Final Completion Report - UN-Habitat

Final Completion Report

‘Reconstruction of Primary Schools and Posyandus in the Province of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam (NAD) and North Sumatera/Nias Island in Indonesia, funded by UNICEF’

2005-2010

Jakarta, April 2011 UNOPS Project Number: 00044648

Indonesia Project Centre IDPC Reconstruction of Primary Schools and Posyandus in the Province of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam (NAD) and

North Sumatera/Nias Island in Indonesia

Table of Contents 1. Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 2

1.1 Background .............................................................................................................. 2

1.2 Cooperation between UNICEF and UNOPS ................................................................. 3

1.3 Revised Scope and Strategy ........................................................................................ 4

1.4 Coordination and Communication ............................................................................... 5

2. Project Implementation Processes ....................................................................................... 6

2.1 Damage assessments .................................................................................................. 6

2.2 Site selection ............................................................................................................ 6

2.3 Design ..................................................................................................................... 7

2.4 Construction works .................................................................................................. 11

2.5 Capacity building .................................................................................................... 12

2.6 Building types ......................................................................................................... 13

2.6.1 Reinforced concrete moment-resisting frame building..................................................... 13

2.6.2 Light Gauge Steel (LGS) framing in Nias ....................................................................... 15

2.6.3 Alternative Material and Construction Methods Design in Nias ...................................... 16

2.7 Human Resources .................................................................................................... 17

2.8 Financial Management ............................................................................................. 18

3. Project Implementation Evaluation ................................................................................... 19

3.1 Construction duration............................................................................................... 19

3.2 School and posyandu cost ......................................................................................... 19

3.3 Project achievements ............................................................................................... 19

4. Results Summary ........................................................................................................... 20

4.1 Finance .................................................................................................................. 20

4.2 Factors affecting implementation ............................................................................... 21

4.3 Lessons learned ....................................................................................................... 24

4.4 Program Strengths ................................................................................................... 25

4.5 Program Weakness .................................................................................................. 26

4.6 Recommendations ................................................................................................... 27



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Acknowledgements

UNOPS would like to thank UNICEF for their efforts and close collaboration to achieve a common goal in this challenging environment. UNOPS is proud to have been associated with UNICEF‟s post-tsunami school and posyandu reconstruction program in Indonesia, and is most appreciative of the opportunity to be of service to UNICEF. The final outcome of the project is the result of a joint effort with many committed and talented individuals from various backgrounds and experiences who have worked tirelessly to ensure the project‟s success.

Executive Summary

The earthquake off the west coast of Aceh on December 26, 2004 and the ensuing tsunami claimed the lives of more than 200,000 people in Aceh alone while a further 500,000 were displaced. Physical destruction in Aceh was immense, with total damage and losses estimated at US$4.5 billion. On Nias Island, already one of Indonesia‟s poorest areas, a subsequent earthquake on March 28, 2005 displaced 70,000 people and killed another 961 causing damages and losses totaling US $400 million. Large numbers of schools and health facilities were affected threatening the education and health services for tens of thousands of children. Aceh and Nias Island were challenging settings for all actors and stakeholders active in the recovery program. Apart from the inaccessibility of many sites and the lack of adequate building materials and skilled workers, many areas were not attractive to large scale contractors for various reasons including non-technical issues with communities. UNICEF and UNOPS had to learn and adapt to the challenges that the post-tsunami environment imposes for all entities venturing on high scale operations such as this ambitious construction program. It is against this background that UNICEF and UNOPS have been trying to move forward despite the slow initial rate of progress. Any consideration of any serious activity must take into account this uneasy and challenging background. In partnership with UNICEF, UNOPS built 225 new permanent primary schools (1,467 classrooms) in Nangroe Aceh Darussalam (NAD) and Nias Island on behalf of the Ministry of National Education in Indonesia. UNOPS also built 27 integrated village health posts, called „posyandus‟, on Nias Island. UNICEF built posyandus in Aceh using other implementing partners. The project, which operationally ran until 2010, aimed to restore educational facilities to a much higher standard than existed prior to the tsunami. The basic school design set new standards in earthquake resistance and typically incorporated six classrooms, separate toilet facilities for girls and boys, with washbasins to encourage improved hygiene, a teacher‟s office, and an outdoor play area. The design of all school facilities was adapted to the specific needs of each community and the requirements of each site of construction. The project has increased the number of children enrolled in primary schools, thereby contributing to the Millennium Development Goal 2 to “achieve universal primary education”. It has also led to significant improvements in the quality of education, reduced drop-out rates in elementary schools and increased primary school completion rates. Children are empowered with the basic life skills and education necessary to become productive members of society. This Final report is a requirement of the Management Service Agreement initially signed by UNICEF and UNOPS on November 26, 2006 and amended on May 31, 2010, to support the ongoing partnership on the reconstruction of permanent primary schools and posyandus in Aceh and Nias Island. The process of reconstruction was slow to meet initial expectations. At the same time, the complexities involved in the unprecedented damage and loss assessment and human recovery needs meant that an earlier target date would not be realistic.



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This report takes stock of the final outcome and achievements of the project objectives as well as a summary on the overall performance and the obstacles that were faced during implementation. The recovery operations have revealed some key lessons that will be relevant to future post-disaster recovery operations.

1. Introduction

1.1 Background At 07:58 on December 26, 2004, one of the largest recorded earthquakes occurred. Generally accepted as measuring 9.15 on the Richter Scale, the earthquake originated in the Indian Ocean just north of Simeulue Island, off the western coast of Sumatra, generating the most destructive tsunami in recorded history. The earthquake was unusually large in geographical extent. An estimated 750 miles of fault-line was moved by approximately 50 feet. The slip did not happen instantaneously but took place in two phases over a period of several minutes. Seismographic and acoustic data indicate that the first and most disruptive phase involved the formation of a rupture about 250 miles long and 60 miles wide, located 19 miles beneath the sea bed – the longest rupture ever known to have been caused by an earthquake. The rupture proceeded at a speed of about 1.8 miles per second (6,480 miles per hour), beginning off the coast of Aceh, and proceeded north-westerly during the next 100 seconds. The sea bed is thought to have risen by several meters, displacing an estimated 19 miles of water. The subsequent tsunami devastated the shores of Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Maldives, South India, Thailand and other countries, with Indonesia suffering the worst of the wave‟s force. It caused serious damage and fatalities, as far as the east coast of Africa, with the furthest recorded tsunami-related death occurring at Port Elizabeth in South Africa, 5,000 miles away from the epicenter. In Aceh Province, Indonesia, the wave reached a height of 80 feet (24 m) when coming ashore along large stretches of the coastline, rising to 100 feet (30 m) in some areas when progressing inland. More than 200,000 people perished, a further 500,000 were displaced. A significant majority of the physical infrastructure of Aceh was destroyed or seriously damaged as a result of the effects of both the earthquake and tsunami. The western coastal areas of Aceh, including the cities of Banda Aceh, Calang, and Meulaboh, were among the areas hardest-hit by the tsunami. The earthquake and resulting tsunami claimed the lives of 2,500 teachers and displaced 121,000 students from their schools. Ministry of National Education (MoNE) estimates (June 2005) that 2,269 schools out of a total of 5,565 schools in Aceh province were damaged. 309 Sekolah Dasar Negeri (SDN, primary level) and Madrasah Ibtidaiyah Negeri (MIN, muslim primary level) schools suffered light damage, a further 494 were heavily damaged, while 235 were totally destroyed. A further 122 hospitals and health centers were damaged or destroyed. A subsequent powerful earthquake on March 28, 2005 caused extensive collateral damage to infrastructure throughout Nias Island, leaving a further 70,000 people displaced and nearly 1,000 dead. In Nias, heavy damage was reported on 413 SDN and MIN schools. Thus learning and health capacities across the region were severely reduced. In the post tsunami situation, approximately 177,000 students needed learning facilities. This vast devastation in Aceh and throughout Nias Island has further compounded the misery of survivors who lost family members and means of livelihoods. Even before the earthquake and tsunami, the 30-year conflict between the Government of Indonesia and the separatist Free Aceh Movement – or Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) had taken its toll on Aceh where much of the province's infrastructure was dysfunctional. It must therefore be acknowledged that the recovery effort was against both a post-disaster as well as a post-conflict backdrop. The tsunami helped trigger the peace agreement between the Government of Indonesia and GAM, mediated by former Finnish president Martti Ahtisaari, with the signing of a MoU on August 15, 2005. During elections for the



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provincial governor later held in December 2006, the former GAM and national parties participated. The election was won by Irwandi Yusuf, whose base of support consisted largely of ex-GAM members. With the Governor‟s leadership and assistance of the European Union through the Aceh monitoring mission peace and stability have – for the most part – held and were instrumental to the success of the recovery process.

The longer term recovery process in Indonesia was entrusted to a specially created Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency for Aceh and Nias (BRR), which reported directly to the President. This centralized coordinating agency was also critical to the success of the recovery process, in large part owing to the stewardship of its Director, Dr. Kuntoro Mangkusubroto and his dedicated team. The rapid response of the international community provided immediate relief goods, services and funds for long-term infrastructure reconstruction works targeting priority sectors such as education and health. Part of these reconstruction funds were made available to the UN Children‟s Fund (UNICEF), which undertook a major responsibility for the reconstruction of schools and health facilities in Aceh and Nias Island.

1.2 Cooperation between UNICEF and UNOPS

Pursuant to the general partnership between UNICEF and UNOPS in a number of countries, an immediate link was established after the tsunami and earthquake in order to respond to the widespread construction efforts in rebuilding the damaged/destroyed schools and – later – to strengthen Nias‟ network of integrated village health posts, called „posyandus‟, which serve more than 80% of Indonesian families in rural areas across Indonesia. UNICEF was also building posyandus in Aceh using other implementing partners. These provide basic health services such as immunization, growth monitoring of children and antenatal care for pregnant women. By February 2005, UNOPS‟ initial technical team was deployed and structural damage assessment had commenced. UNOPS‟ initial involvement also included an assessment of conditions within the local construction industry to develop mechanisms for effective delivery of the project. In April 2005, a MoU was agreed between the Government of Indonesia (GOI) and UNICEF, by which UNICEF was formally tasked with the responsibility of school rehabilitation and reconstruction in the affected areas. Pursuant to that agreement, UNICEF and UNOPS also entered into a formal agreement on July 4, 2005 whereby UNOPS was requested to assume responsibility for reconstruction of 300 and rehabilitation of 200 damaged primary schools in Aceh and Nias over a 3-year period. UNOPS‟ scope of services included project design services, supervision, management and quality assurance of the building construction work through to the hand-over of the facilities to UNICEF and management of final inspections. Upon acceptance of each individual building by UNICEF, UNOPS and UNICEF worked together to effect hand-over of such buildings to the communities and Government Representatives in Aceh and Nias Island. Effort and time was dedicated in the second half of 2005 to the structural design and standards, issues related to rehabilitation and reconstruction, strategy for implementation, quality control, budgetary concerns, capacity building for actual implementation and management of construction works and designs, and initiation of the pilot construction project in Banda Aceh - Muhammadiyah I & II. Work continued at Muhammadiyah I & II despite several set-backs. The pilot project availed UNOPS and UNICEF the opportunity to observe and agree on standards and norms for the rest of the schools to be built. Muhammadiyah I & II were completed on September 15, 2006 nearly 1-year after the construction contract was signed on 5 October 2005. In January 2006, the first series of school sites were handed over to UNOPS. Accordingly, design works and subsequently the construction activities commenced in the first quarter of 2006, albeit at a



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relatively slow pace. It also gradually became apparent that a more realistic approach to the building design using „modules‟ was required as a solution for faster implementation. Nevertheless, serious concerns on the successful completion of the project started to develop by the second quarter of 2006, particularly in view of the pressure exerted by beneficiaries and their disappointment with non-delivery of permanent schools. In April and May 2006, UNICEF initially hired an independent consultant to review and advise on planning, implementation, and monitoring of their school construction programme in Aceh and Nias. As a result of this review, several recommendations were made, including a revision of the agreement between UNICEF and UNOPS. This necessitated required changes in the project scope and implementation. With effect from July 1, 2006, as a result of internal executive decision, the management of UNOPS was transferred from the Middle East Office (based in Dubai, UAE) to the Asia and the Pacific Office (APO, based in Bangkok, Thailand). This shift coincided with serious concerns of UNICEF at various levels on UNOPS ability to complete the project under the terms of the July 2005 agreement, and their desire for a review/change in the scope of work by UNOPS. In order to streamline operations and reduce costs, the UNOPS office in Jakarta was closed and key project staff relocated to the newly established Project Management Unit (PMU) in Banda Aceh.

1.3 Revised Scope and Strategy In the initial agreement UNOPS was contracted to provide turn-key services at all 500 schools by constructing 300 new schools, and rehabilitating 200 existing damaged schools. However, the task of rehabilitating 200 schools was removed from the UNOPS‟ component and the target was to concentrate on reconstruction of 345 (367 6-classroom equivalent) permanent child friendly and seismic resistant primary schools, providing a learning environment in safe structures. This would facilitate the return to normality for affected children and their communities, following adoption of emergency and transitional humanitarian measures. Given UNICEF‟s concern that project completion would be too late the number of permanent schools which UNOPS was to construct was reduced to 133 because of poor initial delivery by UNOPS. UNICEF established a Construction Unit of its own and the remaining schools were contracted to commercial firms BITA and Nippon Koei (NK) to design and supervise school construction while the construction contracts were prepared and managed by UNICEF‟s Construction Unit and Supply Section. Design and construction supervision services for posyandus were initially awarded to another commercial firm, Mott MacDonald (MMD). However, the latter contract was ended in December 2009. To expedite delivery and avoid derailing the project, several decisive measures were taken in mid-2006 including but not limited to:

x a revised Management Services Agreement (MSA) signed by UNICEF and UNOPS; x improved reporting and Project Implementation Plan (PIP); x improved overall construction work plan, progress indicators and tracking mechanisms; x key changes in UNOPS‟ management structure; x closing the UNOPS Jakarta office and relocating key positions such as Finance Officer to

Banda Aceh while other non-essential international posts were abolished; x the recruitment of a senior TSU Manager and Architect for an improved modular design; x the introduction of roaming Quality Inspectors and the use of UNV Construction Engineers; x a revised salary structure in line with UN recruiting procedures; and,



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x the introduction of alternative construction materials and methods in Nias.

All 133 permanent schools were initially scheduled for substantial completion and hand-over by the end of 2008. However, based on significant improvement in delivery and renewed trust, UNICEF gradually transferred some of these sites back to UNOPS during bi-annual reviews increasing the number of schools for reconstruction by UNOPS to 156, 170, 188, 213 and finally 225 (1,467 classrooms equivalent to 245 6-class room schools) and added 27 posyandus. The last schools and posyandus were substantially completed and handed-over to the beneficiaries in March 2010. The defects liability period ended in October 2010 and the project reached operational closure.

1.4 Coordination and Communication The specific scope of work and services provided by UNOPS was defined in the Project Implementation Plan (PIP). The PIP was reviewed every six months, and at each such review a six month Action Plan was produced for the subsequent six months period, detailing proposed procurement, staffing levels, milestones and outputs, and forecast expenditure. Appropriate adjustments were made in the implementation of the Project. In July 2006 there was significant improvement in the coordination and communication between UNICEF and UNOPS. Weekly meetings on progress and ad hoc technical meetings were conducted in Banda Aceh, and when necessary in Jakarta, to maintain close consultation on project development or issues. UNICEF‟s Chief of Field Office in Banda Aceh served as the UNICEF focal point to UNOPS during the implementation of the Project. Technical oversight and approval of construction related designs was provided by the Head, Construction Unit in UNICEF‟s office in Banda Aceh. UNOPS prepared a weekly update on progress in the field and submitted monthly narrative progress

Banda Aceh

Meulaboh

Nias

Calang

Pidie



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reports and quarterly reports on its work in connection with the Project. Financial reports were also provided to UNICEF on a quarterly basis. Such reports provided an assessment of whether the Project was being implemented in accordance with the Project Implementation Plan and the Project Budget, and a description of any obstacles to full and timely implementation of the Project.

2. Project Implementation Processes

2.1 Damage assessments

A structural survey of 428 damaged schools in Aceh and Nias by UNOPS‟ consultants, conducted between March 2005 and February 2006, indicated that 212 were in need of rehabilitation, 154 to be reconstructed and 56 to be in need of both reconstruction and rehabilitation. Only 6 schools did not need any intervention. While the power and destructive force of the earthquake and resultant tsunami are not disputed, it was apparent that the extent of the destruction would have been less if structural failures resulting from sub-standard construction work, had not occurred. These structural

deficiencies can be largely attributed to inadequate design, poor construction practices, and sub-standard quality of building materials.

2.2 Site selection About 400,000 persons had to be relocated as Internally Displaced Persons. In order to continue teaching, in many remaining schools classes were regrouped, more shifts were introduced, and more students attended lessons in one classroom. UNICEF distributed tents as temporary schools to serve the many affected children. UNICEF would later contract IOM to construct semi-permanent schools with assistance from Institut Teknologi Bandung (ITB), Indonesia. These facilities offered appropriate transitional school shelter during the longer-term reconstruction efforts and made good use of local resources. When deciding whether or not to build a permanent primary school in a given area, UNICEF checked whether there was a risk of further population movement away from the school location. UNICEF carefully selected affected school sites for reconstruction on the guiding principles that:

x The school was heavily/structurally damaged by the tsunami, earthquake and/or conflict; x There were at least 90 pupils per school; x There was at least 2 km separation from the nearest primary school or junior secondary

school; x Or, there were more than 200 pupils in two schools separated by a small distance; x There was commitment from the Education Office to provide teachers, principals and other

school support staff; x There was evidence of population settlement (after the tsunami, earthquake and conflict); x There were projections and/or evidence showing an increase in student numbers by the end of

the school reconstruction;

Structural survey of damaged school building



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x Sites were without major soil problems (hills, swamps, rocks, floods) and therefore could offer an appropriate learning environment;

x There was no land ownership dispute, and the land certificate had to be duly signed and approved by all concerned stakeholders; and,

x There was convergence with other UNICEF supported programs.

2.3 Design Once UNOPS received a written request from UNICEF outlining basic information such as property boundaries (northing and easting), number of male and female pupils and associated toilets, and proposed water distribution system (i.e. piped, deep well, shallow well, and/or rainwater harvesting system etc.), a survey crew was dispatched to the field to conduct topographic surveys and collect soil samples as well as other pertinent information. The construction process followed a participatory approach by allowing communities to comment on site decisions. The data was analyzed and a preliminary design report was prepared for approval by the school headmaster, community head, Education Department and UNICEF. Otherwise UNICEF was notified of the site‟s constraints. Upon approval of the preliminary design report UNOPS prepared the detailed architectural, structural, watsan and electrical designs and associated BoQ. Overall the process took around 6 weeks per site.

Designs by UNOPS conform to the new minimum standards and regulations issued by the Ministry of Public Works in late 2005 for all districts. The majority of schools in Aceh fall into seismic zone 5

Temporary school distributed by UNICEF Semi-permanent IOM school

Soil investigation Topographic survey



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while those in Nias lie within seismic zone 6. The buildings were “engineered structures”, which took into account factors such as importance for post disaster functions, type of building structural system, seismic zoning and local geological conditions. UNOPS followed the Standar Nasional Indonesia (SNI) design code as a basis for all engineering design work. UNOPS also referred to international design standards and construction practices to supplement the minimum requirements of the GoI standards. These included:

x Australian Standards AS3600 – Concrete Structures Standard; x Australian Standards AS1170.1 – Dead & Live Loads; x Australian Standards AS1170.2 – Wind Loads; x New Zealand Standards NZS 3101 Parts 1&2 1995 – Concrete Structures Standard; x American Concrete Institute ACI 318M-05: building Code Requirements for Structural

Concrete; x American Concrete Institute ACI 352R91 – Recommendations for Design of Beam-Column

Joints in Monolithic Reinforced Concrete Structures. Models were checked using structural analysis software while critical elements including column and beam elements and portal frame column and beam joints were checked by manual calculations in accordance with procedures defined in ACI 318 M and ACI 352R91, respectively. UNICEF`s Child Friendly School principals were incorporated into the designs to ensure that the schools met the educational needs of the children, are safe and free of hazards to health. Some of the design criteria included:

x Sufficient ventilation and lit learning spaces with a view to maximize daylighting; x Appropriate classroom space (around 30 pupils per class); x Earthquake-resistance; x Floor levels elevated above the historical flood plain; x Fenced areas; x Outdoor play area for children to connect community and school; x Accessibility for disabled children including ramps, railings, etc.; x Separate toilets and washing facilities for girls and for boys; x Water within toilet block; x Sanitation facilities connected to a system that can be emptied and doesn`t pollute the

groundwater table; and, x Appropriate heights for handles, wash basins, toilet seats etc.

„Modular‟ designs were prepared by UNOPS and utilized for all sites taking into consideration the specificities of the sites. UNOPS prepared construction plans, calculations, drawings, specifications and BoQs. In the preparation of the design, calculations, rate analyses, BoQ and cost estimates UNOPS acted in consultation with the UNICEF Construction Unit prior to tendering of the buildings. The preliminary and detailed designs were certified and submitted to UNICEF for endorsement. UNICEF submitted such documentation to the Public Works Department for final written approval. Designs, specifications and BoQ were prepared in English and translated in to Bahasa Indonesia. UNOPS also prepared building maintenance manuals for the communities. A less utilitarian design was later prepared that included converting the existing bulky concrete veranda to a light weight structure and featured vaulted ceilings and skylights for improved natural ventilation and lighting.



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Revised concept design: separation of veranda from buildings, and use of more economical light structures

Revised concept design: Use of sloped ceiling to improve natural lighting and ventilation



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Rendering of concept for revised school design

Newly built classroom with vaulted ceilings Newly built module with skylights



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Additionally, posyandu designs should include:

x well-ventilated spaces; x space for a range of community activities to persuade women to come regularly with their

children for check-ups; x facilities to accommodate women‟s needs; x an examination room for the village midwife to examine pregnant women; x midwife houses to keep midwives who might otherwise move to another village with better

facilities; and, x play areas for young children, and support early childhood education activities to persuade

parents to bring their children regularly to the village.

2.4 Construction works One of the expected outcomes of the project was that the construction activities would directly benefit the local economy through the injection of cash by contracting of local contractors, employment of local resources and purchase of local construction materials, wherever appropriate. Prior to the tsunami, Aceh relied mostly on the Ministry of Public Works for major infrastructure works and had a limited amount of construction and contracting resources; these were mostly small home building companies which could not sustain the demand of a large reconstruction programme in the province. Not surprisingly many of these small companies were subcontracted to major contractors from large cities like Medan and Jakarta etc. Unfortunately, these major contractors often „sold‟ their contracts to the smaller companies for a fee leaving these smaller companies ill equipped and unprepared. Assistance and training for local businesses was therefore imperative. UNOPS used its standard procurement procedures for purchases and selection of the contractors, taking account of the principles of quality, economy and efficiency. The initial focus was on the pre-qualification of potential contractors through public advertisements. The pre-qualification process classified potential contractors into categories depending on their individual capacity, experience, etc.

Posyandu examination room Posyandu play area for children

Local workers were often ill equipped



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UNOPS sought approval and clearance of UNICEF for all contractors and shared information with UNICEF on those who performed well and those who did not. UNICEF Construction Unit staff were invited as observers to all pre-bid conferences and bid openings. UNOPS used its General Conditions of Contract for the construction works based on principles outlined in FIDIC (Fédération Internationale Des Ingénieurs-Conseils) works contracts. Contract packages with a certain value and complexity were tendered by invitation only to pre-qualified contractors of a particular category that suited the requirements of the particular package. For the reasons mentioned above, contract packages were usually limited to one or two schools per contractor. This approach limited the risk of awarding a contract for multiple sites to a dubious contractor. The skill base and resources gradually expanded locally as a result. The execution of the works was subcontracted to commercial companies through contracts that required performance bonds and bank guarantees for advance payments. However, this proved difficult for most local contractors. Advance payments were therefore not made in most cases which affected the contractor‟s liquidity. The award of all contracts, as a general rule, was based on a competitive bidding process and took between 2 and 3 months from the time bids were issued. Payments were processed upon satisfactory completion of measurable outputs or specific elements of the BoQ. In this regard and at the request of the contractor, National Field Office Engineers measured completed works for Construction Engineer‟s certification and Field Office Manager‟s request for disbursement of funds. The Payment Certificate was then processed by the Finance Officer for progress payments. The substantial completion of the works was jointly inspected and agreed upon by the contractor, UNOPS and UNICEF. Following substantial completion there was a six-month defects cure period for each building delivered to and accepted by UNICEF. Community-based organizations within the respective school and posyandu sites were not considered to the extent possible for small works such as access roads, drainage, fences, landscaping, etc. Direct contracting was contemplated by UNOPS in Nias at an early stage but was not acceptable for the reason that it attracts large overheads and requires purchasing large quantities of construction equipment and machinery, maintenance of vehicles as well as a thorough understanding of the local construction supply chain.

2.5 Capacity building Training was vital to ensure there was common understanding on the scope of the project, technical and contractual conditions and requirements of the projects. Duties and responsibilities of various positions were clarified to avoid overlaps, and gaps. The training provided guidance on how to inspect, assess and make clear and concise instructions to the contractor without any contractual consequences in line with the Project Quality Assurance Manual prepared by UNOPS. Young and enthusiastic local engineers underwent internal training of around 4 weeks at the PMU/TSU in Banda Aceh, and eventually provided continual quality control presence on each construction site on a full-time basis. They also provided technical assistance to the contractors, where required. This mechanism was established as a result of lessons learnt in the first year and due to a lack of indigenous engineering capacity applied throughout the local environment. The site monitors reported to the Field Office Engineers and ultimately to the Construction Engineers and the Field Office Managers. In order to ensure uniform and adequate standards and provide oversight coverage to this important project, a team of two Quality Inspectors, who worked under the direct supervision of the Project Coordinator, regularly visited construction sites, at random and on a rotation basis to assess the quality of works.



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Inspection and testing only confirm that inspection elements of the product or process meet the criteria established. They do not add quality to inspected items. Quality of work during construction is achieved by the contractor‟s quality-control programme. As a matter of high priority in achieving the intended results, UNOPS managers and engineers at all times tried to train local contractors on the UNOPS bidding process, use of unit rate analysis in preparation of bid proposals, completion of BoQs, efficient and correct use of building materials, and other „best practices‟ in the construction process. This effort was intended to benefit the local construction market / industry and increase the local capacity.

2.6 Building types

2.6.1 Reinforced concrete moment-resisting frame building Standards of available building materials in the project area were generally low. Therefore, materials used by contractors had to be carefully scrutinized to ensure compliance with specifications and quality standards. The project had a considerable demand on local material sources and equipment. Individual contractors had to source their own aggregates from the river or sea with very little awareness and attention to quality. UNOPS proposed, and UNICEF accepted, to construct reinforced concrete moment-resisting frame structures with masonry in-fill panels similar to the conventional building types in Aceh province. However, these structures were constructed with a higher level of quality, requiring more extensive supervision. The roof structures of these buildings conventionally use timber trusses; however, due to un-availability of timber from sustainable plantation sources, there was a transition to the use of light gauge steel framed trusses. The second type of structure proposed by UNOPS, to be used in Nias Island, was the light gauge steel framed buildings (LGS) with fiber cement sheet cladding built on top of reinforced concrete raft foundations. This type of alternative construction system was proposed for inaccessible sites. Almost half of the sites in Nias Island were inaccessible by vehicle. This environmental challenge in Nias was an extra difficulty that slowed down the progress of work on the island.

Slump tests Destructive concrete compression tests



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Classroom of reinforced concrete moment-resisting frame building

Reinforced concrete moment-resisting frame school building



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Hard to reach school site on Nias Island

2.6.2 Light Gauge Steel (LGS) framing in Nias In June 2006, a RFP for supply and construction of some 50 schools in Nias Island using the light gauge steel (LGS) frame structure was issued by the project. This tender did not lead to a satisfactory outcome as no contractor could submit a technically and financially viable offer. A second round of RFP was launched in October 2006. However, the project, given the logistical considerations, lack of contractor capacity on the island, and high risk of depending on one contractor for such large number of schools, decided to be cautious in its approach and reduced the number of schools with LGS frame superstructure to 21, in consultation with UNICEF. The RFP resulted to award of a contract in December 2006. Meanwhile reinforced concrete slabs had been completed at all 21 school sites using small local contractors from Nias. However, completion of these schools was severely delayed due to problems with the LGS contractor for the superstructure. It became apparent that the LGS contractor was unable to provide the materials that had been agreed in the contract and the specifications. Therefore, the contract was terminated and the Termination Agreement was signed on 11 October 2007.

Reinforced concrete slab in Nias



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In an effort to resolve the impasse, UNOPS Technical Support Unit Manager and UNICEF‟s Head of Construction Unit joined hands to help the contractor in finding suppliers of the required materials. A local company was identified as the one and only manufacturer of zinc/aluminium metallic coated and pre-painted LGS in Indonesia that would provide long-tem corrosion protection against the tropical marine environment in Nias. In light of two rounds of tenders and lack of confidence in another round of international tender in achieving a satisfactory result the UNOPS team opted for a negotiated contract with the local LGS supplier on a sole source basis.

This decision was based mainly on the fact that the supplied materials matched UNOPS specifications and that they were manufactured locally thus ensuring that the schools would be constructed despite the incessant delays faced by the project. According to the supplier‟s engineering specifications and warranties, LGS profiles had to be installed by trained and certified installers recommended by the supplier. Therefore, the cancelled contract was split into two parts. The first part consisted of a negotiated contract for the design, supply and delivery of LGS materials to Nias by the LGS supplier. The second part consisted of a limited competitive bid for the erection of the LGS frame structures and the completion of school buildings (meaning architectural finishes such as wall cladding, windows and doors, painting, tiles, toilets, lighting etc.). Unfortunately, UNOPS once again hit a snag as all the bids received were significantly above the engineer‟s estimate and UNICEF‟s budget. UNOPS was left with no other choice other than to annul the bid. At this point, expeditious action was required so as to move forward with the school construction. In consultation with UNICEF, the UNOPS team decided to split the contract into three parts: The first part consisted of a negotiated contract for the design, supply and delivery of LGS materials to Nias. The second part consisted of a negotiated contract at a reasonable price for the erection of LGS frame structures only, as this task had to be performed by a contractor certified by the supplier. The third part consisted of a negotiated contract at a reasonable price for the completion of school buildings (architectural finishes such as wall cladding, windows and doors, painting, tiles, toilets, lighting etc.). A third party was selected for conducting pre-shipment inspections of materials before leaving the source warehouses in Medan and Jakarta. This independent firm checked material qualities and quantities and summarized the results in a report vis-à-vis conformance with the engineering specifications and approved packing list including an article concerning labelling and packing. The project resulted to award these contracts in March 2008 and all 21 schools were completed by April 2009.

2.6.3 Alternative Material and Construction Methods Design in Nias Based on a new initiative, 24 schools located in remote areas on Nias Island were packaged into one contract so as to attract large scale contractors from major cities. Accordingly, UNOPS launched a RFP process for the design, build and transfer of these schools, using acceptable alternative

Approved LGS manufacturing facility in Jakarta

Installation of LGS materials



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construction methods and materials in March 2007. This initiative tried to extend the scope of operations and bring in new possibilities and opportunities in order to overcome the geographical, technical, and non-technical challenges faced by both UNICEF and UNOPS in Nias. Bidders were permitted to propose solutions using reinforced concrete, structural steel, light gauge steel, structural timber or other alternative materials. The accepted proposal was for cold-formed steel. However, UNICEF requested that the number of schools be reduced from 24 to 16 as permitted under the terms and conditions of the RFP and the contract was awarded in November 2008. One school was cancelled and the remaining 15 schools were completed by February 2010. The longer implementation time was mainly attributed to delays in procuring high quality materials, cumbersome logistics and added complexity of the revised design.

2.7 Human Resources The project was ultimately run by a Project Management Unit (PMU) headed by an international Project Coordinator. The Project Coordinator was based in the main office in Banda Aceh and was assisted by four Field Office Managers (FOM) based in Banda Aceh, Calang, Meulaboh, and Gunungsitoli (Nias), respectively. A Deputy Project Coordinator was brought in towards the end of the project to support the Project Coordinator and lead the project closure process when the Project Coordinator left the project. A senior engineer in charge of a Technical Support Unit (TSU) within the PMU, and a senior Operations Manager and Finance Officer were recruited as well, albeit at different times. The PMU, TSU and four Field Offices were staffed to meet the technical and non-technical requirements of the project. The Project Coordinator was delegated with adequate level of authority to procure goods and services to facilitate implementation in a timely manner. Financial management of the project was carried out in a transparent and accountable manner and in line with practices of UNOPS, through an imprest account. Each Field Office was responsible for conducting tenders and evaluations in their respective geographical area, assisted by the PMU in Banda Aceh and UNOPS Regional Office in Bangkok. The project peaked in June 2007 with 17 international and 184 national personnel. International Personnel i. Project Coordinator (PC) - As explained above, the PC was responsible for all aspects of delivery of the project. He liaised with UNICEF and GoI at all levels. He was assisted by a Deputy Project Coordinator towards the end of the programme who would eventually close-out the project. ii. TSU Manager- The TSU Manager was a senior civil/structural engineer who was responsible for development of all technical/engineering designs and drawings. He oversaw and directed the various TSU teams, ensuring adequate and timely preparation and processing of all design works.

Cold-formed steel pre-shipment inspection Cladding of cold-formed steel superstructures



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iii. The TSU Manager was assisted by an international team consisting of a Senior Architect and a UNV QA Officer. Part time services of a Geotechnical Consultant were also employed owing to the poor soil conditions uncovered at many sites, especially in the affected areas where the tsunami had deposited loose sediment. iv. Operations Manager- The Operations Manager oversaw all admin/HR, financial, logistical, security, IT, contracts admin/management, documentation and reporting services to all field offices as well as the PMU. v. Field Office Managers (FOM)- Field Managers were positioned in each of the four field offices. They were responsible, inter alia, for (1) delivery of construction in accordance with specified design and construction standards and timelines indicated in the agreed work plan in their respective region, (2) all aspects of contract execution and management, including initial tendering and evaluation processes, (3) interacting with the provincial and district authorities and local UNICEF representatives to ensure they were well aware of the status of project implementation, and (4) supervision of local Field Office Engineers and site monitors to ensure quality benchmarks were maintained at all times by contractors. vi. Quality Inspectors- Two independent Quality Inspectors inspected and monitored quality of works on a full-time and rotational basis to ensure the quality standards of the project, as agreed with UNICEF and GoI, were maintained throughout the project areas. The QIs reported directly to the Project Coordinator. vii. Finance Officer- Given the level and size of financial transactions, the Finance Officer was not only responsible for the overall financial management and operations of the project, he was also responsible for ensuring that financial transactions were within the financial authorizations issued by UNOPS, and that financial transactions took place with due oversight. viii. In Banda Aceh, Meulaboh and Calang field offices, one international civil engineer/UNV acted as the Deputy Field Office Manager (Construction Engineer - CE), and assisted the Field Office Manager in all aspects of construction delivery and technical oversight. In the case of Nias Island, two Construction Engineers were - at times - required while a UNV Operations / Logistics Officer was temporarily employed given the nature of construction works and materials. National Staff Most project personnel were Indonesian nationals who filled various administrative and technical functions in the project. More senior national personnel occupied positions in Finance, HR, Documentation/Reporting, Security Management, IT, Design Management, and Field Office Engineering.

2.8 Financial Management The project was run on two financial reporting platforms, that is, Field Administrative Support System (FASS) for „imprest accounting at project sites and Atlas (Peoplesoft) at the Regional Office. UNOPS took the necessary steps to remedy the past state of financial reporting by discontinuing the use of imprest, implementing Atlas at project sites, introducing a new corporate wide reporting platform, and ensuring consistency in the format of financial statements. All past discrepancies between FASS imprest returns and Atlas have been reconciled and necessary adjustments posted in Atlas.



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3. Project Implementation Evaluation

3.1 Construction duration On average and in the absence of contract termination, construction of reinforced concrete schools lasted just under 10 months in Aceh province while it took an average of 14 months on Nias Island. It took up to 2 years to complete schools in cases where contracts were terminated and works re-tendered and awarded to new contractors. Slabs took an average of 8 months to build principally because UNOPS opted to use indigenous contractors in Nias to build them. These schools were completed 6 months later on average once specified LGS elements were ordered and works on the superstructure had begun following several rounds of failed RFPs. On average posyandus took 10 months to build. Construction times were similar for Banda Aceh, Calang, and Meulaboh but were significantly longer on Nias Island, no matter what building type was selected.

Type of Structure Location Average construction times

Reinforced concrete school buildings Aceh province 10 months Nias Island 14 months

Reinforced concrete slabs using local contractors Nias Island 8 months LGS framed superstructure buildings Nias Island 6 months Cold-formed steel framed buildings in remote areas Nias Island 16 months Posyandu buildings Nias Island 10 months

* excludes terminated contracts

3.2 School and posyandu cost The average price of schools and posyandus, based on actual contract amounts awarded, are summarized in the table below. The cumbersome logistics and lack of indigenous contractor capacity in Nias seemed to influence the final cost more than the building technology selected. In comparison to regions on Aceh‟s west coast that were generally flat, Nias featured mountainous terrain and required more costly land development initiatives. Transactions in Indonesian Rupiah were carried out and recorded at the UN operational rate of exchange in effect on the date of the transaction. The rate fluctuated from IDR 8,680 to the US Dollar in June 2007 to as high as IDR 12,550 to the US Dollar in December 2008 and affected the final cost.

Type of Structure Location No. Average cost

Reinforced concrete school buildings Aceh province 160 US$ 208,766 Nias Island 29 US$ 244,382

LGS framed school buildings Nias Island 21 US$ 226,661 Cold-formed steel framed buildings in remote areas Nias Island 15 US$ 248,119 Posyandu buildings Nias Island 27 US$ 72,320

3.3 Project achievements The basic school design set new standards in earthquake resistance and typically incorporated six classrooms, separate toilet facilities for girls and boys, with washbasins to encourage improved hygiene, a teacher‟s office, and an outdoor play area. The design of all school facilities was adapted to the specific needs of each community and the requirements of each site of construction.



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The project has increased the number of children enrolled in primary schools, thereby contributing to the Millennium Development Goal 2 to “achieve universal primary education”. It has also led to improvements in the quality of education, reduced drop-out rates in elementary schools and increased primary school completion rates. Children are empowered with the basic life skills and education necessary to become productive members of society. The project also employed more than 200 local engineers and support personnel and over 100 contractors.

Physical achievements 2005 - 2010

year ending

DLP completed

planned substantial completed and hand-

over

substantial completed vs planned

under construction

under tender

under design

Permanent schools

2005 0 0 0 N/A 2 0 0 2006 0 18 9 50% 85 39 32 2007 14 101 79 78% 111 17 6 2008 104 186 167 90% 59 0 0 2009 177 224 220 98% 5 0 0 2010 225 5 5 100% 0 0 0

Posyandus 2008 0 0 0 N/A 26 2 0 2009 0 27 23 85% 4 0 0 2010 27 4 4 100% 4 0 0

4. Results Summary

4.1 Finance UNOPS start-up direct support costs were high in the initial phase of the project, especially when taking into consideration the disappointing early delivery results. UNOPS project management had been doing everything possible to curtail its direct support costs towards the end of the project by increasing the number of sites allocated to field engineers, using UNV Specialists and cutting down on the number of international professionals, renting instead of purchasing vehicles, and moving to UNICEF provided premises with less office space. While UNOPS has returned unused funds amounting to $US 750,000 in September 2010 and $US 198,777 in November 2010 in the spirit of accelerating closure and facilitating utilisation of these funds by UNICEF, the provisional financial report as at 31 March 2011 shows a deficit for the amount of US$ 7,499 which is needed to cover UNOPS project delivery costs. Project expenditure on support costs remained under budget but expenditure on subcontracts has increased because of revaluation of 2009 purchase orders and loss on currency ex-change rate resulting in a total recorded expenditure to date of US$ 71,196,858. UNOPS is in the process of 2011 first quarter-end closure. The financial statement should be regarded as provisional and for information purposes only. Adjustment to provisional figures may occur after the issuance of the financial statement. A final financial statement as at 31 March 2011 will be prepared and submitted upon closure of UNOPS books. UNOPS is intending to close the project financially in our accounting system on 31 July 2011.



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An activity-wise breakdown of the overall financial status of the entire project including expenditure by year to date, and balance against the approved Project Implementation Budget will be provided at project Financial Closure which is expected in April 2011.

4.2 Factors affecting implementation The most notable factors affecting implementation include: x Data collection, verification and site selection. Most data and information was made

available to UNICEF by MoNE. Consequently, this impacted the implementation as the coordination of the prioritization and allocation of sites to various international partners was necessary and prudent to avoid overlapping and duplication. Notwithstanding the efforts of the MoNE and UNICEF generated reliable data and information from the affected districts. Information and data from all Government Ministries were sent to BAPPENAS (Ministry of Planning) for the preparation and development of the Reconstruction Plan. Planning and coordination activities included information and data collection, prioritization and allocation of sites, survey and site inspections, land acquisition and lobbying relevant authorities for the necessary approvals.

x Spatial distribution of sites. As a result of the widely distributed population in each district and the uncertainty about the future settlement of IDPs following the tsunami, project sites were located in ubiquitous locations throughout NAD and Nias. Careful initial identification and selection of sites by UNICEF and concerned government authorities made it difficult for UNOPS to optimise the grouping of these sites into more manageable implementation clusters. UNICEF selected and handed-over sites in small tranches. UNOPS did not receive all 225 schools and 27 posyandus until December 2007 making it necessary for UNOPS to maintain set staffing levels. Problems were exacerbated by competition among agencies and government for a limited local contractor base.

9

70

88

53

5

23

40

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

$-

$500,000

$1,000,000

$1,500,000

$2,000,000

$2,500,000

$3,000,000

$3,500,000

$4,000,000

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Schools H/O Posyandus H/O Direct support costs



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x Limited access. In the beginning, all road access to Banda Aceh from Medan via Meulaboh (along the west coast of the island) had been severely damaged. Large sections of road and major bridges had been washed away leaving isolated communities no access to relief assistance. All relief efforts in these areas were flown in by helicopter or brought in by ship. However, in some areas, shipping was not a viable option due to damage to port facilities or lack of suitable landing areas. In particular, districts of Aceh Jaya and Aceh Besar were totally cut off. Fortunately, the restoration of an all weather road was eventually re-established. The damage to the road network was extensive and reliance on road transport, in the initial stages, for the transportation of construction materials and supplies for all reconstruction programmes had accelerated the deterioration of the remaining accessible roads. Problems were compounded during the rainy season, when it was difficult to access remote sites, particularly in Nias, as rivers became swollen and access roads slippery, treacherous and sometimes impassible. This had a dual impact; works and deliveries were often delayed, and arrival of labour and engineers at sites to perform work and inspections were occasionally late.

x Poor soil conditions. Poor soil conditions were uncovered at many sites, especially in low-

lying areas prone to flooding and where the tsunami deposited loose sediment. Time was needed to interpret the results of field and laboratory tests and prepare the foundation designs. Based on the results of the assessment, UNICEF had to decide whether to proceed with the site or find a new site altogether. Time and energy were lost in cases where the site was eventually changed.

x Limited financial capacities. The ability to sign contracts and begin work in a timely manner

was limited by the difficulties local contractors experienced in obtaining acceptable bank guarantees, performance bonds and liability insurance. Contractors were also hampered by their inability to pre-finance and a lack of cash planning. There was often a significant lapse in time from the point at which the contractor was awarded a project, incurred labour, equipment, materials and other costs, and was actually paid for completed work.

West coast road under construction in Aceh

Damaged bridge Limited port facilities/landing areas



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x Material and equipment availability. Local resources were often limited. Materials and equipment which are essential for construction were typically sourced from more developed markets. Delivery from larger nearby cities such as Medan and Jakarta to remote sites was cumbersome and time consuming, especially for Nias Island where they had to be barged across the Indian Ocean and transshipped and handled multiple times before reaching the sites. This resulted in delays and increased transportation costs.

x Quality control requirements. It proved difficult for local contractors to achieve UNICEF/UNOPS‟ expectations of quality and timeliness for construction. As a result, works had to be re-done, and in some cases demolished, in order to meet the requirements.

x Extortion. Some beneficiary communities lacked interest in the programme and paid more attention to disrupting works so that monthly „fees‟ paid by contractors would continue. The situation was exacerbated by post-conflict tensions. Contractors sometimes complained that facilities were vandalized and materials and equipment occasionally went missing when resources were not sourced directly from within the community or because alleged „fees‟ went unpaid by contractors. Under extreme cases sites where cancelled resulting in wasted time, energy and cost.

x Contract terminations. After multiple warnings, particular situations compelled UNOPS to terminate 38 contracts and re-tender the remaining works or request a waiver to negotiate a new contract with proven contractors. This added cost and time to the project, especially if there were unpaid debts left by the terminated contractors.

x Change in scope. In August 2007, UNICEF requested that UNOPS go beyond its original mandate and implement 14 schools in Pidie and Pidie Jaya districts where post conflict tensions are entrenched.

x Missing information. In December 2007 UNICEF requested that UNOPS take-over 13 schools from NK and 29 posyandus (2 sites later cancelled owing to land disputes) from MMD on Nias Island owing to slow progress by the latter consultants and UNOPS accepted the sites in good faith despite the absence of key technical information at the time.

x Site relocation. 10 of the 13 NK sites were later changed by UNICEF obliging UNOPS to start design work from scratch. UNOPS considered the building material proposed by NK as one of the factors inhibiting progress because of long lead times for structural steel fabrication and cumbersome deliveries to remote sites and UNOPS instead opted for its modular design for reinforced concrete schools.

x Data inaccuracy. UNOPS accepted the 27 posyandus from MMD under the assumption that the anticipated technical information would be complete and accurate. However, it was not. The technical information came in nearly 1 month late with increased floor areas compared to what was given to UNOPS in December 2007. Again, UNOPS had to go back to the drawing board to come up with designs within UNICEF‟s budget.

x Non-technical issues. Apart from unfavorable outcomes following several rounds of tendering and re-tendering in Nias for schools and posyandus, UNOPS had been confronted with incessant non-technical problems such as land disputes, extortion, hostilities to workers, physical threats to its own staff and assets, the unattractiveness of Nias Island for non-resident contractors, and PLN‟s [power utility company] inability to move power lines obstructing building works or make new connections.



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x Requests for additional work. In September 2009, owing to the lack of power supply on Nias Island, UNICEF requested that UNOPS design and supervise work for revised gravity fed rainwater harvesting systems. UNICEF also requested that bamboo fencing be erected where disputes with alleged land owners could be avoided.

4.3 Lessons learned From past experience, a list of lessons learnt has been establish in light of the possibly to avoid similar problems for future projects and to minimize the risks and identify new opportunities for improvements. x The BRR model of an executive agency with a direct reporting line to the President of

Indonesia provided a strong mandate to plan and coordinate the overall recovery effort and received international praise. This model was generally accepted as a success and is being replicated elsewhere in Indonesia for other development interventions such as REDD+.

x IOM quickly built semi-permanent schools with assistance from Institut Teknologi Bandung (ITB), Indonesia. These facilities offered appropriate transitional school shelter during the longer-term reconstruction efforts and made good use of local resources. Without these semi-permanent schools, beneficiary unrest would presumably have been much worse.

x Use of „modular‟ designs cut down on the design preparation times including approvals from

the Ministry of Public Works.

x Limited local contractor capacity in the project areas was a limiting factor in the ability of any organisation trying to implement construction works, particularly in a post disaster situation where the demand for reconstruction services outstrip supply of qualified contracting capacity. UNOPS had to provide on-site full-time technical input and supervision in order to overcome the contractor‟s deficiencies and to invest time and effort in training local contractors who could potentially take on construction works.

x The vaulted ceilings and skylights presented a higher degree of complexity and maintenance requirements and the quality of worksmanship was inadequate to apply the designs in most cases.

x Contract termination owing to non-performance of the contractor necessitated decisive action and more flexibility in requesting UNOPS Contracts and Property Committee for a waiver to negotiate with pre-qualified contractors with proven track records. The greatest delays to implementation stemmed from giving too much latitude to contractors that failed to take initiative and fell too far behind and then having to cut their contracts necessitating settlement of debts and another round of tender and award.

x UNOPS combined several schools in tenders aimed at larger national contractors with capacity to mobilize additional resources for construction of schools in areas where local contractor capacity was limited, such as „inaccessible‟ sites on Nias Island. This approach helped to balance the risk of relying solely on local contractors, especially where the quality of local materials was poor.

x It is not clear whether direct contracting would have helped or hindered progress. Local communities proved to be one of the biggest challenges of the programme, particularly in Nias. A policy statement to guide local labour participation should be considered for future



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contracts. Nevertheless community participation should only be considered where communities express a sincere interest in the project and commit to general maintenance.

x UNOPS may have considered using the training facilities and capabilities of ILO in Banda Aceh. Given the abundance of unemployed, unskilled people as a result of the tsunami and conflict, some agencies such as ILO implemented employment and training programmes for IDPs. This would have addressed some of the unskilled labour however, the need was larger than what was available locally and external workers were needed.

x UNOPS provided a vigorous site monitoring mechanism so as to ensure timely implementation of works in accordance with quality standards. It was necessary to have international technical oversight in the field and independent quality control owing to societal hierarchy by age whereby younger engineers may have hesitated to question elder contractor personnel if left alone.

x It was important to map out independent construction materials laboratories early-on. The project therefore consulted Universities and the Ministry of Public Works in the affected areas with a view of understanding their capacities in performing the specified tests. Additional testing equipment was purchased by UNOPS to augment tests in-situ. Given the scale of post-tsunami reconstruction it is surprising how little support these intuitions received. The project may have established LTAs with these testing institutions.

x In an effort to reduce support costs, the Operations Manager position was abolished and the duties were transferred to the Finance Officer. However, this hindered UNOPS operational controls. Operations and Finance roles should have been segregated throughout.

x Even though schools and posyandus had been substantially completed and handed-over to the authorities, additional time was often needed to sort out alleged claims by communities or individuals against contractors‟ debts. In cases where contractors refused to return to site to correct any defects that may have emerged during the Defects Liability Period, additional time was needed to assess the damage and cost of repairs and deduct this amount from the retention payment and then find another proven contractor willing to repair the buildings.

4.4 Program Strengths Positive aspects of the response in Aceh and Nias include: x establishment of disaster management efforts in Indonesia managed by the National

Coordinating Agency for Disaster Response (BNPB) and its counterparts at the provincial level as evidenced by the emergency responses to recent natural disasters in Mentawai, Merapi and Wasior;

x improved structural mitigation measures such as stricter building codes;

x historical peace process leading to greater autonomy for the Acehnese that was critical to the

success of the recovery process;

x empowered leaders at the top provincial and central levels who exercised their authorities in a transparent and accountable manner;

x use of local contractors, identified through a „pre-qualification‟ process, in the construction works as a matter of priority; and,



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x „One UN‟ approach focusing on synergies between UNICEF and UNOPS.

4.5 Program Weakness A summary of things that could have been done better is provided below. x Despite multiple years of implementation, the project never developed a predictable and

effective planning platform.

x Restoring infrastructure was a priority for progress in all sectors but more attention should have given to long-term maintenance.

x A high turn-over of project personnel led to inefficiencies and added cost. The project employed more than 50 international personnel since its inception. The high turn-over was generally attributed to the pressures exerted by the project.

x Piped water distribution systems and streams were not accessible in most situations. Water quality was therefore generally poor, especially around coastal areas. UNICEF‟s WASH unit was charged with boring deep wells at priority locations but the demand outstripped equipment supply. Shallow wells were therefore dug in most cases supported by small electric generators that lifted water to elevated storage tanks. However, these generators were occasionally stolen despite being locked or used for other unintended purposes. Some schools were reluctant to use them at all because of the requirement to buy fuel. This was later addressed by modifying the design to accommodate gravity fed rainwater harvesting systems. But this option is only viable for areas with high rainfall intensity. In all cases the water was not suitable for consumption. This would have required a comprehensive filtration and disinfection system, training and budget allocation for maintenance. It is probable that in most cases children still bring water from home after boiling.

x Power supply in Aceh remains an issue to this day. PLN, the state power company, could not keep up with the pace of development, especially in remote areas. Solar panels for home lighting and television sets were provided by another development partner for communities in North Nias at just over US$1,000 per household.

x In the absence of sewer connections, septic tanks were designed to collect wastewater from toilets and sinks in the building by gravity. Anaerobic bacterial digestive activity on the sludge leads to the generation of methane and carbon dioxide. Sludge settles to the tank floor and the semi-purified water travels to a second chamber where organic matter continues to settle before exiting to a drain field where impurities are further removed. These septic tanks should be emptied after five years or so. At this point it is unclear who will assume this role.

Solar community project in North Nias



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4.6 Recommendations Based on key lessons learned on this project, several recommendations are provided below for consideration in future post-disaster recovery operations. x In the spirit of the Hyogo Framework and Sphere Project, it may be worth developing a single

set of comprehensive and harmonized construction guidelines for recovery settings. Practitioners may also refer to Engineering in Emergencies – A Practical Guide for Relief Workers, Jan Davis & Robert Lambert – 2nd Edition 2002.

x Conduct appropriate needs assessment and develop risk registry to implementation.

x Conduct early supply chain assessment including a review of custom clearance/government formalities and authorization lead times and charges as well as transportation modes and trans-shipment points. Work with top leadership to improve efficiencies, where possible.

x Consider early communication and socialization strategy to better manage donor, partner and beneficiary expectations.

x Establish roster of reliable candidates with appropriate credentials, especially for specialized technical functions, and similar experience gained.

x Where possible, promote the use of local material and labour. x Where appropriate, consider contracting Community-based Organizations (CBOs), or direct

implementation.

x Consider alternative options for contractors to access credit where other securities cannot be accessed to ensure that contractors remain liquid and avoid intermittent work stoppages.

x Maintain database and exchange of information on past performance.

x Conduct regular meetings to monitor progress.

x Consider Long Term Agreements with qualified suppliers of materials to be purchased in

large and predictable quantities such as reinforcing steel, cement, roof sheeting, fittings etc. for implementation projects over longer periods (i.e. more than 1 year), especially where local products are substandard.

x Lobby Government Planning and Utility Departments for commitment to public service

connections such as power, drainage and piped water and sanitation.

x Develop improved strategy regarding water quality.

x Review wastewater treatment options.

x Consider solar power for remote areas.

x Consider Environmental Consultant to evaluate the environmental impact and sustainability of the proposed interventions to balance the environment, resources, cultural and community needs.

x Coordinate activities closely with Planning Departments to avoid development of inappropriate sites such as farmland and avoid habitat encroachment etc.

Final Completion Report - UN-Habitat

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