Experiences of the financial crisis...Money market premiums 1) 5-day moving average. Percentage...

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Experiences of the financial crisis Governor Svein Gjedrem Centre for Monetary Economics (CME)/BI Norwegian School of Management 30 September 2009

Transcript of Experiences of the financial crisis...Money market premiums 1) 5-day moving average. Percentage...

Page 1: Experiences of the financial crisis...Money market premiums 1) 5-day moving average. Percentage points 4 January 2007 – 25 September 2009 2 0,0 0,5 1,0 1,5 2,0 2,5 3,0 3,5 4,0 0,0

Experiences of the financial crisis

Governor Svein GjedremCentre for Monetary Economics (CME)/BI Norwegian School of Management 30 September 2009

Page 2: Experiences of the financial crisis...Money market premiums 1) 5-day moving average. Percentage points 4 January 2007 – 25 September 2009 2 0,0 0,5 1,0 1,5 2,0 2,5 3,0 3,5 4,0 0,0

Money market premiums1)

5-day moving average. Percentage points4 January 2007 – 25 September 2009

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2007 2008 2009

Norway

US

Euro area

1) Difference between three-month money market rates and expected key rates. Expected key rates are derived from Overnight Index Swap (OIS) rates Sources: Bloomberg, Thomson Reuters and Norges Bank

Page 3: Experiences of the financial crisis...Money market premiums 1) 5-day moving average. Percentage points 4 January 2007 – 25 September 2009 2 0,0 0,5 1,0 1,5 2,0 2,5 3,0 3,5 4,0 0,0

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Changes in the key policy rate that follow from Norges Bank's average pattern of interest rate setting with a 90-day confidence interval

Key policy rate

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1) Changes in the key policy rate are explained by developments in inflation, mainland GDP growth , wage growth and key rates among trading partners. See Staff Memo 2008/3 for further elaboration Source: Norges Bank

Key policy rate and Norges Bank’s averagepattern in interest rate setting1)

Per cent. 2002 Q1 – 2009 Q3

Page 4: Experiences of the financial crisis...Money market premiums 1) 5-day moving average. Percentage points 4 January 2007 – 25 September 2009 2 0,0 0,5 1,0 1,5 2,0 2,5 3,0 3,5 4,0 0,0

”To avert panic, central banks should lend early and freely (without limit), to solvent firms, against good collateral, and at ”high rates”.”

”Lombard Street: A description of the Money Market”.Walter Bagehot (1873)

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Page 5: Experiences of the financial crisis...Money market premiums 1) 5-day moving average. Percentage points 4 January 2007 – 25 September 2009 2 0,0 0,5 1,0 1,5 2,0 2,5 3,0 3,5 4,0 0,0

Extraordinary measuresUS UK Europe Norway

Easing of collateralrequirements

Long-term liquidityprovision

F-loans(2- and 3-year)

NOK 35 bn

Lending/exchange of securities Swap arrangement

NOK 225 bn

Purchase of private debt

GovernmentBond FundNOK 6 bn

Purchase of government bonds

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Page 6: Experiences of the financial crisis...Money market premiums 1) 5-day moving average. Percentage points 4 January 2007 – 25 September 2009 2 0,0 0,5 1,0 1,5 2,0 2,5 3,0 3,5 4,0 0,0

15 Sep Lehman Brothers bankruptcy – money markets collapse

15 Sep More liquidity – increased supply through F-loans

16 Sep Exchange rate swaps supply USD for NOK – money markets reactivated

17 Sep AIG emergency loan

24 Sep Monetary policy meeting – widespread uncertainty

25 Sep Washington Mutual into receivership – bond markets collapse

Longer loans – 3-month F-loan

29 Sep Credit arrangement with Federal Reserve – loan of up to USD 15bn

6 Oct Easing of collateral requirementsSubmission proposing swap arrangement sent to Ministry of Finance

8 Oct Exchange rate swaps supply NOK for EUR and USD

10 Oct Loans for smaller banks – 6-month F-loan

15 Oct Key policy rate reduced by 50bp

20 Oct Longer loans for all banks - 6-month F-loan

24 Oct Swap arrangement – Storting decision

29 Oct Key policy rate reduced by 50bp

14 Nov Swap arrangement – circularLonger loans for small banks – 2-year F-loan

24 Nov Swap arrangement – first auction held

27 Nov Swap arrangement – submission with adjustment proposal sent to Ministry of Finance

28 Nov Ministry of Finance adjusts swap arrangement

17 Dec Key policy rate reduced by 175bp

18 Dec Submission to Ministry of Finance proposing government supply of Tier 1 capital

22 Dec Swap arrangement – submission proposing extension of term from 3 to 5 years sent to Ministry of Finance

Financial events and measures in 2008

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Page 7: Experiences of the financial crisis...Money market premiums 1) 5-day moving average. Percentage points 4 January 2007 – 25 September 2009 2 0,0 0,5 1,0 1,5 2,0 2,5 3,0 3,5 4,0 0,0

Key policy rate and short-term moneymarket rate in NorwayPer cent. Daily figures. 2 January 2007 – 25 September 2009

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2007 2008 2009

Key policy rate

D-loan interest rate

Short-term money market interest rate (T/N)

Source: Thomson Reuters

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Page 8: Experiences of the financial crisis...Money market premiums 1) 5-day moving average. Percentage points 4 January 2007 – 25 September 2009 2 0,0 0,5 1,0 1,5 2,0 2,5 3,0 3,5 4,0 0,0

Funding sources, Norwegian banks1)

In per cent of total assets. 1975 – 20092)

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1975 1978 1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008

Equity

Deposits

Market financing and other debt

Loans from Norges Bank

Swap arrangement

Sources: Klovland (2007), Matre (1992), Statistics Norway and Norges Bank1)Including savings and commercial banks2)Including Q1 and Q2

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Page 9: Experiences of the financial crisis...Money market premiums 1) 5-day moving average. Percentage points 4 January 2007 – 25 September 2009 2 0,0 0,5 1,0 1,5 2,0 2,5 3,0 3,5 4,0 0,0

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US

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Norway1)

Sweden

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Sources: Thomson Reuters and Norges Bank

Central bank balance sheetsIndex. January 2008 = 100. January 2007 – August 2009

1)Sum assets excluding investments in the Government Pension Fund - Global

Page 10: Experiences of the financial crisis...Money market premiums 1) 5-day moving average. Percentage points 4 January 2007 – 25 September 2009 2 0,0 0,5 1,0 1,5 2,0 2,5 3,0 3,5 4,0 0,0

Bond spreads1) and three-month moneymarket spread2)

Basis points. Week 1 2007 – Week 39 2009

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Money market spread (3-mth)

3-year financials

5-year financials

Sources: DnB NOR Markets, Thomson Reuters and Norges Bank1)Spreads compared with swap rates2)Spreads compared with projected key policy rate

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Page 11: Experiences of the financial crisis...Money market premiums 1) 5-day moving average. Percentage points 4 January 2007 – 25 September 2009 2 0,0 0,5 1,0 1,5 2,0 2,5 3,0 3,5 4,0 0,0

Bond issues in NorwayAll VPS-registered issues. In billions of NOK2000 – 2008. Period January – September 2008 and 20091)

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Finance companies and mortgage companies

Banks

Non-financials

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Source: Stamdata1)Up to and including 28 September in 2008 and 2009

Presenter
Presentation Notes
Totalt utstedt volum i år er høyere enn for hele fjoråret. Dette er i hovedsak drevet av OMF-utstedelser, som inngår i de grønne søylene. Ikke-finansielle foretak har økt sin emisjonsaktivitet fra 2008, og ser ut til å kunne ende på et relativt høyt volum i år (som 2006 (?)) Både 2006 og 2007 var år med mer aktivitet for ikke-finansielle foretak – bank / finans har endret seg pga OMF, og totalen er større i 2009 enn noen gang før. Ikke-finansielle utstedelser har tatt seg noe opp i forhold til samme periode i fjor. Ca 225 mrd kr i bytteordningen hittil ___
Page 12: Experiences of the financial crisis...Money market premiums 1) 5-day moving average. Percentage points 4 January 2007 – 25 September 2009 2 0,0 0,5 1,0 1,5 2,0 2,5 3,0 3,5 4,0 0,0

Bank liquidityIn billions of NOK. Daily figures. 1 January 2007 – 25 September 2009

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Bank deposits in Norges Bank

Source: Norges Bank

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Page 13: Experiences of the financial crisis...Money market premiums 1) 5-day moving average. Percentage points 4 January 2007 – 25 September 2009 2 0,0 0,5 1,0 1,5 2,0 2,5 3,0 3,5 4,0 0,0

Bank liquidityIn billions of NOK. Daily figures. 1 January 2007 – 31 December 20091)

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Structural liquidityProjection

Source: Norges Bank1)Projection from 28 September 2009

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Page 14: Experiences of the financial crisis...Money market premiums 1) 5-day moving average. Percentage points 4 January 2007 – 25 September 2009 2 0,0 0,5 1,0 1,5 2,0 2,5 3,0 3,5 4,0 0,0

Bank liquidityIn billions of NOK. Daily figures. 1 January 2007 – 31 December 20091)

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Norges Bank's liquidity supply

Structural liquidity

Bank deposits in Norges Bank

Projection

Source: Norges Bank1)Projection from 28 September 2009

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Page 15: Experiences of the financial crisis...Money market premiums 1) 5-day moving average. Percentage points 4 January 2007 – 25 September 2009 2 0,0 0,5 1,0 1,5 2,0 2,5 3,0 3,5 4,0 0,0

”One of us (Akerlof) remembers a dinner conversation a fewyears ago. During the housing boom a distant relative from Norway – by marriage by marriage by marriage, known only from a brief encounter at a family wedding – had reportedly bought a house in Trondheim, for more than $ 1 million. That seemed like a lot of money – perhaps not for New York, Tokyo, London, San Francisco, Berlin, or even for Oslo – but certainly for Trondheim, up the Norwegian coast, on the edge of settlement, and vyingfor the title of world’s most northern city. Nor was it a mansion. This thought remained quietly parked in Akerlof’s brain, classifiedalong with other observations that property values were high in Scandinavia.”

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“Animal SpiritsHow Human Psychology Drives the Economy, and Why It

Matters for Global Capitalism” George A. Akerlof and Robert J. Shiller

Page 16: Experiences of the financial crisis...Money market premiums 1) 5-day moving average. Percentage points 4 January 2007 – 25 September 2009 2 0,0 0,5 1,0 1,5 2,0 2,5 3,0 3,5 4,0 0,0

”Recently Akerlof told his co-author, Shiller, that he had beenwondering if he should have given more thought to theTrondheim story. We discussed the matter. This seems to be a mental lapse, accepting this story of the high price as nothingmore than an insignificant oddity. On the contrary, Akerlofshould have seen it as an incongruity requiring active thought, to be resolved within the context of a larger view of the markets.”

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“Animal SpiritsHow Human Psychology Drives the Economy, and Why It

Matters for Global Capitalism”George A. Akerlof and Robert J. Shiller

Page 17: Experiences of the financial crisis...Money market premiums 1) 5-day moving average. Percentage points 4 January 2007 – 25 September 2009 2 0,0 0,5 1,0 1,5 2,0 2,5 3,0 3,5 4,0 0,0

Flexible inflation targeting in theory

1. The central bank sets the interest rate with the aim ofminimising a loss function

Loss = (deviation from inflation target)2 + λ x (output gap)2

2. The central bank follows a reaction function in interestrate setting

Key policy rate = function of all factors that influence inflationand the output gap in the model

The Taylor rule is a model-independent reaction functionKey policy rate = constant term + 1.5 x inflation gap + 0.5 x output gap

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Page 18: Experiences of the financial crisis...Money market premiums 1) 5-day moving average. Percentage points 4 January 2007 – 25 September 2009 2 0,0 0,5 1,0 1,5 2,0 2,5 3,0 3,5 4,0 0,0

From the Regulation on Monetary Policy

Monetary policy shall be aimed at stability in the Norwegian krone's national and international value, contributing to stable expectations concerning exchange rate developments. At the same time, monetary policy shall underpin fiscal policy by contributing to stable developments in output and employment

The operational target of monetary policy shall be annual consumer price inflation of approximately 2.5 per cent over time.

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Page 19: Experiences of the financial crisis...Money market premiums 1) 5-day moving average. Percentage points 4 January 2007 – 25 September 2009 2 0,0 0,5 1,0 1,5 2,0 2,5 3,0 3,5 4,0 0,0

Bank equity capital1)

In per cent of total assets. 1875 – 20092)

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1875 1895 1915 1935 1955 1975 1995

Source: Klovland (2007), Statistics Norway and Norges Bank

1)Including savings and commercial banks 2)Including Q1 and Q2

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Page 20: Experiences of the financial crisis...Money market premiums 1) 5-day moving average. Percentage points 4 January 2007 – 25 September 2009 2 0,0 0,5 1,0 1,5 2,0 2,5 3,0 3,5 4,0 0,0

Unemployment1)

Per cent. Seasonally adjusted. January 1992 – August 20093)

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LFS unemployment 2)

Registered unemployed

Registered unemployed and on labour market programmes

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CPI

Inflation target

Inflation10-year moving average1) and variation2) i CPI3). Per cent 1980 – 2009

1)LFS unemployment, registered, and registered unemployedand on labour market programmes.2)Chain-linked old and new series in 1997. 3)LFS unemployment includes figures to end-July 2009Sources: Statistics Norway and NAV

1)The moving average is calculated 7 years back and 2 years ahead2)The blue band around the CPI is the variation in the CPI adjusted for tax

changes and excluding energy products in the average period, measured by +/- one standard deviation

3)Projections for 2009 - 2011 are based on projections in MPR 2/09 Sources: Statistics Norway and Norges Bank

Page 21: Experiences of the financial crisis...Money market premiums 1) 5-day moving average. Percentage points 4 January 2007 – 25 September 2009 2 0,0 0,5 1,0 1,5 2,0 2,5 3,0 3,5 4,0 0,0

Experiences of the financial crisis

Governor Svein GjedremCentre for Monetary Economics (CME)/BI Norwegian School of Management 30 September 2009