F-4 in Combat - Phantom Versus Fishbed

8/17/2019 F-4 in Combat - Phantom Versus Fishbed

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IN MARCH 1966, United States

intelligence agencies reported

more than 60 North Vietnamese

Air Force MiG-17 fighters present

at their main base of Phuc

Yen. While the MiG-17 was a

known quantity, officials and planners

were more worried by the fact that

approximately 15 more advanced

MiG-21s were there too. Phuc Yen was a

huge complex about 40 miles north of

Hanoi and had been off limits to any airstrikes by American aircraft. Up until this

time, most of the war’s aerial duels had

been between the F-4 Phantom II and

the MiG-17.

The Phantom’s first successful encounter

against a MiG-21 took place on April 26,

1966 and involved an F-4C from the US

Air Force’s 480th Tactical Fighter Squadron

(TFS). In Vietnam, the F-4 faced the same

disadvantage that the F-86 Sabre had in

the Korean War. The Phantoms had to

fly a long distance to reach the enemy’s

territory, while the MiG-17s and MiG-21s

were just minutes away. Another factor

against them was the fact that the enemy

could be assisted by ground controlintercept (GCI) stations, which always

knew where the F-4s were. On the other

hand, if the MiGs wanted to venture

outside of their comfort zone, their short

range hampered them, with no recourse

to aerial refueling.

The MiG-21s faced off against any

adversaries that were able to carry their

loads up into Route Pack V and VI — the

latter area, covering Hanoi and Haiphong,

was judged the most dangerous airspace

in the world. Both the F-4 and MiG-21

were in the Mach 2 class and armed with

air-to-air missiles (AAMs). However, even

after the MiG-21 became available, many

North Vietnamese pilots continued toprefer the MiG-17 on account of its superb

maneuverability. The high wing loading

of the MiG-21 made it far less agile, but

combined with GCI and using smart

Above: Picturedin early 1969,this 435th TFSF-4D Phantomis loadedwith slickand retardedbombs to beused against

rail lines andtroops in thesouth and overin Laos.James Woodvia author

report: Warren E. Thompson

GLORY DAYS | F4 IN COMBAT

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PHANTOM

VERSUS FISHBED

tactics it was a weapon to be respected.

On numerous occasions, MiG-21s would

intercept F-105 Thunderchiefs (‘Thuds’)

bearing down on Hanoi, forcing the USAF

pilots to jettison their bombs while taking

up defensive postures.

The primary weapon of the North

Vietnamese MiG-21 was the R-3S (AA-2

‘Atoll’) missile. Although notoriously

unreliable, the weapon allowed the MiGs

to employ successful ‘hit and run’ tactics.

The ‘Atoll’ could reach a speed of

around Mach 2.5 as it closed on its

target. Its effective range was around

8km (5 miles), which was sufficient when

working with GCI.

Approximately 80 MiG-21s were shot

down during the Vietnam War between

late April 1965 and January 1973. US Navy

and USAF pilots flying versions of the F-4

registered most of these kills.

The second kill

One such aerial victory took place on July

14, 1966. The F-4C from the 480th TFS

was flown by Capt William Swendner as

pilot and Lt Duane Buttell as back-seater.

At the time, the aggressive F-105 ‘Wild

Weasels’ stationed at Takhli Royal Thai Air

Force Base were working North Vietnam’s

numerous surface-to-air missile (SAM)

sites in an effort to cut down the losses

Right: CaptSwendner and LtButtell move outat Da Nang AB foranother sortie inSeptember 1966,two months aftertheir MiG-21 kill.Bill Swendner

via author

Exactly 50 years ago, a US Air Force F-4Phantom II was credited with the first

confirmed aerial kill against a North

Vietnamese MiG-21 ‘Fishbed’. The eraof supersonic, missile-armed aircraftengaging in combat had begun,

and the F-4 and MiG-21would remain locked

in battle for theremainder of the

Vietnam War.

F4 IN COMBAT | GLORY DAYS

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that plagued the bomber force. These

radar-controlled sites were placed all

along the main routes that the bomberstook when flying into Route Pack V and VI.

Capt Swendner recalls some of the

details of that memorable mission: ‘I was

leading a flight of four F-4C Phantoms

— call sign ‘Nitro’ — out of Da Nang Air

Base to escort a flight of four F-105 ‘Wild

Weasels’ — call sign ‘Panda’ — that were

coming over from Takhli RTAFB. After

refueling over Laos, we met the ‘Thuds’

just after passing the Black River, heading

straight for the Hanoi area. Over the past

few days, the MiGs had been attacking

the ‘Wild Weasels’ and harassing them. We

were fragged to provide escort and keep

the MiG-21s off them. It was a difficult task

because the ‘Weasels’ were much faster

than our Phantoms at such a low altitude,

which was right where the ‘Fishbeds’

wanted them. We were at about 10,000ft

and I was trailing about two or three miles

behind the three F-105s (one of their flight

had aborted early in the mission).’

The escorting F-4Cs were all carrying

the big 600-gallon centerline fuel tank

that added a lot of drag. When they werealmost dry, Swendner gave the order to

jettison the tanks so they could close the

gap with the ‘Weasels’. ‘We were about 50

miles north-west of Hanoi when ‘Panda’

lead called out that he had a ‘three-ringer’

at 12 o’clock and that he was too close to

fire, so he was turning right to reposition

for a good shot. At that time, we were

trailing the fast-moving ‘Thuds’ by about

five miles, so when he called for a right

turn it enabled us to close the distance

because I cut him off in the turn.

‘All of a sudden, about half way through

his turn, my number three in the flightcalled ‘MiG at seven o’clock high!’ I looked

over my left shoulder and got a visual

on the MiG at high and reversed my turn

into him.’

Lt Duane Buttell adds: ‘We were closing

the gap with the F-105 ‘Wild Weasels’. The

MiG-21 was spotted and we had a good

idea that there was one or more in our

vicinity because the scattered flak had

stopped and that could only mean that

their aircraft were close-in — they had to

stop firing just in case they brought down

one of their own MiGs.’

Both the MiG-17 and MiG-21 wereroutinely operated under radar control,

which allowed them to be vectored in at

high speed in order to close rapidly from

the six o’clock position. This is exactly

Above: Aclose-up viewof a MiG-21painted onthe side ofSwendner andButtell’s F-4after scoringthe secondMiG-21 kill ofthe war. Thiswas taken in

early August1966, justdays after theengagement.Duane Buttellvia author

Capt Swendner stands in front of his batteredF-4 shortly before he and Buttell took down a

MiG-21 while assigned to the 35th TFW atDa Nang. Duane Buttell via author



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what was happening. Capt Swendner

immediately jettisoned his wing tanks as

the MiG-21 blew through his flight and

he reversed his direction to pick him up,

estimating that the MiG was now in the

three or four o’clock low position. The haze

was very bad that day, especially below

15,000ft, which was beneficial to the MiG

because he disappeared into the haze

and ground clutter. As he looked around

to regain a visual on the F-105 flight,

Swendner saw a MiG-21 closing fast on

one of the ‘Thuds’. The jet retained an all-

silver finish as opposed to a camouflage

scheme that would have been harder to

spot. The MiG also stood out because it

too was all-silver.

Swendner continues: ‘Seeing the MiG

closing fast, I radioed for ‘Panda 3’ to break

right: ‘You have a MiG closing from your

six o’clock low’. He replied, ‘Negative’. ‘I’vegot a lock and getting ready to fire’. I told

Lt Buttell to boresight [lock the radar

straight ahead] and I pulled down toward

the MiG and put my reticle on him. He got

a lock-on and I was about to fire an AIM-7

Sparrow when the ‘break-x’ popped up on

my scope’. This meant that the MiG was

within minimum AIM-7 range.

‘At that point, I switched to ‘heat’ [AIM-9

Sidewinder] and didn’t get a tone in my

headset. My closure rate on the MiG was

exceptionally fast, so I fired the missile

anyway because I felt I needed to do

something to get the MiG off ‘Panda

3’s’ butt.’

Buttell adds: ‘We were doing an ‘S’

maneuver back and forth above and

behind ‘Panda’s’ flight. We had fallen

slightly back and were accelerating, using

our altitude advantage to help us, when

the MiG appeared. I don’t know if the

pilot knew we were close by as he was

obviously heading straight for the closest

‘Thud’. I remember being extremelyimpressed with ‘Panda 3’s’ reaction to Capt

Swendner calling for a right break. He

didn’t move because he was in the middle

‘I continued to

track him and

finally got a good

heat growl in my

headset and firedoff another AIM-9.

I watched it go

out and it looked

good and then it

just disappeared.

I said, ‘Damn! I

missed again’’

CAPT WILLIAM SWENDNER

Below left to right: A 497th TFS F-4Dtaking on fuelin 1972. At thetime, Phantomswere conductingthe lion’s shareof fighter escortsup into RoutePacks V and VI.

Nolan Schmidtvia author

A flight of F-4Csis prepped for anescort missionover the north. Duane Buttellvia author

Bottom: An F-4Dheads north tobomb targetsaround Hanoi.This shot datesfrom August1966, around

the time of thefirst MiG-21kills of the war.Nolan Schmidtvia author


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of setting up for his missile launch on an

active SAM site and coolly continued to

do so in spite of the fact that an enemy

fighter pilot was about to position himself

right on his six o’clock! I had locked on to

the MiG and noted that we were inside of

our launch parameters. Bill fired the AIM-9

anyway and it went ballistic as it didn’t

have a chance to arm.’

The AIM-9 missile had an operational

range of a little over 10 miles back then.

Swendner’s Sidewinder fired and went

right over the top of the MiG. It was

too close to its target when fired to

arm, so it went above it and ended up

impacting the ground. However, it did

get the attention of the MiG pilot, who

immediately broke off the attack on the

‘Thud’ and lit his afterburner as he climbed

away to the east.

‘Now, I was about 200ft right behind himand at this time I positively identified him

as a MiG-21’, Swendner goes on. ‘I started

to go into a vertical in order to gain some

separation for a better shot. About that

time, the MiG pilot went into afterburner

and that solved my problem fast. I let

him get about a quarter-mile out in front,

tracked him and fired another Sidewinder.

I don’t know if I had a heat tone or not,

but I felt I had him just where I needed

him. The missile went out about 2,000ft

This image: Capt Radeker(standing farright) and hisflight in the555th TFS. Alsoseen is CharlesE. Donnelly Jr(standing secondfrom left). Walt

Radeker via author

Below left to right:A famous shot ofeager MiG-21-killers with ColOlds. They are:(left to right)Frank Gullick, BillLafever, DickPascoe, RobinOlds, Tom Hirschand Norm Wells.Capt EverettRaspberry is inthe F-4’s intake.

Walt Radekervia author

555th TFSMiG-21-killerspose by theirPhantom: CaptRadeker on theleft and Lt JamesE. Murray on theright. They firedan AIM-9 to scoretheir kill on the January 2, 1966mission. WaltRadeker via author



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and blew up. I continued to track him and

finally got a good heat growl in my headset

and fired off another AIM-9. I watched it

go out and it looked good and then it just

disappeared. I said, ‘Damn! I missed again.’’

A split second after thinking he had

missed, Swendner saw a huge fireball

erupt straight ahead — it was the MiG

he had aimed for. He pulled up quickly to

avoid the debris, rolled over the top, and

the only thing he could recognize within

the explosion was the tip of a wing that

had belonged to the MiG. The conclusion

had to be that the Sidewinder had tracked

perfectly right up the MiG-21’s tailpipe

while it was in afterburner. The action had

taken place directly over the big airfield

at Phuc Yen.

‘We immediately headed back toward

friendly territory as I caught sight of the

egressing ‘Weasel’ flight. I asked ‘Panda’ if

they saw my kill and he replied ‘Yeah… did

you see mine?’ I told him I had not, but I

did see the smoke trail from his anti-radar

missile that he had fired at the SAM site.During our initial maneuvering, my number

two, Lt Ronald Martin, got thrown out of

position. I told him to head 220 and get

out of the area. It was never a good idea

to try to rejoin the flight, as it was hard

to recognize an aircraft coming in as to

whether it was friend or foe. However, he

did try to rejoin, and as he did he spotted

another MiG-21 that was closing in on us

from six o’clock. It was probably the first

MiG that blew through our formation

earlier. Lt Martin fired a Sidewinder that

blew up alongside of the MiG and the pilot

ejected. It was the second MiG-21 kill by our

squadron that day.’

Buttell concludes the story of the

mission: ‘I recall that while we were close

to killing our MiG, the gunners below on

the ground opened fire on us, which was

strange because they had their fighters

in close proximity to us. The day after

our kill, we went to Saigon to debrief, as

ours was only the second MiG-21 kill of

the war. Our Intelligence was surprised

and even skeptical of our description ofthe encounter because the F-4 wasn’t

supposed to be able to climb with the ’21.

Our performance info was verified a couple

of years later when the Israelis got their

hands on a MiG-21 and ran performance

tests on it.’

Operation ‘Bolo’ The most successful of the MiG-21 clashes

occurred on January 2, 1967 during

Operation ‘Bolo’. This was the brainchild

of Col Robin Olds and his planning staff.Pitting the F-4 against the MiG-21, it

is considered one of the best combat

deceptions of the Vietnam War. Olds

assigned the planning of Operation ‘Bolo’

to several veteran junior officers. The group

planned a co-ordinated mission by the

‘west force’ (the 8th Tactical Fighter Wing)

consisting of seven flights of F-4Cs from

Ubon RTAFB, and an ‘east force’ consisting

of seven flights from the 366th TFW based

at Da Nang. The ‘west force’ would simulate

an F-105 strike force, while the ‘east force’

would cover alternate airfields to provide

a barrier preventing the MiGs from fleeing

towards China.

The planners determined that if the

MiG-21s reacted, their endurance from

take-off to landing would be around 55

minutes. The arrival times of the F-4 flights

were set five minutes apart to provide

continuous coverage and to attempt to run

surviving MiGs out of fuel by preventing

them from landing. Everything hinged on

getting the MiGs airborne. If they didn’t

take the bait, the plan would collapse. Inorder to deceive the North Vietnamese,

the ‘west force’ had to fly the same ingress

routes, altitudes and speeds as the F-105s,

use the same aerial refueling tanker tracks


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and altitudes, and use ‘Thud’ jargon in voice

communications.

The F-4s were fitted out with QRC-160

jamming pods, normally carried only

by F-105s, to replicate their electronic

signature. The F-4s would also fly the

inflexible line-abreast pod formations

used by the ‘Thuds’ to maximize pod

effectiveness. The pods had to be mounted

on one of the wing pylons, forcing the F-4s

to carry a centerline and single wing tank,

creating an asymmetric imbalance that

made take-off difficult since the aircraft

would try to roll to the side carrying the

wing tank.

The operational plan was presented toGen William Momyer, who commanded

the 7th Air Force, and he immediately

approved it. The mission was planned for

January 1, 1967.

Due to bad weather, the sortie was

rescheduled for January 2. It launched

from Ubon, and by 15.00hrs local time

Olds and his flight were over Phuc Yen.

There was a huge cloud layer over the

area and it hid the MiG-21s taking off.

Unknown to Olds, the North Vietnamese

GCI controllers had delayed take-offs

because of the overcast. Just as the second

flight (call sign ‘Ford’) arrived in the area,

the first MiG-21 emerged from the cloud

below. The Phantom’s finest hour as a

MiG-21-killer had begun.

Capt Everett T. Raspberry was one

of the pilots that Col Olds had placed

his confidence in. He remembers thatmission: ‘I knew nothing of the overall plan

for ‘Bolo’, but, over a few Martinis, Olds

asked me to do what I could to increase

the combat maneuvering skills of the

wing’s pilots. Each time I was flight lead or

mission commander, I would demonstrate

and critique various maneuvers whenreturning from a mission up north.

Before my tour with the 8th TFW, I was an

instructor in the USAF Fighter Weapons

School at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada,

so I was not operating from complete

ignorance. After evaluating the air combat

maneuvering skills and relating the launch

capabilities of the AIM-9B and AIM-7

[+2g and -1g], I concentrated on a simple

maneuver referred to as a ‘roll to the

outside’, which tended to put the attacker

in a position within the missile’s launchenvelope. As it turns out, all of the MiG kills

included that maneuver. I’m proud of that.

‘On January 1, the mission crews were

briefed on the mission. We would have

jamming pods, which we had never

flown with before. Also, we would use

F-105 call signs and F-105 refueling tracks,

plus ‘Thud’ pre-strike terminology. It was

obvious we were trying to imitate an F-105

task force so the MiGs would react to that.

The good part was that I was ‘Ford’ flight

lead, which was to be the second flight in

the area.

‘On the evening of January 1, ‘Chappie’

James [Olds’ second-in-command] came

by my room and told me that he was

taking my place as ‘Ford’ lead. On January

2, we took off from Ubon RTAFB and flew

low level to avoid North Vietnamese radar

up to the ‘Thud’ base and then climbed to

altitude for the refueling tracks. En route, I

did my missile check. As luck would have

it, only one of my eight missiles — an

AIM-9B — passed the test but I was not

going to miss this one. The next thingwas we dropped our centerline tanks and

turned toward Gia Lam.

‘In the target area we had a 100 per cent

cloud undercast, which was supposed to

Top: A 555th TFSF-4C heads backto Ubon aftercovering forF-105s raidingtargets in RoutePack V and VI.Dave Menardvia author

Above: MiGkills over NorthVietnam startedto escalatewhen F-4sbegan escortingThunderchiefsinto thedangerousRoute Packs.

US Navy F-8swere also verysuccessfulin this role.Dave Menardvia author



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‘I knew I only had one missile, so if I was going to

kill this guy I wanted to give it my best shot. I did a

roll to the outside of his turn to try and get within

the missile launch envelope’

CAPT EVERET T T. RASPBERRY

be an abort situation. However, it turned

out to be a blessing. As we approached

the Hanoi area, of course missiles were

flying everywhere, but the electronic

countermeasures pods were doing their job. I saw Col Olds’ flight approaching

below at about our 10 o’clock position

when a MiG-21 came out of the undercast

at their six o’clock position. I called to Olds’

lead about the MiG and I do believe that

they killed that one. I looked back to our

five o’clock and saw a MiG-21 at ‘Ford 3’s’

six o’clock. I called ‘Ford 3’ to break right,

which he did. That was the only thing he

did right on the whole mission.

‘The MiG broke from number 3 and

approached ‘Chappie’ and I called ‘‘Ford

lead’, break right’, but there was no

response. I tried several times, even calling

him ‘Chappie’, to break right… nothing!

As a last resort as the MiG approached to

maybe 500ft, I turned into him just to get

him off my lead’s butt! For a few seconds,canopy-to-canopy, I could actually see his

eyes. He overshot and actually went well

out into our 12 o’clock position. I guess he

realized he was in a whole lot of trouble

so he started a hard left descending turn

heading for the undercast. I knew I only

had one missile, so if I was going to kill this

guy I wanted to give it my best shot. I did

a roll to the outside of his turn to try and

get within the missile launch envelope,

including range and launch g-limits.

‘I had the right range, but he was able

to maintain a fairly hard turn, which kept

me out of the g-limit launch envelope. All

of a sudden he made a fatal mistake…

he reversed his turn, which gave me anopportunity to go to 0g with him exactly

at 12 o’clock. I launched my ‘Golden BB’,

which flew like a rocket-powered bullet

and went right into the cockpit with the

pilot. I did notice that right after launch the

MiG’s rear-view mirror started reflecting

the sun, which was a great target for an

infra-red missile. I made a couple of 360

turns watching the MiG-21 break into little

pieces. Then I realized I was alone, flying

almost directly over Hanoi, which was

the most heavily-defended area in aerialcombat history. Everybody else had gone

home. I quickly made a hasty exit to the

south and that was the end of a good day.’

Capt Raspberry’s victory was one of

seven in what would be the single largest

day’s haul of MiG-21 kills during the war.

Of the 16 MiG-21s known to be in the

North Vietnamese inventory at that time,

between 11 and 14 had been engaged,

with seven destroyed and two others

probably shot down. In turn, Hanoi

admitted the loss of five MiG-21s, without

posting any claims of their own.

Col Robin Olds and hisback-seater Lt CharlesClifton climb out after themonumental mission duringwhich 8th TFW crews nailedthe largest number of killsagainst MiG-21s on a singleday. Craig Cosgrove via author

Below left toright: Capt WaltRadeker withthe F-4C he flewon the January2, 1967 mission

while operatingfrom Ubon,Thailand.Walt Radekervia author

The 433rd TFSwas involvedwith Col Oldson the MiG-21killing spree. Thesquadron had ‘FG’tail codes whilethe 555th TFSused ‘FY’. USAFvia author


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F-4 in Combat - Phantom Versus Fishbed

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