'ENGINEERING DATA TRANSMITTAL EDT 617443/67531/metadc...HNF-SD-SNF-TI-046, Rev. 0 VISUAL...

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HNF-SD-SNF-TI-046 VISUAL EXAMINATIONS OF K WEST FUEL ELEMENTS

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ED-7L00-172-2 (05/96) GEF097

BD 7400-172-1

HNF-SD-SNF-TI-046, Rev. 0

VISUAL EXAMINATIONS OF K WEST FUEL ELEMENTS

A. L. Pitner Duke Engineering and Services Hanford, Inc., Richland, WA 99352 U.S. Department of Energy Contract DE-AC06-96RL13200

EDT/ECN: 617443 UC: 2070 Org Code: 2T650 Charge Code: LBO24 B&R Code: EW7070000 Total Pages: 69

Key Words: K Basin, Fuel Elements, Fuel Damage

Abstract: Over 250 fuel assemblies stored in sealed canisters in the K West Basin were extracted and visually examined for damage. Substantial damage was expected based on high cesium levels previously measured in water samples taken from these canisters. About 11% of the inner elements and 45% of the outer elements were found to be failed in these examinations. generally had multiple instances of major fuel damage.

Canisters that had cesium levels of 1 curie or more

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Pr in ted i n the u n i t e d States of America. DocMent Control Services, P.O. Box 1970, U a i k t o p H6-08, Richland UA 99352, Phone (509) 372-2420; Fax (509) 376-4989.

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Approved for Public Release A-6400-073 (10/95) GEF321

HNF.SD.SNF.TI.046, Rev . 0

CONTENTS

1.0 SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.0 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.0 PROCEDURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 4.0 OBSERVATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 5.0 DAMAGE ASSESSMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 6.0 REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

1

HNF.SD.SNF.TI.046, Rev . 0

1 .

2 . 3 . 4 . 5 . 6 . 7 . 8 . 9 .

10 . 11 . 12 . 13 . 14 . 15 . 16 . 17 . 18 . 19 . 20 . 21 . 22 . 23 . 24 . 25 . 26 .

LIST OF FIGURES

Sludge Cloud Generated During Mark I Canis te r Lid Removal (2667 M ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 Fuel Elements w i t h I n t a c t Top Ends (6241 M) . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

45

Top End Rupture on an Outer Element (6513 U) . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 Inc ip ien t Breach on t h e Top o f an Inner Element (0091 U) . . . . . .

Detached End Cap on Center Element (6513 M) . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 S p l i t Cladding and Fuel Voiding (5744 U) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

49

50

51

Inner and Outer Elements w i t h S p l i t Cladding (1512 M) . . . . . . . Minor Cracking Along t h e Side o f an Element (6513 M) . . . . . . . . Major Cracking Along t h e Side o f an Element (1164 M ) . . . . . . . . Rust B l i s t e r s on an Outer Element (2660 U) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 Broken Outer Element Being Extracted from Canis te r (0161 U )

Outer Element Broken During Examination (1860 U) . . . . . . . . . . 54 Tapered Sludge Band a t t h e Bottom o f an Outer Element (2660 M )

. . . . 53

. . . 55 Bottom End Rupture (1226 U) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 Bottom End with Loose End Cap and S p l i t Cladding (7913 U) . . . . . 57 Medium Coating on an Outer Element (0091 U) . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 Example o f Heavy Element Coatings (0161 M) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 Translucent Coating Flakes (0091 M ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 Fuel Elements w i t h Orange Coating (2667 U) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 Dark Colored Sludge Tra i l (6513 M ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 Orange Colored Sludge Tra i l (1512 M) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 Flocculent Sludge Inside a Canis te r Barrel (6743 U) . . . . . . . . 64 Chip Can Containing Fuel Fragments (5903 U) . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 Fuel Elements Stuck Ins ide a Mark I Canis te r Lid (0943 U) . . . . . 66 Fuel Damage Versus Cesium Level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 Sludge Level Versus Cesium Level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68

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LIST OF TABLES

1. Coat ing and Sludge Observat ions . . . . 2. Survey Resu l ts . . . . . . . . . 3 . Damage Assessment Summary .

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. 20

. 4 1

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VISUAL EXAMINATIONS OF K WEST FUEL ELEMENTS

1.0 SUMMARY

Over 250 f u e l assemblies s to red i n sealed c a n i s t e r s i n t h e K West Basin were e x t r a c t e d and v i s u a l l y examined f o r damage. a c o r r o s i o n i n h i b i t o r , and r e l a t i v e l e v e l s o f corroded f u e l and sludge i n v e n t o r i e s appeared t o be l e s s in tense than observed i n s i m i l a r examinations o f f u e l s to red i n open c a n i s t e r s i n the K East Basin. Nonetheless, s u b s t a n t i a l l e v e l s o f f u e l element damage were found i n these examinations. E a r l i e r measurements o f cesium l e v e l s i n the K West c a n i s t e r s were used t o i d e n t i f y candidates w i t h t h e p o t e n t i a l f o r h igh f u e l element damage and sludge l e v e l s f o r l a b o r a t o r y eva lua t i ons . The f u e l cond i t i ons found i n t h i s sampling were as f o l l o w s :

These c a n i s t e r s conta ined

Inners Outers

I n t a c t Minor Damage Major Damage

89% 5 5% 8% 21% 3% 24%

Thus, about 11% o f the i n n e r elements and 45% o f the o u t e r elements i n these "h igh cesium" c a n i s t e r s were found t o be f a i l e d , w i t h about one- four th o f t he o u t e r elements showing major damage such as s p l i t c l add ing o r broken segments. One c a n i s t e r w i t h low cesium (tO.l C i ) t h a t was examined conta ined b a s i c a l l y i n t a c t f u e l . Canis ter b a r r e l s t h a t had cesium l e v e l s o f 1 C i o r g r e a t e r g e n e r a l l y had m u l t i p l e instances o f major f u e l damage and maximum sludge i n d i c a t i o n s , bu t t he observat ions f o r c a n i s t e r s w i t h lower cesium l e v e l s were h i g h l y va r iab le , ranging from no s i g n i f i c a n t damage t o h i g h l e v e l s o f damage. These incons is tenc ies could be due t o f a u l t y cesium l e v e l measurements, t he v a r i a b i l i t y o f ac tua l damage w i t h i n the "major damage" category, o r both.

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HNF-SO-SNF-TI-046, Rev. 0

2.0 INTRODUCTION

A campaign was conducted in the K West fuel storage basin where selected canisters were opened and the fuel elements individually extracted for visual examination. The examinations were performed in a manner similar to that applied in earlier examinations of K East fuel (Pitner 1997). A total of 24 canisters in K West were examined, with 21 o f the canisters each containing 14 individual fuel assemblies and 3 of the canisters containing known fragmented fuel pieces. Approximately equal numbers of Mark I and Mark I 1 canisters were examined in this campaign.

Prior to the visual examinations, about 50 canisters in the basin were subjected to gas and liquid sampling. A primary measurement in this process was the cesium curie content in the sample, presumably an indication o f the relative level of fuel damage in each canister barrel. A major objective of the visual examinations was to select candidate canisters for obtaining fuel and sludge samples for detailed laboratory examination. Since damaged fuel elements and substantial sludge samples were desired for laboratory evaluations, canisters with relatively high cesium levels were mostly targeted for the visual examinations. Thus, it was anticipated that substantial levels of fuel damage and sludge quantities would be encountered in the visual examinations.

7



a


3.0 PROCEDURE

The procedure used to examine the K West fuel elements was basically the same as applied in the K East fuel examination campaign. stored in encapsulated canisters in K West as opposed to open canisters in K East, additional steps of lid removal and replacement were required for the K West examinations. After moving a candidate canister to the inspection station (south loadout pit), the lid of one barrel was removed, ultrasonic measurements of sludge depths performed, the individual inner and outer fuel elements temporarily extracted and examined, and the lid replaced. The other barrel of the canister was examined in like manner, and the canister was then returned to its basin storage location. All steps of the examination process were recorded on videotape.

The Mark I1 lids were relatively easily removed by loosening the locking bar nut and lifting the lid. little disturbance of the canister contents. utilize a circumferential grafoil seal, and the lids were removed by internal water pressurization through the center valve. This process typically caused significant disruption of the sludge inventory in the canister, often resulting in a substantial sludge cloud release when the lid was removed. Figure 1 shows an example of the sludge cloud generated as the lid is removed from a Mark I canister. The "M" designation in the canister barrel identifier indicates this is the barrel with the marked lid. signify the barrel with the unmarked lid.

Each fuel element was examined for the following conditions. end, each element was placed in at least one of the five categories described (on a few occasions the element had both a loose end cap and split cladding). For the sides and bottom ends, features were noted as appropriate.

Since the fuel is

This process is relatively benign and causes The Mark I canisters, however,

A "U" designation would

For the top

TOD End

Intact - No evidence of cladding failure. All the elements shown in Figure 2 are basically intact on the top end, with the exception of the inner and outer elements in the 1 o'clock location which showed indications of incipient breach upon closeup examination.

Incip. Breach - An indication of possible loss of cladding integrity, but with no exposed fuel evident. Figure 3 shows an example of incipient breach on the top of an inner fuel element . A definite breach in the cladding which provides a pathway for fuel-water contact. Figure 4 shows a breach on the top end of an outer element.

The end cap is separated from the zircaloy cladding. The end cap is missing from the center outer element in Figure 5.

Rupture -

Loose End Cap -

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S p l i t Cladding - The cladding i s peeled open, presumably from t h e volume expansion assoc ia ted w i t h the uranium-water r e a c t i o n . Figure 6 shows fuel voiding where the cladding has s p l i t open a t t h e top of an o u t e r element. Both t h e inner and outer elements shown in Figure 7 have s p l i t c ladding on t h e top end.

Side

Cracks -

Hole -

B l i s t e r s -

Broken -

Bottom End

Sludge Ring Hgt

Rupture -

Loose End Cap -

S p l i t Cladding

Vis ib le cracks along t h e s i d e of t h e element. cracks shown in Figure 8 a r e r e l a t i v e l y minor in na ture , while those shown i n Figure 9 a r e more severe and open.

A hole in the cladding along t h e s i d e of an element. No ins tances of s i d e holes were found in these K West fue l element examinations.

Rust b l i s t e r s from t h e corrosion of t h e carbon s t e e l shoes on t h e spacer c l i p s of t h e o u t e r elements. In Figure 10, t h e two bottom spacers v i s i b l e a r e seen t o be rus ted , and t h e r e i s a l s o a rust b l i s t e r between them where t h e element contacted an adjacent element spacer .

The element i s broken i n t o two ( o r more) p a r t s a t some lower ax ia l l e v e l . The outer element shown i n Figure 11 i s seen t o be broken about 8 inches down from t h e top as i t i s ex t rac ted from the c a n i s t e r . The outer element shown in Figure 12 a c t u a l l y broke during t h e inspect ion process a t a point where t h e r e was a major c i rcumferent ia l crack.

The

The est imated height of t h e dark band sometimes seen around t h e bottom of fuel e lements , presumably a consequence of being buried i n c a n i s t e r s ludge. Figure 13 shows a band a t t h e bottom of an o u t e r element t h a t r e f l e c t s a tapered s ludge p r o f i l e .

Same as f o r top end. rup ture on t h e l e f t s i d e of an outer element.

Same as f o r top end. The o u t e r element shown in Figure 15 has t h e bottom end cap missing.

Same as f o r top end. cap shown in Figure 15 a l s o has s p l i t c ladding on the bottom end.

Figure 14 shows a bottom end

The element with a loose end

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4.0 OBSERVATIONS

When the canisters were opened during these examinations, there were generally substantial volumes of gas released. All these canisters were presumably purged with water during the earlier gas and liquid sampling campaign, so the gas release observed here is believed to be indicative of fuel corrosion that transpired since that sampling campaign (about two months previous).

When fuel was placed in the sealed K West canisters for storage, a corrosion inhibitor (potassium nitrite) was added to each canister barrel. A general observation made during these K West fuel examinations was that the gross mushrooming of reacted fuel often seen in failed elements in K East (Pitner 1995) was not evident here. not as intense in K West as they were in the K East examinations. Either or both of these observations may reflect the effectiveness of the corrosion inhibitor. Nevertheless, substantial levels of damage were found in the K West fuel examined, as discussed below.

Nearly all the fuel elements examined in this campaign were found to have some kind of coating on the exterior. In some cases, the coating was similar in appearance to that seen in K East fuel examinations (Pitner 1997). However, often a heavier type of coating was noted on the K West fuel. It is speculated that these type of deposits may have come from the potassium nitrite inhibitor. Application of the inhibitor was apparently not precisely controlled, and the level of coating varied accordingly. Figure 16 shows an example of a medium level of coating typically observed on the fuel elements. The outer element shown is from a longer type Mark I V assembly, and the upper uncoated portion was apparently above the water level in the canister. The element also exhibits a top end rupture and a spiral cladding crack. An example of heavier coating is shown in Figure 17. The coating on the inner element is crystalline in appearance, while the outer element coating has a poured icing-like appearance. Rust blisters observed on many of the K West fuel elements examined generally were absent on elements with heavy coating. These heavier coatings would sometimes flake off during handling of the fuel elements. In Figure 18, two pieces of the translucent coating are seen lying atop separate fuel assemblies. In one case only, all the elements in a canister barrel had an orange coating, as shown in Figure 19. The fuel elements in the other barrel of this canister had the normal grayish-white coating. General coating observations for each canister barrel are given in Table 1. The level of coating (medium or heavy) is identified along with the observed coloration of the coating.

an ultrasonic probe. While this technique worked well in K East, the results obtained in K West were inconclusive. bottom of the canister. This could indicate a transparency of the K West sludge to the ultrasonic signal, or that sludge levels were relatively shallow. Significant non-zero depth measurements obtained in K West were actually believed to be from foreign material, such as grafoil pieces from the lid seal or other debris. Relatively few occasions of sludge rings at

Also, indications of canister sludge were

Attempts were made to measure sludge depth levels in the canister using

Many measurements corresponded to the

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the bottom of K West fuel were noted, in contrast to the common occurrences of sludge rings observed in K East. Nonetheless, definite visual indications of sludge presence were noted in K West. Sludge clouds often were released when the lids were removed, and sludge frequently trailed the fuel elements as they were extracted from the canisters. A qualitative estimate of the sludge level in each canister barrel was made from these visual observations. Three categories were used to describe the sludge evidence: Minimal, Moderate, and Maximum. Figure 20 shows a "Maximum" incidence of dark colored sludge trailing an outer element, while Figure 21 depicts a "Maximum" case of orange colored sludge. The "Minimal" category refers to only trace amounts of sludge, while the "Moderate" category is intermediate to the other two. sludge level indications for each canister barrel are also presented in Table 1, along with the observed coloration of the sludge. as gas bubbles released from the canister sludge during fuel element manipulations are included as comments in Table 1 as well.

examined, the camera was often positioned overhead for a straight down view prior to replacing the center assembly in the barrel. flocculent sludge cloud was observed in the center of the barrel. Not once was the bottom of the canister visible. Figure 22 shows a typical overhead view in this regard.

The

Observations such

After the fuel elements were all extracted from each canister barrel and

Invariably, a swirling,

Three canisters designated 'chip cans" which contained known fragmented fuel were also examined. These canisters typically had high cesium levels of several curies. Figure 23 shows an example of a chip can. Broken fuel elements with open ends were common in these canisters. fragmented fuel pieces were extracted for examination.

One unusual incident did occur during the K West Fuel examinations. When the lid was lifted from the barrel o f one Mark I canister, three fuel elements wedged laterally across the inside of the lid were lifted with it (Figure 24). Apparently corrosion-induced swelling of the fuel caused this situation. No further examination of this fuel was performed because of its precarious condition. The lid on the other barrel of this canister could not be lifted after loosening, also implying a stuck fuel situation. The barrel that the lid was lifted from had a cesium level of 0.88 Ci, while that in the other barrel was 0.49 Ci.

None of these

The recorded results of the visual inspections are presented in Table 2. The type of canister and the measured cesium curie content in each canister barrel are included in the canister identification column. The element numbering sequence used was to specify the assembly nearest the top canister trunnion as No. 1, and then proceed clockwise from there. The No. 7 assembly was in the center position in the canister barrel. The number of incidences of defects defined in the "Procedure" section above are given for each element examined. For the "Cracks" category, an X " indication signifies minor cracking (Figure 8 ) and an "X+" indication signifies major cracking (Figure 9). When no information is given for a particular element, it indicates that it was not extracted for visual examination, usually due to grappl ing difficulties.

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A t t he end o f Table 2, t o t a l s are g i ven f o r t he number o f elements examined and t h e frequency of defects observed. A t o t a l o f 252 i n n e r elements and 263 o u t e r elements were inspected i n t h i s campaign. f requencies were g r e a t e r f o r o u t e r elements than f o r i nne r elements. t o be expected cons ide r ing t h e i r h ighe r v u l n e r a b i l i t y t o damage d u r i n g r e a c t o r d ischarge. a l though t h e number o f t o p end defects detected were u s u a l l y somewhat g rea te r , probably because o f t h e i r h ighe r v i s i b i l i t y . elements were found t o be cracked a long t h e i r s ides, and about th ree - fou r ths o f them had r u s t b l i s t e r s i n the v i c i n i t y o f t he spacer c l i p s . The occasion o f s p l i t c l add ing f o r t he i nne r elements was near zero, bu t around o n e - f i f t h o f t h e o u t e r elements were found t o have s p l i t c l add ing on one end o r t h e o t h e r (bo th ends on a few occasions). About 2% o f t he i n n e r elements and 6% o f the o u t e r elements i n t h i s sample popu la t i on were found t o be broken a t some in te rmed ia te a x i a l l e v e l .

I n genera l , d e f e c t Th is i s

Top and bottom d e f e c t f requencies were g e n e r a l l y comparable,

Over one- four th o f t h e o u t e r

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5.0 DAMAGE ASSESSMENT

Assessments of overa l l damage l e v e l s observed in t h e K West fuel examinations were made based on r e l a t i v e degrees of minor and major damage. Minor damage in t h i s evaluat ion included incidences of c ladding rupture a s def ined in t h e "Procedure" sec t ion above and recorded in Table 2 , and a l s o occasions of minor c ladding cracking as depicted in Figure 8. These a r e occurrences where d e f i n i t e breach of fuel element i n t e g r i t y i s ind ica ted , but t h e communication path between fuel and water i s l imi ted with respec t t o t h e poten t ia l f o r fue l corrosion and sludge generat ion. While incidences of i n c i p i e n t breach a l s o suggest some damage (usua l ly dented end cap) , no l o s s of i n t e g r i t y i s apparent and these occurrences were not included in t a l l y i n g minor damage frequencies . s p l i t c ladding , broken element, o r open cracks along t h e s i d e of t h e cladding a s depicted in Figure 9. and s ludge generat ion within t h e c a n i s t e r b a r r e l .

The r e s u l t s of t h i s assessment a r e presented in Table 3 . c a n i s t e r bar re l examined, t h e measured cesium c u r i e content i s given, along with the c a n i s t e r type , fue l type, and key d a t e of the f u e l . The number of inner and outer elements examined in each c a n i s t e r bar re l a r e given along with t h e frequencies of minor and major damage. The r e l a t i v e sludge l e v e l s observed in t h e examinations a r e a l s o included. Damage frequency t o t a l s a r e given a t t h e bottom of t h e t a b l e .

A condi t ion of major damage included loose end cap,

These a r e s i t u a t i o n s more prone t o fue l cor ros ion

For each

I t i s seen t h a t 11% of t h e inner elements in these fue l examinations were The f a i l u r e

I n t e r e s t i n g l y , t h e 45% outer element f a i l u r e frequency

found t o be f a i l e d , w i t h 3% f a l l i n g in t h e major damage category. frequency f o r t h e o u t e r elements was found t o be 45%, with 24% being in t h e major damage category. observed f o r K West i s comparable t o t h e 42% level pro jec ted f o r K East based on a basin wide visual survey ( P i t n e r 1995). However, t h e leve l of major damage here (24%) i s s u b s t a n t i a l l y g r e a t e r than observed in t h e overa l l K East survey (-5%). This can probably be a t t r i b u t e d t o t h e f a c t t h a t K West c a n i s t e r s with suspected damaged fuel (high cesium l e v e l s ) were s e l e c t e d f o r examination here . When 26 outer elements from c a n i s t e r s containing highly damaged fue l in K East were subjected t o f u l l length examinations ( P i t n e r 1997), about 60% of them were found t o have s p l i t c ladding and near ly one-third were found t o be broken. be expected when c a n i s t e r s e l e c t i o n s a r e biased in t h i s d i r e c t i o n .

cesium c u r i e leve l and t h e degree o f fue l damage in a c a n i s t e r b a r r e l . In Figure 25, t h e number of elements (both inner and outer ) with major damage found i n t h e c a n i s t e r s a r e p lo t ted aga ins t t h e corresponding c u r i e l e v e l s . Mult iple ins tances of major damage a r e indicated f o r high c u r i e readings , but t h e r e i s cons iderable v a r i a t i o n in damage l e v e l s f o r t h e low c u r i e c a n i s t e r b a r r e l s . Even with t h e wide degree of s c a t t e r in t h e d a t a , some general observat ions can be made. Canis te r b a r r e l s contained no fue l elements w i t h major damage only when t h e cesium level was l e s s than about 0 .5 Ci . I f t h e cesium leve l were g r e a t e r than 0 .5 Ci , a t l e a s t one fue l element with major damage res ided i n t h e b a r r e l . For cesium l e v e l s g r e a t e r than 1 Ci , t h e r e were genera l ly two o r more badly damaged fue l elements in t h e b a r r e l . Confusing

T h u s , h igher l e v e l s of major damage can

I t might be expected t h a t t h e r e should be a c o r r e l a t i o n between t h e

15


t h e issue, however, i s t he wide v a r i a t i o n a t t he lower c u r i e l e v e l s . For b a r r e l s w i t h measured cesium l e v e l s o f about 1 C i o r l e s s , t he number of h i g h l y damaged f u e l elements ranged from none t o f o u r . Th i s v a r i a b i l i t y cou ld be due i n p a r t t o i naccu ra te measurements o f cesium l e v e l s , p o s s i b l y due t o losses from l e a k i n g cans (e.g., cans w i t h broken l o c k i n g ba rs ) . A l t e r n a t e l y , t h e ac tua l damage l e v e l w i t h i n the category o f "major" damage can va ry considerably . For example, an element w i t h a s p l i t open end and vo ided f u e l would be expected t o re lease more cesium than a f u e l element w i t h one o r two major cracks i n the s ide o f t h e c ladding. damage-cesium l e v e l c o r r e l a t i o n may w e l l be combination o f these f a c t o r s .

The c o r r e l a t i o n between sludge l e v e l i n d i c a t i o n s and cesium l e v e l s i s shown i n F igure 26. Some general c o r r e l a t i o n s are once again ev iden t . For minimal sludge i n d i c a t i o n s , t h e cesium l e v e l must be l e s s than about 1 C i . Between 1 and 2 C i , t h e sludge l e v e l i s a t l e a s t moderate. And f o r cesium l e v e l s above 2 C i , maximum sludge l e v e l s were the r u l e . Once again, however, t h e r e was considerable v a r i a b i l i t y a t cesium l e v e l s below 1 C i , w i t h t h e f u l l spectrum o f sludge l e v e l s observed i n t h i s range. This v a r i a b i l i t y may be due t o t h e same f a c t o r s c i t e d above f o r v a r i a b i l i t y i n f u e l damage l e v e l s .

The v a r i a b i l i t y i n t h e

16


6.0 REFERENCES

Pitner, A. L., 1995, K East Basin Underwater Visual Survey, Rev. 0, February 1995.

WHC-SD-SNF-TI-012,

Pitner, A. L., 1997, Visual Examinations o f K East Fuel Elements, HNF-SD-SNF-TI-045, Rev. 0, January 1997.

17



18

HNF-SD-SNF-TI-046. Rev. 0

Table 1. Coat ing and Sludge Observat ions.

19


20

H

0


21

N N

Table 2 . Survey R e s u l t s . (Continued)

m 0

m z n I 4 - I 0 P m

P <

0


- -0

z c

c, c .r

z vi c,

J v) m cc

F

3 > L J v,

N

W

m c 7 n

23


I

25


26


1

27

0

5

ps

W * 0 I

+ Y z v) I

v) I Y

z I

- n

N W

Table 2. Survey Resul ts. (Continued)

I z n

VI 0

VI z -n

rl 0 P m

W C

0


VI +-’

J VI W p:

?

3 L J v)


o o o o c

x x x

X

O L O S O

0 0 0 0

Y ) U ) I D C h

Z Z Z Z P

;

31


I '

32

HNF-SD-SNF-TI-046. Rev. 0

33

Table 2. Survey R e s u l t s . (Cont inued)

I z n

v) 0

v) z -n I --I

I 0 P

- m

W <

0

- U a K

e K

0

.-

v

VI .@ 7 a v)

W CT

3 L a m

N

W

m 7 n


36

Table 2. Survey Resu l ts . (Continued)

I z -n

v) D

v) z -n

W rl -4

0 P m

W

c

0

HNF-SD-SNF-TI-046, Rev. O

W W

Table 2. Survey R e s u l t s . (Continued)

0 P QI

P <

0

T a b l e 2 . Survey R e s u l t s . (Continued)

~~~~1 Breach End Cap Cladding Height l i d End Cap Cladding T O T A L S

Inners 252 216 24 11 0 1 0 0 0 6 0-1 .o 10 0 0

Otners 263 175 28 34 4 26 73 0 181 16 0-1 .o 17 2 20 186%1 110%) 14961 (0%) I4%1 10%) (0%) 10%) 12%) 14%) (O%I (0%)

167%) 111%) (13%1 12%1 110%) 128%1 lO%I (73%) (6%) i6%1 IIW 18%)

P 0

I z n I VI 0

VI z -rl I 4

H

I 0 P m

P rn c

0


1 =Minimal Z=Modarats 3=Maximum

41


T h i s page intentionally l e f t blank.

42

t lNt \I) \ r ' 1 I L 4 6 Rev 0

HNt -Si1 5Nf I1 C46, I t ev . 0

Figure 8 Minor ( : rack in$ A l i i , : ; i h i i S i d e nf a n tlement (6513 M ) .

11 - 11 -96 13 156 : 51:

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F igu re 25. Fuel Damage Versus Cesium Level .

v)

c 4- E 3 - x

2 2-

Q) W 0

Q)

- .c

L

3 z

1- x x x x x X

o-=x x I I I I

x x x x x X

X

X

xx

67


1-xOwK xx

I I I I

Figure 26. Sludge Level Versus Cesium L e v e l

SLUDGE LEVELS

42 X xx X

1 Level 1 = Minimal 2 = Moderate 3 = Maximum

0 1 2 3 4 5 Curies

68

To D i s t r i b u t i o n

From Page 1 of 2 Spent Nuclear Fuel Date 01/30/97 Evaluat ions/2T650

B & W Protec. I n c . 1. L. Welsh

Project Ti t leMlork Order Spent Nuc lear Fuel P r o j e c t

T4-40 X

EDT No. 617443 ECN No.

F l u o r Dan ie l Northwest L. J. Garv in R3-15 X M. Kummerer A3-34 X D. A. Smith R3-15 X

Name

ICF K a i s e r G. Baston R. P. Denise

Text Text Only Attach./ EDT/ECN MSlN Wi th Al l Appendix Only

Attach. Only

R3-82 X R3-82 X

P a c i f i c Northwest N a t i o n a l Labora tory J. Abrefah P7-27 X A. B. Johnson K8-34 X S. C . Marschman P7-27 X P. A. S c o t t K9-46 X S. M. Shor t R3-87 X

SGN Eur isvs Serv ices C o w . A. L. Pajunen R3-86 X

Duke Enqineer inq & Serv ices Hanford. C . J. Alderman R. B. Baker D. W . Bergmann K. H. Bergsman A . E. Br idges W . A. 8 r i g g s L. D. Bruggeman B. S. C a r l i s l e S. A. Chastain R. 8. Cowan C . De f igh P r i c e D. R. Duncan J. R. F reder ickson

Inc. R3-48 X HO-40 X R3-86 X R3-48 X HO-40 X HO-40 X HO-40 X R3-85 X HO-40 X R3-86 X x3-79 X R3-86 X R3-86 X

DISTRIBUTION SHEET To I From I Paae 2 of 2

Spent Nuclear Fuel Eva1 uat ions/2T650

Project Ti t le iwork Order Spent Nuclear Fuel P r o j e c t

D i s t r i b u t i o n I

Date 01/30/97

EDT No. 617443 ECN No.

Name Text Text Only Attach./ EDT/ECN

Wi th Al l I MSIN I Attach. 1 1 Ap~",~ix I Only Duke Enclineerinq & Serv ices . Inc . L. H. Goldmann S. L. Hecht F. G. Hudson J. J. Jernberg A. T. Kee L. A. Lawrence P. G. Leroy B. J. Makenas R. H. Me ich le W . C. M i l l s C . R. Miska R. P. Omberg M. J. Packer T. R. Pauly K. L. Pearce A. L. P i t n e r (10) R. W . Rasmussen M. A. R e i l l y E. J. Shen P. K. Shen D. W . Siddoway D. W . Smith J. A. Swenson D. S. Takasumi C. A. Thompson D. J. Tr imb le Cent ra l F i l e s DPC

F l u o r Dan ie l Hanford. I n c . E. W . Gerber

Lockheed M a r t i n Hanford Coro. J. J. I r w i n

Numatec Hanford CorDorat ion P. M. B o u r l a r d F. W . Bradshaw J. E. F i l i D

(Continued) R3-86 HO-40 R3-11 X3-72 R3-86 HO-40 R3-15 HO-40 x3-79 R3-85 R3-86 HO-40 R3-48 X3-85 R3-48 HO-40 R3-86 R3-86 R3-86 HO-40 x3-71 R3-15 R3-11 X3-85 R3-85 HO-40 A3-88 A3-94

R3-11

X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

X

HO-34

R3-86 R3-85 R3-85

X

X X X

T. A. Flament K9-46 X

A-6000-135 (01/93) YET067

1.0 SUMMARY2.0 INTRODUCTION3.0 PROCEDURE4.0 OBSERVATIONS5.0 DAMAGE ASSESSMENT6.0 REFERENCESLid Removal (2667 M)Fuel Elements with Intact Top Ends (6241 M)Incipient Breach on the Top of an Inner Element (0091 U)Top End Rupture on an Outer Element (6513 U)Detached End Cap on Center Element (6513 M)Split Cladding and Fuel Voiding (5744 U)Inner and Outer Elements with Split Cladding (1512 M)Minor Cracking Along the Side of an Element (6513 M)Major Cracking Along the Side of an Element (1164 M)Rust Blisters on an Outer Element (2660 U)Broken Outer Element Being Extracted from Canister (0161 U)Outer Element Broken During Examination (1860 U)Tapered Sludge Band at the Bottom of an Outer Element (2660 M)Bottom End Rupture (1226 U)Bottom End with Loose End Cap and Split Cladding (7913 U)Medium Coating on an Outer Element (0091 U)Example of Heavy Element Coatings (0161 M)Translucent Coating Flakes (0091 M)Fuel Elements with Orange Coating (2667 U)Dark Colored Sludge Trail (6513 M)Orange Colored Sludge Trail (1512 M)Flocculent Sludge Inside a Canister Barrel (6743 U)Chip Can Containing Fuel Fragments (5903 U)Fuel Elements Stuck Inside a Mark I Canister Lid (0943 U)Fuel Damage Versus Cesium LevelSludge Level Versus Cesium Level1 Coating and Sludge Observations2 Survey Results3 Damage Assessment Summary

'ENGINEERING DATA TRANSMITTAL EDT 617443/67531/metadc...HNF-SD-SNF-TI-046, Rev. 0 VISUAL...

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