From the Editor’s Desk...26 March 2014 | Vol. 5, 9. From the Editor’s Desk Dear FDI supporters,...
Transcript of From the Editor’s Desk...26 March 2014 | Vol. 5, 9. From the Editor’s Desk Dear FDI supporters,...
26 March 2014 | Vol. 5, № 9.
From the Editor’s Desk
Dear FDI supporters,
Welcome to the Strategic Weekly
Analysis. We begin this week’s edition by
examining the long-term food security in
the Philippines after the destruction
caused by Typhoon Haiyan.
Moving west, we analyse the threat posed
by the Don Sahong Dam to food security
in Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia.
In Indonesia we examine the
government’s decision to continue with
its ban on the export of minerals and its
long-term implications.
Continuing westwards, we look at the
incursion of Chinese troops into Indian-
administered territory in the Ladakh
region and gauge how a flare-up of
hostilities could endanger Sino-Indian
trade links.
Still in India, we look at the growing trade
links between that country and Iran to
determine if a long-term trade
relationship is in the offing.
We next examine the first official visit of
the King of Bahrain to Pakistan in four
decades and ask if there is an opportunity
for the two countries to draw the Middle
East closer together.
In Afghanistan we look at President
Karzai’s refusal to sign the bilateral
security agreement and determine if this
could hamper international planning in
the post-2014 era.
Moving to Africa, we examine the Kenyan
Government’s decision to prioritise water
access in towns over regional
development, possibly leading to a
reduction in food and water security in
the Turkana region.
Moving to Somalia, finally, we note that
Somali forces, backed by AMISOM troops,
have regained territory from al Shabaab
fighters. This, however, is only the first
step in re-establishing the rule of law in
Somalia.
I trust you will enjoy this edition of the
Strategic Weekly Analysis.
Major General John Hartley AO (Retd) Institute Director and CEO Future Directions International
*****
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New Plan Focuses on Long-Term Development and Food
Security in Post-Relief Philippines
Typhoon Haiyan has made clear the importance of improving the resilience of the
Philippines to natural disasters, but barriers such as corruption and the lack of
transparency in local governments, need to be addressed before long-term development
plans can truly become effective.
Background
In November last year, Future Directions analysed the Long-Term Food Security Risk in the
Philippines after Typhoon Haiyan. More than three months after the catastrophe,
emergency relief work has mitigated the threat of a large-scale food crisis. Although the
country seems on its way to recovery, however, food security remains dependent on long-
term solutions to social, agricultural, economic and political issues.
Comment
The Philippines government has launched an $8.2 billion, four-year plan to focus on
rebuilding areas affected by Typhoon Haiyan and developing resilience to natural disasters.
The Reconstruction Assistance in Yolanda (RAY) plan, includes budgets for both short-term
and long-term needs. The plan also allows $780 million for critical actions focused on
agriculture, shelter and livelihoods, among other elements.
Problems that could hinder the success of these programs include corruption and
governance issues. Despite recent improvements, corruption in the Philippines remains a
considerable barrier to achieving food security, as funds go missing. In response to this, the
government has launched the Foreign Aid Transparency Hub, a web portal allowing the
public to track international disaster funds.
The Transparent Accountable Governance Program of The Asia Foundation, is designed to
help local governments address their lack of transparency and accountability mechanisms,
through technical assistance, support of civic engagement and by working with local
governments.
Ensuring that programmes and relief efforts are sustainable beyond current aid is critical for
long-term food security. Typhoon Haiyan destroyed a number of important mangrove areas
and coral reefs. The Department for Environment and Natural Resources in the Philippines
has allotted $7.94 million for the restoration of the mangroves, with some 19 million
seedlings and propagules from mangrove trees to be planted over 1,900 hectares of
coastline. The reconstruction of boats and the replacement of fishing gear both need to be
managed sustainably, to ensure that the marine ecosystem is not further damaged or
overfished before it has time to regenerate.
The diversification of community livelihoods is another important challenge. Coconut
farmers, having lost most of their trees, will not be able to quickly prosper from recently
planted trees; not before they reach maturity in six to eight years. The UN Food and
Agriculture Organization (FAO) is developing a recovery plan, which would include clearing
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felled trees through coordinated cash-for-work programmes and introducing crops that can
grow alongside the newly replanted coconut trees.
Shortly after Typhoon Haiyan, the UN designed a Strategic Response Plan to support the
government’s activities in meeting immediate humanitarian needs. Through this
programme, the FAO was able to provide 75 per cent of the rice seeds requested by the
Philippines. This much-needed assistance allowed 44,000 farming families to plant in time
for the December/January planting season. Those seeds are expected to yield enough to
feed about 800,000 people for more than a year, once they are harvested in March/April.
The FAO also distributed 4,000 tonnes of fertiliser, along with 13,000 farming tools, which
will allow more than 80,000 rice farming families to reach full yield potential. This
international help is a critical step towards achieving short-term food security.
Because South-East Asia is often subjected to natural catastrophes, there is a need for
greater coordinated effort within the region to find long-term solutions to improve food
security. The ASEAN Plus Three Emergency Rice Reserve takes reserves from member
countries, which act as a buffer against food-stock loss during food emergencies. Such
initiatives are, however, dependent on the ability of member states to address political
commitment and distribution constraints.
The programmes put in place in the Philippines are a step in the right direction. The World
Bank has supported the Government’s actions to improve the country’s resilience to natural
disasters and lead it towards food security. Economic prospects seem to point to further
growth. For the whole country to benefit from these prospects, however, more needs to be
done to improve the performance and reliability of local governments. With the
decentralised power in the Philippines, complete transparency and accountability are
needed in local governments to ensure long-term food security.
Cécile Levacher Research Assistant Global Food and Water Security Research Programme
*****
To the Bitter End: Indonesia Pushes Ahead with Mining Laws
as Investor Climate Weakens
A recent deal may pave the way for mining operations to resume in Indonesia following
months of disruption. But, as Indonesia pushes ahead with its controversial ban on raw
mineral exports, critics continue to question its long-term value.
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Background
As Indonesia’s mining sector continues to falter following a controversial ban on raw mineral
exports, a number of deals between the government and mining companies may finally be
within reach. On 19 March, the Jakarta Globe announced that Freeport Indonesia, which is
90 per cent owned by the world’s largest copper miner, Phoenix-based Freeport-McMoRan,
had agreed to comply with most of the country’s new regulations. The move means other
companies may soon follow suit. Yet it remains to be seen whether the laws will have the
desired effect, with analysts suggesting the new regulations will only worsen Indonesia’s
shaky investment climate.
Comment
Agreements between the government and mining companies operating in Indonesia may
soon be reached, following months of political turmoil and tense negotiations. Since
January, miners have been at loggerheads with Jakarta over a much-maligned ban on raw
mineral exports. The 2009 law, which came into effect on 14 January, prohibits all exports of
unprocessed ore and introduces a new export tax on ore concentrates. The immediate
fallout was disastrous.
Many firms were forced to scale back production. Some, including Freeport, which operates
the world’s third-largest copper mine in Papua and had seen its copper exports decline 60
per cent as a result of the ban, had threatened to quit operations altogether. Mining,
currently Indonesia’s second-largest industry after manufacturing, has ground to a virtual
standstill in many parts of the country.
But that may not be for long. Many of the country’s mines could soon be back in business
following a tentative deal struck between Freeport and government officials. Early reports
suggest that Freeport, the country’s single-largest taxpayer, has agreed to the majority of
the country’s new regulations. On 19 March, Hatta Rajasa, the Coordinating Minister for the
Economy, said that the government had received an offer from the company requesting a
public-private partnership (PPP) to build a copper smelter, enabling it to process raw
minerals which could then be exported. Two days later, the government confirmed Freeport
had agreed to a PPP with state-owned miner, PT Aneka Tambang (Antam), to set up a
smelter.
The move caught many observers by surprise. Having passed a last-minute exemption
allowing companies to export raw minerals, albeit with a hefty export tax imposed, some
analysts had suggested the government would eventually cede to the miners’ demands and
repeal the unpopular laws. That has not been the case, however; instead, the Freeport deal
suggests that Indonesia is pushing ahead with its mining laws. Other companies, it seems,
will be forced to follow suit, with dozens of miners now in the process renegotiating their
contracts with the government.
Jakarta insists that the move will add long-term value, keeping money and jobs within the
country. But most analysts disagree. The World Bank, in its recent Indonesian Economic
Quarterly, has questioned the government’s much-touted line that the mineral export ban
will capture added-value currently lost to foreign smelters and refineries. They estimate that
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the ban will cost Indonesia some US$6.5 billion in revenues in the next three years and will
have a US$12.5 billion negative impact on the country’s trade deficit, already a major
financial headache for Jakarta. The report concludes that domestic processing of copper and
other minerals are unlikely to succeed in the long run given international conditions. These
include slumping demand and the higher cost of smelting in Indonesia, which may force
many mines to close early.
But even if the new regulations do succeed in the longer term, they are likely to weaken
Indonesia’s already shaky investment climate. South-East Asia’s largest economy is infamous
for its regulatory uncertainty and its mining sector is frequently cited by executives as the
worst in the world with which to do business. The new ban will do little to alleviate that
image, even if investors are slowly making their way back to the country following a capital
flight last year.
Looking ahead, however, it seems unlikely Indonesia will alter the laws, at least in the near-
term. With economic nationalism increasingly in vogue ahead of parliamentary and
presidential elections scheduled for the coming months, few candidates have been willing to
speak out against the ban, fearing a backlash from voters. That could at least provide one
positive: maintaining the ban, however unpopular, should bring some certainty for miners
going forward.
Whether the government eventually repeals or amends the law following the 9 July
presidential election remains to be seen. Much will depend on the next few months and, in
particular, how mining companies proceed from here. Indonesia, having pushed ahead with
its new regulations, will be hoping the gamble eventually pays off.
Andrew Manners
Research Analyst
Indian Ocean Research Programme
*****
Don Sahong Dam threatens food security in Laos, Vietnam and
Cambodia
Construction of the Don Sahong Dam along the Lower Mekong River is scheduled to
commence in December this year. Concerns have been raised that the project will
exacerbate existing malnutrition in the region and jeopardise the livelihoods of villagers
and commercial fishers.
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Background
The government of Laos aims to become the “battery” of South East Asia, by exporting
electricity to its neighbours and generating much needed national income. The Don Sahong
hydro-project, due to begin in December, will be constructed for this purpose. The project is
expected to have a serious impact on the livelihoods of millions of people throughout Laos,
Cambodia and Vietnam. Predicted disruptions to migratory fish patterns will impair the
ability of commercial and non-commercial fishermen to earn a living. They will also threaten
the food security of a population already at serious risk of malnutrition.
Comment
Construction of the Don Sahong Dam in Laos is expected to begin, along the Hou Sahong
channel of the Mekong River, in December. The dam will be located less than 2km upstream
from the border between Laos and Cambodia. On completion it is expected to generate at
least 240 megawatts of power.
The Lao government aims to become the region’s “battery”, by providing electricity to its
neighbours who currently experience chronic electricity shortages. The Don Sahong Dam
and up to 12 other dams earmarked for construction along the Middle and Lower Mekong
River, are together expected to boost the electricity generated in the region by 25 per cent.
While proponents of the project suggest that it will lower electricity costs and only require
minimal resettling of villagers, its opponents argue that the project will cause significant
harm to 60 million people throughout Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam. Dr Robert Mather,
from the International Union for Conservation of Nature, rates the lower Mekong River as
“the most productive inland fishery anywhere in the world”. Many migratory fish species
travel hundreds of kilometres in either direction along the Mekong River, sustaining both
commercial and non-commercial fishers along the way.
The Hou Sahong is critically important to livelihoods, as it is the only channel that allows
year-long migrations both up and downstream. Migratory fish also sustain people employed
in further processing the catch (drying and smoking fish and manufacturing fish sauce or
animal feed). WorldFish puts the yearly economic impact of the project at around US$200
million.
Inland fish stocks are the most important source of animal protein for many regional rural
populations, with yearly per capita consumption estimated at 32.3kg in Cambodia and
24.5kg in Laos. Many of these rural populations are already malnourished. For example, 45
per cent of children under five are underweight in the Stung Trung province of Cambodia
and, in rural Laos, a further 50 per cent experience malnutrition. Consequently, disruptions
to migratory fish patterns will seriously threaten the food security of many in the region.
The environmental impact assessment for the project proposed a number of mitigation
solutions, such as expanding the Hou Xang Pheuak and Hou Sadam (two channels flanking
the Hou Sahong) or diverting more water into the Hou Sadam. These proposed solutions,
however, would produce other problems, as they would involve diverting water away from
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the Hou Phapheng, impacting other populations. Further, widening the long and narrow Hou
Sadam is likely to be economically infeasible.
Laos is heavily dependent on both foreign aid and foreign investment. The World Bank, in an
effort to promote cleaner energy sources, encourages countries such as Laos to construct
hydro-projects. With access to food being still precarious in the Mekong region, projects
such as the Don Sahong Dam will harm villagers along the river; they rely on what they can
catch in the Mekong, both to feed themselves and earn a living. Mitigating the impacts on
villagers living both upstream and downstream, should therefore be a high priority when
decisions are being made about new large-scale infrastructure projects.
Jinny Collet Research Assistant Global Food and Water Crises Research Programme
*****
Ladakh Hot Flash Might Fry India-China Trade Relationship
Chinese incursions into Ladakh and an increasing trade deficit might derail current Indian
trade negotiations and push India towards trade agreements with Russia.
Background
The People’s Liberation Army of China (PLA) made a recent incursion into the Indian territory
of Ladakh. On 16 March, nine soldiers from the PLA made a bid to cross into the territory,
but were stopped by Indian jawans (soldiers). Ten more PLA soldiers tried to make a fresh
incursion but this resulted in more Indian troops joining the wall, which led to the eventual
Chinese retreat.1 This is not an isolated event. Ladakh has been the focal point for growing
tensions since 2012, when the PLA dropped Chinese troops by helicopter to dismantle Indian
storage tents.
In 2013, a fifteen-day stand-off took place due to the construction of Indian bunkers
overlooking Chinese territory. In conjunction with this, five cattle farmers were abducted by
PLA soldiers and taken across the border, seemingly in a bid to stake a greater claim on the
area.2
1 ‘Chinese troops make fresh attempt to violate LAC’, Times of India, 18 March 2014.
<http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Chinese-troops-make-fresh-attempt-to-violate-LAC/articleshow/32249024.cms> 2 ‘Chinese troops detain five Indians in Chumar’, NDTV, 15 December 2013.
<http://www.ndtv.com/article/india/chinese-troops-detain-five-indians-in-chumar-first-incident-at-lac-459083>
Page 8 of 18
Comment
The geographic landscape of the area usually limits the amount of activity from the Chinese
border, due to the presence heavy snowfalls until late April. Increased activity this early in
the year means that China has either identified the area as a threat and is moving to disable
it, or that it wants to increase its surveillance in the area.
This hot flash has come at a very inconvenient time for Sino-Indian trade relations. India is
currently seeking to sign a substantial IT deal with China, during the third round of strategic
and economic dialogue on 25 March in Beijing. India wants to increase its access to the
Chinese market, to reduce the trade deficit with China. Unfortunately, however, China wants
increased access to the Indian electronic and hardware markets, which would be disastrous
for Indian employment rates and manufacturing, especially as it wants to develop this
domestic market.
There are, of course, possible benefits to a trade deal. China has offered to help develop
India’s infrastructure, focussing on improving its railway network. While India is keen to have
this development and is interested in the Chinese offer, it cannot help but view it with some
suspicion. From 2000 to 2013, China has only contributed 0.15 per cent of India’s overall
foreign direct investment. While India’s domestic structure does need improvement, there
are doubts that New Delhi
will accept the Chinese
proposal. The risk of
increased Chinese imports
and improved Chinese
knowledge of Indian
infrastructure is too high,
without strong
reciprocation from China.
According to Indian
officials, the current level
of imports from China has
resulted In India having to
borrow from abroad to
finance the trade deficit.
Deputy Chief of the
Planning Commission,
Montek Singh Ahluwalia,
said, ‘India’s trade deficit
over the last three
successive years has been
in excess of US$35 billion
per annum, which is not sustainable.’3
3 ‘India calls for China investments to offset huge trade deficit’, Business Today, 18 March 2014.
Page 9 of 18
India’s trade deficit can only be reduced by increasing exports to China, while also protecting
India’s domestic markets from Chinese goods. IT-related services, cotton textiles and
pharmaceuticals are all areas awaiting Indian expansion into China. India must maintain a
strong border policy, but will want to treat the latest border incursion as being outside the
economic relationship.
If improved trade relations between the two giants cannot be achieved, India must look
elsewhere to improve its economic position and infrastructure. One avenue could result
from the US imposed sanctions on Russia. These sanctions could result in increased trade
between India and Russia, in the areas of pharmaceutical products and technology. Current
economic forecasts predict that trade will grow into a twenty billion dollar industry by 2015,
increasing to fifty billion by 2020.4
While India is in a difficult position, a strong border policy and new trading partner in Russia
may, in fact, encourage China to shape more diplomatic trade agreement, which, in the long
term, will benefit both countries.
Kyle Sargon Research Assistant Indian Ocean Research Programme
*****
Growing India-Iran Ties: A Possible Long-term Relationship?
India and Iran are ideally positioned to initiate long-term ties as India enhances mutual
trade and infrastructure development with Iran, reversing previous geo-political
difficulties.
Background
India and Iran, separated geographically by Pakistan, have previously had a difficult
relationship, due to geographical issues and political pressures. India, however, imported
US$11.6 billion of Iranian oil in the last fiscal year and is Iran’s second-largest purchaser,
behind China. With much of this trade conducted in Indian rupees, it is beneficial to the
Indian economy on many levels.
Comment
<http://businesstoday.intoday.in/story/india-for-china-investments-to-offset-trade-deficit/1/204381.html> 4 ‘Russia has China, India to trade with if West imposes sanctions – expert’, The Voice of Russia, 19
March 2014. <http://voiceofrussia.com/2014_03_19/Russia-has-China-India-to-trade-with-if-West-imposes-sanctions-expert-4853>
Page 10 of 18
The division of India in 1947 increased its distance from central Asia and, with a hostile
Pakistan situated between them, also introduced a geostrategic disadvantage. This situation
has continued after the end of the Cold War. The post-9/11 era, however, allowed Iran and
India to update their relationship. They soon found common ground in their respective
Afghanistan policies.
In recent years, moreover, India has tried to reduce its geographical handicap vis-à-vis the
Central Asian republics, by improving relations with Iran. It sees the Chabahar port as an
alternative to land routes through Pakistan. Iran, for its part, has sought to improve its trade
infrastructure and, since the recent collapse of the Iran-Pakistan (IP) gas pipeline project due
to Pakistan's inability to meet its end of the contract, also seeks to strengthen trade links
with India.
India, Iran and Afghanistan are on the verge of signing an agreement to start developing
Iran's long-awaited Chabahar port in the Gulf of Oman. This signifies an improved
relationship and an alliance that could potentially play a large role in maintaining the future
balance of power in Asia. The port will give India access not only to Afghanistan, but also to
the resource-rich landlocked countries of Central Asia, while avoiding Pakistan. Some
estimates indicate that India will make an initial investment of more than US$100 million in
the development of the port.
Iran, though, is more interested in developing its trade infrastructure, with plans for a trade
corridor between Chabahar and the Russian city of St. Petersburg. The Indian army helped
construct a road connecting the towns of Delaram and Zaranj in the southern province of
Nimroz; the project costing more than US$1 billion. This road, also called Route A71, was the
missing link between the Iranian border and the A1 highway in Afghanistan, which runs to
Kabul. Together, these links connect Kabul to Zaranj and, in turn, to Chabahar on the Iranian
side.
India also has the second largest population of Shia Muslims, after Iran - a tacit factor in
their combined stance against the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Taliban are
perceived as Sunni-Islamic extremists - a threat to Shia Muslims in Iran and an extremist
enemy that India is fighting in Kashmir.
India does not support Iran's nuclear programme and maintains a considered lower profile
while taking a strong stance against it. Consequently, it welcomed the nuclear deal struck by
Iran and the world’s six major powers in November 2013, which, it hopes, will eventually
lead to the lifting of the sanctions on Iran.
The West's sanctions and its unreliable partnership with Pakistan, have been factors
motivating Iran to consider India as a strategic partner. Many Indian critics, however, believe
that as soon as the sanctions from the West are eased, Iran’s incentives for trading with
India will be much lower, as it can immediately expect increasing demand from the West.
This situation will potentially jeopardise the millions of dollars India has already invested and
its plans to further invest in Iran. So far, though, even after the lifting of some sanctions in
late 2013, India has still increased its imports of Iranian oil.
Page 11 of 18
On the downside, Israel is not happy with India’s growing ties with Iran; Israel is a key source
of India's military imports. It also does not help that the US is actively trying to charm India
by offering military assistance in its own quest to encircle China with militarily strong allies.
Whether it's due to a new presidency in Iran last year, Iran's dented confidence in Pakistan's
ability to meet contractual obligations, or India's growing economy, both India and Iran
seem to have overcome some major barriers to strengthening their relationship. Their joint
projects require a long-term relationship, but uncertainty casts a shadow over how long the
Indian-Iranian interests will coincide and how external powers can be kept from hijacking
the relationship.
Jahangir Qazilbash
Research Assistant
Indian Ocean Research Programme
*****
Pakistan and Bahrain: A Chance to Bring the Middle East
Together?
The first official visit to Pakistan by the King of Bahrain in four decades has opened up the
chance of improved ties between those two countries. With Pakistan in the role of
mediator, it could also be a first step on the long path of reconciliation between Iran and
the Gulf countries.
Background
During King Hamad’s recent three-day official visit to Pakistan, at the invitation of Prime
Minister Nawaz Sharif, 17 bilateral agreements were signed. The provisions included the
creation of a joint ministerial commission, an investment protection scheme, a food security
agreement and an air services agreement. According to the Pakistani foreign office, the
purpose of the trip was to take advantage of a good opportunity to promote and strengthen
a diverse range of interests. Furthermore, more than 450 Bahraini business institutions are
considering investments in the development of Pakistan, which will only advance the current
economic ties between the two countries.
Comment
Pakistan has strong and long standing connections with Bahrain. There are more than
100,000 Pakistanis residing in the country (comprising just under eight per cent of the
population). Apart from this large expatriate Pakistan population living in Bahrain, there is
also the new attitude of goodwill from the PML (Pakistan Muslim League).
Page 12 of 18
In addition, there are other reasons why there is a sudden interest in this Gulf country. It is
in Pakistan’s interest to have strong relations with almost every country in the region.
Pakistan and Iran have had strong relations since Pakistan’s independence in 1947. Iran was
the first country to recognise that independence and they also formed a strong relationship
during the 1979 revolution. On the other hand, however, Bahrain’s relations with Iran have
been volatile, to say the least. Bahrain has long suspected Iranian interference in its
domestic affairs, especially during the 2011 uprisings. With Pakistan’s close ties with Iran
and Bahrain’s conflicting relations with that country, this could possibly be seen as an
obstacle to relations between Bahrain and Pakistan; especially given Pakistan’s interest in
building strong relations with other countries in the region. Diplomats from both countries,
however, insist that this will not be the case.
Bahrain’s Foreign Minister, Shaikh Khalid bin Ahmed bin Mohammad Al Khalifa (Shaikh
Khalid), has stated that Pakistan’s influence in the region can play a role in balancing
bilateral ties between the two countries and, furthermore, between Iran and the Gulf
countries. At a media conference in Pakistan’s capital Islamabad, Shaikh Khalid said that ‘we
want to take steps to help mend this relationship’. Experts on Pakistan, also see Pakistan as
a possible mediator in healing Iran’s ties with the other Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC)
states. According to Shaikh Khalid, Iran has failed over the past three years to take the
agreed steps to mend ties with Bahrain. There is still some hope, however, that Pakistan can
help overcome the long standing political bitterness between them. Although Shaikh Khalid
has denied having asked Pakistan for support or mediation, it was clear at the press
conference that he was hinting at Manama’s desire for outside help in fixing the problems
with Iran.
At the conclusion of King Hamad’s visit to Pakistan, it was clear that ties between the two
countries will only be strengthened, judging by the numerous pacts that were signed during
the official visit. The interest by both countries in ensuring that Iran has stable relations
within the Gulf region has opened up the possibility of a rapprochement. It is too early to
entertain the idea that the strained relations of the past few decades between these
countries will suddenly be healed. But, with Pakistan in the role of mediator, it could very
well be the first step on the long path to healing relations between Iran and the Gulf
countries.
Edward Smith Research Assistant Indian Ocean Research Programme
*****
Page 13 of 18
Afghanistan: Karzai’s Reluctance to Sign Bilateral Security
Agreement Hampers Post-2014 International Planning
The refusal of President Karzai to sign the Bilateral Security Agreement between
Afghanistan and the US makes future strategic planning for post-2014 missions difficult.
Background
The Afghan President, Hamid Karzai, used his final address to parliament on 15 March to
restate his unwillingness to sign the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) with the United
States. Karzai maintains that peace talks with the Taliban are a precondition for him to sign
the BSA. The US has so far refused to accept Karzai’s conditions and has instead pinned its
hopes upon his successor, hoping that he will be more willing to sign the agreement. All ten
presidential candidates have voiced support for the BSA and have committed to signing it,
should they come to power. If the 5 April election is inconclusive, a run-off poll is expected
to take place in July. This means that there may not be a new Afghan president until towards
the end of the year, which would make forward planning for the US post-2014 mission
increasingly difficult.
Comment
The BSA would provide the legal framework for US troops to remain in Afghanistan after
2014; which General Joseph Dunford, the commander of US-led forces in Afghanistan, has
argued is desirable. America’s post-2014 mission would focus upon training, advising and
assisting Afghan forces. Under current plans, the US wishes to maintain a presence of up to
10,000 troops in Afghanistan. General Dunford believes that, should the new Afghan
president sign the BSA by August, the US will be able to provide the level of post-2014
support advocated by the US and NATO. After August, it will become increasingly difficult for
the US to plan and implement its proposed post-2014 mission.
Given Karzai’s reluctance to sign the BSA, Washington has begun to prepare for the full
withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan. President Obama has informed Karzai that the
Pentagon is undertaking additional contingency planning that includes planning to
completely withdraw US troops, on the assumption that the BSA will remain unsigned. If the
US were to fully withdraw from Afghanistan, the strength of the militants would very likely
increase and they would be in a better position to challenge the Afghan Government,
throwing the future stability of the country into question.
At a Loya Jirga, or grand council, meeting in November 2013, some 2,500 Afghan elders
voted in support of the BSA and the continued involvement of the international community
in maintaining the security of their country. Karzai has been heavily criticised within
Afghanistan for his continued refusal to sign the agreement. The Afghan Ambassador to the
United Nations, Zahir Tanin, provided a view on the issue that was sharply at odds with that
of Karzai, stating in his address to the UN Security Council that ‘we are certain that the
Bilateral Security Agreement with the United States will be signed soon’.
Page 14 of 18
The level of popular support for the BSA in Afghanistan and the fact that it is unanimously
supported by Afghanistan’s presidential candidates, suggests that it will be signed by the end
of the year. It remains to be seen, however, whether it will be signed in time for
international forces to fully plan for, and implement, their post-2014 strategic engagement
in Afghanistan.
Australia and other international partners will use the BSA as a basis for their own Status of
Forces Agreements (SOFA) with the Afghan Government. Australia’s SOFA will provide legal
indemnities and other assurances for its defence personnel. The Defence Minister, David
Johnston, is hopeful that Australia will be able to continue to support Afghanistan beyond
2014; without the SOFA, however, it is very unlikely that Australia will maintain its defence
operations. The continuation of its role in Afghanistan therefore depends upon the Afghan
president signing the BSA.
The uncertainty surrounding both the BSA and the outcome of the Afghan election is making
it difficult for the US and its international partners to strategically plan for their involvement
in Afghanistan post-2014. It is very likely that Karzai’s successor will sign the BSA, but, given
the time it may take for Afghanistan to decide upon a new president, international forces
may have to adapt their post-2014 missions or abandon them altogether.
Mervyn Piesse Research Assistant Indian Ocean Research Programme
*****
A Shift in Priorities over Kenya’s Groundwater Resources
Hopes for increased food and water security in Kenya’s Turkana region fade, as the
government prioritises water access in towns over regional development.
Background
Drilling has commenced on the Lotikipi Aquifer, the largest of the groundwater reserves
discovered in the northern Turkana region in September 2013. An announcement by Kenyan
officials that the town of Lodwar (120 km from the groundwater location) will be the
principal recipient of the piped water raises questions over the government’s priorities.
Contrary to initial plans to primarily utilise the water to tackle food insecurity within the
region, the shift in the government’s strategy prompts concerns about its impact on the
country’s food and water insecurity.
Comment
The current proposal to pump water to the town of Lodwar risks overlooking neighbouring
water scarce rural areas in the Turkana region. In this severely underdeveloped and resource
Page 15 of 18
scarce area of Kenya, access to this groundwater has the potential to increase both food
production and economic development.
Kenya is in a precarious position, in both the geographical and geopolitical sense. It is
experiencing a lengthy drought, with almost half of its 41 million citizens lacking access to
clean water and living below the poverty line.
How piping water to Lodwar will benefit the Turkana County, one of the poorest regions in
Kenya, is questionable. While the existence of such reserves is crucial to development,
rendering them accessible is the greater challenge. Opting to transport the water primarily
to Lodwar, 120km from the aquifer, would necessitate the significant development of
supporting infrastructure: boreholes, sewage, and pipelines.
The expectation is that 15,000 acres of land in Lodwar will be irrigated once supply from the
aquifer begins, thus boosting the agricultural industry. The government also aims to expand
the level of investment in Turkana, as this region is abundant in oil and water resources.
Having more robust infrastructure, cultivated land and accessible water in Tukana’s capital
city, could be the key to further development that will improve economic conditions.
Prioritising urban access to the groundwater, however, will delay access for rural
communities facing severe water constraints. This will constrict their water supply and leave
poverty-stricken families with unwelcome options: spend a substantial portion of income on
bottled water, or rely on contaminated water. Neither of these options would improve
livelihoods, nor reduce the uncertainties of these communities. Land in Kenya is arid and the
lack of available water results in unsuitable soils for farming generally and especially growing
crops to supply food. Additionally, the potential for conflict between individuals increases as
they continue to compete for staple resources.
Water access in these isolated areas is vital, with the bulk of the population living in rural
areas and dependent on limited water resources to produce livestock and crops. They are
very vulnerable to problems such as food and water insecurity. Providing them with initial
access to the reserves, could offer the opportunity that will allow these communities to
break the poverty cycle.
Without doubt, the discovery of ground-water reserves is a step forward in tackling the food
and water dilemma in Kenya. It is unclear, however, how such resources will be utilised and
allocated. In this instance, there are positive facets to the changes implemented by the
government regarding the aquifer, but it is important that it acknowledges that any decision
will have a profound impact on the local population. Ensuring that resources benefit
everyone and not just urban populations, will require transparency on decision-making from
officials and genuine community consultation and participation.
Natazsa Bariacto
Research Assistant
Global Food and Water Security Research Programme
Page 16 of 18
*****
Somalia and Al-Shabaab: Reclaiming Territory is the First Step
in Remaking the State
During a joint March offensive, the Somali National Army (SNA) and the African Union
Mission (AMISOM) regained eight Somali towns from the Islamist group, al-Shabaab.
Regaining territory, however, is only the first step in Somalia’s re-development.
Background
The 22 March liberation of the Lower Shebelle town of Qoryooley, followed the recent
recovery of Buulobarde (Hiiran region) and six other Somali towns, by the UN-mandated
allied force. The Head of AMISOM, AU Special Representative, Mahamat Saleh Annadif,
described these hard fought gains as a “major boost to our efforts to bring peace and
stability to Somalia.” From a civil development perspective, the recent retaking of
population centres by Government forces and their international allies is crucial to stabilising
the country. Institutional disunity in Somalia, however, continues to threaten the political
accord that is required for peace and continued strengthening of the country.
Comment
Somalia’s President since late 2012, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, has made a commitment to
his people that al-Shabaab will be evicted from population centres and comprehensively
defeated, by the end of this year. In hard fought battles, the militants have been pushed
back from some of their territories, with concerted AMISOM assistance.
President Mohamad’s claim is still bold. The fragility of Somalia’s security was highlighted by
a deadly gun battle on 21 February between Somali security forces and Islamic extremist
fighters, outside the President’s Palace in the capital Mogadishu, and also a post-liberation
suicide attack in Buulobarde on 19 March. . Somalian leaders, State personnel and civilians
face a constant threat of both targeted and indiscriminate violence.
The twenty-two thousand AMISOM troops in Somalia, mostly from the neighbouring
countries of Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda, support the new Somali Federal Republic in its
attempts to restore peace, effective Statehood and the rule of law.
The military gains in March follow the ejection of al-Shabaab from Mogadishu in 2011 and
from the port city of Kismayo in 2012. Many population centres in the central and southern
regions of the country, however, such as the coastal town of Baraawe, remain as al-Shabaab
strongholds. Liberating and securing these territories is only the first step in what is required
to create the conditions for peace.
Page 17 of 18
The al-Qaeda affiliated al-Shabaab group is a fractured and fragmented movement. Despite
its recent military setbacks and internal power struggles, it still stages violent attacks inside
Mogadishu, across Somalia and in AMISOM nations. Even though international cooperation
to counter offshore piracy has restricted al-Shabaab’s access to illicit funds, last September’s
Westgate Shopping Mall attack in Nairobi, violently showcased its insurgent and retaliatory
capacity.
It is difficult to envisage al-Shabaab’s complete defeat, when there are widespread
grievances amongst the Somali people and a lack of Central Government legitimacy. There
are nearly 370,000 internally displaced people living in squalid camps in Mogadishu. These
factors feed sympathy for, and engagement in, the group’s extremism.
Only consistent security and concerted development efforts, will allow people to return to
their homes and improve their living standards. Some progress has been made in the last
few years, with Mogadishu markets and businesses bustling with more activity than for
decades past. Embassies have been reopened and the Kismayo International Airport
refurbished.
A major hurdle in guaranteeing the consolidation of these gains is the civil disunity in the
fledgling Somali Administration. While Somalia’s new federal parliamentary system evenly
represents its various clans, the marginalisation of minorities and strict clan loyalty in
government representation and decision-making, reflects underlying divisions and interests.
Last year’s no confidence motion against the former Prime Minister, coincided with the fall
of two central bankers; one dismissed for alleged corruption and the other resigning after
alleging corruption. While these developments were in line with new accountability
mechanisms, the frequent occurrence of such scandals blurs the line between the
strengthening of public accountability and the intractability of Somalia’s political crises.
The challenge will be for AMISOM and the international community to translate territorial
gains into increased State capacity and civilian support for the President, his Cabinet and the
Parliament. For this to occur, Somalian institutions and civilians will need to overcome their
clan-based political and societal differences. With the opening of the 4th session of
Parliament last week, a key agenda item in the agenda must be an effective process of
national reconciliation.
Since the 1991 fall of the autocrat Siad Barre and Somalia’s protracted civil war, the nation
has had a history of humanitarian disasters and failed transitional governments. Coordinated
and concerted military, civilian and humanitarian programmes, which will promote stability
and security, need to continue, to prevent another Somali false dawn of civil development.
Hugo Seymour
Research Assistant
Indian Ocean Research Programme
Page 18 of 18
*****
Any opinions or views expressed in this paper are those of the individual authors, unless stated to be those of Future Directions International. Published by Future Directions International Pty Ltd. 80 Birdwood Parade, Dalkeith, WA 6009 Tel: +61 8 9389 9831 Fax: +61 8 9389 8803 E-mail: [email protected] Web: www.futuredirections.org.au
What’s Next?
Iranian President Hassan Rouhani will visit Kabul to attend the fourth international Nowruz Festival on 27 March
High-level Roundtable on 'Food and Nutrition Security through Sustainable Agriculture and Food Systems in the Post-2015 Agenda' will be hosted by the Government of Benin with the support of the Government of Switzerland in New York from 27-28 March.
Anticipated signing of the Comprehensive Agreement on Bangsamoro (CAB) between the Philippines government and the MILF on 27 March.
Myanmar will conduct its first national census in more than three decades from 29 March.
Bangladesh will hold elections to fill fifty parliament seats reserved for women on 29 March.
Thailand to hold Senate elections to fill seventy seven seats on 30 March.
The Philippines will submit its memorial or written pleading on the territorial feud against China in the West Philippines Sea to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea's (ITLOS) arbitral tribunal on 30 March.