Eu Arctic Policy

EU Arctic Policy:

A Memorandum to the European Commission Malte Humpert May 2011

“The sea ice is melting much faster than policy can keep up with.”

Dr. Scott G. Borgerson, Remarks to the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee on May 5, 2009.

“Only when the ice breaks will you truly know

who is your friend and who is your enemy.”

Inuit Proverb

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. INTRODUCTION…………………………………………………………………1–5

2. THE ARCTIC REGION………………………………………………………….5–26

2.1. The Effects of Climate Change on the Arctic

2.2. The Economic Potential of the Arctic

2.2.1. Shipping Routes

2.2.2. Fossil Fuel and Mineral Resources

2.3. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

2.4. The Institutions of the Arctic

3. THE EU’s POLICY OPTIONS…………………………………………………26–39

3.1. The History of EU Arctic Policy

3.2. The Policy Options Within the Existing Regime

3.3. The Policy Options Outside the Existing Regime

4. RECOMMENDATIONS………………………………………………………..39–43

4.1. The EU-Russia Agreement

4.2. Cooperation with the U.S.

4.3. Iceland’s Accession to the EU

4.4. Environmental Leadership

5. CONCLUSIONS……………………………………………………………….43–45

BIBLIOGRAPHY……………………………………………………………………46–51

EU Arctic Policy: A Memorandum to the European Commission 1

EU Arctic Policy: A Memorandum to the European Commission

Malte Humpert ABSTRACT Arctic sea ice is melting rapidly, and within the next decade polar warming may transform the High North from an inaccessible frozen desert into a seasonally navigable ocean. The prospects of exploiting the Arctic Ocean’s rich natural resources and gaining access to vital new shipping routes, particularly between Europe and Asia, have led to increased economic and political interest in the region. Rapid environmental change and the Arctic’s emergent economic potential may challenge the geo-strategic balance in a region where institutions, boundaries, rules, and customary norms have yet to be established or remain weak. The European Union, as the world’s largest exporter of goods and largest importer of fossil fuel resources, has significant economic and energy security interests in the region. Yet it has failed to respond adequately to the changing political environment. The existing regulatory and governance regime, the Arctic Council, has become inadequate, and given the pace of change it is difficult to see how the Arctic can be managed effectively within this regime. This memorandum explores possible alternatives, including developing a new international framework for the region. It also provides policy recommendations on how the EU can best secure its strategic economic and energy security interests—including by incorporating Arctic policy into bilateral treaties.


1. INTRODUCTION The effects of climate change are being observed increasingly throughout the Arctic. Rising temperatures have dramatically reduced the extent of Arctic sea ice, and within the next decade this warming may transform the High North1 from an inaccessible frozen desert into a seasonally navigable ocean. The prospects of exploiting the Arctic Ocean’s rich natural resources and gaining access to new vital shipping routes, particularly between Europe and Asia, have led to increased economic and political interest in the region. Apart from the eight Arctic states2, both the European Union (EU) and emerging Asian economies hope to lay claim to and benefit from the economic resources of the region.3 Rapid environmental change and the Arctic’s emergent economic potential may challenge the geo-strategic balance in a region where institutions, boundaries, rules, and customary norms have yet to be established or remain weak.

The Arctic Council, which evolved out of the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy in 1996, functions as the primary high-level forum for circumpolar cooperation. As new political actors become involved in the High North, however, scholars have begun to question the resilience of the Arctic Council as well as its ability to serve as an administrative body.4 Overall, there has been a “discernable trend for states and political entities to strengthen their Arctic policies.”5

A significant challenge to the raison d'être of the Arctic Council appeared in May 2008, when the Arctic coastal states of Canada, Russia, Norway, Denmark, and the United States met in Greenland to sign the Ilulissat Declaration.6 This meeting, which excluded Sweden, Finland, Iceland, and the indigenous groups that are voting members of the Arctic Council, established

1 The geographical and political concept of the High North varies from one country to another. In this paper, the term High North roughly signifies the land and sea area above the Arctic Circle at 66° 33′ 44″ north of the Equator. 2 The eight Arctic states are: Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Finland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United States. Sweden, Denmark, and Iceland are not littoral or circumpolar Arctic states, which means they do not have access to the Arctic Ocean or their access is south of the Arctic Circle. 3 Jesper Hansen, “Many Countries Court the Arctic Council,” http://arctic.council.org/arti cle/2008/2/many_countries_court_the_arctic_council (accessed February 17, 2011). 4 Alf Hoel, “Do We Need a New Legal Regime for the Arctic Ocean?” International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, 24 (2009): 443–56; Timo Koivurova, “Limits and Possibilities of the Arctic Council in a Rapidly Changing Scene of Arctic Governance.” Polar Record 46, no. 2 (2008): 146–56. 5 Koivurova, “Limits and Possibilities of the Arctic Council,” 146–56. 6 The Ilulissat Declaration was announced on May 28, 2008 by the five Arctic circumpolar nations during a high-level ministerial meeting at the Arctic Ocean Conference in Ilulissat, Greenland.


the so-called “A5 Group.” In the declaration, the five coastal states rejected the need to develop a comprehensive international legal regime to govern the Arctic Ocean.

The signatory countries announced that, “by virtue of their sovereignty and jurisdiction in large areas of the Arctic Ocean [they] are in a unique position to address the possibilities and challenges of the future Arctic.”7 This statement indicates a clear rejection of the need for a multilateral treaty comparable to the Antarctic Treaty System8 that governs the southern pole.9 The declaration can be seen as an attempt by the A5 to not only establish an exclusive club of Arctic stakeholders, but also block an Arctic treaty and exclude other players such as the EU and China from Arctic governance.10 It also poses a direct challenge to the Arctic Council.11

Uncertainty over the future of the Arctic continues to grow and represents a political challenge to countries or groups of countries, such as the EU, that have a vested economic interest in the region. Scholars such as Scott Borgerson with the Council on Foreign Relations and Arctic expert Daniel Cressey have warned about rising power politics, a scramble for Arctic resources, and the potential for armed conflict.12 Other experts, including Oran Young, a renowned Arctic scholar at the University of California at Santa Barbara, and Kristine Offerdal, a professor with the Norwegian Institute for Defense Studies, are more optimistic about the peaceful resolution of disputes, either within the Arctic’s existing legal and institutional framework or through an

7 Arctic Council, Ilulissat Declaration, May 28, 2008, http://arctic-council.org/filearchive/Ilulissat-declaration.pdf (accessed February 17, 2011). 8 The Antarctic Treaty System entered into force in 1961 and sets aside Antarctica as a scientific preserve, establishes freedom of scientific investigation, and bans military activity on that continent. 9 Helga Haftendorn, “Coping with Climate Change in the Arctic: The Applicability of Soft Solutions to Hard Conflicts.” (paper presented at the Climate Change and Security Conference of the Royal Norwegian Society of Sciences and Letters, June 21, 2010), 4. http://climsec.prio.no/papers/1%20Coping%20with%20Climate%20Change%20(Trondheim).pdf (accessed February 17, 2011). 10 Haftendorn, “Coping with Climate Change,” 5; Kathrin Keil, “The EU in the Arctic ‘Game’ - The Concert of Arctic Actors and the EU’s Newcomer Role” (paper prepared for the SGIR 7th Pan-European International Relations Conference, September 9, 2010) 20, http://stockholm.sgir.eu/uploads/Paper%20SGIR_Kathrin%20Keil%20-%20The%20EU%20in% 20the%20Arctic%20‘Game’_final.pdf (accessed February 17, 2011); Christoph Seidler and Holger Dambeck, “Kalter Krieg um die Arktis Beginnt,” Der Spiegel, May 27, 2008, http://www.spiegel.de/wissenschaft/natur/0,1518,555697,00.html (accessed February 17, 2011). 11 Klaus Dodds, “From Frozen Desert to Maritime Domain: New Security Challenges in an Ice-Free Arctic.” Swords and Ploughshares 17, no. 3 (2009): 10–14. 12 Scott Borgerson, “Arctic Meltdown: The Economic and Security Implications of Global Warming.” Foreign Affairs 87, no. 2 (2008): 63–77; Daniel Cressey, “The Next Land Rush.” Nature 451 (2008): 12–15.


expanded framework.13 Although fears about open military conflict in the Arctic are likely exaggerated, the region’s vast economic potential is creating a growing risk for the emergence of Realpolitik.

The EU does not possess an Arctic coastline14, but as the world’s largest exporter of goods and largest importer of fossil fuel energy, it has significant economic and energy security interests in the region. The EU is inextricably linked to the Arctic through its member states of Denmark, Finland, and Sweden and through its cooperation with Norway and Iceland in the European Economic Area.15

In 2008, the former EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, warned in a report on “Climate Change and International Security” that the intensifying scramble for resources in the Arctic Ocean and the changing geo-strategic dynamics across the region will challenge the EU’s “ability to effectively secure its trade and resource interests.” Solana called on the European Council to “develop an EU Arctic policy based on the evolving geo-strategy of the Arctic region, taking into account, i.e., access to resources and the opening of new trade routes.”16 The European Commission has failed thus far to develop a comprehensive and coherent Arctic Strategy to address the challenges spelled out by Solana.

The present policy memorandum, addressed to the European Commission, provides a substantive analysis of European Arctic strategy and defines the EU’s interests in the High North. It provides a short overview of the impact of climate change on the Arctic and elaborates on the region’s overall economic potential. It argues that the existing intergovernmental regime, the Arctic Council, has become significantly weakened since 2008 and no longer represents a suitable administrative body to deal with the challenges of a changing Arctic. In addition, the memorandum describes how the overarching international legal framework defined by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) provides little guidance in developing a future administrative regime for the region.17 13 Oran Young, “Whither the Arctic? Conflict or Cooperation in the Circumpolar North.” Polar Record 45 (2008): 73-82; Kristine Offerdahl, “Arctic Energy in EU Policy: Arbitrary Interest in the Norwegian High North.” Arctic 63 (2009): 30–42. 14 The EU lost its Arctic coastline in 1985 when Greenland, an autonomous country within the Kingdom of Denmark, decided to leave the Union. Sweden and Denmark, the other two EU members in the High North, do not have access to the Arctic Ocean. 15 European Commission, The European Union and the Arctic Region, November 20, 2008, http://eeas.europa.eu/arctic_region/docs/com_08_763_en.pdf (accessed February 12, 2011). 16 EU High Representative, Climate Change and International Security, March 14, 2008, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/reports/99387.pdf (accessed February 9, 2011). 17 The Law of the Sea Convention defines the rights and responsibilities of nations in their use of the world's oceans. It establishes guidelines for businesses, the environment, and the


The memorandum argues that existing EU Arctic policy has failed to respond adequately to the realities of a changing political environment, and that the EU can no longer address the Arctic challenge solely within the existing legal framework. Finally, the memorandum explores possible alternatives, such as developing a new international framework or drafting new bilateral treaties, and provides policy recommendations on how the EU can best secure its strategic economic and energy security interests. 2. THE ARCTIC REGION 2.1. The Effects of Climate Change on the Arctic The Earth’s rapidly changing climate presents a unique and evolving challenge to policy and decision makers. The size and immediacy of this challenge differ by region, because the effects of climate change do not occur uniformly across the globe. The regional impact of global climate change has been most amplified in the Arctic, where the annual average temperature has increased at double the global rate over the last 100 years.

The Arctic is now warmer than is has been at any time during the last 2,000 years.18 The Arctic Ocean, which has had perennial ice cover for the past 700,000 years, is on a trajectory to a new, seasonally ice-free, state.19 The dramatic speed of climate change in the Arctic foreshadows a new kind of policymaking that needs to incorporate the challenges of climate change into the decision making process.

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) estimates that over the next century, Arctic temperature increases will exceed the global annual mean by a factor of four and will range between 4.3 degrees Celsius (°C) and 11.4°C in the winter and 1.2°C and 5.3°C in the summer.20 This temperature rise will continue to have dramatic effects on Arctic sea-ice extent, which has diminished 40 percent between 1979 and 2010.21 (See Figure 1.)

management of marine natural resources. However, the absence of compulsory dispute settlement mechanism significantly weakens UNCLOS’ ability to regulate growing economic activity in the Arctic. 18 Nicola Jone, “Arctic Ocean Feels the Heat.” Nature, January 27, 2011, http://www.nature.com/news/2011/110127/full/news.2011.52.html (accessed February 7, 2011). 19 Thomas Worsley and Yvonne Herman, “Episodic Ice-Free Arctic Ocean in Pliocene and Pleistocene Time: Calcareous Nannofossil Evidence.” Science 210, no. 4467 (1980): 323–25. 20 IPCC, “Climate Change 2007: Working Group I: The Physical Science Basis,” http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/wg1/en/ch11s11-8-1-3-sea-ice.html (accessed February 14, 2011). 21 National Snow and Ice Data Center, “State of the Cryosphere,” October 27, 2010, http://nsidc.org/sotc/sea_ice.html (accessed February 14, 2011).


FIGURE 1. Northern Hemisphere Minimum Sea-Ice Extent, 1979–2010 (Million Square Kilometers) This figure shows the decrease in mean September sea-ice extent for the northern hemisphere since 1978, and is a comparable measure to annual minimum sea-ice extent. Source: National Snow and Ice Data Center, National Snow and Ice Data Center FTP Archives, ftp://sidads.colorado.edu/DATASETS/NOAA/G02135/Sep/N_09_area.txt (accessed February 19, 2011). Graph constructed by the author from this data.

Over this same period, the Arctic sea ice has thinned considerably, experiencing a decline in average volume of 70 percent.22 The reductions in both sea-ice extent and volume render the remaining ice more vulnerable to secondary risk factors, such as changing wind patterns, ocean circulation23, and reduced sea-ice albedo.24 As a general rule, first-year ice is more likely to melt during the summer months than multiyear ice, since ice that survives the summer is able to harden and become denser during the following winter. The

22 Polar Science Center, “Arctic Sea Ice Volume Anomaly,”http://psc.apl.washington.edu/Arctic SeaiceVolume/IceVolume.php (accessed February 17, 2011). 23 Ocean circulation is the large, connected system of water movements in the oceans, including not only the surface movement, but also the slow, deep-water circulations. While the surface currents are caused by the winds and uneven solar energy distribution, the deep ocean circulations are the result of sinking and upwelling water, and termohaline differences. 24 Albedo is the reflecting power of a surface. It is measured on a scale from zero (no reflecting power) to one (perfect reflection). The Earth’s average albedo is 0.3. Sea ice has an albedo of 0.5–0.7, depending on how “dirty” and old the ice is. The water of the Arctic Ocean has an albedo of only 0.07 and thus absorbs the vast majority of the solar radiation instead of reflecting it back.


Arctic has witnessed rapid loss in multiyear ice: whereas in 1988 the vast majority of ice was between four and 10 years old, by 2005 the majority of ice was less than four years old. (See Figure 2.)

FIGURE 2. Changes in the Age of Arctic Sea Ice, 1988–2005 This figures shows the change in the age of sea ice in the Arctic Ocean, comparing September data for 1988, 1990, 2001, and 2005. Source: UNEP/GRID-Arendal, “Change in the age of ice on the Arctic Ocean, comparing September ice ages in 1988, 1990, 2001 and 2005,” UNEP/GRID-Arendal Maps and Graphics Library, http://maps.grida.no/go/graphic/change-in-the-age-of-ice-on-the-arctic-ocean-comparing-september-ice-ages-in-1988-1990-2001-and-2005 (accessed 4 March 2011).

In the summer of 2007, the Arctic witnessed a dramatic sea-ice collapse due to above average temperatures, strong winds, and changes in ocean circulation. The ice has since failed to rebound to pre-2007 levels. Scientists contend that Arctic sea ice may have passed a tipping point beyond which rising air temperatures are no longer the primary cause of ice loss, and where “self destructive dynamics take over.”25 Predicting the occurrence and impact of

25 Alun Anderson, After the Ice: Life, Death, and Geopolitics in the New Arctic (New York: HarperCollins, 2009), 89.


such tipping points, which enable forecasts of when the Arctic will be ice-free during the summer months, is the holy grail of Arctic climate science.

Studies differ widely in their predictions of when summer sea ice will melt completely. Prior to the events of 2007, the IPCC forecasted an ice-free Arctic for the latter part of the twenty-first century.26 Most studies published since 2007, however, expect a dramatic reduction of summer ice by the mid-2020s. Some scientists do not expect the ice to survive beyond 2017.27 The ice-free period along the Arctic’s main shipping routes is expected to increase from around 30 days in 2010 to more than 120 days by mid-century. As the Arctic Ocean becomes navigable for longer periods, access to the region’s vast economic potential will become easier. 2.2. The Economic Potential of the Arctic The economic value of the Arctic for the EU and other countries lies in two main areas: shipping lanes and material resources, especially fossil fuels and minerals. The melting of Arctic sea ice will open up new and faster shipping routes between Europe and Asia, a region that is increasingly central to global trade. The Arctic also may contain the largest fossil fuel reserves outside of the Middle East. In light of rapidly growing world demand for these fuels, it may soon become economical to exploit Arctic energy resources. 2.2.1. Shipping Lanes

The Arctic Ocean’s primary shipping lanes are the Northwest Passage (NWP), the Northern Sea Route (NSR), and the trans-polar route across the North Pole. The NSR is of particular importance to the EU because it promises cheaper and faster transfer of goods between Europe and Asia and is preferable to traditional shipping routes, which require passage through numerous chokepoints. Over the past decade, Asia has overtaken North America as the largest market for European exports, and as global trade dynamics shift, unimpeded access to Arctic shipping routes will be critical for export-dependent European economies. Yet such access is by no means guaranteed, given that both Canada and Russia deem these routes to be internal waterways that are subject to national law.

The EU depends on stable and efficient shipping routes to export its manufactured goods overseas. The region accounts for 25 percent of world

26 IPCC, “Global Climate Projections,” http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg1/ar4-wg1-chapter10.pdf (accessed February 16, 2011). 27 John Roach, “Arctic Largely Ice Free in Summer Within Ten Years?” October 15, 2009, http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2009/10/091015-arctic-ice-free-gone-global-warming.html (accessed February 27, 2011).


trade, of which 90 percent is transported via the high seas.28 In 2009, Asia was the largest recipient of EU exports, receiving more than one-third of the total, followed by North America at 21 percent. Between 2000 and 2010, trade between the EU and Asia increased 140 percent, whereas trade between the EU and North America stagnated. (See Figure 3.)

FIGURE 3. Euro Zone Exports to Asia and the United States, 2000–2010 (billion Euros) This figure shows monthly Euro Zone (EU 17) exports to Asia and the United States between 2000 and 2010, in billions of Euros. Source: European Central Bank, Total Trade – Euro Area 16 Export with the United States, http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/quickview.do?SERIES_KEY=133.TRD.M.I5.Y.X.TTT.US.4.VAL (Accessed February 17, 2011). Graph constructed by the author on the basis of this data.

Despite rapidly rising exports to Asia, the EU maintains a considerable and increasing trade deficit with Asian countries, particularly China. In 2009, EU imports from China totaled €214 billion, compared with exports to China of only €81 billion. This trade gap will only widen as China consolidates its position as the world’s largest exporter.29 Chinese officials recognize the importance of future Arctic shipping lanes and have been making investment overtures to Iceland ever since that country’s economy collapsed in 2008. China’s new embassy in Reykjavík will be the largest in Iceland’s capital. China also operates

28 Borgerson, “Arctic Meltdown: The Economic and Security Implications of Global Warming,” 66-73. 29 European Commission, External and Intra-European Union Trade Data 2004–09, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-CV-10-001/EN/KS-CV-10-001-EN.PDF (accessed April 5, 2011).


the world’s largest non-nuclear icebreaker and has approved construction of a new $300 million Chinese-built icebreaker expected to be operational in 2013.30

Melting of the Arctic sea ice will soon allow for extended periods of navigation in the High North. Although a great deal of ice will still form during the winter months, the more hazardous multiyear ice, the principal threat to cargo ships, will cease to exist.31 This could occur as early as 2017.32 Regular cargo ships will then be able to operate throughout the year with the assistance of icebreakers, and purpose-built ice-strengthened vessels will be able to travel alone. Hundreds of dual-direction vessels, which combine the fuel-efficient bow of a cargo ship on one end and the hardened bow of an icebreaker on the other, are already being built in Finland and South Korea.33

The NSR offers a faster connection between Europe and Asia, avoids numerous chokepoints, and requires no restrictions for the size or weight of vessels.34 (See Figure 4.) Whereas a voyage from Japan to Europe takes roughly 29 days via the Cape of Good Hope and 22 days via the Suez Canal, it takes just 10 days via the Arctic Ocean.35 The actual sailing distance between Yokohama in Japan to Rotterdam in the Netherlands is roughly 20,000 kilometers when using the Suez Canal, but less than 9,000 kilometers via the NSR. This promises significant cost savings, as container-ship owners have increasingly had to adopt “super-slow steaming” to reduce fuel consumption as oil prices rise.36

30 Paul McLeary, “The Arctic: China Opens a New Strategic Front,” World Politics Review, May 2010, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/5558/the-arctic-china-opens-a-new-strateg ic-front (accessed April 10, 2011). 31 Michael Byers, “Conflict or Cooperation: What Future for the Arctic?” Swords and Ploughshares 17, no. 2 (2009): 17–21; Scott Borgerson, “The Great Games Moves North.” Foreign Affairs 88, no 2 (2009): 56–71. 32 John Roach, “Arctic Largely Ice Free in Summer Within Ten Years?” October 15, 2009, http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2009/10/091015-arctic-ice-free-gone-global-warming.html (accessed February 27, 2011). 33 Michael Byers, Who Owns the Arctic (Vancouver, BC: Douglas & McIntyre, 2009), 11. 34 The discussion focuses on the NSR since it is of higher priority to the EU. For the U.S., the NWP is more important. Many of the arguments for the NSR, such as reducing journey times and avoiding chokepoints are also true for the NWP. 35 Badari Narayana Srinath, “Arctic Shipping: Commercial Viability of Arctic Sea Routes” (MSc. Dissertation, City University of London, 2010), 24. 36 John Vidal, “Modern Cargo Ships Slow to the Speed of the Sailing Clippers.” The Guardian, July 25, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2010/jul/25/slow-ships-cut-greenhouse-emissions (accessed April 10, 2011).


FIGURE 4. Comparison of the Northwest Passage and Northern Sea Route to Traditional Routes This figure shows the Northwest Passage and the Northern Sea Route in comparison to traditional shipping routes through the Panama and Suez canals. Source: UNEP/GRID-Arendal, “Northern Sea Route and the Northwest Passage compared with currently used shipping routes,” UNEP/GRID-Arendal Maps and Graphics Library, http://maps.grida.no/go/graphic/northern-sea-route-and-the-northwest-passage-compared-with-currently-used-shipping-routes (accessed April 10, 2011)

Trade between Europe and Asia is conducted almost exclusively along a

single shipping route through the Mediterranean Sea, Red Sea, and Indian Ocean. (See Figure 5.) Ships must navigate numerous chokepoints including the Suez Canal, the Bab-el-Mandeb Passage, and the Straits of Malacca. Shipping routes between Europe and North America, on the other hand, are highly flexible, and ships can follow a direct path between origin and destination. The lack of flexibility along shipping routes to Asia enhances the strategic importance of the NSR.

FIGURE 5. Sea Lane Traffic Around the World, 2007 This figure shows the trajectories of all cargo ships bigger than 10,000 GT during 2007. Source: Pablo Kaluza, Andrea Kölzsch, Michael T. Gastner, and Bernd Blasius, “The complex network of global cargo ship movements,” Journal of Royal Social Interface, http://rsif.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/early/2010/01/19/rsif.2009.0495.full (accessed March 1, 2011)


World trade is expected to double by 2020, further increasing the

importance of shipping lanes.37 Chokepoints represent an economic risk factor, as access might become limited during times of political instability. The closure of the Suez Canal in 1956–57 forced ships to circumnavigate the southern tip of Africa around the Cape of Good Hope, although the closure’s impact was limited because the global economy was less dependent on world trade. Since the 1950s, however, traffic on the world’s oceans has increased substantially, and any interruption along a vital shipping route would have a lasting effect on international trade and the global economy. The threat of piracy continues to destabilize shipping traffic as well. Until the 1990s, piracy was prevalent throughout the Straits of Malacca, and to this day the kidnapping of vessels remains a concern along the coast of Somalia.

The Suez and Panama canals represent serious chokepoints due to their daily capacity limits and size restrictions. The Panama Canal has reached capacity and is currently being expanded to accommodate more vessels. Ships must frequently wait several days at the canal’s entrances. The worst “traffic jam” occurred in 2008, when more than 100 backed-up ships waited up to 10 days to pass through.38 Ships must also adhere to weight and size restrictions to pass through the canals. The newest generation of Very and Ultra Large Crude Carriers, as well as some container ships, exceed these limitations. Detouring around Africa adds costs for fuel, personnel, and insurance. Meanwhile, no such size or weight restrictions exist along the Arctic shipping routes.

Yet unimpeded access to the new Arctic routes is by no means guaranteed. Canada contends that the NWP is part of its internal waterways, and Russia claims formal jurisdiction over the NSR under Article 234 of the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea.39 These interpretations would allow both countries to overlay Arctic waters with their own rules and regulations, including the right to refuse entry to vessels that do not conform to certain environmental and construction standards. The EU and United States argue that under

37 United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, Container Trade Growth, http://www.unescap.org/ttdw/publications/tfs_pubs/pub_2398/pub_2398_ch3.pdf (accessed April 5, 2011). 38 Jon Hamilton, “Shallow Water Ahead for Panama Canal,” National Public Radio, March 3, 2008, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=87851345 (accessed April 5, 2011). 39 Rob Hubert, “Climate Change and Canadian Sovereignty in the Northwest Passage.” Isuma: Canadian Journal of Policy Research 2(4), 86–94; Claes Lykke Ragner, “The Northern Sea Route.” Fridtjof Nansen Institute Year Book 2008, http://www.fni.no/doc&pdf/clr-norden-nsr-en.pdf (accessed April 5, 2011).


UNCLOS40, the Arctic passages are international straits and thus fall under the jurisdiction of the International Maritime Organization (IMO).41 2.2.2. Fossil Fuel and Mineral Resources The EU is highly reliant on fossil fuel imports. In 2009, the region imported 85 percent of its crude oil and 65 percent of its natural gas. (See Figure 6.) Europe’s dependence on imported oil and natural gas is bound to increase because the regional production of hydrocarbon resources (mainly in the United Kingdom, Norway, and the Netherlands) has either peaked or will decline in the years to come. The source of EU energy imports has changed dramatically in recent years. Russia is now the leading supplier of fossil fuels to the region, accounting for roughly one-third of the EU’s crude oil and natural gas imports. In 2009, the EU spent more than €200 billion on Russian energy imports alone.

FIGURE 6. EU Dependency on Imports of Crude Oil and Natural Gas, 1998–2009 This figure shows the EU’s rising dependency on imports of crude oil and natural gas from 1998 to 2009. Source: European Commission, Energy Production and Imports, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statisticsexplained/index.php/Energy_production_and_imports (accessed April 8, 2011). Graph constructed on the basis of this data by the author.

40 UNCLOS is the international agreement that resulted from the third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. The Law of the Sea Convention defines the rights and responsibilities of nations in their use of the world’s oceans and establishes guidelines for businesses, the environment, and the management of marine natural resources. The Convention entered into force in 1994. For more on the legal framework of the Arctic, see Section 2.3. 41 Rob Hubert, “Climate Change and Canadian Sovereignty in the Northwest Passage.” Isuma: Canadian Journal of Policy Research, 2(4), 86–94.


The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal from 2007 estimates that the Arctic may contain up to 90 billion barrels of oil (about 13 percent of the world’s undiscovered reserves) and 1,669 trillion cubic feet of natural gas (roughly 30 percent of undiscovered gas).42 The vast majority of these resources are located within the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ)43 of the five Arctic coastal states. This means that they are not “up for grabs” by third parties such as the EU or China.

With rapid economic growth in the developing world, global demand for hydrocarbons is expected to surge 60 percent over the next two decades.44 This will increase the competition between the EU and Asia’s emerging economies for Russian fossil fuel resources. China’s crude oil imports are forecasted to grow from 4 million barrels per day (mbd) to 14 mbd by 2030. Over that same period, the crude oil imports of non-China Asia will grow from 10 mbd to 35 mbd. China’s natural gas consumption is expected to increase almost 300 percent over the next two decades, the highest growth rate worldwide,45 whereas global gas production will increase only 45 percent.46

Early 2011 marked the opening of the first oil pipeline linking Russia, the world’s biggest oil producer, with China, the world’s largest energy consumer. A second stage, extending the pipeline to a total of 4,700 kilometers, is due to open in 2014.47 On the natural gas front, the Central Asia-China pipeline that delivers gas from Turkmenistan to China opened in 2007.

In contrast to oil, which is exchanged on a global market, natural gas remains a regionally traded commodity. The European Commission addressed this vulnerability of regional energy security in its Second Strategic Energy Review in November 2008.48 As the natural gas market becomes more

42 United States Coast Guard, 90 Billion Barrels of Oil and 1,670 Trillion Cubic Feet of Natural Gas, July 23, 2008, http://www.usgs.gov/newsroom/article.asp?ID=1980&from=rss_home (accessed March 1, 2011). 43 Under the Law of the Sea Convention, the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) is the area of a sea over which a state has special rights for the exploration and use of marine resources. It stretches from a coastal baseline out to 200 nautical miles from the coast. 44 Energy Information Agency, 2010 Energy Outlook, May 25, 2010. http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/highlights.html (accessed March 1, 2011). 45 Energy Information Agency, International Energy Outlook 2010, July 27, 2010, http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/pdf/nat_gas.pdf (accessed April 5, 2010). 46 Kepis and Probe, Natural Gas to 2030. January 1, 2011, http://www.kepisandpobe.com/pdf/K&P%20Natural%20Gas%20to%202030-1.pdf (accessed April 5, 2011). 47 “Russia-China Oil Pipeline Opens,” BBC News, January 1, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-12103865 (accessed April 5, 2011). 48 European Commission. Second Strategic Energy Review, November, 2008, http://ec.europa.eu/energy/strategies/2008/doc/2008_11_ser2/strategic_energy_review_memo.pdf (accessed April 18, 2011).


globalized, competition for the European market, the world’s largest, will increase. Germany hopes to gain direct access to Russian natural gas through the Nordstream pipeline project, which circumvents several central European countries. The EU-backed Nabucco pipeline project, meanwhile, is an attempt to diversify gas suppliers and delivery routes, lessening dependence on Russian energy. The fossil fuel reserves of the Arctic, although unknown in size and recoverability, are an important variable for European energy dependence and must be incorporated into long-term EU energy security planning.

2.3. The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) provides the overarching legal framework to determine claims to the Arctic’s resources. Of primary concern are ownership of the region’s non-living marine resources (for example, fossil fuels) and the extent of national control over Arctic shipping routes. UNCLOS entered into force in 1994 and has been ratified by 158 countries to date. The Convention established the exclusive economic zone (EEZ), an area that extends 200 nautical miles offshore from a country’s coastal baseline.

Within an EEZ, a country is granted exclusive ownership over and right to exploit all living and non-living natural resources. Under Article 76, countries can file for extension of their EEZs up to 350 nautical miles if they meet a complex set of criteria, including water depth, seafloor shape, and sediment thickness. The vast majority of the Arctic’s natural resources lies within the existing EEZ of 200 miles. Thus, the lingering disputes over the delineation of marine borders, for example between Canada and the United States and between Denmark and Canada, are of limited economic or strategic importance.


FIGURE 7. Distribution of Arctic Natural Resources This figure shows the distribution of current oil, natural gas, and mineral resource exploration and prospective areas for oil and gas reserves. Source: UNEP/GRID-Arendal, Fossil fuel resources and oil and gas production in the Arctic, UNEP/GRID-Arendal Maps and Graphics Library, http://maps.grida.no/go/graphic/fossil-fuel-resources-and-oil-and-gas-production-in-the -arctic (Accessed April 7, 2011). For the EU, the question of whether Russia and Canada can exert national control over the NWP and the NSR is of much greater significance. Both countries’ interpretations of the UNCLOS legal framework differ from that of the EU and the United States. Canada claims that the NWP is part of its historical internal waters and has stated that there “is no question over Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic. These are Canadian waters and this is Canadian property.”49 Other documents declare that “Canada’s Sovereignty in the Arctic is indivisible. It embraces land, sea, and ice. It extends without interruption to the seaward-facing coasts of the Arctic Islands.”50 This

49 Paul Reynolds, “Trying to Head Off an Arctic ‘Gold Rush,’” BBC News, May 29, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/low/in_depth/7423787.stm (accessed April 5, 2011). 50 Hubert, “Climate Change and Canadian Sovereignty in the Northwest Passage.”


interpretation would make Article 21 of UNCLOS applicable. The Article gives foreign vessels the right of innocent passage through internal waters, but it bestows the right to Canada to overlay those waters with its own rules and regulations. This could potentially enable Canada to refuse entry to vessels that do not conform to certain national standards. The EU and United States, meanwhile, argue that the NWP is an international strait. The U.S. in particular maintains that the NWP connects two international bodies of water—the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans—and has been used historically for international shipping. Thus, Part III of UNCLOS on “Straits Used for International Navigation” would become applicable. This reading would deny Canada the right to unilaterally set standards and regulations for international shipping in the NWP, relegating this task instead to the IMO.

The question about jurisdiction along the NSR differs from that for the NWP. The NSR does not entail a clearly defined linear route, but instead encompasses the entire sea area north of Russia. Ice conditions are highly variable, leading to variations in the optimal sea route for vessels. Russia claims formal jurisdiction over the NSR based on Article 234 of UNCLOS, which allows coastal states to adopt and enforce non-discriminatory laws and regulations to protect the marine environment within the limits of the EEZ, in instances where ice coverage and severe climate conditions cause hazards to navigation.

Russia’s regulations require all vessels that wish to enter the NSR to give four months’ advance notification to the Administration of the Northern Sea Route.51 Ship operators also must submit an application for guiding and pay a substantial fee to use the route. Russia’s mandatory icebreaker fees are high and can total up to $4 million each way.52 Fees are not directly linked to the actual service rendered, and even ice-strengthened vessels that do not require icebreaker assistance are charged the full fee.

This fee system has served as a major obstacle to transit traffic since the NSR opened to foreign vessels in 1991. Most countries have accepted Russia’s de facto control over these waters and have not challenged the regime that Russia has put in place. The United States, however, maintains that the NSR should be considered international straits. This interpretation would open the NSR to transit passage without the need to pay mandatory transit or icebreaker fees.53

51 Class NK, Guidelines for Navigating Ice Covered Seas in Russian Territorial Waters, October 2009, http://www.classnk.or.jp/hp/rules_guidance/Guidelines/russiagl.pdf (accessed April 5, 2011). 52 Class NK, Guidelines for Navigating. 53 Ragner, “The Northern Sea Route.”


2.4. The Institutions of the Arctic As climate change causes the ice to melt and creates new areas of open water, the Arctic faces unprecedented challenges. The existing regulatory and governance regime is inadequate for dealing with these changes. For the past two decades, the Arctic Council and its predecessor, the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS), have been the primary high-level forums for circumpolar cooperation. The Arctic Council was established in 1996 when the eight Arctic countries (the United States, Canada, Russia, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, and Iceland) signed the Ottawa Declaration, which broadened existing cooperation under the AEPS.

Given the pace of change in the Arctic, it is difficult to see how the region can be managed effectively within the existing regime. The Arctic Council does not represent an operational body, but instead functions on a project basis without a permanent independent secretariat. Its mandate focuses on sustainable development and environmental protection in the Arctic, but excludes matters related to military security. The Council also suffers from the lack of legally binding obligations on any of its participants. Membership is limited to Arctic states, although six states, among them Germany, France, and the United Kingdom, have been granted observer status.

In May 2008, the five Arctic coastal states of Canada, Russia, Norway, Denmark, and the United States met in Greenland to sign the Ilulissat Declaration. The formation of this group, known as the A5, further reduces the number of stakeholders and limits the opportunities for participation of non-Arctic states. (See Figure 7.) Sweden, Finland, Iceland, and regional indigenous groups, all permanent members of the Arctic Council, were not invited to the meeting. The five littoral Arctic states announced that, “by virtue of their sovereignty and jurisdiction in large areas of the Arctic Ocean [they] are in a unique position to address the possibilities and challenges of the future Arctic.”54 The foreign ministers of the A5 Group met for a subsequent meeting in Chelsea, Quebec where they emphasized the “stewardship role of the five littoral states.”55

The Ilulissat Declaration rejects the need for any multilateral treaty comparable to the Antarctic Treaty System.56 It can be viewed as an attempt by

54 Arctic Council, Ilulissat Declaration, May 28, 2008, http://arctic-council.org/filearchive/Ilulissat-declaration.pdf (accessed January 19, 2011). 55 Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, Chair’s Summary of Arctic Ocean Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, March 29, 2010, http://www.international.gc.ca/polar-polaire/arctic-meeting_reunion-arctique-2010_summary_sommaire.aspx?lang=eng (accessed March 1, 2011). 56 Helga Haftendorn, “Coping with Climate Change in the Arctic: The Applicability of Soft Solutions to Hard Conflicts” (paper presented at the Climate Change and Security Conference of the Royal Norwegian Society of Sciences and Letters, June 21, 2010), 4


the A5 to establish an exclusive club of Arctic stakeholders, to obstruct the formation of an Arctic treaty, and to exclude other players such as the EU or China from the process of Arctic governance.57 The declaration represents a direct challenge to the Arctic Council and to the existing regime.58 Formation of the A5 Group must thus be seen as an attempt to shift responsibility for high-level Arctic policy issues away from the Arctic Council.59

FIGURE 8. Members and Observer Nations on the Arctic Council and the A5 Group The first map shows the members of the Arctic Council (dark blue) and observer nations (light blue). The second map shows the members of the A5 Group. Note the absence of Sweden, Finland, and Iceland and the lack of observer nations. Source: UNEP/GRID-Arendal, Arctic map, political, UNEP/GRID-Arendal Maps and Graphics Library, http://maps.grida.no/go/graphic/arctic-map-political (Accessed April 7, 2011). Graphic edited by the author to add color elements.

The re-emergence of Russia as a global superpower with strong

strategic and security interests in the Arctic, as well as the emergence of Canada as an Arctic power, have resulted in a shift in relative power capabilities. The initiative for the creation of the A5 lies with these two countries. Both countries also blocked bids by the EU and China in 2009 to gain permanent

http://climsec.prio.no/papers/1%20Coping%20with%20Climate%20Change%20(Trondheim).pdf (accessed February 1, 2011). 57 Haftendorn, “Coping with Climate Change,” 5; Kathrin Keil, “The EU in the Arctic ‘Game’ - The Concert of Arctic Actors and the EU’s Newcomer Role” (paper prepared for the SGIR 7th Pan-European International Relations Conference, September 9, 2010) 20, http://stockholm.sgir.eu/uploads/Paper%20SGIR_Kathrin%20Keil%20-%20The%20EU%20in% 20the%20Arctic%20‘Game’_final.pdf (accessed February 7, 2011); Christoph Seidler and Holger Dambeck, “Kalter Krieg um die Arktis Beginnt,” Der Spiegel, May 27, 2008, http://www.spiegel.de/wissenschaft/natur/0,1518,555697,00.html (accessed February 7, 2011). 58 Klaus Dodds, “From Frozen Desert to Maritime Domain: New Security Challenges in an Ice-Free Arctic,” Swords and Ploughshares 17, no. 3 (2009): 10–14. 59 Koivurova, “Limits and Possibilities of the Arctic Council,” 152.


observer status on the Arctic Council, an issue that will be reconsidered in May 2011. Russia and Canada actively pursue a policy of limiting the number of Arctic stakeholders and preventing outside actors from gaining access to the forum. With the formation of the A5 Group, a fundamental regime change in the Arctic has begun.60

As a member of the A5, Canada is adamant in claiming sovereignty over its Arctic territory. Over the past decade, it has invested heavily in its ability to patrol and secure the northern latitudes. It commissioned three Arctic patrol boats and a new Polar-class icebreaker, and has announced plans for a deep-water port at Nanisivik. The Canadian government has invested several hundred million dollars to upgrade existing infrastructure and build new research stations throughout the North.61 In an attempt to broaden its claim for sovereignty and expand its sphere of influence, Canada also has assumed responsibility for weather and shipping alerts in the northern seas.

Russia, too, has begun long-term strategic planning for the High North. The government has defined the Arctic as a major source of revenue, mainly from energy production and profitable maritime transport. It also has outlined plans to transform the northern region into a strategic base by 2020, begun investments to upgrade and revitalize its Northern Fleet, and created a special paramilitary unit deployed above the Arctic Circle.62 Russia operates a fleet of several dozen icebreakers, seven of which are polar-class nuclear icebreakers, including the “50 Years of Victory” the world’s largest icebreaker.63 The United States, in comparison, has only one heavy icebreaker, which is ill suited for the heavy ice of the Arctic.

Norway’s military developments in the Arctic have occurred more quietly, but they nonetheless foreshadow the strategic importance that the government ascribes to the region. The Norwegian army has moved its headquarters from Oslo to Bardufoos as part of an increased focus on the northern regions. It also has established an operational command headquarters for the High North at Reitan above the Arctic Circle.64

Prior to the Ilulissat Declaration, scholars argued that an expanded role for the Arctic Council and increased opportunities for cooperation and

60 Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, Power and Interdependence (New York and London: Longman, 1989), 56 61 “Canada’s Northern Goal,” Economist, November 13, 2009, http://www.economist.com/theworldin/displayStory.cfm?story_id=14742472&d=2010 (accessed March 1, 2011). 62 Haftendorn, “Coping with Climate Change in the Arctic,” 12. 63 Roderick Kefferpütz and Daniela Bochkarev, “Expanding the EU’s Institutional Capacities in the Arctic Region,” Heinrich Böll Stiftung, http://www.boell.ru/downloads/Arctic_Web-Version-3.pdf (accessed February 17, 2011). 64 Haftendorn, “Coping with Climate Change in the Arctic,” 12.


participation would ensure the Council’s future.65 The creation of the A5, however, has weakened the Arctic Council’s agenda-setting capabilities, and the body appears to be undergoing a rapid decline in importance. According to one assessment, it may already be “too late for a system of joint governance under the Arctic Council.”66 Finland and Sweden, both lacking access to the Arctic Ocean, as well as Iceland, just south of the Arctic Circle, have protested vehemently against their exclusion from the Ilulissat and Chelsea meetings and continue to oppose the creation of the A5.67 3. THE EU’S POLICY OPTIONS Political interest in the Arctic has intensified in recent years, and nearly all states of the High North have developed national strategies for the region. Some Arctic states are showing marked reluctance to opening up Arctic cooperation to outside actors. The EU has struggled both to develop a clear Arctic strategy or to define the direction for its approach to the issue. The fact that the EU cannot lay claim to a significant territorial base in the Arctic makes the struggle to become an accepted player in the region an uphill one. 3.1. The History of EU Arctic Policy The process of defining EU Arctic policy began in October 2008 when the European Parliament responded to the growing impetus of the Arctic issue and adopted a resolution on Arctic governance. Prior to 2008, EU Arctic Policy had been ad-hoc and to a large extent was defined by and practiced through individual member states, especially Sweden and Finland.68 The Northern Dimension Policy69, launched in 1999, can be seen as an initial step by the EU to create institutional capacity in the High North

EU policy interest in the Arctic region became more defined in March 2008, when High Representative Javier Solana published a paper on “Climate Change and International Security.” His report warned of an intensifying scramble for resources as the Arctic Ocean transformed due to climate change. Solana summarized the EU’s interests as follows:

Rapid melting of the polar ice caps is opening up new waterways and international trade routes. In addition, increased accessibility

65 Young, “Whither the Arctic?” 81. 66 Haftendorn, “Coping with Climate Change in the Arctic,” 5. 67 Seidler and Dambeck, “Kalter Krieg um die Arktis Beginnt.” 68 Offerdahl, “Arctic Energy in EU Policy,” 39. 69 The Northern Dimension Policy outlines a strategy for cooperation with non-EU states in the region.


of the enormous hydrocarbon resources in the Arctic region is changing the geo-strategic dynamics with potential consequences for international stability and European Security interests. [There is] growing debate over territorial claims and access to new trade routes, which challenge Europe’s ability to effectively secure its trade and resource interests in the region.70

The EU Parliament’s resolution on Arctic governance called on the European Commission to publish a communication that would “lay the foundations for a meaningful EU Arctic Policy.”71 Besides mentioning adaptation to climate change, the rights of indigenous populations, and the need for cooperation in the Arctic, it also made a controversial suggestion that:

the Commission should be prepared to pursue the opening of international negotiations designed to lead to the adoption of an international treaty for the protection of the Arctic, having as its inspiration the Antarctic Treaty, as supplemented by the Madrid Protocol signed in 1991, but respecting the fundamental difference represented by the populated nature of the Arctic and the consequent rights and needs of the peoples and nations of the Arctic region.72

In November 2008, the Commission released its communication on “The European Union and the Arctic Region.”73 Rather than calling for a new international treaty, the document instead proposed cooperative action within the existing legal framework. The communication and the parliamentary resolution differ significantly in the forcefulness of the language used. The Commission states that:

The suggestions contained in this Communication aim to provide the basis for a more detailed reflection. […] The present Communication should also lead to a structured and coordinated approach to Arctic matters, ast he first layer of an Arctic policy for the European Union. This will open new cooperation perspectives

70 EU High Representative, Climate Change and International Security. 71 European Parliament, European Parliament Resolution on Arctic Governance, October 9, 2008, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN&reference=P6-TA-2008-0474, (accessed February 4, 2011). 72 European Parliament, European Parliament Resolution on Arctic Governance, October 9, 2008, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN&reference=P6-TA-2008-0474, (accessed February 4, 2011). 73 European Commission, The European Union and the Arctic Region, November 20, 2008, http://eeas.europa.eu/arctic_region/docs/com_08_763_en.pdf (accessed February 6, 2011).


with the Arctic states, helping all of us to increase stability and to establish the right balance between the priority goal of preserving the Arctic environment and the need for sustainable use of resources.74

EU Commissioner Joe Borg further expressed the importance of the Arctic issue when he stated that, “the challenges and opportunities of the Arctic will have significant repercussions on the life of EU citizens for generations to come.”75

In April 2009, the European Parliament debated a follow-up resolution calling on the Council of Ministers and the European Commission to initiate negotiations for environmental protection of the Arctic. Parliamentarians from all six political parties called for “the geopolitical neutralization of the region” through an Arctic treaty, as this “would allow an increase in cooperation between circumpolar nations.”76 However, “[d]ue to objection by the Council and the Commission about the politically untimely and potentially counterproductive character”77 of such a call, the Parliament decided to postpone the motion.

In December 2009, at the end of the Swedish presidency of the EU, the Council of Ministers adopted extensive conclusions on Arctic issues. The Council called for the “gradual formulation of a policy on Arctic issues to address EU interests and responsibilities, while recognizing Member States’ legitimate interests and rights in the Arctic.”78 It also called on the Commission to present a progress report by June 2011. In April 2010, the Parliament met for a debate on EU policy and Arctic issues.79

It is noteworthy that the security dimension, which featured prominently in Solana’s report on “Climate Change and International Security,” is markedly absent from these communications and resolutions. The EU’s reluctance to

74 European Commission, The European Union and the Arctic Region. 75 Joe Borg, “The European Union’s Strategy of Sustainable Management for the Arctic,” January 19, 2009, http://ec.europa.eu/maritimeaffairs/speeches/speech190109_en.html (accessed March 1, 2011). 76 European Parliament, Joint Motion for a Resolution on the International Treaty for the Protection of the Arctic, March 30, 2009,http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do ?type=MOTION&reference=P6-RC-2009-0163&language=EN (accessed February 12, 2011). 77 European Parliament, Opening of International Negotiations in View of Adopting an International Treaty for the Protection of the Arctic. April 1, 2009. http://www.europarl.europa.eu /sides/getDoc.do?type=CRE&reference=20090401&secondRef=ITEM-013&language=EN (accessed April 12, 2011). 78 Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions on Arctic Issues, December 8, 2009, http://ec.europa.eu/maritimeaffairs/pdf/arctic_council_conclusions_09_en.pdf (accessed February 13, 2011). 79 European Parliament, EU Policy on Arctic Issues, March 10, 2010, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=CRE&reference=20100310&secondRef=ITEM-011&language=EN (accessed April 15, 2011).


define Arctic policy around more high-profile security and energy issues may be an attempt to not further complicate cooperation with Arctic states.80 3.2. The Policy Options Within the Existing Regime The regime change in the Arctic severely reduces the EU’s ability to become involved in the High North. The EU’s options to participate in Arctic policy are limited in three ways. First, the EU cannot directly participate in the Arctic dialogue due to the closed nature of the A5 and the rejection from the Arctic Council. Second, Sweden and Finland have been excluded from the A5. This reduces the EU’s ability to influence Arctic policy by proxy through its member states. And third, the A5 has increased the discrepancy between policy preferences among the Nordic countries. These limitations decrease the chances of creating a genuinely EU regional initiative, of expanding the existing Northern Dimension, or of forming a broader Nordic Security Cooperation for the Arctic—all steps that would have enabled the EU to influence Arctic policy.

The EU has criticized the creation of an exclusive Arctic club and vowed to reapply for membership in the Arctic Council in 2011. The existence of an exclusive club such as the A5 cannot be in the interest of the EU.81 Neither the Commission nor the Council has responded to the development with new communications or initiatives. In fact, in contrast to the EU’s once lively involvement in Arctic affairs in 2008, it now seems to react only passively to the “harsh political realities instead of acting bravely on its own initiative.”82

The EU’s role in the Arctic from the beginning has been one of external actor.83 The EU’s ability to influence Arctic policy through its member states was always limited by the fact that only three of the eight members of the Arctic Council were EU members. This weak representation distinguishes the EU Arctic policy decisively from other initiatives on regional cooperation such as the Mediterranean and Baltic Sea initiatives.84 After the creation of the A5, the role of EU member states in the Arctic diminished even further.

To make matters worse, the Arctic policy preferences of the Nordic states have become increasingly divergent since the Ilulissat Declaration. This development has diminished the chance for EU-led regional cooperation among Denmark, Finland, Sweden, and Iceland, through which the EU could gain

80 Adele Airoldi, “European Union and the Arctic: Main developments July 2008–July 2010,” Norden: Nordic Council of Ministers, http://www.norden.org/en/publications/publications/2010-763/at_download/publicationfile (accessed April 15, 2011). 81 Keil, “The EU in the Arctic ‘Game’,” 26. 82 Keil, “The EU in the Arctic ‘Game’,” 27. 83 Anje Neumann, “The EU – A Relevant Actor in the Field of Climate Change in Respect to the Arctic?” Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, July 1, 2010, http://www.swpberlin.org/en/common /get_document.php?asset_id=7275, 12 (accessed February 2, 2011). 84 Neumann, “The EU – A Relevant Actor,” 12.


access to Arctic policymaking. Sweden and Finland, as well as Iceland, which is on track to join the EU by 2012-13, were not invited to the Ilulissat Declaration. Denmark is now the only EU country with a seat at the Arctic table, but its role is further complicated by Greenland’s special status: Denmark is only an Arctic Ocean coastal state through its Overseas Territory of Greenland. Despite wide-ranging autonomy since a referendum in June 2009, Denmark retains control over Greenland’s foreign affairs and defense matters.

Denmark has significant institutional overlap as a littoral A5 state and as a member of the EU, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the Arctic Council. As a result, some scholars have argued that Denmark has in fact taken on a special role in the Arctic.85 Nonetheless the EU’s access to Arctic policymaking through Denmark is limited at best due to Greenland’s departure from the EEC in 1985. As a result, Denmark’s Arctic policymaking occurs outside of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the EU.

Denmark has taken a very proactive stance toward the Arctic, albeit primarily outside of the EU framework. A debate in 2007 on the possibility of Greenland rejoining the EU and thus widening the EU’s Arctic window has subsided. Denmark issued a directive on Arctic policy in May 2008 outlining its position on, among other things, sovereignty, Arctic and Nordic cooperation, and energy and resource extraction.86 A study on the impact of climate change on Danish security in the Arctic released by the Danish Ministry of Defense recommended the creation of a Danish quick-reaction force for the Arctic and increased air patrols over Greenland and the Faroe Islands. The Danish parliament voted in July of 2009 to follow those recommendations and also establish an Arctic military command by 2014.87

Denmark has been very active in the creation of the A5 Group and also hosted the Ilulissat Foreign Minister meeting. Given Greenland’s size, its location above the Arctic Circle, and its economic potential, Denmark is well aware of the importance of this Overseas Territory. Denmark understands that its national Arctic interests are better positioned within the small forum of the A5, where it wields considerable influence, than within the EU, where it is just one of 27 actors.

Finland has rejected its exclusion from the A5 and sees itself as a key Arctic player with a “long and rich history in the region.”88 In June 2010, Foreign Minister Alexander Stubb outlined the Finnish Arctic policy, which reiterates the

85 Keil, “The EU in the Arctic ‘Game’,” 28. 86 Keil, “The EU in the Arctic ‘Game’,” 28. 87 Haftendorn, “Coping with Climate Change in the Arctic,” 12; Linda Jakobson, “China Prepares for an Ice-free Arctic,” SIPRI: Insights on Peace and Security 2 (2010): 1–16. 88 Alexander Stubb, “Minister Stubb: High Time for the High North,” June 17, 2010, http://formin.finland.fi/Public/Print.aspx?contentid=195010&nodeid=15149&culture=en-US&contentlan=2 (accessed March 1, 2011).


country’s active support for the EU’s Northern Dimension Programme. Finland is the most outspoken advocate for an enhanced role for the EU in Arctic issues.89 Finland’s Foreign Minister commented that:

Actors with an observer status are an integral part of the Council. We welcome the non-Arctic Asian and European states, as well as the European Commission as Permanent Observers in the Council. […] Finland will act to cover the indisputable Arctic vocation of the EU into a more specific and stronger Arctic policy.90

Hence, Finland can be seen as a clear supporter of a greater role for the EU in the Arctic.

Sweden has been less expressive in its Arctic policy preferences. However, it rejects the creation of the A5, supports the applications of non-Arctic countries to the Arctic Council, and calls for the Council to remain the decisive regional forum. Sweden also supports an increased role for the EU and has said that it, “welcomes the EU’s communication as a first and important step towards a coherent EU Arctic policy.”91 According to Sweden’s government, it is “high-time” for the EU to turn its attention to the Arctic and develop a comprehensive EU Arctic policy.92 This implies that, similar to Finland, Sweden does see the EU as an important actor in the region. In contrast to Denmark and Norway, Sweden has not invested in its Arctic military forces, nor has it established an Arctic military command. Iceland finds itself in the same position as Sweden and Finland, neither of which are among the five stakeholding Arctic littoral states. Iceland traditionally sees itself as an Arctic country and has protested against its exclusion from the A5. In its 2009 Northern policy, Iceland called for broader multilateral cooperation within the Arctic Council and supports the EU’s application for observer status. While Iceland currently finds itself at the geopolitical margins of Arctic security considerations, its attractiveness as a future trans-Arctic commercial hub for energy and resources will likely elevate its strategic standing.

The Ilulissat Declaration has enhanced Denmark’s leadership position in the Arctic. At the same time, the formation of the A5 has reduced the importance of the Arctic Council and excluded Finland, Sweden, and Iceland

89 Kefferpütz and Bochkarev, “Expanding the EU’s Institutional Capacities,” 8. 90 Stubb, “Minister Stubb.” 91 Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, Advisory Board to Promote Finland’s Arctic Policy, April 4, 2010, http://formin.finland.fi/Public/default.aspx?contentid=189643&nod eid=15145&contentlan=2 &culture=en-US (accessed March 1, 2011). 92 Keil, “The EU in the Arctic ‘Game’,” 23.


from at least portions of the decision making process. Thus, the policy preferences of EU Arctic countries have been placed on diverging paths, and the EU’s ability to foster a regional cooperation among those four countries, which could strengthen policy coherence of European Arctic policy, has been limited.

Denmark is quite content with its role in a changing Arctic regime and opposes an enhanced role for the EU in the Arctic. Sweden, Finland, and Iceland, on the other hand, are no longer able to pursue their national interests as effectively since the formation of the A5. They are thus favoring a stronger role for the EU through which they can achieve their Arctic interests. Roy Ginsberg, a Professor of government at Skidmore College, supports the idea of EU states increasing their clout by acting through the EU. In his text, “Conceptualizing the European Union as an International Actor,” he states that “for smaller states, CFSP is perhaps the most important outlet for pursuing their foreign policy interest.”93

The same line of argument applies to the proposed Arctic Security Cooperation among the Nordic states. In February 2009, the former Norwegian Secretary of State recommended a security alliance for Arctic matters among the five Nordic states (Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, and Iceland), which would allow them to meet the new regional challenge.94 While cooperation among Nordic countries exists in a number of policy areas, an Arctic alliance appears unlikely since the Nordic countries’ interests in the Arctic are not compatible with one another, thus limiting the potential for enhanced cooperation projects.95 This means that one potential avenue for a joint EU-Nordic initiative through which the Commission could gain a foothold in Arctic affairs is no longer available.

Some analysts also argue for increased Arctic cooperation between the EU and Russia, citing Norway as an example96 of how to successfully engage Russia in the Arctic.97 Such scenarios appear unlikely in light of the fact that the abundance of Arctic natural resources may play a pivotal role in Russia’s strategy to regain superpower status.98 It is also worth noting that Sweden and

93 Roy Ginsberg, “Conceptualizing the European Union as an International Actor: Narrowing the Theoretical Capacity-Expectations Gap,” Journal of Common Market Studies 37 (1999): 429–54, on 439. 94 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iceland, Nordic Cooperation on Foreign and Security Policy, February 9, 2009, http://www.mfa.is/media/Frettatilkynning/Nordic_report.pdf (accessed March 1, 2011). 95 Keil, “The EU in the Arctic ‘Game’,” 28. 96 In September 2010, Norway and Russia signed a treaty that settles a 40-year dispute over a 175,000 square kilometer area in the Barents Sea. 97 Kefferpütz and Bochkarev, “Expanding the EU’s Institutional Capacities,” 8. 98 Nikolaj Petersen, “The Arctic as a New Arena for Danish Foreign Policy: The Ilulissat Initiative and Its Implications.” Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook (2009): 35–78, on 45.


Finland are hesitant for the EU to enter into any alliance with Russia in the Arctic. These countries are not part of NATO and may feel threatened by the emergence of Canada and Russia and the creation of the A5. In contrast, Norway, which has maintained close relations with Russia in the Arctic, as well as Denmark, are both part of the alliance and are less wary of engaging with Russia.

Following the developments since 2008, several avenues of enhanced involvement in the Arctic have closed for the EU. The Commission’s bid to gain observer status on the Arctic Council was rejected in 2009. The A5 group represents an exclusive club with little hope for the EU to become a member in the future. Key EU Arctic states, Sweden, Finland, and Iceland (an EU member starting in 2012) are now sidelined and can no longer represent the EU’s interests. Finally, the barriers for a Nordic or Arctic cooperation either among the EU’s Arctic states, among all Nordic states, or even including Russia, have increased dramatically. Thus, the question remains of how the EU can get involved in Arctic policymaking against the backdrop of strong national interests, the decline in importance of the Arctic Council, the exclusion of EU member states from the A5, and the unlikelihood of regional cooperation.

3.3. The Policy Options Outside the Existing Regime The EU faces significant barriers to influencing Arctic policy within the existing regime. International agreements or treaties—either multilateral or bilateral—represent a more suitable route for the EU to actively shape Arctic policymaking and assert its influence as a major global political, economic, and military power. The EU can pursue three distinct approaches to altering the existing Arctic framework (or it can establish a new one), thereby circumventing the barriers of the current regime. These are: creating a broad multilateral and legally binding governing body for the Arctic similar to the Antarctic Treaty System; establishing more narrowly focused multilateral treaties; and negotiating bilateral agreements with the region’s major players, particularly Russia and Canada.

An international treaty or charter for the Arctic may represent the most suitable regime to ensure long-term stability for the region. However, national security and energy considerations may render such an approach unlikely. In their article on how to expand the EU’s institutional capacities in the Arctic Region, Roderick Kefferpütz and Daniela Bochkarev, both with the Heinrich Böll Foundation, argue that:

A multilateral binding body governing the Arctic with sufficient institutional authority is needed to entrench co-operation in the


fragile polar region on climate change, the environment and territorial disputes. […] The best regime for the region would be one that mirrors the Antarctic treaty. However energy security and international trade […] considerations are agenda setters and are likely to dispel any proposals for an arrangement in line with the Antarctic Treaty.99

Kefferpütz and Bochkarev stress that rapidly growing economic interests make a multilateral binding agreement increasingly unlikely to be achieved.

Despite the substantial barriers to establishing a broad multilateral binding agreement for the Arctic, the approach could merit the EU’s consideration. The value for the EU in pursuing such an agreement should not only be seen in the end result—a treaty or charter—but also in the process itself. By pushing for an Arctic Treaty, the EU could reposition itself at the center of the debate over the future of the Arctic and “bravely act on its own initiative.”100 In this regard, Alyson Bailes, a former British diplomat and ambassador to Finland, explains:

the EU is a strategic entity of a new kind. […] It has the power to mobilize the economic forces of most of the European continent, as well as channeling much (if not yet all) of the European political input to global policy- and rule-making on issues like climate change and security in the Arctic. The Arctic is a stern test of European maturity.101

The author view the challenge of the Arctic as an important step in the EU achieving political maturity.

In addition, defining the EU’s Arctic policy goals around a treaty would allow it to end the “institutional confusion” that currently exists in the EU, as evidenced by differing approaches in the Commission, Council, and Parliament.102 Currently, the EU fails to speak with a single voice as initiatives are challenged by the bureaucracy of dozens of policy instruments and “scattered throughout the Brussels organs.”103 Alexandr Vondra, the Czech Secretary of Defense, point out that “the Union has not developed a broad Arctic policy bringing together all the relevant individual policy areas.”104 This lack of a “holistic 99 Kefferpütz and Bochkarev, “Expanding the EU’s Institutional Capacities,” 10. 100 Keil, “The EU in the Arctic ‘Game’," 27. 101 Alyson Bailes, “The EU and the Arctic: A Test for Soft Power?” http://www.europesworld.org/NewEnglish/Home/CommunityPosts/tabid/809/PostID/518/HowtheEUcouldhelpcooltempersovertheArctic.aspx (accessed April 1, 2011). 102 Offerdahl, “Arctic Energy in EU Policy,” 39. 103 Bailes, “The EU and the Arctic.” 104 Alexandr Vondra, “European Parliament Debate, 1st April,”


Arctic policy” within the EU was also voiced in the European Parliament by British MP Diana Wallis.105 The failure to present a coherent Arctic policy has unnecessarily weakened the EU’s role in the international arena, undermined its credibility as an international actor, and thus diminished its ability to achieve specific foreign policy goals.106 A holistic EU approach to the Arctic would open up new opportunities for cooperation among Arctic parties.107 One such ally could be the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC), which holds a permanent voting position on the Arctic Council but was excluded from the Ilulissat Declaration, essentially ignoring the rights that the Inuit have gained through international law and the self-government process. The Inuit are hence clearly in favor of a stronger international governance arrangement.108 Policy overlap can also be found on the issue of sovereignty of the Northwest Passage and the Northern Sea Route among the EU, the United States, and Norway. In general, the EU’s Arctic approach seems to align itself most closely with the U.S. Arctic strategy.109

Klaus Dodds, a professor of geopolitics at the University of London, argues that the Arctic is currently in the midst of an interregnum as actors and organizations debate the future of the High North.110 This offers an opportunity for the EU to clearly define its Arctic policy around an Arctic treaty, step up to the plate, and “prevent the emergence of a geopolitical game and minimize the risk of conflict in an area of increased militarization.”111 4. RECOMMENDATIONS The EU has thus far failed to become an active player in a region where evolving security and economic considerations have increasingly complicated international cooperation. EU Arctic policy has been inconsistent across its institutions, and the EU has found it challenging to clearly define and prioritize its

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=CRE&reference=20090 401&secondRe f=ITEM-013&language=EN&ring=B6-2009-0163 (accessed April 1, 2011). 105 Diana Wallis, “Cross-border Governance in Vulnerable Areas: Has the EU Anything to Offer in the Arctic?” http://www.dianawallismep.org.uk/resources/sites/82.165.40.25416d2c46d399 e8.07328850/Arctic+Speech+%28Rovaniemi+2008%29.pdf (accessed April 1, 2011). 106 Stephan Keukeleire and Jennifer MacNaughtan, The Foreign Policy of the European Union (Hampshire, England: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 121. 107 European Commission, “The European Union and the Arctic Region.” 108 Koivurova, “Limits and Possibilities of the Arctic Council,” 6. 109 Bailes, “The EU and the Arctic.” 110 Dodds, “From Frozen Desert to Maritime Domain,” 13. 111 Kefferpütz and Bochkarev, “Expanding the EU’s Institutional Capacities,” 10.


policy preferences. Initially, the EU framed its interest in the Arctic around security issues—as clearly laid out by the European Council report on climate change and international security—but it has since shied away from such an approach. The lack of viable territorial claims in the Arctic and the exclusion of Sweden and Finland from the A5 Group have further increased the lack of coherence in policy formation. The absence of opportunities to participate in the dialogue, and even the Arctic states’ outright rejection of the EU as an Arctic Council observer in 2009, have added to the EU’s reluctance to get involved in the High North. This memorandum recommends four sets of policies that will allow the EU to ensure its long-term energy and economic interests and to actively contribute to and shape Arctic cooperation as an accepted member of the community: • The EU must include Arctic shipping and energy issues in the ongoing

negotiations on the EU-Russia Agreement; • The EU must cooperate closely with the United States to define the NWP as

an international strait and thus to ensure unrestricted access; • The EU must capitalize on Iceland’s accession to the EU, which represents a

strategic opportunity to play a more active role in the Arctic Council; and • The EU must draw on its long-established leadership on climate change and

environmental issues and thus assert itself as positive and useful player rather than as a club with a military or security agenda.

4.1. Arctic Shipping and Energy and the EU-Russia Agreement The EU must include Arctic shipping and energy issues in the new EU-Russia agreement, which aims to build and expand on existing commitments between the two parties to ensure efficient functioning of the bilateral relationship.112 Maritime transport along the NSR represents a key interest of the EU, as described by a 2009 Commission communication.113 The EU needs to work toward improving existing Arctic navigation regulations and standards, reducing bureaucracy to facilitate access, and lowering the costs of transit passage. The EU should draw on the Directive on port formalities and expand on its pilot project on “Maritime transport without barriers – Blue Belt.” The reduction of

112 Council of the European Union, Joint Statement of the EU-Russia Summit on the Launch of Negotiations for a New EU-Russia Agreement, June 27, 2008, http://www.consilium.europa.eu /uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/er/101524.pdf (accessed April 15, 2011). 113 European Union, Summary of EU Legislation: Waterborn Transport. http://europa.eu/legislat ion_summaries/transport/waterborne_transport/index_en.htm# (accessed April 15, 2011).


bureaucracy, regulations, and administrative burdens for shipping companies are key to gaining preferred access to and taking full advantage of the NSR.114

The EU-Russia energy strategy aims to establish a long-term partnership to ensure energy supply security. The dialogue focuses on the exchange of information on investments in exploration, exploitation, and commercialization over the next 10–15 years, but fails to mention Arctic resources. The EU must establish a roadmap that outlines the role that Russian Arctic energy sources will play in the EU’s energy mix to 2050, and aim to gain preferred access to such resources over competitors, especially China. 4.2. Cooperation with the U.S. on the NWP The EU must cooperate closely with the United States on the legal status of the NWP. Arctic issues have thus far not been a visible element in the transatlantic relationship., even though EU and U.S. policies in this area align closely. The U.S. National Security Presidential Directive 66 on Arctic Region Policy, signed by President George W. Bush in January 2009, rejects the notion that the NWP is an internal waterway of Canada and instead designates it as a strait for international navigation, thus allowing for transit passage. Similarly, the EU Commission calls for “Member States and the Community [to] defend the principle of freedom of navigation and the right of innocent passage in the newly opened routes and areas.”115 Transatlantic cooperation may prove essential in exerting pressure on Canada and reaching a satisfactory resolution of the underlying legal dispute, before international large-scale shipping along the NWP commences and further escalates the political debate over its legal status.116

4.3. Iceland's Accession to the EU Iceland’s accession will allow the EU to anchor its presence in the Arctic Council and gain a new geographical foothold in the region.117 Iceland is widely

114 European External Action Service, EU-Russia Common Spaces Progress Report 2010, March 2011, http://eeas.europa.eu/russia/docs/commonspaces_prog_report_2010_en.pdf (accessed April 15, 2011). 115 European Commission, Maritime Policy Actions: Transport, http://ec.europa.eu/maritimeaffairs/arctic_transport_en.html (accessed April 15, 2011). 116 Adele Airoldi, “European Union and the Arctic: Main Developments July 2008–July 2010.” 117 On April 11, 2011 Icelanders rejected the latest government-approved plan to repay the $5.8 billion owed to Britain and the Netherlands from the crash of the country's banking system in 2008. Nonetheless, Iceland remains on track to begin negotiations on the acquis


recognized as a key player along future Arctic shipping routes and may develop into a important transportation hub. The EU needs to take advantage of Iceland’s strategic position at the entrance to the High North and to develop its Arctic policy accordingly. In contrast to China, which has long recognized Iceland’s strategic position and continues to invest in the country’s shipping infrastructure, the EU has not defined Iceland as a key priority of its Arctic foreign and economic policy.

Along with Sweden and Finland, Iceland represents the third EU Arctic state that favors larger involvement of the EU in the High North. Following the exclusion of Sweden and Finland from the A5 Group, the process of EU internal Arctic policy formation lost focus. Iceland’s accession represents an opportunity for the EU to overcome this stagnation, reinvigorate the process, and strengthen the overall EU position within the Arctic region.

4.4 Leadership on Climate Change and Environmental Issues The EU should develop multilateral agreements that address specific concerns about climate change and environmental protection in the Arctic. The EU can draw on its long-established leadership on these issues to assert a stronger presence in Arctic cooperation. The EU’s experience in such areas as adaptation to climate change, air and marine pollution, and maritime transport safety, as well as its political weight in this policy area, facilitate a closer involvement with the Arctic Council. A targeted and sustained policy approach in such “soft” policy areas will allow the EU to assert itself as a “positive and useful player” rather than as a club with a military or security agenda.118 5. CONCLUSIONS The interplay of climate change, natural resources, and weak international frameworks has transformed interaction in the High North from straightforward environmental cooperation in the Arctic Council to a more traditional and complex game for power and strategic dominance. Although Arctic

communautaire in 2011 and is slated to join the EU in 2013-14. EU Enlargement Commissioner Stefan Füle confirmed that “the outcome of the referendum does not impact the ongoing accession negotiations, to which the commission remains fully committed." Stefan Füle, Statement on the Outcome of the Referendum on the Icesave Agreement. http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/fule/headlines/news/2011/04/20110411_en.htm (accessed May 3, 2011). 118 Keil, “The EU in the Arctic ‘Game’,” 27.


policymaking is still dominated by “soft” power games, the region reflects the renaissance of great power rivalries and exemplifies the rise of multipolarity in the 21st century. The EU faces the difficult task of coordinating internal policymaking among its Arctic and non-Arctic member states as well as across various EU institutions. Externally, the EU needs to interact with non-EU Arctic states and to cooperate with other countries and institutions that consider the EU as equally entitled to a seat at the Arctic table.

The ongoing effects of climate change in the Arctic have challenged the region’s stability, and the High North may well be the first of many regions where climate change interrupts and alters the geo-strategic balance. The rise of power politics in the Arctic has complicated the entry of the EU as an actor in the region. The fact that other major players, particularly China and South Korea, are also vying for influence in the Arctic further complicates the issue.119 Several Arctic states remain reluctant to open up cooperation to new members and to allow for a broader dialogue. The EU must demonstrate that it can legitimately represent the interests of its Arctic member states and that it can provide added value to cooperation in the High North.

The formation of EU Arctic policy, which began in earnest less than three years ago, is still at an early stage and has yet to be consolidated across its institutions and member states. The European Commission’s progress report on Arctic issues, due to be released in June 2011, represents a further step in arriving at a coherent and overarching EU Arctic Policy. Iceland’s accession to the EU will provide new impetuous to foster cooperation between the inner core Arctic States—Sweden, Finland, Denmark, and Iceland—and the non-Arctic EU members, such as Germany, France, and the U.K., that have strong and growing interests in the region.

Implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, which bestows greater power to the European Parliament, may also shift the balance of power within the workings of the EU and lead to a more pronounced and influential role for EU parliamentarians. Of interest will also be the outcome of the high-level Arctic Council meeting on May 11, 2011, which will again consider the applications for observer status from the EU, China, and South Korea. A positive vote may signal that Arctic cooperation will become more inclusive in the future and progress along a broader framework. Renewed rejection, however, may place the region on a trajectory of exclusivity and further emergence of power politics.

The Arctic represents a new kind of political and geo-strategic challenge. Similarly, the EU constitutes a new and emerging strategic and economic entity, which may be able to mobilize and channel its significant political and rule-making power to act as a mediating force, not only in the Arctic, but in other regions affected by the 21st century’s greatest challenge—climate change. 119 Adele Airoldi, “European Union and the Arctic: Main Developments July 2008–July 2010.”


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