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Transcript of February 2, 2011 Presenters from Public Financial Management, Inc. John H. BonowTodd Fraizer...
February 2, 2011
Presenters from Public Financial Management, Inc.
John H. Bonow Todd FraizerManaging Director Managing [email protected] [email protected]
Debt 2: Planning and Bond Sales: Accessing The Debt Market
MARKETING AND PRICING
Oakland, California
C D I A C
C D I A COverview
2
Method of Sale Alternatives How bonds from various sectors are priced Pricing Data, Essential Market Information and the
Pricing Process Understanding Investors and the Unique Perceptions
of Each Credit in a Post-Bond Insurance World Market Access Challenges and Related Considerations Techniques to Access the Markets to Best Satisfy
Financing Objectives
C D I A CMarketing a Fixed Rate Bond Issue
3
Methods of Selling Bonds Competitive Negotiated Hybrid Competitive
Negotiated for Retail-Only Order Period Competitive sale for unsold balances
Private Placement
C D I A CHow Bonds are Competitively Sold
4
Issuer and financial advisor structure the bond issue and take bids from syndicates of investment banks.
Underwriters bid interest rates by maturity and a total purchase price to determine the lowest True Interest Cost (“TIC”).
Winning bidder then sells the bonds, often with a markup, to retail and institutional investors. Generally used for General Obligation (G.O.) bond sales,
enterprise fund revenue bonds, and strong credits
C D I A CCompetitive Sales – The Process Effective outreach to the
universe of potential bidders increases the number and quality of bids
Knowledge of investor preferences results in a “friendly” structure and bidding parameters
5
COMPETITIVE SALE
Create Notice of Sale
Issuer & Financial Advisor pre-market the SALE to underwriters
Underwriters work-up & submit bids
Issuer & Financial Advisor evaluate & accept lowest conforming bid (TIC)
C D I A CHow a Negotiated Sale Works Bonds are sold to one investment banking syndicate. Interest rates and the purchase price result from
negotiations between the issuer/financial advisor and the underwriter.
The investment banking syndicate pre-markets the bonds to retail and institutional investors.
Investors submit orders and the investment bank offers to underwrite (purchase) the entire bond issue. Generally used for large, complex or weak credits. Most common type of bond sale method for health care
and higher education transactions.
6
C D I A CNegotiated Pricings – The Process
Where does the Issuer acquire the knowledge to negotiate the best outcome (the lowest, risk-adjusted cost of capital)?
More on that later…
7
NEGOTIATED SALE
Issuer hires underwriting syndicate
Syndicate pre-markets BONDS
Issuer, Financial Advisor & Senior Underwriter negotiate pricing scale
(Pre-pricing call)
Pricing wire released & bonds offered directly to investors
Underwriting syndicate takes orders
Final price negotiated (Pricing call)
C D I A CHow a Hybrid Competitive Sale Works An investment banking syndicate and a selling group
take orders from retail investors over one/more days. Interest rates and purchase terms are negotiated for the
bonds sold to retail. Remaining/unsold bond balances are then sold via a
competitive sale (usually the following day). Underwriters bid for the remaining bonds. Maximizes access to retail investors. Preserves competitive sale benefits.
8
C D I A CHow a Private Placement Works Bonds are purchased by a Bank or another qualified
investor but are not typically resold to the general public (e.g., retail investors).
Interest rates and the purchase price result from direct negotiations between the issuer/financial advisor and the purchaser. An investment bank may not be used.
Generally used for weak or very complex credits
9
C D I A CChoices when Selling Bonds Can the same financing goals be accomplished with any method
of sale/placement?
10
Selecting a Method of Placement
CONSIDERATION COMPETITIVE NEGOTIATEDPRIVATE
PLACEMENT
Complex terms and structure
Low to moderate High All
Volatile marketDepends
(Supply driven?)
Useful
(Market timing)Varies
Size (par amount) of issue
Very large issues may shrink bidder list
No functional upper limit
Investor-driven limitations
Issuer Credit Rating
Minimum investment grade (> BBB-/Baa3)
AllAll (may be better with weak credits)
Investor awareness & familiarity
Depends on the ability to reach and educate investors
Issuer knowledge Each method can be EQUALLY effective
C D I A CCompetitive vs. Negotiated
11
C D I A CPricing Bonds from Different Sectors
12
All Bonds are not created equal (even those with identical credit ratings) Municipal
General Obligation Bonds Essential Service Revenue Bonds
Utilities and Special Purpose Districts Water, Wastewater, Electric, Stormwater, etc.
Private, 501(c)3 Borrowers Health Care Higher Education
Industrial Development, Land-Secured, RDAs
C D I A CSector Differences with the Same Ratings
13
Investors perceive different levels of risk between sectors.
General ratings-driven yield indications are inadequate indicators of pricing levels.
Comparable issue analysis and trade data will help develop an informed pricing opinion.
C D I A CEssential Pricing Information Elements
14
General market conditions Interest rates Supply Secondary market activity (net buying/selling)
Sector-specific conditions (e.g., health care, RDAs, assessment districts)
Pricing performance of comparable transactions (rating, sector, size, state)
Prior issuer-specific pricing results (primary market) Recent secondary market trades for the issuer Does the issuer have access to this information?
C D I A CMunicipal Market: Supply/Demand Impact
Overall supply & demand factors still drive the market
Low supply levels combined with consistent demand pushed rates lower throughout the summer of 2010
Credit spreads tightened as investors ventured out the credit curve in search of yield throughout the summer of 2010
Last quarter of 2010, supply-demand dynamics shifted, putting upward pressure on rates and spreads through year-end
Sustained heavy supply calendar through December 2010
Reduction in demand with large mutual fund outflows since November
15
$0
$2
$4
$6
$8
$10
$12
$14
$16
Billi
ons
SupplyTaxableTax-ExemptTotal
2.0%2.2%2.4%2.6%2.8%3.0%3.2%3.4%3.6%3.8%4.0%
50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95
100
Yield
Spre
ad t
o M
MD
in
bps
Rate and Spread MovementA GO 10 yr SpreadMMD 10 yr
($14)
($12)
($10)
($8)
($6)
($4)
($2)
$0
$2
$4
$6
Billi
ons
Demand
Inflows (Outflows)
Inflows (Outflows) Trendline
C D I A CDemand – Mass Exodus from Munis
($15)
($10)
($5)
$0
$5
$10
$15
1/1/07 7/1/07 1/1/08 7/1/08 1/1/09 7/1/09 1/1/10 7/1/10 1/1/11
Billi
ons
2007-2010 Monthly Mutual Fund Inflows (Outflows)
Since November 1st, the municipal market has seen $30B flow out of mutual funds
The municipal market saw net inflows of $32B in the first ten months, but gave nearly all of it back in just ten weeks $5
$10
$14 $15$17
$19
$23
$28$30
$32
$25
$12
$2
$0
$5
$10
$15
$20
$25
$30
$35
1/1 2/1 3/1 4/1 5/1 6/1 7/1 8/1 9/1 10/1 11/1 12/1 1/1
Billi
ons
Cumulative Inflows (Outflows) since 2010
16
C D I A CRecent Market Rate Movement
Dramatic movement in rates from November 1st through end of the year Supply/demand dynamics have put upward pressure on rates Unrelenting media attack and political rhetoric
17
Late 2010 / Early 2011 AAA MMD Rate Movement
718
36
54 5865
7282 84
90 94 98 102108
114122 127 129 131 133 134 133 133 130 127 124 123 123 122 122
-
+ 25
+ 50
+ 75
+ 100
+ 125
+ 150
+ 175
+ 200
+ 225
+ 250
+ 275
0.00%
0.50%
1.00%
1.50%
2.00%
2.50%
3.00%
3.50%
4.00%
4.50%
5.00%
5.50%
(In
crea
se in
Bas
is P
oin
ts)
Change in MMD (11/1 - 1/14) 11/1/2010 MMD 12/1/2010 MMD 1/1/2011 MMD 1/14/2011 MMD
Source: Bloomberg & TM3
C D I A CRecent Market Rate Movement
18
Mid-Late January AAA MMD Rate Reversal
Low supply has helped keep rates in check
Recent relative-value (“cross-over”) buyers have helped reverse course
0
1
0 0
2
57
9 10 1012 13 14 15 16
18
2123
26
30 3129 28
26 26 25 26 26 26 26
- 35
- 30
- 25
- 20
- 15
- 10
- 5
-
+ 5
+ 10
+ 15
+ 20
0.00%
0.50%
1.00%
1.50%
2.00%
2.50%
3.00%
3.50%
4.00%
4.50%
5.00%
5.50%
(In
crea
se in
Bas
is P
oin
ts)
Change in MMD (since 1/14) 1/14/2011 MMD 1/26/2011 MMD
Source: Bloomberg & TM3
C D I A C
14
4352
11289
206
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
Basi
s Po
ints
Aa/AA A/A Baa/BBB
Credit Uncertainty Persists
Source: TM3 * 10 Year Maturity
Credit Spread Movement (since 2008)
Low yields on high-grades pushed investors out the credit curve in search of yield throughout 2010
2010 year-end saw a small spike in credit spreads at the end of 2010
19
C D I A CIssuer-specific Secondary Market Trades
20
Issuers can look at the trading performance of prior bond issues to assess demand and yield ranges.
(40)
(20)
0
20
40
60
80
100
July
Aug
ust
Sept
embe
r
Oct
ober
Nov
embe
r
Wei
ghte
d Ave
rage
Spr
ead
to M
MD
(Bas
is P
oint
s)
Sound Transit Tax-Exempt, Uninsured Bonds:Secondary Market Trades,
July -November 2010
2007A - 2034 2007A - 2036 2009P-1 - 2015 2009P-1 - 2016A 2009P-1 - 2016B
Secondary Market Trading Activity for Select Parity Maturities from the
Same Issuer
C D I A CCredit Analysis has Changed
21
Prior to 2008 municipal credit analysis was often homogenized Bond Insurance used for a majority of transactions Underlying bond ratings were not emphasized Credit analysis varied by investor
The loss of bond insurance has put a strong focus on credit/risk analysis Rating agencies are hyper-aware of their conclusions Investors undertake their own credit review Issues with the same credit ratings are differentiated
(example) Aa3 rating health care ≠ Aa3 general obligation
C D I A COutreach to Investors is Important
22
Securing Investment Grade Ratings does not Ensure a Good Pricing Result Skepticism about the “accuracy” of credit ratings Press releases add to herd mentalities
“Companies are in trouble!” = buy munis or treasuries “Municipal defaults will expand!” = buy stocks
Develop an investor relations program for each credit Find out who typically owns your kind of bond and who
actually owns your bonds Expand the demand base for your credit
C D I A CKnow Who Owns Your Bonds (and Why)
Bondholder's Report
Firm Name USD Par (000)
USD Net Change (000)
Series Held
1 Vanguard Group Inc, The 4,022 0 42 Prime Advisors Inc 3,512 0 73 Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Co 3,445 0 24 Columbia Management Investment Advisers LLC 3,240 0 25 New Jersey Manufacturers Insurance Co 3,170 0 26 Conning Asset Management Co 2,846 0 67 United Farm Family Life Insurance Co 2,525 0 28 Texas Farm Bureau Insurance Companies 1,730 0 29 Nationwide Insurance Co (Office of Investments) 1,545 0 110 Island Insurance Co Ltd 1,540 0 111 Country Trust Bank 1,290 0 112 Deutsche Asset Management (DeAM) (NYC) 1,218 -541 313 General Re-New England Asset Management Inc 1,214 815 314 State Street Global Advisors (SSgA) 1,187 0 215 AEW Capital Management LP 1,080 0 416 Grinnell Mutual Reinsurance Co 1,000 0 117 EquiTrust Investment Management Services Inc 1,000 0 118 Wellington Management Co LLP 882 0 419 GE Asset Management Inc 815 815 120 Asset Allocation & Management Co LLC (AAM) 803 0 2
Concentration among a few investors is not unusual Creates opportunities to
find an investors in times of market difficulty
Helps focus the effort to broaden demand
Comparison of actual holders to “typical” holders is important Why does not investor X
own MY bonds?23
C D I A CMarket Access Challenges
24
Industry-wide threats of default International unrest Net selling among mutual bond funds Fear on behalf of retail investors Federal and state budget uncertainty Persistent confusion on the direction of inflation Sector-specific concerns
Redevelopment Agency revenue, health care reform, water supply, etc.
C D I A CAccessing the Markets to Satisfy Financing Objectives
25
Be clear on financing objectives Minimum proceeds goal? Cost of capital target?
Determine flexibility in the plan of finance Are long amortizations essential? Can short-term maturities be managed?
What investors are buying and what are they buying? Consistent with objectives, tailor the offering to what
investors want/demand.
C D I A C
Nuts and Bolts of a Negotiated SaleNuts and Bolts of a Negotiated Sale
C D I A CUnderwriting Spread Components
27
C D I A CPriority of Orders
28
C D I A COrder Period(s)
29
C D I A CPrice Talk
30
C D I A CPricing Lingo
a. Bump To add a basis point in price
b. Cut To subtract a basis point in price
c. 5 handle 5%-5.99% coupon (interest rate)
d. Blocks Size of maturity or order
e. Going away order Order to a “buy and hold” investor
f. Tighten Lower the yields
g. Loosen Raise the yields
h. Nickel 5 basis points
i. Sloppy Prices are too cheap
j. Basis point (“bip” or “tick”) 1/100 of 1%(i.e., change 0.05% = a 5 bip adjustment)
31
C D I A CPreliminary Pricing Thoughts – Retail
PRELIMINARY PRICING WIRE
RE: $121,135,000 CEFA/CHFFA
Moody's: A1 S&P: A Fitch: A+
DATED: 6/1/2010 FIRST COUPON: 12/1/2010
DUE: 6/1TAKEDOWN
MATURITY AMOUNT COUPON PRICE ($/1,000)6/1/2011 1,700M 3.000 % 1.360 3.75 6/1/2012 1,750M 3.000 % 1.780 3.75 6/1/2013 1,800M 3.000 % 2.200 5.00 6/1/2014 1,855M 4.000 % 2.650 5.00 6/1/2015 1,930M 4.000 % 3.110 5.00 6/1/2016 2,005M 4.000 % 3.600 5.00 6/1/2017 2,090M 4.500 % 3.890 5.00 6/1/2018 2,180M 4.500 % 4.080 5.00 6/1/2019 2,280M 5.000 % 4.270 5.00 6/1/2020 2,395M 5.000 % 4.420 5.00 6/1/2021 2,515M 5.000 % 4.520 6.25 6/1/2022 2,640M 5.000 % 4.610 6.25 6/1/2023 2,770M 5.000 % 4.690 (APPROX. PTC $ 6/1/2020 100.079) 6.25 6/1/2024 2,910M 5.000 % 4.770 (APPROX. PTC $ 6/1/2020 100.236) 6.25 6/1/2025 3,055M 5.000 % 4.850 6.25 6/1/2026 3,210M 5.500 % 4.950 6.25 6/1/2027 3,385M 5.500 % 5.050 6.25 6/1/2028 3,570M 5.500 % 5.150 6.25 6/1/2029 3,765M 5.500 % 5.250 6.25 6/1/2030 3,975M 5.500 % 5.350 6.25
6/1/2034 18,280M 5.750% 5.560 5.00
6/1/2038 22,765M 5.500% 5.630 (APPROX. PTC $ 6/1/2020 100.151) 7.50
6/1/2042 28,310M 5.750% 5.750 6.25
CALL FEATURES: OPTIONAL CALL IN 06/01/2020 @ 100.000 32
C D I A CRetail Orders
Syndicate and selling group members supported the shorter maturities in the transaction.
To focus potential demand, only one term bond was offered to retail.
Note: adjusting for oversubscriptions, $100.135M of bonds (before adjustments) are left after the retail-only order period.
Total Retail RetailAmount Retail Priority Member Balance
Maturity Coupon ($000's) ($000's) ($000's) ($000's) ($000's)6/1/2011 1.500 % 1,700 1,700 1,700 - 06/1/2012 1.800 % 1,750 2,000 750 1,250 (250)6/1/2013 2.200 % 1,800 3,000 800 2,200 (1,200)6/1/2014 2.650 % 1,855 3,500 855 2,645 (1,645)6/1/2015 3.100 % 1,930 2,000 1,430 570 (70)6/1/2016 3.600 % 2,005 2,250 1,505 745 (245)6/1/2017 3.900 % 2,090 770 770 - 1,3206/1/2018 4.100 % 2,180 180 180 - 2,0006/1/2019 4.250 % 2,280 460 460 - 1,8206/1/2020 4.400 % 2,395 220 220 - 2,1756/1/2021 4.500 % 2,515 890 890 - 1,6256/1/2022 4.600 % 2,640 4,800 2,000 2,800 (2,160)6/1/2023 4.700 % 2,770 - 2,7706/1/2024 4.800 % 2,910 - 2,9106/1/2025 4.850 % 3,055 - 3,0556/1/2026 4.950 % 3,210 - 3,2106/1/2027 5.050 % 3,385 - 3,3856/1/2028 5.150 % 3,570 - 3,5706/1/2029 5.250 % 3,765 - 3,7656/1/2030 5.350 % 3,975 - 3,975
6/1/2034 5.750 % 18,280 NOT OFFERED TO RETAIL 18,280
6/1/2038 5.650 % 22,765 4,800 3,800 1,000 17,965
6/1/2042 5.750 % 28,310 NOT OFFERED TO RETAIL 28,310
TOTAL 121,135 26,570 15,360 11,210 100,135
33
C D I A C(Initial) Preliminary Pricing Wire – Institutional
Underwriter desires to avoid risk and proposes to “term up” the longer-dated Serial bonds.
Maturities with some retail demand but remaining par have been “bifurcated.” Coupon structure reflects
institutional investor desires (e.g., premium)
Takedowns have been lowered to institutional levels.
(INITIAL) PRELIMINARY PRICING WIRE - INSTITUTIONAL ORDER PERIOD
RE: $121,585,000 CEFA/CHFFA
Moody's: A1 S&P: A Fitch: A+
DATED: 6/1/2010 FIRST COUPON: 12/1/2010
DUE: 6/1TAKEDOWN
MATURITY AMOUNT COUPON PRICE ($/1,000)6/1/2011 NMO 1.500 % 1.3606/1/2012 NMO 1.800 % 1.7806/1/2013 NMO 2.200 % 2.2006/1/2014 NMO 2.650 % 2.6506/1/2015 NMO 3.100 % 3.1106/1/2016 NMO 3.600 % 3.6006/1/2017 NMO 3.900 % 3.8906/1/2017 1,345M 4.500 % 3.890 5.00 6/1/2018 NMO 4.100 % 4.0806/1/2018 2,025M 4.500 % 4.080 5.00 6/1/2019 NMO 4.250 % 4.2706/1/2019 1,845M 5.000 % 4.270 5.00 6/1/2020 NMO 4.400 % 4.4206/1/2020 2,195M 5.000 % 4.420 5.00 6/1/2021 NMO 4.500 % 4.5206/1/2021 1,645M 5.000 % 4.520 (APPROX. PTC $ 6/1/2020 103.827) 5.00 6/1/2022 NMO 4.600 % 4.6106/1/2023 2,780M 5.000 % 4.690 (APPROX. PTC $ 6/1/2020 102.452) 5.00 6/1/2024 2,920M 5.000 % 4.770 (APPROX. PTC $ 6/1/2020 101.812) 5.00 6/1/2025 3,065M 5.000 % 4.850 (APPROX. PTC $ 6/1/2020 101.177) 5.00
6/1/2030 17,960M 5.500 % 5.350 (APPROX. PTC $ 6/1/2020 101.150) 5.00
6/1/2034 18,330M 5.750% 5.560 (APPROX. PTC $ 6/1/2020 101.442) 5.00
6/1/2038 NMO 5.650% 5.630 (APPROX. PTC $ 6/1/2020 100.151)6/1/2038 18,040M 5.500% 5.630 (Dollar Price 98.178) 5.00
6/1/2042 28,435M 5.750% 5.750 5.00
CALL FEATURES: OPTIONAL CALL IN 06/01/2020 @ 100.000
34
C D I A C(Revised) Preliminary Pricing Wire – Institutional
PRELIMINARY PRICING WIRE - INSTITUTIONAL ORDER PERIOD
RE: $121,585,000 CEFA/CHFFA
Moody's: A1 S&P: A Fitch: A+
DATED: 6/1/2010 FIRST COUPON: 12/1/2010
DUE: 6/1TAKEDOWN
MATURITY AMOUNT COUPON PRICE ($/1,000)6/1/2011 NMO 1.500 % 1.3606/1/2012 NMO 1.800 % 1.7806/1/2013 NMO 2.200 % 2.2006/1/2014 NMO 2.650 % 2.6506/1/2015 NMO 3.100 % 3.1106/1/2016 NMO 3.600 % 3.6006/1/2017 NMO 3.900 % 3.8906/1/2017 1,345M 4.500 % 3.890 5.00 6/1/2018 NMO 4.100 % 4.0806/1/2018 2,025M 4.500 % 4.080 5.00 6/1/2019 NMO 4.250 % 4.2706/1/2019 1,845M 5.000 % 4.270 5.00 6/1/2020 NMO 4.400 % 4.4206/1/2020 2,195M 5.000 % 4.420 5.00 6/1/2021 NMO 4.500 % 4.5206/1/2021 1,645M 5.000 % 4.520 (APPROX. PTC $ 6/1/2020 103.827) 5.00 6/1/2022 NMO 4.600 % 4.6106/1/2023 2,780M 5.000 % 4.690 (APPROX. PTC $ 6/1/2020 102.452) 5.00 6/1/2024 2,920M 5.000 % 4.770 (APPROX. PTC $ 6/1/2020 101.812) 5.00 6/1/2025 3,065M 5.000 % 4.850 (APPROX. PTC $ 6/1/2020 101.177) 5.00 6/1/2026 3,220M 5.500 % 4.950 (APPROX. PTC $ 6/1/2020 104.297) 5.00 6/1/2027 3,395M 5.500 % 5.050 (APPROX. PTC $ 6/1/2020 103.499) 5.00 6/1/2028 3,580M 5.500 % 5.150 (APPROX. PTC $ 6/1/2020 102.708) 5.00 6/1/2029 3,780M 5.500 % 5.250 (APPROX. PTC $ 6/1/2020 101.925) 5.00 6/1/2030 3,985M 5.500 % 5.350 (APPROX. PTC $ 6/1/2020 101.150) 5.00
6/1/2034 18,330M 5.750% 5.560 (APPROX. PTC $ 6/1/2020 101.442) 5.00
6/1/2038 NMO 5.650% 5.630 (APPROX. PTC $ 6/1/2020 100.151)6/1/2038 18,040M 5.500% 5.630 (Dollar Price 98.178) 5.00
6/1/2042 28,435M 5.750% 5.750 5.00
CALL FEATURES: OPTIONAL CALL IN 06/01/2020 @ 100.000
Slope of yield curve (e.g., 0.76% from 2023-2030) would result in a higher weighted cost if the 2026-2030 maturities were combined.
Maintaining Serial bonds at original maturities is advocated.
35
C D I A CPrimary (Institutional) Orders
Most maturities were priced well.
Certain maturities (2017 and 2042) saw significant order flow and are the focus of a favorable repricing.
Maintaining the longer serial maturities (with Member support) helped to “ride the yield curve.”
NetTotal Designated Member Subscription Subscription
Amount Retail Orders Orders Balance Priority TotalMaturity Coupon ($000's) ($000's) ($000's) ($000's) ($000's) Orders Orders6/1/2011 1.500 % 1,700 1,700 0 100.0% 100.0%6/1/2012 1.800 % 1,750 2,000 (250) 114.3% 114.3%6/1/2013 2.200 % 1,800 3,000 (1,200) 166.7% 166.7%6/1/2014 2.650 % 1,855 3,500 (1,645) 188.7% 188.7%6/1/2015 3.100 % 1,930 2,000 (70) 103.6% 103.6%6/1/2016 3.600 % 2,005 2,250 (245) 112.2% 112.2%6/1/2017 3.900 % 770 770 0 100.0% 100.0%6/1/2017 4.500 % 1,345 4,500 1,000 (4,155) 334.6% 408.9%6/1/2018 4.100 % 180 180 0 100.0% 100.0%6/1/2018 4.500 % 2,025 4,000 1,000 (2,975) 197.5% 246.9%6/1/2019 4.250 % 460 460 0 100.0% 100.0%6/1/2019 5.000 % 1,845 3,200 (1,355) 173.4% 173.4%6/1/2020 4.400 % 220 220 0 100.0% 100.0%6/1/2020 5.000 % 2,195 3,000 (805) 136.7% 136.7%6/1/2021 4.500 % 890 890 0 100.0% 100.0%6/1/2021 5.000 % 1,645 3,300 (1,655) 200.6% 200.6%6/1/2022 4.600 % 2,640 4,800 (2,160) 181.8% 181.8%6/1/2023 5.000 % 2,780 2,000 780 0 71.9% 100.0%6/1/2024 5.000 % 2,920 2,000 920 0 68.5% 100.0%6/1/2025 5.000 % 3,065 2,000 1,065 0 65.3% 100.0%6/1/2026 5.500 % 3,220 3,220 0 100.0% 100.0%6/1/2027 5.500 % 3,395 3,395 0 100.0% 100.0%6/1/2028 5.500 % 3,580 3,580 0 100.0% 100.0%6/1/2029 5.500 % 3,780 3,780 0 100.0% 100.0%6/1/2030 5.500 % 3,985 3,985 0 100.0% 100.0%
6/1/2034 5.750% 18,330 7,800 10,530 42.6% 42.6%
6/1/2038 5.650% 4,800 4,800 0 100.0% 100.0%6/1/2038 5.500% 18,040 25,000 (6,960) 138.6% 138.6%
6/1/2042 5.750% 28,435 70,000 5,000 (46,565) 246.2% 263.8%
TOTALS 121,585 26,570 144,760 9,765 (59,510) 140.9% 148.9%
36
C D I A CVerbal Award
37
C D I A CPricing Bingo
[To be used on pricing calls with the underwriting desk]
Big BlocksHolding their cards close to
the vestWe've got good
momentumGood place to start
Couponing looks good Market tone feels good Aggressive Good interest at these levels
The right levels to go out We are getting pushback Balanced Get their attention
Behind the Curve Going away orders Market feels sloppy Build the book
Underwriter Bingo
38