Foundations in Kantian Constructivism

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Foundations in Kantian Constructivism necessary and necessarily

metaphysical

Dr. Kerstin Budde

Associate Lecturer

Cardiff University, School of European Studies

University of Sheffield, Department of PhilosophyEmail: [email protected]

[email protected]

Abstract:Kantian Constructivism, first developed by John Rawls, has been seen by many as a

new and fruitful way of justifying liberal and democratic institutions. The key claim

of Kantian constructivism as a justificatory theory is that it can convincingly argue for

the objectivity or reasonableness of certain norms and institutions, thus avoidingrelativism, without relying on any contested foundations. Instead the claim of

"construction" is to start from uncontested premises and to construct via a reasonable

procedure principle all could agree on. This paper will argue that despite this aim of

constructivism, the arguments of Kantian constructivists imply certain foundational

premises. I argue that this is not just an unfortunate mistake of some Kantian

Constructivists, but that foundations or foundational premises are necessarily a part of

constructivist argument. I then further argue that the foundations used in Kantian

constructivism are most plausibly understood as metaphysical foundations, and that

indeed they need to be metaphysical to account for the objectivity of the norms

'constructed'.

1. Introduction

Kantian Constructivism, first developed by John Rawls, has been seen by many as a

new and fruitful way of justifying liberal and democratic institutions. The key claim

of Kantian constructivism as a justificatory theory is that it can convincingly argue for

the objectivity or reasonableness of certain norms and institutions, thus avoiding

relativism, without relying on any contested foundations. Instead the claim of

"construction" is to start from uncontested premises and to construct via a reasonable

procedure principle all could agree on. This paper will argue that despite this aim of

constructivism, the arguments of Kantian constructivists imply certain foundational

premises. I argue that this is not just an unfortunate mistake of some Kantian

Constructivists, but that foundations or foundational premises are necessarily a part ofconstructivist argument. I then further argue that the foundations used in Kantian

constructivism are most plausibly understood as metaphysical foundations, and that

indeed they need to be metaphysical to account for the objectivity of the norms

'constructed'.

It will start my analysis of Kantian constructivism, by imposing upon it a formal

structure, which I argue captures the essence of the constructivist enterprise.1 I will

then proceed by indicating where within this formal structure Kantian

1Different authors have emphasised different elements or features in their characterization of Kantian

constructivism.See for example Krasnoff 1999: 388ff, Barry 1989: 266ff, ONeill 2003: 348ff, Brink1996: 307ff and Dworkin 2004: 159ff. I would argue that my characterization captures the essential

elements of Kantian constructivism as a non-foundational, non-relativist theory of justification.

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constructivisms failure to provide a non-foundationalist theory of justification can be

located, using as examples Rawlss ONeills and Scanlons constructivism. This

failure is that each of the Kantian constructivists discussed relies upon a

foundational conception of the person. This leads me to argue that no Kantian

constructivism can be an anti-foundational theory of justification, if it continues to

make strong normative claims for moral principles. I further argue that Kantianconstructivism again if it wants to retain its claim to objectivity will also have to

provide a metaphysical argument for their favoured conception of the person. This is

so because theoretically there are several foundational assumptions possible, and thus

a moral theory has only conditional status unless we can give an explanation, account

or justification of the necessity, priority, or truth of a particular foundational

assumption. This, I argue, will however be an argument, which transcends the domain

of both the specific moral inquiry as well as any other scientific inquiry and must

approximate an all-encompassing explanation of the reality or our necessary

conception of the world. That is, it must involve a metaphysical argument.

2. Foundations in Kantian Constructivism2.1. Formal characterization

I want to start with giving a general outline of what I have taken to be the

constructivist enterprise and indicate where one can locate the foundational

assumptions within this structure, using as example three constructivist theories. I will

then go on to make the claim that these foundational assumptions are not just present

in the three particular constructivist theories, but will be found necessarily in all

constructivist theories, which subscribe to the general outline of (Kantian)

constructivism and its particular ambitions.

If one wants to characterize (Kantian) constructivism in a general or formal

way, then, I think, one could do so as follows. Constructivism starts with certain facts

or conceptions a, b, c which are said to be basic, weak, non-question-begging and

uncontroversial (but obviously relevant for the construction of moral and political

principles). A, b, cthen feed into a procedurepin a twofold fashion: they can either

determine the build-up or structure of the procedure in the form of certain constraints

or they can be used as data within the procedure. Pthen generates various normative

moral or political principles n1, n2, n3

It is important here to note that constructivism generally conceives of the basic

facts or conceptions as being plural, trying to fend off from the very start any

suspicions or danger of foundationalism. One will therefore rarely find a

constructivist who sets out explicitly to use only one basic fact or conception, which

one might illustrate as follows: a

p

n1, n2, n3 Instead the argument willgenerally proceed according to the following formula: a, b, cpn1, n2, n3

Further, a, b, c are seen as basic and in one sense morally non-committal or non-

substantive. By this I want to emphasise the crucial constructivist assumption that n1,

n2, n3do not follow straightforwardly or directly from a, b, c; that is, the resulting

normative principles are not assumed to be already entailed within normative starting

assumptions. For this to hold, constructivism must claim for p a (what I will call)

self-generating element. As Krasnoff has set out, the procedure must take us beyond

the basic materials and must lead us to particular principles (Krasnoff 1999: 387). For

this, the procedure in itself must do some substantial work in getting us to the specific

principles n1, n2, n3, which we could not arrive at by an analysis of a, b, c alone.

Foundations are then avoided when neither of the basic conceptions a, b, cgrounds or influences either n1, n2, n3or pfundamentally, and when the procedure

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contains an independent element which enables it to generate principles that take us

beyond what is implied or entailed in a, b, c. For foundations to be avoided, however,

the procedure itself must also be as basic and non-controversial as possible and the

procedural element which generates principles must be suitably influenced by and

connected to a, b, c, so that it does not on its own determine the principles n1, n2, n3

regardless of the specific basic conception. To illustrate, it must make a difference tothe principles n1, n2, n3if the basic material is a, b, cor if it isx,y,z.

Constructivism then asserts that it is the (systematic) coming, connecting and

working together of several elements, all of which are as much as possible basic,

convincing and uncontroversial, so that they cannot reasonably be doubted or

contested, which leads to normative principles, and which avoids relying on a single

foundation. Thus, as we are simultaneously said to (have to) accept the starting

assumptions and procedure, once we are shown, how when considered all together,

we reach the particular normative principles, we cannot but accept them too, without

however, thereby, being committed to one foundational fact, value or moral principle.

Given that the starting assumptions and the (nature or build-up of the) procedure are

said to be in an uncontroversial sense right or correct, so are the resulting normativeprinciples.

2.2. Foundations

Thus foundationalism is only possible within Kantian constructivism if certain things

they claim do hold, in fact dont hold. The first of these possibilities concerns the

plurality and independence of starting assumptions. If instead of several, markedly

different and to a suitable degree independent2facts or conceptions, only one fact or

conception influences the set-up or decision within the procedure, a suspicion of

foundationalism arises. The same suspicion still holds, I would argue, if a

constructivists had several starting material, but where one starting material is clearly

dominant in influencing the procedure and decision within the procedure and the

other facts at best only marginally influential. But this suspicion can only be

confirmed if the constructive procedure, instead of adding something substantial and

new to the starting conception, doesnt. If we only have one starting conception and

fact, and the procedure, instead of adding something substantial in the generation of

principles, just helps us to see better which moral principles are entailed or required

by our starting conception, then we dont seem to have constructivism but

foundationalism. The second possibility of foundationalism in Kantian constructivism

is then contained in the possible failure of the constructivist procedure to get us

beyond the starting material to specific principles. Both of these possibilities of failure

seem to have to be fulfilled before we could definitely accuse Kantian constructivismof foundationalism.

In the following I would like to briefly show how the three most prominent

Kantian constructivists, ONeill, Rawls, and Scanlon compare when assessed with

those criteria in mind. This can be only a very sketchy argument,3but hopefully will

2The independence condition need not be a strong one, but it rules out, I think, mascerading as several

facts or conceptions, those which are in fact contained in one. Thus when ONeill talks about the factof plurality and the fact that this plurality is not naturally coordinated, she seems to speek of two facts.But ONeill also states that a plurality which is coordinated naturally is not a genuine pluality (ONeill2000: 212). That is, ONeill here implies that the fact or concept of plurality entails the fact that no pre-established coordination exists. In my characterization this would violate the independence condition.

These are not several facts, but only one (If ONeills claim that plurality entail non-coordination istrue).3I undertake a more detailed analysis in my PhD thesis Foundationalism in Kantian Constructivism.

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suffice to make my point. Rawls admits in his Kantian constructivism openly to a

conception of the person (as free, equal, reasonable and rational) as one of the starting

material of his constructivism. The other starting material (model-conception) is the

conception of society as well-ordered (Rawls 1980: 520, 530). The conception of

society as well-ordered does not add anything new or fundamentally important to the

design or decision within the procedure of construction (the original position) apartfrom the thought that we dont just have a singular instance of the conception of the

person, but a plurality of such persons (Rawls 1980: 521; Galston 1982: 494) and that

a well-ordered society would be regulated by a public conception of justice (Rawls

1980: 521). However, the conception of the person already endowed people with a

sense of justice, that is, the capacity to understand and act from a conception of justice

paired with the highest-order interest to exercise and promote this capacity (Rawls

1980: 525). It thus follows that any society of such people would aim to be regulated

by a public conception of justice. Thus the conception of the person is Rawlss

fundamental and most significant starting material. His procedure, the original

position, does not seem to do any independent work. The original position itself and

the decision within are characterized almost exclusively according to the conceptionof the person. The veil of ignorance is put into place to make sure we conceive

ourselves solely as free and equal people (Rawls 1980: 523, 550), and do not

unreasonably try to advantage ourselves, the rationality of the parties within the

original position reflect that we are rational and have a conception of the good (Rawls

1980: 520,521, 528) and the primary goods are those we need to maintain, use and

further our two moral powers (Rawls 1980: 548). The only principles that can come

out of the selection process are then those most congruent to the Rawlsian conception

of the person. The conception of the person as both free and equal, reasonable and

rational is then the foundation of Rawlss Kantian constructivism.

ONeill avoids talking of a conception of the person altogether. Indeed it is one

of her criticisms of Rawls that he illegitimately uses an ideal of the person. Instead

ONeill aims to use only meagre facts about human agency and the world (ONeill

2002: 7, 48, 179, 210). Those facts include the fact of plurality, the fact that there is

no natural coordination between this plurality of agents, the fact that we need

principles of coordination and the limited capacities and vulnerabilities of human

beings. From these ONeill tries to construct the fundamental principle of

followability as the necessary principle of coordination and derives at the first

principle of justice, the rejection of principles of injury. Because we are faced with a

plurality of agents and have no inborn standard which could guide interaction with

each other, we have to adopt as principle to guide our action the principle of

followability (any maxim of action must be such that it could be followed by allrelevant others) the only principle which includes the possibility of universal

coordination (ONeill 2002: 60). However, as I have argued elsewhere,4 what is

crucially underlying this construction are not facts, but the value-commitment to non-

violent coordination, which is ultimately grounded in the respect and value of rational

agency. This underlying conception of the person also determines in ONeill which

principles are followable and thus which principles are constructed. When ONeill

argues that a principle of injury could not be followed by all, because it would leave

some peoples capacity for action injured (ONeill 2002: 163), it is not so much

conceptual followability which does the work here, but a commitment to maintain the

4Constructivism all the way down: Can ONeill succeed where Rawls failed under submission with

Contemporary Political Theory.

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(most extensive) capacities for rational agency. While all people could indeed follow

a principle of injury if they were not committed to value rational agency and its

expression as such, it could not conceived to be followable by those who have such a

value commitment.

Scanlon seems to avoid all those difficulties, by using as a procedure of

construction the idea of reasonable rejectability (Scanlon 2000: 4) and as startingmaterial various generic reasons (adopting a view which characterises the nature of

these reasons as or primitive (Scanlon 2000: 17)). The reasons, which could feed

into the procedure, are unlimited and Scanlon thus seems to the fullest extend to fulfil

the criteria of plural starting points. When we ask whether a principle could

reasonably be rejected we can take recourse to the generic reasons connected with the

relevant standpoints connected to the principle (Scanlon 2000: 204, Scanlon 2002:

519). These are the materials, which the reasonable rejectability procedure has at its

disposal. Within the procedure the materials (reasons) are then weighted and

considered until a decision about the reasonable rejectability of a principle can be

reached. No conception of the person seems to be lurking around in Scanlons

constructivism. But this impression is deceptive. Scanlons justification of thereasonable rejectability formula is that this is the only formula, which expresses the

value of human life as rational autonomous agents (Scanlon 2000: 13, 106, 143, 181,

231, 268). And further the criteria or standard according to which the various reasons

are assessed within the procedure is the value of rational autonomous agency

(Scanlon 2000: 218). In fact, it is to a certain degree irrelevant which reasons are

brought forward into the procedure, as it is clear that only those reasons that can be

derived or connected to the value of rational autonomous agency can have any weight

in determining whether a principle can or cannot be reasonably be rejected.

Each of the constructivist theories, I then argue, relies on a foundational

conception of the person. This foundational conception of the person is contained in

some cases in one of the basic facts, which thereby also proved to be more than a

pure fact (for example in the case of ONeills Constructivism the need for non-

violent coordination). In some cases it is straightforwardly assumed as one element of

the starting material (for example in Rawlss Constructivism). These foundational

starting conceptions a determine the structure, nature or build-up of the procedure

fundamentally, and also the decisions or workings within the procedure and

subsequently the construction of normative principles. The other basic material b, c

are either derived from a, or indeed peripheral or non-influential to the argument.

Where the foundational conception of the person is not one of the starting materials

stated (for example in the case of Scanlons theory) it turns out to be the underlying

conception v, which determines and structures the procedure exclusively. Here a, b, c(basic reasons) have only indirect influence on the resulting principles, as only those

facts which are congruent, or can be subsumed under or derived from vhave decisive

influence on n1, n2, n3 Facts a, b, c have no influence in their own right on

principles, but are discounted withinpif they do not accord with v.

Structurally, then, we find foundations in Kantian constructivism either in one

of the starting materials, structuring p fundamentally, or in the (hidden) conception

underlying and structuring p. Normative principles n1, n2, n3 are then

straightforwardly connected to the foundational conception of the person, which takes

on such a fundamental role and has such substantive content that from an analysis of

it alone one could have deduced the resulting principles.

One can thus also see that the procedure in all the constructivist theories lookedat does not fulfil its promise to get us beyond the starting material, constructing out of

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its own with the help of the material, principles which are not already entailed in the

starting material. Why is this the case? The element or candidate for the productive or

self-generating nature of the procedure is the idea of agreement, choice or

(reasonable) rejection employed within the procedure. However, the only way to

release the potential of this element to add something significant to the starting

material, I would argue, is to rely on actual choice, agreement or rejection and thus tomake the procedure totally self-generating and independent with little or no

connections to a, b, c. If actual choice, agreement or rejection is required from the

procedure then the outcome is open and not pre-determined by a, b or c. But this

would be so exactly because actual persons or choosers would bring to the choice or

agreement much more starting material as those specified by constructivism and

their decision on what is to count as reason for agreement or choice would also be

guided by different standards and principles. Actual choosers would bring their

different facts, conceptions or reasons to the table and these could in various ways

alter or add to the (procedural) situation and thus to the principles decided. The self-

generating element here comes with the danger of cutting ties with the starting

material. This is so because the procedure which relies on actual agreement or choiceis unable to guarantee that the starting material specified by constructivists as the

most important for moral argument can have a meaningful influence on the resulting

principle.5

In the same way as one would not be able to predict the influence of the starting

material a, b, con principles n1, n2, n3, one would also be unable to predict principles

n1, n2, n3or say anything meaningful about their potential content. Actual agreement

or choice has to be awaited and there is no guarantee that we will get the same result

at different times or with different people. Here, however, the reason why we are to

accept the resulting principles n1, n2, n3 and take them to be objective and

authoritative, according to the constructivist rationale, no longer applies. We could

not theoretically comprehend any more how acceptance or correctness of the basic

starting material and procedure would compel us in a meaningful way to accept the

resulting principles n1, n2, n3. The link between starting material and resulting

principles is broken. This is so because the self-generating aspect of the procedure

has in an important way introduced additional and unrestricted (and I argue morally

arbitrary) elements into the procedure, which has contaminated the resulting

principles. In the case of actual agreement or choice someone will always be able to

challenge the resulting principle as morally arbitrary because nothing prevents them

from being contingent on the different and uncontrolled reasons and preferences

brought into the agreement or choice situation. One has not necessarily accepted or

seen as morally obliging all of the facts and reasons determining the outcome and itcan therefore not be inferred that the outcome is morally obliging because one has to

accept the starting material.6The only obligation resulting here is the one (implicit in

5Could the actual choice or agreement situation not be kept open and actual but non-arbitrary in, forexample, requiring actual discussants only to put forward reasons or principles all could accept or find

un-contestable? I do not think that this will work, as either one would have to specify in advance whatis un-contestable or reasonable for all to accept, in which case one could theoretically specify theprinciples capable of acceptance in advance. Then however, the procedure would no longer really beopen nor need it be actual any more. The other possibility is to wait and see what turns out to beacceptable or un-contestable, which again might depend upon and be contingent upon all kinds of

reasons, and thus is again arbitrary.6While this is of course even more the case if one has not participated in the initial choice or

agreement situation, it holds also when one has participated. Actual choice and agreement cannot

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be the case due to the specific nature and structure of the constructivist enterprise, and

also due to the general structure and nature in normative moral and political

justification.

Let me turn to the specific structure of constructivism first and why it will

always entail a foundational commitment. Two aspects here are crucial. The first

concerns the basic material that constructivism wants to use. The aim is to use onlybasic uncontroversial and weak premises, which do not have the potential to claim to

be or to provide a (thick) foundation. The prime candidates for constructivists here are

basic facts, whether those concerning the human condition, or general sociological,

psychological or economic facts. Facts would seem to have the advantage of not

being subject to reasonable rejection or contestation and of not being morally or

metaphysically loaded, that is of being neutral and therefore an acceptable starting

point for all regardless of their more particular value commitments.

However, as Cohen has observed no facts can take on the task of grounding

normative principles or procedures without presupposing a more ultimate normative

principle, which explains why the facts would ground that principle or procedure.

Alternatively one could say that no principle or procedure can be derived purely fromfacts without presupposing a more ultimate or foundational normative principle.

Cohen states his main thesis as follows:

In my view and this is my thesis a principle can reflect or respond to a fact

only because it is also a response to a principle that isnot a response to a fact.

To put the same point differently, principles that reflect facts must, in order to

reflect facts, reflect principles that dont reflect facts (Cohen 2003: 214).

Cohen calls these fact-insensitive principles basic principles (Cohen 2003: 214n4).

What is important to Cohen is that we need an explanation of why a given fact F

grounds a principle p (Cohen 2003: 218). So any sequence of arguments for certain

principles thought to be based on or grounded in facts presupposes a logically prior

normative principle, which explains why the facts support the given principle. This

prior principle is valid whether or not the facts hold (Cohen 2003 215, 215/6, 216). It

is also the foundation of all following principles. Cohen states:

all principles that reflect facts reflect facts only because they also reflect

principles that do not reflect facts, and that the latter principles form the ultimate

foundation of all principles, fact-reflecting principles included (Cohen 2003:

231, my italics).

Take, for example, ONeills constructivism, which explicitly aimed to use not just

basic (empirical) facts but also to ground the constructive procedure in those facts.

The fact of plurality and the fact that there is no pre-established coordination was said

to do all the work here. However my analysis showed that what made these facts

into decisive ones supporting the universality principle was a normative commitment

to non-violent coordination. This could be expressed for example as principlep1: we

should seek coordination and communication, which is non-violent. Now, our

commitment to p1 might be supported by the fact that we are creatures with the

capacity for reason and communication and therefore can establish non-violent

coordination. However this fact only supports the principle p1if we believe an even

more basic principle p2, namely that we should respect and use our rationalcapacities, that is, that we should respect rational creatures. This seems to be an

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ultimate principle which itself is based on no facts and which would also survive the

denial of the facts. Principles are fact-independent in the sense that they are logically

prior to and would survive the denial of, the facts they explain. So, for example, we

would still (have to) be committed to p1, that we should seek non-violent

coordination, even if we came to believe that there is a pre-conditioned harmony

among human beings. We would still have to be committed to the goal of non-violentcoordination in cases where it would apply. It is only because we are committed to

(the truth of) these normative principles that when we are confronted with the fact of

non-coordination, it can be used to ground a moral principle or procedure. ONeill

could not ground her normative principles solely on empirical facts without relying on

a more ultimate and foundational normative principle, which explained why those

facts support her normative conclusions.

I think that we can see clearly in ONeill that a more ultimate normative

principle is presupposed in order to make certain facts relevant for normative

principles, and that this principle or commitment to this principle is logically prior to

the facts and is thus also more fundamental than the facts. This expresses nothing

other than that it is the foundation of ONeills respective theories. Therefore my firstargument against any successful anti-foundational constructivism bases itself on the

truth of Cohens argument and states that there is no way that constructivism could

ever get started or get off the ground by basing itself or using solely non-controversial

facts. They will always be committed one way or another to a more ultimate

normative principle which then takes on a foundational role.

My second argument against the success of a non-foundational constructivism is

even more specific in arguing that no constructivist theory can be put forward without

a foundational conception of the person. This is related not to the idea of facts as

adequate starting material, but to the procedure of construction. This procedure is said

to be in one sense obvious and innocuous, but also to be to a certain extent adding

something to the basic material and generating specific principles. The most likely

candidate here is a procedure, which involves (hypothetical) agreement or choice of

human beings or agents.8If we rule out on good reasons, as I argued actual choice

or agreement (as normatively authoritative) we are left with a procedure which asks

what all could or would agree to or reject.

In one way or another, this can be seen as an expression, interpretation or

modification of the Kantian universality test, the Categorical imperative. Now, I argue

that if we do not believe any more that the universality test, as supreme principle of

practical reason, can undoubtedly and decisively identify moral principles by its pure

formal operation (contradiction in conception and contradiction in the will), because

the transcendentally valid criteria of reason would force us all to converge onprinciples which pass this formal test, then any form of this procedure presupposes a

particular and substantive conception of the person which determines what a person

can, or must, will, agree or choose.

For this claim it will be useful to look at Korsgaards argument. Korsgaard, who

herself puts forward a neo-Kantian theory, argues that what kind of reasons we accept

or adopt depends on the practical identity we hold (Korsgaard 1996: 101). Without

such a practical identity we could determine no reasons as relevant and thus have no

reason to act (Korsgaard 1996: 120). If a constructive procedure asks what we could

8If anyone is to do the agreeing or choosing, that is, the constructing, then it would have to be human

beings or agents, as one of constructivisms basic premises is the rejection of both the existence ofsome transcendental being who could construct moral principles and the existence of a natural order

which could generate or construct moral principles.

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all agree on or choose, and the reasons for choice and agreement depend on our

conception of ourselves or our practical identity, then what we would agree or

choose would depend on the particular practical identity we presuppose. And as

Korsgaard observes, there are numerous possible conceptions of practical identity

(Korsgaard 1996: 101, 116/7), which consequently would lead to different principles

being agreed to or chosen. The constructivist theorist has then to argue for herfavoured conception of the person or practical identity and why we all universally

or within a given community should have or accept this particular identity.

It is not enough here to argue that we do actually share some particular identity,

as some practical identities can be shed and are thus contingent (Korsgaard 1996: 102,

120, 129). An argument has to be made why a particular conception of the person or a

particular practical identity is the one which we all should or necessarily have to

accept.9 And once we do accept it, then it will also be clear what kind of reasons,

given our fundamental practical identity or conception of the person, we will take as

relevant for us. And only then can we make an argument for what we all (should

morally) accept or choose.

I have argued then that the nature of the constructive procedure (combined withtheir fundamental belief that there is no a-historical transcendental reason which

determines what is rational to do or agree to), forces constructivists to rely on a

substantial conception of the person or practical identity which makes it intelligible to

talk about what all people could accept, agree or choose. As it is by no means

uncontroversial, uncontested or obvious which conception of the person we should

hold, that is which is the most fundamental one on which then to base morality,

constructivists will always have to defend and justify their adherence to a particular

(foundational) conception of the person. The question or procedure that asks what we

all could agree or choose is not and cannot be an innocuous one, exactly because of

the fact of pluralism and the rejection of a transcendental reason or nature which

necessitates us to converge on the same reasons, principles or conceptions of the

person. By asking what we all could agree, choose or reject constructivists are

fundamentally asking which conception of the person we should have or have to

accept as fundamental. And as I have argued before, once we have decided upon this

9Korsgaards argument proceeds by claiming that our reflective nature necessitates us to have apractical identity which determines our reasons for action. But while most identities are contingent, thefact that we are reflective creatures who need a practical identity is not contingent and cannot be shed

(Korsgaard 1996: 121/2). This amounts to, as Korsgaard phrases it, the necessary recognition of ourhumanity (Korsgaard 1996: 121) as our fundamental practical identity (although it only becomes

morally authoritative for us when we endorse it (Korsgaard 1996: 254)). However, Korsgaard alsoadmits that what specific normative obligations we accept depends on our understanding of humanity.Korsgaard says that Citizen of the Kingdom of Ends, participant in a common happiness, speciesbeing, one among others who are equally real, are different conceptions of the human-being- as- suchamong which further sorting would have to be done (Korsgaard 1996: 118). Needless to say, I wouldcontend that Korsgaard is involved in a foundational and metaphysical argument concerning the

nature of human beings, namely an argument that it is our nature to construct practical identities(Korsgaard 1996: 150) and that she will also need a metaphysical argument regarding the choice ofhow we are to interpret our humanity more concretely. Indeed when Korsgaard states something likethe following, one cannot but help thinking that she is making a metaphysical claim: You areananimal of the sort I have just described. And that is not merely a contingentconceptionof your identity,which you have constructedor chosen for yourself, or could conceivably reject.It is simply the truth

(Korsgaard 1996: 123, my italics). Interestingly in this statement Korsgaard also seems to equate

construction with contingency. It is clear, however, that Korsgaard accepts the need for a fundamentalconception of the person as foundation for a moral theory and goes to some lengths to argue for thenecessity of this particular one.

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question it is in a sense a technical (or theoretical) exercise to ask what those persons

would agree to or choose.

Kantian Constructivists then have to come clean about the particular

conception of the person they use as foundational and provide us with a justification

for it. And given the many possible conceptions of the persons available they have to

provide us with a justification for it, if the resulting normative principles are notarbitrary and can fulfil their role as normative principles that is telling us what we

ought to do. This justification cannot itself be constructivist as the question of what

conception of the person we all could or would accept or choose already presupposes

(on the constructivist reading) the conception of the person. Thus, constructivists also

have to face up to the fact that their conception of the person isa non-constructive

foundation, and that their theory therefore cannot be constructivist. What kind of

theory they really do provide will then depend on the particular account or

justification they provide for their conception of the person.

3. A Note of Foundations

This said, however, my argument so far has said very little about the nature of andstatus of those foundations (the concept of the person) and how we (can) come to

know them. I take my argument to be largely neutral in regard to the question of the

substantive content and status of foundations with two exceptions, which I will

address, in a short while. For my argument regarding the foundational structure of

Kantian Constructivism, it is important to point out that I have been using a very

broad notion of foundation, similar to the one that Andrew Vincent suggests. He

states:

The term foundation is used in a very broad sense. It is taken to imply some

class of statements or propositions, which are favoured absolutely over others.

To be foundational, this class of statements is regarded as fundamental

fundamental implying that its possessors cannot avoid deferring or referring

back to it. This class of statements is, in other words, always presupposed by a

diversity of other statements. Insofar as this class of statements is fundamental,

it can be considered near inescapable or near unavoidable in any theorizing

(Vincent 2004: 3).10

His definition of foundations as having fundamental status favoured absolutely over

others accords with my use of foundations. Vincent argues that through this

fundamental status these foundations can be seen as inescapable or unavoidable,

echoing here more traditional definitions of foundations, which, for example, claim

that foundational beliefs have to be undeniable and immune to revision (Herzog1985: 20).11While Vincent has weakened this assumed requirement considerably, it

seems to be important for my use of foundations to clarify it further. On my reading

foundational assumptions are inescapable or unavoidable or non-revisablewith regard

toa given theory. That is, while I want to allow the possibility to revise, question and

doubt the foundational assumptions of the justification of a particular theory, I want to

argue that this doubt or revision will alter the justified theory fundamentally. We can,

for example, doubt in a Kantian theory whether property rights are a necessary

10For other more specific or narrow definitions of foundationalism see Seery 1999: 466, Herzog, 1985:

20, Timmons 2004: 226, 234/5, Brink 1996: 102, Ripstein 1987: 115, Heath 1997: 460.11

Brink similarly argues that what is essential to foundational beliefs, according to foundationalism, istheir relative incorrigibility (subjective conceptions) or their relative reliability (objective conceptions)

(Brink 1996: 110).

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precondition for practical reason to be effective in the world and thus adjust the

theory accordingly, yet we could still, I would suggest, maintain that the overall

nature of the theory (and the account of the authoritative status of moral obligation) is

Kantian, because this element is not the foundational element of a Kantian theory.

However, we could not change or doubt the belief in human beings freedom without

altering the theory fundamentally. My point is therefore that foundational assumptionsare fundamental for any moral theory and have to be favoured above all others, as

doubting or altering these foundational assumptions would result in the destruction or

alteration of the whole theory.

This avoids in my mind one of the frequent attacks against foundationalism,

namely that there is no presupposition or assumption, which could not theoretically be

doubted or imagined to be different, and that it is unclear what would make such a

foundational assumption self-justifying or self-evident. Foundations on my reading

then do not have to be self-justifying or self-evident (although of course they could

be). Instead, foundations are only self-evident, necessary, un-doubtable, and immune

to revision in relation to a particular theory. We then need another argument for these

foundations.

I have said that my argument is so far neutral with regard to the nature and

content of possible foundations, but I now want to argue for two restrictions regarding

the nature of these foundations, which indeed follow partly from what I have argued

so far. The first restriction concerns the content of foundations and follows from my

acceptance of Cohens argument, namely that no facts can ground normative

principles alone. From this it follows that the absolute or fundamental assumptions of

a moral theory cannot be facts.

The second restriction concerns the status of these foundational assumptions and

is connected to the specific task of justifying normative, moral and political

principles, which are obliging or necessitating. In regard to this, I claim that no

foundational assumptions for justifying moral or political norms can be adequate or

convincing or fulfil their role, when it has to be conceded that we have just posited

them without further explanation, account or justification of their special status or

importance for morality.12To do so would fulfil the necessary formal structure of all

moral and political justification but it would not succeed in giving a convincing

normative justification. The reason for this is that normative (moral) principles are

said to have a certain hold over us; they are thought to oblige or necessitate us to

action even if we would rather do something else. Korsgaard has given a good

account of the peculiar nature of normative principles. Ethical standards, according to

Korsgaard, are normative in that they do not merely describea way in which we infact regulate our conduct. They make claims on us; they command, oblige,

recommend, or guide. Or at least, when we invoke them, we make claims on one

another (Korsgaard 1996: 8). Korsgaard then argues that When we seek a

philosophical foundation for morality we are not looking merely for an explanation of

moral practices. We are asking what justifies the claims that morality makes on us.

This is what I am calling the normative question(Korsgaard 1996: 9/10). Thus, one

of the criteria that any moral theory must answer to is one she calls normative or

justificatory adequacy. This criteria denotes the fact that when we do moral

philosophy, we also want to know whether we are justifiedin according this kind of

12

Note here, that an explanation that we could all agree on them is only insofar adequate as it issupported by an account of the normative authority or significance or truth conveying nature of

(shared) agreement.

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importance to morality [] We want to know what, if anything, we really ought to

do (Korsgaard 1996: 13).

Thus a justification, which has to admit that its foundational assumption is

(purely) contingent, cannot account for the importance of moral principles and why

we should see them as obliging. Some account of the importance, priority or

worthiness or inevitable nature of the particular foundational assumption has to begiven for the justificatory theory to at least be a genuine attempt to justify normative

principles, which reallydo oblige. Otherwise we are not really involved in justifying

moral norms at all, but only involved in a sceptical exercise. That is, we would

formally show that there are certain presuppositions for our moral principles, but

these can have no special hold on us or any importance, and we would thus defeat the

point of justification. We would then have to be sceptics with regard to moral

obligation. Korsgaard defines the moral sceptic as someone who thinks that the

explanation of moral concepts will be one that does not support the claims that

morality makes on us (Korsgaard 1996: 13). This would be precisely the case if we

had to concede that we could give no meaningful account of whywe use the particular

foundations we use in our justificatory argument and why they are the adequatefoundations for a moral theory. Any person engaged in genuine moral and political

justification that is any one who really does want to show or argue why we should

direct our actions according to some principle has not only some foundational

assumption, but must give an account, explanation or justification of their priority or

adequacy as moral and political foundations. This need is even more obvious if we

consider that the option to claim that our foundational assumptions are facts, which

can just be pointed out and therefore do not seem in need of any explanation or

justification, does not exist.

These conclusions, although they leave much of the content and nature of

possible foundations open,13lead me to make a further (tentative) claim about Kantian

constructivism. This is that Kantian constructivism cannot avoid making metaphysical

claims and thus must also be involved in metaphysical arguments.

4. Necessity of Metaphysics

Metaphysics has acquired a bit of a bad reputation in moral and political philosophy.

Because of its alleged non-empirical character and thus its elusiveness with regard to

conclusive (empirical) proof, validation or argument, many are tempted to see it as

nonsense to be dismissed. Even if they would not go that far, it is implied by many

liberal and Kantian Constructivists that agreement on metaphysical questions could

never be attained, as they are always and inherently open to contestation, and thattherefore in conditions of pluralism we should avoid talking about or involving

metaphysical presuppositions or arguments altogether.14

13Here it might be helpful to point out that my claim is also relatively neutral regarding the question ofhow thick or weak the foundations are to be. A weak foundationalist theory would still have a

foundation which could be contested and needs a (metaphysical) justification. The thinness orweakness of the foundation in question cannot translate itself directly into acceptability or normativeauthority for the so developed theory. The argument for thinness or weakness of foundation is, so Iwould probably suggest, itself based on a substantive normative and metaphysical claim about thenature of morality or moral theorizing.14

Hampton, when asking herself what definition of metaphysics Rawls is referring to when he rejectsit, states that from context it doesnt seem that he can mean it in the positivists sense as nonsense to

be dismissed but, rather, in a more Hobbesian sense as doctrines for which an incontrovertible

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It is often not altogether clear what exactly, for example, constructivists

understand under metaphysics, when they assert that they want to and do avoid it in

their arguments. I will in the following assume metaphysics to either be concerned, as

traditionally understood, with claims about the fundamental nature of reality, which

could not be substantiated solely by the methods of any special science or intellectual

discipline, such as anthropology or history or sociology (Lowe 2002: 4, my italics) orwith the necessary or fundamental structure of our understandingof and acting in the

world (Kant 1996: A 841/2; B869/70, Lowe 2002:7, Loux 1998: 1,6; Williams 1999:

2-3). Regardless of whether one adopts the traditional definition of metaphysics or a

more Kantian one, they both capture what I take constructivists as wanting to avoid,

namely an attempted explanation or account of the nature of the world or the

necessary conditions of our experience or understanding of and action in the world,

which goes beyond the remit of the specialised sciences and therefore cannot be

proven or shown by any one of them. This, in a sense, represents the danger of

metaphysics as it slips through the nets of the explanatory or conceptual tools of the

more specialised (and, as we feel, more validated or sound) sciences.15 Because it so

slips through the nets of the acceptable tools we have to show it as undeniable oruncontestable true, it is generally assumed that metaphysical arguments cannot be

used to argue for principles we all could agree to. Even though this is an inherent

problem of metaphysics and carries with it the possibility of irresolvable dispute, I

will nevertheless (tentatively) suggest that it is inevitable (even and maybe exactly

because we live in a plural world).

I have argued that Kantian constructivism relies on a foundational conception of

the person and thus has a foundational structure and that different foundational

assumptions will lead us to different moral and political principles. Living in a

pluralistic world we know of the possibility of different substantial conceptions of the

person.16 It might seem that this kind of argument should lead me in exactly the

opposite direction from assuming the necessity of metaphysics. It seems that I have

shown that foundations are inevitable but that also several or a manifold of

foundations are possible. One, maybe obvious, conclusion or reaction to such a

demonstration may be to assume or postulate that one foundation is in principle as

good as the other and that we should either choose among them as we please and

prefer or just accept the one foundational assumption we happen on introspection to

hold.

Now, firstly I would like to argue that this in itself constitutes or would entail a

metaphysical argument about the fundamental nature of reality, namely that there is

no (ultimate) true, better or necessary foundational assumption from or on which true

moral or political theories could be developed. This post-modern conclusion impliesa thesis that goes beyond the valid or established conclusions or claims of other

demonstration is not possible. Such doctrines have the potential to arouse controversy and provokeconflict in the community (Hampton 1989: 794/5).15However, the impossibility of or extravagant nature of, metaphysics is often exaggerated. Vincentrefers to Peirce in defence of metaphysical argument, stating that the complaint that the study of

metaphysical foundations is too abstract, is in itself ridiculous, since all the natural sciences (and manysocial sciences for that matter) are fare moreabstract and remote than metaphysics. Equally, it isnonsensical to say that the objects of foundational metaphysics are not observable or easily studied.Most objects in the sciences (and social sciences) cannot be directly or easily observed (Vincent 2004:6). For example, Energy, gravitation, or supply and demand curves [] cannot actually be seen

(Vincent 2004: 7).16Successful is used here not to denote something like maximally flourishing or the like, as this is itself

a substantive criteria, but just the fact that people could live by it.

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sciences and also beyond the claim that different foundations are possible. It makes a

very fundamental claim about the reality of (moral) knowledge. Only the

metaphysical thesis of the impossibility of true foundational assumptions (for

morality) leads or directs us from the statement about different possible foundations

to the normative claim that we should not try and could not find a true foundation,

but should instead either make the best of what we have or choose as we please. Inthat sense I argue with Lowe who states that the attempt to undermine or eliminate

the metaphysical dimension of our thinking is self-defeating, because the very attempt

necessarily constitutes a piece of metaphysical thinking itself (Lowe 2002: 4). Even

those who want to deny that moral or political principles are capable of universal truth

claims or of being objective must in the end make a universal metaphysical claim

about the nature of reality or about our possible understanding of it.

While I therefore argue that even the post-modern or radical relativist

conclusions that one could try to draw from my argument would involve a

metaphysical claim, I would also like to argue that these conclusions cannot be drawn

by anyone who wants to engage in genuine justification. If we really did hold the

metaphysical view that no foundational assumption can even possibly be true orcorrect or necessary17and that we therefore would not be wrong, or would be equally

justified in espousing any of the foundational assumptions, we would have turned

once more into the sceptic. Here moral theory would not survive metaphysical

explanation. We could not account for the demands and importance of a particular

moral obligation, and would have to concede that we are deceiving ourselves about

the status of morality. To attempt any genuine justification at all of moral or political

norms we need to at least entertain or allow for the possibility that a foundational

assumption could be true, correct or necessary.

In the case of Kantian Constructivists, with their reliance on various principles

of respect for rational and free human beings, this metaphysical argument would, for

example, have to take the form of providing an explanation of why we (necessarily)

have to conceive of ourselves as free, and why rationality and freedom express our

real or fundamental nature, so that they can demand respect and can thus demand to

be valued by us.

Bibliography

Barry, B. (1989): Theories of Justice. A Treatise on Social Justice, Volume I.

Harvester-Wheatsheaf, Hertfordshire.

17

Here it is important that one only need to state the possibility of foundations to be true or correct andthat one is not committed to saying that we have found an (undeniable) true foundation or that there is

an easy way to do so.

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Foundations in Kantian Constructivism

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