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    An Empirically-Validated Framework

    for Industrial Pricing

    Peter M. NobleHumbolt State University

    Thomas S. GrucaUniversity ofIowa

    ISBM Report 9-1998

    Institute for the Study ofBusiness MarketsThe Pennsylvania State University

    402 Business Administration Building

    University Park, PA 16802-3004(814) 863-2782 or (814) 863-0413 Fax

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    This publication is available in alternative media onrequest.

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    An Empirically-Validated Framework for Industrial Pricing

    Peter M. Noble

    Humbolt State University

    1 Harpst St.Arcata, CA 95521

    (707) 826-3224

    Thomas S. Gruca

    College ofBusiness

    University ofIowaIowa City, IA 52242-1000

    319-335-0946 (phone)

    319-335-1956 (fax)

    thomas-gruca~uiowa.edu

    A previous version ofthis paper was presented at the 1995 INFORMS International Conference

    in Singapore. The authors would like to thankGerry Tellis and Kent Monroe for their review ofthe survey used in this research.

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    An Empirically-Validated Frameworkfor Industrial Pricing

    Abstract

    We propose and test a parsimonious and comprehensive two-level frameworkfor

    industrial goods pricing which allows for multiple pricing strategies for a single product. We

    identify a reduced set ofcost, product and information conditions determining which strategy type

    (new product, competitive, product line, cost-based) is optimal. We frirther identify a set of

    unique determinants under which a given principal strategy within each type is optimal. For

    example, the competitive pricing strategy type (leader, parity or low cost supplier) should be used

    in the later stages ofthe product life cycle. Leader pricing should be used by firms with high

    market share whereas parity pricing should be used by firms with high costs. A firm should

    consider a low priced supplier strategy if it has relatively low costs. Similar relationships between

    pricing strategies and determinants are developed for a comprehensive set of10 industrial pricing

    strategies.

    We validated the frameworkthrough a national survey ofpricing managers in capital

    goods industries. Using censored regression models, we tested (and confirmed) the relationships

    between the determinants, pricing strategy types and individual pricing strategies. This framework

    provides an important tool to help managers make better pricing decisions. It is grounded in

    sound economic and marketing analyses and consistent with actual managerial practice.

    Furthermore,..this study answers the call ofmany authors to bridge the gap between the normative

    research on pricing and actual managerial behavior.

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    Introduction

    Pricing is one ofthe most important and complex ofall marketing decisions. There is a

    wide range ofproduct, company and competitive conditions determining which pricing strategy or

    strategies should be used in a given situation (Diamantopoulos 1991, 1994). For example, in the

    classic FIBR case, Deere & Company: Industrial Equipment Operations, the price for a new

    model ofbulldozer has to be determined (Shapiro, 1977). This new model has an innovative

    transmission that may increase productivity significantly. Therefore, a skimming strategy should

    be more profitable than penetration pricing. However, since market leader Caterpillar offers

    comparable models, the pricing strategy has to reflect competitive prices as well. In addition,

    Deere will sell spare parts that represent a significant income stream over the life ofthe product.

    Maximizing the revenue stream from the entire product line (accessories, spare parts, etc.) is

    another important consideration in the pricing strategy. Finally, a high mark-up over unit

    manufacturing costs would be desired to quickly recoverthe high development and tooling costs

    for this model. Therefore, in this typical case study, there can be one, two or more types of

    pricing strategies (i.e., new product, competitive, product line and cost-based) involved in a single

    pricing decision.

    How does the marketing literature help a manager facing such a complex pricing situation?

    Unfortunately, most normative research on pricing concentrates on only one or two narrow

    aspects ofthe situation. For example, Schoell and Guiltinan (1995) outline the conditions that

    favor choosing skimming over penetration pricing for a new product. The notable exception is the

    comprehensive literature review by Tellis (1986).

    In his review, Tellis develops a unif~jing frameworkthat highlights the similarities and

    differences among a wide range ofpricing strategies. Two dimensions ofshared economies

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    available to a firm and the consumer conditions necessary to exploit these economies determine

    which ofnine pricing strategies (or their related counterparts) should be adopted by the firm. The

    Tellis framework represents a major contribution to the literature since it is the first

    comprehensive comparison and integration ofpricing strategies which had, heretofore, been

    discussed in relative isolation.

    The focus ofthe Tellis paper on providing a classification system for as wide a range of

    pricing strategies as possible presents some challenges when trying to apply its results to practical

    pricing situations. For example, the two conditions identified by Tellis define the best single

    choice ofpricing strategies for a firm. However, there are additional requirements associated with

    relative quality or costs that are necessary for the choice ofstrategy to be optimal (Tellis, 1986:

    Table 2). Unfortunately, the Tellis framework does not address the options for a firm not in an

    advantaged position in terms ofcosts or quality.

    By construction and in the interest ofclarity ofpresentation, the Tellis frameworkassumes

    that only one strategy should be used in a given situation. However, empirical research on pricing

    objectives shows that multiple objectives are often used simultaneously (Shipley 1981, Jobber and

    Hooley 1987, Samiee 1987, Coe 1983; 1988; 1990; Diamantopoulos and Mathews; 1994). We

    expect (and find) that the same is true in pricing strategy decisions. Managers often use more than

    one pricing strategy in setting the price for a single product

    Finally, the Tellis framework has not been empirically validated (Lilien, Kotler and

    Moorthy, 1992). This is a critical step in the development ofmanagerial prescriptions for pricing.

    Since all models are necessarily simplifications ofreality, it is important to compare the normative

    results with actual practice in order to validate the assumptions underlying the normative models.

    In this paper, we have more modest goals in terms ofintegrating the existing pricing

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    literature. However, by focusing on a smaller set ofindustrial pricing problems (capital goods),

    we are able to achieve closure through empirical validation ofour proposed framework.

    Specifically, we propose and test a parsimonious and complete two-level (strategy type-principal

    strategy) framework for industrial goods pricing which allows for multiple pricing strategies for a

    single product. We identify a reduced set ofcost, product and information conditions under which

    a given strategy type (new product, competitive, product line, cost-based) should be used. We

    then identify a set ofunique conditions under which a principal strategy within each type should

    be used. For example, one type ofpricing strategy encompasses the competitive pricing strategies.

    The principal strategies within this type are Leader pricing, Parity pricing and Low-Price supplier.

    A competitive pricing strategy should be employed in the latter stages ofthe product life cycle.

    With this type, Leader pricing should be used by firms with high market share whereas Parity

    pricing should be used by firms with high costs. A firm should use a Low-price Supplier strategy

    ifit has relatively low costs. Similar relationships between pricing strategy types, principal

    strategies and determinants are developed for a comprehensive set offour strategy types and 10

    principal pricing strategies..

    We validated our framework through a national survey ofpricing managers in capital

    goods industries. We asked them about characteristics ofthe product, their company and the

    product-market at the time oftheir last pricing decision. Using limited dependent variable

    regression models, we confirmed most ofthe expected relationships between the proposed

    determinants, pricing strategy types and principal pricing strategies.

    This frameworkprovides an important tool to help managers make better pricing

    decisions. It is grounded in sound economic and marketing analyses and consistent with actual

    managerial practice. Furthermore, this study answers the call ofmany authors (Bonoma,

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    Crittenden and Dolan, 1988; Lilien, Kotler, and Moorthy 1992; Diamantopoulos, 1994) to bridge

    the gap between the normative research on pricing and actual managerial behavior.

    Related Research

    Most ofthe empirical research investigating how managers set prices has focused on

    identifying the objectives used by managers in pricing decisions (Diamantopoulos, 1991). The

    major studies (Kaplan, Dirlam, and Lanzillotti, 1958; Shipley, 1981; Jobber and Hooley, 1987;

    Samiee, 1987; Coe, 1983, 1988, and 1990; and Diamantopoulos and Mathews, 1994) have shown

    that profit maximization is used by many firms, but it is clearly not dominant across all firms

    (Diamantopoulos, 1994). These studies also show that most firms use multiple pricing objectives,

    the objectives change over time (Coe, 1983, 1988, 1990) and the choice ofobjective is related to

    the pricing environment ofthe firm (Diamantopoulos and Mathews, 1994).

    The study ofpricing objectives can provide information on what the firm is trying to

    accomplish, but objectives do not tell us much about how the firm will accomplish those

    objectives. These studies do not address the issue ofwhat pricing strategies will be used to

    accomplish the goals ofthe firm. For the purpose ofthis study, objectives are defined as the

    results a decision maker seeks to achieve (e.g., profit maximization). A pricing strategy is the

    means by which a pricing objective is to be achieved. A pricing strategy implies a specific price

    level or schedule related to costs, competition, or customers. Determinants are the internal and

    external conditions that determine managers choices ofpricing strategies.

    A briefexample may help distinguish these constructs. Consider a firm with a pricing

    objective ofmaximizing profitability for a new product. In one scenario, customers might be

    insensitive to price and the products in this market are highly differentiated. The firm can use a

    price skimming strategy to achieve their profit maximization objective (Nagle and Holden, 1995:

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    154-158). In a second scenario, the same company is faced with highly price sensitive customers.

    Ifthe firm can reduce its unit costs by spreading its fixed costs over a high volume ofoutput, the

    firm can use a penetration pricing strategy to achieve the profit maximization objective (Nagle and

    Holden, 1995: 159-160). The determinants in these examples were price sensitivity, product

    differentiation, and potential for economies ofscale.

    Diamantopoulos (1991, 1994) refers to these determinants collectively as the pricing

    environment, describing them as the elements that constitute the setting within which price

    decision-making takes place. It is the goal ofthis study to develop a frameworkfor industrial

    pricing decisions which simplifies the pricing environment for the manager by identifying those

    conditions which separate strategy types and principal strategies within type.

    Previous empirical studies that have investigated the use ofpricing strategies have

    generally been limited in scope to researching small numbers offirms or to identifying strategies

    without regard to determinants (Abratt and Pitt, 1985; Morris and Pitt, 1993; Udell, 1972).

    Studies that have looked at both strategies and determinants across a large number offirms have

    generally not been statistically rigorous (see Diamantopoulos 1991 for review ofthese studies).

    The validation study presented in this paper remedies these short-comings. Our framework is

    discussed next.

    A Framework for Industrial Pricing Strategy

    After an extensive review ofthe literature, we identified a set ofindustrial pricing

    strategies and determinants following the example set by Tellis (1986). However, our study

    focuses on the under-researched area ofindustrial (capital goods) pricing while the Tellis

    framework is more oriented towards consumer products. To accommodate these differences, we

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    have made some modifications to his original framework.

    First, we did not consider strategies predominantly used with consumer products (i.e.,

    defensive pricing, random discounts), strategies for export markets (i.e., second market

    discounting) or pricing tactics (e.g., basing point pricing). Second, Cost-Plus pricing and

    Customer Value pricing were added due to their prominence in previous studies ofindustrial

    pricing (Morris and Calantone, 1990).

    The ten principal pricing strategies are described in Table 1 .

    Table 1 about here

    Note that a related strategy is either part ofthe principal strategy (e.g., Markup Pricing is a form

    ofCost-Plus Pricing) or is similar to the principal strategy. That is , the related strategy is one

    which can be expected to occur under similar conditions and result in a similar price level (e.g.,

    Opportunistic Pricing and Low-Price Supplier).

    Strategy Types and Principal Strategies

    We have divided these ten strategies into four strategy types based on the similarity ofthe

    situations for which they are appropriate. The four strategy types are: 1) new product strategies,

    2) product line strategies, 3) competitive strategies, and 4) cost-based strategies.

    New product strategies share the common attribute ofbeing strategies which are applied

    early in the life ofthe model in question. Included in the category ofentry strategies are: 1) Skim

    Pricing, 2) Penetration Pricing, and 3) Experience Curve Pricing.

    Competitive strategies have as their main focus the price ofthe product relative to the

    price ofone or more competitors.. Competitive pricing strategies include: 1) Leader Pricing, 2)

    Parity Pricing, and 3) Low-price Supplier.

    Product line strategies are strategies in which the price ofone product is influenced by

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    other related products or services from the same company. These related products may be

    complements, substitutes, or ancillary items such as spare parts; they may be products sold

    simultaneously or in another time period. These strategies include: 1) Complementary Product

    Pricing, 2) Price Bundling, and 3) Customer Value Pricing.

    Cost-based strategies consider the internal costs ofthe firm including fixed and variable

    costs, contribution margins, and so on. The principal strategy included in this category is

    Cost-Plus Pricing. Several related strategies, such as Target-Return Pricing, are included as part

    ofCost-based pricing strategies.

    Strategy Determinants

    In every normative discussion ofpricing strategy, a set ofmarket, company and

    competitive conditions is specified under which a given strategy is optimal (profit-maximizing).

    Since these conditions determine when a given strategy should be used, we refer to them as

    determinants.

    The set ofdeterminants we include in our study includes major elements ofTellis (1986)

    frameworkincluding product differentiation, economies ofscale, capacity utilization, and

    switching costs. Other determinants are based on additional sources including pricing articles

    (Dean 1950), specialized pricing monographs (Oxenfeldt 1975, Nagle and Holden 1995) and

    general marketing management texts (Kotler, 1988; Guiltinan, Paul and Madden 1997).

    During our literature review, we found that some determinants are common to more than

    one strategy. For example, ifbrand demand is elastic, then Penetration pricing, Experience Curve

    pricing, Parity pricing, Low-Price Supplier pricing, Complementary product pricing and Bundling

    are all profit-maximizing options depending on the other market, company and competitor

    conditions. Therefore, high levels ofbrand elasticity does not separate these principal strategies

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    from each other.

    On the other hand, we also discovered that some determinants are unique to a given

    strategy type. For example, the presence ofother products from the same firm (either substitutes

    or complements) is common to Bundling, Customer Value pricing and Complementary Product

    pricing. Yet this determinant is unique to the Product Line strategy type. Therefore, the presence

    ofrelated products from the same firm separates out this strategy type from the others. The set of

    unique determinants for each strategy type forms the first level ofindustrial pricing framework.

    Similarly, within the strategy types, there are determinants which separate one principal

    strategy from the others. In the Competitive Pricing strategies, high market share separates

    Leader pricing from the Parity and Low-Price Supplier strategies. Since these determinants are

    unique to a given principal strategy within a strategy type, they are also referred to as unique

    determinants. The unique determinants for each principal strategy allow us to identify a

    parsimonious set ofconditions under which a given principal strategy is optimal. This organization

    ofthe strategy types, particular strategies and their determinants are presented in Table 2.

    Table 2 about here

    The unique determinants are indicated by underlined type.

    This table is an important contribution ofour study since it simultaneously summarizes the

    previous normative research and identifies a testable framework for managerial pricing strategy.

    The determinants for strategy types are discussed in detail next.

    Determinants for Strategy Types

    The determinant for choosing a New Product pricing strategy is the age ofthe model

    being priced. Skim pricing, Penetration pricing and Experience curve pricing are al l appropriate

    for new products.

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    One might expect that Competitive pricing strategies would be appropriate for the

    opposite condition, i.e. the pricing ofolder products. However, the common determinants for

    these strategies (Price Leader, Parity pricing and Low-price Supplier) are a late stage ofthe

    product life cycle and the ease ofdetermining demand. Note that these two conditions refer to a

    mature market and not necessarily to the age ofthe model being priced.

    Returning to the Deere example above, the model being priced was new to the market yet

    it was entering the mature bulldozer marketplace. Therefore, both New Product strategies and

    Competitive pricing strategies should be incorporated into the final decision for this new model of

    bulldozer.

    Inherent in the definition ofProduct Line pricing strategies is the existence ofother

    products, accessories or supplementary goods (e.g., spare parts) to guide the pricing ofthe

    product in question (Guiltinan, Paul and Madden, 1997).

    Diamantopoulos (1991) claims that Cost-Plus pricing is by far and away the most widely

    used pricing strategy. The Hall and Hitch (1939) survey of39 business managers found the

    general pattern ofprice setting to be cost-based. The Brookings Institution Studies (Kaplan,

    Dirlam, and Lanzillotti, 1958) corroborated this finding. Thirty years later, Bonoma, Crittenden

    and Dolan (1988) found that managers continue to use cost as a primary pricing concern.

    Most authors caution managers against relying on cost-based methods for establishing

    prices (e.g. Nagle and Holden, 1995). The only situation in which Cost-Plus pricing is profit-

    maximizing is one in which average unit costs are likely to be constant over time and at any point

    on the demand curve (Lilien and Kotler 1983: 405-407). However, due to economies ofscale

    and/or experience curve effects, neither ofthese conditions are likely to hold in a manufacturing

    industry (Lilien and Kotler, 1983: 407).

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    The weakness ofCost-Plus Pricing is that it ignores consumer and competitive

    information. However, ifthe firm has little or no information about demand, then Cost-Plus

    pricing is the default strategy (Harrison and Wilkes, 1975).

    Determinants ofPrincipal Strategies

    Three ofthe strategy types, New Product, Competitive and Product Line, contain more

    than one strategy. For each ofthese strategies, we have identified the determinants which are

    unique to that strategy and those which are common to other strategies within that strategy type.

    The unique and common determinants for these principal strategies are discussed next.

    New Product Pricing

    There are three options for pricing new products: Skimming, Penetration and Experience

    Curve pricing. Skimming is the practice ofsetting a high initial price which is often systematically

    discounted over time. The purpose ofSkim pricing is to discriminate between those buyers who

    are insensitive to the initial high price because ofspecial needs. As this segment becomes

    saturated, the price is lowered to broaden the appeal ofthe product (Dean, 1950).

    Skim pricing is recommended over Penetration or Experience curve pricing when there is

    a high degree ofproduct differentiation in the market (Jam, 1993). Without this condition, there

    cannot be a better product which would command a higher price. In addition, there must be

    some buyers who are price insensitive, i.e. willing to pay more for a product which meets their

    special needs (Guiltinan, Paul and Madden, 1997; Schoell and Guiltinan, 1995). The new product

    usually represents a major improvement over previous versions in order to command a premium

    price (Mercer, 1992). Finally, firms with high factory utilization (Schoell and Guiltinan, 1995) or

    those who lackcost advantages due to scale or learning should consider skimming over the low-

    price new product pricing strategies (Schoell and Guiltinan, 1995).

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    Both Penetration and Experience curve pricing involve setting a low initial price for a new

    product. Penetration pricing is used to speed adoption ofa new product or establish it as a de

    facto standard. It is suggested that firms with cost advantages due to scale use Penetration pricing

    (e.g., Tellis 1986).

    Experience curve pricing has a different focus and source ofadvantage than penetration

    pricing. The experience (or learning) curve effect shows that unit costs fall with cumulative

    volume due to increased familiarity with the assembly process and other factors (Boston

    Consulting Group 1972). However, there is a great deal ofcontroversy about the extent ofthese

    effects (e.g., Amit 1986).

    Experience curve pricing seeks to exploit the experience/learning curve by setting prices

    low to build cumulative volume quickly and, thereby, drive down unit costs. The presence of

    these experience/learning curve effects are necessary for this pricing strategy to be a success

    (Tellis 1986; J a m 1993; Nagle and Holden, 1995). Whether this is a sound long-term strategy has

    been questioned on many fronts (e.g., Abernathy and Wayne 1974; Alberts, 1989; Ghemawat

    1985; Kiechel 1981).

    The common conditions which favor these low-price new product strategies contrast to

    those for Skim pricing: low product differentiation (Schoell and Guiltinan, 1995), used for minor

    product revisions (Mercer, 1992), elastic demand (Guiltinan, Paul and Madden, 1997), and low

    capacity utilization (Schoell and Guiltinan, 1995).

    Competitive Pricing

    Price leaders initiate price changes and expect that others in the industry will follow suit.

    Price leaders tend to have higher prices than their competitors who use the leaders price to set

    their own price levels (Greer, 1984; Jam, 1993). Hence, this strategy is also known as Umbrella

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    pricing. Price Leaders such as Caterpillar in heavy equipment tend to have the highest market

    share as well (Kotler, 1997).

    Parity pricing involves imitating the prevailing prices in the market, maintaining a constant

    relative price between competitors. In some respects, this strategy is born ofweakness. Ifa firm

    had superior products, it should be able to command a premium price (Guiltinan, Paul and

    Madden, 1997). Or, ifthe firm had cost advantages, it could become a low-price supplier (Jam,

    1993). Ifa firm has high costs, its only option in a mature market is to employ parity pricing (Jam,

    1993, Guiltinan, Paul and Madden, 1997).

    Three conditions are common to both Leader pricing and Parity pricing: markets in which

    price changes are easy to detect (Nagle and Holden, 1995), inelastic total demand (Guiltinan, Paul

    and Madden, 1997), and high factory utilization (Schoell and Guiltinan, 1995).

    Low-price Suppliers could be exploiting a cost advantage (Nagle and Holden, 1995) or

    reflecting a weakness (i.e., low factory utilization: Kotler, 1997). In addition, a Low-price

    Supplier might be exploiting a lackofpricing knowledge in the market by under-cutting its rivals

    (Greer, 1984). Ifthis under-cutting behavior were known, it might ignite a damaging price war.

    Finally, the Low-price Supplier strategy should be more successful in markets with high levels of

    overall elasticity (Guiltinan, Paul and Madden, 1997).

    Common to both the Low-price Supplier strategy and Price Leadership is low costs

    (Greer, 1984; Nagle and Holden, 1995) due to scale or experience curve effects (Jam, 1993). Low

    market share is a common determinant for Parity pricing and Low-price Supplier pricing (Nagle

    and Holden, 1995; Kotler, 1997).

    Product Line Pricing

    The economic and psychological aspects ofprice bundling have been explored in depth

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    elsewhere (Guiltinan, 1987). Most ofthe suggested determinants for Bundling pricing are

    common to other pricing strategies. Therefore, such determinants cannot be used to identify the

    situation(s) where Bundling is optimal.

    The sole exception is the type ofprice-setting process. When each sale or contract is

    priced separately, as in the case ofsystem selling ofmainframe computers, then Bundling is a

    preferred option (Jam, 1993). For example, a major avionics firm uses bundling in most ofits

    pricing. Its customers need systems for control, communications and navigation. To avoid a

    competitive pricing battle for each system, this firm quotes a bundled price for the entire package.

    Since this firm is one ofthe few which make al l ofthese products, it usually wins the contract. In

    addition, this approach reduces the number ofsuppliers (and potential incompatibility problems)

    for the airframe manufacturer.

    Complementary Product pricing began with King Camp Gillettes strategy ofselling razors

    cheaply and blades dearly. For many industrial products, there are a wide range ofsupplies, spare

    parts and accessories which make up a large portion ofthe profit stream from the customer. In the

    Deere case above, it was suggested that a bulldozer consumes 90% ofits initial purchase price in

    spare parts over its lifetime.

    Under this strategy, the main product or platform is sold for a relatively low price while

    the ancillary or supplementary products carry a high margin (Guiltinan, Paul and Madden, 1997).

    For bulldozers, for example, the markup on spare parts can be as high as 200%, much higher than

    the margin on the main product (Kotler, 1997: 515). In addition, Tellis (1986) suggests that high

    customer switching costs may keep customers buying the captive, high-margin additional

    products.

    Customer Value pricing is becoming increasingly common in industrial markets. This

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    strategy involves pricing one version ofthe product at very competitive levels, offering fewer

    features than are available for other versions. The most visible applications ofthis strategy

    recently have been in consumer markets. For example, when McDonalds lowered the price ofits

    basic hamburger to 59 cents in 1990, its was employing Customer Value pricing to spur sales in a

    low growth market (Gibson, 1990; Rigdon, 1990).

    Manufacturers ofconsumer durables such as Pella Windows have introduced new lines of

    products with fewer features and lower pricing points than their traditional customized lines

    (Nagle and Holden, 1995: 165). Usually, these products are intended for a specific market

    segment. In the case ofHon furniture, it produced a new line ofless expensive office furniture for

    home offices to be distributed through category killers such as Staples rather than their full-

    service dealer network.

    In contrast to the case with consumer markets, Customer Value pricing in industrial

    markets is more likely to be successful if price changes are difficult to detect. Since the firm is

    providing most ofthe functionality ofits main product for a lower price, it runs a large risk of

    cannibalizing its main, higher priced product (Dolan and Simon, 1995: 212-214).

    A Parsimonious Pricing Framework

    We used the information in Tables 1 and 2 to develop a parsimonious frameworkfor

    industrial pricing. We summarize the relationships between strategy types, principal strategies and

    determinants in Figure 1 .

    Figure 1 about here

    This framework contains three separate elements which must be tested. The first is the

    relationship between the pricing strategies and the relative price ofthe product. This serves as a

    cross-validation ofour self-reported measures ofpricing strategies. Second, we tested the

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    relationships between each strategy type and its unique determinants. Third, we tested the

    relationship between each principal strategy and its unique determinants. In addition, we tested

    the relationships between the common determinants and each principal strategy within strategy

    type. At the end ofthis process, we have a reduced set ofconditions for managers to consider

    when choosing pricing strategies for an industrial product.

    Validation Study Design

    To validate our framework, we conducted a national survey ofmarketing managers in

    capital goods industries in the late spring/early summer of1994.

    Survey

    The survey document was a four page questionnaire mailed to practicing managers in May

    and June of1994 (Figure 2). The survey underwent extensive pre-testing to assure readability and

    accurate understanding ofthe questions. This included pilot testing with written and verbal

    feedback from a convenience sample ofexecutive MBA students as well as a review ofthe survey

    by two noted academic pricing scholars from other institutions.

    Figure 2 about here

    To avoid the criticisms leveled at many studies ofpricing objectives by Diamantopoulos

    (1991: 136), we asked the managers to provide information on their most recent pricing decision

    ofa single industrial capital good rather than indicating an overall pricing strategy for all products

    or circumstances.

    Measures ofPricing Strategies

    Previous research on pricing objectives shows that many managers use more than one

    objective in their pricing decisions (e.g., Diamantopoulos, 1991). To reflect the similar complexity

    ofthe pricing strategy decision, we allowed respondents to indicate their usage ofup to three

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    pricing strategies. The response to this question was ratio-scaled (importance weights summing to

    100%) in order to assess the magnitude ofthe importance ofa given strategy in the decIsIon.

    In the pre-testing for this study, we found that none ofthe managers used more than three

    alternatives. In our final results, we found that 48.5% used one strategy, 28.5% two and 22.5%

    used three strategies. We note that the average importance ofthe third strategy was 15% (versus

    28% for the second strategy). Therefore, ifthere is any bias in not allowing for more than three

    strategies, it is not expected to be very large.

    In addition, we allowed the manager to specify a pricing strategy which was not part of

    the list often strategies provided. Ofthe 21 who did, a total of17 , upon review by two

    independentjudges and the authors, were found to be special cases or related strategies ofthe

    original ten strategies. The remaining observations were dropped from the analysis

    Measures ofDeterminants

    We modeled the scales to measure the determinants after the questions used in the PIMS

    database (Buzzell and Gale, 1986). We pre-tested the wording and meaning ofthe scales in a pre-

    test with experienced managers. The determinants and their measurement scales are presented in

    Table 3.

    Table 3 about here

    Sample

    We focused our survey on the pricing decisions ofdifferentiated, durable capital goods in

    business-to-business markets. We restricted our sample to these industries since industrial

    components, supplies or raw materials are less likely to be highly differentiated which would

    restrict the pricing strategy options ofthe firms. Furthermore, since channels ofdistribution in

    industrial markets tend to be shorter than those in consumer markets, the manufacturer exerts

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    more control over pricing to end-users.

    Fifteen such industries were identified using 4-digit SIC codes. The target industries and

    distribution offirm sizes are presented in Table 4.

    Table 4 about here

    Contact names and addresses for the 1534 firms were purchased from Dun and Bradstreet.

    Initially, surveys were to be addressed only to job titles including Director ofMarketing, Sales

    Manager, Pricing Manager, and variations ofthese title. However, this targeting approach

    resulted in the exclusion oftoo many smaller companies. Therefore, the category ofPresident,

    CEO, and variations ofthese titles was included as well since this was the only title available for

    the majority ofthe smaller companies.

    A total of1021 firms was selected from this list (after deleting replicated records from the

    total of1034). In a pre-test using a similar survey1, a sample of200 mailings was sent out. The

    sample was stratified based on firm size. This pre-test showed that response rate increased

    monotonically with firm size.

    In order to best represent the pricing behavior in these industries, we drew a

    disproportionate stratified sample for the final study. There were five size categories offirms. The

    number offirms remaining after the pre-test in the largest four categories were relatively small

    (342, 130, 65 and 70 from the smallest to largest size group). The remaining 427 names were

    randomly selected from the 727 available in the smallest category.

    This approach is consistent with syndicated surveys such as the Neilsen Retail Index. Our

    intent is to understand marketing behavior in as large a proportion ofthe market as possible.

    Therefore, this sampling approach should capture the widest variation in pricing behavior in these

    industries since there are more strategic options for larger firms than smaller ones.

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    Each firm was sent a survey package including a personalized, hand-signed cover letter

    with a pledge ofconfidentiality ofindividual responses, a four-page survey and a $1 incentive.

    The pretest also showed that the response rate for a $2 incentive (32%) was identical to that for a

    $ 1 incentive (31%).

    A total of347 surveys were returned to the authors. Ofthese, 77 were returned blank

    (62), incomplete or were otherwise2 unusable (15). This yielded a gross response rate of34%

    (347/1007 delivered). The total usable sample was 270 for a usable response rate of27% which is

    a similar sample size3 and usable response rate4 to recent surveys ofmarketing managers.

    Respondent Profile

    The responding managers are highly experienced with pricing as the majority are involved

    in such decisions for more than 20 products. The majority ofrespondents also report 10+ years of

    experience in the industry and with their current company. In addition, these managers were

    highly involved in the pricing decision they describe. On a seven-point scale (7 = high, 1 = low),

    the average self-reported involvement was 5.98.

    Median firm size was between $15 and $50 million in annual sales. These firms compete in

    highly concentrated markets with an average 3-firm concentration ratio about 70%.

    Validation Study Results

    There are three aspects ofour pricing frameworkwhich require validation. The first is the

    relative price levels for the various principal pricing strategies. Second, we test the relationships

    between strategy types and their unique determinants. Finally, we examine the relationships

    between principal strategies and their unique (within-type) and common determinants.

    Relative Price Validation

    One ofthe limitations ofprevious studies ofpricing objectives is the lackofan objective

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    measure to cross-validate the pricing objective indicated by the respondent. For example, a firm

    whose objective is to maximize profits may have a relatively low price or a relatively high price

    depending on its strategy (Penetration v . Skim pricing). Therefore, the price charged by the firm

    cannot be used to cross-validate the self-reported measure ofpricing objective.

    For most pricing strategies, however, there is a one-to-one correspondence between the

    level ofpricing in the marketplace and the pricing strategy. Strategies leading to relatively high

    prices include Leader pricing and Skim pricing. Relatively low prices should be expected from

    those firms employing the Penetration pricing, Experience Curve pricing, Complementary Product

    pricing, Customer Value pricing or Low-Price Supplier strategies. Market-equivalent prices

    should result from Parity pricing.

    For Bundling pricing, we do not have a prior expectation since the product is priced as

    part ofa bundle. Similarly, the relationship between relative price level and Cost-plus pricing will

    be based on relative costs which are known and profitability levels which are not.

    We asked the respondents to indicate the relative price oftheir product in addition to their

    pricing strategies. The scale ranged from 1 = 5% or less than the market to 5 = 5% or more than

    the market.

    We compared the average response from managers indicating that they used a given

    strategy with the average response for the entire sample. We used a 1-tail t-test with the overall

    average as the population mean for all but the comparison for Parity pricing. Since the null

    hypothesis is that there is no difference between the price level for firms using this strategy and

    the overall relative price for al l firms, we used a 2-tailed t-test. The results are in Table 5 .

    Table 5 about here

    The two groups with an expected high relative price are indeed higher than the average for

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    all respondents (Skim pricing, Leader pricing). Parity pricing had an average price level no

    different from the overall mean, as we expected (2-tailed test). Finally, three ofthe five pricing

    strategies with expected relatively low prices had average price levels that were significantly lower

    than the overall average. Based on these results, we conclude that the self-reported measures of

    pricing strategies are quite robust.

    Determinants ofStrategy Types

    From the importance weights for the principal strategies, we determined ifa respondent

    chose a strategy within each ofthe four strategy types. A value ofone was assigned to a strategy

    type ifa respondent assigned a positive weight to a principal strategy within that type (chosen).

    The value was zero otherwise (not chosen).

    The independent variable for New Product pricing was the time ofintroduction ofthe

    current model ofthe product being priced (Question 1.3.i on page 3 ofthe survey). The possible

    answers range from 0 (not yet available) to 5 (10 years or more). We expect this variable to be

    negatively associated with the probability ofchoosing this strategy type.

    For Competitive pricing, the first independent variable is the stage ofthe product life cycle

    (Question 1 .3.a on page 3). This variable ranged from 1 for products in their introductory stage to

    4 for products in decline. We expect the product life cycle to be positively related to the

    probability ofchoosing ofa Competitive pricing strategy. In addition, we expect that Competitive

    Pricing strategies will be used when demand is easy to determine (lain, 1993).

    To determine ifthe firm sells other supplementary or complementary products to the

    model being priced, we used Question 7 on page 1 ofthe survey. In our analysis, we constructed

    a dummy variable which had the value of1 ofthe firm produced either substitute or

    complementary products and zero otherwise. We expect that this variable will be positively

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    related to the probability ofchoosing a Product Line pricing strategy.

    The sole determinant for Cost-based pricing is the ease ofdetermining demand in the

    market. We expect that this variable will be positively related to probability ofchoosing the Cost-

    plus strategy since it is the only principal strategy in this type.

    Since we defined our dependent variable as a binary choice, we used a logit model to test

    the relationship between the choice ofstrategy type and their determinants5. The results are given

    in Table 6.

    Table 6 about here

    New Product strategies were chosen by 32% (87) ofthe respondents. The choice ofthis

    strategy type was negatively and significantly (p

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    framework.

    Determinants ofPrincipal Strategies

    In order to test the determinants for principal pricing strategies, we used a tobit model for

    censored dependent variables (Tobin, 1958). Our measure ofpricing strategies included

    information on the magnitude ofthe importance ofthe given principal strategy. The tobit model

    will take advantage ofthe magnitude information for testing the relationships between principal

    strategies and their determinants. We tested the restricted set ofunique determinants as well as

    the full set ofunique and common determinants. All ofthese results are presented in Table 7.

    Table 7 about here.

    The results for each principal strategy are presented next.

    Skim Pricing

    There are seven determinants which separate Skim pricing from the low priced new

    product strategies. They are high levels ofproduct differentiation, a major product change, high

    costs, cost disadvantage due to scale, cost disadvantages due to learning, low market elasticity,

    low brand elasticity and high capacity utilization.

    About 14% ofrespondents (37/27) incorporated skim pricing into their overall strategy.

    The overall tobit model was significant at the p

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    Penetration Pricing

    Nine percent ofrespondents (25/270) indicated that they used this strategy.

    The sole unique determinant for this strategy is a cost advantage due to scale. This

    determinant is significantly related to Penetration pricing for the restricted model (p

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    competition in the computer chip industry when clone chip producers introduce their products at

    much lower prices to shift the focus ofcompetition from performance only to a price-performance

    condition. At that point, the clone manufacturers try to build an advantage over the innovating

    firm by lowering their costs via large volumes. Unfortunately, firms using this approach might also

    be leaving money on the table by cutting prices to build volume ifthe expected price-dominant

    phase ofcompetition does not materialize.

    Leader Pricing

    Eleven percent ofrespondents (31/270) used Leader pricing.

    High market share is the sole unique determinant ofLeader pricing. The overall model is

    significant (p

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    utilization) do not allow it to exploit an otherwise favorable external condition (high market

    elasticity). An interesting direction for future pricing research would be to identify those

    conditions which constrain the choices faced by the firm and those which are merely favorable to

    a given strategy.

    Low-Price Supplier

    About 9% (24/270) ofrespondents followed the Low-Price Supplier strategy.

    Ofthe three conditions which favor this strategy (difficulty in detecting price changes,

    high market elasticity and low capacity utilization), only low factory capacity utilization is related

    to the use ofthis strategy (p

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    consistent with what we predict with razor-and-blade type products and durables which require

    the eventual purchase ofcaptive spare parts in large quantities.

    Customer Value Pricing

    Customer Value pricing was used by 11% (29/270) ofrespondents.

    The Tobit results for this strategy suggest that firms choose this strategy for products

    which would appeal to a narrow segment (p

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    are not unique to a given principal strategy, they should be viewed with some caution. The same

    conditions might be appropriate for another principal strategy but this relationship was not

    confirmed by our data.

    Limitations and Directions for Future Research

    While the results reported above are very exciting, they are not complete due to the

    sample in our verification study. We are limited in the types ofproducts (industrial capital goods),

    customers (domestic U.S.) and companies (domestic U.S.) studied. For example, there is little

    variation in the sample in concentration and height ofentry barriers.

    In addition, there was very little variation in self-evaluated product quality. The average

    rating was 5.79 out of7 (std. dev. = 1.08). This is not surprising given a managers bias towards

    his/her own firms products. However, keep in mind that these are very highly concentrated

    markets from which firms with marginal quality may have already been eliminated.

    In addition to providing validation ofour pricing framework, the empirical study ofpricing

    managers provides some important insights into current pricing practices. One ofthe more

    interesting results is the varied importance ofdifferent pricing strategies. The distributions ofthe

    importance weights and median importance weight for each strategy is presented in Table 9.

    Table 9 about here

    Consider the distributions ofthe importance weights for two strategies, Price Skimming

    and Complementary Product Pricing. Note that the distribution for Price Skimming has a strong

    skew to the left while the distribution for Complementary Product Pricing is skewed to the right.

    Several ofthe other strategies follow similar patterns.

    We interpret this as an indication that some ofthe pricing strategies are primary strategies

    while others are secondary, or supporting, strategies. The distributions in Table 9 indicate that

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    Cost-Plus Pricing, Low-price Supplier Pricing, and Price Skimming strategies appear to be

    primary strategies. Complementary Product Pricing, Bundle Pricing, and Customer Value Pricing

    appear to be secondary strategies. (The median importance weights for each strategy are indicated

    in Table 9).

    Note that al l three ofthe strategies classified as secondary are from the product line group

    ofstrategies (Complementary Product Pricing, Price Bundling, and Customer Value Pricing). This

    suggests that product line pricing strategies, when chosen, will rarely be paramount in importance.

    The pricing frameworkdeveloped in this paper can be used to determine which pricing

    strategies should be considered when pricing a complex, high-value industrial product. However,

    it does not suggest how these strategies should be combined to determine the ultimate pricing

    schedule. At this stage it is only possible to comment on the relative importance ofthe strategies.

    For example, it is not known ifthe strategies are usually chosen simultaneously or sequentially.

    An interesting path for future research would be to explore how these strategies are integrated by

    managers into a final decision

    Another interesting result was the prevalence ofCost-Plus Pricing. A full 56% ofthe 270

    managers mentioned Cost-Plus Pricing. When it was used, it was the dominant strategy (with an

    importance weight larger than any ofthe others mentioned) 71% ofthe time. This confirms the

    observations ofSimon (1989) and others that, even after all ofthe research on market- and

    competitive-oriented pricing, cost-based methods remain prevalent.

    Cost-Plus Pricing is an inward oriented strategy, involving company and product

    considerations, while the other nine pricing strategies generally have an outward orientation,

    focusing on the customer and competition (Day and Nedungadi 1994).

    Over 35% ofthe managers responding used a combination ofCost-Plus Pricing and one of

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    the other nine market based strategies, implying that a significant number ofmanagers are looking

    inward and looking outward to set their prices. This suggests that many managers have a Janus-

    faced approach to choosing a pricing strategy. Their gaze is fixed both inside and outside their

    companies at the same time (Monroe 1990). Whether this approach leads to better market (sales,

    share, customer retention) or financial results would be another fruitful avenue ofresearch.

    Conclusion

    In their 1988 article, Bonoma, Crittenden and Dolan stated that managers find little ofthe

    pricing research in marketing to be ofany practical help. The industrial pricing framework

    presented here can help mangers cut through some ofthe fog ofthe pricing literature without

    resorting to simplistic or misleading rules ofthumb.

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    End Notes:

    1 . The Noble (1997) study ofpricing objectives is identical except for the measures ofpricing

    strategies.

    2. For example, the respondent indicated multiple price levels which may indicate the response

    was for a product line rather than a single product.

    3. During the five years preceding this study (1989-1994), twenty-two surveys ofmanagers were

    published in the Journal ofMarketing Research (JMR). The average sample for al l ofthe surveyswas 284. During the same period, the Journal ofMarketing (JM) published 41 articles involving

    surveys ofmanagers. The average sample for al l ofthe surveys was 270..

    4. In the period 1989-1994, response rates were often unreported for studies in IMIR and JM.Managerial survey studies in the JM articles had average gross response rates ofabout 32% andusable response rates of29%. In the JMR articles, the response rates were higher, with the gross

    response rate about 40% and the usable response rate of37%.

    5. Ifwe restricted our respondents to a single choice ofprincipal strategy, we could have used a

    multinomial choice model. Managers could choose strategies from up to three different strategytypes. We decided to model this process as a set ofbinary choices since the determinants we

    identified are related to the choice ofindividual strategy types and not to the choice of

    combinations ofstrategy types.

    6. We also tested the relationship between the choice ofLeader pricing and market share using a

    logit model. The independent variable was 1 ifLeader pricing was given a weight greater thanzero (3 1 observations), 0 ifthe firm gave a positive weight to either Parity or Low Price Supplier

    (96 = 127 - 31 observations), or missing ifno Competitive pricing strategy was given a positiveweight (143 = 270 - 127 cases). Thus, we tested the relationship between the choice ofLeader

    pricing and market share given that a Competitive pricing strategy was chosen. This conditiohal

    logit model was significant at the 0.01. The coefficient for market share was positive andsignificant at the 0.01 level.

    In general, the results from the logit models were identical to those from the tobit models.For Skim, Experience Curve and Customer Value Pricing, the full logit models were not

    significant at the 0. 10 level. The results for Penetration pricing were identical for the restricted

    and full logit models. Forthe full Leader pricing model, the coefficient for Cost advantage due tolearning was significant at the 0.10 level. For Parity pricing, the restricted model results were

    identical but market share and utilization were not significant in the full logit model. For Low-Price supplier, the restricted model was identical but the coefficient for Cost advantage due tolearning was negative (p

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    Table 1 Pricing Strategy Definitions

    PrincipalStrategy Description Related Strategies

    New Product Pricing StrategiesPrice Skimming W e se t the initial price high and then Premium Pricing, Value-in-Usesystematically reduce it over t ime. Customers Pricingexpect prices to eventually fall.

    Penetration W e initially se t th e price low to acceleratePricing product adoption.

    Experience W e se t the price low to build volume an d reduce Learning Curve PricingCurve Pricing costs through accumulated experience.

    Competitive Pricing StrategiesLeader Pricing We initiate a price change and expect th e other Umbrella Pricing, Cooperativefirms to follow. Pricing, Signaling

    Parity Pricing We match the price s e t b y the overall market or Neutral Pricing, Follow erth e price leader. Pricing

    Low-Price We always strive to have th e low price in t he Pa ra ll el P ri cing , Adap ti veSupplier market. Pricing, Opportunistic Pricing

    Product Line Pricing StrategiesComplementaxy W e price the core product low w hen Razor-and-Blade PricingProduct Pricing complementary items such as accessories,

    supplies, spare pans, services, etc. can be pricedw ith a higher premium.

    Price Bundling W e offer this product as part ofa bundle of System Pricingseveral products, usually at a total price thatgivesour customers an attractive savings over

    th e sum ofindividual prices.

    Customer Value W e price on e version ofour product a t very Economy PricingPricing competitive levels, offering fewer features than

    are available on other versio ns.

    Cost-Based Pricing Strategies

    Cost-Plus W e establish th e price ofthe product a t a point Contribution Pricing, Rate-ofPricing that gives us a specified percentage profit Return Pricing, Target Return

    margin over our costs. Pricing, Contingency Pricing,Markup Pricing

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    Table 2: Determinants ofPricing Strategies

    New Product Pricing Strategies Skim Pricing

    Penetration

    Pricing

    Experience Cur

    Pricing

    Unique to Strategy Product ag eType:

    New (1.10) New (1.10) New (10.11)

    Within-type ProductDeterminants: differentiation

    High (4.8.10) Low (4,8,10) L ow (4.8.10)

    Significance of

    product change

    Maior (6.10) Minor (6,10) Minor (6.8.10)

    Costs Hi2h (4.10) Low (4) L ow (4)

    Scale or experience

    curve effectsDemand

    Disadvanta2e (10)

    Inelastic (4.8.10)

    Advantaae: scale

    (3.4.8.10.11)Elastic (1.3,4.6.8)

    A dvant a~ i e :

    experience (4.8.10.1Elastic (1.3.4,6.8.9)

    Factorvcapacity

    utilization

    Hi~h(3.l0) Low(l0.1l) Low(10.l1)

    Price Low-Price

    Competitive Pricing Strategies Leadership Parity Pricing Supplier

    Unique to Strategy Product Life CycleType:

    Mature (5) Mature (3.5) Mature (5)

    Ease ofdeterminingdemand

    Easy (4) Ea~ (4) Easy (4)

    Within-type Market shareDeterminants:

    High (4.5) Low (8) Low (2,5)

    C osts L ow (4) Hi2h (2.3.4) L ow (8)

    Scale or experiencecurve effects

    Advantage (2,4) Disadvantaae (3 ) Advantage (4 )

    Ease ofdetectingprice changes

    Easy (2 ) Easy (3,8) Difficult (2)

    Total demand Inelastic (2,3) Inelastic (3) Elastic (3)

    Factory capacity

    utilization

    High (10) High (10) Low (5 )

    Other Determinants: Product

    differentiation

    L ow (8) L ow (8)

    Brand Demand Elastic (3) Elastic (3)

    3 6

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    Product Line Pricing StrategiesComplementaryProduct Pricing

    Customer Va

    Bundling Pricing Pricing

    Unique to StrategyType:

    Common (within-type) Determinants:

    Firm sells entireproduct line (othermodels, ancillaryproducts. supplemen-tan products)

    Profitability ofaccompanying orsupplementary sales

    Switching costs

    Per sale/contractpricing

    Market appealMarket growth rate

    Ease ofdetecting

    price changes

    Hi!h (3.5

    H ii~h (1 1

    Y es (4

    Narrow

    Low

    Difficult

    Other Detenninants: Brand demand Elastic (3 ) Elastic (3.7.8. 10)

    Cost-Based Pricing Strategies

    Unique to Strategy Ease ofdetermining Diflicult (3 )Type: demand

    Common (within- nonetype) Determinants:

    Other Determinants: none

    References:I. Dean (1950)2. Greer(1984)3 . Guiltinan, Paul and Madden (1997)

    4. J a m (1993)

    6. Mercer (1992)

    7. Monroe (1990)8 . Nagle andHolden (1995)9. Oxenfeldt (1975)

    1 0 . Schoell and Guiltinan (1995)1 1 , Tellis (1986)

    Y es (3 Yes (3 Y es (3

    Cost-Plus

    Pricing

    37

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    Table 3 Determinants ofPricing Strategies

    Definition of Determinant

    Market Conditions

    Sensitivity ofcustomers to price differences between brands

    Sensitivity oftotal demand to changes in average price

    Ease ofdetermining market demand

    Market growth

    Switching costs

    Competitive Conditions

    Ease ofdetecting competitive price changes

    Concentration: Three firm concentration ratio

    Product differentiation

    Product/Company Conditions

    Age ofproduct in years

    Cost (dis)advantage due to experience curve

    Cost (dis)advantage due to economies ofscale

    Capacity utilization (relative)

    Costs (relative to competitors)

    Major Product Change: Significance ofmost current design

    change

    Market Coverage

    Market Share

    Per Sale/Contract Pricing

    Profitability ofaccompanying sales ( e.g., other products)

    Profitability ofsupplementary sales (e.g.. spare parts. service)

    Scale in Survey

    = insensitive, 7 = sensit ive

    I = insensitive, 7 = sensit ive

    =easy, 7 = difficult

    I = low , 7 =high

    = low, 7 high

    =difficult, 7 = easy

    I =K5%, 7=> 80%

    I = low . 7 high

    1 =notyet available, 2 =< 1 year,6= lO+years

    I = (dis)advantage, 0 = otherwise

    = (dis)advantage, 0 = otherwise

    I = low , 7 high

    1 =advantage, 7 =disadvantage

    1 = totally new product,

    o = otherwise

    =all segments, 7 =one segment

    1 = low, 7 =leader

    1 =yes, 0 =no

    1 = low , 7 high

    I = low , 7 high

    3 8

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    Table 4 Mailing List by SIC Code and Revenue

    4-digit SIC Code Industry Number ofFirms

    3523 Farm 1 3 8353 1 Construction 1423532 Mining 6 3

    3 5 3 7 I n d u s t r i a l T r u c k s a n d T r a c t o r s 933541 Machine Tools, Cutting 573542 Machine Tools, Forming 773549 Metal Working Machines 323554 Paper Industry Machines 8 33571 Electronic Computers 2693663 Radio and TV Communication Equipment 1883711 Tractor and Tractor Trucks 18

    3721 Aircraft 413743 Railroad Equipment 643812 Search and Navigation Equipment 1183823 Process Control Instruments 151

    Total 1534

    Company Size Number ofFirms in Number ofFirms

    (Annual Revenue in millions) Mailing List / Sample Responding

    $5-$14 836/427 9 3$15-$49 393/342 77

    $50-$149 149/130 3 6$150-$499 75/65 2 4

    $500+ 81/70 3 9

    unknownTotal 1534/1034 270

    39

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    Table 5 Cross-Validation ofPricing Strategy Using Relative Price

    Strategy

    Skim Pricing

    Leader Pricing

    Parity Pricing

    Customer Value

    Pricing

    Experience CurvePricing

    Complementary

    Product Pricing

    Penetration Pricing

    Low Priced

    Supplier

    Entire Sample

    Number of

    Respondents

    3 7

    3 1

    82

    2 9

    3 2

    24

    2 5

    2 4

    Expected

    Relative

    Price

    High

    High

    Same

    Low

    Low

    Low

    Low

    Low

    270

    Mean of

    Relative

    Price

    4.11

    3 . 9 7

    3.35

    3 . 3 7

    3. 6 8

    3 . 2 1

    2.68

    2 . 0 0

    Std. Dev. Of

    Relative

    Price

    1 . 5 1

    1 . 4 0

    1 . 2 0

    1.42

    1 . 4 9

    1.25

    1 . 7 7

    1 . 2 5

    t-statistic

    (p-value)*

    2 . 2 2 ( 0 . 0 2 )

    1 . 6 3 ( 0 . 0 6 )

    1 . 5 9 ( 0 . 1 2 ) * *

    - 0 . 7 2 ( 0 . 2 4 )

    -0.46 (0.33)

    - 1 . 3 7 ( 0 . 0 9 )

    - 2 . 4 9 ( 0 . 0 1 )

    -6.46 (0.00)

    3 . 5 6

    * p-value calculated for 1-tail t-test except for ** which is the p-value forthe 2-tailed t-test.

    40

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    Table 6 Test ofUniaue Determinants ofStrategy Types

    New Product Strategies Estimate Std. Error Chi-square Prob>Chi2

    ProductAge(-)

    InterceptModel Chi-squareModel FitPositive Responses

    Competitive Strategies

    -0.31

    0.3212.24

    p

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    Table 7 : Test ofDeterminants ofIndividual Pricing Strategies

    Estimate (Prob > Chi2)

    Restricted Full Tobit

    TobitSkim Pricing

    Unique Determinants1Product Differentiation (+)Major Product Change (+ )Cost (+)

    Cost disadvantage: scale (+ )Cost disadvantage: learning (+ )Market Elasticity (-)Brand Elasticity (-)

    Capacity Utilization (+ )

    1 9 . 2 2 ( 0 . 0 1 )

    1 . 0 7 ( 0 . 9 6 )

    2 . 0 7 ( 0 . 8 2 )

    4 0 . 6 5 ( 0 . 0 8 )

    -65.46 (0.14)

    0.85 (0.90)

    -10.16 (0.15)

    2 . 3 5 ( 0 . 7 0 )

    -185.61 (0.00)Intercept

    Model Fit p K 0.043 7Sample

    Penetration Pricing

    Unique Determinants

    Cost advantage: scale (+ )

    Common Determinants

    Product Differentiation (-)Major Product Change (-)

    Cost (-)

    Market Elasticity (+ )Brand Elasticity (+)Capacity Utilization (-)Intercept

    55.88 (0.02)

    - 1 5 6 . 9 8 ( 0 . 0 0 )

    43.49 (0.05)

    8.65 (0.24)

    1 2 . 7 6 ( 0 . 5 6 )

    -14.61 (0.11)

    19.23 (0.01)-17.69 (0.01)-0.82 (0.89)

    141.17 (0.03)

    Model Fit

    Sample

    Experience Curve Pricing

    Unique Determinants

    Cost advantage: learning (+ )

    Common Determinants

    Product Differentiation (-)Major Product Change (-)

    Market Elasticity (+ )Brand Elasticity (+)Capacity Utilization (-)

    Intercept

    Model FitSample

    4.09 (0.84)

    -125.91 (0.00)

    p

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    Price Leadership

    Unique Determinants

    Market Share (+)

    Common Determinants

    Cost (-)

    Cost advantage: scale (+)Cost advantage: learning (+ )Ease: detecting price changes (+)Market Elasticity (-)Capacity Utilization (+)Intercept -148.29(0.00)

    1 2 . 1 2 ( 0 . 2 0 )

    3 1 . 0 5 (0.13)

    3 3 . 0 3 ( 0 . 1 1 )

    9.52 (0.10)

    -3.86 (0.50)-0.11 (0.98)

    - 3 2 1 . 6 3 ( 0 . 0 0 )

    Model FitSample

    Parity Pricing

    Unique Determinants

    Cost (+)

    Cost disadvantage: scale (+ )Cost disadvantage: learning (+ )

    Common DeterminantsMarket Share (-)Ease: detecting price changes (+ )Market Elasticity (-)Capacity Utilization (+)

    Intercept

    15.55 ( 0 . 0 0 )

    20.55 (0.13)16.39 (0.38)

    -94.23 (0.00)

    16.57 (0.00)1 0 . 2 4 ( 0 . 4 4 )

    5.60 (0.76)

    -9.15 ( 0 . 0 0 )

    -0.18 (0.96)9.12 (0.01)6.07 (0.07)

    -113.06 (0.00)

    Model FitSample

    Low-Price Supplier

    Unique DeterminantsEase : detecting price changes (-)Market Elasticity (+)

    Capacity Utilization (-)

    C o m m o n DeterminantsMarket Share (-)Cost (-)

    Cost advantages due to scale (+ )Cost advantage: learning (+ )Intercept

    Model FitSample

    1.54 (0.82)-5.93 (0.42)

    -15.52 (0.04)

    -82.93 (0.11)

    p

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    Bundling Pricing Full Tobit

    Unique DeterminantsPer Sale/Contract Pricing (+ )Intercept

    38.32 (0.02)

    -99.25 (0.00)

    Model FitSample

    p < 0.0135

    Complementary Product Pricing

    Unique DeterminantsProfitability ofaccompanying

    sales (+)Profitability ofsupplementary

    sales (+)Switching Costs (+ )Intercept

    - 0 . 2 3 ( 0 . 9 6 )

    1 5 . 1 7 ( 0 . 0 1 )

    2 . 0 1 ( 0 . 5 6 )

    - 1 6 0 . 0 9 ( 0 . 0 0 )

    ModelFitSample

    p

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    Table 8: Validated Pricing Strategy Framework

    Strategy

    Type

    New ProductPricing

    Determinants

    .New model

    Principal Strategies

    related strategies

    Skimming

    Premium Pricing Value-in-Use Pricing

    Penetration Pricing

    Unique Determinants

    High productdifferentiation in the

    market Cost disadvantage

    due to scale

    Cost advantage dueto scale

    Experience/LearningCurve Pricing

    Competitive Mature marketPricing

    Product LinePricing

    Firmsells

    substitute or

    complement

    ary products

    Cost-Based Difficult toPricing determine

    demand

    * based on t-tests in Table 5

    Leader Pricing

    UmbrellaPricing Cooperative Pricing

    SianalingParityPricing

    Neutral pricing

    Follower pricing

    High costs

    Additional

    Favorable

    Conditions

    Elastic marketdemand

    Inelastic branddemand

    N ot a majorproduct change

    High productdifferentiation inthe market

    Low capacity

    utilization Cost advantages

    due to learning Easy to detectprice

    changes

    Low market share

    Elastic marketdemand

    High capacityutilization

    Low costs

    Cost advantagesdue to scale

    No cost advantagedue to learning

    Low -price Supplier Lowfactory Parallel pricing utilization

    Adaptive pricing

    Opportunistic pricing

    Bundling Per saleI contract

    System Pricing pricing

    Complementary Product High profit onPricing supplementa~ sales

    Razor-and-bladepricing

    Customer Value Pricing Hard to detect price

    Economy pricing changes

    Narrow marketappeal

    Cost-plus pricing Contribution Pricing Target return pricing

    Markup pricing

    Relative

    Price

    High

    Low

    el-liali

    Equal

    Low

    Low

    45

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    Table 9 ImportanceWeight Distribution by Pricing Strategy

    Strategy 10% 20% 30% 400/0 50% 60% 70% 800/o 90% 100% Total

    New Product Pricing Strate ies

    SkimPricing

    Penetration Pricing

    ExperienceCurvePricing

    2 6

    2 5

    4 5

    5

    5

    5

    0

    0

    0

    3

    3

    3

    1 2

    0 3

    1 3

    1

    1

    1

    0

    0

    0

    16

    5

    9

    36

    25

    3 1

    ies[1 3 6 210 4 [31

    1 2 5 3 6f1 2 2 8 1

    112 0 3 3 j 0 7 f 2 4

    Strategies . . .

    C om plem entary Product 7 9 3 1 2 0 1 0 0 1 2 4Pricing

    BundlePricing 8 9 3 2 1 .2 4 2 0 4 2 4

    Customer Value Pricing 2 9 8 0 1 2 1 1 0 6 3 0

    Competitive Pricing Stratef 5

    Ill

    3

    LeaderPricing

    ParityPricing

    Low-PriceSuppl ier

    4

    4

    4

    1

    1

    1

    7

    7

    Product Line Pricing

    Cost-based Pricing Strategies

    Cost-Plus Pricing 1 0 8 1 0 9 1 4 1 3 1 2 1 4 3 5 7 1 50

    Importance Weight

    Note: Median is indicated by underlined type.

    46

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    Figure 1: Overview ofIndustrialPricing Framework

    New model ofproduct

    Company sellsc o m p l e m e n t a r y o r

    substitute products

    P e r s a l e . / c o n t r a c t

    p r i c i n g

    Narrow market appeal Low market growth

    Difficultto detectp r i c e c h a n g e s

    Complementary

    Product Pricing( low)

    BundlingPricing

    CustomerValue Pricing( low)

    D i f f i c u l t t o

    e s t i m a t e demand

    C o s t - b a s e d P r i c i n g

    S t r a t e g i e s

    S t r a t e g y T y p eD e t e r m i n a n t s

    S t r a te g y T y p e s U n i q u e P r i n c ip a lS t r a t e g y D e t e r m i n a n t sPrincipal Pricing

    Strategies(relative price)

    H i g h p r o d u c t

    d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n

    S i g n i f i c a n t d e s i g nc h a n g e

    H i g h r e l a t i v e c o s t s C o s t d i s a d v a n t a g e d u e

    to scale or experience Inelastic demand Low factory

    u t i l i z a t i o n

    Skim Pricing(high)

    High relative costs

    Cost disadvantage dueto scale or experience

    S

    0

    Difficultto detect

    p r i c e c h a n g e s

    E l a s t i c t o t a l demand

    Low c a p a c i t yutilization

    H i g h p r o f i t a b i l i t y o f

    a c c o m p a n y i n g o rs u p p l e m e n t a r y s a l e s

    H i g h s w i t c h i n g c o s t s

    Cost-PlusPricing

    47

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    Figure 2: Managerial Pricing Strategy Survey

    GENERAL PRODUCF E NFORM ATION pale

    lam interested in th e most recent pricing decision you were involved with in th e last 1 2 months forthe U.S. market. The

    decision you describe should b e fo r a s i n g l e d u r a b l e good9 sold in business-to-business markets. Please provide some

    general back~ound information for your product. Answer for one oroduct only

    1. This specific product is best described as : _____________________________________________________

    2 . The p r i n c i p a l i n d u s t r y you consider th e product to he part of (e.g., heav y truck, machine tool, etc.):

    3 . Your a p p r o x i m a t e ~wi~selling price i s :

    u n d e r from $ 1 , 0 0 0 f r o m $ 3 , 0 0 0 from SIO .000 from S30.000 f r o m $ 10 0 , 0 0 0 $ 30 0 , 0 0 0$ 1.000 t o $2,999 to S9.999 t o $ 2 9 , 9 9 9 t o $ 9 9 , 9 9 9 t o S2 9 9 , 9 9 9 o r o v e r

    00 0 0 0 0 0

    4. How often do you (or your company) set th e pricing for this product?

    weekly monthly quarterly semi-annually annually each saledcontmct Otlw ____________

    o 0 0 0 0 0 05. Wha t percent ofth e annua l dollar sales of your division (or company, as appropriate) does this product represent?

    ~ lessthan atleas: 1% atleastS% atleast2.5% 50%I Division I 1 % bu t under 5% but under 25% but under 3 0 % or over0 0 0 0 0

    6. W hen th e current model w as znti~oduced, how significant w as th e design change?

    totally new p ro du ct m aj or revision m inor revision no change

    0 0 0 0

    7. We offer other products to th i s m arket which , relative to th i s product. ar e (check al l that apply):sub s t i tu t e s c om p l e m e n t s h a v e n o r e la t io n s h i p to this p r oduc t no o ther produc t s are ava i lab leo o 0 0

    8. How would yo u charecterize ~ in relation toy~ THREE l a rges t competitors?

    morethan5% 2%to5% about 2%to5% mored~an5% Suchacompauisonisbelow below equal above above meaningless in m y situation

    o 0 0 0 0 09 . Approximately what percentage ofth e dollar sales fo r this product categoiy in the U.S. market is made by the

    THREE largest manufactiws? Ifthere ar e fewer than three manufacturers in total, mark 8 0% or more.

    -lessihan atleast20%but atleast3S%hut a:leaszS0%but arie ,as t65% bsn 80%or20 % under35% under50% under65% wider80% mom0 Ii 0 0 0 0

    10. H ow extensive is y o u r coverege of th e various market segments for th i s product? Mark an X at the p o i n t on th e

    scale that best describes th e number ofmarket segments in which you ar e active:

    al l segments i!l~i~~I only one segment

    I I. H ow easy is it to determine the m ark et demand for th r ~ single product? M ark an X at the appropriate po int .

    very d i f W u l i

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    STRATEGY USED IN YOUR PRICING DECISION page 2

    Consider which ofthe follow ing best describes th e pricing strategy that you used fo r the product you just described on the

    previous page. Remember that this is fo r th e decision made in th e past 12 months fo r a single product.

    IEAIE~X

    A. Price Skimming

    B. PenetrationPricing

    C. Experience CurvePricing

    D. ComplementaryProduct Pricing

    E . Price Bundling

    F. Customer ValuePricing

    G. Price Leader

    H. Parity Pricing

    I. Low PriceSupplier

    J. Cost-pluspricing

    DE S CRIPTION

    We se t th e initial price high an d then systematically reduce it o v e r t i m e . C u s t o m e r s e x p e c tprices to eventually fall.Related Strategies: Premium Pricing, Value-in-Use Pr ic ing

    W e initially se t the price low to accelerate product adoption.

    W e se t the price low to build volume and reducecosts through accumulated experience.Related Strategies: Learning Curve Pricing

    We price th e core product low when complementary i tems such as accessories, supplies,spare parts, services, etc. can be priced with a higher margin.Related Strategies: R azor -and-B lade Pricing

    We offer this product as part ofa bundle ofseveral products , usually at a to ta l price th a tgives our customers an attractive savings over th e stun of th e individual prices.Related Strategies: System Pr ic ing

    We price one version ofou r product at very competitive levels, offering fewer features thanare available on other versions.Related Strategies: Economy Pricing

    We initiate a price change an d expect th e other f irms to follow.Related Strategies: Umbrella Pricing, Co operative Pricing, Signaling

    We match th e price set by th e overall market or by th e price leader.Related Strategies: Neutral Pricing, Price Follower Pricing.

    We always strive to have the low price in the market .Related Strategies: Parallel Pricing, Adaptive Pricing,Opportunistic P ricing

    We establish th e price ofthe produ ct at a point that gives us a specified percentage profitmargin over our costs.Related Strategies: Con tribution Pricing, Rate-of-Return Pricing, Target-ReturnPricing, Contingency Pricing, Markup Pricing

    Questions:

    I. Ifyo u used a pricing strategy not listed above p l ea s e ~ ~

    2. Which pricing strategy ~ describes what yo u used for pricing this

    product? Enter the appropriate letter from above: s t ra t egy :

    3. Ifyou used more than one strategy in your decision, enter th e letter ofeach strategy an d its relative importance in

    your decision b dividing l00~ among the various strategies used:

    strategy: [J : _________ strategy: III: ..........................%; s t ra t egy :~IJ: _________

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    SITUATION WHEN Y O U MADE THE PRICING DE CIS ION page 3

    I. Circle th e number on th e scale w hich best describes th e situation atth e t u n e th e p r ic ingdecision ~ made.

    1.1 YOUR MARKET

    a. Market growth rate:

    b. Sensitivity ofmarket demand to changes in th e average

    m a r k e t p r i c e :

    c. Sensitivity ofcusto