14 August 2013 | Vol. 4, № 29.

From the Editor’s Desk

Dear FDI supporters,

Welcome to this week’s edition of the

Strategic Weekly Analysis. We begin with

an examination of the motivations behind

the purchase of hi-tech weaponry by

Qatar, the UAE and Bahrain, and ask if

these states are moving to ensure their

own security.

Moving east, we analyse the recent flare-

up along the India-Pakistan border and its

implications for the scheduled peace talks

between the two countries.

We next re-visit the ethnic conflict

between Buddhists and Muslims in Sri

Lanka. The article asks whether the strife

there could provide the Sri Lankan

government with another opportunity to

take control of the situation.

Still in the Asian region, we examine the

almost-completed Burma-China oil and

gas pipelines. We observe that even

though deliveries of gas have

commenced, some security issues remain

unresolved. Looking at Indonesia, we

assess French efforts to boost relations

with Indonesia and ASEAN following the

first visit by a French Foreign Minister to

Indonesia in 17 years.

Moving to Africa, we look at the need for

government intervention in demarcating

land boundaries in the lower Cheptebo

area of Kerio Valley. Current exploration

has convinced local clans that oil may be

found in that area.

Finally, we examine the linkage between

gender equality and food security.

I trust you will enjoy this edition of the

Strategic Weekly Analysis.

Major General John Hartley AO (Retd) Institute Director and CEO Future Directions International

*****

Page 2 of 15

Tanks, Jets and Satellites: Why Qatar, UAE and Bahrain are

Purchasing High-Tech Weaponry

The surge in military acquisitions so far this year in Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and

Bahrain may be a response to the reduced presence of the United States Navy in the

Persian Gulf.

Background

A recent announcement by the German Ministry of Economics has revealed arms exports in

the first six months of 2013 were worth 817 million Euros, much of which was pegged for

Qatar in the form of 62 Leopold II tanks and 24 Panzerhaubitze 2000 Self-Propelled Guns

(SPG). Additionally, the United Arab Emirates has ordered two high-resolution military

observation satellites from France, while Bahrain considers acquiring the BAE Eurofighter

Typhoon from Britain. This flurry of activity, in addition to some questionable purchases, has

raised suspicions among commentators about the reasons for these purchases.

Comment

Many Middle Eastern states in the past used the high levels of government revenues

acquired from either oil or gas exports, to become highly developed and militarised

societies. This has been seen as a rational and realistic response, as the lack of regional

integration has created significant security fears. Most of these fears stem from either Israel

or Iran, which have been perceived as the primary antagonists in the region. The recent

upgrades to military infrastructure and equipment, however, may not relate solely to Israel

or Iran, both of whom have been quite stable in recent years, but may relate to a

significantly decreased presence of the US Fifth Fleet in the region.

Qatar’s order of 62 tanks and 24 SPGs, in addition to other smaller items, is unique in that

the Qatar’s only land border is with Saudi Arabia. Lacking any substantial large-vehicle

transport system, the effectiveness of the equipment is limited. The options available to

Doha may be to transit through Saudi Arabia, with Riyadh’s consent, or to deploy in support

of a coalition operation that can provide heavy lift capability.

While Qatar focuses on its army, Bahrain and the UAE have focused on the skies. Bahrain is

currently in the process of talking with British multinational aerospace company, BAE, about

possibly acquiring the Eurofighter Typhoon. This will be an improvement over the current

inventory of 21 F-16s and four ageing F-5s. The potential shift to the British Eurofighter

follows a trend in the Middle East of purchasing cheaper and less sophisticated, but

operationally ready, aircraft from Europe, rather than unproven US models. This follows a

meeting between King Hamad of Bahrain and British Prime Minister David Cameron on

6 August, which BAE has referred to as ‘very early discussions.’

The UAE has recently announced an order of two surveillance satellites from France, which

are likely to be used to monitor naval and aerospace movements across the Strait of Hormuz

into Iran. The satellite system will be the third operational system in the Middle East, after

Israel and Turkey, and is part of the UAE’s efforts to become a self-sufficient force. The

Page 3 of 15

efforts of the UAE mirror those of Qatar and Bahrain and reflect the deteriorating security

environment in nearby Syria and the Persian Gulf.

As the US continues to draw down the number of vessels it operates in the Persian Gulf, it is

likely that the Gulf States will increase their military capability. Additionally, these states,

apart from Saudi Arabia, may prefer contracts with Europe rather than the US, as there will

be less implicit need to ‘buy protection’. Consequently, defence companies in various

European states, not just the “big three” (Britain, France, Germany), will see an

improvement in the marketability of their products. It is likely that this will cover the full

spectrum of defence acquisitions, from small arms to major platforms.

The recent defence orders and acquisitions by Qatar, the UAE, and Bahrain, confirm

suspicions that many Middle Eastern states are taking their security into their own hands.

The diminished presence of the US Fifth Fleet, which will now operate with one aircraft

carrier rather than two, signifies a substantial drawdown. The effects of this drawdown have

not been lost on the regional states and may indicate a future trend in which the Emirates

share an increased security burden.

Gustavo Mendiolaza

Research Analyst Indian Ocean Research Programme

*****

Diplomatic Damage from Latest India-Pakistan Border Clashes The recent killing of five Indian soldiers by Pakistani troops has put the Indian Government

under pressure. The incident is likely to cause the suspension of the scheduled dialogue

between the two countries.

Background

On 6 August 2013, five Indian soldiers were shot dead in an ambush in Indian-controlled

Kashmir, near the India-Pakistan Line of Control (LoC). While it is unclear who was

responsible for the attack, blame has been attributed to either militants backed by the

Pakistan Army, or the Pakistani Special Forces themselves. Although Pakistan has denied any

involvement and its Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif, has sent his condolences over the killings,

tensions have markedly increased. Intermittent exchanges of small arms fire across the LoC

have occurred throughout the week, wounding several soldiers and civilians. The most

recent incident occurred on 11 August, with both sides using machine guns.

Comment

While the incident on 6 August and the following border skirmishes are unlikely to escalate

into more serious military actions, they are likely to damage the efforts of the Indian and

Page 4 of 15

Pakistani governments to improve relations between their countries. Both governments are

showing restraint and a willingness to co-operate at the moment, but political pressure over

a similar incident in January 2013, forced the Indian Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, to

suspend the official dialogue with Pakistan.

Talks between Indian and Pakistani bureaucrats over their territorial disputes were

scheduled to restart this month, but that is now doubtful; many in India’s opposition are

stridently opposed to them taking place. The main Indian opposition party recently

demanded that Singh’s government cancel a planned meeting with Sharif in New York next

month and even scale down relations with Pakistan by recalling the Indian High

Commissioner to Islamabad.

With elections in India due next May, Singh’s government is particularly susceptible to

agitation from the Indian opposition and the notoriously jingoistic media, which could force

it to take a harder stance against Pakistan. Although the current administration favours

dialogue to reach a consensus with Pakistan, the public mood in India will make this

politically difficult. Singh’s government is frequently painted as being weak on border

protection, owing to the incursions by Chinese and Pakistani forces at various times through

the past year. Since the Indian Government is already contending with domestic anger over

the rising cost of living, it is likely that it will heed calls to take some action to shore up its

support, rather than just wait out the media storm before quietly restarting talks. While

India’s reaction is unlikely to be as extreme as the opposition and sections of the media are

calling for, the government will almost certainly suspend the talks and make a diplomatic

protest.

Perhaps a greater concern not just for relations in the sub-continent but for the region and

beyond, is that this event highlights the Pakistani government’s lack of control over at least

some elements of its military forces and the militants aligned with Pakistan. The government

of Prime Minister Sharif has been seeking to re-engage in dialogue with India for some time

now, making it highly unlikely that it would have authorised such an attack. Consequently,

although the efforts by Sharif to ease tensions and rebuild trust are widely seen as sincere,

questions will again begin to rise about his government’s ability to deliver on its peace

agreements.

When India, or indeed any country, enters into security-based talks with Pakistan, the issue

of how Pakistan can control its rogue elements and prevent them from tarnishing any deal,

will need to be factored into the discussions. Given that Pakistan’s democracy is newly

established, it is unlikely to be able to give any reliable guarantees in this area. That alone

may provide the Indian Government with a reasonable excuse for suspending the talks with

Pakistan, now that it is politically expedient for them to do so.

Stephen Westcott Research Assistant Indian Ocean Research Programme

*****

Page 5 of 15

Sri Lanka’s Ethnic Tensions Continue Sri Lanka continues to experience ethnic tensions, as Sinhalese Buddhists attack Muslims

during evening prayers, giving the government an opportunity to respond and to prevent

further escalation.

Background

Four years after the end of a long and bitter civil war between the majority Sinhalese and

the Tamil minority, ethnic tensions continue to grow. The target now, however, is the

Muslim minority.

On Saturday, 10 August, a Buddhist mob attacked a mosque in central Colombo, Sri Lanka’s

capital, injuring at least 12 people during evening prayers. After the mob threw stones at the

three-storey mosque, hundreds of Muslim residents took to the street to prevent further

attacks. The latest event adds to a series of attacks on minority Muslims by the Buddhist

majority.

Comment

The mosque damaged in Saturday’s attack was built a month ago, after hard-line Buddhists

forced the closure of a nearby mosque. Leading the recent attacks is the Buddhist Sinhalese

group, Bodu Bala Sena

(Buddhist power force,

BBS). The group has

campaigned against the

Muslim minority since last

year, with attacks on

mosques and boycotts

against Muslim-owned

businesses. The clashes

mirror events in Buddhist-

majority Burma (Myanmar),

which has also seen

increasing violence against

members of the minority

Muslim population.

The Muslim community

makes up approximately

nine per cent of Sri Lanka’s

population of 20 million.

Buddhists make up about

70 per cent. Leaders of the

BBS, Galagodatthe Gnasara

Thera and Kirama

Page 6 of 15

Vimalajothy Thera, have accused the Muslim minority of destroying the Sinhala race through

extremism. According to them, Muslims have increased their birth-rate to take over the

country. Many of the BBS’s arguments centre on traditional Muslim practices, such as halal

food and commodities and the wearing of the niqab, claiming they are a threat to Buddhism.

Bodu Bala Sena calls for the end of such rituals and practices, asserting that as Sri Lanka is a

Buddhist country, it is obligatory to comply with Buddhist tradition.

The attacks in Sri Lanka, however, are not totally anti-Muslim. Buddhism is an integral part

of the Sri Lankan national identity. The hard-line Buddhists consider their religion to be

under threat, as they did in 1983 at the beginning of the civil war against the Tamil minority.

Consequently, violence has also been perpetrated against Hindu and Christian minorities.

Since 2009, several churches and temples have been destroyed. This suggests that the

current violence is, to some extent, to ensure Buddhism’s survival, not simply aimed at the

destruction of Islam in Sri Lanka.

The government’s response, or rather the lack of it, is also worrying. Despite attacks against

more than twenty mosques over the past year, law enforcement agencies have not taken

punitive measures against those propagating violence. The few arrested in connection with

past events were later freed, as police did not press charges. Moreover, when Azard Sally, a

Muslim Politician and former deputy Mayor of Colombo, spoke out against the BBS in May,

he was arrested under the Prevention of Terrorism Act, allegedly for instigating

communalism.

The relationship between the BBS and the ruling party in Sri Lanka is unclear. Sri Lanka’s

Defence Secretary, Gotabhaya Rajapaksa, was the guest of honour at the opening of a

Buddhist Brigade training school. He referred to the monks as those who ‘protect our

country, religion, and race.’

The recent mosque attack has presented an opportunity for the government to finally take

action. Muslim politicians representing the Sri Lankan Freedom Party (SLFP)-led United

Freedom Peoples Alliance (UPFA), have called upon the government to take tangible action

against those targeting the Muslim community, to prevent a catastrophe.

As the violence continues, the fear amongst the Muslim community grows and there is a risk

that Muslims will deploy counter-measures. In one incident, a hand grenade was thrown at a

Buddhist temple in the Jaffna Peninsula, on the northern tip of the island. If such counter-

attacks occur on a regular basis, it will be difficult to restrain the popular swell of Buddhist

prejudice against the Muslim minority.

The failure of the government to act now would only encourage more attacks. The situation

at the mosque would not have escalated had the government implemented regulations

several months ago. It would be wise for the government to ensure religious freedom and

provide security to minorities. The on-going development of Colombo and neighbouring

suburbs could suffer if the situation escalates.

Kaelin Lutz Research Assistant Indian Ocean Programme

Page 7 of 15

*****

Gas Deliveries from Burma to China Have Begun, but Security Issues Remain Even though gas has begun to flow from Burma to Kunming in China’s southern Yunnan

Province, the security of the gas pipeline is not assured.

Background

A multi-billion US dollar gas pipeline, between Kyaukpyu in Burma and Kunming in China,

was inaugurated recently and the delivery of gas to energy-hungry China has begun. The

South-East Asia Gas Pipeline (SEAGP) runs for 870 kilometres and has a designed annual

capacity of twelve billion cubic metres of gas. The adjoining South-East Asia Crude Oil

Pipeline (SEAOP), is designed to transport 22 million tonnes of oil annually.

The SEAOP Company comprises two entities: the China National Petroleum Corporation

(CNPC) and Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE). The SEAGP consortium, on the other

hand, has six members from four states: CNPC of China, Daewoo and KOGAS of South Korea,

OCEBV and GAIL from India, and MOGE of Myanmar. Oil from the Middle East destined for

China, will be transported to Myanmar and pumped to China via the pipelines, as will be the

case with gas purchased from Burma.

Chinese analysts have expressed satisfaction with the pipelines, saying that they reduce

China’s Malaccan Dilemma to a large extent and shorten delivery times. The gas pipeline, in

particular, is expected to

meet a full quarter of China’s

annual gas demand, while

simultaneously contributing

an estimated one and a half

billion US dollars to Burma by

way of royalties and fees. This

creates a win-win situation

for both countries.

As is often the case with such

matters, though, things are

not as clear cut as they

appear to be at first glance.

Comment

The Burma (Myanmar)-China

Natural Gas Pipeline, which

Page 8 of 15

has taken the better part of four years to construct, is part of a larger plan to allow imports

of oil and gas into China to bypass the Malacca Strait, long seen by Chinese analysts as a

major weakness in China’s energy strategy. Little wonder, then, that the voices of dissent

heard in relation to the pipeline’s construction have been vociferously denounced in the

Chinese media as the shady mentality of Western criticism. This antagonism to dissent

notwithstanding, problems do persist on both sides of the border.

In China, the pipeline is yet to be completed. While this will undoubtedly be done sooner

rather than later, a projected date by which the gas will be available for use has not yet been

announced by the Chinese authorities at CNPC. They also will not specify when gas will be

available for use in Kunming and the surrounding country. These issues, however, pale into

insignificance when compared to the problems in Burma.

A major undertaking by the SEAGP consortium was to provide schools and medical clinics

along the pipeline’s route. According to Xinhua, the consortium has provided about US$20

million to build forty-five schools and twenty-four clinics. Sources familiar with the project,

however, say that the school buildings consist only of walls and a roof, without the

necessary ancillary equipment and staff. China’s ambassador to Burma has refused to take

responsibility for this, stating that it is Burma’s responsibility to provide the necessary staff,

without addressing the issue of the equipment. The clinics, similarly, are unusable since

there are few medical staff members to man them.

Aid issues, however, are not the only worry for the SEAGP consortium. According to Eleven

News in Burma, twenty-three villages around the port of Kyaukpyu in the Rakhine state,

which claim to have been affected by the pipeline, have initiated formal proceedings against

the consortium. A mass demonstration was held in April by villagers who claim they have not

been compensated adequately for being dispossessed of their land. They demanded, in

addition to the promised schools and clinics, roads connecting the villages, access to drinking

water and electricity, a better transport infrastructure and higher wages for local workers.

Activists also claim that, in addition to causing environmental degradation and ignoring the

rights of local residents, the project lacks transparency and, to a large extent, only benefits

China.

As if that were not enough, the pipelines traverse the insurgency-prone Shan state. The

greater part of Burma’s north-western Shan and Kachin states are controlled by armed

militia groups, which have fought pitched battles with the Burmese army (see Conflict and

the Threat of Democracy to Burma). The Kachin Independence Army has fought for an

independent Kachin state for decades now, as has the United Wa State Army, which has the

largest non-government military force, consisting of an estimated thirty thousand personnel.

In addition to the threat of having the pipelines held hostage or destroyed by militia attacks,

China is also worried that increased strikes by the Burmese army against these militia groups

will exacerbate the problem of Kachin refugees seeking security in Yunnan province. This

would also pose a problem that China would prefer to avoid. The obvious course of action

for China is to mediate talks between the Burmese army and the militia groups. This, though,

would force China to put aside its vaunted principle of not interfering in the internal affairs

of other countries.

Page 9 of 15

The gas pipeline, therefore, helps solve one of China’s burning issues, but raises the prospect

of others being created.

Lindsay Hughes Research Analyst Indian Ocean Research Programme

lhughes@futuredirections.org.au

*****

France Looks to Boost Relations with Indonesia, ASEAN

French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius has visited Indonesia in an effort to boost relations

with Indonesia and ASEAN. The first visit by a French foreign minister to Indonesia in 17

years, the trip underscores France’s ambition to more actively engage the region in the

future.

Background

French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius visited Indonesia on 1 August in an effort to boost

relations with the South-East Asian state and other ASEAN members. The visit, which also

included a side trip to Vietnam, was aimed at implementing a strategic partnership signed

between Indonesia and France in 2011 and improving trade dealings with ASEAN. While

France may have traditionally overlooked South-East Asia in favour of India, China and

Japan, the recent trip underscores Paris’s desire to more actively engage the region in the

future.

Comment

The three-day visit saw Mr Fabius meet a range of officials, including Indonesian counterpart

Marty Natalegawa and President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. Talks focussed on trade,

investment, technology and defence and both sides said they were keen to implement the

strategic partnership they signed in 2011. The partnership focusses on strengthening

bilateral co-operation in areas such as security, economics, and development and, more

broadly, is seen as a key element in developing relations between the EU and ASEAN.

Speaking at the ASEAN headquarters in Jakarta on 2 August, Fabius conceded that France

had not preciously prioritised Indonesia or South-East Asia, but said that he hoped that

would change in the future. ‘For too long, relations between Indonesia and France have

been rather distant’ he said, noting that no French foreign minister had visited Indonesia in

17 years. While he acknowledged that some progress had been made, especially

economically, he called on both states to move forward ‘hand in hand’.

In many ways, Indonesia’s projected rise makes it impossible to ignore. South-East Asia’s

largest economy, some investors have predicted it will become the seventh-largest economy

Page 10 of 15

by 2030 and the fifth-largest by 2050. Whether such predictions eventuate remains to be

seen, especially given recent signs of weakness, but the archipelago state should present

significant economic opportunities for France and the EU in the future.

Moreover, with Indonesia seen as an indispensable member of ASEAN, warmer ties should

also lead to stronger economic relations with other ASEAN members. Among the 47 states

France recently highlighted as priority export countries, six were members of ASEAN:

Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam. Currently, France’s

exports to ASEAN are comparable to that of China; but that figure is expected to rise,

especially given the growth of countries such as Indonesia and the Philippines and increased

French foreign investment in the region.

For Indonesia, warmer relations with France would also be greatly beneficial. France is

currently the fifth-largest economy in the world, a permanent member of the Security

Council and a leading voice in the EU. It is also the fourth most common destination for

foreign investments, underlining the opportunities that exist and the ease of doing business

there.

Indonesian investment in France has been modest so far, but, as Indonesian companies

begin to expand globally, France potentially offers an important avenue into EU markets that

will become increasingly important to ASEAN members.

Even as Indonesia and France recognise the growing importance of their relationship, much

work will need to be done if it is to achieve its potential. But with both countries leading

members of the EU and ASEAN, and with possibility of stronger collaboration between the

EU and ASEAN in the future, it is certainly something worth pursuing.

Andrew Manners Research Analyst Indian Ocean Research Programme amanners@futuredirections.org.au

*****

Possibility of Oil Discoveries Fuels Land Disputes in Kenya Tensions could escalate further and result in violent unrest, if the Kenyan Government does not assist in the demarcation of land boundaries in the lower Cheptebo area of Kerio Valley.

Background Tensions are currently high in the lower Cheptebo area of the Kerio Valley, a branch of

Kenya’s Rift Valley province. Three clans are claiming ownership of the land where Tullow Oil

Page 11 of 15

is conducting its exploration. According to local media reports, the Kong’oot, Kayoi and

Setek clans are claiming ownership of areas that do not have clear boundaries, but may be

at the centre of potential oil discoveries by Tullow. Without government assistance to clearly

define the borders, residents have warned there could be inter-clan fighting.

Comment As with many communities in Africa, the clans in Kerio Valley have used available

geographical structures, including rivers, streams, valleys and gabions, to demarcate their

ownership of land since ancestral times. The recent entry of Tullow and the potential

discoveries of oil in Kerio Valley have sparked land ownership disputes. The residents

envisage the associated wealth and improvements in the area’s economy and are fearful of

“land grabbing” by neighbouring clans. As a result, there have been reports of clans fencing

off areas that they lay claim to; a move which has angered neighbouring tribes. In Kenyan

communities, any occurrence that causes suspicion, often leads to a sharp escalation in

tensions.

As there are no legally demarcated boundaries, and with tensions and suspicion among the

neighbouring clans escalating, it is important that the government intervene. It should assist

the community to legally demarcate the contested areas, to avoid inter-clan conflicts.

The Deputy County Commissioner has since attempted to calm the tensions between the

groups, by informing them that, even if oil is discovered, the affected clans will be resettled

in another area as the oil belongs to the government. Consequently, they need not be

concerned about land demarcation at this time. Nevertheless, he has committed to having

borders drawn in the short-term. Despite the Deputy Commissioner’s acknowledgement of

the issue, the response is somewhat problematic. The communities may not feel that it

allows enough dialogue between them and the government and it is unlikely that the

affected clans will be willing to relocate without further consultation.

In Kenya, local communities have a strong sense of attachment with the land, viewing it as

their own and building their identity upon it. Experts have noted that this perception and

attachment to the area, leads to continued dissatisfaction among the communities with the

government’s processes for allocating land. When communities perceive the government

has not done enough to adequately inform and engage the affected residents about the

decision making process, tensions can escalate rapidly.

Heightened tensions about border and land disputes are likely to continue throughout the

wider East African region, including Kenya, as further natural resource discoveries are made,

or are rumoured to have been made. This will ultimately increase the potential for inter- and

intra-state conflicts.

Minerals and energy companies working in the region should remain cognisant of local

claims to land and, where possible, engage and inform the affected communities. Land and

border disputes have the potential to negatively impact exploration efforts and to result in

violent unrest without much warning.

Page 12 of 15

Kim Moss Research Analyst Minerals and Energy Research Programme kmoss@futuredirections.org.au

*****

Report Identifies Strategic Importance of Gender Equality to

Future Food Security

Faced with numerous inequalities and constraints, women and girls worldwide need

greater access to education and employment opportunities in the agricultural sector if

food security is to be achieved.

Background

In a recently released report the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food,

Oliver de Schutter, has identified gender inequality as a key issue in achieving global food

security. The report Gender, Equality and Food Security – Empowerment as a Tool against

Hunger, identifies the key strategic importance of gender empowerment to improving food

security and preventing global and local food crises.

Comment

Of the 870 million people in the world who are currently food insecure, estimates indicate

that over 60 per cent are women and girls. In developing countries, women are also the

primary agricultural producers, responsible for more than 70 per cent of food production.

Despite their significant contribution to household-level food security, women’s agricultural

productivity is often constrained by local laws and customary practices, which leave them

with limited access to agricultural inputs, credit, extension services, markets, education and

training, and subject to restrictions on land ownership.

Land access directly affects livelihood security and the ability to access lines of credit to

develop or expand agricultural production. In a number of developing countries the ability to

purchase or inherit land is the right of male relatives and women have limited power in

controlling assets. This directly affects women’s economic participation. In the long term,

gender inequality reduces potential labour productivity, affects rural development and

ultimately food security, for both men and women. According to de Schutter, global

comparisons have identified a strong correlation between hunger and gender inequality.

Closing the gender gap in agriculture has the potential to generate significant improvements

in productivity. By ensuring that women have access to the same productive resources and

knowledge as men, estimates indicate that yields on their farms could be increased by

between 20 and 30 per cent. This means that the agricultural output of developing countries

Page 13 of 15

could increase by four per cent, simply by ensuring the equitable distribution of existing

knowledge and inputs.

Beyond the potential productivity gains, research indicates that greater gender equality,

through providing education and employment opportunities for women in agriculture,

would lead to additional rounds of social benefits, in the form of increased food security and

improvements in household health and nutrition. In areas where rural women have the

power to control agricultural production and income, there has been a positive link to

increased health, education and nutritional outcomes for their children. Women reportedly

tend to favour the production of food crops, which ensure household food security.

Empowering women in agriculture would also contribute significantly to economic growth

and domestic agricultural output in developing countries. Domestic and regional strategy

should reflect this potential and facilitate the emergence of women in the agricultural

sector, to address long-term food security and nutrition. By doing so, the UN Food and

Agriculture Organization estimates that as many as 100 million people could be raised out of

hunger. The agricultural development programmes of AusAID and ACIAR place a heavy

emphasis on gender empowerment, reflecting the strong link between gender equality and

food security.

Sinéad Lehane

Research Analyst Global Food and Water Security Research Programme slehane@futuredirections.org.au

*****

What’s Next?

The African Union Peace and Security Council meets on 14 August to discuss the ongoing crisis in Egypt and to debate Egypt’s suspension from the organisation.

Foreign Ministers of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) are meeting in Lilongwe, Malawi, on 14 August to discuss the Zimbabwean election and regional economic issues.

The SADC heads of state, including Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe, will hold their own meeting in Lilongwe on 17 August. Among the topics to be discussed is the Zimbabwe election result.

India’s opposition Bharatiya Janata Party is expected to formally name Narendra Modi as its prime ministerial candidate for the 2014 general elections on 15 August.

The New Zealand Defence Force is hosting Exercise Phoenix Spirit in Christchurch until 17 August. Phoenix Spirit brings together personnel from New Zealand, Australia, the United States and China in a humanitarian aid and disaster relief forum and planning exercise.

Page 14 of 15

Any opinions or views expressed in this paper are those of the individual authors, unless stated to be those of Future Directions International. Published by Future Directions International Pty Ltd. 80 Birdwood Parade, Dalkeith WA 6009 Tel: +61 8 9389 9831 Fax: +61 8 9389 8803

Page 15 of 15

E-mail: lluke@futuredirections.org.au Web: www.futuredirections.org.au