FOREST FIRES AND THE BAN ON NTFP

COLLECTION IN BILIGIRI RANGASWAMY

TEMPLE SANCTUARY, KARNATAKA

Report of a Field Investigation and Recommendations for Action

(Investigation Team: Ashish Kothari, Saili Palande, Milind Wani, Kalpavriksh, with Keya Acharya, freelance journalist)

Kalpavriksh

25 June 2007

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Table of Contents Pg.No.

Acknowledgments 4

Structure of the Report 4

Summary 5

1. Introduction: Why the Investigation?1.1 The stimulus: adivasis lighting fire to the forest? 8 1.2 Kalpavriksh’s interest in the incident 81.3 Methodology and limitations of the investigation 9

2. Background: The Sanctuary and the Adivasis2.1 The BRT Sanctuary 102.2 The Soligas 11

3. The Incidents of Forest Fire3.1 The March forest fires and the Forest Department’s action 123.2 Adivasi and civil society response 15

4. The Context: the Ban on NTFP Collection, and other Aspects4.1 Adivasi - Forest Department relations 164.2 The NTFP ban and its impacts 164.3 Other aspects: coffee plantations and mining 19

5. Analysis5.1 The forest fires 205.2 The NTFP ban 215.3 Adivasi - Forest Department relations 225.4 The role of civil society organizations 225.5 The Tribal Forest Rights Act 235.6 Coffee plantations and mining 24

6. Recommendations6.1 The forest fires 246.2 The NTFP ban 246.3 Adivasi-Forest Department relations 256.4 The Tribal Forest Rights Act 256.5 Coffee plantations and mining 266.6 The role of CSOs 26 6.7 Towards collaborative management 26

Annexure I: Article in Times of India: “Denied of produce, tribals set forest afire”, 26.4.2007.Annexure II: Article in Prajavani, “DCF harasses aged tribal”, 30.3.2007.Annexure III: Letter to Chief Minister by C. Made Gowda and C. Madappa (protesting against

harassment and registering of false cases against tribals, creating an atmosphere of fear etc.), English translation.

Annexure IV: Letter to Chief Minister by several tribal leaders, 5.4.2007 (protesting against harassment and registering of false cases against tribals, creating an atmosphere of fear etc.), Kannada original and English translation.

Annexure V: Letter to District Panchayat from Dr. H. Sudarshan, VGKK, 5.4.2007 (supporting the adivasis’ contention regarding harassment).

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Annexure VI: Memorandum of adivasis to CEO, Zilla Panchayat alleging harassment of adivasis and extraction of confessions under duress, English translation..

Annexure VII: Article in Deccan Herald, “Soligas wrongly blamed for forest fires: tribal leaders”, 1.4.2007.

Annexure VIII: Official memorandum from PCCF, Karnataka banning NTFP collection for commercial purpose.

Annexure IX: Letter from DCF (WL) Chamarajanagar, Mr. Dixit Kumar, to the PCCF in response to official memorandum banning NTFP collection for commercial purpose, 29.3.2004.

Annexure X: Proposal submitted by DCF (WL) Chamarajanagar, Dr. R. Raju, to the PCCF urging permission for Soligas to collect 5 key NTFPs, 1.6.2006.

Annexure XI: Letter of DCF (WL) Chamarajanagar to Deputy Commissioner to disallow quarrying in areas near to BRT WLS, 29.12.2005.

Annexure XII: Letter of Dy. Commissioner, Chamarajanagar District, to Dept. of Mines and Geology, to discontinue 12 quarries near the BRT WLS, 25.3.2006.

Annexure XIII: Letter of Karnatak Rajya Raitha Sangha and Hasiru Sene to the Centrally Empowered Committee, Supreme Court, to order stoppage of quarrying, 20.9.2006.

Annexure XIV: Letter of Zilla Soliga Abirudhi Sangha to Chief Minister, regarding Wildlife Committee.

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Acknowledgments

The Kalpavriksh team expresses its gratitude to the following for cooperation, hospitality, and information inputs during the investigation: Soliga leaders and residents of Kaneri Colony, the Karnataka Forest Department including the PCCF and Chief Wildlife Warden AK Varma, and the DCF (WL) Chamarajanagar Dr. R. Raju, researchers at the Ashoka Trust for Research in Ecology and Environment, and members and staff of Vivekananda Girijan Kalyana Kendra. The Foundation for Ecological Security, Anand, made the investigation trip possible with a prompt response to our request for funds. Kalpavriksh members helped with comments and encouragement.

Structure of the Report

A Summary presents the background and key findings of the investigation.

Section 1 introduces the subject of this report: the initial news of the forest fires, why Kalpavriksh decided to conduct an investigation, what methodology was followed, and what the limitations of this report are.

Section 2 gives a brief introduction to the BRT Wildlife Sanctuary and to the Soliga adivasis who live within it.

Section 3 covers the incidents of forest fire, providing various accounts of what happened and why.

Section 4 puts the forest fire incident in the context of an existing ban on NTFP collection, its impact on the tribal people, the historical roots to the current situation including the relations between the Soligas and the Forest Department, and additional related matters such as the coffee plantations inside the sanctuary and granite quarrying outside.

Section 5 provides an analysis of the incidents and their context, bringing in various policy issues.

Section 6 lays out recommendations for next steps, building on the analysis in Section 5.

A series of annexures contain key documents accessed during the investigation.

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Summary

This report is based on an investigation carried out by Kalpavriksh, in May 2007, into the incidents of forest fires inside the Biligiri Rangaswamy Temple Sanctuary (BRT WLS) in Karnataka, and their context, in particular the ban on forest produce collection and its impacts.

Newspaper reports of the forest fires quoted the state’s forest officials as having put the blame on the Soliga adivasis living inside the BRT WLS, reportedly in retaliation against their collection of non-timber forest produce (NTFP) having been banned. There were also reports of harsh treatment by the officials against some Soligas.

Having worked on issues of protected areas and local people for three decades, and having known of BRT WLS as a critical area for both biodiversity and for adivasis, Kalpavriksh felt it necessary to conduct an investigation into the above incidents and allegations. An additional impetus to this was the fact that Kalpavriksh has been studying and campaigning on the issue of the ban on collection of NTFP, which has been imposed in several states. It was therefore keen to see if there was a connection between the incidents of fire and this ban.

The investigation involved a field visit to BRT WLS, perusal of relevant documents, and detailed discussions with forest officials, civil society organizations working in BRT WLS, and the Soligas. A draft of the report was shared with all of these and comments considered before finalizing this report.

The investigation revealed that there were varying versions and opinions of the extent and causes of the forest fires. Forest officials held the Soligas responsible (though with the caution that perhaps only a fraction of the community was involved), stating that they may have done this to protest the recently implemented ban on NTFP collection. They speculated the perhaps there was also a connection with the Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act 2006. The Soligas and local civil society organizations (CSOs), on the other hand, denied any major role (though admitting that “one or two” fires may well have been lit by the adivasis). They pointed to the possible role of outsiders, as also to the alleged neglect of annual fire prevention measures this year by the Forest Department. Soliga leaders and CSOs were also highly critical of the Department’s handling of the post-fire situation, in particular the widespread arrests and alleged manhandling of some Soligas by the forest staff.

All those spoken to agreed that the ban on NTFP was a serious issue that needed urgent resolution. Forest officials showed how they have been proposing to allow restarting of harvest, at least for some key NTFP, and also to get funds for providing alternative employment. Soligas and CSOs pointed to the serious livelihoods loss that the adivasis had suffered due to the ban, compounded by the fact that these were a people already on the margins of existence. CSOs also mentioned that after the ban, there were serious incidents of cutting of amla trees by outsiders, not stopped by the adivasis as they may have done earlier, and also that while the Soligas may not have themselves lit most of the fires, they may have been less enthusiastic about reporting and dousing the fires than was usually the case. Both these pointed to the onset of alienation from the forest, as a result of the NTFP ban.

Also highlighted in the discussions was the issue of the coffee plantations inside the BRT WLS, and of granite quarries close to the boundaries of the WLS. Soligas and CSOs wondered why

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these were not being stopped if NTFP collection was banned ostensibly for conservation reasons. Forest officials stated that they were attempting to stop these operations to the best of their ability.

Key findings: Kalpavriksh’s analysis based on the investigation suggests that:

1. Blame for the forest fires cannot be put solely or even predominantly on the Soligas (and certainly not on them as a community), and that other factors not adequately considered by the government have played a significant role. The Forest Department’s own failure to adequately prepare for the fire season this year seems to be a significant factor. Speculation about the links between the fires and the Tribal Forest Rights Act seems unfounded.

2. The much bigger issue, highlighted in the context of the fires, is the ban on NTFP collection. The socio-economic impact on the ban, and the possible repercussions on conservation due to the alienation it has caused amongst the Soligas, are serious enough to warrant urgent action.

3. There is a deterioration in relations between the Forest Department as the formal custodian of the BRT WLS, and the Soliga adivasis as the traditional custodians. All evidence seems to point to a relatively harmonious relationship in the last several years, which has been spoilt over the last year or so, in particular due to the ban on NTFP collection and the lack of ameliorative action on part of the Forest Department. No serious effort has been made by the Forest Department to formally involve the Soligas in the management of the WLS.

4. While CSOs in the area have played a significant role in conservation and in helping the adivasis in various ways, the Forest Department is yet to work out an institutionalized arrangement in which their role could be systematic and sustained. On their part, some of the CSOs have been surprisingly silent about the NTFP ban, neglecting to publicly raise the issue at an early enough stage when its implications should have been clear.

5. Though unconnected to the forest fires, the Scheduled Tribes and Other Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act 2006, is likely to have significant conservation and socio-economic impacts on the BRT WLS and the Soligas.

Recommendations:

1. Forest fires: The state government should make public any enquiry reports it has commissioned on the incidents, take appropriate action against officers for the alleged harsh treatment of adivasis, and for the longer term, facilitate an independent assessment and action plan on forest fires in BRT WLS. For their part the Soligas through their Sangha should create greater awareness amongst its member regarding the importance of controlling forest fires, and commit to taking action if it finds any adivasis indulging in uncontrolled burning.

2. The NTFP ban: CSOs should survey the socio-economic and ecological impacts of the ban on NTFP, and the state and central governments should review and amend or interpret Section 29 of Wild Life (Protection) Amendment Act 2003 (WLPA), to enable resumption of regulated NTFP collection with appropriate conservation safeguards using the already available long-term ecological studies by CSOs.

3. Relations between the Forest Department and the Soligas: Immediate measures to rebuild trust between these two main players could include a series of mediated meetings, an explanation and apology by the Department for harsh measures taken against the Soligas, a declaration by the Soligas to cooperate with the Forest Department

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in conserving BRT WLS, urgent provision of employment to Soliga families, appointment of Soligas as Honorary Wildlife Warden and on the Chamarajanagar Wildlife Committee, and the creation of the Sanctuary Advisory Committee mandated in the WLPA.

4. The Tribal Forest Rights Act: Much better understanding of this Act is needed amongst local CSOs and forest staff, and a readiness to enable its positive implementation in ways that benefit both the Soligas and the forests and wildlife, including through precise mapping of the lands that will be subject to claims, identification of critical wildlife habitats using the best available scientific knowledge and the Soliga classification of forests.

5. Coffee plantations and mining: The plantations need to be mostly phased out, leaving some small patches with organic coffee production in the hands of the Soligas, and aided restoration of forest in most of the plantation area in ways that provide employment to the Soligas; existing mining/quarrying in areas adjacent and within a 5 km. belt of BRT WLS should be shut down, and consideration to re-open mining or quarrying in these areas should be abandoned.

6. Role of civil society organizations: The Forest Department needs to sign MoUs to initiate an institutionalized, long-term arrangement with CSOs for inputs on research, conservation action, adivasi livelihoods and welfare, tourism management, and other aspects.

7. Towards collaborative management: Eventually, BRT WLS needs to move towards collaborative management, as mandated for all PAs by international agreements to which India is a party. This would entail a joint or collaborative management body, delineation of the roles of respective partners, and sharing of appropriate benefits including revenues from tourism.

Given the relatively harmonious relations between the Forest Department and the Soligas till recently (including the formal relations between the two through institutions such as LAMPS), the long-term work of civil society organisations on conservation, research, and tribal community welfare, and the continued richness of the BRT ecosystem, the WLS presents a unique opportunity to explore stronger, more participatory, and sustainable strategies for conservation. We hope that the recent incidents of forest fire provide, ironically, the spark to move towards such exploration.

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1. Introduction: Why the Investigation?

1.1 The stimulus: adivasis lighting fire to the forest?

On April 26, 2007, the Times of India (TOI) reported incidents of forest fire at the Biligiri Rangaswamy Temple Wildlife Sanctuary (BRT WLS)1. It referred to the fire as an “inferno” which had “engulfed” “huge tracts of forest in 20 locations in the Yellandar, Punjar (where Kannada cinestar Rajkumar had been captured by Veerappan) and Kyatadevaragudi ranges”. It informed readers that it “took over ten days to douse the flames triggered by enraged tribals” and that the Forest Department managed to contain the fire at “ground level without destroying the crown of the trees”. The report also quoted the Principal Chief Conservator of Forests (PCCF) A. K. Verma as saying that the fire was started “at the behest of certain people” and was a “deliberate, revengeful and retaliatory” action by local tribals in response to the strict implementation, of the Wild Life Protection Act 1972 (WLPA), to ensure that unlike in the previous years when tribals were allowed to collect minor forest produce (MFP) like amla and berries, this year “there was no infringement of the Act”. The PCCF was quoted as asserting that the Department had “filed forest offence cases against 28 tribals…21 were let off on furnishing personal bonds, seven are still in judicial custody” and that they “are further enquiring into the matter to ensure such things don’t happen again”. The report also cites a “source” (unnamed) as indicating that this attempt to destroy forest may have been with intent to later “stake claim to the land” once the Tribal Forest Rights Bill is enshrined into an act.

1.2 Kalpavriksh’s interest in the incident

Kalpavriksh has for over two decades worked on issues of conservation, and in particular the links between formal conservation policy and the lives and livelihoods of people living inside areas sought to be protected for wildlife. It is deeply interested in, and has been both researching and taking positions on, conflicts that take place between local communities and protected area authorities, as also instances of successful cooperation between the two.

On reading the above news item, Kalpavriksh members made some further enquiries from individuals and organizations that are familiar with the BRT WLS. We heard a number of versions of the incident and its causes. We also learnt of a letter written to TOI by Dr. Prashanth N.S., in response to the above-mentioned report. Dr. Prashanth, who has been residing in or visiting the BRT Sanctuary for the past 4 years, has been associated with Vivekananda Girijana Kalyana Kendra (VGKK), a group that has been working with the adivasis inside BRT WLS for the last 3 decades. In his letter, Dr. Prashant questioned the legitimacy of the process by which the Forest Department attempted to hold and charge the Soliga tribals with forest offences. While pointing to the fact of common occurrence of fire in the Western Ghats, Dr. Prashant’s letter also pointed to the dismal management record of the Forest Department in relation to the BRT WLS. Some of the issues he raises are:

• Negligence in drawing up of firelines to prevent fire from spreading• Non-involvement/ non-addressing of tribes and communities in fire patrolling related

activities• Random arresting and holding of 23 Soliga tribal people

1 Hoover, J. 2007. Denied of produce, tribals set forest afire. Times of India, 26.4.2007.( See Annexure 1)

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Dr. Prashant’s letter also alleges that in “a shocking example of a bureaucracy which is blind to field realities, the local DFO even kicked a tribal viciously on the head and yet another was tortured”. He raises a concern that the article presents the view of a senior forest officer, “who has NOT EVEN visited the place yet”. He further asks as to how one can justify a one-sided reporting from the point of view of the Forest Department to the exclusion of “the local tribal, NGOs or field staff”?

The chain of events and how they were being variously reported and responded to, led members of Kalpavriksh to discuss the possibility of visiting BRT WLS to find out the facts for ourselves. There were a number of considerations for this:

• The TOI report was silent or cryptic on a number of points: how much forest had actually been burnt, what the damage to wildlife was, who the culprits (if any) were (more specifically than just local adivasis), whether those adivasis charged by the Forest Department had actually been caught in the act of lighting the fires, whether there was really a connection between the Tribal Forest Rights Act and the fires (and who the “source” mentioned for this speculation was), and so on.

• Dr. Prashanth’s letter was in direct contradiction to the TOI report, on issues such as whether the Soligas were to blame for the fire; what really was the truth on this?

• Did the Forest Department really behave in an unjustifiably harsh manner towards the Soligas, or did they have enough cause for their action?

• Did the ban on NTFP collection inside the BRT WLS, have anything to do with the fires?

Most importantly, however, Kalpavriksh’s main interest in the incident was the larger context within which it had occurred. We have followed events in the BRT WLS for a number of years, due to our interest in working towards a new paradigm of conservation that integrates wildlife protection with livelihood security of those living within or around protected areas. It has appeared to us that BRT WLS was in an ideal position to explore such a paradigm, given the reportedly harmonious relations between the adivasis and the forest, the good relations between the Forest Department and the adivasis, and the presence of civil society organizations that were working for several years on ecological and socio-economic aspects. Due to this Kalpavriksh and other groups had organized a “National Consultation on Conservation and Livelihoods: Building Bridges”, at BRT WLS, in 2000. Additionally, over the last 2-3 years Kalpavriksh has also been involved with environmental education work in the BRT WLS, focusing especially on education with and for the Soliga children and their teachers at a school run by the VGKK.

Given this association, it was natural for us to be extremely concerned about the happenings at BRT WLS. But it was also clear that we needed a deeper understanding of the issue before considering any kind of response. Hence the decision to undertake a field investigation.

1.3 Methodology and limitations of the investigation

The Kalpavriksh investigation team comprised three members of its Conservation and Livelihoods Programme from Pune, Ashish Kothari, Saili Palande, Milind Wani, and a collaborating partner from Bangalore, Keya Acharya.

The methodology followed by the team involved:

1. Study of relevant and available literature on BRT WLS and the Soligas

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2. Review of news clippings on the forest fire incidents of March 20073. Interviews with Forest Department officials, Mr. A K Verma (PCCF and Chief Wildlife

Warden, Karnataka) and Dr. R. Raju (DCF Wildlife, in charge of BRT WLS)4. Interviews and meetings with Soliga leaders and other Soliga residents of BRT WLS5. A visit to one Soliga podu (settlement), Kaneri Colony, comprising of discussions with a

number of its residents, on 10th May 2007.6. A visit to some sites affected by forest fire 7. Discussions with researchers at the NGO Ashoka Trust for Research in Environment and

Ecology (ATREE), in Bangalore, and with the staff of VGKK (including its founder Dr. H. Sudharshan) in BRT WLS, on 8-11th May and 8-9th June 2007.

8. Review of memoranda, letters, and other documents related to the forest fire incidents, and to the issue of NTFP ban in BRT WLS

Subsequent to the field visit in May, a series of further questions were asked of the Forest Department, ATREE, and VGKK. The draft report was circulated to key groups and individuals, and their comments considered before finalization. Though the Forest Department was specifically requested, comments on the draft report were not received from it.

This investigation has necessarily been limited in its scope and depth. There are a number of reasons for this:

• There was some distance in time; almost two months had already elapsed since the first fire incidents before the Kalpavriksh team learnt of them and could visit the site. The embers of the fires had already been doused; the Kalpavriksh team could not gain a first-hand experience of the fire, and had to thus rely on second-hand reporting (oral and published).

• Limited resources were available, making it difficult to have a larger team with more days to gather more comprehensive and in-depth information.

Despite these limitations, we submit that the facts and conclusions presented here, are accurate to the best of our knowledge. We trust that the analyses and recommendations in this report will be valid and useful.

2. Background: The Sanctuary and the Adivasis

2.1 The BRT Sanctuary2

The Biligiri Rangaswamy (BR) hills are in the Yelandur taluka of Chamarajanagar district of Karnataka, with the highest peak being Kattari Betta, at 1800 msl.

Within these hills, the Biligiri Rangaswamy Temple Wildlife Sanctuary (BRT WLS) spreads over an area of 540 Sq. km, between 11°43’ and 12°08’ N latitudes and 77°01’ and 77°15’ East longitudes. A WLS covering an area of 322.4 km² was created around the Biligiri Rangaswamy temple on 27 June 1974, and enlarged to its current size on 14 January 1987. It derives its name ‘Biligiri’ either from the white rock face that constitutes the major hill crowned with the temple of Lord Rangaswamy, or from the white mist and the silver clouds that cover the hills for a greater part of the year. 2 ATREE and VGKK. 1998. Biligiri Rangaswamy Temple Wildlife Sanctuary: Natural History, Biodiversity and Conservation. Ashoka Trust for Research in Ecology and the Environment, and Vivekananda Girijana Kalyana Kendra, Bangalore; and http: //www.wildindia.org/wiki/BR_hills

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BRT WLS has a large diversity of vegetation types such as scrub, dry and moist deciduous forests, evergreen forests, sholas and high-altitude grasslands. The evergreen, semi-evergreen and shola forest are restricted to the hilly terrain of the sanctuary. This diversity of vegetation types supports a rich variety of fauna. BRT WLS is also known for its many endemic species of plants including valuable medicinal ones.

The forests form an important wildlife corridor between the Western Ghats and the Eastern Ghats, linking the largest populations of Asian elephants and the Tiger in southern India. BRT WLS has a total of 38 mammal, 278 bird, 22 reptile and 116 butterfly species. The last constitutes a third of the butterfly diversity of the Western Ghats. A preliminary survey of ants in BRT yielded 48 species constituting about 8% of the total ant species in India. A recent (2005) survey of tigers by DNA analysis of scat samples has revealed 17 tigers, but this is only a sample count, and the number is likely to be higher; the official figure is 28. The avifauna includes seven endemic and several endangered species such as the Yellowthroated Bulbul (Pycnonotus xantholaemus), Nilgiri Wood Pigeon (Columba elphinstonii) and the Rufous-bellied Eagle (Hieraatus kienererii). There are 399 flowering plants belonging to 79 families and 194 genera. Of these, 243 plants have been identified as having medicinal properties.

2.2 The Soligas3

The Soliga is an indigenous tribe that has traditionally resided in the forested regions of Yelandur, Chamarajanagar, Nanjangud and Kollegal, including the Biligiri Rangaswamy (BR) and the Malai Mahadeshwara (MM) hill ranges in the southern part of Karnataka. These adivasis, nearly 30000 of them in the district (of which about 12500 are inside the BRT WLS4), are known to have co-existed with the forest for centuries in a quiet harmony. Traditionally semi-nomadic, they have however been induced to a more-or-less sedentary existence (in small forest villages called podus or doddi or hadi) after the imposition of forest regulations, in the last 3-4 decades5. The Soligas are known for their rich traditional knowledge and cultural life linked with their natural surrounds.

Though the Soligas practice agriculture, with the staple food crop being ragi or finger millet (Eleusine coracana), land-holdings are small, and there is a heavy traditional dependence on non-timber forest produce (NTFP) for subsistence and domestic consumption. These are typically collected by the entire Soliga family. Possibly as a result of their dependence and links with the forest, their traditional ecological knowledge is extensive and diverse (see Box 1).

Box 1Soligas and Nature: Traditional Ecological Knowledge

Researchers have recorded that the Soligas can name 107 species of trees, 11 of grasses and creepers, 13 types of fibers, 55 species of birds, 15 of snakes, 97 of insects, and 41 of other animal species. The forest classification scheme of the Soligas divides their surrounds into kanu kadu (thick forest where animals live), mala kadu (thin forest where animals and Soligas live), nadu kadu (open thorn forests) and bole (where tall grasses grow and animals like bear are found). Water sources are also included in their classification of forests. The Soligas have

3 ATREE and VGKK, op.cit 4 There are 57 tribal settlements (podus) within the limits or on the borders of the BRT Wildlife Sanctuary, with 2304 families.5 Under provisions of the Forest Act 1927 and the Wild Life (Protection) Act 1972.

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an intricate link with forests and forest resources. The forest is a place for them to live and celebrate their festivals. It provides them with honey, fruits, tubers and roots to eat. They have their own medicinal system known as naru-beru oushadi (roots and tuber medicine). Traditional healers effectively treat common ailments, set fractured bones and even manage mental health problems. The Soligas use more than 300 herbs for treatment. Thus nature has been the single largest factor of their culture and their concern for the environment is a product of their necessity, intuition, and knowledge.

Soliga dependence on NTFP for household income is extensive across the BRT WLS, ranging from over 60% in the interior villages to about 30% in the fringe villages6. The Karnataka Government has helped in sustaining these livelihoods by establishing Large Area Adivasi Multipurpose Societies (LAMPS), which ensure a stable remuneration for the NTFPs that the Soligas collect. About 5700 of the Soligas are members of the three LAMPS (Hanur, BR Hills, and Chamarajanagar), and have a say in their decision-making. Additionally, VGKK has helped the adivasis with some level of processing and packaging of NTFP so that they earn more than when they were selling only the raw produce, and ATREE has helped with building capacity for sustainable forms of harvesting of NTFP like amla (Emblica officinalis) and honey. ATREE has also been monitoring the ecological impact of the harvesting, and contends that levels are sustainable with no significant negative impact on the species being harvested7. The VGKK and ATREE work has built and considerably expanded on the earlier ‘enterprise based conservation’ project that was conducted in the WLS through the Biodiversity Conservation Network, in 1994-978.

While there is considerable documentation on the economic livelihoods that the Soligas make from NTFP, not so well documented but nevertheless widely recognized is the equally important domestic (home consumption) dependence on forests. Wild foods, medicines, and other products (which do not necessarily enter the market) are extensively used at home (see Box 1). Equally important, Soligas relate to the forest in myriad cultural and spiritual ways, considering it as their mother and protector.

Forests being their lifeline, it is not surprising that the Soligas have a number of practices oriented towards conservation. For instance, each podu has a “protector” of forest whose responsibility it is to ensure that large trees are not cut. Bahera (Terminalia bellerica) fruits are harvested by the Soligas as one of the NTFPs, but no one cuts the tree or branches during harvesting. Sacred sites such as the Dodda Sampige (big champa or Michelia champaca) are found at various points in the BR Hills.

Given this concern for the forests, the traditional practice of Soligas to light fire to the forest has been recognized to be for strictly precautionary purposes or small-scale benefits. This includes burning grass for increasing visibility of wild animals, to keep paths clear, to destroy the weeds in their fields or keep forest weeds like Lantana in check, to control the population of ticks, or to regenerate grass growth for their cattle. Fires were lit early in the season, resulting only in the burning of leaf litter, and avoiding large fires that might damage the trees or forest as a whole. However, all lighting of fire has been discouraged by forest officials since the declaration of the WLS.

6 Hegde, R., Suryaprakash, S., Achoth, L. and Bawa, K.S. 1996. Extraction of Non-Timber Forest Products in the Forests of BR Hills: 1. Contribution to Rural Income. Economic Botany, 50: 243-250.7 See for instance, Ganesan, R. and Setty, S. 2004. Regeneration of Amla, an Important Non-Timber Forest Product from Southern India, Conservation and Society. 2 (2): 365-375.8 http://www.worldwildlife.org/bsp/bcn/learning/ar97/97_ghats5.htm

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Given the widely recognized reverence that the Soligas have for forests, it would prima facie seem strange that they be responsible for burning of large tracts of forest in 20 locations. If indeed they had a hand in the fires, it could be symptomatic of a sense of alienation or resentment of sorts, which would need urgent remedial action.

3. The Incidents of Forest Fire

3.1 The March forest fires and the Forest Department’s action

As mentioned above, the Times of India (April 26, 2007) reported the incidents of forest fire at the BRT WLS as engulfing huge tracts of forests in 20 locations across Yellandar, Punjar and Kyatadevaragudi ranges. The fires started in mid-March, 2007. Some were doused quickly, others raged for a few days. The extent of the fires is unclear. The Forest Department says only about 200 ha (i.e. less than 1% of the WLS) burnt, whereas ecological researchers at ATREE put the figure at closer at about 10 to 15 times this extent (15 to 17% of the dry deciduous part of the WLS). No study of the wildlife damage exists. For our purpose, however, it was important to try to ascertain the causes of the fire. We therefore sought opinions and evidence from forest officials, Soligas, and researchers.

According to both the DCF (WL) Chamarajanagar and researchers, historically tribals had been known to resort to small scale fire for various survival (usufruct collection, hunting small animals, regenerate grass) cultural (faith based), and scientific (controlling diseases, and eradicating ticks, weeds, mites, and parasites on amla) reasons. These may not be particularly damaging to the forest, as they are lit early in the season, burn mostly forest floor litter, and do not affect even seedlings of trees. Indeed the reduction of fires since the WLS was declared, could be partly responsible for the spread of Lantana, and death of many amla trees due to parasites; ironically, it may have also set up the conditions for much more destructive fires due to widespread accumulation of combustible biomass.

The March fires, however, were not of only a small scale nature, according to the DCF. He said they could be termed as an act of “provocation” initiated by the tribals to “sensitize” the Forest Department to their serious livelihood problems. The main reason for this action , according to him, was the ban on NTFP collection imposed in 20049. It seems that the wildlife authorities had not implemented the ban until April 2006, and even then the current DCF had sought in a proposal to the government (attached at Annex X) to exclude five NTFPs (amla, honey, chebula, antlers, lichen) from the ban and to allow collection for the same. However despite this and because of the delay in resolving this issue (of not being allowed to collect usufruct), and after having exhausted all other avenues (including appeals to the Chief Minister), some of the tribals had allegedly resorted to starting the fire. The DCF also said that it may (he stressed this was speculation) have been a move by some adivasis to encroach on forest land to be able to claim eligibility to it under the Tribal Forest Rights Act. However, he hastened to add that he believed that 95% of the tribals were innocent and those who had actually started the fire had also probably done so under the influence of “outsiders”. He also stated that the fire was not a “damaging fire” but a “ground fire” that would largely affect only burrowing animals, rodents and chicks. It seems that the fire was lit in the afternoon and had been lit in 5-6 places across 5 ranges. After considerable searching, one Soliga adivasi, Veere Gowda, reportedly confessed that he was involved, and also named a number of other adivasis who were responsible. Based

9 Under the WLPA 1972, as amended in 2003, extraction of forest resources for ‘commercial’ use is not permitted.

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on this information, several Soligas were arrested from different podus. All of them were later released on personal bonds.

The Soliga adivasis, however, vehemently refuted the charges leveled against them by the Forest Department. Though they admitted the possibility of one or two disgruntled elements having started the fire, this, according to them does not mean that the Soliga community can be held responsible as appears to have been implied by the Forest Department, going by what newspaper reports have said. On the other hand they charged that the DCF had falsely arrested around 35 adivasis towards the fourth week of March. Four of these were kept in custody and released only on bail, and still have charges pending against them; the rest were made to sign “self-bonds” and released immediately, with the condition that they had to appear every day in the Forest Department office at BR Hills and sign the conditions of the self-bond. The adivasis said this action appeared to be aimed more at creating fear in the minds of the Soliga community than identifying and punishing a few guilty individuals, especially given the fact that all those rounded up were adivasi leaders from various podus. All confessions, they alleged, were obtained under duress (allegedly with threats, physical violence, and in one reported case by pointing a revolver at an adivasi). A memorandum to this effect has been submitted by the adivasis to the CEO of the Zilla Panchayat (Annexure VI). They also reported that the DCF pointedly asked if they (the adivasis) had been paid by VGKK to burn the forest.

Most seriously, they alleged that he physically beat up some of the adivasis. The particular case brought to our attention (and reported in the local newspaper Prajavani on 30 March 2007, Annexure II), was of Magarikhete Gowda, a 60 year old tribal from the Kuntagudi podu, who was reportedly kicked on his neck by the DCF with his shoes. Mr. Gowda gave a detailed description of this incident, and it was corroborated by two other adivasis who were on the spot. The medical record at the VGKK adivasi hospital, where Mr. Gowda sought treatment, also reports injury caused by blows on the neck.

The Soliga have a custom wherein the touch of footwear to any part of a person’s body is considered sacrilegious, and can only be expunged by offering ritualistic prayers and feeding the entire community. Meanwhile that person would be kept out of the community, and not be involved in any of the community’s activities, not even enter his or her relatives’ houses. Magarikhete Gowda, who is still recuperating at the VGKK hospital from the beating he reportedly received, appears to have neither the money needed to fulfill this penance, nor the strength to earn any due to his ill-health.

Some adivasis expressed a suspicion that some disgruntled elements from non-tribal villages in areas adjacent to the sanctuary, may have been responsible for the fires. The example given was of a non-tribal village called Nagavalli, outside the sanctuary towards K’gudi. Apparently people from this village had been arrested for stealing firewood from the sanctuary area, just 3-4 days before the forest fires on that side broke out. The Soligas said that possibly these people had set fire to take revenge. They wondered why the Department had not made enquiries into these possibilities10.

A number of adivasis, researchers, and social workers named the deterioration in relations between the Forest Department and the adivasis as one factor in the fires. The NTFP ban was an element in this, but there were others. The pre-fire seasons meetings that have been annually held in Soliga podus by the Department, were reportedly not held this year. Adivasis

10 On specifically being asked this question subsequently, the DCF said they were absolutely sure the fires were all caused by the Soligas (personal communication, 2 May 2007).

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and VGKK also alleged that this year very little employment was provided in forest works, doubly hitting adivasis already impacted by the NTFP ban. It is possible, said a number of non-adivasis we spoke to, that even if Soligas did not themselves light most of the fires, they may have been less enthusiastic this year (unlike previous years) to report or douse them, as they no longer felt they had a stake in the forest.

Another factor mentioned was the absence of drawing fire lines, and non-clearance of Lantana and other undergrowth. These are reportedly done every year, but were not this year. The DCF reported that while “fire lines and fire tracing works were carried out to the extent of budget available during the year” (DO No. DCF/WL-BRT WLS/Q/2007-08, dt. 2.6.2007), funding was thoroughly inadequate, and he had therefore focused on employing more local people for fire prevention and patrolling. It is not clear whether indeed more people were employed; as mentioned above, the adivasis and VGKK seem to think otherwise, saying that as against 20-25 firewatchers employed in this season every year, this year less than 15 were employed. The DCF however, in a subsequent communication, claimed that aout 100 tribal youths had been employed as firewatchers in the BRT WLS and fringe areas, from January to March, as is reportedly the case every year (DO No. DCF/WL-BRT WLS/Q/2007-08, dt. 2.6.2007). At a later meeting between the Forest Department, adivasis, and VGKK, during the visit of the Social Welfare Minister in May, however, he is reported to have admitted that post-March, there was zero employment. At this meeting the Department was reportedly unable to explain why this year JCBs were used for digging trenches whereas every year this was done manually, providing employment to local people.

Researchers also mentioned that this year there may have been much less rain in January and February (we were not able to access rainfall data, though), unlike previous years, thereby leaving the forest much drier than normal. The increased dryness, said the researchers, should have been even more of a reason for the Forest Department to have taken stronger anti-fire measures.

One final cause mentioned was accidental fires along the roadside caused by tourists throwing cigarettes or bidis, though no one could provide any evidence of this (such evidence would in any case be hard to get).

The team was told that the Government of Karnataka had instituted two or three separate enquiries into this incident, including one by the Social Welfare Department, one by the Chief Secretary (ordered by the Chief Minister), and one by the Conservator of Forests.

3.2 Adivasi and civil society response

As a first response to the incidence of rounding up of tribal leaders for questioning by the Forest Department, two Soligas, C. Made Gowda and C. Madappa, sent a letter on 30 March 2007 to the Chief Minister of Karnataka, Mr. H.D. Kumaraswamy, protesting against what they perceive as an unjust treatment (see English translation in Annexure III). They emphasized the fact of their close communion with nature, and asserted that:

• the Soliga tribals have not committed any illegal acts within the forest• the current DCF is creating problems for the Adivasis by curtailing their livelihood

opportunities (this is w.r.t. the ban on NTFP collection, see Section 4.2 for details) • the current DCF is harassing the tribals by:

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o alleging that the Soligas were the cause of the recent fires and by registering false cases against them for forest offences like starting forest fires with mal-intent

o detaining and physically beating up tribal leaders in a manner resulting in mental trauma for some

o creating an atmosphere of fear amongst the tribal communityo coercing (with threats of imprisonment ) the tribals into signing of letters of

confessions (of crimes they had not committed) on stamp paper• the current DCF has appointed as an Honorary Wildlife warden a person of

questionable credentials, who is working hand-in-glove with the DCF ( with an intention of evicting the Soliga tribals from forest).

A subsequent letter of concern and protest, dated 5 April 2007 and signed by several Soliga leaders, was sent to the Chief Minister of Karnataka, with copies to the Dy. Chief Minister, Social Welfare Minister, Forest Minister, Home Minister, District Minister in Charge, Minister for Culture, Principal Chief Conservator of Forests and Chief Wildlife Warden, Forest Secretary, Government Secretary, and the local MLA (see Annexure IV). This letter, apart from holding the current DCF responsible for the current unhappiness amongst the Soligas, also gave a list of “Major reasons for forest fire”, including the lack of preparation by the Forest Department (e.g. drawing fire lines, and holding community level meetings prior to the fire season).

The matter has also been taken up by the District Tribal Association (Sangha). Mr. Sanmade Gowda, secretary of this Sangha, informed us that a letter protesting the Forest Department’s action against innocent trabls had been sent to the Karnataka Government and all the relevant authorities. While condemning the act of “some miscreants” in setting off forest fires in BRT, it refuted the allegations made by the Forest Department (Deccan Herald, dated 1/04/2007, Annexure VI). Mr. Sanmade Gowda, said that it was not right to put the blame on the tribals and their leaders. Instead, he blamed elements opposed to the tribals as possibly having indulged in setting fire, with an intention of tarnishing the image of the Soliga community. According to him, to “term the forest fires as a retaliatory act for the same by the tribals is condemnable”. The Soligas, according to him, worshipped the forest and would never indulge in such activities. Instead, he counter-alleged that the Forest Department had forced some tribals to light fire in order to film the act. This, according to him, was a “part of a large conspiracy to evict Soligas for the forest”. (Whether there is any connection to the DCF’s point on the urgency of introducing a “relocation package” in his proposal to the state government, described below in Section 4.2, needs to be investigated in the light of this allegation.)

VGKK has supported the adivasis’ contentions, with its founder Dr. H. Sudarshan expressing his concern orally and in writing to the District Panchayat and the Karnataka Government (See Annexure V).

At a subsequent meeting in the BRT WLS on 20th May (even as we were drafting this report), adivasis have also personally recounted the entire incident to the Social Welfare Minister, who has reportedly promised to take necessary action.

4. The Context: the Ban on NTFP Collection, and other Aspects

4.1 Adivasi – Forest Department relations

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From all available indications, it appears that till the above incidents took place, the relations between the Soligas and the Forest Department were relatively harmonious. The Department continued to allow collection of NTFP and other traditional activities of the Soligas, and the latter helped the Department in forest works, controlling fires, anti-poaching activities, and so on. The previous DCF (WL) Chamarajanagar, Mr. Dixit Kumar, explicitly noted this harmony in his letter arguing for the continuation of NTFP collection (see section 4.2 below, and Annexure VIII). The relationship also had a formal component, with the Department and the Soligas sharing functions and powers in the LAMPS active in the WLS area. Undoubtedly the two major civil society organizations that have a long-term presence here, VGKK and ATREE, also had a role to play in this peaceful co-existence.

The souring of relations can perhaps be traced back to a drastic step that the Forest Department took in 2006, bringing into effect a ban on the collection (for sale) of NTFP, as part of the implementation of the Wild Life (Protection) Act (WLPA). More than any other aspect of the BRT situation, this is the one that kept coming up in our investigation. A brief history of what has transpired on the NTFP front, is therefore necessary.

4.2 The NTFP ban and its impacts

On 23 February 2004, an official memorandum (No. B/WL/CR-36/2002-03) banning NTFP collection for sale, was issued by the Forest Department (see Annexure IX). Citing references to Section 29 of WLPA 1972 ( as substituted by Act 16 of 2003) and the Government of Karnataka letter No. FEE 113 FWL 2003 (dated 06-02-2004), the memorandum stated that “under the powers delegated to the Chief Wildlife Warden under Section 33 of the Wildlife Protection Act,1972…collection of all NTFP (Non timber Forest Produce) from BRT wildlife Sanctuary for commercial purpose shall be stopped forthwith” and that the Deputy Conservator of Forest (DCF) and Deputy Wildlife Warden should take “needful action” regarding the same.

In response, the then DCF (WL) Chamarajanagar, Mr. Dixit Kumar wrote a detailed letter (No.SAS/LAMPS-55/2003-04/327/103, dated. 29/03/04) to the PCCF, in which he argued that such a step would be counter-productive (see Annexure VIII). He sought clarification as to whether “the collection of NTFP under the aegis of Large Adivasi Multipurpose Society (LAMPS) cooperative by Soliga tribals residing in the sanctuary falls within the meaning of the term ‘commercial extraction’ or not”. He then goes on to briefly trace the history and life style of the Soligas, arguing that the “Soligas in general are of the primitive agricultural type and the collection of NTFP that they do serves for their subsistence only.” He asserted that “activities related to bare survival are matters that are related to livelihood and terming them as commercial may not be appropriate in my view. The collection of NTFP by them may thus not fall in the category of “Commercial””. Additionally, in this letter he also questions the validity of certain “research papers” that had referred to NTFP collection by the Soligas as ‘commercial’. He then goes on to point to the “likely repercussions of the banning of collection of NTFP by Soligas for LAMPS”, including:

• whether banning NTFP collection by Soligas would upset the “much adored sought for equilibrium” and whether this would have any implications for the health and harmony of the symbiotic relationship between the tribals and the Forest Department with consequences that “will neither benefit the tribals nor the wildlife”;

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• whether the Soligas, when they are denied the wages they earned from collection of NTFP, would be “constrained to turn to smuggling of forest produce (including NTFP), poaching and other money yielding criminal acts financed by others”

• whether it was actually possible to implement an effective ban.

Finally his letter recommends:

• resolution of whether the collection of NTFP through LAMPS was to be considered as “commercial” or as “bonafide personal use”;

• provision of an additional budget (of Rs. 45 lakhs per year) to compensate for the loss of livelihood in the case of the ban being implemented;

• disallowing collection of NTFP by Soligas who either own land or live outside the sanctuary because “collection of NFP should necessarily be for subsistence only” in the event of the collection of NTFP through LAMPS being allowed.

It seems that from 2004 to 2006, there was actually no implementation of the ban. This was so not only during the tenure of the previous DCF, but also in the first year or so of the tenure of the current DCF. Indeed, according to the current DCF, he was issued show cause notice for continuing to allow the collection. All those we spoke to said that the ban was strictly enforced only after April 2006. Even subsequent to this, the DCF argued for continuation of collection of at least some of the key NTFPs, or if this was not possible, the provision of alternative employment. His proposal (No. DCF.WL/CHN LAMP/2006-07, dated. 1 June 2006) submitted to the PCCF, referred to the 3500 tribals across 31 settlements, and stated that: “as these 31 tribal settlements are cut off from the mainstream of society the “food and civic amenities” to these people is always under crisis (see Annexure X). Excepting the Department of Forest, no other government departments either carry out the departmental work or they are allowed to do so as the area is wildlife sanctuary and there is no such provision to carry out any such developmental works within the sanctuary as per Wildlife (Protection) Act 1972”. He stressed that Soligas are “solely depending on the seasonal forestry works and collection of NTFPs for their bonafide and livelihood (sic)”, and argued that the obligation of providing livelihood security to these tribals lies solely with the Forest Department. He placed this in the context of the National Forest Policy (1988) that “envisages tribal welfare in order to ensure the welfare of the forest and wildlife”, and stated that after a “careful and critical analysis of this problem and keeping the larger interest of the bio-diversity conservation, it is felt that, the livelihood security of affected tribals need to be considered on top priority”. After giving due space to issues related to:

the ban entailed by Section 29 of WLPA (1972) importance of working of relocation package and the problem of scarcity of budgets for creating livelihood options,

he proposed that the tribals be allowed to collect 5 key NTFP (amla, deer antlers, hirda or chabula, honey, and tree moss (lichen). The proposal also specified the harvestable quantity per podu (see comment on this in Section 5.2 below).

It was reported that senior officials of the government, and the Chief Minister himself, have told the WLS officials to allow the collection to continue, but no-one is willing to say this in writing.

There appears to be no systematic study of the impacts of the NTFP ban, on the lives and livelihoods of the Soligas. That the impacts have been severe, however, is apparent. If the extent of livelihood dependence estimated by existing research is an indication, several hundred

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families have lost between 30 to 65% of their earnings. For a population already on the economic margins, this is a drastic loss.

Statistics do not reveal the full extent of this loss. A visit to Kaneri Colony11, a Soliga settlement that had been established by the Forest Department by resettling adivasis from their shifting cultivation areas in the hills in the 1970s, showed us the human side of this tragedy. The settlement has a population of about 400-500 people (150 families). At the time of resettlement, they were reportedly given 1/2 to 1 acre of land, where they are cultivating ragi, pumpkin, banana, coffee, ginger, and other crops, There is substantial nutritional dependence on the forest for mushrooms, tubers, green leaves, fruits (jamun, gutti, and others), and for seasonal collection of saleable NTFP. This had been severely hit by the NTFP ban, to the extent that a number of families claimed they can now afford only one meal a day.

An elderly woman, Gauramma, said that there was an atmosphere of fear since the new DCF had taken over as he had threatened that they would be evicted if they used the forest as a source for NTFP. In earlier times, villagers were hired by the Forest Department for roadside clearance of vegetation or other work, but this year there had been little employment after March. Earlier, they could earn a few thousand rupees a year (per family) from NTFPs like amla and lichen. After the ban, she and her husband were forced to migrate to find work at coffee plantations or to farms of non-adivasis outside the sanctuary. Even this was made difficult by forest staff, who harassed them if they even walked through the forest to the plantations and fields. They had to resort to taking the bus, cutting into the meager earnings they made from such labor.

A number of the adivasis presented a similar picture. There is evidently much greater migration out of the BRT WLS after the ban was imposed, in search of any kind of job they can find, including as construction and agricultural labour. Many can’t afford a bus, so have to walk, which means sometimes being away from home for long stretches.

Some adivasis also reported that though NTFP collection for purely domestic consumption was still legally permitted, in practice even this was quite difficult as there was harassment on entering the deeper forest patches.

Apart from the social and economic impacts, the NTFP ban appears to have had significant repercussions on conservation itself. CSOs reported, for instance, that since the ban a large number of amla trees on the WLS fringes have been chopped or badly lopped, by outsiders, with adivasis who would earlier have been protecting these trees or at least reporting such incidents to the FD or to the LAMPS, now doing nothing to stop the outsiders or report them. The incidence of fire too is an indication of growing alienation, with negative impacts on conservation.

4.3 Other related factors: coffee plantations, and mining

Adivasis and civil society organizations pointed out to us what they felt was hypocrisy on part of the state government: while on the one hand it had strictly enforced the ban on NTFP collection, it did not seem to be so concerned about the enormously damaging activities of other players. In particular, two were repeatedly mentioned: coffee plantations that extend over 2000 hectares

11 After the recent fire, eight people from this colony were reportedly rounded up and charged by the Forest Department.

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within the BRT WLS, and quarrying/mining that is going on or proposed in areas adjacent to the sanctuary.

Coffee plantations (belonging to a number of agencies with the largest being run by the Birlas) have existed for several decades in the BR Hills, partly on private lands and partly on government (revenue) lands. Though set up well before the declaration of the sanctuary, their most recent extension of lease has been after the declaration. Researchers point to the possibility of enormous damage being caused by not only the take-over of forest lands for monoculture plantations like coffee, but also by the use of pesticides, and the diversion of water. The Forest Department accepts this. The DCF told us that he had already filed cases under the Forest Act and Rules on counts of causing pollution and diverting waterways, and had argued with his superiors that leases on government land should be cancelled or not renewed, and the private land acquired to return it to forest.

An added dimension to this problem is the issue of granite quarrying12 in Chamarajanagar district. There are reportedly over 150 quarrying units extracting black granite. According to senior forest officials, this is a serious and chronic problem in the Gudlapetta taluka (outside the BRT WLS). Quarrying essentially goes on for two purposes: local domestic consumption and commercial exploitation. It is being legally done on both private lands (about 27 units) and some on government revenue land. However no quarrying is happening on forest land. The DCF Chamarajanagar has requested the Deputy Commissioner of Chamarajanagar District to take appropriate action under the Environment Protection Act (vide letter No. WLD/CHN/DMN/Quarrying/2005-06, dt. 29 December 2005, See Annexure XI; and again in February 2006); and in turn the Deputy Commissioner has directed the Deputy Director, Department of Mines and Geology, Chamarajanagar, to cancel the leases of 12 mines operating within a 10 km radius of the BRT WLS (vide DO L.No. IND:CR:140:2005-06, dt. 25 March 2006, see Annexure XII).

One complication is that environmental laws of the central government applicable to mining may not be usable here, as these are applicable only to major minerals. Granite is recorded as a minor mineral, with decisions being in the hands of the state government13. However, the Deputy Commissioner in his above mentioned letter has clearly pointed out that under the relevant notification of the Environment Protection Act, any such activity within 25 km of a national park or sanctuary, requires environmental clearance from the central government, which these mines do not have.

However, action does not seem to have been taken on the above. The Chamarajanagar district cell of the Karnatak Rajya Raitha Sangh14 (KRRS), a farmers’ organization, along with Hasiru Sene, has therefore filed an application (on 20 September 2006) with the Centrally Empowered Committee of the Supreme Court, to disallow quarrying (see Annexure XIII). According to its district secretary, Mr. Mahesh Prabhu, the major arguments they have made are about the pollution the mining caused, and the damage to water tables that it led to. According to him over 200 villages in a 25 km periphery of the sanctuary will get affected, and that environmental clearance has not been given to most of the quarries. In fact agricultural land is being diverted to

12 Paneesha, V. 2007. “Damage to ecology will be irreparable if quarrying is allowed to continue – Fears over granite extraction in Biligiri Rangaswamy Temple Sanctuary area”, The Hindu, 2.5.2007.13 Under Rule II of Karnataka Minor Mineral Concession Rule (KMMCR) the government can form a committee that can screen applications and deicide on authorization for quarrying. 14 An organization struggling for farmers’ rights.

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non-agricultural quarrying work The reason for this apathy, according to him, is the fact that most of these quarries are owned by powerful vested interests, including many politicians.

5. Analysis

5.1 The forest fires

From available evidence and discussions with a wide range of people, it appears to us that the cause of the forest fires this year cannot be attributed to a single agency. There are in all likelihood a combination of factors behind the higher incidence of fire this year compared to previous ones, including the inadequacy of fire prevention measures (e.g. fire lines and community level meetings), some deliberate burning by Soligas (most likely minimal and related to traditional reasons, but perhaps also in stray cases due to anger against the ban on NTFP collection) and non-adivasis (possibly retaliatory against the Department’s actions against them), a drier than usual period in the first quarter of the year, the extent of Lantana undergrowth providing combustible material15, and accidental burning by tourists or others. It may also be that while there may have been multiple causes for the fires to start, this year unlike previously, the Soligas in some podus may have been less enthusiastic about reporting and dousing the fires.

It is highly improbable that the Soligas were the sole or predominant cause of the fire. Lighting fires at 20 different points in the WLS, within a few days of each other, would have meant a high degree of premeditated planning, and we found nothing to lead us to such a conclusion. The Forest Department’s reaction (as cited in the TOI report), appears to be a significant over-statement. We also find its action against adivasi leaders to be excessive. If this action was intended to put “fear in the minds of the few people misleading the Soligas”, as one forest officer put it, it was counter-productive, for it has only turned a normally peaceful people into one seething with anger and hurt. In a sanctuary where relations have generally been harmonious over several years, the tension that the Department’s action has caused does not augur well for either the wildlife/forests or the adivasis.

We also find no evidence whatsoever linking the fires with the Tribal Forest Rights Act. As the Soligas pointed out, each of the settled podus has a trench dug around it, and it would be easy to detect any attempts at fresh encroachment outside the trench lines. In any case, the Forest Department claims to have full records of lands allocated to the Soligas, so we see no way in which new encroachments would go unnoticed and be claimed to be eligible under the Act. Nor do we find any evidence to back the speculation (expressed by some local workers) that the Forest Department may be acting harshly to intimidate the Soligas against making claims under the Act.

Soligas and researchers also point out that every year, the northern part of the WLS (which has substantial scrub forest landscape) is burnt annually by graziers from outside, but no action is taken by the Forest Department on this. We could not investigate this aspect.

15 Lantana is a serious management problem in itself, which we did not deal with in the investigation. The DCF (WL) Chamarajanagar claims that it is in its present form “acting as a ‘nurse crop’”, in providing protection to seedlings of forest trees as also cover for herbivores, and therefore need not be totally eradicated, but only controlled especially to check its negative impacts on grasslands. Researchers working in the WLS are more critical of its presence. A thorough scientific assessment and a management plan built on this are urgently needed.

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It is not possible to state the damage that the fires have caused, since only preliminary assessments of the extent of the fires are available, and these too are widely varying (itself a matter of concern, see Section 5.4 below)16. There seems to be no study on the loss of flora and fauna. At the 3-4 sites we could visit, it appeared to be mostly the thick Lantana undergrowth that was affected, with very few trees having been seriously damaged. Nevertheless, the incident should serve as a wake-up call to all concerned, to initiate and sustain fire management measures through the BRT WLS (which may not necessarily mean elimination of all fire, since limited burning may in fact have a crucial function).

5.2 The NTFP ban

To us the most serious aspect of the current situation in BRT WLS, is the ban on NTFP collection for sale. As noted above, the ban has had two significant impacts:

• Serious socio-economic deprivation and dispossession of the Soliga adivasis, tantamount to violations of basic constitutional guarantees and fundamental human rights;

• Significant repercussions on conservation itself, including the cutting of amla trees by outsiders no longer stopped by the Soligas, and the increased fire incidence.

It is commendable that both the previous DCF and the current one have argued with their state governments to either allow NTFP collection to continue, or to provide equivalent alternative employment to the Soligas. There is however one crucial difference in their approach. The current DCF has limited the proposal to continue collection to 5 NTFPs (out of 24), and these too in limited quantities. The rationale for arriving at the proposed harvestable quantity is not provided in his proposal. Analysis suggests that the limits suggested are well below what has been annually harvested by the adivasis, reportedly on a sustainable basis (see Table 1).

Table 1NTFP Collection in BRT WLS: Quantum proposed by the DCF (WL) Chamarajanagar vs. actual collection in previous years

No. Name of NTFP Quantity suggested by DCF (in kg)17

Average annual quantity collected over 14 years (1990-2004) (in kg)18

DCF suggestion as a %age of what was actually harvested

1. Honey 8800 15118 58%2. Amla (Emblica

officinalis)8800 411129 2%

3. Hirda (Terminalia chebula)

2000 5580 36%

Clearly there is a discrepancy in the Forest Department’s understanding of “bonafide personal use” vis-à-vis what is actually required by the tribal for subsistence and livelihood. When considered in relation to the conditions that need to be fulfilled by the adivasis in order to get

16 Estimates of the extent ranged from about 1% of the WLS area, according to forest officials, to about 10 to 15 times this extent, according to some researchers; since this is not a crucial issue for our enquiry, the investigation did not go into this in detail. The wide variation in estimates is however, a matter of concern. 17 Vide his letter to the PCCF, No. DCF.WL/CHN LAMP/2006-07, dated. 1 June 2006, see Annexure VIII.18 LAMPS figures, made available by VGKK.

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even these reduced levels of NTFP, one gets the feeling that the access to NTFP is being looked at by the state as a matter of charity rather than one of basic right to livelihood.

5.3 Adivasi - Forest Department relations

The current tension between the Soligas and the Forest Department perhaps marks an all-time low in the history of their relations in BRT WLS. Given that part of the origin of this is a legal stricture coming from the central government over which the state government has little control, this was to some extent inevitable. Nevertheless, state governments do have considerable space in dealing with situations that arise from central legislation, which the Karnataka government has not used in this instance. There was nothing to stop it from doing any or all of the following:

• Writing to the central government asking for a clearer definition of ‘commercial’ vs. ‘bona fide’, and arguing, as did the former DCF Chamarajanagar, that regulated NTFP collection in BRT WLS should be considered as the latter; and meanwhile continuing to allow NTFP collection as indeed it did from 2004 to 2006;

• Providing much greater access to alternative livelihoods in forest works and other tasks, to offset potential loss of income if any NTFP collection curbs had to be put;

• Working much more vigorously with communities this year to prevent and control fires.

Additionally, the harsh manner in which the Soligas have been dealt with in response to the fire incidents, appears to us to have not only been unnecessary but callous and unthinking; given the past relations of the Department with the Soligas, and also the crucial mediation role that civil society organizations inside the BRT WLS have been playing, it should have been entirely possible to deal with the situation with greater tact. Instead, the Forest Department has aggravated the situation and created disharmony where previously there was very little.

In the larger perspective, it appears to us that the state government has not adequately used the unique situation in BRT WLS, to initiate and strengthen a form of management that maximized the inputs of the Soligas and civil society organizations. This is indicated by the double standards by which the WLPA has been implemented: while the ban on NTFP has been strictly enforced since 2006, another provision, to set up Sanctuary Advisory Committees, has not been acted upon. Forest officers we spoke to appeared uncertain about the status of this, other than saying that it had received some consideration. Apparently a decision to set up an advisory committee of sorts was announced in June 2005 by the then CF, Mr. Venkatesh, in the presence of the DCF (WL) Chamarajanagar, VGKK, ATREE, and the Soliga Sangha, but no meeting of this was ever convened, and the FD subsequently said that there was no mandate for such a committee19.

We also find it unfortunate that despite there being so many knowledgable Soliga individuals, including some who have done higher education and are highly credible researchers, the Department has appointed a non-adivasi as the Honorary Wildlife Warden, and not included Soligas on the Chamarajanagar Wildlife Committee.

Nor is any space being given in the current management structure, to traditional systems of the Soligas for conserving and managing the forest. As an example, the adivasis have the Kula and Nyaya systems of governance, which could have been built upon in the Forest Department’s

19 There is however an informal committee with the FD, ATREE, VGKK, and the Soliga Adivasi Sangha, which met a couple of times in 2005-06; it is perhaps a sign of deteriorating relations that it has not met in the last one year or so.

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initiatives towards setting up institutions such as Eco-development Committees; or the Soliga forest classification system (see Box 1 above) could be used to identify zones of inviolate and multiple use areas.

5.4 The role of civil society organizations

As mentioned above (Section 2.2), civil society organizations (CSOs) such as VGKK and ATREE have had a crucial role in BRT WLS, both from a conservation perspective (e.g. providing crucial research inputs to the management, modifying NTFP collection practices to become more sustainable, and promoting participatory resource assessments), and in the socio-economic lives of the Soligas (enhancing livelihoods, helping them to organize, providing educational and health inputs, and so on). This is perhaps one of the few protected areas in India to have such a long-term presence of CSOs, and provides an additional significant opportunity to move towards stronger collaboration for conservation in BRT WLS.

In this respect we find it worrying that the CSO involvement has not been maximized by the Forest Department to improve management of the BRT WLS. Individual forest officers have reportedly involved researchers and used their results in management planning, but these are ad hoc individual initiatives rather than part of an institutionalised system.

We are also puzzled that CSOs active in the area did not raise a national alert about the potential of tension and conflict in BRT WLS, once the ban on NTFP was imposed in 2006. It should have been easy to predict this, given the serious impacts on the Soligas. It is also surprising that there are no studies on the precise nature and extent of the impact, which could be used in advocacy regarding the issue. To their credit, however, the CSOs have now intervened in the situation, with VGKK taking up the matter at the highest state government levels.

5.5 The Tribal Forest Rights Act

Another factor that is going to soon enter the BRT WLS situation, is the Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act 2006. While we did not find any evidence linking this Act to the forest fires or to the Forest Department’s actions against adivasis, we recognize that it has the potential to significantly alter local equations between the Soligas and the Department. The adivasis will be able to claim (amongst others):

• titles to the lands they cultivate or live on (currently mostly forest lands, given to them during the process of relocation)

• the right to collect NTFP for both domestic consumption and sale • the right to conserve and manage forest areas that they have been traditionally managing• the right to access areas of cultural importance, and protect traditional knowledge.

Whether they will succeed in getting such claims accepted will depend on how they can provide evidence of traditional/customary occupation and access, whether the forwarding of claims will be done at the hamlet (podu) level or at the level of the panchayat (since the latter is often controlled by non-adivasis), and what process is adopted at the level of the sub-divisional and district committees to be set up under the Act. If all this works well, the Act could provide very significant socio-economic benefits to the Soligas.

But equally important are the ecological implications of the Act. Kalpavriksh’s analysis of the Act (see http://www.kalpavriksh.org/f1/f1.2/Tribal Forest Rights Act 2006.doc) suggests that it could provide a powerful impetus to conservation if it enhances the stake of local communities,

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but it could also lead to serious ecological damage if the rights being provided are not balanced by clear responsibilities and authority to ensure conservation. It appears to us that the situation in BRT WLS is ideal for such a balanced approach, given the long-term work that has been done by and amongst the Soligas to establish sustainable harvesting techniques and limits, the Soligas’ inherent conservation ethos, the work of CSOs who also have conservation of biodiversity as their explicit mandate, and of course the presence of the Forest Department with its powers to ensure conservation. This is all the more reason that the current situation of tension is quickly healed; if the government continues to act harshly, the adivasis or CSOs working with them may well use the Forest Rights Act as a means of hitting back, with implications that we are apprehensive about.

In this respect we found the local understanding of the Act to be seriously inadequate. Adivasi leaders and VGKK staff had heard about it, but most knew little of the provisions. Reportedly a few meetings had been organized by VGKK to discuss it, but clearly much more in-depth understanding and wider outreach (not only to adivasi leaders, but to the rest of the Soliga population also, and to the forest staff) was necessary.

5.6 Coffee plantations and mining

Everyone we spoke to was against the continuation of the coffee plantations inside the BRT WLS, as also the ongoing and proposed new granite quarrying outside the WLS. Yet it seems that the Forest Department may by itself be unable to stop these. What is very interesting is the kind of policy and legal perversion that allows the Department to rather easily stop a basic survival activity (which is shown to be having minimal ecological impact) like NTFP collection, but does not permit it to as easily stop outrightly commercial and profit-oriented activities with clear negative impacts, like coffee plantations and mining. Such a perverse policy environment clearly needs drastic corrective measures.

6. Recommendations

6.1 The forest fires

1. The Karnataka state government and/or the central government should facilitate an independent assessment and action plan on forest fires in BRT WLS, building on studies and mapping that already exists with the Forest Department and agencies like ATREE, and the knowledge and practices of the Soligas themselves. This process should assess the negative and positive role that fire plays in such an ecosystem, and come up with a comprehensive and long-term action plan on how to deal with it, including the respective role of the Department, the Soligas, and CSOs. The central and state governments need to ensure that adequate funds are available for fire prevention and control measures; given the biodiversity importance of BRT WLS, it should be treated on par with the Bandipur and Nagarahole National Parks for central and state assistance.

2. The Karnataka state government should make public any reports of the ongoing enquiries into complaints by the adivasis against the Forest Department’s behavior towards them in the aftermath of the forest fires. Appropriate action needs to be taken regarding the unduly harsh treatment of the Soligas, and in particular the brutal beating up of adivasis that the local forest staff has been reported to have indulged in.

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3. The Soliga Sangha should undertake to create greater awarness amongst the adivasis about the dangers of uncontrolled fire, and commit to taking appropriate social action against such individuals who are found to be indulging in any such act leading to haphazard and uncontrolled fires.

6.2 The NTFP ban

1. Local CSOs should urgently carry out a survey of the socio-economic and ecological impacts of the ban on NTFP, in particular the levels of distress it has caused to the Soligas, and the ways in which the ban is proving counter-productive to conservation of wildlife in BRT WLS. The results of such surveys should be widely publicized and used in advocacy regarding the ban.

2. The Ministry of Environment and Forests and the Ministry of Tribal Affairs, Government of India, should review the Wild Life (Protection) Act 1972 (as amended in 2003), in particular Section 29 regarding the commercial use of forest produce, and initiate steps to either amend the provision or provide a suitable definition allowing for essential livelihood-based extraction of NTFP and aquatic produce within appropriate regulations and restrictions arrived at jointly with local communities. This should be only for situations where such use of resources has been traditionally or customarily made by local communities, and on no account must such a step allow large-scale profit-oriented commercial extraction by outsiders to a protected area.

3. The Karnataka state government should accept the argument of the former DCF (WL) Chamarajanagar, regarding the interpretation of the words ‘commercial’ and ‘bona fide’, and continue to allow NTFP collection pending the Government of India’s review of Section 29 of the WLPA. It should also make such an argument to the central government and if need be, to the Supreme Court.

4. The long-term ecological research already available for BRT WLS, information available with the LAMPS, and observations of the Soligas, should all be used as a basis for jointly working out sustainable extraction limits for each of the NTFP being harvested. The current DCF’s proposal needs accordingly to be modified.

6.3 Adivasi – Forest Department relations

Immediate measures to rebuild trust and mutual confidence are needed, to mend the relationship between the Forest Department and the Soligas, which has been soured by the recent incidents. These could include:

• Holding a series of meetings between the two, if need be mediated by one or more CSOs; • An explanation and apology by the Forest Department for the harsh measures taken

against the Soligas, and appropriate action against the staff responsible for these; • A declaration by the Soligas to work pro-actively to control fire, poaching, and other

threats to the BRT WLS, and to work with the Forest Department on these actions;• Urgent provision of employment in forest-related works to as many Soliga families as

possible; • Setting up of the Sanctuary Advisory Committee mandated in the WLPA, with self-

chosen representatives of the Soligas, and local CSOs, as members (and soon thereafter moving towards more joint or collaborative management institutions, as recommended in Section 6.7 below);

• Appointing one or more Soligas on the Chamarajanagar District Wildlife Committee (from amongst several names suggested by the Zilla Soliga Abirudhi Sangha, see

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Annexure XIV), and at least one as a Honorary Wildlife Warden, with good candidates being C. Made Gowda and M. Jade Gowda, who are amongst the first Soliga post-graduates from amongst the Soligas;

• Initiating a regular dialogue process, with public hearings every 6 months or so, open to all the Soliga settlements in the WLS, and relevant CSOs.

6.4 The Tribal Forest Rights Act

1. Local CSOs and forest staff need to gain a better understanding of the provisions and implications of the Tribal Forest Rights Act, in relation to BRT WLS, and to be ready for intervention as and when the Act becomes operational20. This would entail a mapping of the lands that are likely to be claimed by the Soligas for cultivation and homestead, as also preliminary delineation of “critical wildlife habitats” with the help of the best available scientific knowledge and the Soligas’ own knowledge and forest classification system (Box 1 above).

2. CSOs and the Forest Department should also provide outreach services to the Soligas, to understand the Act, to be able to benefit from it for enhancing and securing their livelihoods, but also to enable them to enhance the conservation of forests and wildlife around them. In particular, Section 5 of the Act which empowers communities to protect forests and wildlife, needs to be used to provide clear authority and responsibilities for the Soligas, to stop external and internal threats to the BRT WLS.

6.5 Coffee plantations and mining

1. The coffee plantations inside BRT WLS need to be mostly closed down, by terminating the lease they have on government lands, and acquiring the private land. This would entail substantial expenditure on part of the government, which we recommend the central government help out with, but it would well worth facilitating a conversion of some small patches to organic coffee production in the hands of the Soligas, and restoration of most of the plantation into forest, providing in the process employment to the Soligas (especially those that may be currently employed in the plantations).

2. Existing mining in areas adjacent and within a 5 km. belt of the BRT WLS should be shut down with appropriate alternative employment to the affected workers, and all consideration to re-open mining in areas where it has previously been stopped within this belt, should be abandoned.

On both the above counts, there was unanimity of opinion amongst all those we met, including BRT WLS officials, CSOs, the Soligas, and in the case of mining, the farmers’ groups from adjacent areas. Given this, there is no justification for the state government to delay taking a decision on the coffee plantations and on mining.

6.6 The role of CSOs

The long-term presence of CSOs like VGKK and ATREE should be maximally used by the Forest Department and the Soliga Adivasi Sangha to devise plans and actions for enhanced conservation and livelihood security. This needs to be institutionalized and not be dependent on individual forest officers. The Forest Department should sign MoUs with these organizations, 20 Currently a committee appointed by the Tribal Affairs Ministry, Government of India, is drafting a set of Rules; once these Rules finalized and notified, the Act will be operational. It is expected that this will be well within 2007.

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for mutually beneficial long-term collaboration in research, conservation action (including aspects of poaching, fire and weed management, and others), adivasi livelihoods and welfare, tourism management, and other aspects of BRT WLS.

6.7 Towards collaborative management

Eventually, the government needs to move towards collaborative management of the BRT WLS. As mentioned above, we strongly feel that this is one of the few protected areas in India which is ready to move towards such a model of conservation. Participatory and collaborative PA management is now the internationally accepted norm, and India is committed to moving towards it under its obligations to the Convention on Biological Diversity21.

Such an approach would entail:• the creation of a joint or collaborative management body (which could build on the

Sanctuary Advisory Committee already mandated under the WLPA, as mentioned above)

• clear delineation of the roles of respective partners (Forest Department, Soligas, CSOs, and others) in which the FD is on an equal footing with adivasi institutions such as the Soliga Sangha

• joint planning, implementation, and monitoring of various activities for management of the BRT WLS; and

• sharing of appropriate benefits including revenues from tourism.

Some partial steps towards this have been taken in a few of India’s protected areas, such as Periyar Tiger Reserve22. Additionally, full-fledged collaborative or joint management is found in many PAs in other countries, including some of our neighbors23. Their experience can be learned from, to apply (with suitable modifications) to BRT WLS. Finally, there is considerable experience on the integration of conservation and livelihood security in many community conserved areas (CCAs) in India, which also can provide valuable lessons for BRT WLS24.

We are, of course, mindful of the fact that the above is much easier said than done. The biggest hurdle to be overcome is a mindset, amongst not only many government officials but also many conservationists, that protected areas can only be managed by centralized, trained bureaucracies. The folly of such a top-down model, however, is clear not only from the recent events in BRT WLS, but also from conflict situations and conservation failures in dozens of India’s PAs. It is also clear that this model leaves open PAs to all kinds of ‘developmental’ and industrial commercial pressures, which Forest Departments, however committed, find hard to resist. There is no alternative but to build larger constituencies for conservation, to make it a truly public movement. It should therefore be more and more apparent that without active and central role of communities that live within PAs and/or depend on them for their basic survival and livelihood, conservation will remain fragile. Moving towards this needs systemic change. But this itself would be facilitated if in areas such as BRT WLS, the state government could ensure the

21 In particular, the CBD’s Programme of Work on Protected Areas clearly obliges countries to promote community involvement in PA management, respect community rights, and provide equitable sharing of benefits (see http://www.biodiv.org/programmes/cross-cutting/protected/default.asp).22 See Kothari, A. and Pathak, N. 2006. Tigers, people and participation: Where conservation and livelihoods go hand in hand. Policy Matters 14, March 2006. 23 For more information on collaborative management of PAs, see publications mentioned at www.tilcepa.org. 24 For more information on India’s CCAs, see http://www.kalpavriksh.org/f1/f1.2/cbc/document_view, and contact Neema Pathak at neema.pb@gmail.com.

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positioning of forest staff that is known to be oriented towards social sensitivity and collaborative work.

Given the relatively harmonious relations between the Forest Department and the Soligas till recently (including the formal relations between the two through institutions such as LAMPS), the long-term work of civil society organisations on conservation, research, and tribal community welfare, and the continued richness of the BRT ecosystem, BRT WLS presents a unique opportunity to explore stronger, more participatory, and sustainable strategies for conservation. We hope that the recent incidents of forest fire provide, ironically, the spark to move towards such exploration.

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