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Future threat concept to GCC and

C4ISR adaptation

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Contents• Introduction.• Iran.• Syria.• Iraq.• Yemen.• Challenges to C4ISR.• C4ISR Architecture.• Conclusion.

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IntroductionStrategic

Environment Analysis

Iran

SyriaIraq

Yemen

C4ISR Engineering &

Adaptation

ISISAQAPSTM

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Introduction• It is time for all GCC countries to acknowledge

Iran as a major threat (politically, religiously and militarily).

• We should recognize Iraq militias, Hezbollah as hostel and enemy as ISIS (no difference or may be worse).

• More human intelligences and surveillance from (Coast, Boarder Guards) infused into the C4ISR.

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DEALING WITH IRAN AS A BROAD GULF AND REGIONAL

SECURITY THREATIRAN’S NUCLEAR PROGRAMSIRAN’S MISSILE BUILDUPCONVENTIONAL AND ASYMMETRIC DETERRENCE AND DEFENSEREGIONAL INFLUENCE

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IRAN’S NUCLEAR PROGRAMS

• Enrichment 20% to 3.67 %• Stockpile 10,000 to 300 kilograms through

export to Russia• Centrifuges 20,000 to 6,104• Duration 10 to 15 years• Enforcement Iran has a long record of cheating

on its international nuclear agreements. It has violated international agreements at least three times in 2014.

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• (Iran has skilled and well-educated political figures and diplomats who know how to talk to the West does not mean that they are willing to compromise on U.S. terms, that they say what they think, or what they say reflects their true motives. Taqiya – the right to dissemble or lie to defend the faith – is an all too familiar part of Iran’s Shiite past).

• Sanctions snap back sanctions.. Easy?• C4ISR Role. Collaboration with International

entities and Allies to help detect violations?

IRAN’S NUCLEAR PROGRAMS

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IRAN’S MISSILE BUILDUP

• The U.S. negotiators dropped demands that Iran restrict development of intercontinental ballistic missiles that could be used to deliver the warheads

• Iran tests-fires ballistic missiles (9 March 2016) 700 and 1400 km.

• Breach of Nuclear Deal or U.N. Security Council resolution?

• Hundreds if not thousands of ballistic missiles. Is current C4ISR sufficient to deal with?

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CONVENTIONAL AND ASYMMETRIC DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE

• Iran is using a combination of conventional and asymmetric means in its military Strategy.

• Concerns only if Iran is attacked or as retaliation.• Ballistic Missile.• Naval Mines.• Coastal Anti-Ship missiles and artillery.

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CONVENTIONAL AND ASYMMETRIC DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE

• What is more concerning is Iran asymmetrical means.

• It is using proxies wherever and whenever possible.

• Armored proxies consist of Hezbollah, Houthis, Sabreen, etc.. And tens militias in Iraq.

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CONVENTIONAL AND ASYMMETRIC DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE

• Cultural groups and centers with the aim is to develop these into armored militias in the future.

• Iran is augmenting this with huge propaganda, instigation and intimidations.

• Iran is using Shiia ceremonial celebrations (31 days out of 354 days) to preach continuous hatred and ideology.

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CONVENTIONAL AND ASYMMETRIC DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE

• Iran has used terrorism in the past and it is going to use in the future.• It has tunneled weapons and explosives to

groups in GCC.

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REGIONAL INFLUENCE• Find, follow, warn and eliminate Iranian

presence and its proxies specially the cultural missions.• Information war against Iran propaganda.

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DEALING WITH THE THREAT POSED BY THE MIX OF ETHNIC, SECTARIAN, EXTREMIST THREATS; ONGOING FIGHTING; AND LONGER-TERM

INSTABILITY IN SYRIA • Unambiguous designation and declaration of

armed groups as terrorist or legitimate.• Hezbollah and other foreign militias must be

considered terrorist and should be targeted during any intervention

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DEALING WITH THE THREAT POSED BY THE MIX OF ETHNIC, SECTARIAN, EXTREMIST THREATS; ONGOING FIGHTING; AND LONGER-TERM

INSTABILITY IN SYRIA

• More political and military assistance to legitimate groups.

• Continuous surveillance and vigilance of Syrian territories for early warning against terrorist operations in GCC.

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DEALING WITH THE THREAT POSED BY THE MIX OF ETHNIC, SECTARIAN, AND EXTREMIST

THREATS; ONGOING FIGHTING; AND LONGER-TERM INSTABILITY IN IRAQ

• It is obvious that Iraq is dominated religiously and politically by Iran.

• The Iranian system is cloning itself in Iraq. Ayatollah there and Ayatollah here. An IRCG there and Shiite Militias here.

• The tone and rhetoric of Iraqis religious and political figures are not far from their Iranian compatriots.

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DEALING WITH THE THREAT POSED BY THE MIX OF ETHNIC, SECTARIAN, AND EXTREMIST

THREATS; ONGOING FIGHTING; AND LONGER-TERM INSTABILITY IN IRAQ

• Iraqi governance is an absolute corrupt and sectarian. Prosecution continues not only against Muslims but also against its Shiite.

• Iraqi Army and Militias would not stand ISIS advances without the massive air strike by the Allies.

• If they are good at something, they excel in vengeance from poor civilians and instigating more violence and prosecution.

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DEALING WITH THE THREAT POSED BY THE MIX OF ETHNIC, SECTARIAN, AND EXTREMIST

THREATS; ONGOING FIGHTING; AND LONGER-TERM INSTABILITY IN IRAQ

• The future of Iraq is not bright. Destabilization and terrorism will continue.

• Group terrorism and/or crowd ingression through Kuwaiti and Saudi borders is a big possibility.

• Continuous surveillance and vigilance of Iraqi territories and borders is required.

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DEALING WITH THE THREAT POSED BY THE CIVIL WAR IN YEMEN

• Applying UN 2216.• Houthis Disarmament.• Nation building and aids.• Continuous military operation against AGAP

and ISIS.

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Challenges To C4ISR• Large Forces• More Integrations• Collateral Damages• More Players• Complications and Training (not only

technological but also conceptual).

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GCC C4ISR Architecture

WarningOrdering

Execution

AssessingCollection

sharing

ProcessingStrateg

y

Doctrine

Directions

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Conclusion• As we comprehend the future threat concept

and realize their significance and ramifications.

• We need to asses every element of our C4ISR.• C4ISR is not an Air Command and Control. It is

a holistic system that include all domains (Air, Land, Naval, Cyber).

• Latest technology and integrations.

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References• U.S.News

http://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2015/04/27/10-ways-obamas-iran-nuclear-agreement-fails

• NPR News http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2015/07/14/422920192/6-things-you-should-know-about-the-iran-nuclear-deal

• CSIS http://csis.org/publication/saudi-arabia-and-united-states-common-interests-and-continuing-sources-tension

• CNN http://edition.cnn.com/2016/03/09/middleeast/iran-missile-test/• CSIS

http://csis.org/publication/continuing-duel-iran-containment-deterrence-and-iranian-arms-control-agreement

• CIA https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ym.html