Frédéric Lebaron (UVSQ-CNRS, Laboratoire Printemps, Sciences Po Saint-Germain-en-Laye)

Youth Summer School on European Studies Immanuel Kant University - Kaliningrad

HOW TO STUDY INSTITUTIONS IN TIMES OF CRISIS ? METHODOLOGICAL REFLECTIONS ABOUT THE EU AND THE

FEDERATION OF RUSSIA.Frédéric Lebaron (UVSQ-CNRS, Laboratoire Printemps,

Sciences Po Saint-Germain-en-Laye)Youth Summer School on European Studies

RUSSIA AND EU: MONOLOGUES IN THE ÉPOQUE OF DIALOGUES

University Immanuel Kant, Kaliningrad


Plan of the presentation 1. EU and Russian Federation: from

imperial to modern relationships ? From monologues to dialogue ?

2. The European economic governance in times of crisis

3. Political discourses in crisis: the multiannual financial framework, a multidimensional stake in the European field of power


Introduction How to conduct a field study ? From research questions and hypotheses to

methodological choices… and the reverse. The construction of the research object as a

guideline for field work. A rapid presentation based on example and

case-studies.Þ Mapping “social spaces” (institutions and

actors).Þ Analyze discourses (content analysis,

discourse analysis).


1. EU and RF, from imperial to “modern” relationships ?

The effects of long history: nations, empires and cold war (“path dependency”)

A complex and divided collective memory A particular context: the Ukraine crisis, the RF,

the US and the EU in a complex nexus The political and economic dynamics of the EU:

which social cohesion and integration ? EU foreign policy in times a crisis: a weakening

influence for a ‘weakly integrated’ policy ? Russian foreign policy: internal national cohesion

through foreign policy in a context of threats ?


1. EU and RF, from imperial to modern relationships ?

Studying or referring to the legal framework and the institutional settings as a more or less constraining frame and as a set of resources for actors. E.g. the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU.

Mapping institutions (e.g. foreign policy in the system of EU institutions).

Following political and administrative actors involved through biographical data (population, sample…) and interviews.

Selecting texts and position-takings (corpus) Interpreting the collected materials, referring to a

set of concepts and theories in various fields.



What specificities of a field study in times of crisis ?

Þ Moving and fuzzy realities (the events in Ukraine: facts are highly controversial, juridical interpretation remain unclear…)

Þ Access to information restricted and controlledÞ Biased information may be largely diffused from

the media and public actorsÞ Difficulties (and necessity) to get to an objective

and independent point of view, not a politically “neutral” one (“axiological neutrality”)



The output: a document which adds knowledge to the previous state of knowledge

Þ Empirical data which allow to answer the initial research question through a rigorous methodology

Þ Conceptual clarificationÞ New hypotheses and insights on a

particular topic


2. THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE IN TIMES OF

CRISIS

Frédéric Lebaron (Printemps, UVSQ-CNRS, Sciences Po Saint-Germain-en-Laye) with Didier Georgakakis

(CESSP, Paris 1-CNRS)


The emergence of a meta-elite ?


Introduction Institutions and actors of the EU in the global crisis (2007-

…): an important shift in power relations. A more fragmented EU (North / South divide), a growing

political instability (European Parliament elections) Stronger elements: European Central Bank,

intergovernmental mechanisms ( Eurogroup, European Council), Commission ;

…and weaker ones: Parliament, European Court of Justice…

Urgency and institutionalisation, moves towards a stronger political and economic integration: “golden rule”, Banking Union, etc.

A paradoxical move (intergovernentalism and integration).


Research hypotheses Stronger alliances between certain actors

(individuals, institutions) in the “field of Eurocracy”. The domination of a cohesive group of actors,

illustrated -at the institutional level- by the Eurogroup and the “Troïka” (the “Frankfurt group”).

These individuals share a set of coherent and complementary assets, based on economic expertise, the close connection with global financial markets, professional trajectories related to central banks (esp. the ECB), ministries of finance (Treasuries), or IO (IMF, WB).


DataBiographical data on:Þ Commissioners, Directors-General and Deputy DG, MEPs

(Strasbourg research group GSPE, now SAGE), currently completed for the post-crisis period

Þ Central Bankers and economists (F.Lebaron)And…Þ Ministers of Finance (in progress)Þ “Troïka” missions members (in progress)Þ The members of all relevant or efficient organisation in the

fieldA kaleidoscopic space, a “multilevel perspective” (in progress)Textual analysisInterviews


ReferenceDidier Georgakakis, Jay Rowell (eds), The Field of Eucrocracy. Mapping EU actors and Professionals, Palgrave McMillan, 2013.


Plan 1. The process of ascension 1.1. Socio-economic mechanisms 1.2. The ECB at the centre of the system ? 1.3. The actors of the “Troïka” 2. Institutions in transformation 2.1. The case of the ECB 2.2. ECB leaders in the space of central bankers 2.3. Profiles of main actors in the field of economic

governance 2.4. Changes at the EC Conclusion: the consequences of the process


1. The process of ascension: socio-economic mechanisms

The “credibility” stake: in the context of financial speculation against public bonds, need for states to maintain or accumulate symbolic capital on the financial markets.

A classical shift in favour of creditors against debtors (Germany versus southern countries, financial institutions versus states) in circumstances of financial crisis. Debt as a power relation.

Budgetary orthodoxy seen as the “only solution” to restore credibility of states (especially at the ECB and in the Treasuries).

Public debt put at the top of the agenda, especially from July 2010 onwards.


1. The process of ascension: the ECB at the centre of the system ? The multidimensional functional ascension of the

ECB: as a warden of financial stability since 2007, now as a regulator, since 2010 as an influential actor in various national contexts, including Spain and Italy.

ECB as the head of the banking system. New non conventional instruments: Securities

Market Program (2010), Outright Monetary Transactions (2012)…

It has lead to strong tensions around and inside the ECB, and in a sense to a crisis (of growth ?).

No complete stabilisation of the situation until now.


1. The process of ascension: the ECB at the centre of the system ?Þ Trichet vs Merkel on Greece and bank’s losses, in

2010-2011.Þ Internal divisions have come out during the Euro

crisis, especially with the German central bankers (Axel Weber, Jürgen Stark) choosing the ‘exit’ after criticizing the Securities Markets Program (May 2010), against the other members.

Þ Internal critiques still important (Jens Weidmann called “mister No”)

Þ A 2013 negative judgment of the Constitutional Court of Karlsruhe about ‘non-conventional’ policy (esp. OMT program) may weaken the ECB (depending on the EUCJ).


1. The process of ascension: the ECB at the centre of the system The continuing strength of the Euro as a

currency. The ECB remains a highly independent

central bank, on the basis of the Maastricht treaty, with a low democratic accountability, low transparency.

It has been able to seize the opportunity to impose political measures to governments asking for rescue during the Eurozone crisis.

It has seen its regulatory role increase much during and after the crisis.


1. The process of ascension: the actors of the “Troïka”

Data: participants to official ‘meetings’ (report at the EP)

The actors of the “Troïka”: a combination of various resources in a rather similar frame:

Þ Economics as exclusive training disciplineÞ US and UK-based university programs (Anglo-Saxon

style, English, micro-macro-econometrics)Þ High academic levels (PhD or MSc)Þ Domination of German (+ Dutch, Danish, Hungarian…)

economists, except at the IMF (India, New Zealand…).Þ A few have notorious experiences in private banks (2),

CBs (2), MF (1) and IOs (3)…


The actors of the “Troïka”FAMILY NAMEFIRST NAME Sex Interv. Nationality

Institution Position

Educ Level

Discipline of educ University

Country studies

BORGES Antonio M All Portugal IMF

Director European Department PhD

Economics Stanford USA

MOGHADAM Reza M All India ? IMF

Director European Department PhD

Economics Warwick UK

MODY Ashoka M Ireland India IMF PhDEconomics Boston USA

BEAUMONT Craig M IrelandNew Zealand IMF MSc

Economics

London School of Economics UK

VELCULESCU Delia W Cyprus Romania IMF ? ?

THOMSEN Poul M Greece Denmark IMFDeputy-director Dip

Economics

Copenhagen DK

SELASSIE Abebe M Portugal Ethiopia ? IMF ? ?

LALL Subir M Portugal India IMF PhDEconomics Brown USA

MASUCH Klaus M Greece Germany ? ECB Director of division ?

VON KÖPPEN MERTES Isabel W Cyprus Germany ECB

Deputy-director Master (2)

Economics

Exeter/Francfort UK/All

RÜFFER Rasmus M Portugal Germany ? ECB Director of division ?

SZEKELY Istvan P.M Ireland HungaryDG ECFIN Director PhD

Economics Cambridge UK

VERWEYMaarten M Cyprus

Netherlands

DG ECFIN Director MSc

Economics Gröningen NL/UK

MORSMatthias M Greece Germany

DG ECFIN Director ?

Economics Regensburg/Oxford

KRÖGER Jürgen M Portugal GermanyDG ECFIN Director ?

Economics


1. The process of ascension: the actors of the “Troïka”

In the Eurogroup, actors seem to be much more often trained in Law (Juncker, Schäuble, Lagarde…), and of course very experienced political actors (national and European political capital).

PhD economists seem to more present in crisis countries like Greece or Cyprus.

Both “groups” converged around the “Memoranda”, that is economic policy programs, strongly embedded in the neoliberal doctrine.


2. Institutions in transformation: the case of the ECB

The ECB: bigger, stronger, more and more visible and multifunctional (see Fontan, 2013)

Eurobarometers are indicators of its centrality and its crisis of legitimacy (especially in 2012).

A growing and constrained heterodoxy in the conduct of monetary policies (“non conventional” measures, “whatever it takes” discourse by M.Draghi in July 2012).


2. Institutions in transformation: ECB leaders in the space of central bankers Need to situate the ECB main actors (the

members of the Governing Council) in the space of central bankers to understand their specificity.

Main conclusion: not much specificity, esp. when compared to FOMC members at the Fed.

Stability during the period. The structure of the space of central bankers

shows how actor’s resources are composed. An internal heterogeneity in an apparent similar

pattern.


2. Institutions in transformation: ECB leaders in the space of central bankers Collect ‘prosopographical’ data, at various

levels: individuals, organisations, countries, World regions.

Textual data is part of this data collection. Sources: official Websites, Who’s who in Central

Banking ?, etc. The unequal visibility of central bankers is part

of the functioning of the institutions, and relates to the symbolic value of currencies and countries (cv, citations and texts, English). Anglo-American norm of transparency versus bureaucratic anonymity.


2. Institutions in transformation: ECB leaders in the space of central bankers Field: all the members of the 4 main

committees from 1st January 1999 to 1st January 2011.

Active individuals : n=140 members ; ECB: 44;Fed: 42;BoJ:21;PBC:33 / 9.3% women ; 55% PhD ; 35.7% born in the 50s-60s.

Method: Specific Multiple Correspondence Analysis.

Take into account the multidimensionality and the complexity of trajectories (career patterns) and resources at stake.


2. Institutions in transformation: ECB leaders in the space of central bankers

Q=10 questions and K’=29 active modalities : Þ 3 questions and 9 active modalities on education. Level: PhD/Master/Bachelor and Other/NA* ; First field:

Economics/Law/Management/Science*/NA-Other* ; Studies abroad: No/USA/UK/Other*/NA*)

Þ 7 questions and 20 active modalities on career patterns Main career: Central Bank/Financial administration/Other administration/Politics/University-Research/Banks-Private Finance/Other corporate ; Position in CB (2) ; Position in Finance (2); Position in Private sector (2); Position in Administration (No/National/International); Position in university (2) ; Position in political field (2).Geometric model: the distance between two individuals is defined on the basis of the convergence and divergence of their profiles. A simplified model of the trajectories.



Axis 1 opposes academic legitimacy to political and bureaucratic legitimacy. Two major forms of capital in the field.

Þ A division between theoreticians and more “practical” (political and bureaucratic) actors.

Þ Different traditions in the training of monetary elite: the example of French “State Nobility” (“grandes écoles” vs PhD).



Axis 2 opposes an internal versus an external legitimacy, and secondly public versus private forms of professional and social capital.

Þ The more or less close relationship with private interests, esp. banks, is a major stake in this field, with many examples of “too close” relationships, from E.Welteke (Buba) to S.Friedman (NY Fed) or T.Fukui (BoJ).

Þ Central bank position as a sequence in a career inside the banking sector for some of the leaders (A.Weber).

Þ At the opposite, the technocratic internal expertise.



No strong specificity of the ECB leaders compared to other central banks (except a stronger specialisation in Law, an older age, and a bit more political capital).

No clear evolution at this level of the organisation during the period under scrutiny.

Law profiles will certainly have more importance inside the institution with the new regulatory functions of the ECB.


2. Institutions in transformation: profiles of main actors in the European field of economic

governance ? Academic profiles, with institutional connectionsÞ A general trend (rise of economics as a “strong

field”) ? Private financial profiles coming from or moving to

the public sector through central banks or finance ministries.

Þ Is this kind of profile more frequent since the crisis ? Political profiles, with more or less “economic

expertise” legitimacy, law specialisation, bureaucratic or partisan capital.

Þ Is this type of capital more and more efficient in the political field ?


2. Institutions in transformation: changes at the EC

The importance of economists at the Commission is not a new phenomenon.

Economists versus Law specialists: a long-term competition.

Official discourses are the indicators of a shift in priorities towards economic expertise.

Human Resources policy also shows a clear move in favour of more “economic” profiles.

The example of Olli Rehn (PhD political economy, Oxford) in the political field (Liberal): an empirical indicator of ascension.


Conclusion. The consequences of the process

Rapid shift toward austerity policies in 2010 after a short keynesian moment (the “Stiglitz moment”, 2008-2009).

No inflexion of trajectory after their first economic and social results, despite numerous critiques among economists (Krugman, Stiglitz…).

Self-satisfaction remains dominant in the sub-field: “recovery”, “financial resilience”. Jean-Claude Trichet: “The euro is a great success” (one week before the European elections).

Jean-Claude Juncker as new president of the EC: a strong continuity.


3. POLITICAL DISCOURSES IN CRISIS. THE MULTIANNUAL FINANCIAL FRAMEWORK, A

MULTIDIMENSIONAL STAKE IN THE EUROPEAN FIELD OF POWER

Frédéric Lebaron (CURAPP/CNRS, U. Picardie J. Verne)With Philippe Bonnet (EA VAC, Paris Descartes)

[email protected] [email protected]

mailto:[email protected]

mailto:[email protected]

INTRODUCTION Economic crisis and the crisis of economic

beliefs: economic and political discourses in turmoil.

Political alignment in crisis: European elections, doctrinal crises of parties…

The European case as a set of contradictions (e.g. intergovernmentalism and growing political integration, sectorial policy interests and macroeconomic dynamics, multilevel stakes)

The case of “fiscal integration”, in a context of crisis of the Eurozone.

Youth Summer School on European Studies Immanuel Kant University -

Kaliningrad


Research question and methodology

How does the crisis affect the debates around the fiscal integration in the EU (esp. Eurozone), esp. as regards the idea of a European budget ?

Position-takings and texts as main material. Data: small texts of position-takings (February

2013), parliamentary debates, interviews + biographical data.

Sources: Websites of the institutions, “Collection of public discourses” (in French)

Methods: qualitative discourse analysis; lexicometrics, Geometric Data Analysis.

References

Bourdieu, P. (1999), Language and symbolic power, Harvard, Harvard University Press.

Georgakakis, D., Rowell J. eds (2013), The field of Eurocracy. Mapping EU actors and professionals , Palgrave / McMillan.

Le Roux, B. & Rouanet, H. (2010). Multiple Correspondence Analysis (QASS Series, n°163). CA:Thousand Oaks, Sage.

Themmar M., Angermüller, J., Lebaron, F. (dir.), Les discours sur l’économie, Paris, PUF, « CURAPP », 2013.


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Plan of the chapter 1. Economic and political discourses in

Europe: a dynamics of crisis 2. The MFF: a multidimensional, multi-

sectorial and multilevel stake 3. The space of position-takings 4. Crisis of economic beliefs and political

alignment


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1. Economic and political discourses in Europe: a dynamics of crisis

The euro crisis has led to an acceleration of political integration (esp. through surveillance and sanctions of budget deficits), but with strong resistances and tensions all over Europe.

Rise of intergovernmentalism and national interests play a major role.

More an more unbalanced relations between countries (North / South, Germany / France)

A global rise of “Euroscepticism” in the European arena (Ukip, Front National, AfD, 5 stelle…)


1. Economic and political discourses in Europe: a dynamics of crisis

European public policies in the crisis: stabilities, shifts, accelerations and contradictions

Þ Monetary policy (ECB): unconventional policy, very low interest rates, financial stability put at the centre. Flexible attitude with the Treaty.

Þ Budgetary policy (national governements): in a situation of tension after 2009, the “golden rule” for national budget deficits, a new regime of control, surveillance and sanction (Commission).

Þ Budgetary policy (European level): a reduction in size for the years 2014-2020.


2. The MFF: a European budget ?

1984: political crisis between the UK and the other member-states (“I want my money back”, M.Thatcher). A paradigm for future negotiations and crises…

1988: Delors I pack, beginning of multi-annual programming.

Rise of the annual budget, until the 2014-2020 MFF. Still small: 1% of EU GDP. Co-decided between the Council and the Parliament. Main expenses: agriculture, social cohesion, research

and development. No fiscal integration. Usually no important public debate.


2. The MFFThe EU long-term spending plan

“The multiannual financial framework (MFF) lays down the maximum annual amounts ('ceilings') which the EU may spend in different political fields ('headings') over a period of at least 5 years. The upcoming MFF covers seven years: from 2014 to 2020. The MFF is not the budget of the EU for seven years. It provides a framework for financial programming and budgetary discipline by ensuring that EU spending is predictable and stays within the agreed limits. It also allows the EU to carry out common policies over a period that is long enough to make them effective. This long term vision is important for potential beneficiaries of EU funds, co-financing authorities as well as national treasuries.By defining in which areas the EU should invest more or less over the seven years, the MFF is an expression of political priorities as much as a budgetary planning tool. The annual budget is adopted within this framework and usually remains below the MFF expenditure ceilings in order to retain some flexibility to cope with unforeseen needs.Proposed by the European Commission, the regulation laying down the MFF must be adopted by the Council by unanimity after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament.

2. The MFF“The MFF regulation enables the European Union to spend up to EUR 959.99 billion in commitments and EUR 908.40 billion in payments over the next seven years. This is 3.5% and 3.7% respectively less than under the MFF 2007-2013, ensuring budgetary discipline for the EU and reflecting the particular budgetary pressure that member states currently face at national level.A strong emphasis is put on expenditure aimed at boosting growth and creating jobs, in line with the political priorities of the EU: the expenditure ceiling for sub-heading 1a ("competitiveness") is increased by more than 37% compared to the current MFF. Apart from ensuring budgetary discipline for the European Union and translating political priorities into figures the MFF's aim is also to facilitate the adoption of the EU annual budget. For 2014 the new MFF has already fulfilled this purpose: on the basis of the political agreement on the MFF 2014-2020 reached in June, the Conciliation Committee. agreed on next year's budget on 12 November.” (Council of the EU, Brussels, 2 December 2013).


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2. The MFF: the 7-8 february agreement

« In line with the efforts of budget consolidation of the member-states, the leaders of the EU agreed to reduce the financial resources available for the EU as regards the level of the MFF. Nevertheless, in order to favor growth and employment, funds for research, innovation and education have been increased » (European Council, 8 February 2013).


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2. The MFF: the 7-8 february agreement

In France, the official reaction (communication of the minister of foreign affairs to the MPs) was not really enthusiastic:« Taking into account the strongly constrained context in which the negotiation took place, the result must be taken with satisfaction as much as regards the interests of France as the European priorities defended by the President: support to growth, in line with the Pact for Growth and Employment adopted in June 2012 ; continuity of important European policies (common agriculture policy and cohesion policy) ; solidarity, as much inside the Union (cohesion, funds for the fight against youth unemployment, help to the poor, as much as with third-countries (European development fund) ».


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2. The MFF: a contestation« From the crisis, national leaders have finally come to the conclusion that the solution needed a weaker and less generous union. At the European Parliament, we come to the opposite conclusion.From this agreement, the Union would come out less generous, less powerful and finally less European, because it would be profoundly divided between contradictory national interests.(…) Growth and employment would be the first victims.I would recommend the Parliament to contest as much the results as the method » (Alain Lamassoure, French MEP, EPP –conservative-, President of the commission of budget).


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2.The MFF: a contestation Alain Lamassoure was followed by the 4 major groups

at the EP (during the 2009-2014 mandate), namely EPP (right-wing), S&D (social-democrats), ALDE (liberal-democrats), Greens-EFA (ecologists).

They didn’t ask for a revision of the figures, but contested the method and asked for changes in the agreement (more flexibility between different headings, an intermediary assessment, etc.).

Positions varied among the MEPs, especially as regards the notion of “austerity” applied to the new MFF.

The negotiation lasted around 4 months before an agreement. Regulation finally adopted in December 2013.


2. The MFF A first concrete test of the “co-decision”

between the Council and the Parliament in case of an apparently strong disagreement.

Alignment and dis-alignment of the MEPs Democracy, integration, growth and

employment: a set of correlated stakes. A case which allows to understand what

the EU is about.

2.1. A corpus 20 texts, written in French, consisting in reactions to the

8th february agreement (reactions, communiqués, etc.). 20 political actors of different status and orientation:

collective author, individual MEPs, national party leaders, etc.

A variety of institutional positions (elected / not elected, European MP / national leader, etc.)

A variety of positions in the political field, from the most central and legitimate at the European level (from head of a small national organization to the president of the European Council)

Most of the position-takings were initially critical.Youth Summer School on European Studies Immanuel Kant University -

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2.2. Construction of the space

Lemmatisation. Reduced forms with a frequency equal or

superior to 7 (63 forms). Construction of the lexical table authors x

forms Correspondence analysis. Clustering. Structured data analysis


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Cloud of words in plane 1-2


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2.3.a. Interpretation of Axis 1

Opposition between political references ("France", “French", "François Hollande",…), to agriculture ("pac", "agriculture" and alimentary aid one one side, economic references (“economy", “growth", "competitiveness", "austerity"…) on the other side.

Two forms of the critique: political versus economic.


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2.3.b. Interpretation of Axis 2

It opposes up the words interest and national, which are in contradiction with European ideals and down below the words "vision", "history", "François Hollande", "France", which refer to the inscription in national history.

European versus national-historical critique.


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Space of authors in plane 1-2


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Cloud of authors Axis 1 opposes European leaders of

groups, centrists and socialists to national right-wing political leaders (violently attacking the president).

Axis 2 opposes national political leaders to European MPs, these ones on the side of the “European critique”, whatever their group (including GUE-NGL).


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2.4. Ascending hierarchical clustering

4 classes of authors: - individual MEPs- grouped MEPS- national political leaders from the right- centrist and socialist national or European actors

Unequal types and amounts of political capital.


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Cloud of words


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Cloud of words in four clusters

Interpretation of the clusters:4 clusters:critique of national egoism économique européenne politique française (agriculture) politique sociale (aide alimentaire, emploi)

Each class corresponds to a type of critique of the agreement.

Space of authors


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Cloud of authors in four classes

2.5.a. Vocabulary and position-takings

Relation between vocabulary and position-takings: authors positioning against the agreement and the president are located in the south-east quadrant ; the « pro » at the centre ; the other « against » on the left.Coherence between the pragmatic dimension of the position-taking and the vocabulary used.


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Space of authors


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Space of authors according to position-taking

2.5.b. Vocabulary and institutional position

Relation between vocabulary and institutional position: MEPs on the top and the left ; political leaders down below.

The institutional position seems more predictive than the partisan membership.

Þ A European political capital, which creates specific interests and views of the world.


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Space of authors


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Space of authors according to institutional status


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Space of authors Space of authors according to political party


4. Economic beliefs and political alignment: the

dynamics of position-takings (2013-2014) Growing internal divisions inside the right-

wing (UMP) party in France, esp. between “Eurosceptics” (Guaino, Wauquiez…) and pro-integration (Lamassoure, Juppé…).

Growing divisions inside the French socialist party between the majority loyal to Hollande and Valls and the left-wing minority, very critical against austerity policies in Europe.

The crisis seems to accentuate the disarticulation of political spaces.

Conclusion

A strong relation between position-takings, institutional positions and vocabulary.

Growing incoherence inside parties in France and, more generally, in Europe.

A decline in European cohesion ?


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General Conclusion No strong specificity of methodology in

times of crisis, except the fact that things are rapidly moving and access to information tends to be more difficult.

Necessity to combine disciplinary backgrounds and methodologies.

Research questions lead to empirical operations, and empirical observations allow new questioning.


Thank you very much !

Frédéric Lebaron (UVSQ-CNRS, Laboratoire Printemps, Sciences Po Saint-Germain-en-Laye)

Documents

Transcript of Frédéric Lebaron (UVSQ-CNRS, Laboratoire Printemps, Sciences Po Saint-Germain-en-Laye)