Filsafat Ilmu-Rethinking-Ethics of Science and Technology-1

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Rethinking Ethics of Science andTechnology with Pragmatism

Wanderley Dias da [email protected]

In this paper I am interested in some prominent themes in science, technology andethics – notably, how more appropriate perceptions of technological artefacts anddevelopments in general can improve the quality and effectiveness of contemporarydiscourses in the field. It is certain that traditional moral theories seem unable to copeadequately with the strongly dynamic nature of our technological culture. My second,more specific task, then, is to lay out an alternative approach to bear upon the broadquestion of the place of ethics in a technological world. 1 This question is often thoughtto imply a dilemma: should society be involved in the evaluation of science andtechnology, or should it leave it to scientists, engineers, technicians, and technocrats?But, as I hope will become clear, the dilemma is false. For one thing, it is safe to say thattechnology is not “outside” society, but it is rather another element of it. Thus the“technical” question is already a “ social” one. 2

The discussion is divided into five sections. I begin with a “likely story” to illustratethe false dilemma mentioned above. I focus primarily in the “conflict” between social and moral symbolic landmarks on the one hand, and technological development on theother. In section 2 I outline K eulartz et al.’s discussion on the “ technological blindness ” of traditional applied ethics and classical philosophy of technology. 3 Next, in section 3 Ilay out their critique of the “normative deficit ” of the constructivism proposed by

modern technology studies. In section 4 I summarize Keulartz et al.’s pragmatistalternative. 4 By going over these matters I hope to show the unique value ofpragmatism in considering moral issues in our modern technological culture.

1 For this purpose, I have in mind a “pragmatist ” model elaborated by Keulartz et al. See note 3 belowfor reference purposes.

2 I follow the account of Guido Van Steendam, in “Ethics of Science and Technology,” Lectures atKatholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium; October 10 – November 29, 2010. There is nothing new in myrendering of this argument here.

3

“Ethics in Technological Culture: A Programmatic Proposal for a Pragmatist Approach,” Science,Technology, & Human Values, Vol. 29/1 (Winter 2004), 3-29.In this paper I’ll provide the reader with in -textedition and page references.

4 To be sure, I do not pretend to offer a comprehensive review of their pragmatist project here – sincethat is obviously beyond the scope of this paper – but only a clarification of their major arguments.

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Rethinking Ethics of Science and Technology

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1. The False Dilemma

Let us begin with the ending: it is above all else urgent not to think of social evaluationas divorced from scientific or technological evaluation. Why? The typical question ofwhether society should be involved in the assessment of science and technology (or

technology for short) is, at its very best, a false dilemma – or even a philosophical myth.So, it is important to remember that so-called “ethical issues” in technology do notactually arise between science and society, but rather between two scientific processesor practices. This is to say, then, that the question of whether society should beinvolved in the evaluation of science and technology, or whether it should leave it toscientists, engineers, technicians, and technocrats, is groundless. Simply, the alleged“technical” question is already a “ social” one. But this can be probably best illustratedby means of an example.

Consider this likely story. Last week Jack was driving home back from London on M1.Suddenly he drives through deep standing water, loses control of his car and collideshead-on with a heavy lorry. Jack is rushed to hospital, but physicians declare him “dead”minutes later. Now, according to the “Human Tissue Act 2004 ” – covering England,Wales and Northern Ireland – if Jack had not, while alive and competent, given consentfor some or all of his organs or tissue to be donated following his death, the medicalstaff will have to approach his relatives or other relevant persons to establish anyknown wishes of his to do so. As it happens, there is no record of Jack’s consent; andnow the hospital is negotiating organs and tissue recovery with his family. We need tointerrupt our “likely story” now to say more about the “dilemma ” we put aside earlier.

On the one hand, it is safe to say (1) that the organs and tissues recovered fromJack’s body can save the lives of various patients waiting for transplantation. One theother hand, however, we cannot ignore (2) that there might be some religious andbioethical arguments against the donation. I do not want to poke into these arguments.The most important lesson that emerges from this narrative is that: (1) poses thequestion of priority; i.e., the claim that, all things considered, we should do our best to“save” lives, for example; and (2) is a pointer to the landmark criterion or socialsymbolic constructions; i.e., the question of whether the principles underlying ouractions satisfy certain ethical or social standards – particularly whether they can beuniversalized. It will be no surprise that such landmarks function as “conceptualrestrictions” for society. As a matter of fact, it is certain that people generally limit theirethical considerations by holding on to those landmarks. What happens to these moralor social constructions in the course of history, however, remains to be seen. To thisend, we must return to our story.

Let us suppose for a moment that Jack’s accident did not happen last week; butsome time ago, when – for religious or philosophical reasons – the human heart was stillbelieved to be the “seat” of the soul. It is certainly not hard to see that such a principlewould function as a conceptual restriction against heart transplantation. More simply, itis safe to say that , under the “seat of the soul” perspective, heart transplantation wouldsurely be considered morally unacceptable. As a matter of fact, this was exactly the casewhen, in December 1967, Dr. Christian Barnard performed the first heart transplant in

history. (And “failure of the heart” was then the legal and medical definition of death.)




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Of course there is nothing new in this case. From the discovery of Penicillin, there havealways been debates regarding the moral issues involved in new scientific inventions.So, naturally when the first heart transplant was performed, many considered itunethical, immoral. What is more, the controversy occupied the front pages ofmagazines around the world.

On the face of it, then, we can say that actions which are perceived as contradictingsymbolic constructions or landmarks, come to be morally disapproved; for they seem toweaken social cohesion. To be sure, it will not be necessary – particularly in such a shortessay – to dwell laboriously on the peculiarities of how (or perhaps why) society tendsto hold so tight to those landmarks (albeit, to dismiss the “power” of religious beliefs inthe consolidation of those symbolic constraints would be rather metaphorical andinconclusive, to say the least). For we are here more interested in the way applied ethicstry to assess and cope with those technological development.

In any case, with the increasing ability of medical experts to resuscitate people with

no heartbeat, the need for a better “definition” of death became obvious. To cut a longstory short, since the 1960s, legal and medical communities have – for obvious reasons– adopted “brain death” as the legal explanation of mortality. Put simply, the old “seat -of-the-soul” landmark was replaced by a new one. Thus heart transplantation no longercounted as morally objectionable. So, the lesson to be learned is, as Harbers andKoenis5 put it, simply this: social and moral standards are not merely “determined bysymbolic constructions..., but just as much by material objects: [e.g.,] ‘Fire, food,money, steam engines, dikes and polders, sewage pipes, viruses and computer systemshave just as strong a binding effects as sym bolic constructions, if not more so’” (2004:4).

This brings us back to Van Steendam’s remark that alleged “ethical issues” in scienceand technology do not actually arise between science and society, but rather betweentwo scientific processes or practices. How is this? Simply, as a matter of fact, we inhabita world full of people continuously discovering and inventing new things (and ideas);and sometimes this strongly dynamic characteristic of society generates conflicts. This isto say that old ways of life are repetitively being replaced by new ones. Hence, “normsand values are always being put up for discussion, and we regularly find ourselvesconfronted with new moral problems” (ibid).

Now, presumably, any effective moral theory must be able to accommodate those

changes. But, as I hope will become clear, because traditional philosophy (i.e., appliedethics and classical philosophy of technology) tends to adopt totally unquestioningprinciples as starting points for its inquiries, it surely lacks insight to cope with thestrongly dynamic and pluralist character of our technological culture. That is to say that– contrary to what traditional philosophy supposes – the moral “conflicts” that evolvein the process of technological development are as much part of society as technologyitself. It is therefore necessary to adopt a more appropriate perception of technologicalartefacts and developments in general, if we are to improve the quality andeffectiveness of contemporary discourses on ethics of technology.

5 1999, 4, in Keulartz et al. 2004.




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So, if indeed it seems necessary to propose another moral theory to repair the“technological blindness” of traditional philosophy – one that seems to accommodatethe fact that social and moral evaluations of technology are more complex than thetypical question of whether society should be involved in the assessment oftechnological development – I suggest the pragmatist approach sketched by Keulartz et

al. in their essay “Ethics in Technological Culture: A Programmatic Proposal for aPragmatist Approach.” We turn now to their discussion.

2. Technological Blindness of Traditional Ethics and Classical Philosophy

Keulartz et al. begin by giving an overview of the so- called “technological blindness”that seems to affect traditional philosophy in general. The main culprit, they say, is theclassical belief that technology and society “form each other’s opposites and, as such,the idea of a “technological culture could only be an oxymoron” (ibid:7). They explainthe origin and nature of this technological blindness, as derived from the two traditions

upon which modern philosophy is built. They say “modern philosophy is largely shapedby empiricism and rationalism. Empiricism – as modelled by the works of Francis Bacon – launched a utopian program aimed basically at “achieving social progress throughscientific and technological means.” Rationalism, on the other hand, rests on anobsession with the so-called “unshakable foundation upon which knowledge” can besystematically constructed. So, “The imagine o f man that arises from modernphilosophy is one of a completely autonomous subject who uses science andtechnology in a sovereign way to achieve his or her aims ” (ibid:5). As it happens, thishumanistic, heroic and self-centred individual is still, they say, to a large extent thesubject of applied ethics in general. To illustrate their point, Keulartz et al. refer to DeVries thus:

Depending on the sort of ethical theory one supports, attention will be focused eitheron the presuppositions underlying actions or on the consequences of actions. In theformer case [rationalism], the question to be answered is whether the principleunderlying the actions satisfies ethical criteria, particularly whether it can beuniversalized. In the latter case, one asks whether the action contributes to theaggregated individual welfare [empiricism] (1999, 19).

In other words, moral theorists seem to restrict their focuses on the “cement holdingsociety together to the values, principles, norms, and rules by which people attune theiractions to each other” (2004:5). What’s wrong with this approach? It should clear by

now that society’s moral landmarks are not merely determined by symbolicinterpretations, but just as much by scientific and technological developments. This is tosay – in line with Harbers and Koenis 6 – that science and technology have “just as stronga binding effect as symbolic constructions, if not more so .” Against this background,Keulartz et al. argue that “applied ethics seem to view technology mainly ininstrumental terms; it can be used for good or for bad but does not form a subject ofconsideration in its own rights” (ibid:6). In this view (of technology as a neutralresource), applied ethics will often evaluate scientific progress accordingly, dependingon whether it conflicts with its symbolic constructions or not.

6 See previous note.




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But this, however, is by no means the only concept of technology that emerges fromthe vast sphere of modern philosophy. There is the classical “substantive” viewprofessed by traditional philosophy of technology. Two particular names had a directimpact on the development of classical philosophy of technology, Martin Heidegger andJaques Ellul. According to these philosophers, science is anything but “neutral” – an

innocent resource that can be used for good or for bad. On the contrary, for Heidegger,technology tends to disclose the world as standing reserve ( Bestand). In a technologicalworld, he says, the primary end is that of efficiency and, as such, things come to revealthemselves to us as mere resources. So, ultimately technology might extinguish all theother modes of perception. As Keulartz et al. point out, “Back in the 1930s, Heideggerhad already predicted that the human being would be relegated to a mere ‘technicizedanimal,’ once he became the main resource for technological control. ” Ellul, for his part,talks of a sort of “technological determinism.” That is, the idea that – contrary to whatmodern philosophy supposed – not man, but technology is in reality autonomous.Othe rwise stated, “Technology has not brought about liberation but instead a new

form of slavery.” On this picture, then, technology has unmistakably apocalyptic andprophetic characteristics (ibid:7). But what can we learn from this?

Keulartz et at. believ e it’s quite safe to say that, as a result of the anthropocentricismof traditional ethics and the prophetic characteristic of classical philosophy oftechnology, “applied ethics has not yet opened up the black box of technologicaldevelopment.” It surely pays attention to the moral problems invoked by the use ofnew technologies. Yet it “remains blind to the moral significance of technology itself .”This, they say, “condemns applied ethics to be left running to catch up with the facts.”Moreover, as long a s it “clings to its ‘anthropocentric prejudices,’ [traditional] ethics willnot be able to accommodate adequately the dynamic character of the present

technological culture.” What’s more, the foundationalism that has dominatedtraditional philosophy for su ch a long time is “mainly aimed at underpinning moral rulesand judgements on the basis of one or more universal starting points [absolutelandmarks] or principles.” As a consequence, little attention – or perhaps no attentionat all – is actually “paid to change of norms and morals over time” (ibid:10).

Now, what ’s the relevance of this account to the problem of ethics? No doubt, saysKeulartz et al., that traditional philosophy seems to have insufficient insight into themoral significance of technologi cal development and systems and that “it cannot copeadequately with the dynamic character” of the technological culture in which we live”(ibid:25). To be sure, few of us would probably entertain any serious doubt about thesignificant role of change in the construction of social and moral constructions.Consider the case of Jack, as we have seen earlier.

Our “likely story” makes it clear that technological development embodies particularoptions and restrictions, i.e., it invites “certain kinds of actio ns or behaviour anddiscourage other ones, and thus reinforce or alter existing role divisions and powerstructures” (ibid). Or, in Van Steendam’s terms: on the one hand, Jack’s story poses thequestion of priority: i.e., the claim that, all things considered, we should do our best tosave lives, for example. On the other, it ’s a pointer to the landmark criterion or socialsymbolic constructions. But this, we have suggested, is a misconception. Such falseimpression emerges from the mistaken assumption that the implications of scientific




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and technological artefacts are limited to the particular practices for which they areintended. But in reality the “functioning of a particular too l depends on a variety of‘action anchors’ or actors.” Unfortunately, the significance of this insight for appliedethics has until now, says Keulartz et al., not been “acknowledged sufficiently” (ibid). To sum it up, then, it isn’t difficult to see that, “as a result of its technological blindness

and foundationalist tendencies, traditional ethics is barely able to cope with thechanges and renewals that are an everyday affair in our technological culture in acreative or innovative way. ”

That is precisely why modern science and technology studies (STS) search for a“democratic control and normative assessment of technological developments.” Thatis, the evaluation of technology, according to STS, isn’t within the scope of appliedethics. This extreme approach, however, is certainly not without its problems; for, byholding on this “agnostic or even antagonistic attitude towards ethics” (ibid:12) , STStake moral norms and values on holiday. Now we have to see what Keulartz et al. mean

by this.3. The Normative Deficit of Constructivism

Keulartz et al. point out that STS have even tually replaced both Heidegger’s substantivevision of technology and Ellul’s technological determinism with a more pluralisticconcept. In their own terms, “Modern technology studies have opened up the ‘blackbox’ of technological development and revealed the intimate intertwinement oftechnology and society.” So it’s safe to say that, technology does not “operate” uponsociety as an external – neutral or otherwise – influence, but it ’s actually part of it. STSholds that both “scientific facts and technol ogical artefacts appear to be the outcomeof negotiations, in which many diverse actors are involved.” On this view, we must atany rate understand that technology isn’t completely autonomous at all. That is, scienceand technology do n’t follow “their own patters but rather are a fairly random result ofsocial interaction” (ibid). The question, therefore, is not how to relate science andculture , but rather how to understand the way these two are interconnected.

This “new” way of seeing things is called constructivism. Constructivism “does notview culture as unilaterally subject to technological imperatives, but argues that there isa coevaluation of technology and society.” Thus, “to be able to introduce technologicalartefacts successfully into society, one must change certain aspects of society, while

one can also say that the development and design of these artefacts takes place in asocial field of influence, with many different players, each with diverse interests, aims,resources, and means of powe r.” But this, however, is by no means the end of thematter. According to Keulartz et al., STS have “vigorously exposed the normativesignificance of technological artefacts” (ibid). At this point we ought to slow down andexplain these premises carefully.

Constructivism comes in two broad varieties, moderate constructivism (MC) andradical constructivism (RC). One form of moderate constructivism in particular, SocialConstruction of Technology (SCOT) defends the idea that science and technology “canbe explained by social factors like dominant group interests or existing powerstructures.” In other words, applied ethics needs not worry about technological




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artefacts and development; these can be analysed by following the basis of society andits structures. This is to say that (1) technological artefacts “should not be interpreted asintrinsic and invariable features and that (2) the kind of script that artefacts displaydepends on the specific context in which they are designed, developed, and used” (ibid:13). It isn’t hard to see that MC is already lacking in normative assessment. But it ’s

when we turn to RC that normative evaluation goes on astray for good.

For its part, RC blames MC for simply replacing one form of determinism(technological) with social determinism. So, to explain technological development, RCsubscribes to (1) but not to (2). In this view, both technology and society are merefabrications. That is to say that, technological artefacts have no value built into them.Thus, “we cannot de termine what the specific context looks like apart from theinterpretations of relevant actors....” In other words, if there is any need for normativeevaluation, we should simple “follow the actors of science and technology withouttaking sides.” Hence, according to RC, “what counts as the capacity and effect of a

technology is socially structured and is consequently contingent and open torenegotiation ” (ibid). What ’s wrong with both forms of constructivism?

Here Keulartz et al. refer to Radder, who thinks that RC is guilty of “judgementalrelativism.” That is, the assumption that “any interpretation is as valid or as invalid asany other.” This, however, as Keulartz et al. point out, cannot work in practice. The bestoption seems to be the “actor -networ k” approach MC endorse s. But, again, Radderholds that the danger here is that evaluation is based “exclusively from the winner’spoint of view rather than from the loser’s point of view.” Keulartz et al. think, however,that one thing is for sure: “their use is difficult to reconcile with ethical deliberation, inwhich justified norms and values are sought in order to evaluate the development of

technologies.” Again, Keulartz et al. refer to Radder, who believes that STS should“overcome its fear of becoming explicitly normative. He concludes that one should ‘tryto combine the achievements of the empirical approach – their more adequate views onthe practices of science and technology – with normative insights concerning theproblematic aspects of our tech no scientific world...” It’s precisely this “combination”that Keulartz et al. intend with their pragmatist proposal to “ethics in a technologicalculture” (ibid:14). The following is a summary of that model.

4. The Pragmatist Alternative

As Keulartz et al. explain, given the wide diversity of philosophers, “it is clear thatpragmatism must not be understood as a systematic theory in the usual sense, butrather as a particular series of theses; theses which can be and were argued verydifferently by differen t philosophers with different concerns” (ibid:15). I’ll, then, takeoff from the tripartite “pragmatist antitheses” Keulartz et al. describe in pages 16-7:

1. Antifoundationalism : That is, pragmatists reject the obsession for certainty whichphilosophers hav e celebrated since Plato. “All our convictions, without exception, are of aprovisional nature and are in principle susceptible to repeal or review.” More simply,pragmatists adhere to a particular form of fallibilism (ibid:16).

2. Antidualism : Here we are not talking simply of the dualism of essence and appearance –

which, again, philosophers have celebrated since Plato – but also other forms of dualismsuch as theory/practice, consciousness/external reality, fact/value and duty/inclination and




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so on. It should be clear by now that traditional philosophy and applied ethics are stronglyinfluenced by some sort of dualism. Pragmatists, on the other hand, “deny such anelevated state to these distinctions and give then only a functional significance, inaccordanc e with their potential usefulness for problem solving.” This is to say that, “thesedistinctions do not precede research but are formed or construed only during theresearch itself, with a view to practice.” Hence, the dividing lines between thesedistinctions are n’t clear and fixed forever from the beginning, whatever that beginning may be (ibid).

3. Antiscepticism : It’s important to note that, according to pragmatism, fallibilism shouldnot be mistaken by scepticism. True, pragmatists deny that absolute truth can beachieved by metaphysical guarantees, but “this does not mean that people are left at themercy of universal doubt.” Or, in Peirce’s words, “there is a world of difference betweenfallible knowledge and no knowledge at all.” What pragmatists claim instead is that“there is only more and less reliable knowledge. So for example, the Cartesianassumption that philosophy must start with real or initial scepticism is seen as an illusion.Pragmatism assumes instead that we can never begin our research with complete doubt;i.e., we always “enter” philosophy with prejudices. So, says Peirce, “one must havereasons to doubt, as well as to believe” (ibid:17).

These three antitheses are of vital importance for a pragmatic approach to ethics. Apragmatic moral theory turns crucially on the possibilities for living and workingtogether. In Keulartz et al.’s own terms, “While consequentialists take collectivehappiness to be the moral touchstone and deontologists, the obliging character ofmoral norms, peaceful cohabitation and fruitful cooperation serve as the moraltouchstone for pragmatism.” So, to sum it up, pragmatism rejects both dualism andscepticism. The former is “counterproductive because it encourages ‘black -and-white ’thinking, which brings conflicts to a head and leads debates to degenerate intounproductive boundary disputes, or gets stuck in childish ‘does not’ – ‘does too’exchange.” The latter also “forms an obstacle to a creative tackling of problems”because it simply “cultivates philosophical doubt at the expense of real doubt” (ibid).

But how does pragmatism plan to solve the problems created by both dualism andscepticism? Put differently, how does pragmatism avoid (1) technological blindness and(2) normative deficit? It would appear that the moral point of reference to cooperationand peaceful cohabitation typical of pragmatism reinforces two important “progressiveproblemshifts ” models (ibid, emphasis added).

(a) Process/Product shift : Keulartz et at. say that “because of its attention to the settlementof conflicts for the sake of further cooperation, pragmatism has always been interestedas much in the process of (moral) inquiry as in its ready-made products ” (ibid). This is tosay that, to promote fairness and quality of the “process of inqu iry and deliberation, it isessential that all those concerned can have their say and that decisions are made on thebasis of a careful consideration of all relevant conflicting moral claims and arguments”(ibid:18).

(b) Justification/Discovery shift: A second shift to which pragmatism gives rise is a “shift inemphasis from the context of justification to the context of discovery ...” That is,pragmatists pay as much attention to “the justification of moral judgments as they do toheuristics, to the art of inve ntion.” This, says Keulartz et al., avoids the problems of moretraditional philosophical models, which attach too much importance upon justifying moralvalues. This shift between contexts is often referred to as the “ split personality” of

pragmatism, “a term referring to the distinction between the rationalist [context of




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justification] and the romantic [context of discovery] side of pragmatism.” But how doesthis work? The rationalist side of pragmatism “is concerned with the cognitive capacity forargumentative problem solving and justification, while the romantic side is concernedwith the creative capacity for the innovation and invention of vocabularies which providenew meanings and open new perspectives” ( ibid). Now we need to investigate theoutcome of this progressive problemshifting tools.

It seems that if we combine the “distinction between rationalist and romantic aspectsof pragmatism with the distinction between product-oriented and process-orientedapproaches”, we arrive at a matrix of tasks for a pragmatist ethics. We shall considerthis “matrix of tasks” in a while. First, it’s important to note here that, according toKeulartz et al., some of these tasks are “well known to prev ailing forms of appliedethics, but others constitute supplements that [we] believe are necessary to makeethics better geared to dealing with moral problems in a technological culture ”(ibid:19).

Keulartz et al. explain that, “depending upon the moral problem at hand,pragmatists will switch between these different tasks and their corresponding methodsand tools” (ibid). The se methods and tools are determined according to the basicrationalist-romantic distinction described above, and are divided into four groups oftasks. In connection to the context of justification (the rationalist side of pragmatism),we are left with two sets of tasks: (a) traditional ethics and (b) discourse ethics ; and, inthe context of discovery ( romantic side), we have: (c) dramatic rehearsal and (d)conflict management .

To be sure, different applied ethics models will make use of one of these methodsand respective sets of tasks. It won’t be necessary, particular in an essay aiming to

investigate the methods used by pragmatists, to dwell laboriously on this matter. Weare here more inter ested in the general claim Keulartz et al. make that “applied ethicshas insufficient insight to cope adequately with the dynamic character of ourtechnological world” precisely because it’s limited to one method (ibid:25). I, therefore,propose to summary their major arguments thus.

So, in the context of justification , (a) will provide the arguments and justifications foror against specific courses of action. This is often the methods of traditional ethicists,lawyers or moral “scientists”. Keulartz et at. point out that the “common methods inapplied ethics are principlism, casuistry, cost- benefit analysis, and so on.” Meanwhile(b) aims at improving the structure of public debate and decision making. That is, it

supposes that “one should help to devel op procedures and institutions that guaranteeequal access to public deliberation and fair representation of all relevant arguments toensure that moral decisions are based on the ‘force of the better argument’ rather thanon the forces of power, money, an d the like” (ibid:19).

To Keulartz et al. “for common and familiar types of problems for which the relevantethical considerations are in principle known, the prevailing rationalist tools of appliedethics and discourse ethics usually suffice, while for new problems for which existingrules and routines are not adequate, it ’llbe necessary to resort to the romantic side ofpragmatism” (ibid). To this end, (c) offers the possibility of criticizing and renewingvocabularies, exploring possible future worlds, while (d) helps with the openconfrontation of heterogeneous moral vocabularies and worldviews. The former




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involves detailed descriptions of complex scenarios, “of various competing possiblelines of action and courses of conduct. The latter aims at dealing with the fundamentalvalue conflicts that arise from assessment and evaluation of technologicaldevelopments (ibid:21). The latter, they say, is possibly the most important for apragmatist ethics, since the “problems that threaten cooperation and coh abitation are

most pregnant and manifest” in handling such value conflicts. It would appear that theantifoundationalism and antiessentialism characteristic of pragmatism plays a crucialrole here, since “pragmatism will look for solutions in a more practi cal direction insteadof looking for ultimate moral truths or foundations for the ‘only right answer’ astraditional ethics tends to do” (ibid:23).

With this matrix of tools and tasks , pragmatists believe they can offer an ethics that iswell-equipped for our technological world. It ’s clear from the model described abovethat pragmatists don’t propose to radically break with the current practice of ethics, asit’s the case with STS, but “rather is complementary in character” (ibid:24). This is to saythat, unlike more traditional methods, which tend to hold tight to symbolic restrictions(and thus will be limited by one single method and task for every situation), pragmatistspropose to “switch between these different tasks and their corresponding methods ortools.” Keulartz et al. conclude by pointing out, however, that “to develop an ethicsthat is well equipped for our technological culture, further theoretical analysis of thetasks we have suggested and practical experimentation with the corresponding toolsare required” (ibid:25). I won’t attempt to pursue this possibility further here. Rather, I’llclose with some further observations relating the nature and ground of pragmatism.

5. General Comments

So, it will be found, upon consideration, that pragmatism seems to avoid both thetechnological blindness of traditional applied ethics and the normative deficit thatdisturbs STS. It is worth recalling the simple logic behind Keulartz et al.’s project here.We know that pragmatism – from its outset – aims at bridging the ever-widening abysmbetween two divergent tendencies in modern philosophy: empiricism and rationalism.Empirical theorists and scientists reject most rationalist propositions because theylacked, they say, objective evidence. Rationalists, for their part, believe that empiricismis a threat to moral and religious values. Pragmatism, on the other hand, aims atmediating between these traditions, combining what was most significant in each ofthem. So, “like empiricists , the pragmatists thought that we have no conception of the

whole of reality.” This is to say that, “we know things from many perspectives, and wemust settle for a multifaceted approach to knowledge.” And “like rationalists andidealists, [pragmatists] saw morality, religion, and human purpose as constituting asignificant aspect of our experience.” 7

As it happens, there is a considerable demand for such approach in the dynamictechnological world we live. We do not have to poke too deeply into the differentassumptions and arguments some of the great moral philosophers have constructed inthe course of history to arrive at one simple conclusion – perhaps the only conclusionpossible – that they cannot all be correct. There should be little doubt that Plato,

7 For a lucid evaluation of this topic, see Samuel E. Stumpf and James Fieser, Philosophy: History and

Problems, 7th edition, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2008), 372.




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Aristotle, Hume, Kant, Mill, Nietzsche, and so on possessed incredible philosophicalinsight. Yet, their various ethical theories differ drastically from each other. On thispicture, it is safe to say that perhaps none of these models is correct. (Or perhaps thereis no metaethical criterion to which we can appeal in order to test them.) Hence, theonly way to check their validity is to see whether they work “in practice.” And it is not

hard to see that all of them, to one extent or another, could – in principle – work,depending on a particular social framework. As we have seen earlier, there aresituations where traditional ethics can cope with moral problems in a technologicalworld. But the lack of insight (and its “amnesia ” regarding the fact that we inhabit apluralist society in which it is clearly difficult to achieve a consensus on controversialissues – particularly the ones that evolve from technological artefacts and development)turns traditional ethics into a sort of “blind uncle.” 8 Against this background, we cansurely argue that there is no single theory that can possibly offer a full, real definition ofsomething as socially and culturally complex as science and technology.

Now I hope the reader will forgive what may seem a rather esoteric route into thistopic, but here I can only remember the tale of the Buddhist master who wanted hisdisciples to be aware of the limitations of human understanding. The monk blindfoldedhis young students and took them in front of an elephant. Then he asked each one totouch a part of the animal, and try to describe what they “perceived ”. Each monkdescribed “elephant” according to the part of the animal they were holding. Obviouslynone of the descriptions were “real” and “ complete ” ones. The point being made issimply this: any absolute, unquestionable model is bound to fail; it is like trying todescribing an elephant blindfoldedly.

But of course the solution is certainly not to do away with moral principles and socialevaluation of technology altogether – as STS suggest. For it should be clear by now thattechnology is not separated from society; it is rather a crucial element of it. Socialevaluation is not divorced from scientific or technological evaluation. The technicalquestion is, as already pointed out, a social one. In this light, what pragmatist ethics isadvocating is that we need to take account of both the role of moral intuition and thevalue of development. Metaphorically, we need to try and see the whole elephant – i.e.,if we want to describe it appropriately. To this end, the different methods and tasksKeulartz et al. propose in their paper can be a source of hope; for pragmatism is betterequipped to cope with the highly dynamic character of our modern technological world.In short, its various methods and tasks can improve the quality and effectiveness ofcontemporary discourses on ethics of science and technology. However, as Keulartz etal. admit, this “pragmatist matrix of tools and tasks ” needs further theoretical analysisand practical experimentation. I will not attempt to investigate this claim here.Meanwhile, it is above all else urgent not to think of social evaluation as divorced fromscientific or technological evaluation....

8 Albeit, as the popular saying has it, “a blind uncle is better than no uncle at all.”

Filsafat Ilmu-Rethinking-Ethics of Science and Technology-1

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