from a consulting discourse to an organizationaldiscourse – is associated with a (mostly unnoticed) re-interpretation, i.e. with achange of its meaning. In this sense, an organization might refer to the labels ofa general strategy concept, but it will understand those in an organization-spe-cific way that is different from the way they are used elsewhere. Teubner (2000)describes this phenomenon as ‘productive misunderstanding’:

‘In a precise sense, interdiscursive translation is impossible. Here lies the paradox oftoday’s babylonic language confusion. Between the discourses, the continuation of




meaning is impossible and at the same time necessary. The way out of this paradox ismisunderstanding. One discourse cannot but reconstruct the meaning of the other in itsown terms and context and at the same time can make use of the meaning material of theother discourse as an external provocation to create internally something new.’ (Teubner2000: 408)

As Teubner explains, a discourse cannot receive an input of meaning fromanother discourse; it merely reconstructs elements of another discourse accord-ing to its own logic. This internal reconstruction is, however, its very own con-struct, which is different from the original one.

From this perspective, the introduction of general strategy labels from outsidecauses within the discourse an unspecific ‘provocation’ (Teubner) or ‘perturba-tion’ (Luhmann) that leads to discourse-specific reactions. In other words, theorganization starts developing its own strategy concepts in trying to accommo-date the new labels. Empirically, one finds that whenever organizations pro-claim that they are applying new strategy concepts there are usually longdiscussions about the interpretation of the labels and how these can be relatedto existing practices (cf. Zbaracki 1998). The organization tries to make senseof the new labels on the basis of its existing discursive structures (cf. Von Kroghand Roos 1995) and in this way creates new sense, i.e. new meaning.

In the general management literature there are a few examples of studies thatexplicitly focus on the way in which general management concepts have dif-ferent meanings in different organizational settings. A series of articles, forexample, showed how Total Quality Management (TQM) was defined and usedvery differently in different organizations (Hackman and Wageman 1995;Westphal et al. 1997; Zbaracki 1998). Zbaracki (1998), in particular, pointedout how the adoption of TQM is associated with the collective construction ofnew social realities within the organizations. Other studies have analysed theuse of the concept of Business Process Reengeneering (Benders and Van Veen2001) and Lean Management (Benders and Bijsterveld 2000) in different dis-courses. In their study of the German reception of the Lean Management fash-ion, Benders and Bijsterveld came to the conclusion that

‘the meaning of lean production was shaped and reshaped on a continuous basis.Different interpretations of what a fashion actually means, and probably also the tacticor even opportunistic use of a popular label, make that the actions undertaken in thename of the fashion are likely to become coupled loosely (or even completely decou-pled) to the fashion’s original content, or the practices at organization(s) that stoodmodel for the fashion. Judging from its original content, such actions may be disquali-fied as having little to do with the fashion itself’. (Benders and Bijsterveld 2000: 61)

Although these and similar studies come from very different perspectives fromour own and try to make slightly different points, their empirical findings are nev-ertheless very much compatible with our argument. They demonstrate empiri-cally how different those concepts are when they are ‘applied’ to different settings(discourses).

What new strategy concepts are ultimately created in reaction to the intro-duction of new labels is not completely random. Rather, the discursive contextinto which the new labels get embedded restricts the range of possible mean-ings that it may attach to them. This is particularly the case where there is a




whole set of labels to accommodate (see, for example, the set of labels con-tained in the TQM concept compiled by Hackman and Wageman 1995). Inthese cases the interpretation of every individual label has to fit with the inter-pretation of the other labels – unless, that is, one selectively draws on only sin-gle labels (Zbaracki 1998; Benders and Van Veen 2001).

It is impossible to determine from the outset what internal strategy conceptwill ultimately be created in response to the introduction of a general strategylabel. Teubner writes in this sense: ‘There is of course, no built-in guarantee thatsuch a misunderstanding will be productive. You cannot say in advance whetherin the famous shell, the irritation of the sand-corn will at the end create thepearl’ (Teubner 2000: 409). In some cases, organizations might accomplish afundamental strategic change. In other cases, the ongoing strategy discoursesmight hardly be affected: the organization might just use the new labels butwithout really changing the structure of the strategy discourse itself. There aremany empirical accounts in the management literature of such instances of purere-labelling (e.g. Brunsson and Olsen 1993; Ashforth and Gibbs 1990; Elsbach1994; Zbaracki 1998). While this is often portrayed as intentional deception,there are many cases where the involved actors themselves believe that theyhave changed organizational practices: through the new labels they experiencetheir social world differently, even if it has not changed in any ‘substantial’ way.

The discourse-specific reinvention of the strategy concept is, however, possi-ble only if the organization finds some point of connection to the label. That is,the different labels and sub-labels in some way or other must be open to beinginterpreted according to the existing interpretational context: general strategylabels need ‘interpretive viability’ (Benders and Van Veen 2001), i.e. they haveto leave scope for interpretation. Many authors have commented on the ambi-guity and vagueness of general strategy concepts/labels (e.g. Astley andZammuto 1992; Kieser 1997, 2002; Zbaracki 1998; Ortmann and Salzman2002). While some authors see this ambiguity fairly critically, other authorshave pointed out – in accordance with our own line of reasoning – that only bybeing ambiguous and vague is there a chance of ‘general’ strategyconcepts/labels being able to be made to ‘fit’ the concrete organizational con-text. Astley and Zammuto write in this sense:

‘Linguistic ambiguity ... gives conceptual terminology great flexibility of application,allowing words to take on new meanings in the context of a different language game.’(Astley and Zammuto 1992: 453; emphasis added)

The Reproduction of Strategy Conceptsin the Ecology of Discourses

In the last section we focused on the role of general strategy concepts for indi-vidual organizations. In the following we will move back to the organizationalfield of strategy – as a higher level of analysis – to study the reproduction ofgen-eral strategy concepts. The question is: how do we interpret the ‘generality’ ofgeneral strategy concepts across different strategy discourses? If every organization




merely constructs its own strategy concept, what is it that gets reproduced? Forthis purpose we have to look in particular at the way in which the different dis-courses within the field of strategy relate to each other.

In our analysis so far we have stressed particularly the fragmentation andautonomy of the different strategy discourses: every discourse has its own logicand cannot be influenced directly by any other discourse. This does not meanthat the different strategy discourses are unrelated. On empirical grounds aloneone could not deny that different strategy discourses interact intensely – particu-larly if we think of the dynamics of management fashions (Abrahamson 1991,1996; Kieser 1997). Whatever meanings might be processed within each strat-egy discourse, we can certainly observe that the use of specific new general strat-egy labels often leads to the use of the very same labels in other strategydiscourses. To account for this we have to conceptualize strategy discourses asboth autonomous and highly interdependent at the same time. In order to capturethese two – seemingly contradictory – characteristics we suggest thatthe field of strategy be conceptualized as an ecology of strategy discourses (cf.Vickers 1968; Bateson 1972; Kirsch and Eckert 2005; Baecker 2006).

Conceptualizing a field as a kind of ecology places great emphasis on theinterdependencies between its various components. As Geoffrey Vickers writes,‘[The ecologist] develops first the idea of interdependence. In a field of vari-ables so closely and mutually interrelated, any change anywhere will in somedegree affect the whole’ (Vickers 1968: 34). Viewed as an ecology, the differentstrategy discourses cannot be studied independently of each other. Despite itsautonomy, every discourse is affected by the processes in other discourses andvice versa. There is a co-evolution between the discourses.

The basic mechanism of this mutual stimulation between different discourses –despite their autonomy – can be described as ‘structural coupling’ (Luhmann1995). By this we mean that the structures of the different discourses are insome way or other ‘adjusted’ with regard to each other. Although the differentdiscourses process different units of meaning, their structures are neverthelessin some respects ‘parallelized’. Because of that, different discourses can bestimulated by the same external events (despite their different logics). The mostgeneral form of structural coupling between discourses is language. All dis-courses are structured in such a way as to be able to process language (Luhmann1995). However, every discourse does so in a different way. Beyond this, thereis a particularly close structural coupling between strategy discourses based ona shared strategy language; in all strategy discourses one finds that more or lessthe same strategy language is used. Every strategy discourse, for example, canmake (its own) sense of the labels ‘strategic planning’, ‘strategy review’,‘strategic forecasting’, etc. – phrases that might have no meaning at all in othertypes of discourse. Because of that fact, different strategy discourses possessparticularly strong ‘resonance’ (Luhmann 1989) with regard to each other –where resonance means that a system reacts to external events in accordancewith its own logic (Luhmann 1989: 145).

This shared language provides strategy discourses with a basis for communi-cating (internally) about each other – or better, for discursive observation(Luhmann 1995). Within a consulting discourse, for example, one might refer




to the strategy discourses that take place in science (e.g. scientific articles on anew strategy concept), or in the education system (e.g. MBA textbooks on strat-egy). Owing to their shared strategy language, these different strategy dis-courses are more likely to refer to each other’s communications than a strategydiscourse and a physics discourse would, for example. Because strategy dis-courses share the same language, one is likely to assume that they also processthe same meaning (cf. Brunsson and Olsen 1993: 87; Benders and Bijsterveld2000; Nicolai 2004: 960). This, however, is just an illusion – a productive mis-understanding.

It is on the basis of this structural coupling that the ‘diffusion’ of generalstrategy concepts takes place. The sets of labels attached to the general strategyconcepts serve as ‘signposts’ that help the various communications orient them-selves with regard to each other. Whenever different strategy discourses findother strategy discourses using the same labels, they are likely to assume thatthey are dealing with the same general strategy concepts. In this sense the labelsserve as a common point of reference for the different strategy discourses, whenthey communicate about each other internally.

In order to appreciate the dynamics of mutual observations between the dif-ferent discourses, a second characteristic of ecologies has to be taken intoaccount: ecologies of discourses have no super-system that coordinates them(Baecker 2006: 118). Ecologies do not have a centre; the relations between theirsystems have to be treated as symmetrical (Luhmann 1989). In this sense, anystrategy discourse might resonate with any other strategy discourse, dependingon its very own discursive logic. By the same token, ‘general strategy concepts’might originate in any of the different strategy discourses. Such a tendency toview the discourses as symmetrical can also be found in the relevant manage-ment literature. In contrast to the mainstream belief that strategy concepts typ-ically are developed in the consulting discourse and from there disseminated tobusiness organizations, researchers increasingly acknowledge the symmetrybetween the discourses (e.g. Kieser 1997; Whittington et al. 2003; Nicolai2004). Similarly, the relation between business organizations and managementscience is seen more critically. Many strategy concepts discussed in scientificdiscourses were originally stimulated through management practice. Galbraitheven reversed the relation between the two types of discourses when hefamously wrote: ‘I know of no new form of organization that was invented byorganization theorists while advancing theory. Instead, the researchers recordwhat the inventive practitioner creates and give it labels like grids, systems 4, ormatrix organization’ (Galbraith 1980: 162). Ultimately, however, the scientificdiscourses might ‘feed back’ into the organizational discourse leading tochanges in the original strategy concept there – in this sense describing a circularrelation between the discourses (cf. Astley and Zammuto 1992: 454).

The dynamics of the strategy field – particularly also of fashions(Abrahamson 1991; 1996; Kieser 1997) – can be explained on the basis of themutual and sometimes recursive observations between the different discourses.The observation that other discourses seem to use the same general strategy




concept (whereas in fact they merely use the same labels) might serve as aconfirmation of one’s own use of the concept, which again might lead to othersusing the (assumedly) same concept and so on. Some discourses might com-municate about the ‘diffusion’ of a general management concept itself (e.g. inthe form of surveys). This observation might in its turn be observed by otherstrategy discourses, and this could lead them to draw on the same strategy label.In this sense, ‘The more companies are reported as having achieved competitiveadvantages through the implementation of a management concept ... the higherthe propensity of non-adopters to get on the band-wagon’ (Ernst and Kieser2003: 14–15). It is these mutual observations between strategy discourses(despite their different logics) that build up the momentum in the ecology untilthe entire process finally slows down again (Abrahamson 1996; Benders andVan Veen 2001).

Conclusion: Implications for Research and Practice

The proposed perspective, if taken seriously, has important implications forstrategy research and practice, which we want to outline in this concludingsection. These implications can be discussed on three levels: on a first level wewill show how the perspective changes the way we conceptualize strategizing.On a second level we discuss the consequences of this perspective for the waywe conduct empirical research on strategy. On a third level we will analyse theconsequences for strategy consulting, the practice of management science andstrategic management itself.

Implications for the Conceptualization of Strategizing

In comparison with the praxiological approach that we referred to in the intro-duction, the proposed perspective leads to a different conceptualization of therole of general strategy concepts in the structuring of strategizing activity. In thepraxiological approach, the general concepts are understood as a set of practiceson the societal level that the organizational members draw upon in order to struc-ture and guide their individual behaviours. In contrast to that, from the systemic-discursive perspective there are no such trans-discursive concepts. The processeswithin a particular discourse cannot receive any structuring or guidance fromoutside. All structures within a particular discourse ultimately have to be treatedas the product of the particular discourse itself. Phenomena external to a specificdiscourse, in particular labels for strategy concepts, can merely stimulate thediscourse-specific invention of a strategy concept. Thus, while the praxiologicalapproach assumes that the strategic activities within an organization, consultingfirm, etc. can be structured through practices external to that particular context,the systemic-discursive perspective treats any existing structures as the dis-course’s own product. Consequently all strategy concepts ultimately need to beexplained on the basis of the processes within the particular discourse.




Since the praxiological approach assumes that strategic practices can beshared across contexts, it tends to presume a natural tendency towards thehomogenization of strategic practice. In other words, one expects to find somedegree of isomorphism (Johnson et al. 2003: 7–8). The systemic-discursiveapproach, by contrast, emphasizes the differentiation of different discourses andthus presumes a natural tendency for heterogeneity. While the former approachneeds to explain differentiation as a particular achievement, the latter approachwould need to explain homogeneity as a particular achievement (e.g. as the resultof a particular structural coupling between discourses).

Implications for Empirical Research on Strategy

On the level of empirical research on strategy, the systemic-discursive perspec-tive refocuses the research process. The main emphasis of the research is placedon the way in which the meaning behind labels is created within the particulardiscourses. It is very much a focus on the micro-processes of meaning construc-tion. Generally, the research on strategy concepts would be structured around thefollowing four steps:

(1) Identification of the relevant discourses and reconstruction of their respective logics:

This first step is a crucial one as all ensuing steps depend on it. Discourses aregenerally defined by their specific logic. That is to say, the researcher candistinguish between different discourses if he/she can identify different logicsaccording to which each of these discourses functions. For example, Luhmanndistinguishes empirically between science and economics, treating them as twoseparate discourses, on the grounds that one operates on the basis of thedistinction true/false while the other operates on the basis of payment/non-payment. The boundaries of these discourses are clearly defined by the particulardistinctions. Only those communications that are based on the particulardistinctions belong to the particular discourses. Within these discourses aresearcher might distinguish sub-discourses that use such distinctions inparticular ways. In science, for example, one might distinguish differentscientific discourses if one can identify different principles according to whichthe distinction true/false is used. Again, within these sub-discourses one mightdistinguish a further level o sub-discourse, and so on.

For the researcher who wants to use the systemic-discursive perspectiveempirically it is important to find the right level at which discourses should bedifferentiated. This ultimately depends on the particular question that concernsthis particular researcher. For example, if the researcher wants to analyse howstrategy research affects strategy practice, it might be enough to distinguishbetween the logic of the scientific discourse and that of strategy practice (e.g.Astley and Zammuto 1992; Nicolai 2004). However, if our researcher is inter-ested in the effects of strategy research on a particular organization, then the par-ticular organization might be treated as a discourse in itself. In that case theresearcher would seek to identify a particular logic according to which that




organization operates – a particular sub-logic, that is, within the logic of strat-egy practice. Or, if one were interested in the diffusion of a particular strategypractice within an organization, one would consider decomposing the discourse‘organization’ into different sub-discourses. This, however, would be possibleonly if one could identify different discursive logics within the organizationaldiscourse, e.g. based on different professions or different departments. If one isnot able to identify different logics, one has to treat the organization as a singlediscourse.

(2) Analysis of the modes of structural couplings between the identified discourses: Theresearcher needs to identify the particular means through which the discoursesare coupled to each other. In particular he/she has to analyse what makes thedifferent discourses resonate with processes in other discourses.

(3) Analysis of the discourse-specific construction of the strategy concept: This is thesecond crucial point in the study. The researcher needs to study the process bywhich the meaning behind a set of labels, i.e. the discourse-specific concept, isconstructed in the particular discourses.

(4) Analysis of the function of the discourse-specific concept within the particular discourse:

The researcher needs to study how the constructed concept is related to, and whateffect it has on, the existing practices. A new concept might, for instance,become deeply embedded in the existing core practices or be kept distant fromthem; it might merely confirm existing practices or it might lead to fundamentalchanges.

Implications for Practice

With regard to the practical implications of the systemic-discursive perspective,we can distinguish between the practice of strategy research, the consultingpractice and the management practice, each of which we will discuss in turn. Inmanagement science in general and in strategy research in particular there hasbeen a long-standing debate on the practical irrelevance of strategy research (cf.Lowendahl and Revang, 1998; Rynes et al. 2001; Baldridge et al. 2004). Fromthe systemic-discursive perspective this might be explained not as a deficiencyof the particular research but as an inevitable consequence of the incommensu-rability between the various discourses. In a strict sense we might thus speakof the relevance or irrelevance of research to further research – but notto practice. The implication of this is twofold: on the one hand, managementresearch has to acknowledge its self-referentiality as constitutive. That is to say,management science – like all science – progresses only by focusing on the sci-entific discourse (cf. Kieser 2002; Nicolai 2004). On the other hand, the scien-tific discourse could take into account that it might cause resonance in thepractical management discourses (cf. Astley and Zammuto 1992).




In other words, the scientific discourse might reflect its potential for stimu-lating parallel processes in the practical discourse; for stimulating, that is, pro-ductive misunderstandings. This reflection can focus on the content or theprocess side of research. On the content side, one might try to develop labelsthat are likely to have resonance in the practical discourse. On the process side,one might try to ensure that the process of research comes into ‘contact’ withmanagement practice. For example, this might take the form of the so-called‘mode 2 management research’ (e.g. Gibbons et al. 1994). However, in contrastto the usual interpretation, mode 2 would have to be understood as a parallelprocessing of separate discourses: the scientific discourse and the practical dis-course take place at the same time, with the ‘same’ communications meaningdifferent things in the different discourses.

The proposed perspective has analogous implications for consulting practice.This, first of all, means that consulting has to acknowledge its self-referential-ity. However, compared to science, consulting fundamentally depends on itsability to cause resonance in the discourses of practice (Luhmann 2005a). Whilethe consulting discourse has so far operated mostly on the basis of the assump-tion that it could transfer its concepts into management practice, an awarenessfor the incommensurability of the discourses would result in a reorientation inconsulting work (cf. Königswieser and Hillebrand 2005). Consultants woulddevelop and value strategy concepts according to the potential of the labels tostimulate creative processes in their client organizations. In addition to that, theemphasis of a consulting project would be placed much more on the processesin the client organization than in the consulting firm, since it is the client whoultimately invents the new strategy concept.

For management practice, the new perspective has just as important implica-tions: the management has to acknowledge its own, creative role in the inventionof new strategy concepts. Thus, rather than ensure the accurate application of astrategy concept (which is not possible), the management would have to promotecreativity in the ‘application’ (invention) of the concept. This, however, also meansthat the management (and the organization at large) has to take the responsibilityfor any new strategy concepts and their consequences, since they are ultimately itsown inventions. The consequences of new strategy concepts cannot be blamed onthe consultants or other external actors who provided the labels.

However, in what way consulting and management discourses will actuallydeal with the academic argument put forward in this article depends entirely onthe logic of the discourses themselves. On the basis of our own argument, weare aware that consulting and management practices cannot but misunderstandit – even our thoughts on its implications. Let us at least hope that the misun-derstanding will be productive!

I am grateful to Alfred Kieser, Alexander Nicolai, Günther Ortmann, Werner Kirsch, Ann Langleyand the four anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of the article.


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David Seidl is Assistant Professor of Organization and Strategy at the University of Munich.He studied Management and Sociology in Munich, London and Witten/Herdecke. Heearned his PhD at the University of Cambridge. Current research focuses on sociologicalapproaches to strategy and change. He is coordinator of the EGOS standing working groupon ‘Strategizing: Activity and Practice’ and is guest editor of a special issue of Human

David Seidl



Relations on ‘Strategizing: The challenges of a practice perspective’ (both together withJulia Balogun and Paula Jarzabkowski) – see also www.strategy-as-practice.org. He haspublished in the Journal of Management Studies, Organization and Human Relations andhas (co-)produced three books, including most recently Niklas Luhmann and organi-zation studies (CBS Press, 2005) and Organizational identity and self-transformation: Anautopoietic perspective (Ashgate, 2005).Address: Institute of Business Policy and Strategic Management, University of Munich,Ludwigstr. 28 Rgb., D-80539 Munich, Germany.Email: [email protected]




General Strategy Concepts and the Ecology of Strategy Discourses

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