EXPERIENCING GOD

KEVIN CORCORAN

Department of Philosophy, Calvin College, Grand Rapids. M149546, USA

Some philosophers claim that it is not possible for God, if God exists, to figure in the phenomenological content of experi- ence. W.T. Stace was one such philosopher committed to this claim, but he offered nothing in the way of an argument for it. William Forgie, however, has argued that on the assumption of two putatively plausible theses about the phenomenology of experience, phenomenologically theistic experience is impossible. In this paper I suggest how a broadly Anselmian theist I committed to those theses might still argue for the pos- sibility of phenomenologically theistic experience. After pro- viding an initial argument for the possibility of such experi- ence, I entertain four possible objections against it. I show how three of those objections fail of their aim and how the argument can be reformulated to meet the fourth. I conclude that a broadly Anselmian theist who accepts the theses in question has good prima facie reasons for believing that phe- nomenologically theistic experience is possible.

I. PHENOMENOLOGICAL CONTENT AND TWO PUTATIVELY PLAUSIBLE THESES CONCERNING THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF EXPERIENCE

The subject of this paper is the possibility of phenomenolog- ically theistic experience (hereafter, PTE), the claim that God can figure in the phenomenological content of experience. But what is meant by phenomenological content of experi-

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ence? As a first approximation we might distinguish how an experience represents the world from the actual object or objects represented. For example, an experience may repre- sent the world, or some aspect of the world, as red and round. The reddishness and roundishness might thus at least partly constitute the phenomenological content of an experience of an apple, say. By phenomenological content, then, one might just mean the sensuous or imagistic representational elements of experience. 2

But one might cast the phenomenological net wider. One might hold that upon one's being appeared to redly and roundly in the case of perceiving a red apple there might also be, in addition to the reddishness and roundishness that are phenomenologically presented, affective phenomenological aspects of the experience. For example, one might desire the apple or perhaps be repulsed by it. Moreover, one might include, in addition to the sensuous and affective phenome- nological aspects of experience, the doxastic elements that figure among the phenomenological content of many experi- ences. For example, when I perceive an apple, in addition to the affective and sensous elements, there might also be the impulsion with respect to a certain proposition (that I see an apple) to believe that that proposition is true, that the world is the way the proposition represents it. 3 So one might include in the phenomenological content of experience not just the sensuous or imagistic representational elements, but also the affective and doxastic.

By phenomenological content I mean to include all of the the 'what it's like' features that are presented to con- sciousness in the having of an experience, the sensuous, affec- tive and doxastic. Many who deny that PTE is possible, on the other hand, seem to restrict what is to be counted among phenomenological content to the sensous and imagistic rep- resenational elements of experience. But their arguments against the possibility of PTE do not depend on this claim. 4

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On what sorts of claims then do such arguments depend? One very compelling argument against the possibility of PTE depends partly on the following thesis

P: An experience E is phenomenologically of x (where x is an individual) if and only if the content of E includes the manifestation of F, where F is a property x alone pos- sibly possesses.

William Forgie assumes P (or some variant of it) in objecting to the possibility of PTE. s We will examine Forgie's objection in due course. In any event, P is to be understood as an internal requirement on the phenomenological content of experience. For example, if an experience is said to be phe- nomenologically of Richard Nixon, then among the phenom- enological content of that putative experience of Nixon must be the manifestation of some property that Nixon alone pos- sibly possesses. If the manifestation of a uniquely identifying property is not among the phenomenological content of some experience, then that experience is not phenomenologically of some particular individual as opposed to some individual or other, each of whom might equally 'fit' the content of the experience. Thus an experience E is phenomenologically of x if and only if E includes the manifestation of F and it is impos- sible for F to be exemplified by some y numerically distinct from x. 6

Our concern here shall be with the phenomenology of veridical experience. I will follow Forgie and others here and mean that an experience is veridical if and only if that expe- rience is of an actually existing, mind-independent object and is not a hallucinatory or otherwise illusory experience. Moreover, I will assume that the actual objects of veridical perceptual experiences possess properties, and thus causal powers, in virtue of which they are responsible for the phe- nomenological content of those experiences. 7 On this con- strual of veridical, the following are both possible:

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(A) two veridical perceptual experiences of the same object differ in phenomenological content, and

(B) veridical perceptual experiences of numerically distinct objects share the same phenomenological content

(A) poses no special problems for the possibility of PTE. Assuming P, two veridical experiences of God may differ as much as you like in phenomenological content so long as the content of each includes the manifestation of a uniquely instantiable property of God's. (B) on the other hand entails the possibility of an experience being phenomenologically of God even if the manifestation of no uniquely instantiable property of God's is included in the phenomenological con- tent of the experience. B is ruled out by P. In fact, William Forgie goes further than P and stipulates that

P: If an experience is phenomenologically of x (where x is an individual) and is also veridical, then the phenomeno- logical content of that experience of x must metaphysi- cally determine the actual object of that experience

It is the conjunction of P and P, Forgie believes, that ren- ders PTE impossible, s P requires that in the case of a veridi- cal perceptual experience phenomenologically of an individ- ual, say Richard Nixon, it be metaphysically impossible for a numerically distinct individual, say Ed Sullivan, to cause an experience phenomenologically indistinguishable from that of Nixon. Thus when an experience E includes the manifes- tation of F among its phenomenological content (where F is a property x alone possibly possesses) and E is veridical, and it is impossible for a numerically distinct object y to cause an experience phenomenologically indistinguishable from x, then P and P are jointly satisfied.

The claim then is this. If an experience is veridical and is phenomenologically of something having property F (and phe- nomenologically of nothing else), where property F is a prop- erty capable of being instantiated by more than one possible

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individual, then nothing in the content of that experience will guarantee that its actual object is any particular one of the many possible individuals capable of exemplifying that proper- ty. On the other hand, if an experience is veridical and its phe- nomenological content includes the manifestation of some property uniquely possessed by a particular individual such that the actual object of that experience must be the individual who alone can have the uniquely instanfiable property in ques- tion, then that experience is phenomenologically of the unique individual possessing that property. Forgie does not believe that any experience of God could be such that it is not possible that an experience of something else be phenomenologically indis- tinguishable from that experience of God. 9 So he claims that phenomenologically theistic experience is impossible. We shall consider Forgie's argument for this claim shortly.

I have argued elsewhere against both P and P and against the claim based on them that PTE is impossible. 1~ In fact, P and P strike me as monumentally implausible. Still, I believe a broadly Anselmian theist committed to those theses can motivate a plausible argument for the possibility of PTE.

Substituting 'God' for 'some specific individual' and 'it,' in P, the Anselmian might offer the following argument for the possibility of PTE, using P and P as premises.

II. AN ARGUMENT FOR THE POSSIBILITY OF PTE

(i) If an experience is phenomenologically of x (where x is an individual) and is also veridical, then the phe- nomenological content of that experience of x must metaphysically determine the actual object of that experience

(ii) An experience E is phenomenologically of God if and only if the content of E includes the manifesta- tion of F, where F is a property God alone possibly possesses.

(iii) God alone possibly possesses omnipotence.

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Therefore,

(iv) If some experience is veridical and is phenome- nologically of something manifesting omnipo- tence, then the object of that experience must be God.

Therefore,

(v) According to (i), if some experience is veridical and is phenomenologically of something manfesting omnipotence, then such an experience is phenome- nologically of God.

This argument is valid. But what are we to make of premise (iii) and, therefore, the claim in (iv) that the object of such an experience must be God? The Anselmian has reasons for believing both that (a) God is a necessary being, and thus exists at all possible worlds, and (b) God possesses omnipo- tence essentially. 11 Arguments for (a) can be found in Anselm's own writings or, more recently, in the works of Alvin Plantinga) 2 That God possesses omnipotence essential- ly follows both from the concept of God as that of a maxi- mally perfect being, and from the plausible belief that power is a perfection. Therefore, at whatever worlds God exists (which is all possible worlds if God is a necessary being), God will possess all perfection-making properties and do so max- imally. 13

There is good reason also to believe that the only object that possibly possesses omnipotence is God, since it is plausi- ble to suppose that there cannot simultaneously be two omnipotent beings. Since on our Anselmian reading God is an essentially omnipotent and necessarily existent being, the object of such an experience under consideration would have to be God, could not possibly not be God. Given (a) and (b), and on the basis of P and P, it is rational for the Anselmian to believe that PTE is possible.

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III. OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES

There are four possible objections to this Anselmian argu- ment that I want to consider. Before examining an objection that may immediately strike the reader, to wit, that the man- ifestation of omnipotence cannot figure in the phenomeno- logical content of an experience, I want to examine two other objections of equal importance. The first objection consists in an appeal to the concept of God. The classical Western con- ception of God minimally consists in that of a being that falls under no one of the sensory modalities. It might be argued that in virtue of God's nature as an immaterial being a PTE appears conceptually incoherent. God, if such there be, is sim- ply not the kind of object that can enter into experience. TM

Let me begin by pointing out that there are places in the relevant literature where mystics include sensory content in their phenomenological descriptions of putative theistic expe- riences. Moreover, William Alston has recently provided rea- sons for why it is not inconceivable that God, if God exists, should be presented sensorily even though God's nature is such as to be devoid of sensory qualities? 5

The main difficulty with the objection, however, lies in its assumption that all, or even most, theistic experiences are sensory experiences. Not so. Most reports of putative theistic experiences consist in accounts of non-sensory experience. Descriptions of such experiences uniformly depict God as presenting God's self non-sensorily to the experient's con- sciousness in a way analogous to the way ordinary physical objects are presented to, or given in, sensory experience, i.e., involuntarily, and such that the qualitative features of the experience differ markedly from, say, thinking or imagining.

The concept of God as that of an immaterial being logi- cally precludes the possibility of theistic experience only if it is assumed both that an immaterial being cannot present itself sensorily in experience and all experiences are sensory expe- riences. The first of these claims has been addressed by

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Alston. The claim that all experiences are sensory experiences does not, to my lights, have the same epistemic status as '1+1=2,' and so is in need of some justification or argument. I know of no such argument.

The second possible objection to the possibility of PTE is one raised by William Forgie. The objection is predicated on the claim that the omni-properties classically attributed to God are not uniquely instantiable properties.

Take 'being omnipotent,' 'being omniscient," 'being all good,' or 'being the creator of the heavens and the earth.' Even if these properties are instantiated in this world by a certain individual, A, there is another possible world in which they are instantiated by a numerically distinct indi- vidual, B. 16

If this is so, then premise (ii) in the original argument is not satisfied in the case of God, and thus it is possible that an experience of something manifesting omnipotence not be an experience of something identical with God. And given premise (i) it would follow that such an experience is not phe- nomenologically of God. Forgie's objection may be repre- sented as follows.

Forgie's Argument (i) If an experience is phenomenologically of x (where

x is an individual) and is also veridical, then the phe- nomenological content of that experience of x must metaphysically determine the actual object of that experience

(ii) An experience E is phenomenologically of God if and only if the content of E includes the manifesta- tion of F, where F is a property God alone possibly possesses.

(iii) None of the omni-properties classically attributed to God are such that God alone possibly possesses them.

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Therefore,

(iv) If some experience is veridical and is phenomeno- logically of something manifesting omnipotence, then there is no guarantee that the (actual) object of that experience is God.

Therefore,

(v) According to (i), if some experience is veridical and is phenomenologically of something manifesting omnipotence, then such an experience cannot be phenomenologically of God.

Both arguments, the initial argument for the possibility of PTE and now Forgie's, manifest valid argument forms. Thus deciding on which is better will come to a judgment on the premises. Since both arguments employ P and P as premises one cannot be better or worse than the other on account of P or P. Which argument is better is a matter of which premise, (iii) or (iii), it is more rational to accept.

(iii) of Forgie's argument entails that either (a) God is not a necessary being or (b) God does not possess the omni-prop- erties essentially. 17 But Forgie offers us nothing in the way of reasons or arguments for accepting (iii) and thus for accept- ing either (a) or (b). TM The Anselmian, on the other hand, has arguments to the effect that God is a necessary existent and since the concept of God is that of a maximally perfect being, it follows that at whatever worlds God exists (which is all possible worlds if God is a necessary being) God will possess all perfection-making properties and do so maximally. But if that is the case, then it is not possible for numerically distinct individuals to manifest those properties in different possible worlds. Together Ca) and (b) provide an Anselmian theist with grounds for rejecting Forgie's argument.

Moreover, if Ca) and (b) are true, then given P and P, premise (iii) leads not to the claim that it is possible that an experience of an object manifesting omnipotence is God, but

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rather to the more modally robust claim that God must be the object of such an experience. God must be the object of such an experience since God both exists necessarily and possesses the omni-properties essentially such that a veridical experi- ence of something manifesting one of those properties cannot fail to be God. Thus to the extent that the Anselmian com- mitted to P and P has reasons for believing (a) and (b) she has good prima facie reasons for believing that the object of such an experience not only would be God but could not possibly not be God. Assuming (a) and (b), and given P and P, it fol- lows that such an experience would be phenomenologically of God.

It remains open for the critic of theistic experience sim- ply to deny that any veridical experience could include the manifestation of omnipotence among its phenomenological content. This is the criticism that likely occurred to the read- er right from the start and it constitutes a third possible objec- tion against the possibility of PTE. After all, how would the phenomenology of a display of omnipotence differ from the phenomenology of a display of power that is very impressive indeed but less than infinite?

There are two points to be made here. First, the argu- ment of Forgie's just considered accepts, for the sake of argu- ment, that the manifestation of such properties of God's as omnipotence could be part of the phenomenological content of an experience. That argument was intended to show that even if this were the case it still would not follow that an experience phenomenologically of something manifesting any one of the omni-properties is identical with God) 9 And this for the reason given, namely, that there are other possible worlds where numerically distinct individuals exemplify the omni-properties. It is this claim of Forgie's that the Anselmian has good reason to reject in virtue of the nature of God's exis- tence and the modality of Divine property possession, accord- ing to Anselmian perfect-being theology.

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But second, it is not clear to all comers to the table that the manifestion of omnipotence c a n n o t appear on an inven- tory of the phenomenological content of experience. Edward Schoen has argued that '[the] manifestation of divine infinite beings as well as manifestations of infinite attributes may be perceived and recognized as such. '2~ For the sake of argu- ment, let us suppose that Schoen's argument fails and that there are no good reasons for believing that the phenomenol- ogy of an experience can include the manifestation of omnipotence. Does this concession undermine the Anselmian argument? Well, as stated I suppose it does. For as stated the argument requires good reasons for believing that omnipo- tence can figure in the phenomenological content of experi- ence and we have conceded, at least for the sake of argument, that there are no such reasons.

This is not the end of the story, however. A broadly Anselmian argument for the possibility of PTE need not depend on the claim that a manifestation of omnipotence can

figure among the phenomenological content of experience. What is required of a successful argument for PTE, on the assumption of P and P, are reasons to believe (a) that God is a necessary being, (b*) that God possess certain of God's properties essentially and (c) that at least one of these essen- tial properties of God's is such that its manifestation can be part of the phenemonology of experience. It is not necessary that this property be one of the traditional omniproperties, such as omnipotence. An experience whose phenomenology involves the manifestation of any property had essentially and uniquely by God would be an experience phenomenological- ly of God.

Are there any such properties? I think there are. For example, as conceived in the major monotheistic religions God is identified as forgiver of sins. It seems plausible to believe that this property is an essential dispositional proper- ty of God's 21 such that an experience of something manifest-

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ing it, as judged by an experience whose phenomenological content includes all of one's sins being forgiven, would be an experience whose phenomenological content was theistic, 22 assuming of course, as the Anselmian does, that God also is a necessary being. The Anselmian might, therefore, reformu- late her argument along the following lines.

IV. THE ANSELMIAN ARGUMENT REFORMU~TED

(i) If an experience is phenomenologically of x (where x is an individual) and is also veridical, then the phe- nomenological content of that experience of x must metaphysically determine the actual object of that experience

(ii) An experience E is phenomenologically of God if and only if the content of E includes the manifesta- tion of F, where F is a property God alone possibly possesses.

(iii) God alone possibly possesses the property of being forgiver of all of one's sins.

Therefore,

(iv) If some experience is veridical and is phenomeno- logically of all of one's sins being forgiven then the object of that experience must be God.

Therefore,

(v) According to (i), if some experience is veridical and is phenomenologically of all of one's sins beng for- given, then such an experience is phenomenologi- cally of God.

V. MORE OBJECTIONS AND REVUES

One might think that this argument fairs no better than the original, that the phenomenological content of experience cannot include even the manifestation of Divine forgiveness.

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But I see no a priori reason to believe that Divine forgiveness cannot figure in the phenomenological content of experience. According to the major monotheisms, human beings are responsible to God for their actions. Now suppose, as the Anselmian will, that we human beings have culpably violated God's commands and trespassed against our neighbor. In other words, suppose we human beings have sinned. If God exists necessarily and possesses the dispositional property of being forgiver of sins essentially, then the only reason I can conceive for supposing that the manifestation of that proper- ty cannot be part of the phenomenological content of experi- ence is to believe that an experience of that sort would have to be a sensory experience, and to believe further that such an experience is impossible. As I suggested earlier, however, I see no reason to believe that all experiences are sensory experi- ences. So I see no a priori reason for believing that the mani- festation of Divine forgiveness cannot be part of the phe- nomenological content of experience.

Of course not having a reason to believe that something is impossible is not the same as having a reason to believe that it is possible. Is there any reason for believing that the mani- festation of Divine forgiveness could be part of the phenom- enological content of experience? As a prima facie reason in its favor the Anselmian theist might point to the many people

- mystics and non-mystics alike - who report having puta- tively non-sensory experiences of all of their sins being for- given. Such people very often describe their experience in some such terms as these. They claim to find themselves sub- ject to a profound sense of shame and guilt at having violat- ed God's commands, their fellows and perhaps their earthly habitat. These emotions - shame and guilt, are construals of a certain state of affairs involving themselves as offender and God as offended, even in the case where it is one's fellows or nature that one perceives oneself to have violated. 23 Furthermore, putative experients of Divine forgiveness judge

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themselves to be culpable for their offenses and see the offens- es to God as staggeringly serious. As a result, and most importantly, they see themselves as fit objects for wrath and punishment, as offensive, alien and wholly unfit for Divine company. The experience of forgiveness comes into play with something like a radical gestalt-switch, i.e., a switch in the cognitive content in terms of which the experient sees herself. Suddenly she is aware of herself not as being the subject of alienation, offensiveness and an object of Divine punishment and wrath, but as an object of Divine love, one whom God is pursuing not with retribution but with benevolence and com- passion, with the aim of welcoming into harmonious rela- tions. Those who claim to have had such an experience claim that the experience is one of complete and absolute forgive- ness. Complete because they sense that all of their sins are being forgiven and absolute because it is God whom they per- ceive as having offended and whom they perceive as forgiving them.

Now if forgiveness fundamentally involves the overcom- ing of anger or resentment on the part of the offended, com- ing to see the culpable offender not in terms of retribution and wrath, but rather in benevolent terms and with the aim of reconciliation, and if, furthermore, the offended is per- ceived to be God, then an experience with the phenomeno- logical features just described is precisely what we should expect an experience of Divine forgiveness to involve.

No doubt such experiences are not exactly perception- like in their phenomenology. And Forgie does seem to restrict what is to be counted among phenomenological content to the sensous and imagistic represenational elements of experi- ence. But his argument against the possibility of PTE, as we have seen, does not depend on this restriction. And I as I sug- gested at the beginning of the paper, I want to include in the phenomenological content of experience all of the the 'what it's like' features that are presented to consciousness in the

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having of an experience, the sensuous or perception-like ele- ments, as well as the affective and doxastic elements. Such experiences as I've been describing certainly involve these lat- ter elements. Even if we were to grant that the manifestation of Divine forgiveness could be part of the phenomenological content of experience, why is it impossible for such an expe- rience of forgiveness to be an experience whose object is not identical with God? The Anselmian must be able to provide a satisfactory answer to this question. Can she? I believe she can. For the Anselmian might plausibly maintain that the magnitude of forgiveness putatively displayed, and hence experienced by the forgiven, is possible only for a being to whom the forgiven is morally responsible for the whole of her existence. For example, you can forgive me wrongs done to you, but you cannot forgive me for wrongs done to others, nor can you forgive me for the mistreatment of non-human animals and the rest of the natural world. God, according to the major monotheisms, can. And it is reasonable to suppose that one cannot be morally responsible for the whole of her existence to two or more beings. 24 If the property of being forgiver of sins is an essential dispositional property of God's, and if God is a necessary being, then an experience of all of one's sins being forgiven would be an experience whose phe- nomenological content was theistic.

Now one might object that all that has been done here is to substitute one kind of omniproperty for another and object further that the manifestation of omnipropteries of any kind cannot enter into the phenomenological content of experi- ence. My response is simply to point out that in the case of Divine forgiveness, when God manifests the property of being forgiver of all of one's sins, what God exercises is forgiveness simplicter. So long as the forgiveness manifested covers all of one's sins, and is experienced as such, then P and P' will have been satisfied and one will have experienced a property had uniquely and essentially by God. In other words, it is not nec-

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essary that an experience of Divine forgiveness somehow be experienced as the sequential forgiveness of each of one's sins or even as the all-at-once forgiveness of the set of all of one's sins, which might require the experient to be consciously aware of each of her sins. All that is required is that the phe- nomenology of the experience include an affective element of forgiveness that is whole and complete in the sense of one's being throughly forgiven from all of one's sins. That is enough, given P and P, to guarantee that the experience is phenomenologically theistic.

The case for the possibility of PTE can be made even stronger. Suppose we human beings have been fitted with something like a sensus divinitatis. Then it seems even more plausible to suppose that upon having a certain experience there should be included in its phenomenological content the associated affective elements of complete forgiveness and a doxastic aspect in virtue of which one finds oneself being compelled with respect to a certain proposition (that I have been completely forgiven by almighty God) to believe that that proposition is true, that one really has been forgiven by, and welcomed into fellowship with, God. If such is the result of properly functioning cognitive equipment (including some- thing like a sensus divinitatis), then it seems to me all the more plauisble to believe that PTE is possible.

There is one final objection to the possibility of theistic experience that I want to consider. The conclusion to both Anselmian arguments takes the form of a conditional. And it might be argued that all of the properties to which we have pointed as possibly filling in the antecedent (e.g., being omnipotent, being creator of the world, being benevolent and being forgiver of sins) rely on a putative object's manifesting those properties. But to observe an object manifesting a prop- erty is to observe that object causing some event or bringing about some state of affairs. Hume has taught us, however, that causation never shows up as an item on an inventory of

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phenomenological content of experience. Therefore, since the antecedents to our Anselmian arguments can never be satis- fied their consequents shall never obtain; which is to say that no experience can be phenomenologically of God. This in fact constitutes another of Forgie's arguments against the possi- bility of PTE. 2s

The Anselmian should not be moved by this objection, however. First, it is not obvious that causation never shows up as an item on an inventory of phenomenological content. When I watch as the knife slices through the bread it is plau- sible (even if controversial) to believe that I perceive the knife's action causing the bread's being cut, that it is a part of the phenomenology of the experience. Second, the objection has the unwelcome consequence that if it succeeds it quickly generalizes to exclude the possibility of an experience being phenomenologically of a physical object. For imagine a world at which an experience phenomenologically indistinguishable from an experience caused by a physical object at the actual world is caused by a play of light in empty space, z6 Given the fact that the phenomenological content of veridical experi- ences must metaphysically determine the actual objects of those experiences, and given the fact that causation is not phenomenologically presentable, we would have to conclude that no experience is phenomenologically of a physical object. It seems to me more plausible to suppose that the assumption is mistaken than to suppose that no experience ever has been or ever will be phenomenologically of a physical object.

Moreover, although the objection correctly takes the phe- nomenological content of a veridical experience to be the end product of a causal chain that links the putative object experi- enced to the phenomenological content, it incorrectly assumes that the causal element must somehow be carried along the chain as part of the phenomenological content. It is not the case, however, that causation must be a phenomenological ele- ment of experience in order for an experience phenomenologo

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ically of x to guarantee that the actual object of the experience is x. All that is required, given P and P, is that the phenome- nological content include the manifestation of a property uniquely possessed by x. In response to the previous objection, I sketched an argument that shows just how the content of a putative experience of Divine forgiveness might in fact meta- physically determine the actual object of such an experience.

Furthermore, the objection also seems to assume, incor- rectly I think, that the cognitive act of identifying an object of experience is always separate from and a consequence of reflecting on the experience. But it does not seem to be the case that identification always occurs at a temporal distance from the experience itself. Nelson Pike, for example, has suggested that some sensory experiences are such that identification ele- ments are included in the phenomenological content of those experiences, elements such as 'it's a coffee maker,' or 'it's mother's voice. '27 The identification of the phenomenological content, in other words, is not always a distinct cognitive act temporally subsequent to an experience but rather sometimes is part and parcel of the experience, part of what I have called the doxastic aspect of experience. And if this is so in the case of sensory experience, and it certainly seems so, then I see no reason for thinking otherwise in the case of non-sensory expe- rience. Therefore I see no reason why the phenomenology of a non-sensory experience cannot include God.

In short, to make the objection based on causation stick what is required are compelling reasons for thinking that, in order for the phenomenological content of an experience to guarantee the actual object, causation must be included in the phenomenological content of experience, and, furthermore, compelling reasons for believing that doxastic and affective elements cannot or ought not be included in the phenomeno- logical content of experience. No such reasons have been forthcoming.

Perhaps the objection based on causality can be pushed in

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a different direction. Perhaps the problem is that one can only be justified in claiming that an experience is phenmenological- ly theistic by appeal to experience-independent evidence, evi- dence that traces the causal chain leading from God to the experience in question. It might be argued that since there is no way to obtain such experience-independent evidence in the case of putative theistic experience, one cannot be justified in claim- ing to have had a phenomenologically theistic experience.

Two points are relevant here. First, the issue between Forgie and myself is not the epistemological issue of whether, and under what conditions, one is justified in claiming to have had a phenomenologically theistic experience. The issue between us is whether or not such an experience is possible, given P and P. I have sought to make a plausible case for the claim that an Anselmian theist has good prima facie reasons for believing that phenomenologically theistic experience is possible. But second, the epistemological objection against claims to veridical theistic experience has been raised by Evan Fales 28 and, to my lights, successfully refuted by Jerome Gellman. 29 Gellman argues that it is unwarranted to demand that the only way to be justified in one's claim to have had a veridical theistic experience is by way of uncovering the causal mechanism or connection between God and the experience. If an experient's (really) perceiving God implies God's being in the right sort of causal relation to that experient, then any evi- dence that she (really) perceived God will also be evidence that God was in the right causal relation to her. And Gellman claims that we find just such evidence that an experient {real- ly) perceived God in that it seems that God is appearing to her. Says Gellman, '[t]his "seeming" creates a prima facie case in favor of the [experient] really perceiving [God]. '3~

Whatever one's assessment of the epistemological issue, the relevant point for my case against Forgie is just that the causal element that relates God to the putative experience need not enter into the phenomenological content of that

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experience in order for the content to guarantee that the actu- al object of the experience is God.

I maintain, therefore, that an Anselmian theist commit- ted to P and P can make a plausible case for the possibility of PTE. As I have tried to show, such a theist is in possession of reasons and arguments for believing both that God is a nec- essary being and that God possesses certain of the Divine properties essentially such that an experience of something manifesting any such property had uniquely by God is an experience whose phenomenological content is theistic.

VI. CONCLUSION

I conclude that the nature of God's existence and the modali- ty of Divine property possession, according to Anselmian per- fect-being theology, provides the Anselmian who accepts P and P with good prima facie reasons for believing that PTE is possible. Until the Anselmian is provided with reasons or arguments that compel her to reject (a), (b*) or (c) or, alterna- tively, compel her to believe that all experiences are sensory or perception-like experiences and that theistic experiences of an affective and doxastic sort are impossible, she should remain unmoved in her commitment to the possibility of PTE. M

NOTES

1 1. I.e., a theist who embraces perfect-being theology, the belief concerning God that God possesses all perfections (necessary existence among them) and does so maximally.

2 It is worth pointing out that the question 'What is (are) the actual object(s) of experience?' sometimes may permit the answer 'noth- ing,' as in the case of hallucination, whereas the question 'What is the phenomenological content of the experience?' logically excludes such an answer. The question 'What is the phenomenological con- tent of the experience?' logically excludes such an answer insofar as an experience's having some phenomenological content is a neces- sary condition for the very existence of the experience.

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3 For a discussion of the wider understanding of what is to be included in the phenomenological content of experience see Nelson Pike's Mystic Union (Cornell University Press, 1992), especially 139-146 and also chapter 12 in Alvin Plantinga's forthcoming installment of the Warrant series titled Warranted Christian Belief.

4 William Forgie, who works with a restricted view of phenom- enological content, claims that even if the scope of what is to be included in phenomenological content were wider this would be of no help to the theist in escaping the impossibility of PTE. See his 'Pike's Mystic Union and The Possibility of Theistic Experience,' Religious Studies 30 (1994) 231-242, especially pp. 238-240. Walter Stace assumes a restricted view of phenomenological content throughout Mysticism and Philosophy (J.P. Tarcher, Inc./St. Martin's Press, 1960), but he never gives any reasons or arguments for accepting that view.

5 That Forgie assumes P (or some variant of it) is brought out by the following claim: '[I]f an experience is to be phenome- nologically of God, the content of the experience must guar- antee that its object is a certain unique individual...' See Forgie's 'Theistic Experience and The Doctrine of Unanimity,' International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 15 (1984) 16.

6 When combined with the claim that the phenomenological content of all experiences is wholly general, P might reason- ably be said to underwrite Stace's charge that all 'mystical' experiences are non-theistic. Stace himself, however, never formulates such an argument. Colin McGinn is among con- temporary philosophers who endorse the claim that the phe- nomenology of all experiences is inherently and essentially general in its mode of representation. See McGinn's The Character of Mind, (Oxford University Press, 1982) pp.37-58. In Mystic Union, op. cir., Nelson Pike argues against the claim that the phenomenology of all experience is inherently gener- al on the grounds that the position falsely assumes that there is always a temporal gap between an experience whose con- tent is of a general 'something' and the identification of that 'something' as (a particular) 'so and so.'

7 It is interesting to note that on W.T. Stace's construal of 'veridical' an experience is veridical just in case it gives us

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10

11

information about the external world. Such an experience, in Stace's parlance, will be 'orderly' in both its internal and exter- nal relations. Stace takes such 'orderliness' to be a necessary and sufficient condition for veridicality. See his Mysticism and Philosophy, op. cit., chapter 3. Stace's condition for veridical- ity is not sufficient, however, insofar as it counts the following experience as veridical. Imagine that by some quirk of nature each time I strike my elbow with sufficient force it causes me to hallucinate a crackling fire in a fireplace before me. Imagine my sitting in front of a fireplace with a crackling fire when accidentally I strike my elbow on the arm of the chair in which I'm sitting, which causes me to hallucinate a crackling fire in a fireplace before me. No w my experience of the crackling fire is, on Stace's score, a veridical one since it gives me informa- tion about the external world and is orderly in both its inter- nal and extenal relations. But surely in order form my experi- ence to be veridical, not only must it give me information about the external world and manifest the requisite 'order', but the content of my experience must stand in the right kind of causal relation to the external world, i.e., my seeming to see a fire before me must be the effect whose cause is a mind inde- pendent event located in front of me. Stace's criterion fails to require this causal connection and is, therefore, inadequate as a criterion for veridicality.

For a defence of P see Forgie's 'Pike's Mystic Union.. . ,' op. cit.

Indeed, Forgie does not believe that any experience of an indi- vidual x is such that it's not possible that an experience of some other individual z be phenomenologically indistinguish- able from that experience of x. In short, Forgie does not believe that an experience is ever phenomenologically of any individual whatever. If the argument I present is correct, then it is possible for at least one individual to figure in the phe- nomenological content of experience, namely, God.

See my 'Is theistic Experience Phenomenologically Possible,' Religious Studies 32 (1996) 449-461.

(a) of course is to be read existentially and not hypothetically. (a) claims that there is a being that has the property of neces- sary existence and not that if there is such a being as God, then that being is a necessary being. I thank Larry Lacy for getting me to make this point explicit.

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12 See Plantinga's God, Freedom and Evil (Harper & Row, 1974).

13 For Anselm, perfection-making or great-making properties are those properties such that possession of them always makes a being greater or more perfect than that being otherwise would be if it failed to possess them. Knowledge, power and good- ness are all perfection-making properties, according to Anselm. By maximal I take Anselm to mean that such proper- ties come in degrees and that God possesses each property to its upper limit or to its fullest degree. One must think, there- fore, of degrees of knowledge or power on analogy with the possible number of degrees in a circle rather than, say, degrees of largeness in integers. Whereas with integers there are an infinite number and for any one there is one larger, i.e., its suc- cessor, it is not so with angles within a circle. There are an infi- nite number of angles in a circle but there is an upper limit, i.e., 360. God, according to Anselmian perfect-being theology, possesses all the knowledge and power there is, or infinite knowledge and power.

14 John Hick runs this line in his Faith and Knowledge, Second Edition (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1966). See especial- ly pp. 188ff.

15 See his Perceiving God, (Cornell, 1991), p. 19.

16 See Forgie's 'Theistic Experience and The Doctrine of Unanimity,' International Journal of the Philosophy of Religion 15 (1984) p.17.

17 To see this consider the following. If none of the omniproper- ties are such that God alone possibly possesses them, then there is a world at which some object not identical with God pos- sesses one or more of the omniproperties. Since argument I makes use of omnipotence, let's consider it. We have already ruled out the possibility of two or more objects possessing omnipotence simultaneously. Therefore, if there is a world at which an object not identical with God possesses omnipotence, then at that world either (A) God exists but lacks omnipotence or (B) God does not exist. (A) entails that (b) God does not pos- sess omnipotence essentially. (B) entails that (a) God is not a necessary being. Thus if (iii), then either (a) or (b).

18 This is not to say that Forgie has no such reasons or arguments or that there are none to be had. William Rowe, for example, has offered an argument for the impossibility of God's existence.

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19

20

21

See his 'Modal Versions of the Ontological Argument,' in Philosophy of Religion: An Anthology, ed. Louis Pojman, (Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1987), 69-73. In this paper Rowe asks if it is logically possible that among the infinite number of possible worlds there is at least one at which every conscious being that exists at that world has some defect. If this is so much as possible, then God not only does not exist at that world but God does not exist at any possible world. The Anselmian will of course deny that such a world is possible. And even if the Anselmian cannot offer Rowe an argument against such a pos- sibility without begging the question against him, it seems Rowe himself cannot offer an argument in its favor without begging the question against the Anselmian. We seem to have a case of epistemic stalemate. Neither Rowe nor the Anselmian has shown the other to be irrational in her commitment to the exis- tence, or non-existence, of God. What I go on to argue here is that insofar as the Anselmian is rational in her belief that (a) and (b) she is justified in her belief that PTE is possible.

See Forgie, 'Theistic Experience... ,' op. cit.

See his 'Sensory Presentation of Divine Infinity,' Faith and Philosophy 7 (1990) p. 5. See also Jerome Gellman 'Experiencing God's Infinity,' American Philosophical Quarterly 31 (1994) 53-61.

By taking the property of being forgiver of sins as disposition- al I have in mind to allow for the possibility of worlds at which God exists but at which the conditions never obtain for God to exemplify that property. Such a world might be void of any beings who have fallen into sin, void of any beings for whom sin is possible or contain both beings for whom sin is possible and have fallen into sin but it also be the case that other con- ditions necessary for Divine forgiveness are not satisfied at that world. Thus, to conceive God as essentially forgiving does not constrain God to forgive at every possible world. What is true if God has the essential dispositional propery of being forgiver of sins is that the following conditional is true, at every possi- ble world: if there are beings of a certain sort (e.g., significant- ly free, moral beings), and at least one of them has sinned, and other conditions for forgiveness that God has established are satisfied, then God manifests forgiveness at those worlds. Why suppose that there are 'other conditions God will have estab-

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lished' at worlds containing signifcantly free, moral beings? Because it is reasonable to believe that a necessary and essen- tially omnibenevolent being would desire fellowship with such creatures and that moral offenses stand in the way to such fel- lowship. So it seems at least plausible to believe that God has the property of being forgiver of sins essentially.

22 A common misconception about Roman Catholic theology is that priests have the authority as vicars of Christ to forgive sins. Therefore it might be argued that according to the view just put forth, an experience of one having one's sins forgiven at confes- sion by a priest is an experience whose phenomenological con- tent is theistic. Yet, given P, we know that the phenomenologi- cal content of such an experience is not theistic but thoroughly human since we know the actual object of the experience is a priest. So the argument just put forth is flawed. It must be point- ed out that as vicars of Christ it is not the priests themselves who forgive sins, according to Roman Catholic theology, but rather God who dispenses forgiveness to those whom the priests absolve or judge worthy to receive God's forgiveness. Therefore, if in the act of confession and absolution, the penitent has an experience of forgiveness of all her sins, the experience will have as its phenomenological content not the priest, but God. For God alone, according to Roman theology, can forgive all of one's sins. Of course the experience of the priest's voice in absolving the penitent has as its phenomenological content the priest whose voice is experienced. We must be careful then to distinguish the experience of forgiveness from the experience of absolution, in Roman Catholic Theology. The object of an experience of the former is believed to be God. The object of an experience of the latter is believed to be a human being, a priest. See Catechism of the Catholic Church (Missouri: Liguori Publications, 1994), pp. 362-4.

23 I am following Robert C. Roberts in viewing emotions as 'concern-based construals.' See his 'What an Emotion Is: A Sketch,' The Philosophical Review 97 (1988) 183-209 and 'Forgivingness,' American Philosophical Quarterly 32 (1995) 289~ for an exceptionally fine discussion of emotions.

24 One may, of course, be jointly responsible to two beings for some subregion of one's existence, as when a child is responsi- ble to both her mother and her father for her behavior at home

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and at school. But it seems to me that one cannot be responsi- ble for the whole of one's existence to two or more beings.

25 See his 'Theistic Experience...,' op. cit., pp. 19-21.

26 I borrow this example from Nelson Pike Mystic Union, op. cit., p.137.

27 Mystic Union, op.cit., pp.136-145.

28 Fales, 'Mystical Experience as Evidence,' International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 40 (1996) 19-46.

29 Jerome Gellman's 'On A Sociological Challenge to the Veridicality of Theistic Mystical Experience,' Religious Studies 34 (1998) 235-251. See especially pp 248-249.

30 'On a Sociological Challenge...,' p.250.

31 I wish to thank the following individuals for helpful discussion and comments: Jeff Brower, Alvin Plantinga, Dave Vanderlaan, and William Wainwright. Thanks also to mem- bers of the weekly philosophy of religion discussion group at the Center for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Notre Dame, where an earlier version of this paper was dis- cussed while I was a visiting fellow during the academic year 1996-1997. An earlier version of this paper was presented to the Metaphysical Society of America's annual meeting held at the University of South Carolina in March, 1998.

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