External evaluationof the Ban Advocates

External evaluation of the Ban Advocates (BAs) InitiativeSummary of findings and lessons

Ruth Mayne

V O I C E S F R O M C O M M U N I T I E S A F F E C T E D B Y C L U S T E R M U N I T I O N S

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Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 03

Summary of findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 04

1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 04

2. Achievement of goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 05

3. Achievement of policy change objectives: the BAs’ contribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 05

4. Outcomes of the Oslo Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 06

5. How change happened: change factors/drivers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 06A tactical alliance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 06Shifting the negotiations to a more favourable forum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 06Centring and framing negotiations around a compelling humanitarian principle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 06Effective strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 06Political courage & leadership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 07External circumstances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 07

6. Obstacles to change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 08

7. The effectiveness and quality of BAs’ advocacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 08Design of the BA strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 08Implementation of strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 08Effects of BA advocacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 08Quality of BA advocacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 09

8. The BAs’ satisfaction with HIB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

9. Looking ahead . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10Prognosis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10BAs’ future role . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11HIB’s future support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

10.Lessons for involving affected people in civil society campaigns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12Lesson 1 – Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12Lesson 2 – Replication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12Lesson 3 – Levels of involvement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12Lesson 4 – Payment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13Lesson 5 – Logistical support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

11. Lessons for how change happens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14Lesson 1 – Soft power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14Lesson 2 – Emotional engagement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14Lesson 3 – The power of direct experience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15Lesson 4 – Being positive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15Lesson 5 – Civil society relations with governments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15Lesson 6 – Copy and adapt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15Lesson 7 – Sustain the effort . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Summary


Ban Advocates Initiative – a project developed byHandicap International Belgium (HIB) to support andensure the participation of a group of individuals fromaround the world affected by cluster munitions in thenegotiation, promotion and implementation of theConvention on Cluster Munitions. The individuals areknown as the Ban Advocates.

Phase 1 of the Ban Advocates Initiative was imple-mented between September 2007 and December2008 with the objective of ensuring and sustaining theparticipation of the Ban Advocates from affected com-munities in the negotiations for the Convention onCluster Munitions.

Phase 2 of the Ban Advocates Initiative is currentlybeing implemented. The goal of Phase 2 is to ensureand sustain the participation of Ban Advocates fromaffected communities in the promotion and follow-upof the Convention on Cluster Munitions (signature,ratification and implementation).

Cluster Munitions (CMs) – a cluster munition is acontainer with lots of tiny bombs, called bomblets (orsub munitions) inside.

Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) – theUnited Nations Convention on Certain ConventionalWeapons (CCW or CCWC), concluded at Geneva onOctober 10, 1980 and entered into force in December1983, seeks to prohibit or restrict the use of certainconventional weapons which are considered excessivelyinjurious or whose effects are indiscriminate.

Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) – the treatyto ban cluster munitions. It prohibits all use,stockpiling, production and transfer of ClusterMunitions and provides groundbreaking provisions tosupport the victims. The Convention was adopted inDublin by 107 states on 30th May 2008 and signed on3rd December the same year. The Convention entersinto force six months afer the 30th state has submittedits instrument of ratification.

Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC) – the internationalcivil society coalition works to protect civilians fromthe effects of cluster munitions by promoting universaladherence to and full implementation of the CCM. Ithas a membership of around 300 civil society

organisations from more than 80 countries. It may bemerged with the International Campaign to BanLandmines in the future.

Oslo Process – this is the name for the process thatled to the Convention on Cluster Munitions. Theprocess was named after the city, Oslo, where theNorwegian government launched the call for theConvention in February 2007. It is an open and timebound diplomatic process that included States,members of the CMC, the International Committee ofthe Red Cross and the UN.

The core group of states – this includes the initialgovernment proponents of the Oslo Process - Austria,the Holy See, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Norwayand Peru.

The Like Minded Group – this is the name given to agroup of about twelve countries including Germany,France, UK, Canada and Denmark who joined the OsloProcess but during the negotiations initially sought towater down the Convention.

About the author – Ruth Mayne is an independentfree lance consultant. Her contact details can beobtained from HIB - [email protected] to Jim Coe for his insightful comments on thedraft report and his assistance with the evaluationmethodology, interview questions and analysis.

EXTERNAL EVALUATION BAN ADVOCATES 03


Glossary


The Ban Advocates (BAs) Initiative is a projectsupported by Handicap International Belgium (HIB) topromote the involvement of individuals affected bycluster munitions (CMs) in the negotiation, promotionand implementation of the Convention on ClusterMunitions (CCM).

This independent external evaluation was commissionedby HIB and funded by The Diana, Princess of WalesMemorial Fund (the Fund). It comes a few months afterthe signature in Oslo of the Convention on ClusterMunitions (CCM). The CCM emerged from years of effortsby a growing number of NGOs rallied under the ClusterMunition Coalition (CMC), a ‘core group’ of states, theInternational Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and theUnited Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

The evaluation covers Phase 1 of the Ban AdvocatesInitiative from September 2007 to December 2008. Itspurpose is to:

Provide a conceptualisation of the BAs’ advocacystrategy Assess the effectiveness of the BAs’ advocacystrategyAssess the effects of the BAs on decision and opinionmakersAssess the personal satisfaction of the BAsProvide detailed practical recommendations to HIBto help them adapt and adjust the project to theimplementation phase of the Convention on ClusterMunitions (CCM)Draw out lessons for other campaigns/movements

The report is based on an understanding built up bythe evaluator from 23 interviews with external andinternal respondents including diplomats, NGOs,media, independent experts and the BAs, and a deskreview. The report’s findings do not reflect the viewsof governments critical of the Convention as those weapproached did not make themselves available forinterview2.

Draft findings were presented to the BAs and HIB staffand their comments and feedback taken into accountin the final draft. Comments were also solicited fromthe Fund.

A full report, with detailed recommendations, hasbeen submitted to HIB and the BAs.

04 BAN ADVOCATES EXTERNAL EVALUATION


Summary of findings

The report is based on an understanding built up by the evaluator from 23 interviews with external and internal respondents including diplomats, NGOs, media, independent experts and the BAs, and a desk review.

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2 This is perhaps because the convention had already been agreed, and theyfelt there was little to gain by engaging in this review.

1. Introduction

Ban Advocates statement, Oslo Signing Conference, 4 December 2008.

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The findings from the evaluation suggest that the twomain goals of Phase 1 of the Ban Advocates Initiativehave been largely achieved, which were to:

Support international efforts to rid the world ofcluster munitions, andRaise awareness in the negotiations (known as theOslo Process) for an international ban on clustermunitions (CMs) of the human impact of clustermunitions

However, as one BA noted, ‘the process is not finished:it is just beginning. Without implementation it is just apiece of paper and fine words’.



The Ban Advocate Initiative did not have written policychange objectives or priority target audiences againstwhich to measure achievements. These were decidedin coordination with the Cluster Munition Coalition(CMC) on a conference by conference basis and duringcountry tours.

However, the findings from the evaluation show thatthe Ban Advocates (BAs) were a vital factor contributingto the success of the Oslo Process. Their particularcontribution, as part of the wider civil society campaign,was to help:

Increase the legitimacy of the Oslo Process (alongwith affected countries) Strengthen the power of the humanitarian argumentin favour of a ban Influence diplomats understanding and views of theissue, and in some cases contribute to a change ingovernment policyStrengthen the text of the convention, particularly onvictim assistanceSecure high profile media coverage for the OsloProcess Motivate campaigners and diplomats

As one respondent said ‘The involvement of the BAswas a massive morale boost for the whole campaign– it was incredibly motivating’.

2. Achievement of goals

3. Achievement of policychange objectives: the BAs’ contribution

Soraj Ghulam Habib, Ban Advocate, congratulates the Norwegian Foreign Minister, Oslo, 3 December 2008.

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CMC campaigners, Oslo, 4 December 2008.

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The successful outcome was driven by a combinationof the following actors and factors:

A t a c t i c a l a l l i a n c e

Between the core supportive governments (seeglossary), the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC), theBan Advocates, affected states, and internationalorganisations such as the UNDP and the ICRC. As onerespondent noted: ‘The outcome couldn’t havehappened without civil society and the BAs – butequally they couldn’t have done it without the coregovernments’.

S h i f t i n g t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s t o a m o r ef a v o u r a b l e f o r u m

i.e. a forum that offered the prospects for a strongeragreement and more favourable conditions forproponents, including participation by civil society.However, shifting the forum was also a gamble, andhence ‘the involvement of the Ban Advocates and theaffected states, was crucial in providing legitimacy tothe Oslo Process’, as one respondent commented.

C e n t r i n g a n d f r a m i n g n e g o t i a t i o n sa r o u n d a c o m p e l l i n g h u m a n i t a r i a np r i n c i p l e

That strengthened the moral force of the argument fora ban, and nullified some of the negotiatingadvantages states have because of their expertknowledge. The BAs were widely acknowledged tohave made a major contribution to the success of this

strategy: ‘The BAs got us away from victims asnumbers which do not mean much on a human level.It was much more powerful that the BAs were presentin the form of living people’.

Ef fect ive st rateg y

A key factor contributing to the successful outcome ofthe Oslo process was the effective strategy of, andcoordination by, the tactical alliance.

The BA Initiative and wider civil society campaign werean important element of the overall strategy. The BAsconstituted a semi-autonomous group within thewider civil society coalition. While they participated inCMC briefings when possible, they also met separatelyto plan and implement their own advocacy activities.HIB mediated relations between BAs and the CMC toensure coordination.

The CCM was widely regarded by respondents to:

Be a strong and significant conventionContain strong and clear definitions of what constitutesa cluster munitionSet high standards for victim assistance

4. Outcomes of the Oslo Process

5. How change happened:change factors/drivers

Ban Advocates lobbying delegates, Dublin Diplomatic Conference on ClusterMunitions, May 2008.

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Survivor panel, Oslo Signing Conference, 3 December 2008.

The involvement of the Ban Advocates and the affected states, was crucial in providing legitimacy to the Oslo Process.

’‘It was beyond the scope of this evaluation to assess

the effectiveness of the wider civil society campaign.However, some of its strengths and weaknesses areoutlined here in order to provide the context for theassessment of the BAs’ specific contribution which isoutlined in Section 7 below.

The following strengths of the civil society campaignwere cited by respondents:

Effective coordination of an increasingly large anddiverse group of NGOs at the negotiating conferencesClear policy briefings, and lobbying guides for eachconferenceEffective day-to-day coordination of advocacy strategyat conferencesEffective and flexible mix of influencing approachesincluding:

- tactical targeting & lobbying of key decision makers - effective mix of expertise/evidence - both humani-

tarian and technical - public monitoring & reporting of government positions - media coverage

Respondents cited the following areas where therewas room for improvement:

Limited public mobilisation – this was in part due tolack of time (as the campaign moved very quickly),low public awareness of CMs (compared tolandmines), and few civil society networks workingon the issue, and capacity Limited national advocacy – this was also in part dueto lack of time and capacity Resentment from some governments about civilsociety’s role in the process – this was possiblyinevitable Some criticisms of the NGO name and shamecampaign in Wellington At times, a somewhat ‘top down’ coordination style,by the CMC - however given the large numbers ofNGOs and the fast pace of negotiations this wasunderstandable up to a point

Pol i t ica l courage & leadership

The courage and leadership of the following actorswere also mentioned as key success factors by somerespondents:

The initial NGO proponents who promoted the banwhen the idea was still considered unrealistic Norway and the core governments who took thepolitical risk of launching the Oslo ProcessThe BAs – as one respondent said: ‘It must take a lotof courage to stand up and speak in diplomaticconferences in front of the high and mighty’.

External c i rcumstances

Israel’s use of cluster bombs in Lebanon publiclyunderscored the need for a ban.

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There were strong opponents to the ban but:

The United States, China and others remainedoutside the process – which weakened their influenceover the processThe group of governments within the Oslo Processwho were seeking a weaker agreement, known as the Like Minded Group, were divided and on thedefensiveStates were not captured by a powerful commerciallobby – which increased the prospect of a successfuloutcome and made the alliance’s job easier (incomparison to other international negotiations suchas trade).



Overall, respondents felt that the BAs’ advocacy waseffective and of high quality. As one diplomat said:‘The BAs did an extraordinary job and HIB did anextraordinary job in supporting them’.

D e s i g n o f t h e B A s t r a t e g y

The Ban Advocates Initiative had a clear rationale, aim,change assumptions and mix of influencing approaches.However, the Initiative did not develop an overarchingwritten advocacy strategy, or specific policy changeobjectives or priority targets. These were decided byHIB and the BAs on a conference by conference basisin coordination with CMC. On the one hand thisallowed the BAs to respond flexibly and quickly to afast changing policy and advocacy environment. Buton the other, it meant that the BAs did not learn howto conduct their own power analysis, design their ownadvocacy strategy, or contribute fully to strategicplanning. The BAs were not involved in the strategicdesign or planning of the Oslo Process or the civilsociety campaign.

I m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f s t r a t e g y

The main focus of the BAs’ activities during most of thereview period was on making conference interventionsand media advocacy. Participative ways of workingmeant that the BAs could choose which activites theygot involved in. Most only got fully involved in lobbyingdiplomats towards the end of the process. While someBAs may not have felt ready to engage in lobbying earlyon without support and training, others could haveplayed an effective role earlier on. National advocacywas not an objective for Phase 1 and hence was notprioritised, although BAs were encouraged to apply forsmall grants from the Fund’s Local Voices, Global Bangrants scheme for national advocacy work.

E f f e c t s o f B A a d v o c a c y

Respondents indicated that the BAs:Had a powerful and positive effect on the waydiplomats saw and understood the issues:

- ‘The BAs brought their [the diplomats’] humanity tothe fore – and were very powerful in doing so’

Ban Advocates United States speaking tour, briefing at Obama Headquarters,October 2008.

6. Obstacles to change

7. The effectiveness andquality of BAs’ advocacy

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- ‘The BAs brought moral force to the negotiations –they were bearing witness in a very direct way ….Involving them in negotiations kept everyone in thereal world and not just the world of negotiations’

- ‘The BAs put them [the diplomats] in a dilemma –they either looked really bad or agreed with the BAs.The BAs simplified things down to the bare bones andchanged the ‘rules of the game’ for the diplomats’Contributed alongside other actors/factors, includingthe wider civil society campaign, to changing thepositions of some key governments e.g. UnitedKingdom & Afghanistan Influenced some elements of the text e.g. on victimassistance, but their role was limited by barriers toparticipation in the Working Groups Played a very important role in securing media coverage

However, some diplomats were reportedly irritated atlosing control of the issue.

Q u a l i t y o f B A a d v o c a c y

Respondents pointed to the following strengths of theBAs’ advocacy:

Moral force and legitimacy derived from their directexperience of the issue, and from their positive andconstructive approach Powerful and moving conference interventionsEffective targeting of decision makers adapted tochanging circumstancesPowerful engagement with diplomats on a human/emotional level Important role in getting media coverageGood advocacy and media skills, which improvedover time, including a good balance between criticismand propositionGood mix of people and skills

Respondents cited the following areas for improvement:

Coordination – overall coordination between theBAs, HIB and the CMC was good but there were someunresolved tensions about the BAs’ separate statuswithin CMC, and some lost opportunities forcoordination and learning for BAsNational advocacy – there were some importantefforts at national advocacy by the BAs, but it wasnot an objective for phase 1 and was therefore notprioritised. Some respondents mentioned thatnational efforts were not fully coordinated within the

CMC, and the effort invested did not necessarilycorrelate with outcomesLearning – although the BAs received useful trainingin advocacy and communications skills, they werenot trained to design their own advocacy strategy orundertake a power analysis, nor were they involvedin strategic design or planning of the civil societycampaign. This was not a critical gap in Phase 1 butit will be important in Phase 2 of the Initiative whichwill prioritise national advocacyLack of in-depth technical knowledge for some BAs –the BAs’ power and influence was widely recognisedto be derived largely from their direct experience ofthe issue (although some BAs were also technicalexperts). However, some respondents, includingsome of the BAs, felt that improved technicalknowledge could increase their confidence and abilityto tackle counter argumentsLanguage skills – language was felt to be their mostcritical barrier to effective advocacy and communicationby many BAs, rather than advocacy skills per se.



Signature of the Convention on Cluster Munitions by Afghanistan, witnessedby Afghan Ban Advocates, Oslo, 3 December 2008.

Media interview, Dublin Diplomatic Conference on Cluster Munitions, May 2008.

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P r o g n o s i s

Most respondents were fairly upbeat about theprospect of achieving more signatures and getting the30 ratifications needed for the convention to comeinto force. Many also felt optimistic that as the paceof ratification of the Convention gathers momentum,its international recognition and influence wouldextend to those who have not signed.

C h a l l e n g e s

Respondents cited the following future challenges:

Keeping up the momentum as attention turnselsewherePromoting ratification – 30 ratifications are neededfor the convention to enter into force – althoughratifications may initially happen quickly they maythen die outPromoting implementation – as many respondentsnoted without implementation the convention is justa piece of paper. International financial assistancewill be required for clearance and victim assistanceEncouraging more governments to sign – the US willbe a big challenge, but there was no consensus onwhether this should be a priority focus or notPromoting stigmatisation to make it unthinkable forany government to use CMs whether they aresignatories or notAddressing specific challenges in affected countries– the BAs outlined a range of different challengesthey face in their countriesEnsuring continued funding for CMC, key NGOs andthe BAs

The BAs’ rated HIB’s support highly in relation to mostof their following objectives and/or principles. As oneBA said ‘HIB were very effective in providing support –and very careful that they were not using the BAs’.Nonetheless, the BAs identified a numbers of areasfor improvement, which are outlined in the full report,and reflected in the detailed recommendations.



8. The BAs’ satisfaction with HIB

9. Looking ahead

Residential training programme, Germany, June 2009.

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B A ’ s f u t u r e r o l e

For Phase 2 of the BA Initiative, HIB and the BAs haveagreed to continue the Initiative and:

Prioritise national advocacy, for signature, ratification,implementation, and monitoring of the treaty; andEngage in lobbying at regional and international levelto promote signature, ratification and implementationof the treaty

In order for the BAs’ advocacy to be effective andsustainable at national level, it is vital that the BAs’work is coordinated effectively with local civil societyorganisations and networks, as well as with the CMC.

H I B ’ s f u t u r e s u p p o r t

HIB and BAs have agreed to retain the currentstructure of the Initiative, and reinforce it if needed. Inparticular HIB has agreed to:

Make available small grants to support the BAs’national advocacyContinue to ensure coordination with other relevantactors including the CMCProvide financial support for language and computertraining through small grant schemes which BAs canapply forSupport interested Ban Advocates to collect data tomonitor implementationProvide individual coaching sessions to help BAsidentify a plan for their own personal and professionaldevelopment. (These sessions were provided in June2009 during a residential training in Germany)

A number of recommendations for HIB support, training,funding and coordination with the CMC are outlined inthe full report and detailed recommendations.



Public awareness on the Convention on Cluster Munitions in a Tajik school.

Interview on the Convention on Cluster Munitions with Afghan media.

The BAs’ rated HIB’s support highly in relation to most of their following objectivesand/or principles.

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L e s s o n 1 – R a t i o n a l e

Involving affected people in change campaigns is botha moral imperative and a powerful and effective way ofcontributing to policy change. As one BA said, ‘It is vitalto involve the voices of affected people, and makedecision-makers face the victims. Where there is adistance, decision-makers don’t have to face theconsequences of their actions and so can makedecisions that are so wrong, even though they aregenerally good people’. As another BA pointed out, ‘Itis very important to involve ordinary people who sufferthe consequences of human stupidity in future treatiesand campaigns. Diplomats believed the BAs becausethey were talking from the heart, not just the mind.People can tell whether someone is talking sincerely ornot. Even with bad English, this is more powerful’.

L e s s o n 2 – R e p l i c a t i o n

Involving affected people in campaigns is a highlyreplicable idea. Respondents suggested that it couldbe extended to campaigns on white phosphorous,small weapons, nuclear weapons, various forms ofdiscrimination, human rights abuse, and to campaignsfor change generally.

L e s s o n 3 – L e v e l s o f i n v o l v e m e n t

It is important to develop, and adhere to, clearprinciples about how to involve affected individuals incampaigns.

HIB developed the following principles which wereendorsed by the BAs:

Initial consultation and discussion with the BAs toagree on the objectives and content of the projectSupporting BAs to choose the ways in which theycould get involved in the campaignsSupporting BAs to express themselves, rather thanimposing their own views Providing the BAs with the necessary training andsupport to succeed in their advocacyBuilding relationships with the beneficiaries on thebasis of respect and confidence Supporting the development of a team spirit amongthe beneficiaries to promote solidarity between eachof them

Other campaigns may also want to consider empoweringaffected people to participate in strategic decisionmaking, although the desirability of this will depend inpart on their interests and capacity. One respondentsuggested, for example, that individual BAs should havebeen on the CMC Steering Committee. In addition,various BAs expressed interest in working together todesign an overarching international advocacy strategyfor their own activities.

Another important principle that the BA Initiativeadopted, although it was perhaps not clearly enougharticulated to other elements of civil society, was thecreation of a separate and independent space for theBAs to share experiences and support each other. Thepractice of having separate sections for minoritygroups within broader coalitions draws on a longhistory which, if understood, can enrich rather thanweaken organisations or coalitions.



Speaking to the Irish Foreign Minister, Dublin Diplomatic Conference onCluster Munitions, May 2008.

10. Lessons for involving affected people in civil society campaigns

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There are also numerous examples of affected peoplewho have gone one step further and established theirown independent organisations, and engaged incampaigning on their own behalf or as part of widercoalitions e.g. organisations of the displaced, thedisabled, victims of political violence or human rightabuses, workers, peasants, indigenous people, women,gay people, ethnic minorities etc. In these cases aseparate set of principles will apply to NGOs or coalitionsthat campaign ‘for’ or ‘on behalf’ of these groups.

These may include:

Reviewing, and if necessary, enhancing theiraccountability to the affected organisations Providing capacity building to strengthen thecapacity of affected organisations to advocate intheir own right Involving and augmenting the voices of affectedorganisations in campaign alliances/coalitionsProviding financial and logistical support to ensureaffected organisations can participate in decisionmaking forums that affect themPromoting research and information, and recruitingallies to support and legitimise the concerns ofaffected organisations

L e s s o n 4 – P a y m e n t

It is also important to have clear principles aboutpaying affected individuals or ‘beneficiaries’ for theirinvolvement in campaigns. HIB gave the BAs perdiems (at a rate that allowed them to take somemoney home) rather than paying them a fee. It was feltthat if they were paid for their participation this mayweaken their perceived independence and hence theirlegitimacy and power. HIB also wanted to beconsistent with existing practice of the InternationalCampaign to Ban Landmines and the CMC, both ofwhich pay per diems to participating volunteers.

Good practice from some organisations suggests thata broader principle may be relevant i.e. that affectedpeople should not be financially disadvantaged as aresult of their involvement. This suggests a range ofpossible responses may be appropriate depending onthe circumstances including providing per diems,paying them as consultants, or at least compensatingthem for any loss of income incurred in the course oftheir involvement in the campaign. The appropriateoption will depend in part on the role and expertise ofthe ‘beneficaries’. If affected individuals are beinginvolved because of their direct experience of an issue,this could be regarded as ‘expert knowledge’, in whichcase contracting them as short term consultants maybe appropriate. If they are being involved in acampaign to demonstrate their support for a cause,for instance to participate in a demonstration, thenpaying them per diems would be more appropriate.Another important principle is to be transparent aboutwhat you decide.



Dublin Diplomatic Conference on Cluster Munitions, May 2008

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L e s s o n 5 – L o g i s t i c a l s u p p o r t

A major lesson arising from the Ban AdvocatesInitiative is that facilitating the involvement of a diversegroup of affected individuals in a campaign requiressound logistical support and adequate resourcing if itis to be done properly. Necessary support may include:

Logistical support including help with visas, travel,accommodation Training in advocacy, media and other skills English language trainingTranslators who are briefed on the policy issues andhave an understanding of the campaign Psychological support

The BA Initiative and wider Oslo Process illustrate thefollowing lessons about how change happens (not inorder of importance):

L e s s o n 1 – S o f t p o w e r

It was possible for ‘weaker’ states (i.e. states withlimited ‘hard’ power) and civil society to achieve majorinternational policy changes by working collectively tomaximise, and make effective use of, their sources of‘soft’ - or ‘persuasive’- power. In the Oslo Process,their soft power was derived from the authority andlegitimacy of the core actors, the moral force of theirargument, their technical and practical expertise, andan effective strategy to drive change3. The involvementof affected individuals (and states) in the Oslo processgreatly added to the legitimacy, moral force andultimately power and influence of the proponents.

L e s s o n 2 – E m o t i o n a l e n g a g e m e n t

When people who were directly affected by an issue,in this case the BAs, engaged on a personal, emotionaland human level with diplomats, it made a powerfuldifference to the way officials and diplomatsunderstood and viewed the issue. In some instances italso contributed, alongside other factors (includingthe wider civil society campaign) to influencegovernment positions.

However, experience from this and other campaignssuggests that emotional engagement is unlikely to besufficient on its own if there are strong opponents, ifstates are heavily influenced by powerful vestedinterests, if the issue is highly contentious, and/or ifthere is lack of public support. In such cases high profilemedia coverage, public mobilisation, or other forms ofpressure will also be necessary to achieve change.



3 The terms hard and soft power are used in international relations. Hard power relates to the use of military and/or economic coercion to influence thebehavior or interests of other political bodies. Soft or persuasive power comes from an actor’s capacity to win others over to their cause, without the use ofcoercion i.e. winning hearts and minds. It may involve appealing to reason, shared values, empathy, common humanity, duties or legal obligations i.e. thewinning of hearts and minds. Its effectiveness rests on the actors’ authority, reputation, knowledge, individual charisma, reward or position power.

“Vantastic”, Dublin Diplomatic Conference on Cluster Munitions, May 2008.

11. Lessons for how change happens

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Lesson 3 – The power of direct experience

Direct personal experience of an issue is an important,but sometimes undervalued, source of expertise andsoft power. As one diplomat pointed out ‘The BAs wereexperts in the human effects of CMs … they broughtspecific experience which helped in the elaboration ofthe Victim Assistance clause … I learnt a lot from themas they could tell me how things work on the groundand they raised several things I hadn’t thought of’.

When direct experience is combined with technicalexpertise (whether from the same source or combinedwith other sources of expertise) it can become an evenmore powerful and effective force.

L e s s o n 4 – B e i n g p o s i t i v e

The moral force of affected individuals is increasedwhen they come across as people who are positiveand proactive, and want to help others, rather thanjust being victims to be pitied.

L e s s o n 5 – C i v i l s o c i e t y r e l a t i o n s w i t hg o v e r n m e n t s

The formation of tactical alliances between civil society- including affected people - and progressive elementsin governments can be crucial to achieving change.However, lessons from other campaigns suggest thatcivil society actors should be wary of entering intotactical alliances with states unless there is a clearagreement on objectives and strategy. They shouldalso retain their independence and capacity to exertpressure on governments when necessary.

L e s s o n 6 – Co p y a n d a d a p t

Successful policy change can occur through copyingand adapting previous good practices or precedents.In this case the Oslo Process successfully modelledmuch of its strategy on the Ottawa Process.

L e s s o n 7 – S u s t a i n t h e e f f o r t

The Convention on Cluster Munitions is a significantachievement, but a proactive campaign will need tobe sustained to ensure that it is implemented and hasa positive impact on people’s lives. This will require:

Continued commitment from key actors including theBAsDonor funding for implementation and victimassistance, and Donor funding for civil society campaigns includingthe CMC, key NGOs and the BAs


Ban Advocates demonstrating with the CMC, Dublin, May 2008.


The moral force of affected individuals is increased when they come across as people who are positive and proactive,and want to help others, rather than just being victims to be pitied.

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The Diana, Princess of Wales Memorial Fund continues thePrincess’ humanitarian work in the UK and overseas. By givinggrants to organizations, championing charitable causes, advocacy,campaigning and awareness raising, the Fund works to securesustainable improvements in the lives of the most vulnerable peoplein the UK and around the world.

www.theworkcontinues.org

In 2009, the Ban Advocates Initiative received support from thegovernments of Australia, Ireland, Netherlands and Norway, as wellas from The Diana, Princess of Wales Memorial Fund.

The external evaluation of the Ban Advocates Initiative has beenfunded by The Diana, Princess of Wales Memorial Fund.

Ban AdvocatesInformation and contact:Handicap International ASBL-VZW67 Rue de Spastraat - 1000 Brussels, BelgiumPhone : +32 2 280 16 01Fax : +32 2 230 60 30E-mail : policy.unit@handicap.bewww.handicap-international.bewww.banadvocates.org

The Ban Advocatesparticipants at the Oslo Conference, December 2008


External evaluationof the Ban Advocates

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Transcript of External evaluationof the Ban Advocates