GE541 Economic Geography of Transport October 30th.
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Transcript of GE541 Economic Geography of Transport October 30th.
GE541Economic Geography of
TransportOctober 30th
Congestion Pricing: Theory and Practice
• Congestion Price Charging a substantial fee for vehicle operation at times and places subject to peak demand
• Monetary incentives toward behavior modification
• Recent policy interest in pricing policies such as road tolls and parking fees
• Focus on limiting traffic congestion
Road Pricing Examples
1. Singapore (1975)
2. Bergen, Oslo, Trondheim, Norway (circa 1990)
3. Auto Route A1 (France)
4. California 91 (1995)
5. London
6. Seoul, Korea
Singapore Area Licensing Scheme (1975)
A. Fee of US $1.50 - 2.5/day (exempting car pools & taxies, motorcycles & commercial trucks).
B. Above vehicles no longer exempt
C. Afternoon peaks included Car commuting (<4 riders) dropped 48% - 27%
Carpool & bus increased 41% - 62%
More Recent Electronic System Stringent Policies
Hong Kong and Cambridge, UK
Trials and Non Adoption
Scandinavian Toll Rings
Objectives:
Revenue Generation rather than Congestion Pricing
Both in Norway and Sweden
The latter may evolve into a congestion pricing
Stockholm
Dennis Package
• Improved public transit• New bypass roads and • Road pricing
[A toll ring - 15 year investment package]
North-South bypass route west of the city
Auto Route A1 N. France
Weekend Peak Spreading
April 1992
Red Tariff - Sunday 4:30 - 8:30 pm• Toll rates 25 - 56% higher than normal toll
• Open Tariff (lower toll rates) – before and after peak hours
Riverside Freeway (California)
(CA-I-91)
Private French toll road firm (Toll approximately $2.00)
Dulles Highway Tolls
Netherlands
Randstand Region
2,000 square miles
6 million people
Road Pricing Scheme Plan
Greater London
• £5 Charge in Central London
• A Success Story
Seoul Case
New York City Plan
The Politics of Road Pricing
• The Anglo Saxon Experience
US Government tried tolls on publicly owned and operated roads and bridges
No cities bought the idea [Distinction between road and home use pricing]
ISTEA experiments in congestion pricing
More interest in tolling growing, however, in controlling air pollution
(especially in inner portions of metro areas)
- in these cases, new construction almost impossible
Tolls in such situations can induce motorists to consider:
Demand Management Role of Tolling
alternative routes alternative modes and alternative travel times
1990 Clean Air Act
• All reductions of air pollution came initially from technologies
• Further reduction must come from behavioral changes
• Auto air pollution comes fromCold engine startsVMT
No discouragement of auto use in off-peak periods
Interest in ubiquitous tolling for environmental planners
Winners and Losers
Economists - focus on CBA
Gains to winners a must > Costs to losers so that society as a whole is better off.
Planners and engineers sensitive to the fact that such compensation seldom takes place, so that some parties are left worse off by tolling than before.
Tolling on Existing Road
Winners Losers
1. High value on travel time savings
1. People with low value of time
2. HOV lane users 2. People shifting to a competing untolled facility
3. Recipients of toll revenues
3. Users of the above competing facility
4. People who decide not to make this trip
• Political support for tolling difficult to put together. • Compensation packages?
Tolling a New Road
• Less losers
• More acceptable than tolling existing one (e.g. taking away an existing lane for a tolled HOV lane not popular)
Federal Gas Tax
4 cents/gallon 1950s
9 cents 1983
14 cents 1990
18 1/2 cents 1993
Gas tax weakens the case for imposing tolls