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1. G.R. No. 147080. April 26, 2005CAPITOL MEDICAL CENTER, INC.,Petitioners,vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, JAIME IBABAO, JOSE BALLESTEROS, RONALD CENTENO, NARCISO SARMIENTO, EDUARDO CANAVERAL, SHERLITO DELA CRUZ, SOFRONIO COMANDAO, MARIANO GALICIA, RAMON MOLOD, CARMENCITA SARMIENTO, HELEN MOLOD, ROSA COMANDAO, ANGELITO CUIZON, ALEX MARASIGAN, JESUS CEDRO, ENRICO ROQUE, JAY PERILLA, HELEN MENDOZA, MARY GLADYS GEMPEROSO, NINI BAUTISTA, ELENA MACARUBBO, MUSTIOLA SALVACION DAPITO, ALEXANDER MANABE, MICHAEL EUSTAQUIO, ROSE AZARES, FERNANDO MANZANO, HENRY VERA CRUZ, CHITO MENDOZA, FREDELITA TOMAYAO, ISABEL BRUCAL, MAHALKO LAYACAN, RAINIER MANACSA, KAREN VILLARENTE, FRANCES ACACIO, LAMBERTO CONTI, LORENA BEACH, JUDILAH RAVALO, DEBORAH NAVE, MARILEN CABALQUINTO, EMILIANA RIVERA, MA. ROSARIO URBANO, ROWENA ARILLA, CAPITOL MEDICAL CENTER EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-AFW, GREGORIO DEL PRADO, ARIEL ARAJA, and JESUS STA. BARBARA, JR.,Respondents.

This is a petition for review of the Decision1of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 57500 and its Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration thereof.

The Antecedents2Whether the respondent Capitol Medical Center Employees Association-Alliance of Filipino Workers (the Union, for brevity) was the exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of the petitioner Capitol Medical Center, Inc. had been the bone of contention between the Union and the petitioner. The petitioners refusal to negotiate for a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) resulted in a union-led strike on April 15, 1993.

The Union had to contend with another union the Capitol Medical Center Alliance of Concerned Employees (CMC-ACE) which demanded for a certification election among the rank-and-file employees of the petitioner. Med-Arbiter Brigida Fadrigon granted the petition, and the matter was appealed to the Secretary of Labor and Employment (SOLE). Undersecretary Bienvenido E. Laguesma rendered a Resolution on November 18, 1994 granting the appeal. He, likewise, denied the motion filed by the petitioner and the CMC-ACE. The latter thereafter brought the matter to the Court which rendered judgment on February 4, 1997 affirming the resolution of Undersecretary Laguesma, thus:

1. Dismissing the petition for certification election filed by the Capitol Medical Center Alliance of Concerned Employees-United Filipino Services Workers for lack of merit; and

2. Directing the management of the Capitol Medical Center to negotiate a CBA with the Capitol Medical Center Employees Association-Alliance of Filipino Workers, the certified bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees.3The decision of the Court became final and executory. Thereafter, in a Letter dated October 3, 1997 addressed to Dr. Thelma N. Clemente, the President and Director of the petitioner, the Union requested for a meeting to discuss matters pertaining to a negotiation for a CBA, conformably with the decision of the Court.4However, in a Letter to the Union dated October 10, 1997, Dr. Clemente rejected the proposed meeting, on her claim that it was a violation of Republic Act No. 6713 and that the Union was not a legitimate one. On October 15, 1997, the petitioner filed a Petition for the Cancellation of the Unions Certificate of Registration with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) on the following grounds:

3) Respondent has failed for several years to submit annually its annual financial statements and other documents as required by law. For this reason, respondent has long lost its legal personality as a union.

4) Respondent also engaged in a strike which has been declared illegal by the National Labor Relations Commission.5Apparently unaware of the petition, the Union reiterated its proposal for CBA negotiations in a Letter dated October 16, 1997 and suggested the date, time and place of the initial meeting. The Union further reiterated its plea in another Letter6dated October 28, 1997, to no avail.

Instead of filing a motion with the SOLE for the enforcement of the resolutions of Undersecretary Laguesma as affirmed by this Court, the Union filed a Notice of Strike on October 29, 1997 with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB), serving a copy thereof to the petitioner. The Union alleged as grounds for the projected strike the following acts of the petitioner: (a) refusal to bargain; (b) coercion on employees; and (c) interference/ restraint to self-organization.7A series of conferences was conducted before the NCMB (National Capital Region), but no agreement was reached. On November 6, 1997, the petitioner even filed a Letter with the Board requesting that the notice of strike be dismissed;8the Union had apparently failed to furnish the Regional Branch of the NCMB with a copy of a notice of the meeting where the strike vote was conducted.

On November 20, 1997, the Union submitted to the NCMB the minutes9of the alleged strike vote purportedly held on November 10, 1997 at the parking lot in front of the petitioners premises, at the corner of Scout Magbanua Street and Panay Avenue, Quezon City. It appears that 178 out of the 300 union members participated therein, and the results were as follows: 156 members voted to strike; 14 members cast negative votes; and eight votes were spoiled.10On November 28, 1997, the officers and members of the Union staged a strike. Subsequently, on December 1, 1997, the Union filed anex partemotion with the DOLE, praying for its assumption of jurisdiction over the dispute. The Union likewise prayed for the imposition of appropriate legal sanctions, not limited to contempt and other penalties, against the hospital director/president and other responsible corporate officers for their continuous refusal, in bad faith, to bargain collectively with the Union, to adjudge the same hospital director/president and other corporate officers guilty of unfair labor practices, and for other just, equitable and expeditious reliefs in the premises.11On December 4, 1997, the SOLE issued an Order, assuming jurisdiction over the ongoing labor dispute. The decretal portion of the order reads:

WHEREFORE, this Office now assumes jurisdiction over the labor disputes at Capitol Medical Center pursuant to Article 263(g) of the Labor Code, as amended. Consequently, all striking workers are directed to return to work within twenty-four (24) hours from the receipt of this Order and the management to resume normal operations and accept back all striking workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike. Further, parties are directed to cease and desist from committing any act that may exacerbate the situation.

Moreover, parties are hereby directed to submit within 10 days from receipt of this Order proposals and counter-proposals leading to the conclusion of the collective bargaining agreements in compliance with aforementioned Resolution of the Office as affirmed by the Supreme Court.

SO ORDERED.12In obedience to the order of the SOLE, the officers and members of the Union stopped their strike and returned to work.

For its part, the petitioner filed a petition13to declare the strike illegal with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), docketed as NLRC NCR Case No. 00-12-08644-97. In its position paper, the petitioner appended the affidavit of Erwin Barbacena, the overseer of the property across the hospital which was being used as a parking lot, at the corner of Scout Magbanua Street and Panay Avenue, Quezon City. Also included were the affidavits of Simon J. Tingzon and Reggie B. Barawid, the petitioners security guards assigned in front of the hospital premises. They attested to the fact that no secret balloting took place at the said parking lot from 6:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. of November 10, 1997.14The petitioner also appended the affidavit of Henry V. Vera Cruz, who alleged that he was a member of the Union and had discovered that signatures on the Statements of Cash Receipt Over Disbursement submitted by the Union to the DOLE purporting to be his were not his genuine signatures;15the affidavits of 17 of its employees, who declared that no formal voting was held by the members of the Union on the said date, were also submitted. The latter employees also declared that they were not members of any union, and yet were asked to sign documents purporting to be a strike vote attendance and unnumbered strike vote ballots on different dates from November 8 to 11, 1997.

In their position paper, the respondents appended the joint affidavit of the Union president and those members who alleged that they had cast their votes during the strike vote held on November 10, 1997.16In the meantime, on September 30, 1998, the Regional Director of the DOLE rendered a Decision denying the petition for the cancellation of the respondent Unions certificate of registration. The decision was affirmed by the Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations on December 29, 1998.

In a parallel development, Labor Arbiter Facundo L. Leda rendered a Decision on December 23, 1998 in NLRC NCR Case No. 00-12-08644-97 in favor of the petitioner, and declared the strike staged by the respondents illegal. Thefalloof the decision reads:

1. Declaring as illegal the strike staged by the respondents from November 28, 1997 to December 5, 1997;

2. Declaring respondent Jaime Ibabao, in his capacity as union president, the other union officers, and respondents Ronald Q. Centeno, Michael Eustaquio and Henry Vera Cruz to have lost their employment status with petitioner; and

3. Ordering the above respondents to pay, jointly and severally, petitioner the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00) by way of damages.17The Labor Arbiter ruled that no voting had taken place on November 10, 1997; moreover, no notice of such voting was furnished to the NCMB at least twenty-four (24) hours prior to the intended holding of the strike vote. According to the Labor Arbiter, the affidavits of the petitioners 17 employees who alleged that no strike vote was taken, and supported by the affidavit of the overseer of the parking lot and the security guards, must prevail as against the minutes of the strike vote presented by the respondents. The Labor Arbiter also held that in light of Article 263(9) of the Labor Code, the respondent Union should have filed a motion for a writ of execution of the resolution of Undersecretary Laguesma which was affirmed by this Court instead of staging a strike.

The respondents appealed the decision to the NLRC which rendered a Decision18on June 14, 1999, granting their appeal and reversing the decision of the Labor Arbiter. The NLRC also denied the petitioners petition to declare the strike illegal. In resolving the issue of whether the union members held a strike vote on November 10, 1997, the NLRC ruled as follows:

We find untenable the Labor Arbiters finding that no actual strike voting took place on November 10, 1997, claiming that this is supported by the affidavit of Erwin Barbacena, the overseer of the parking lot across the hospital, and the sworn statements of nineteen (19) (sic) union members. While it is true that no strike voting took place in the parking lot which he is overseeing, it does not mean that no strike voting ever took place at all because the same was conducted in the parking lot immediately/directly fronting, not across, the hospital building (Annexes "1-J," "1-K" to "1-K-6"). Further, it is apparent that the nineteen (19) (sic) hospital employees, who recanted their participation in the strike voting, did so involuntarily for fear of loss of employment, considering that their Affidavits are uniform andpro forma(Annexes "H-2" to "H-19").19The NLRC ruled that under Section 7, Rule XXII of DOLE Order No. 9, Series of 1997, absent a showing that the NCMB decided to supervise the conduct of a secret balloting and informed the union of the said decision, or that any such request was made by any of the parties who would be affected by the secret balloting and to which the NCMB agreed, the respondents were not mandated to furnish the NCMB with such notice before the strike vote was conducted.20The petitioner filed a motion for the reconsideration of the decision, but the NLRC denied the said motion on September 30, 1999.21The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the CA assailing the decision and resolution of the NLRC on the following allegation:

PUBLIC RESPONDENT NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC) COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, ACTED CAPRICIOUSLY, AND CONTRAVENED THE LAW AND ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE IN REVERSING THE LABOR ARBITERS DECISION DATED DECEMBER 23, 1998 (ANNEX "E") AND IN UPHOLDING THE LEGALITY OF THE STRIKE STAGED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FROM NOVEMBER 28, 1997 TO DECEMBER 5, 1997.22On September 29, 2000, the CA rendered judgment dismissing the petition and affirming the assailed decision and resolution of the NLRC.

The petitioner filed the instant petition for review oncertiorariunder Rule 45 of the Rules of Court on the following ground:

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE NLRCS FINDING THAT RESPONDENTS COMPLIED WITH THE LEGAL REQUIREMENTS FOR STAGING THE SUBJECT STRIKE.23The petitioner asserts that the NLRC and the CA erred in holding that the submission of a notice of a strike vote to the Regional Branch of the NCMB as required by Section 7, Rule XXII of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, is merely directory and not mandatory. The use of the word "shall" in the rules, the petitioner avers, indubitably indicates the mandatory nature of the respondent Unions duty to submit the said notice of strike vote.

The petitioner contends that the CA erred in affirming the decision of the NLRC which declared that the respondents complied with all the requirements for a lawful strike. The petitioner insists that, as gleaned from the affidavits of the 17 union members and that of the overseer, and contrary to the joint affidavit of the officers and some union members, no meeting was held and no secret balloting was conducted on November 10, 1997.

The petitioner faults the CA and the NLRC for holding that a meeting for a strike vote was held on the said date by the respondents, despite the fact that the NLRC did not conduct an ocular inspection of the area where the respondents members allegedly held the voting. The petitioner also points out that it adduced documentary evidence in the form of affidavits executed by 17 members of the respondent union which remained unrebutted. The petitioner also posits that the CA and the NLRC erred in reversing the finding of the Labor Arbiter; furthermore, there was no need for the respondent union to stage a strike on November 28, 1997 because it had filed an urgent motion with the DOLE for the enforcement and execution of the decision of this Court in G.R. No. 118915.

The petition is meritorious.

We agree with the petitioner that the respondent Union failed to comply with the second paragraph of Section 10, Rule XXII of the Omnibus Rules of the NLRC which reads:

Section 10. Strike or lockout vote. A decision to declare a strike must be approved by a majority of the total union membership in the bargaining unit concerned obtained by secret ballot in meetings or referenda called for the purpose. A decision to declare a lockout must be approved by a majority of the Board of Directors of the employer, corporation or association or the partners obtained by a secret ballot in a meeting called for the purpose.

The regional branch of the Board may, at its own initiative or upon the request of any affected party, supervise the conduct of the secret balloting. In every case, the union or the employer shall furnish the regional branch of the Board and notice of meetings referred to in the preceding paragraph at least twenty-four (24) hours before such meetings as well as the results of the voting at least seven (7) days before the intended strike or lockout, subject to the cooling-off period provided in this Rule.

Although the second paragraph of Section 10 of the said Rule is not provided in the Labor Code of the Philippines, nevertheless, the same was incorporated in the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code and has the force and effect of law.24Aside from the mandatory notices embedded in Article 263, paragraphs (c) and (f) of the Labor Code, a union intending to stage a strike is mandated to notify the NCMB of the meeting for the conduct of strike vote, at least twenty-four (24) hours prior to such meeting. Unless the NCMB is notified of the date, place and time of the meeting of the union members for the conduct of a strike vote, the NCMB would be unable to supervise the holding of the same, if and when it decides to exercise its power of supervision. InNational Federation of Labor v. NLRC,25the Court enumerated the notices required by Article 263 of the Labor Code and the Implementing Rules, which include the 24-hour prior notice to the NCMB:

1) A notice of strike, with the required contents, should be filed with the DOLE, specifically the Regional Branch of the NCMB, copy furnished the employer of the union;

2) A cooling-off period must be observed between the filing of notice and the actual execution of the strike thirty (30) days in case of bargaining deadlock and fifteen (15) days in case of unfair labor practice. However, in the case of union busting where the unions existence is threatened, the cooling-off period need not be observed.

4)Before a strike is actually commenced, a strike vote should be taken by secret balloting, with a 24-hour prior notice to NCMB. The decision to declare a strike requires the secret-ballot approval of majority of the total union membership in the bargaining unit concerned.

5) The result of the strike vote should be reported to the NCMB at least seven (7) days before the intended strike or lockout, subject to the cooling-off period.

A union is mandated to notify the NCMB of an impending dispute in a particular bargaining unitviaa notice of strike. Thereafter, the NCMB, through its conciliator-mediators, shall call the parties to a conference at the soonest possible time in order to actively assist them in exploring all possibilities for amicable settlement. In the event of the failure in the conciliation/mediation proceedings, the parties shall be encouraged to submit their dispute for voluntary arbitration. However, if the parties refuse, the union may hold a strike vote, and if the requisite number of votes is obtained, a strike may ensue. The purpose of the strike vote is to ensure that the decision to strike broadly rests with the majority of the union members in general and not with a mere minority, and at the same time, discourage wildcat strikes, union bossism and even corruption.26A strike vote report submitted to the NCMB at least seven days prior to the intended date of strike ensures that a strike vote was, indeed, taken. In the event that the report is false, the seven-day period affords the members an opportunity to take the appropriate remedy before it is too late.27The 15 to 30 day cooling-off period is designed to afford the parties the opportunity to amicably resolve the dispute with the assistance of the NCMB conciliator/mediator,28while the seven-day strike ban is intended to give the DOLE an opportunity to verify whether the projected strike really carries the imprimatur of the majority of the union members.29The requirement of giving notice of the conduct of a strike vote to the NCMB at least 24 hours before the meeting for the said purpose is designed to (a) inform the NCMB of the intent of the union to conduct a strike vote; (b) give the NCMB ample time to decide on whether or not there is a need to supervise the conduct of the strike vote to prevent any acts of violence and/or irregularities attendant thereto; and (c) should the NCMB decide on its own initiative or upon the request of an interested party including the employer, to supervise the strike vote, to give it ample time to prepare for the deployment of the requisite personnel, including peace officers if need be. Unless and until the NCMB is notified at least 24 hours of the unions decision to conduct a strike vote, and the date, place, and time thereof, the NCMB cannot determine for itself whether to supervise a strike vote meeting or not and insure its peaceful and regular conduct. The failure of a union to comply with the requirement of the giving of notice to the NCMB at least 24 hours prior to the holding of a strike vote meeting will render the subsequent strike staged by the union illegal.

In this case, the respondent Union failed to comply with the 24-hour prior notice requirement to the NCMB before it conducted the alleged strike vote meeting on November 10, 1997. As a result, the petitioner complained that no strike vote meeting ever took place and averred that the strike staged by the respondent union was illegal.

Conformably to Article 264 of the Labor Code of the Philippines30and Section 7, Rule XXII of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code,31no labor organization shall declare a strike unless supported by a majority vote of the members of the union obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for that purpose. The requirement is mandatory and the failure of a union to comply therewith renders the strike illegal.32The union is thus mandated to allege and prove compliance with the requirements of the law.

In the present case, there is a divergence between the factual findings of the Labor Arbiter, on the one hand, and the NLRC and the CA, on the other, in that the Labor Arbiter found and declared in his decision that no secret voting ever took place in the parking lot fronting the hospital on November 10, 1997 by and among the 300 members of the respondent Union. Erwin Barbacena, the overseer of the only parking lot fronting the hospital, and security guards Simon Tingzon and Reggie Barawid, declared in their respective affidavits that no secret voting ever took place on November 10, 1997; 17 employees of the petitioner also denied in their respective statements that they were not members of the respondent Union, and were asked to merely sign attendance papers and unnumbered votes. The NLRC and the CA declared in their respective decisions that the affidavits of the petitioners 17 employees had no probative weight because the said employees merely executed their affidavits out of fear of losing their jobs. The NLRC and the CA anchored their conclusion on their finding that the affidavits of the employees were uniform andpro forma.

We agree with the finding of the Labor Arbiter that no secret balloting to strike was conducted by the respondent Union on November 10, 1997 at the parking lot in front of the hospital, at the corner of Scout Magbanua Street and Panay Avenue, Quezon City. This can be gleaned from the affidavit of Barbacena and the joint affidavit of Tingzon and Barawid, respectively:

1. That I am working as an overseer of a parking lot owned by Mrs. Madelaine Dionisio and located right in front of the Capitol Medical Center, specifically at the corner of Scout Magbanua Street and Panay Avenue, Quezon City;

2. That on November 10, 1997, during my entire tour of duty from 6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m., no voting or election was conducted in the aforementioned parking space for employees of the Capitol Medical Center and/or their guests, or by any other group for that matter.33

1. That I, Simon J. Tingzon, am a security officer of Veterans Philippine Scout Security Agency (hereinafter referred to as VPSSA), assigned, since July 1997 up to the present, as Security Detachment Commander at Capitol Medical Center (hereinafter referred to as CMC) located at Scout Magbanua corner Panay Avenue, Quezon City;

2. That my (Tingzon) functions as such include over-all in charge of security of all buildings and properties of CMC, and roving in the entire premises including the parking lots of all the buildings of CMC;

3. That I, Reggie B. Barawid, am a security guard of VPSSA, assigned, since June 1997 up to the present, as security guard at CMC;

4. That my (Barawid) functions as such include access control of all persons coming in and out of CMCs buildings and properties. I also sometimes guard the parking areas of CMC;

5. That on November 10, 1997, both of us were on duty at CMC from 7:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m., with me (Barawid) assigned at the main door of the CMCs Main Building along Scout Magbanua St.;

6. That on said date, during our entire tour of duty, there wasnovoting or election conducted in any of the four parking spaces for CMC personnel and guests.34The allegations in the foregoing affidavits belie the claim of the respondents and the finding of the NLRC that a secret balloting took place on November 10, 1997 in front of the hospital at the corner of Scout Magbanua Street and Panay Avenue, Quezon City. The respondents failed to prove the existence of a parking lot in front of the hospital other than the parking lot across from it. Indeed, 17 of those who purportedly voted in a secret voting executed their separate affidavits that no secret balloting took place on November 10, 1997, and that even if they were not members of the respondent Union, were asked to vote and to sign attendance papers. The respondents failed to adduce substantial evidence that the said affiants were coerced into executing the said affidavits. The bare fact that some portions of the said affidavits are similarly worded does not constitute substantial evidence that the petitioner forced, intimidated or coerced the affiants to execute the same.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decisions of the Court of Appeals and NLRC are SET ASIDE AND REVERSED. The Decision of the Labor Arbiter is REINSTATED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

2. G.R. No. 75271-73 June 27, 1988

CATALINO N. SARMIENTO and 71 other striking workers of ASIAN TRANSMISSION CORPORATION,petitioners,vs.THE HON. JUDGE ORLANDO R. TUICO of the Municipal Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, ROBERTO PIMENTEL, NELSON C. TEJADA, and the COMMANDING OFFICER, 224th PC Company at Los Baos Laguna,respondents.

No. L-77567 June 27, 1988

ASIAN TRANSMISSION, CORPORATION (ATC),petitioner,vs.THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC),respondent.

CRUZ,J.:Two basic questions are presented in these cases, to wit:

1. Whether or not a return-to-work order may be validly issued by the National Labor Relations Commission pending determination of the legality of the strike; and

2. Whether or not, pending such determination, the criminal prosecution of certain persons involved in the said strike may be validly restrained.

The first issue was submitted to the Court in G.R. No. 77567, to which we gave due course on July 1, 1987.1The case arose when on May 7, 1986, petitioner Asian Transmission Corporation terminated the services of Catalino Sarmiento, vice-president of the Bisig ng Asian Transmission Labor Union (BATU), for allegedly carrying a deadly weapon in the company premises.2As a result, the BATU filed a notice of strike on May 26, 1986, claiming that the ATC had committed an unfair labor practice.3The conciliatory conference held on June 5, 1986, failed to settle the dispute. The ATC then filed a petition asking the Ministry of Labor and Employment to assume jurisdiction over the matter or certify the same to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration.4Noting that the impending strike would prejudice the national interest as well as the welfare of some 350 workers and their families, the MOLE issued an order on June 3, 1986, certifying the labor dispute to the NLRC.5At the same time, it enjoined the management from locking out its employees and the union from declaring a strike or similar concerted action. This order was reiterated on June 13, 1986, upon the representation of the ATC that some 40 workers had declared a strike and were picketing the company premises.6Proceedings could not continue in the NLRC, however, because of the acceptance by President Aquino of the resignations of eight of its members, leaving only the vice-chairman in office.7For this reason, the MOLE, on September 9, 1986, set aside the orders of June 9 and 13, 1986, and directly assumed jurisdiction of the dispute, at the same time enjoining the company to accept all returning workers.8This order was itself set aside on November 24,1986, upon motion of both the BATU and the ATC in view of the appointment of new commissioners in the NLRC. The MOLE then returned the case to the respondent NLRC and directed it to expeditiously resolve all issues relating to the dispute, "adding that the union and the striking workers are ordered to return to work immediately."9Conformably, the NLRC issued on January 13, 1987 the following resolution, which it affirmed in its resolution of February 12, 1987, denying the motion for reconsideration:CERTIFIED CASE No. NCR-NS-5-214-86, entitled Asian Transmission Corporation, Petitioner versus Bisig ng Asian Transmission Labor Union (BATU), et al., Respondents.-Considering that the petitioner, despite the order dated 24 November 1986 of the Acting Minister, "to accept all the returning workers" continues to defy the directive insofar as 44 of the workers are concerned, the Commission, sittingen banc,resolved to order the petitioner to accept the said workers, or, to reinstate them on payroll immediately upon receipt of the resolution.

It is these orders of January 13 and February 12, 1987, that are challenged by the ATC in this petition for certiorari and are the subject of the temporary restraining order issued by this Court on March 23, 1987.10The second issue was raised in G.R. Nos. 75271-73, which we have consolidated with the first- mentioned petition because of the Identity of their factual antecedents. This issue was provoked by three criminal complaints filed against the petitioning workers in the municipal trial court of Calamba, Laguna, two by the personnel administrative officer of the ATC and the third by the Philippine Constabulary. The first two complaints, filed on July 11 and July 15, 1986, were for "Violation of Article 265, par. 1, in relation to Article 273 of the Labor Code of the Philippines."11The third, filed on July 17, 1986, was for coercion.12In all three complaints, the defendants were charged with staging an illegal strike, barricading the gates of the ATC plant and preventing the workers through intimidation, harassment and force from reporting for work. Acting on Criminal Case No. 15984, Judge Orlando Tuico issued a warrant of arrest against the petitioners and committed 72 of them to jail although he later ordered the release of 61 of them to the custody of the municipal mayor of Calamba, Laguna.13The petitioners had earlier moved for the lifting of the warrant of arrest and the referral of the coercion charge to the NLRC and, later, for the dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. 15973 and 15981 on the ground that they came under the primary jurisdiction of the NLRC.14As the judge had not ruled on these motions, the petitioners came to this Court in this petition for certiorari and prohibition. On August 12, 1986, we issued a temporary restraining order to prevent Judge Tuico from enforcing the warrant of arrest and further proceeding with the case.15This order was reiterated on September 21, 1987, "to relieve tensions that might prevent an amicable settlement of the dispute between the parties in the compulsory arbitration proceedings now going on in the Department of Labor," and made to apply to Judge Paterno Lustre, who had succeeded Judge Tuico.16That is the background. Now to the merits.

It is contended by the ATC that the NLRC had no jurisdiction in issuing the return-to-work order and that in any case the same should be annulled for being oppressive and violative of due process.

The question of competence is easily resolved. The authority for the order is found in Article 264(g) of the Labor Code, as amended by B.P. Blg. 227, which provides as follows:

When in his opinion there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause strikes or lockouts adversely affecting the national interest, such as may occur in but not limited to public utilities, companies engaged in the generation or distribution of energy, banks, hospitals, and export- oriented industries, including those within export processing zones, the Minister of Labor and Employment shall assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. Such assumption or certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout as specified in the assumption order. If one has already taken place at the time of assumption or certification, all striking or locked out employees shall immediately return to work and the employer shall immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. The Minister may seek the assistance of law-enforcement agencies to ensure compliance with this provision as well as such orders as he may issue to enforce the same.

The justification of the MOLE for such order was embodied therein, thus:

Asian Transmission Corporation is an export-oriented enterprise and its annual export amounts to 90% of its sales generating more than twelve (12) million dollars per year. The corporation employs three hundred fifty (350) workers with a total monthly take home pay or approximately P1,300,000.00 a month.

Any disruption of company operations will cause the delay of shipments of export finished products which have been previously committed to customers abroad, thereby seriously hampering the economic recovery program which is being pursued by the government. It wig also affect gravely the livelihood of three hundred fifty (350) families who will be deprived of their incomes.

This Office is therefore of the opinion that a strike or any disruption in the normal operation of the company will adversely affect the national interest. It is in the interest of both labor and management that the dispute be certified for compulsory arbitration to National Labor Relations Commission.

WHEREFORE, this Office hereby certifies the labor dispute to the National Labor Relations Commission in accordance with Article 264(g) of the Labor Code, as amended. In line with this Certification, the management is enjoined from locking out its employees and the union from declaring a strike, or any concerted action which will disrupt the harmonious labor-management relations at the company.17There can be no question that the MOLE acted correctly in certifying the labor dispute to the NLRC, given the predictable prejudice the strike might cause not only to the parties but more especially to the national interest. Affirming this fact, we conclude that the return-to-work order was equally valid as a statutory part and parcel of the certification order issued by the MOLE on November 24, 1986. The law itself provides that "such assumption or certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike. If one has already taken place at the time of assumption or certification, all striking or locked out employees shall immediately return to work and the employer shall immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout." The challenged order of the NLRC was actually only an implementation of the above provision of the Labor Code and a reiteration of the directive earlier issued by the MOLE in its own assumption order of September 9, 1986.

It must be stressed that while one purpose of the return-to-work order is to protect the workers who might otherwise be locked out by the employer for threatening or waging the strike, the more important reason is to prevent impairment of the national interest in case the operations of the company are disrupted by a refusal of the strikers to return to work as directed. In the instant case, stoppage of work in the firm will be hurtful not only to both the employer and the employees. More particularly, it is the national economy that will suffer because of the resultant reduction in our export earnings and our dollar reserves, not to mention possible cancellation of the contracts of the company with foreign importers. It was particularly for the purpose of avoiding such a development that the labor dispute was certified to the NLRC, with the return-to-work order following as a matter of course under the law.

It is also important to emphasize that the return-to-work order not so much confers a right as it imposes a duty; and while as a right it may be waived, it must be discharged as a duty even against the worker's will. Returning to work in this situation is not a matter of option or voluntariness but of obligation. The worker must return to his job together with his co-workers so the operations of the company can be resumed and it can continue serving the public and promoting its interest. That is the real reason such return can be compelled. So imperative is the order in fact that it is not even considered violative of the right against involuntary servitude, as this Court held in Kaisahan ng Mga Manggagawa sa Kahoy v. Gotamco Sawmills.18The worker can of course give up his work, thus severing his ties with the company, if he does not want to obey the order; but the order must be obeyed if he wants to retain his work even if his inclination is to strike.If the worker refuses to obey the return-to-work order, can it be said that he is just suspending the enjoyment of a right and he is entitled to assert it later as and when he sees fit? In the meantime is the management required to keep his position open, unable to employ replacement to perform the work the reluctant striker is unwilling to resume because he is still manning the picket lines?

While the ATC has manifested its willingness to accept most of the workers, and has in fact already done so, it has balked at the demand of the remaining workers to be also allowed to return to work.19Its reason is that these persons, instead of complying with the return-to-work order, as most of the workers have done, insisted on staging the restrained strike and defiantly picketed the company premises to prevent the resumption of operations. By so doing, the ATC submits, these strikers have forfeited their right to be readmitted, having abandoned their positions, and so could be validly replaced.The Court agrees.

The records show that the return-to-work order was first issued on June 3, 1986, and was reiterated on June 13, 1986. The strike was declared thereafter, if we go by the criminal complaints in G.R. Nos. 75271-73, where the alleged acts are claimed to have been done on June 9,1986, and July 15,1986.

These dates are not denied. In fact, the petitioners argue in their pleadings that they were engaged only in peaceful picketing,20which would signify that they had not on those dates returned to work as required and had decided instead to ignore the said order. By their own acts, they are deemed to have abandoned their employment and cannot now demand the right to return thereto by virtue of the very order they have defied.One other point that must be underscored is that the return-to-work order is issuedpendingthe determination of the legality or illegality of the strike. It is not correct to say that it may be enforced only if the strike is legal and may be disregarded if the strike is illegal, for the purpose precisely is to maintain thestatus quowhile the determination is being made. Otherwise, the workers who contend that their strike is legal can refuse to return to their work and cause a standstill in the company operations while retaining the positions they refuse to discharge or allow the management to fill. Worse, they win also claim payment for work not done, on the ground that they are still legally employed although actually engaged in activities inimical to their employer's interest.

This is like eating one's cake and having it too, and at the expense of the management. Such an unfair situation surely was not contemplated by our labor laws and cannot be justified under the social justice policy, which is a policy of fairness to both labor and management. Neither can this unseemly arrangement be sustained under the due process clause as the order, if thus interpreted, would be plainly oppressive and arbitrary.

Accordingly, the Court holds that the return-to-work order should benefit only those workers who complied therewith and, regardless of the outcome of the compulsory arbitration proceedings, are entitled to be paid for work they have actually performed. Conversely, those workers who refused to obey the said order and instead waged the restrained strike are not entitled to be paid for work not done or to reinstatement to the positions they have abandoned by their refusal to return thereto as ordered.

Turning now to the second issue, we hold that while as a general rule the prosecution of criminal offenses is not subject to injunction, the exception must apply in the case at bar. The suspension of proceedings in the criminal complaints filed before the municipal court of Calamba, Laguna, is justified on the ground of prematurity as there is no question that the acts complained of are connected with the compulsory arbitration proceedings still pending in the NLRC. The first two complaints, as expressly captioned, are for "violation of Art. 265, par. 2, in relation to Art. 273, of the Labor Code of the Philippines," and the third complaint relates to the alleged acts of coercion committed by the defendants in blocking access to the premises of the ATC. Two of the criminal complaints were filed by the personnel administrative officer of the ATC although he vigorously if not convincingly insists that he was acting in his personal capacity.

In view of this, the three criminal cases should be suspended until the completion of the compulsory arbitration proceedings in the NLRC, conformably to the policy embodied in Circular No. 15, series of 1982, and Circular No. 9, series of 1986, issued by the Ministry of Justice in connection with the implementation of B.P. Blg. 227.21These circulars, briefly stated, require fiscals and other government prosecutors to first secure the clearance of the Ministry of Labor and/or the Office of the President "before taking cognizance of complaints for preliminary investigation and the filing in court of the corresponding informations of cases arising out of or related to a labor dispute," including "allegations of violence, coercion, physical injuries, assault upon a person in authority and other similar acts of intimidation obstructing the free ingress to and egress from a factory or place of operation of the machines of such factory, or the employer's premises." It does not appear from the record that such clearance was obtained, conformably to the procedure laid down "to attain the industrial peace which is the primordial objectives of this law," before the three criminal cases were filed.The Court makes no findings on the merits of the labor dispute and the criminal cases against the workers as these are not in issue in the petitions before it. What it can only express at this point is the prayerful hope that these disagreements will be eventually resolved with justice to all parties and in that spirit of mutual accommodation that should always characterize the relations between the workers and their employer. Labor and management are indispensable partners in the common endeavor for individual dignity and national prosperity. There is no reason why they cannot pursue these goals with open hands rather than clenched fists, striving with rather than against each other, that they may together speed the dawning of a richer day for all in this amiable land of ours.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. In G.R. No. 77567, the petition is DENIED and the challenged Orders of the NLRC dated January 13, 1986, and February 12, 1986, are AFFIRMED as above interpreted. The temporary restraining order dated March 23, 1987, is LIFTED.

2. In G.R. Nos. 75271-73, the temporary restraining order of August 12,1986, and September 21, 1986, are CONTINUED IN FORCE until completion of the compulsory arbitration proceedings in the NLRC.

No costs. It is so ordered.

3. G.R. Nos. 95494-97 September 7, 1995

LAPANDAY WORKERS UNION, ARQUILAO BACOLOD, JOSE ERAD, FERNANDO HERNANDO, EDDIE ESTRELLA, CIRILO DAYAG, EDUARDO POQUITA, CARLITO PEPITO, RENE ARAO, JUANITO GAHUM, EMILIANO MAGNO, PERLITO LISONDRA, GREGORIO ALBARAN, ABRAHAM BAYLON, DIONESIO TRUCIO, TOMAS BASCO AND ROSARIO SINDAY,pertitioners,vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,respondents.

G.R. Nos. 95494-97 September 7, 1995

LAPANDAY WORKERS UNION, ARQUILAO BACOLOD, ET AL.,petitioners,vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND CADECO ARGO DEVELOPMENT PHILS., INC.respondents.

G.R. Nos. 95494-97 September 7, 1995

LAPANDAY WORKERS UNION, ARQUILAO BACOLOD, ET AL.,petitioners,vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND LAPANDAY AGRICULTURAL & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,respondents.

G.R. Nos. 95494-97 September 7, 1995

LAPANDAY WORKERS UNION, TOMAS N. BASCO, ET AL.,petitioners,vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND LAPANDAY AGRICULTURAL & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,respondents.

PUNO,J.:Petitioner Lapanday Agricultural Workers' Union (Union for brevity) and petitioners-workers of Lapanday Agricultural and Development Corporation and CADECO Agro Development Philippines, Inc., seek to reverse the consolidatedDecision dated August 29, 1990,1rendered by public respondent National Labor Relations Commision, declaring their strike illegal and ordering the dismissal of their leaders.The background of the case:

Private respondents are sister companies engaged in the production of bananas. Their agricultural establishments are located in Davao City.

On the other hand, petitioner Lapanday Workers' Union (Union) is the duly certified bargaining agent of the rank and file employees of private respondents. The Union is affiliated with the KMU-ANGLO. The other petitioners are all members of the Union.

The records show that petitioner Union has a collective bargaining agreement with private respondents, covering the period from December 5, 1985 to November 30, 1988. A few months before the expiration of their CBA, private respondents initiated certain management policies which disrupted the relationship of the parties.

First, on August 1, 1988, private respondents contracted Philippine Eagle Protectors and Security Agency, Inc., to provide security services for their business premises located in Lapanday, Bandug, Callawa, Davao City, and Guising, Davao Del Sur. Their contract also called for the protection of the lives and limbs of private respondents' officers, employees and guests within company premises. The Union branded the security guards posted within the company premises as private respondents' "goons" and "special forces." It also accused the guards of intimidating and harassing their members.

Second, private respondents conducted seminars on Human Development and Industrial Relations (HDIR) for their managerial and supervisory employees and, later, the rank-and-filers, to promote their social education and economic growth. Among the topics discussed in the seminar were the mission statement of the company, corporate values, and the Philippine political spectrum. The Union claimed that the module on the Philippine political spectrum lumped the ANGLO (Alliance of Nationalist and Genuine Labor Organization), with other outlawed labor organizations such as the National Democratic Front or other leftist groups.

These issues were discussed during a labor-management meeting held on August 2, 1988. The labor group was represented by the Union, through its President, petitioner Arquilao Bacolod, and its legal counsel. After private respondents explained the issues, the Union agreed to allow its members to attend the HDIR seminar for the rank-and-filers. Nevertheless, on August 19 and 20, the Union directed its members not to attend the seminars scheduled on said dates. Earlier on, or on August 6, 1988, the Union, led by petitioners Arquilao Bacolod and Rene Arao, picketed the premises of the Philippine Eagle Protectors to show their displeasure on the hiring of the guards.

Worse still, the Union filed onAugust 25, 1988, a Notice of Strikewith the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB). It accused the company of unfair labor practices consisting of coercion of employees, intimidation of union members and union-busting.2These were the same issues raised by the Union during the August 2, 1988 labor-management meeting.On August 29, 1988, the NCMB called a conciliation conference. The conference yielded the following agreement:

(1) Union officers, including the officials of KMU-ANGLO, and the Executive Director of the NCMB would attend the HDIR seminar on September 5, 1988; and

(2) A committee shall convene on September 10, 1989, to establish guidelines governing the guards.

The Union officials did attend the September 5, 1988 seminar. While they no longer objected to the continuation of the seminar, they reiterated their demand for the deletion of the discussion pertaining to the KMU-ANGLO.

With the apparent settlement of their differences, private respondents notified the NCMB that there were no more bases for the notice of strike.

An unfortunate event brake the peace of the parties. On September 8, 1988, Danilo Martinez, a member of the Board of Directors of the Union, was gunned down in his house in the presence of his wife and children. The gunman was later identified as Eledio Samson, an alleged member of the new security forces of private respondents.

On September 9, 1988, the day after the killing, most of the members of the Union refused to report for work. They returned to work the following day but they did not comply with the "quota system" adopted by the management to bolster production output. Allegedly, the Union instructed the workers to reduce their production to thirty per cent (30%). Private respondents charged the Union with economic sabotage through slowdown.

On September 14, 1988, Private respondents filed separate charges against the Union and its members for illegal strike, unfair labor practice and damages, with prayer for injunction. These cases were docketed as Case Nos. RAB-11-09-00612-888 and RAB No. 11-09-00613-88 before Labor Arbiter Antonio Villanueva.

On September 17, 1988, petitioners skipped work to pay their last respect to the slain Danilo Martinez who was laid to rest. Again, on September 23, 1988, petitioners did not report for work. Instead, they proceeded to private respondents' office at Lanang, carrying placards and posters which called for the removal of the security guards, the ouster of certain management officials, and the approval of their mass leave application. Their mass action did not succeed.

In a last ditch effort to settle the deteriorating dispute between the parties, City Mayor Rodrigo Duterte intervened. Dialogues were held on September 27 and 29, 1988 at the City Mayor's Office. Again, the dialogues proved fruitless as private respondents refused to withdraw the cases they earlier filed with public respondent.

On October 3, 1988, a strike vote was canducted among the members of the Union and those in favor of the strike won overwhelming support from the workers. The result of the strike vote was then submitted to the NCMB on October 10, 1988. Two days later, or on Ootober 12, 1988, the Union struck.

On the bases of the foregoing facts, Labor Arbiter Antonio Villanueva ruled that the Onion staged an illegal strike. The dispositlve portion of the Decision, dated December 12, 1988, states:

COMFORMABLY WITH ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered:

a) Declaring the strike staged by respondents (petitioners) to be illegal;

b) Declaring the employees listed as respondents in the complaint and those mentioned in page 21 to have lost their employment status with complainants Lapanday Agricultural and Development Corporation and Cadeco Agro Development Philippines, Inc.; and

c) Ordering respondents (petitioners in this case) to desist from further committing an illegal strike.

Petitioners appealed the Villanueva decision to public respondent NLRC.

It also appears that on December 6, 1988, or before the promulgation of the decision of Arbiter Villanueva, the Union, together with Tomas Basco and 25 other workers, filed a complaint for unfair labor practice and illegal suspension againstLADECO. The case was docketed as Case No. RAB-11-12-00780-88. On even date, another complaint for unfair labor practice and illegal dismissal was filed by the Union, together with Arquilao Bacolod and 58 other complainants. This was docketed as Case No. RAB-11-12-00779-88. These two (2) cases were heard by Labor Arbiter Newton Sancho.

Before the NLRC could resolve the appeal taken on the Villanueva decision in Case Nos. RAB-11-09-00612-88 and RAB-11-09-00613-88, Labor Arbiter Sancho rendered a decision in the two (2) cases filed by the Union against private respondentsLADECOandCADECO(Case Nos. RAB-11-12-00779-88 and RAB-11-12-00780-88). The Sancho decision, dated October 18, 1989, declaredLADECOandCADECOguilty of unfair labor practices and illegal dismissal and ordered the reinstatement of the dismissed employees of private reapondents, with backwages and other benefits. Significantly, the Sancho decision considered the refusal of the workers to report for work on September 9, 1988, justified by the circumstance then prevailing, the killing of Danilo Martinez on September 8,1988.

Private respondents appealed the Sancho decision, claiming, among others, that labor arbiter Sancho erred in passing upon the legality of the strike staged by petitioners since said issue had already been passed upon by the Regional Arbitration Branch and was still on appeal before the NLRC.

Considering that the four (4) cases before it arose from the same set of facts and involved substantially the same issues, the NLRC rendered a consolidated decision, promulgated August 29, 1990, upholding the Villanueva decision in Case Nos. RAB-11-09-00612-88 and RAB-11-09-00613-88. The dispositive portion of the assailed NLRC decision states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, a new judgment is entered in the four consolidated and above-captioned cases as follows:

1. The strike staged by the Lapanday Agricultural Workers Union is hereby declared to be (sic) illegal;

2. As a consequence thereof, the following employees-union officers are declared to have lost their employment status with Lapanday Agricultural Development Corporation and CADECO Agro Development Philippines, to wit: Arguilao Bacolod, Jose Erad, Fernando Hernando, Eldie Estrella, Cerelo Dayag, Lucino Magadan, Rene Arao, Eduardo Poquita, Juanito Gahum, Emilio Magno, Perlito Lisondra, Gregorio Albaron, Abraham Baylon, Dionosio Trocio, Tomas Basco and Rosario Sinday;

3. However, the individual respondents (union members), being merely rank-and-file employees and who merely joined the strike declared as illegal, are ordered reinstated but without backwages, the period they were out of work is deemed the penalty for the illegal strike they staged;

4. Ordering Lapanday Workers' Union, its leaders and members, to desist from further committing an illegal strike; and

5. Dismissing the complaint for unfair labor practice, illegal suspension and illegal dismissal filed by the Lapanday Workers Union (LWU)-ANGLO and its members, for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioners fileds motion for reconsideration. It did not prosper. Hence, the petition.

Petitioners now claim that public respondent NLRC gravely abused its discretion in: a) declaring that their activities, from September 9, 1988 to October 12, 1988, were strike activities; and b) declaring that the strike staged on October 12, 1988 was illegal.

The critical issue is the legality of the strike held on October 12, 1988. The applicable laws are Articles 263 and 264 of the Labor Code, as amended by E.O. No. 111, dated December 24, 1986.3Paragraphs (c) and (f) of Article 263 of the Labor Code, as amended by E.O. 111, provides:

(c) In cases of bargaining deadlocks, the duly certified or recognized bargaining agent may file anotice of strikeor the employer may file, notice of lockout with the Ministry at least 30 days before the intended date thereof.In cases of unfair labor practice, the notice shall be 15 daysand in the absence of a duly certified or recognized bargaining agent, the notice of strike may be filed by any legitimate labor organization in behalf of its members. However, in case of dismissal from employment of union officers duly elected in accordance with the union constitution and by-laws, which may constitute union busting where the existence of the union is threatened, the 15-daycooling-off period shall not apply and the union may take action immediately.

xxx xxx xxx

(f) A decision to declare a strike must be approved by amajorityof the total union membership in the bargaining unit concerned, obtained by secret ballot in meetings orreferenda called for that purpose. A decision to declare a lockout must be approved by a majority of the board of directors of the corporation or association or of the partners in a partnership, obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for that purpose. The decision shall be valid for the duration of the dispute based on substantially the same grounds considered when the strike or lockout vote was taken. The Ministry may, at its own initiative or upon the request of any affected party, supervise the conduct of secret balloting.In every case, the union or the employershallfurnish the Ministry the results of the votingat least seven (7) days before the intended strike or lockout subject to the cooling-off period herein provided.Article 264 of the same Code reads:

Art. 264. Prohibited activities. (a) No labor organization or employer shall declare a strike or lockout without first having bargained collectively in accordance with Title VII of this Book or without first having filed the notice required in the preceding Article orwithout the necessary strike or lockout vote first having been obtained and reported to the Ministry.xxx xxx xxx

. . . . Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status:Providedthat mere participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient ground for termination of his employment, even if a replacement had been hired by the employer during such lawful strike. (emphasis ours).

A strike is "any temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute."4It is the most preeminent of the economic weapons of workers which they unsheathe to force management to agree to an equitable sharing of the joint product of labor and capital. Undeniably, strikes exert some disquieting effects not only on the relationship between labor and management but also on the general peace and progress of society. Our laws thus regulate their exercise within reasons by balancing the interests of labor and management together with the overarching public interest.Some of the limitations on the exercise of the right of strike are provided for in paragraphs (c) and (f) of Article 263 of the Labor Code, as amended,supra.They Provide for the procedural steps to be followed before staging a strike filing of notice of strike, taking of strike vote, and reporting of the strike vote result to the Department of Labor and Employment. InNational Federation of Sugar Workers (NFSW) vs. Overseas, et al.,5we ruled that these steps are mandatory in character, thus:If only thefilingof the strike notice and the strike-vote report would be deemed mandatory, but not the waiting periods so specifically and emphatically prescribed by law, thepurposes(hereafter discussed) far which the filing of the strike notice and strike-vote report is required cannot be achieved. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

So too, the 7-day strike-vote report is not without a purpose. As pointed out by the Solicitor General

. . . The submission of the report gives assurance that a strike vote has been taken and that, if the report concerning it is false, the majority of the members can take appropriate remedy before it is too late.

The seven (7) day waiting period is intended to give the Department of Labor and Employment an opportunity to verify whether the projected strike really carries the imprimatur of the majority of the union members. The need for assurance that majority of the union members support the strike cannot be gainsaid. Strike is usually the last weapon of labor to compel capital to concede to its bargaining demands or to defend itself against unfair labor practices of management. It is a weapon that can either breathe life to or destroy the union and its members in their struggle with management for a more equitable due of their labors. The decision to wield the weapon of strike must, therefore, rest on a rational basis, free from emotionalism, unswayed by the tempers and tantrums of a few hotheads, and firmly focused on the legitimate interest of the union which should not, however, be antithetical to the public welfare. Thus, our laws require the decision to strike to be the consensus of the majority for while the majority is not infallible, still, it is the best hedge against haste and error. In addition, a majority vote assures the union it will go to war against management with the strength derived from unity and hence, with better chance to succeed. InBatangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Company vs. NLRC,6we held:xxx xxx xxx

The right to strike is one of the rights recognized and guaranteed by the Constitution as an instrument of labor for its protection against exploitation by management. By virtue of this right, the workers are able to press their demands for better terms of employment with more energy and persuasiveness, poising the threat to strike as their reaction to employer's intransigence. The strike is indeed a powerful weapon of the working class. But precisely because of this, it must be handled carefully, like a sensitive explosive, lest it blow up in the workers' own hands. Thus, it must be declared only after the most thoughtful consultation among them, conducted in the only way allowed, that is, peacefully, and in every case conformably to reasonable regulation. Any violation of the legal requirements and strictures, . . . will render the strike illegal, to the detriment of the very workers it is supposed to protect.

Every war must be lawfully waged. A labor dispute demands no less observance of the rules, for the benefit of all concerned.

Applying the law to the case at bar, we rule that strike conducted by the union on October 12, 1988 is plainly illegal as it was held within th seven (7) day waiting period provided for by paragraph (f), Article 263 of the Labor Code, as amended. The haste in holding the strike prevented the Department of Labor and Employment from verifying whether it carried the approval of the majority of the union members. It set to naught an important policy consideration of our law on strike. Considering this finding, we need not exhaustively rule on the legality of the work stoppage conducted by the union and some of their members on September 9 and 23, 1988. Suffice to state, that the ruling of the public respondent on the matter is supported by substantial evidence.

We affirm the decision of the public respondent limiting the penalty of dismissal only to the leaders of the illegal strike. especially the officers of the union who served as its major players. They cannot claim good faith to exculpate themselves. They admitted knowledge of the law on strike, including its procedure. They cannot violate the law which ironically was cast to promote their interest.

We, likewise, agree with the public respondent that the union members who were merely instigated to participate in the illegal strike should be treated differently from their leaders. Part of our benign consideration for labor is the policy of reinstating rank-and-file workers who were merely misled in supporting illegal strikes. Nonetheless, these reinstated workers shall not be entitled to backwages as they should not be compensated for services skipped during the illegal strike.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is dismissed for failure to show grave abuse of discretion on the part of the public respondent. Costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

4. G.R. No. 145496 February 24, 2004STAMFORD MARKETING CORP., GSP MANUFACTURING CORP., GIORGIO ANTONIO MARKETING CORP., CLEMENTINE MARKETING CORP., ULTIMATE CONCEPTS PHILIPPINES, INC., and ROSARIO G. APACIBLE,petitioners,vs.JOSEPHINE JULIAN, LEONOR AMBROSIO, MARILYN AQUINO, PURITA BARRO, ROSARIO BASADA, HERMINIA BERGUELLES, ERLINDA CANARIA, SALVACION CIRUELOS, MARITESS BALISARIO, JULIETA DOLONTAP, JOSEFINA DOMINGO, GLORIA FLORENDO, AMELITA GRANDE, SIMONA MALUNES, CORAZON MARASIGAN, SUSANA OBNAMIA, LUCY PEREZ, GINALYN PIDOY, CAROLINA REYNOSO, LETICIA SARMIENTO, ARCELY VILLEZA, MARIA SANCHO LABIT, IMELDA RIVERA, ROWENA ALVARADO, VIOLETA ARRIOLA, VIRGINIA DE VERA, GIRLIE DISCAYA, ADELAIDA LOMOD, MARILOU RABANAL, JOCELYN RUFILA, ELENA SUEDE, JACINTA TEJADA, MELBA TOLOSA, LEZILDA CARANTO, JECINA BURABOD, LUCITA CASERO, MONICA CRUZ, GLENDA MIRANDA, YOLANDA PANCHO, MYRNA RAGASA, FILOMENA MORALES, FELIPA VALENCIA, CORAZON VIRTUZ, MARICEL BOLANGA, SONIA ANTILLA, LEONITA BINAL, GLORIA LARIOSA, LIZABETH LUANGCO and JULIETA LEANO,respondents.

D E C I S I O N

QUISUMBING,J.:For review on certiorari is the Court of Appeals Decision,1dated April 26, 2000, in CA-G.R. SP No. 53169, as well as its Resolution,2dated October 11, 2000, denying the petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. The Court of Appeals modified the Resolution,3dated August 27, 1998, of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)-First Division which, in turn, dismissed the petitioners appeal from the decision of Labor Arbiter Ramon Valentin C. Reyes in three (3) consolidated cases, namely:

(1)Josephine Julian, et al. vs. Stamford Marketing Corp.(NLRC NCR Case No. 00-11-08124-94);

(2)Philippine Agricultural, Commercial and Industrial Workers Union, et al. vs. GSP Manufacturing Corp., et al.(NLRC NCR Case No. 00-03-02114-95); and

(3)Lucita Casero, et al. vs. GSP Manufacturing Corp., et al.(NLRC NCR Case No. 00-01-10437-95).

The instant controversy stemmed from a letter sent by Zoilo V. De La Cruz, Jr., president of the Philippine Agricultural, Commercial and Industrial Workers Union (PACIWU-TUCP), on November 2, 1994, to Rosario A. Apacible, the treasurer and general manager of herein petitioners Stamford Marketing Corporation, GSP Manufacturing Corporation, Giorgio Antonio Marketing Corporation, Clementine Marketing Corporation, and Ultimate Concept Phils., Inc. Said letter advised Apacible that the rank-and-file employees of the aforementioned companies had formed the Apacible Enterprise Employees Union-PACIWU-TUCP. The union demanded that management recognize its existence. Shortly thereafter, discord reared its ugly head, and rancor came hard on its wake.

Josephine Julian, et al. vs. Stamford Marketing Corp.NLRC NCR Case No. 00-11-08124-94

On November 9, 1994, or just a day after Apacible received the letter of PACIWU-TUCP, herein private respondents Josephine Julian, president of the newly organized labor union; Jacinta Tejada, and Jecina Burabod, board member and member of the said union, respectively, were effectively dismissed from employment.

Without further ado, the three dismissed employees filed suit with the Labor Arbiter. In their Complaint, the three dismissed employees alleged that petitioners had not paid them their overtime pay, holiday pay/premiums, rest day premium, 13thmonth pay for the year 1994, salaries for services actually rendered, and that illegal deduction had been made without their consent from their salaries for a cash bond.

For its part, herein petitioner Stamford alleged that private respondent Julian was a supervising employee at the Patricks Boutique at Shoemart (SM) Northmall. In October 1994, when she was four (4) to five (5) months pregnant, the management of SM Northmall asked her to go on maternity leave, pursuant to company policy. Julian was then directed to report at Stamfords Head Office for reassignment. She was also asked to submit a medical certificate to enable the company to approximate her delivery date. Julian, however, allegedly failed to comply with these directives and instead, ceased to report for work without having given notice. Stamford then allegedly asked Tejada to take over Julians position, but the former inexplicably refused to comply with the management directive. Instead, like Julian, she abandoned her work with nary a notice or an explanation.

As to Burabod, petitioner Giorgio Antonio Boutique (Giorgio) averred that she was employed as one of its sales clerks at its SM Northmall branch. When directed to report to the Giorgio branch at Robinsons Galleria, she defiantly questioned the validity of the directive and refused to comply. Like Julian and Tejada, she then ceased to report for work without giving notice.

Philippine Agricultural, Commercial and Industrial Workers Union, et al. vs. GSP Manufacturing Corp.NLRC NCR Case No. 00-03-02114-95

On March 17, 1995, PACIWU-TUCP, filed on behalf of fifty (50) employees allegedly illegally dismissed for union membership by the petitioners, a Complaint before the Arbitration Branch of NLRC, Metro Manila. PACIWU-TUCP charged petitioners herein with unfair labor practice. The Complaint alleged that when Apacible received the letter of PACIWU-TUCP, management began to harass the members of the local chapter, a move which culminated in their outright dismissal from employment, without any just or lawful cause. It was a clear case of union-busting, averred PACIWU-TUCP.

GSP Manufacturing Corporation (GSP) denied the unions averments. It claimed that it had verified with the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) whether a labor organization with the name Apacible Enterprises Employees Union was duly registered. It was informed that no such labor organization was registered either as a local chapter of PACIWU or of the Trade Union Congress of the Philippines (TUCP). GSP claimed that after unsuccessfully misrepresenting themselves, herein private respondents then started making unjustified demands, abandoned their work, and staged an illegal strike from November 1994 up to the filing of the Complaints. Petitioners then asked the private respondents to lift their picket and return to work, but were only met with a cold refusal.

Lucita Casero, et al. vs. GSP Manufacturing Corp., et al.NLRC NCR Case No. 00-01-10437-95

This separate case was also filed by the dismissed union members (complainants in NLRC NCR Case No. 00-03-02114-95), against the petitioners herein for payment of their monetary claims. The dismissed employees demanded the payment of (1) salary differentials due to underpayment of wages; (2) unpaid salaries/wages for work actually rendered; (3) 13thmonth pay for 1994; (4) cash equivalent of the service incentive leave; and (5) illegal deductions from their salaries for cash bonds.

Petitioner corporations, however, maintained that they have been paying complainants the wages/salaries mandated by law and that the complaint should be dismissed in view of the execution of quitclaims and waivers by the private respondents.

The Labor Arbiter ordered the three cases consolidated as the issues were interrelated and the respondent corporations were under one management.

After due proceedings, Labor Arbiter Ramon Valentin C. Reyes rendered a decision, the decretal portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises all considered, judgment is hereby rendered in the respective cases as follows:

A. NLRC NCR CASE NO. 00-11-08124-94

1. Holding the respondent guilty of unfair labor practice, and declaring complainants dismissals illegal;

2. Ordering respondent to reinstate complainants to their former positions without loss of seniority rights and other benefits;

3. Ordering the respondent to pay complainants their backwages from the date of their termination up to the date of this decision;

4. Ordering the respondent to pay complainants their unpaid salaries, overtime pay, holiday and rest day premium, unpaid 13thmonth pay and reimbursement of the cash deposit deducted by the respondent from the salaries of complainants.

B. NLRC NCR CASE NO. 00-03-02114-95

1. Declaring the strike conducted by complainants to be illegal;

2. Declaring the officers of the union to have lost their employment status, and thus terminating their employment with respondent companies;

3. Ordering the reinstatement of the complainants who are only members of the union to their former positions with respondent companies, without backwages, except individual complainants Cristeta De Luna, Luzviminda Recones, Eden Revilla, and Jinky Dellosa.

C. NLRC NCR CASE NO. 00-01-104314-95

1. Ordering respondents to pay individual complainants:

a. salary differentials resulting from underpayment of wages

b. unpaid salaries/wages for work actually rendered;

c. 13thmonth pay for the year 1994;

d. cash equivalent of the service incentive leave;

e. illegal deductions in the form of cash deposits

all in accordance with the computation submitted by the individual complainants.

2. Dismissing the complaint with regard to complainants Cristeta De Luna, Luzviminda Recones, Eden Revilla, and Jinky Dellosa.

All other claims are dismissed for lack of merit.

The Research and Information Division, this Commission, is hereby directed to effect the necessary computation which shall form part of this Decision.

SO ORDERED.5Labor Arbiter Reyes ruled the reassignment and transfer of complainants in NLRC NCR Case No. 00-11-08124-94 as unfair labor practice, it being management interference in the complainants formation and membership of union. He held that the protested reassignments and transfers were highly suspicious, having been made right after management was informed about the formation of the union. Such timing could not have been pure coincidence. The Labor Arbiter also found that petitioners herein failed to substantiate their claim that private respondents had abandoned their employment. He pointed out that the complainants filing of a case immediately after their alleged dismissal militated against any claim of abandonment. Moreover, petitioners did not furnish complainants with written notices of dismissal. As to the unpaid wages and other monetary benefits claimed by private respondents herein, the Labor Arbiter ruled that as petitioners herein did not present proof of their payment, there is presumption of non-payment. Finally, Labor Arbiter Reyes found the cash deposit ofP2,000.00 unauthorized and illegal, without any showing that the same was necessary and recognized in the business.

In NLRC NCR Case No. 00-03-02114-95, it was duly established that the employees union was not registered with the Bureau of Labor Relations. Hence, private respondents had engaged in an illegal strike since the right to strike maybe availed of only by a legitimate labor organization. Labor Arbiter Reyes upheld the dismissal of the union officers for leading and participating in an illegal strike, but ruled the dismissal of the union members to be improper since they acted in good faith in the belief that their actions were within the bounds of law.

In NLRC NCR Case No. 00-01-10437-95, the Labor Arbiter found petitioners liable for salary differentials and other monetary claims for petitioners failure to sufficiently prove that it had paid the same to complainants as required by law. He likewise ordered the return of the cash deposits to complainants, citing the same reasons as in NLRC NCR Case No. 00-11-08124-94.

Petitioners herein seasonably appealed the decision of Labor Arbiter Reyes. Subsequently, the NLRC affirmed the decision in NLRC NCR Case Nos. 00-11-08124-94 and 00-01-10437-95. However, the NLRC set aside the judgment with respect to NLRC NCR Case No. 00-03-02114-95 and ordered the remand of the case for further proceedings, in view of the various factual issues involved. The NLRC ruling reads:

WHEREFORE, finding the appeal unmeritorious, the same is hereby DISMISSED.

ACCORDINGLY, we hereby set aside the ruling in NLRC NCR CASE NO. 00-03-02114-95 as we order the same remanded for further proceedings in view of the nature of the issues involved being purely factual in character. The awards in NLRC NCR CASE NO. 00-11-08-08124-94 and NLRC NCR CASE NO. 00-01-10437-95 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.6Meanwhile, on May 14, 1996, petitioners herein filed a Petition to Declare the Strike Illegal against their striking employees, docketed as NLRC NCR Case No. 05-03064-96 and raffled off to Labor Arbiter Arthur L. Amansec.

On September 2, 1998, Labor Arbiter Amansec decided NLRC NCR Case No. 05-03064-96, as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby made finding the strike conducted by the respondents from December 1, 1994 up to May 14, 1996 illegal and concomitantly, ordering respondents who are established to have knowingly participated to have committed an illegal act to have lost their employment status.

Other claims for lack of merit are ordered DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.7In declaring the strike illegal, Labor Arbiter Amansec noted that: (1) no prior notice to strike had been filed; (2) no strike vote had been taken among the union members; and (3) the issue involved was non-strikeable, i.e., a demand for salary increases.

Petitioners then moved for reconsideration of the NLRC ruling, citing the ruling in NLRC NCR Case No. 05-03064-96 to support their position that respondents herein had conducted an illegal strike and were liable for unlawful acts.

On March 12, 1999, the NLRC resolved to partly grant the Motion for Reconsideration, thus:

WHEREFORE, prescinding from the foregoing premises, the Motion for Reconsideration is partly given due course, in that the issues raised in NLRC NCR CASE No. 00-03-02114-95 is hereby declared to have been rendered academic.

The rest of the dispositions in the questioned resolution remains.

SO ORDERED.8Unwilling to let the matter rest there, petitioners then filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 53169. The Court of Appeals considered the following issues in resolving the petition, to wit: (a) the validity of the respondents dismissal and entitlement to backwages, (b) the validity of the Release, waiver and quitclaim executed by some of the respondents, and (c) the validity of the claims for non-payment of salaries, overtime pay, holiday pay, premium pay, etc.

On April 26, 2000, the appellate court disposed of CA-G.R. SP No. 53169 as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises studiedly considered, the Petition is partly given due course as the 12 March 1999 Resolution of the NLRC is hereby modified as follows:

1. In lieu of reinstatement, private respondents Josephine Julian, Jacinta Tejada, and the rest of the officers of the Union shall be given separation pay at the rate of one month pay for every year of service, with a fraction of at least six months of service considered as one year, computed from the time they were first employed until December 10, 1994;

2. Ordering petitioner corporations to reinstate, without loss of seniority, Jacina Burabod and the rest of the Union members; plus payment of backwages;

The rest of the dispositions in the two (2) challenged resolutions remains.

SO ORDERED.9The appellate court brushed aside petitioners theory that the illegality of strike makes the respondents dismissal legal. It stressed that while the strike was illegal, marked as it was with violence and for non-compliance with the requirements of the Labor Code, nonetheless, Julian, Tejada, and Burabod (complainants in NLRC NCR Case No. 00-11-08124-94) were dismissed prior to the staging of the strike. Said dismissal constitutes unfair labor practice. Moreover, said dismissal was done without valid cause and due process. Thus, the complainants in NLRC NCR Case No. 00-11-08124-94 are entitled to reinstatement and backwages, although separation pay may be given in lieu of reinstatement due to strained relations with petitioners. The appellate court also ruled that the quitclaims relied upon by petitioners herein are void, having been executed under duress. Finally, the Court of Appeals affirmed the finding of the NLRC that petitioners had failed to support their claim of having paid herein respondents their money claims, because belated evidence presented by petitioners is bereft of any probative value.

Petitioners timely moved for reconsideration, but the appellate court denied said motion.

Hence, this petition alleging that the Court of Appeals committed palpable and reversible errorS of law when:

I IT ORDERED THE RESPONDENTS, WHO ARE UNION MEMBERS, BE REINSTATED AND BE PAID BACKWAGES, DESPITE THE FACT THAT IT CATEGORICALLY HELD THAT UNLAWFUL ACTS ATTENDED THE STAGING OF THE ILLEGAL STRIKE IN CONTRAVENTION OF THE CLEAR MANDATE OF ARTICLE 264(a) OF THE LABOR CODE.

II IT AWARDED BACKWAGES TO THE RESPONDENTS, WHO ARE UNION MEMBERS, DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE ISSUE OF WHETHER OR NOT THE SAID UNION MEMBERS ARE ENTITTLED TO BACKWAGES HAVE BEEN ANSWERED IN THE NEGATIVE BY THE DECISION DATED 15 APRIL 1996, PROMULGATED BY THE HONORABLE LABOR ARBITERA QUOVALENTIN C. REYES AND SUCH RULING HAD ATTAINED FINALITY.

III IT AWARDED SEPARATION PAY AND BACKWAGES TO THE RESPONDENTS WHO ARE OFFICERS OF THE UNION, NAMELY: ADELAIDA LUMOD, LUCITA CASERO, MYRNA RAGASA, FELY MORALES, ELEN SUEDE, FELY VALENCIA AND VIOLETA ARRIOLA, DESPITE THE FACT THAT IT WAS HELD IN THE DECISION DATED 15 APRIL 1996 PROMULGATED BY THE HONORABLE LABOR ARBITER A QUO VALENTIN C. REYES THAT THE AFORENAMED UNION OFFICERS HAVE LOST THEIR EMPLOYMENT STATUS BY STAGING AN ILLEGAL STRIKE AND SUCH RULING HAD ATTAINED FINALITY.

IV IT HELD THAT RESPONDENTS JULIAN, TEJADA AND BURABOD WERE ILLEGALLY DISMISSED.

V IT FAILED TO UPHOLD THE VALIDITY OF THE RELEASE, WAIVER AND QUITCLAIM EXECUTED BY THE RESPONDENTS CONCERNED.

VI IT REFUSED TO GIVE PROBATIVE VALUE ON THE VOLUMINOUS DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE SUBMITTED BY HEREIN PETITIONERS.10In our view, considering the assigned errors, the following are the relevant issues for our resolution:

1. Whether the respondents union officers and members were validly and legally dismissed from employment considering the illegality of the strike;

2. Whether the respondents union officers and members are entitled to backwages, separation pay and reinstatement, respectively.

On thefirst issue, petitioners argue that respondents were legally dismissed, pursuant to Article 26411of the Labor Code in view of the determination by the Labor Arbiter that the strike conducted by respondents are illegal and that illegal acts attended the mass action. The respondents counter that the determination of the illegality of strike is inconsequential as the conclusion by the appellate court on the illegality of dismissal was based on the petitioners non-compliance with the due process requirements on terminating employees, which had nothing to do with the legality of the strike.

Some elaboration on the legality of the strike is needed, though briefly. In ruling the strike illegal, the NLRC observed that:

While the right to strike is specifically granted by law, it is a remedy which can only be availed of by a legitimate labor organization. Absent a showing as to the legitimate status of the labor organization, said strike would have to be considered as illegal.

A review of the records of this case does not show that the local union to which complainants belong to has complied with these basic requirements necessary to clothe the union with a legitimate status. In fact, and as respondents claim, there is no record with the BLR that the union complainants belong to have complied with the aforementioned requirements. This Office then has no recourse but to consider the union of complainants as not being a legitimate labor organization. It then follows that the strike conducted by complainants on respondent companies is illegal, as the right to strike is afforded only to a legitimate labor organization.12Indeed, the right to strike, while constitutionally recognized, is not without legal restrictions.13The Labor Code regulates the exercise of said right by balancing the interests of labor and management in the light of the overarching public interest. Thus, paragraphs (c) and (f) of Article 26314mandate the following procedural steps to be followed before a strike may be staged: filing of notice of strike, taking of strike vote, and reporting of the strike vote result to the Department of Labor and Employment.15It bears stressing that these requirements are mandatory, meaning, non-compliance therewith makes the strike illegal. The evident intention of the law in requiring the strike notice and strike-vote report is to reasonably regulate the right to strike, which is essential to the attainment of legitimate policy objectives embodied in the law.16In the instant case, we find no reason to disagree with the findings of the NLRC that the strike conducted by the respondent union is illegal. First, it has not been shown to the satisfaction of this Court that said union is a legitimate labor organization, entitled under Article 263 (c) to file a notice of strike on behalf of its members. Second, the other requirements under Article 263 (c) and (f) were not complied with by the striking union. On this matter, the record is bare of any showing to the contrary. Hence, what is left for this Court to do is to determine the effects of the illegality of the strike on respondents union officers and members, specifically (a) whether such would justify their dismissal from employment, and (b) whether they ceased to be entitled to the monetary awards and other appropriate reliefs and remedies.

Article 264 of the Labor Code, in providing for the consequences of an illegal strike, makes a distinction between union officers and members who participated thereon. Thus, knowingly participating in an illegal strike is a valid ground for termination from employment of a union officer. The law, however, treats differently mere union members. Mere participation in an illegal strike is not a sufficient ground for termination of the services of the union members. The Labor Code protects an ordinary, rank-and-file union member who participated in such a strike from losing his job, provided that he did not commit an illegal act during the strike.17Thus, absent any clear, substantial and convincing proof of illegal acts committed during an illegal strike, an ordinary striking worker or employee may not be terminated from work.18Recourse to the records show that the following respondents were the officers of the union, namely: Josephine C. Julian (President), Adelaida Lomod (Vice President), Lucita Casero (Secretary), Myrna Ragasa (Treasurer), Filomena Morales (Auditor), Elena Suede (Board Member), Jacinta Tejada (Board Member), Felipa Valencia (Board Member) and Violeta Arriola (P.R.O.).19Before us, petitioners insist that these employees were legally terminated for their participation in an illegal strike and moreover, Julian and Tejada were validly dismissed for abandoning their jobs after refusing to comply with transfer and reassignment orders.

While holding the strike illegal, the Court of Appeals nonetheless still ruled that the union officers and members were illegally dismissed for non-observance of due process requirements and union busting by management. It likewise gave no credence to the charge of abandonment against Julian and Tejada. Thus, it awarded separation pay in lieu of reinstatement to all union officers including respondents Julian and Tejada and affirmed all other monetary awards by the Labor Arbiter i