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  • General Principles of

    Tariff

  • Conclusion

    ABT

    Power Tariff Evolution

    Tariff Principles

    Introduction

    Presentation Outlines

  • Introduction

  • What is Regulation

    Regulation is defined as

    The act of regulating;

    A rule or order prescribed for management or government;

    A regulating principle;

    A percept, rule or order prescribed by superior or competent authority relating to action of those under its control

    Blacks Law Dictionary

  • Electricity a concurrent subject as per Constitution of India

    Both Centre and States can legislate

    In case of repugnancy or conflict, Central legislation prevails

    Basic Legal Framework

  • STAKEHOLDERS REGULATORY FRAMEWORK

    CONSUMER

    DISTRIBUTORS

    GENERATORS

    REGULATOR

    CPPs

    REGULATOR

    TRANSMITTERS

    TRADER

    TRANSMITTERS

    PX

    RE

    GU

    LA

    TO

    R

    GOVT.

  • The Electricity supply industry was earlier governed by three Acts i.e. before enactment of the Electricity Act- 2003, namely

    Indian Electricity Act, 1910

    Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948

    Electricity Regulatory Commissions Act, 1998

    The above three Acts now repealed in Electricity Act, 2003

    History of Electricity Regulation in

    India

  • Indian Electricity Act 1910 laid down basic framework for the power sector in the country along with all the policies governing the electricity supply in India

    o Growth of the sector through private licensees

    o Licence by State Govt.

    o Provision for licence for supply of electricity in a specified area

    o Legal framework for laying down of wires and other works

    o Provisions laying down relationship between licensee and consumer

    Indian Electricity Act, 1910

  • The supply of electricity was limited to urbanareas and most of the country was deprived ofelectricity

    The situation was so grim that afterindependence not a single private organizationwas competent to administer the power supplyin the country, thereby, making way for stateparticipation in the power sector

    Indian Electricity Act, 1910

  • Post-Independence Policy

    The Act concentrated on increasing state monopolyover the sector by

    Mandated creation of SEBs

    Establishment of CEA

    Need for the State to step in (through SEBs) to extendelectrification (so far limited to cities) all across the countryespecially in rural areas

    As a result of this, 19 SEBs (State Electricity Boards)were formed under the Act which enjoyed monopoly overgeneration, transmission and distribution at intra-state level

    However the power situation lacked in quality, security andreliability

    Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948

  • Main amendments to the existing Acts

    1956 Amendment- to increase role of State Govt to monitor SEBs

    Amendment in 1964 to enable REBs

    Amendment in 1975 to enable generation in Central sector

    Amendment to bring in commercial viability in thefunctioning of SEBs Section 59 amended to make the earning of a minimum return of 3%

    on fixed assets a statutory requirement (w.e.f 1.4.1985)

    Amendment in 1991 to open generation to private sector (foradditional capacity requirement) and establishment of RLDCs

    Amendment in 1998 to provide for private sectorparticipation in transmission and also provision relating toTransmission Utilities

    Legal Framework Old Laws

  • In order to strictly implement reforms and rationalizing of thetariff structure, second generation reforms were introduced

    In 1998 the GOI implemented The Electricity RegulatoryCommission Act, 1998

    It emphasized on the establishment of state and central levelelectricity regulatory commissions (ERCs) (independentregulatory bodies) for rationalizing the tariff structure, creatingtransparency in policy formulation, to frame and promoteefficient and environmentally benign policies and for greaterinvolvement of private participation

    Objective distancing of Govt./Govt. organization fromfunctioning of SEBs i.e. regulation and tariff determination

    Electricity Regulatory Commission

    Act, 1998

  • Resultant Industry Structure

  • Need for New Legislation

    The SEBs incurred heavy loses and failed to make the necessarypayments to the CPSUs, owing to their bulky design, these utilitieswere inevitably becoming cumbersome to manage, therefore, theadministration decided to unbundle the utilities into more'manageable' size which paved the way for the Electricity Act 2003

    Requirement of harmonizing and rationalizing the provisions in the existing laws to a self-contained comprehensive legislation

    Create competitive environment which would result in enhancing quality and reliability of services to consumers

    Distancing of Govt. from regulatory responsibilities

    Obviating need for individual States to enact their own reform laws

    Requirement of introducing newer progressive concepts like power trading, open access, Appellate Tribunal etc.

    Special provision for the Rural areas

  • Regulatory Milestones

    1910 1948 1975 1998 2003

    IE Act ES Act EA Central Utilities ERC ACT

    British India-

    agglomeration of provincesIndian Union

    Isolated Private LicenseesIsolated

    SEBs

    Regional

    SystemCentral Utilities Central Utilities, IPPs,

    CTU, SEBs

    Early British Model State Govt Central Govt Regulator

    Country

    Status

    Sectoral

    Makeu

    p

    Institutional

    Structure

    Electricity Regulation in India

  • This Act seeks to consolidate

    The laws relating to generation, transmission, distribution, trading and useof electricity

    Taking measures conducive to development of electricity industry,promoting competition

    Protecting interest of consumers and supply of electricity to all areas, Rationalization of electricity tariff ensuring transparent policies regarding

    subsidies

    Promotion of efficient and environmentally benign policies Constitution of Electricity Regulatory Commissions to rationalize electricity

    tariff and establishment of Appellate Tribunal and for matters connected

    Electricity Act, 2003 - enacted June 10th 2003, envisages development in an open, nondiscriminatory, competitive, market driven environment in the interest of the consumers/ suppliers of power

    Legal Framework

    Electricity Act-2003

  • Objectives of

    Electricity Act

    2003

    Liberal Framework

    Competitive Environment

    Private Investments

    DelicensesGeneration

    Rural Distribution Delicenced

    Controlling Theft of

    Electricity

    Restructure Electricity

    Boards

    Regulatory Commission/

    Appellate Tribunal

    Open Access

    Trading

    Competitive Bidding

  • Industry Structure After Electricity Act 2003

  • National Electricity Policy and Plan

    Central Govt. to prepare National Electricity Policy and TariffPolicy in consultation with State Govt. and CEA Feb 05

    National Electricity Plan for a period of 5 years issued by CEAin accordance with National Electricity Policy Aug 07

    National Policy on rural electrification including stand alonesystems (including renewable and non-conventional energysources) to be issued by Central Government in consultationwith State Government Aug 06

    Policy for electrification and distribution in rural distributionPanchayats, Co-operatives, NGOs, franchisees

    Rule Making through Notifications for carrying out various provisions of the Act

    Powers to issue directions to the Regulatory Commissions on issues involving public interest

    Role of Government

  • Total village electrification by year 2010

    By year 2012 :

    Per capita availability 1000 units

    Installed capacity over 200,000 MW

    Spinning reserves 5%

    Minimum lifeline consumption of 1 unit per household per day

    Inter-regional transmission capacity 37,000 MW

    Energy efficiency/ conservation savings about 15%

    National Electricity Policy

  • Mandates competitive procurement of power andtransmission services transitional window of 5 years periodgiven to public sector companies

    Encourage efficiency in operations by sharing of gains betweenlicensees and consumers

    Promote Multi-Year Tariff (MYT) framework

    Encourage loss reduction Strategies

    Tariff design : Linkage of tariffs to cost of service

    gradual reduction in cross subsidy (+/- 20% of average costof supply)

    Progressive reduction in Cross-subsidy surcharge for openaccess

    Tariff policy - Jan 06

  • Tariff Principles

  • o Electricity Provides consumers with the ability torealize numerous conveniences in their everydaylives

    One does not buy electricity as an end product

    o One buys electricity as an input which is then utilizeto produce consumable goods or services or to enjoydomestic comforts

    Features of Electricity

    23

  • Electricity is different from other commodity

    o Electricity is not Visible

    o It can not be touched

    o It can not be stored

    o Production & Consumption of

    electricity inseparable

    o Can only be sent through wires

    o Travels at a speed of light

    o Can not carry a brand mark

    o Transfer of ownership is not possible

    o It obeys laws of physics

    o Electricity has demand side flaws

    Features of Electricity

    24

  • Tariff should provide correct pricing signals toinvestors as well as consumer

    Protection of consumer interest and alsoinvestors risk by Stable and predictable over aperiod of time

    Appropriate incentive for efficiencyenhancement and rational use of energy bysuppliers and consumers

    Tariff Principles

    25

  • Economic conservation of societal resources,i.e. scarce national economic resources mustbe allocated efficiently

    Socio-economic need of the country, i.e. tariffmust be made affordable to all sectors of theeconomy and minimum level of service evento the low income group of the society

    Transparency and simplicity in determinationof tariff

    Encourage market determination of prices

    Tariff Principles

    26

  • Institutional Arrangement Options

    Government monopoly

    Private monopoly without regulation

    Private monopoly with (National, Regionalor Local) regulation

    Two Basic Regulatory Forms

    Rate-of Return (ROR) also known as Cost-of-Service (COS)

    Performance Based Ratemaking (PBR)

    Tariff Principles

    27

  • In ROR regulations, role of regulation is toencourage enough investment to meetcustomer demand and to compensate investorswith a reasonable rate of return

    Under ROR or COS regulation, regulatordetermines The value of invested capital The allowed rate of return on invested capital Appropriate expenses

    Required Revenue = Expenses + {allowed rateof return x (Allowed Investment)}

    Tariff Principles ROR

    28

  • Performance Based Ratemaking (PBR) orincentive regulations sets performance targets -both operational and financial for utility

    The return to the utility depends uponperformance, over achievement of theperformance criteria can increase returns for theutility while underachievement will decreasereturns

    "Light Handed" regulation i.e. least interferenceby the regulators

    Tariff Principles PBR

    29

  • Establishment of extensive data base forbenchmarking performance criteria on the basisof industry best practices, historic data etc. areessential component for effective regulationunder this method

    A form of PBR is in actual use in India, wheretariffs are based on normative parameters

    PBR weakens the link between a utilitysregulated tariff and its costs by increasingregulatory lags which also provides incentivesfor cost reduction

    Tariff Principles PBR

    30

  • Regulation is intended to serve as an offset tothe monopoly situation

    Regulatory agencies are charged withresponsibilities to balance the interest of bothcustomer and utility

    Regulation strives to keep price as low aspossible for consumers while allowing theutility to earn a fair return on its investment

    Tariff Principles

    31

  • To achieve this balance, regulator generallyoperate from a position that prices should bebased upon costs

    o Cost plus mechanism

    To bring accountability and performanceenhancement PBR element is introduced in thecost plus structure

    Electricity Pricing

    32

  • Power Tariff Evolution In India

  • Single part Two part- K P Rao

    ABTMarket Based

    Mutually Agreed Govt. of India

    Regulatory Commission

    Evolution of Power Tariff

    Competitive Bidding

    34

  • Pricing of power prior to 1992 in India

    The rate of power was fixed by GOI on the basis of

    reasonable ROE at the then operating PLF level

    Both Fixed Charges and Variable Charges realized in

    one part as energy charge Existed before NTPC

    Initially adopted for NTPC

    The rates were very liberal and in favor of generators

    Tariff was not related to availability or frequency

    Calculated so as to cover both the fixed cost as well as

    variable (energy) cost at a certain (normative)

    generation level

    Single Part Tariff

    35

  • Single Part Tariff

    36

  • Single Part Tariff was conducive neither toeconomic generation of power and itsabsorption by boards as per merit order, nor tosatisfactory operation of regional grid

    Distorts Economic Dispatch (Merit Order Operation)

    SEBs found that total cost to be paid to GENCOswas higher than the marginal cost of theirstation

    Under drawal accrues monetary benefit tobeneficiaries

    Shortcomings of Single Part Tariff

    37

  • With Actual Generation Level much higher thannormative, collection of fixed charges was muchhigher than the fixed charges agreed

    GENCOs resorted to dumping power even whenfrequency was high

    Led to sharp difference between Central SectorGencos & SEBs on who should back down

    Shortcomings of Single Part Tariff

    38

  • The Central Government constituted a Committee in 1989 togo into the issues of Power Sector and recommend a tariffstructure

    The Committee submitted its report on Principles and Normsfor Tariff Fixation of Central Sector Generating Stations inJune 1990

    GOI adopted a Two Part Tariff formula for NTPC stations in1992 based on K. P. Rao Committee recommendations

    Fixed Charges and Variable Charges computed separately

    Fixed Charges compensate for the cost of capacity,including investment cost

    Variable Charges compensates for cost of energy

    Laid down fairly sound costing principles

    K. P. Rao Committee

    39

  • Fixed charges Return on equity O&M charges Interest on loans Interest on working

    capital Depreciation

    Variable Charge Primary fuel (Coal/Gas) Secondary fuel Oil

    Recovery of charges Fixed charges recoverable at

    62.8% PLF (i.e. actual generationplus deemed generation)

    Incentive at the rate of 1paisa/kWh for every 1% increasein PLF above 68.5%

    Disincentive at graded reductionin fixed charges below 62.8%subject to a minimum of 50% offixed charges at nil generation

    Fixed charges and incentives/disincentive are paid bybeneficiaries in proportion totheir energy drawals

    Variable charges in paisa/kWhsubject to fuel price adjustment

    Recommendations

    40

  • Two Part Tariff

    41

  • Did nothing for promoting grid discipline Low frequency during peak hours High frequency during off-peak hours Rapid changes in frequency and fluctuating voltages

    Reasons K. P. Rao Committee tackled only Central Generating Stations Conflicting commercial interest of stakeholders- SEBs/CGS 50% FC is assured to generating stations even at 0% PLF Lack of generating capacity and transmission systems No penalty for jeopardizing the GRID Over-drawals by SEBs during peak-load hours and under-

    drawals during off-peak hours continued unabated, causingserious frequency excursions

    Shortcomings of K. P. Rao

    Committee Recommendations

    42

  • SEBs/CGs have conflicting commercial interests

    Absence of direct incentives or penalties to control this

    Lack of generating capacity and transmission systems

    One SEB suffers for nonperformance of other

    Off-Peak

    Peak

    Did not encourage grid discipline

    43

  • Problems in grid operation

    Load

    (MW)

    Time (hours)

    Low frequency:

    48 48.5 Hz

    Off-Peak

    Peak

    High frequency:

    50.5 51 HzRapid change:

    1 Hz in 5 10 minutes;

    many hours everyday

    1 2 3

    Frequent grid disturbances:

    Generator tripping, supply interruptions,

    grid disintegration

    4

    Freq.

    (Hz)

    44

  • The Central Government considered further structuralreforms in bulk power and transmission tariff to inducebetter system operation and grid discipline through amechanism of commercial incentives and disincentives

    M/S ECC of USA were commissioned under a grant fromADB to undertake comprehensive study of Indian powersystem and recommend a suitable tariff structure

    ECC submitted its report in February, 1994, recommendedAvailability Tariff for generating stations, which wasaccepted in principle by GOI in November, 1994

    A National Task Force (NTF) was constituted by MoP inFebruary, 1995 to oversee the implementation of ECCsrecommendations

    Based on NTF deliberations between 1995 and 1998, MoPnotified a draft notification of ABT in 1999

    Availability Based Tariff

    45

  • Electricity Regulatory Commissions Act, 1998 Providesfor establishment of CERC at Central level and SERC atState levels

    CERC was formed in May,1999

    Date of implementation of ABT

    oWestern region: 1.7.2002

    o Northern region: 1.12.2002

    o Southern region: 1.1.2003

    o Eastern region: 1.4.2003

    o North Eastern region: 1.11.2003

    Availability Based Tariff

    46

  • ISGS 500 MWe

    Aux

    30 MWe

    470 MWe ex-bus

    SEB1 SEB2

    loss is distributed to

    all the constituents in

    proportion to

    schedule

    o Installed Capacity

    o Aux Power (%)

    o Declared Capability

    o NAPAF (%)

    o Scheduled Generation

    o AFC (Rs.)

    o ECR (Rs./kWh) on ex-bus basis

    o GHR (kcal/kWh)

    Relevant Terms

    47

  • Auxiliary power consumption or AUX is the quantum of energyconsumed by auxiliary equipment and transformer losses withinthe generating station, expressed as a percentage of the sum ofgross energy generated at the generating terminals of all theunits of the generating station

    Declared capacity (DC) means the capability of the generatingstation to deliver ex-bus electricity in MW declared by theGenco in relation to reference period considering availability ofFuel/ water

    Plant Availability Factor (PAF) means the average of the dailydeclared capacities (DCs) expressed as a % of the installedcapacity in MW reduced by the normative auxiliary energyconsumption

    Scheduled Generation (SG) with reference to any period is theschedule of generation in MW ex bus as given by Load DispatchCentre

    Some Definitions

    48

  • Gross Station Heat Rate means the heat energy inputin kcal required to generate one kWh of electricalenergy at generator terminals of a thermal generatingstation In case of coal stations:

    (i) Coal consumed in kg/kWh is converted into kcal bymultiplying with GCV of coal

    (ii) Heat due to oil consumption in kcal

    Gross Calorific Value means the heat produced inkcal by complete combustion of one kilogram of solidfuel or one litre of liquid fuel or one standard cubicmeter of gaseous fuel, as the case may be;

    Some Definitions..

    49

  • For Thermal generating station

    o Capacity Charge (for recovery of annual fixed cost)linked to availability and are recovered at Normativeavailability & pro-rata recovery below norm

    o Energy charges (for recovery of primary fuel cost)linked to scheduled generation and are based onactual fuel cost and normative operating parameters

    o UI charges (real time pricing) are linked to frequencyand are levied on deviations from schedules

    Components of Tariff

    50

  • UNSCHEDULED INTERCHANGE (UI) CHARGES

    o Variation between actual generation or actual drawaland scheduled generation or scheduled drawalaccounted for through Unscheduled Interchange (UI)Charges

    o UI for a generating station shall be equal to its actualgeneration minus its scheduled generation

    o UI for a beneficiary shall be equal to its total actualdrawal minus its total scheduled drawal

    o UI worked out for each 15 minute time block

    o Charges for all UI transactions shall be based onaverage frequency of the time block

    Availability Based Tariff concept

    51

  • Unscheduled Interchange (UI)

    Charges

    Frequency (Hz)

    UI C

    ha

    rge

    s (

    Pa

    isa

    )

    52

  • Gen

    Beneficiary

    Load

    Import = Load - Gen

    For beneficiary: UI = Import Scheduled drawal

    For CGs: UI = Actual sent out Scheduled generation

    UI Charges

    53

  • Encourage merit order

    generation

    Save natural resources

    Help protect environment

    Establish a level playing field

    for all the constituents

    No conflicting commercial

    interests

    Ensure grid stability

    Protect equipments

    Gen

    Beneficiary

    Load

    Import = Load -

    Gen

    States additional power

    requirement can be met by its

    reserved generating stations

    (DG, Pump storage, GT etc. or

    import from CGs)

    ABT Rational Tariff Structure

    54

  • Energy is metered in 15 min Time Block

    UI (Metered Scheduled) energy payments are made into and

    from UI pool account operated by the concerned RLDC

    Deviation from Schedule

    55

  • Decentralised Scheduling

    Availability

    DeclarationEntitlements

    S

    L

    D

    C

    Requisition &

    Bilateral Agreements

    Injection Schedule Drawal Schedule

    Revision in DC Revision in Requisition

    Final

    Injection ScheduleFinal

    Drawal Schedule

    08:00

    10:00

    15:00

    18:00

    22:00

    23:00

    R

    L

    D

    C

    I

    S

    G

    S

    Time

    Revisions during

    Current dayRevisions during

    Current day

    0 to 24

    hours 56

  • The station foresees a capability to deliver 900 MW(ex-bus) on the next day, and advises the same to theRLDC by 8 AM

    The RLDC would break it up, and advise the SLDCs by10 AM that their entitlements in the CGS for the nextday

    Entitlements in the other Central stations would alsobe advised by RLDC to the SLDCs similarly

    Simultaneously, the SLDCs would receive availabilitystatus from their intra - state stations as well

    Day by Day Scheduling

    57

  • They would then carry out a detailed exercise as tohow best to meet the expected consumer demand intheir respective States

    For this, they would compare the variable costs ofvarious intra - state power stations, and with energycharge rates of the CGS

    The total dispatch schedule for the CGS of 900 MWduring the day time and 740 MW during the nighthours

    Daily Scheduling Process

    58

  • This would be issued by the RLDC by 5 PM, andwould be effective from the following midnightunless modified in the intervening hours

    States A, B and C shall pay CC for the whole daycorresponding to DC of 270, 270 and 360 MW andthe GS would get CC corresponding to 900 MW

    EC payments by the three States would be for 270 x24 MWh, 270 x 24 MWh, and (200 x 24 + 160 x 16)MWh at the specified EC rate of the generatingstation

    Daily Scheduling Process

    59

  • Daily Scheduling Process

    60

  • The two areas marked X represent the off-peak

    hour capability of the Central generating station

    Back down the station during off-peak hours

    The station gets CC for the day corresponding to

    its DC (900 MW), and EC to fully recover its fuel

    cost for generating the scheduled quantum of

    energy

    Options for Generating Stations

    61

  • Find a buyer (other than State - C)

    As long as the energy sale rate agreed upon ishigher than the fuel cost per kWh of the station

    It would also reduce the technical problemsassociated with backing down of the station andimprove the stations efficiency

    The agreement has to be non-firm or interruptible

    Low price

    Trading Opportunity for Generating

    Stations

    62

  • The station may accept the schedule given by the

    RLDC, but generate power to its full capability of

    900 MW even during off-peak hours

    Earn UI*

    Options for Generating Stations

    63

  • The options for the generating station arise only in case

    a State has not requisitioned its full entitlement

    In fact, the same three options are available to State-C,

    before they get passed on to the Central station

    Requisition power from the Central station only as per

    its own requirement, and draw power as per the

    resulting schedule

    Options for States

    64

  • Requisition full entitlement of 360 MW from the

    Central station for the entire 24 - hour period, find a

    buyer for the off-peak surplus, and schedule a

    bilateral sale

    This would make sense as long as the sale rate

    per kWh is more than the energy charge rate of

    the Central station

    Trading Opportunity for States

    65

  • Requisition the full entitlement for the entire 24 -

    hour period, but draw power only according to its

    actual requirement

    Earn UI*

    Availability of various and similar options, both for

    the beneficiaries and for the generating companies,

    means that the mechanism is sound and equitable

    Options for States

    66

  • A frequency pattern would emerge depending on the daily

    profile of the total system load and the generation mix

    The corresponding UI rate profile shall reflect the daily pattern of

    the system marginal cost

    System Marginal Price Pattern

    67

  • Frequency (Hz)

    UI

    rate

    pa

    ise

    /kW

    h

    0

    100

    200

    300

    400

    500

    600

    700

    800

    900

    1000

    279, 49.92132, 50.04

    LC PH

    Un

    it lo

    ad

    (%

    )

    States marginal gen cost will move down towards the

    prevailing UI rate

    Gen station will maximize its gen as long f < its threshold f

    UI Rate Vs System Marginal Cost

    68

  • 0100

    200

    300

    400

    500

    600

    700

    800

    900

    1000

    49.50

    49.52

    49.54

    49.56

    49.58

    49.60

    49.62

    49.64

    49.66

    49.68

    49.70

    49.72

    49.74

    49.76

    49.78

    49.80

    49.82

    49.84

    49.86

    49.88

    49.90

    49.92

    49.94

    49.96

    49.98

    50.00

    50.02

    50.04

    50.06

    50.08

    50.10

    50.12

    50.14

    50.16

    50.18

    50.20

    50.20

    Frequency Based Dispatch

    69

  • 70