Emperically Vaildated Framework for Industrial Pricing
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Transcript of Emperically Vaildated Framework for Industrial Pricing
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An Empirically-Validated Framework
for Industrial Pricing
Peter M. NobleHumbolt State University
Thomas S. GrucaUniversity ofIowa
ISBM Report 9-1998
Institute for the Study ofBusiness MarketsThe Pennsylvania State University
402 Business Administration Building
University Park, PA 16802-3004(814) 863-2782 or (814) 863-0413 Fax
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This publication is available in alternative media onrequest.
The Pennsylvania State University is committed to the policy that all persons shallhave equal access to programs, facilities, admission, and employment withoutregard to personal characteristics not related to ability, performance, orqualifications as determined by University policy or by state or federal authorities.The Pennsylvania State University does not discriminate against any person becauseof age, ancestry, color, disability or handicap, national origin, race, religious creed,sex, sexual orientation, or veteran status. Direct all inquiries regarding thenondiscrimination policy to the Affirmative Action Director, the Pennsylvania StateUniversity, 20 1 Willard Building, University Park, PA 16802-2801; Tel. (814) 865-4700/V; (814) 865-1150/TIY.
U.Ed. BUS 98-070
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An Empirically-Validated Framework for Industrial Pricing
Peter M. Noble
Humbolt State University
1 Harpst St.Arcata, CA 95521
(707) 826-3224
Thomas S. Gruca
College ofBusiness
University ofIowaIowa City, IA 52242-1000
319-335-0946 (phone)
319-335-1956 (fax)
thomas-gruca~uiowa.edu
A previous version ofthis paper was presented at the 1995 INFORMS International Conference
in Singapore. The authors would like to thankGerry Tellis and Kent Monroe for their review ofthe survey used in this research.
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An Empirically-Validated Frameworkfor Industrial Pricing
Abstract
We propose and test a parsimonious and comprehensive two-level frameworkfor
industrial goods pricing which allows for multiple pricing strategies for a single product. We
identify a reduced set ofcost, product and information conditions determining which strategy type
(new product, competitive, product line, cost-based) is optimal. We frirther identify a set of
unique determinants under which a given principal strategy within each type is optimal. For
example, the competitive pricing strategy type (leader, parity or low cost supplier) should be used
in the later stages ofthe product life cycle. Leader pricing should be used by firms with high
market share whereas parity pricing should be used by firms with high costs. A firm should
consider a low priced supplier strategy if it has relatively low costs. Similar relationships between
pricing strategies and determinants are developed for a comprehensive set of10 industrial pricing
strategies.
We validated the frameworkthrough a national survey ofpricing managers in capital
goods industries. Using censored regression models, we tested (and confirmed) the relationships
between the determinants, pricing strategy types and individual pricing strategies. This framework
provides an important tool to help managers make better pricing decisions. It is grounded in
sound economic and marketing analyses and consistent with actual managerial practice.
Furthermore,..this study answers the call ofmany authors to bridge the gap between the normative
research on pricing and actual managerial behavior.
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Introduction
Pricing is one ofthe most important and complex ofall marketing decisions. There is a
wide range ofproduct, company and competitive conditions determining which pricing strategy or
strategies should be used in a given situation (Diamantopoulos 1991, 1994). For example, in the
classic FIBR case, Deere & Company: Industrial Equipment Operations, the price for a new
model ofbulldozer has to be determined (Shapiro, 1977). This new model has an innovative
transmission that may increase productivity significantly. Therefore, a skimming strategy should
be more profitable than penetration pricing. However, since market leader Caterpillar offers
comparable models, the pricing strategy has to reflect competitive prices as well. In addition,
Deere will sell spare parts that represent a significant income stream over the life ofthe product.
Maximizing the revenue stream from the entire product line (accessories, spare parts, etc.) is
another important consideration in the pricing strategy. Finally, a high mark-up over unit
manufacturing costs would be desired to quickly recoverthe high development and tooling costs
for this model. Therefore, in this typical case study, there can be one, two or more types of
pricing strategies (i.e., new product, competitive, product line and cost-based) involved in a single
pricing decision.
How does the marketing literature help a manager facing such a complex pricing situation?
Unfortunately, most normative research on pricing concentrates on only one or two narrow
aspects ofthe situation. For example, Schoell and Guiltinan (1995) outline the conditions that
favor choosing skimming over penetration pricing for a new product. The notable exception is the
comprehensive literature review by Tellis (1986).
In his review, Tellis develops a unif~jing frameworkthat highlights the similarities and
differences among a wide range ofpricing strategies. Two dimensions ofshared economies
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available to a firm and the consumer conditions necessary to exploit these economies determine
which ofnine pricing strategies (or their related counterparts) should be adopted by the firm. The
Tellis framework represents a major contribution to the literature since it is the first
comprehensive comparison and integration ofpricing strategies which had, heretofore, been
discussed in relative isolation.
The focus ofthe Tellis paper on providing a classification system for as wide a range of
pricing strategies as possible presents some challenges when trying to apply its results to practical
pricing situations. For example, the two conditions identified by Tellis define the best single
choice ofpricing strategies for a firm. However, there are additional requirements associated with
relative quality or costs that are necessary for the choice ofstrategy to be optimal (Tellis, 1986:
Table 2). Unfortunately, the Tellis framework does not address the options for a firm not in an
advantaged position in terms ofcosts or quality.
By construction and in the interest ofclarity ofpresentation, the Tellis frameworkassumes
that only one strategy should be used in a given situation. However, empirical research on pricing
objectives shows that multiple objectives are often used simultaneously (Shipley 1981, Jobber and
Hooley 1987, Samiee 1987, Coe 1983; 1988; 1990; Diamantopoulos and Mathews; 1994). We
expect (and find) that the same is true in pricing strategy decisions. Managers often use more than
one pricing strategy in setting the price for a single product
Finally, the Tellis framework has not been empirically validated (Lilien, Kotler and
Moorthy, 1992). This is a critical step in the development ofmanagerial prescriptions for pricing.
Since all models are necessarily simplifications ofreality, it is important to compare the normative
results with actual practice in order to validate the assumptions underlying the normative models.
In this paper, we have more modest goals in terms ofintegrating the existing pricing
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literature. However, by focusing on a smaller set ofindustrial pricing problems (capital goods),
we are able to achieve closure through empirical validation ofour proposed framework.
Specifically, we propose and test a parsimonious and complete two-level (strategy type-principal
strategy) framework for industrial goods pricing which allows for multiple pricing strategies for a
single product. We identify a reduced set ofcost, product and information conditions under which
a given strategy type (new product, competitive, product line, cost-based) should be used. We
then identify a set ofunique conditions under which a principal strategy within each type should
be used. For example, one type ofpricing strategy encompasses the competitive pricing strategies.
The principal strategies within this type are Leader pricing, Parity pricing and Low-Price supplier.
A competitive pricing strategy should be employed in the latter stages ofthe product life cycle.
With this type, Leader pricing should be used by firms with high market share whereas Parity
pricing should be used by firms with high costs. A firm should use a Low-price Supplier strategy
ifit has relatively low costs. Similar relationships between pricing strategy types, principal
strategies and determinants are developed for a comprehensive set offour strategy types and 10
principal pricing strategies..
We validated our framework through a national survey ofpricing managers in capital
goods industries. We asked them about characteristics ofthe product, their company and the
product-market at the time oftheir last pricing decision. Using limited dependent variable
regression models, we confirmed most ofthe expected relationships between the proposed
determinants, pricing strategy types and principal pricing strategies.
This frameworkprovides an important tool to help managers make better pricing
decisions. It is grounded in sound economic and marketing analyses and consistent with actual
managerial practice. Furthermore, this study answers the call ofmany authors (Bonoma,
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Crittenden and Dolan, 1988; Lilien, Kotler, and Moorthy 1992; Diamantopoulos, 1994) to bridge
the gap between the normative research on pricing and actual managerial behavior.
Related Research
Most ofthe empirical research investigating how managers set prices has focused on
identifying the objectives used by managers in pricing decisions (Diamantopoulos, 1991). The
major studies (Kaplan, Dirlam, and Lanzillotti, 1958; Shipley, 1981; Jobber and Hooley, 1987;
Samiee, 1987; Coe, 1983, 1988, and 1990; and Diamantopoulos and Mathews, 1994) have shown
that profit maximization is used by many firms, but it is clearly not dominant across all firms
(Diamantopoulos, 1994). These studies also show that most firms use multiple pricing objectives,
the objectives change over time (Coe, 1983, 1988, 1990) and the choice ofobjective is related to
the pricing environment ofthe firm (Diamantopoulos and Mathews, 1994).
The study ofpricing objectives can provide information on what the firm is trying to
accomplish, but objectives do not tell us much about how the firm will accomplish those
objectives. These studies do not address the issue ofwhat pricing strategies will be used to
accomplish the goals ofthe firm. For the purpose ofthis study, objectives are defined as the
results a decision maker seeks to achieve (e.g., profit maximization). A pricing strategy is the
means by which a pricing objective is to be achieved. A pricing strategy implies a specific price
level or schedule related to costs, competition, or customers. Determinants are the internal and
external conditions that determine managers choices ofpricing strategies.
A briefexample may help distinguish these constructs. Consider a firm with a pricing
objective ofmaximizing profitability for a new product. In one scenario, customers might be
insensitive to price and the products in this market are highly differentiated. The firm can use a
price skimming strategy to achieve their profit maximization objective (Nagle and Holden, 1995:
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154-158). In a second scenario, the same company is faced with highly price sensitive customers.
Ifthe firm can reduce its unit costs by spreading its fixed costs over a high volume ofoutput, the
firm can use a penetration pricing strategy to achieve the profit maximization objective (Nagle and
Holden, 1995: 159-160). The determinants in these examples were price sensitivity, product
differentiation, and potential for economies ofscale.
Diamantopoulos (1991, 1994) refers to these determinants collectively as the pricing
environment, describing them as the elements that constitute the setting within which price
decision-making takes place. It is the goal ofthis study to develop a frameworkfor industrial
pricing decisions which simplifies the pricing environment for the manager by identifying those
conditions which separate strategy types and principal strategies within type.
Previous empirical studies that have investigated the use ofpricing strategies have
generally been limited in scope to researching small numbers offirms or to identifying strategies
without regard to determinants (Abratt and Pitt, 1985; Morris and Pitt, 1993; Udell, 1972).
Studies that have looked at both strategies and determinants across a large number offirms have
generally not been statistically rigorous (see Diamantopoulos 1991 for review ofthese studies).
The validation study presented in this paper remedies these short-comings. Our framework is
discussed next.
A Framework for Industrial Pricing Strategy
After an extensive review ofthe literature, we identified a set ofindustrial pricing
strategies and determinants following the example set by Tellis (1986). However, our study
focuses on the under-researched area ofindustrial (capital goods) pricing while the Tellis
framework is more oriented towards consumer products. To accommodate these differences, we
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have made some modifications to his original framework.
First, we did not consider strategies predominantly used with consumer products (i.e.,
defensive pricing, random discounts), strategies for export markets (i.e., second market
discounting) or pricing tactics (e.g., basing point pricing). Second, Cost-Plus pricing and
Customer Value pricing were added due to their prominence in previous studies ofindustrial
pricing (Morris and Calantone, 1990).
The ten principal pricing strategies are described in Table 1 .
Table 1 about here
Note that a related strategy is either part ofthe principal strategy (e.g., Markup Pricing is a form
ofCost-Plus Pricing) or is similar to the principal strategy. That is , the related strategy is one
which can be expected to occur under similar conditions and result in a similar price level (e.g.,
Opportunistic Pricing and Low-Price Supplier).
Strategy Types and Principal Strategies
We have divided these ten strategies into four strategy types based on the similarity ofthe
situations for which they are appropriate. The four strategy types are: 1) new product strategies,
2) product line strategies, 3) competitive strategies, and 4) cost-based strategies.
New product strategies share the common attribute ofbeing strategies which are applied
early in the life ofthe model in question. Included in the category ofentry strategies are: 1) Skim
Pricing, 2) Penetration Pricing, and 3) Experience Curve Pricing.
Competitive strategies have as their main focus the price ofthe product relative to the
price ofone or more competitors.. Competitive pricing strategies include: 1) Leader Pricing, 2)
Parity Pricing, and 3) Low-price Supplier.
Product line strategies are strategies in which the price ofone product is influenced by
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other related products or services from the same company. These related products may be
complements, substitutes, or ancillary items such as spare parts; they may be products sold
simultaneously or in another time period. These strategies include: 1) Complementary Product
Pricing, 2) Price Bundling, and 3) Customer Value Pricing.
Cost-based strategies consider the internal costs ofthe firm including fixed and variable
costs, contribution margins, and so on. The principal strategy included in this category is
Cost-Plus Pricing. Several related strategies, such as Target-Return Pricing, are included as part
ofCost-based pricing strategies.
Strategy Determinants
In every normative discussion ofpricing strategy, a set ofmarket, company and
competitive conditions is specified under which a given strategy is optimal (profit-maximizing).
Since these conditions determine when a given strategy should be used, we refer to them as
determinants.
The set ofdeterminants we include in our study includes major elements ofTellis (1986)
frameworkincluding product differentiation, economies ofscale, capacity utilization, and
switching costs. Other determinants are based on additional sources including pricing articles
(Dean 1950), specialized pricing monographs (Oxenfeldt 1975, Nagle and Holden 1995) and
general marketing management texts (Kotler, 1988; Guiltinan, Paul and Madden 1997).
During our literature review, we found that some determinants are common to more than
one strategy. For example, ifbrand demand is elastic, then Penetration pricing, Experience Curve
pricing, Parity pricing, Low-Price Supplier pricing, Complementary product pricing and Bundling
are all profit-maximizing options depending on the other market, company and competitor
conditions. Therefore, high levels ofbrand elasticity does not separate these principal strategies
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from each other.
On the other hand, we also discovered that some determinants are unique to a given
strategy type. For example, the presence ofother products from the same firm (either substitutes
or complements) is common to Bundling, Customer Value pricing and Complementary Product
pricing. Yet this determinant is unique to the Product Line strategy type. Therefore, the presence
ofrelated products from the same firm separates out this strategy type from the others. The set of
unique determinants for each strategy type forms the first level ofindustrial pricing framework.
Similarly, within the strategy types, there are determinants which separate one principal
strategy from the others. In the Competitive Pricing strategies, high market share separates
Leader pricing from the Parity and Low-Price Supplier strategies. Since these determinants are
unique to a given principal strategy within a strategy type, they are also referred to as unique
determinants. The unique determinants for each principal strategy allow us to identify a
parsimonious set ofconditions under which a given principal strategy is optimal. This organization
ofthe strategy types, particular strategies and their determinants are presented in Table 2.
Table 2 about here
The unique determinants are indicated by underlined type.
This table is an important contribution ofour study since it simultaneously summarizes the
previous normative research and identifies a testable framework for managerial pricing strategy.
The determinants for strategy types are discussed in detail next.
Determinants for Strategy Types
The determinant for choosing a New Product pricing strategy is the age ofthe model
being priced. Skim pricing, Penetration pricing and Experience curve pricing are al l appropriate
for new products.
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One might expect that Competitive pricing strategies would be appropriate for the
opposite condition, i.e. the pricing ofolder products. However, the common determinants for
these strategies (Price Leader, Parity pricing and Low-price Supplier) are a late stage ofthe
product life cycle and the ease ofdetermining demand. Note that these two conditions refer to a
mature market and not necessarily to the age ofthe model being priced.
Returning to the Deere example above, the model being priced was new to the market yet
it was entering the mature bulldozer marketplace. Therefore, both New Product strategies and
Competitive pricing strategies should be incorporated into the final decision for this new model of
bulldozer.
Inherent in the definition ofProduct Line pricing strategies is the existence ofother
products, accessories or supplementary goods (e.g., spare parts) to guide the pricing ofthe
product in question (Guiltinan, Paul and Madden, 1997).
Diamantopoulos (1991) claims that Cost-Plus pricing is by far and away the most widely
used pricing strategy. The Hall and Hitch (1939) survey of39 business managers found the
general pattern ofprice setting to be cost-based. The Brookings Institution Studies (Kaplan,
Dirlam, and Lanzillotti, 1958) corroborated this finding. Thirty years later, Bonoma, Crittenden
and Dolan (1988) found that managers continue to use cost as a primary pricing concern.
Most authors caution managers against relying on cost-based methods for establishing
prices (e.g. Nagle and Holden, 1995). The only situation in which Cost-Plus pricing is profit-
maximizing is one in which average unit costs are likely to be constant over time and at any point
on the demand curve (Lilien and Kotler 1983: 405-407). However, due to economies ofscale
and/or experience curve effects, neither ofthese conditions are likely to hold in a manufacturing
industry (Lilien and Kotler, 1983: 407).
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The weakness ofCost-Plus Pricing is that it ignores consumer and competitive
information. However, ifthe firm has little or no information about demand, then Cost-Plus
pricing is the default strategy (Harrison and Wilkes, 1975).
Determinants ofPrincipal Strategies
Three ofthe strategy types, New Product, Competitive and Product Line, contain more
than one strategy. For each ofthese strategies, we have identified the determinants which are
unique to that strategy and those which are common to other strategies within that strategy type.
The unique and common determinants for these principal strategies are discussed next.
New Product Pricing
There are three options for pricing new products: Skimming, Penetration and Experience
Curve pricing. Skimming is the practice ofsetting a high initial price which is often systematically
discounted over time. The purpose ofSkim pricing is to discriminate between those buyers who
are insensitive to the initial high price because ofspecial needs. As this segment becomes
saturated, the price is lowered to broaden the appeal ofthe product (Dean, 1950).
Skim pricing is recommended over Penetration or Experience curve pricing when there is
a high degree ofproduct differentiation in the market (Jam, 1993). Without this condition, there
cannot be a better product which would command a higher price. In addition, there must be
some buyers who are price insensitive, i.e. willing to pay more for a product which meets their
special needs (Guiltinan, Paul and Madden, 1997; Schoell and Guiltinan, 1995). The new product
usually represents a major improvement over previous versions in order to command a premium
price (Mercer, 1992). Finally, firms with high factory utilization (Schoell and Guiltinan, 1995) or
those who lackcost advantages due to scale or learning should consider skimming over the low-
price new product pricing strategies (Schoell and Guiltinan, 1995).
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Both Penetration and Experience curve pricing involve setting a low initial price for a new
product. Penetration pricing is used to speed adoption ofa new product or establish it as a de
facto standard. It is suggested that firms with cost advantages due to scale use Penetration pricing
(e.g., Tellis 1986).
Experience curve pricing has a different focus and source ofadvantage than penetration
pricing. The experience (or learning) curve effect shows that unit costs fall with cumulative
volume due to increased familiarity with the assembly process and other factors (Boston
Consulting Group 1972). However, there is a great deal ofcontroversy about the extent ofthese
effects (e.g., Amit 1986).
Experience curve pricing seeks to exploit the experience/learning curve by setting prices
low to build cumulative volume quickly and, thereby, drive down unit costs. The presence of
these experience/learning curve effects are necessary for this pricing strategy to be a success
(Tellis 1986; J a m 1993; Nagle and Holden, 1995). Whether this is a sound long-term strategy has
been questioned on many fronts (e.g., Abernathy and Wayne 1974; Alberts, 1989; Ghemawat
1985; Kiechel 1981).
The common conditions which favor these low-price new product strategies contrast to
those for Skim pricing: low product differentiation (Schoell and Guiltinan, 1995), used for minor
product revisions (Mercer, 1992), elastic demand (Guiltinan, Paul and Madden, 1997), and low
capacity utilization (Schoell and Guiltinan, 1995).
Competitive Pricing
Price leaders initiate price changes and expect that others in the industry will follow suit.
Price leaders tend to have higher prices than their competitors who use the leaders price to set
their own price levels (Greer, 1984; Jam, 1993). Hence, this strategy is also known as Umbrella
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pricing. Price Leaders such as Caterpillar in heavy equipment tend to have the highest market
share as well (Kotler, 1997).
Parity pricing involves imitating the prevailing prices in the market, maintaining a constant
relative price between competitors. In some respects, this strategy is born ofweakness. Ifa firm
had superior products, it should be able to command a premium price (Guiltinan, Paul and
Madden, 1997). Or, ifthe firm had cost advantages, it could become a low-price supplier (Jam,
1993). Ifa firm has high costs, its only option in a mature market is to employ parity pricing (Jam,
1993, Guiltinan, Paul and Madden, 1997).
Three conditions are common to both Leader pricing and Parity pricing: markets in which
price changes are easy to detect (Nagle and Holden, 1995), inelastic total demand (Guiltinan, Paul
and Madden, 1997), and high factory utilization (Schoell and Guiltinan, 1995).
Low-price Suppliers could be exploiting a cost advantage (Nagle and Holden, 1995) or
reflecting a weakness (i.e., low factory utilization: Kotler, 1997). In addition, a Low-price
Supplier might be exploiting a lackofpricing knowledge in the market by under-cutting its rivals
(Greer, 1984). Ifthis under-cutting behavior were known, it might ignite a damaging price war.
Finally, the Low-price Supplier strategy should be more successful in markets with high levels of
overall elasticity (Guiltinan, Paul and Madden, 1997).
Common to both the Low-price Supplier strategy and Price Leadership is low costs
(Greer, 1984; Nagle and Holden, 1995) due to scale or experience curve effects (Jam, 1993). Low
market share is a common determinant for Parity pricing and Low-price Supplier pricing (Nagle
and Holden, 1995; Kotler, 1997).
Product Line Pricing
The economic and psychological aspects ofprice bundling have been explored in depth
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elsewhere (Guiltinan, 1987). Most ofthe suggested determinants for Bundling pricing are
common to other pricing strategies. Therefore, such determinants cannot be used to identify the
situation(s) where Bundling is optimal.
The sole exception is the type ofprice-setting process. When each sale or contract is
priced separately, as in the case ofsystem selling ofmainframe computers, then Bundling is a
preferred option (Jam, 1993). For example, a major avionics firm uses bundling in most ofits
pricing. Its customers need systems for control, communications and navigation. To avoid a
competitive pricing battle for each system, this firm quotes a bundled price for the entire package.
Since this firm is one ofthe few which make al l ofthese products, it usually wins the contract. In
addition, this approach reduces the number ofsuppliers (and potential incompatibility problems)
for the airframe manufacturer.
Complementary Product pricing began with King Camp Gillettes strategy ofselling razors
cheaply and blades dearly. For many industrial products, there are a wide range ofsupplies, spare
parts and accessories which make up a large portion ofthe profit stream from the customer. In the
Deere case above, it was suggested that a bulldozer consumes 90% ofits initial purchase price in
spare parts over its lifetime.
Under this strategy, the main product or platform is sold for a relatively low price while
the ancillary or supplementary products carry a high margin (Guiltinan, Paul and Madden, 1997).
For bulldozers, for example, the markup on spare parts can be as high as 200%, much higher than
the margin on the main product (Kotler, 1997: 515). In addition, Tellis (1986) suggests that high
customer switching costs may keep customers buying the captive, high-margin additional
products.
Customer Value pricing is becoming increasingly common in industrial markets. This
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strategy involves pricing one version ofthe product at very competitive levels, offering fewer
features than are available for other versions. The most visible applications ofthis strategy
recently have been in consumer markets. For example, when McDonalds lowered the price ofits
basic hamburger to 59 cents in 1990, its was employing Customer Value pricing to spur sales in a
low growth market (Gibson, 1990; Rigdon, 1990).
Manufacturers ofconsumer durables such as Pella Windows have introduced new lines of
products with fewer features and lower pricing points than their traditional customized lines
(Nagle and Holden, 1995: 165). Usually, these products are intended for a specific market
segment. In the case ofHon furniture, it produced a new line ofless expensive office furniture for
home offices to be distributed through category killers such as Staples rather than their full-
service dealer network.
In contrast to the case with consumer markets, Customer Value pricing in industrial
markets is more likely to be successful if price changes are difficult to detect. Since the firm is
providing most ofthe functionality ofits main product for a lower price, it runs a large risk of
cannibalizing its main, higher priced product (Dolan and Simon, 1995: 212-214).
A Parsimonious Pricing Framework
We used the information in Tables 1 and 2 to develop a parsimonious frameworkfor
industrial pricing. We summarize the relationships between strategy types, principal strategies and
determinants in Figure 1 .
Figure 1 about here
This framework contains three separate elements which must be tested. The first is the
relationship between the pricing strategies and the relative price ofthe product. This serves as a
cross-validation ofour self-reported measures ofpricing strategies. Second, we tested the
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relationships between each strategy type and its unique determinants. Third, we tested the
relationship between each principal strategy and its unique determinants. In addition, we tested
the relationships between the common determinants and each principal strategy within strategy
type. At the end ofthis process, we have a reduced set ofconditions for managers to consider
when choosing pricing strategies for an industrial product.
Validation Study Design
To validate our framework, we conducted a national survey ofmarketing managers in
capital goods industries in the late spring/early summer of1994.
Survey
The survey document was a four page questionnaire mailed to practicing managers in May
and June of1994 (Figure 2). The survey underwent extensive pre-testing to assure readability and
accurate understanding ofthe questions. This included pilot testing with written and verbal
feedback from a convenience sample ofexecutive MBA students as well as a review ofthe survey
by two noted academic pricing scholars from other institutions.
Figure 2 about here
To avoid the criticisms leveled at many studies ofpricing objectives by Diamantopoulos
(1991: 136), we asked the managers to provide information on their most recent pricing decision
ofa single industrial capital good rather than indicating an overall pricing strategy for all products
or circumstances.
Measures ofPricing Strategies
Previous research on pricing objectives shows that many managers use more than one
objective in their pricing decisions (e.g., Diamantopoulos, 1991). To reflect the similar complexity
ofthe pricing strategy decision, we allowed respondents to indicate their usage ofup to three
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pricing strategies. The response to this question was ratio-scaled (importance weights summing to
100%) in order to assess the magnitude ofthe importance ofa given strategy in the decIsIon.
In the pre-testing for this study, we found that none ofthe managers used more than three
alternatives. In our final results, we found that 48.5% used one strategy, 28.5% two and 22.5%
used three strategies. We note that the average importance ofthe third strategy was 15% (versus
28% for the second strategy). Therefore, ifthere is any bias in not allowing for more than three
strategies, it is not expected to be very large.
In addition, we allowed the manager to specify a pricing strategy which was not part of
the list often strategies provided. Ofthe 21 who did, a total of17 , upon review by two
independentjudges and the authors, were found to be special cases or related strategies ofthe
original ten strategies. The remaining observations were dropped from the analysis
Measures ofDeterminants
We modeled the scales to measure the determinants after the questions used in the PIMS
database (Buzzell and Gale, 1986). We pre-tested the wording and meaning ofthe scales in a pre-
test with experienced managers. The determinants and their measurement scales are presented in
Table 3.
Table 3 about here
Sample
We focused our survey on the pricing decisions ofdifferentiated, durable capital goods in
business-to-business markets. We restricted our sample to these industries since industrial
components, supplies or raw materials are less likely to be highly differentiated which would
restrict the pricing strategy options ofthe firms. Furthermore, since channels ofdistribution in
industrial markets tend to be shorter than those in consumer markets, the manufacturer exerts
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more control over pricing to end-users.
Fifteen such industries were identified using 4-digit SIC codes. The target industries and
distribution offirm sizes are presented in Table 4.
Table 4 about here
Contact names and addresses for the 1534 firms were purchased from Dun and Bradstreet.
Initially, surveys were to be addressed only to job titles including Director ofMarketing, Sales
Manager, Pricing Manager, and variations ofthese title. However, this targeting approach
resulted in the exclusion oftoo many smaller companies. Therefore, the category ofPresident,
CEO, and variations ofthese titles was included as well since this was the only title available for
the majority ofthe smaller companies.
A total of1021 firms was selected from this list (after deleting replicated records from the
total of1034). In a pre-test using a similar survey1, a sample of200 mailings was sent out. The
sample was stratified based on firm size. This pre-test showed that response rate increased
monotonically with firm size.
In order to best represent the pricing behavior in these industries, we drew a
disproportionate stratified sample for the final study. There were five size categories offirms. The
number offirms remaining after the pre-test in the largest four categories were relatively small
(342, 130, 65 and 70 from the smallest to largest size group). The remaining 427 names were
randomly selected from the 727 available in the smallest category.
This approach is consistent with syndicated surveys such as the Neilsen Retail Index. Our
intent is to understand marketing behavior in as large a proportion ofthe market as possible.
Therefore, this sampling approach should capture the widest variation in pricing behavior in these
industries since there are more strategic options for larger firms than smaller ones.
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Each firm was sent a survey package including a personalized, hand-signed cover letter
with a pledge ofconfidentiality ofindividual responses, a four-page survey and a $1 incentive.
The pretest also showed that the response rate for a $2 incentive (32%) was identical to that for a
$ 1 incentive (31%).
A total of347 surveys were returned to the authors. Ofthese, 77 were returned blank
(62), incomplete or were otherwise2 unusable (15). This yielded a gross response rate of34%
(347/1007 delivered). The total usable sample was 270 for a usable response rate of27% which is
a similar sample size3 and usable response rate4 to recent surveys ofmarketing managers.
Respondent Profile
The responding managers are highly experienced with pricing as the majority are involved
in such decisions for more than 20 products. The majority ofrespondents also report 10+ years of
experience in the industry and with their current company. In addition, these managers were
highly involved in the pricing decision they describe. On a seven-point scale (7 = high, 1 = low),
the average self-reported involvement was 5.98.
Median firm size was between $15 and $50 million in annual sales. These firms compete in
highly concentrated markets with an average 3-firm concentration ratio about 70%.
Validation Study Results
There are three aspects ofour pricing frameworkwhich require validation. The first is the
relative price levels for the various principal pricing strategies. Second, we test the relationships
between strategy types and their unique determinants. Finally, we examine the relationships
between principal strategies and their unique (within-type) and common determinants.
Relative Price Validation
One ofthe limitations ofprevious studies ofpricing objectives is the lackofan objective
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measure to cross-validate the pricing objective indicated by the respondent. For example, a firm
whose objective is to maximize profits may have a relatively low price or a relatively high price
depending on its strategy (Penetration v . Skim pricing). Therefore, the price charged by the firm
cannot be used to cross-validate the self-reported measure ofpricing objective.
For most pricing strategies, however, there is a one-to-one correspondence between the
level ofpricing in the marketplace and the pricing strategy. Strategies leading to relatively high
prices include Leader pricing and Skim pricing. Relatively low prices should be expected from
those firms employing the Penetration pricing, Experience Curve pricing, Complementary Product
pricing, Customer Value pricing or Low-Price Supplier strategies. Market-equivalent prices
should result from Parity pricing.
For Bundling pricing, we do not have a prior expectation since the product is priced as
part ofa bundle. Similarly, the relationship between relative price level and Cost-plus pricing will
be based on relative costs which are known and profitability levels which are not.
We asked the respondents to indicate the relative price oftheir product in addition to their
pricing strategies. The scale ranged from 1 = 5% or less than the market to 5 = 5% or more than
the market.
We compared the average response from managers indicating that they used a given
strategy with the average response for the entire sample. We used a 1-tail t-test with the overall
average as the population mean for all but the comparison for Parity pricing. Since the null
hypothesis is that there is no difference between the price level for firms using this strategy and
the overall relative price for al l firms, we used a 2-tailed t-test. The results are in Table 5 .
Table 5 about here
The two groups with an expected high relative price are indeed higher than the average for
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all respondents (Skim pricing, Leader pricing). Parity pricing had an average price level no
different from the overall mean, as we expected (2-tailed test). Finally, three ofthe five pricing
strategies with expected relatively low prices had average price levels that were significantly lower
than the overall average. Based on these results, we conclude that the self-reported measures of
pricing strategies are quite robust.
Determinants ofStrategy Types
From the importance weights for the principal strategies, we determined ifa respondent
chose a strategy within each ofthe four strategy types. A value ofone was assigned to a strategy
type ifa respondent assigned a positive weight to a principal strategy within that type (chosen).
The value was zero otherwise (not chosen).
The independent variable for New Product pricing was the time ofintroduction ofthe
current model ofthe product being priced (Question 1.3.i on page 3 ofthe survey). The possible
answers range from 0 (not yet available) to 5 (10 years or more). We expect this variable to be
negatively associated with the probability ofchoosing this strategy type.
For Competitive pricing, the first independent variable is the stage ofthe product life cycle
(Question 1 .3.a on page 3). This variable ranged from 1 for products in their introductory stage to
4 for products in decline. We expect the product life cycle to be positively related to the
probability ofchoosing ofa Competitive pricing strategy. In addition, we expect that Competitive
Pricing strategies will be used when demand is easy to determine (lain, 1993).
To determine ifthe firm sells other supplementary or complementary products to the
model being priced, we used Question 7 on page 1 ofthe survey. In our analysis, we constructed
a dummy variable which had the value of1 ofthe firm produced either substitute or
complementary products and zero otherwise. We expect that this variable will be positively
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related to the probability ofchoosing a Product Line pricing strategy.
The sole determinant for Cost-based pricing is the ease ofdetermining demand in the
market. We expect that this variable will be positively related to probability ofchoosing the Cost-
plus strategy since it is the only principal strategy in this type.
Since we defined our dependent variable as a binary choice, we used a logit model to test
the relationship between the choice ofstrategy type and their determinants5. The results are given
in Table 6.
Table 6 about here
New Product strategies were chosen by 32% (87) ofthe respondents. The choice ofthis
strategy type was negatively and significantly (p
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framework.
Determinants ofPrincipal Strategies
In order to test the determinants for principal pricing strategies, we used a tobit model for
censored dependent variables (Tobin, 1958). Our measure ofpricing strategies included
information on the magnitude ofthe importance ofthe given principal strategy. The tobit model
will take advantage ofthe magnitude information for testing the relationships between principal
strategies and their determinants. We tested the restricted set ofunique determinants as well as
the full set ofunique and common determinants. All ofthese results are presented in Table 7.
Table 7 about here.
The results for each principal strategy are presented next.
Skim Pricing
There are seven determinants which separate Skim pricing from the low priced new
product strategies. They are high levels ofproduct differentiation, a major product change, high
costs, cost disadvantage due to scale, cost disadvantages due to learning, low market elasticity,
low brand elasticity and high capacity utilization.
About 14% ofrespondents (37/27) incorporated skim pricing into their overall strategy.
The overall tobit model was significant at the p
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Penetration Pricing
Nine percent ofrespondents (25/270) indicated that they used this strategy.
The sole unique determinant for this strategy is a cost advantage due to scale. This
determinant is significantly related to Penetration pricing for the restricted model (p
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competition in the computer chip industry when clone chip producers introduce their products at
much lower prices to shift the focus ofcompetition from performance only to a price-performance
condition. At that point, the clone manufacturers try to build an advantage over the innovating
firm by lowering their costs via large volumes. Unfortunately, firms using this approach might also
be leaving money on the table by cutting prices to build volume ifthe expected price-dominant
phase ofcompetition does not materialize.
Leader Pricing
Eleven percent ofrespondents (31/270) used Leader pricing.
High market share is the sole unique determinant ofLeader pricing. The overall model is
significant (p
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utilization) do not allow it to exploit an otherwise favorable external condition (high market
elasticity). An interesting direction for future pricing research would be to identify those
conditions which constrain the choices faced by the firm and those which are merely favorable to
a given strategy.
Low-Price Supplier
About 9% (24/270) ofrespondents followed the Low-Price Supplier strategy.
Ofthe three conditions which favor this strategy (difficulty in detecting price changes,
high market elasticity and low capacity utilization), only low factory capacity utilization is related
to the use ofthis strategy (p
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consistent with what we predict with razor-and-blade type products and durables which require
the eventual purchase ofcaptive spare parts in large quantities.
Customer Value Pricing
Customer Value pricing was used by 11% (29/270) ofrespondents.
The Tobit results for this strategy suggest that firms choose this strategy for products
which would appeal to a narrow segment (p
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are not unique to a given principal strategy, they should be viewed with some caution. The same
conditions might be appropriate for another principal strategy but this relationship was not
confirmed by our data.
Limitations and Directions for Future Research
While the results reported above are very exciting, they are not complete due to the
sample in our verification study. We are limited in the types ofproducts (industrial capital goods),
customers (domestic U.S.) and companies (domestic U.S.) studied. For example, there is little
variation in the sample in concentration and height ofentry barriers.
In addition, there was very little variation in self-evaluated product quality. The average
rating was 5.79 out of7 (std. dev. = 1.08). This is not surprising given a managers bias towards
his/her own firms products. However, keep in mind that these are very highly concentrated
markets from which firms with marginal quality may have already been eliminated.
In addition to providing validation ofour pricing framework, the empirical study ofpricing
managers provides some important insights into current pricing practices. One ofthe more
interesting results is the varied importance ofdifferent pricing strategies. The distributions ofthe
importance weights and median importance weight for each strategy is presented in Table 9.
Table 9 about here
Consider the distributions ofthe importance weights for two strategies, Price Skimming
and Complementary Product Pricing. Note that the distribution for Price Skimming has a strong
skew to the left while the distribution for Complementary Product Pricing is skewed to the right.
Several ofthe other strategies follow similar patterns.
We interpret this as an indication that some ofthe pricing strategies are primary strategies
while others are secondary, or supporting, strategies. The distributions in Table 9 indicate that
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Cost-Plus Pricing, Low-price Supplier Pricing, and Price Skimming strategies appear to be
primary strategies. Complementary Product Pricing, Bundle Pricing, and Customer Value Pricing
appear to be secondary strategies. (The median importance weights for each strategy are indicated
in Table 9).
Note that al l three ofthe strategies classified as secondary are from the product line group
ofstrategies (Complementary Product Pricing, Price Bundling, and Customer Value Pricing). This
suggests that product line pricing strategies, when chosen, will rarely be paramount in importance.
The pricing frameworkdeveloped in this paper can be used to determine which pricing
strategies should be considered when pricing a complex, high-value industrial product. However,
it does not suggest how these strategies should be combined to determine the ultimate pricing
schedule. At this stage it is only possible to comment on the relative importance ofthe strategies.
For example, it is not known ifthe strategies are usually chosen simultaneously or sequentially.
An interesting path for future research would be to explore how these strategies are integrated by
managers into a final decision
Another interesting result was the prevalence ofCost-Plus Pricing. A full 56% ofthe 270
managers mentioned Cost-Plus Pricing. When it was used, it was the dominant strategy (with an
importance weight larger than any ofthe others mentioned) 71% ofthe time. This confirms the
observations ofSimon (1989) and others that, even after all ofthe research on market- and
competitive-oriented pricing, cost-based methods remain prevalent.
Cost-Plus Pricing is an inward oriented strategy, involving company and product
considerations, while the other nine pricing strategies generally have an outward orientation,
focusing on the customer and competition (Day and Nedungadi 1994).
Over 35% ofthe managers responding used a combination ofCost-Plus Pricing and one of
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the other nine market based strategies, implying that a significant number ofmanagers are looking
inward and looking outward to set their prices. This suggests that many managers have a Janus-
faced approach to choosing a pricing strategy. Their gaze is fixed both inside and outside their
companies at the same time (Monroe 1990). Whether this approach leads to better market (sales,
share, customer retention) or financial results would be another fruitful avenue ofresearch.
Conclusion
In their 1988 article, Bonoma, Crittenden and Dolan stated that managers find little ofthe
pricing research in marketing to be ofany practical help. The industrial pricing framework
presented here can help mangers cut through some ofthe fog ofthe pricing literature without
resorting to simplistic or misleading rules ofthumb.
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End Notes:
1 . The Noble (1997) study ofpricing objectives is identical except for the measures ofpricing
strategies.
2. For example, the respondent indicated multiple price levels which may indicate the response
was for a product line rather than a single product.
3. During the five years preceding this study (1989-1994), twenty-two surveys ofmanagers were
published in the Journal ofMarketing Research (JMR). The average sample for al l ofthe surveyswas 284. During the same period, the Journal ofMarketing (JM) published 41 articles involving
surveys ofmanagers. The average sample for al l ofthe surveys was 270..
4. In the period 1989-1994, response rates were often unreported for studies in IMIR and JM.Managerial survey studies in the JM articles had average gross response rates ofabout 32% andusable response rates of29%. In the JMR articles, the response rates were higher, with the gross
response rate about 40% and the usable response rate of37%.
5. Ifwe restricted our respondents to a single choice ofprincipal strategy, we could have used a
multinomial choice model. Managers could choose strategies from up to three different strategytypes. We decided to model this process as a set ofbinary choices since the determinants we
identified are related to the choice ofindividual strategy types and not to the choice of
combinations ofstrategy types.
6. We also tested the relationship between the choice ofLeader pricing and market share using a
logit model. The independent variable was 1 ifLeader pricing was given a weight greater thanzero (3 1 observations), 0 ifthe firm gave a positive weight to either Parity or Low Price Supplier
(96 = 127 - 31 observations), or missing ifno Competitive pricing strategy was given a positiveweight (143 = 270 - 127 cases). Thus, we tested the relationship between the choice ofLeader
pricing and market share given that a Competitive pricing strategy was chosen. This conditiohal
logit model was significant at the 0.01. The coefficient for market share was positive andsignificant at the 0.01 level.
In general, the results from the logit models were identical to those from the tobit models.For Skim, Experience Curve and Customer Value Pricing, the full logit models were not
significant at the 0. 10 level. The results for Penetration pricing were identical for the restricted
and full logit models. Forthe full Leader pricing model, the coefficient for Cost advantage due tolearning was significant at the 0.10 level. For Parity pricing, the restricted model results were
identical but market share and utilization were not significant in the full logit model. For Low-Price supplier, the restricted model was identical but the coefficient for Cost advantage due tolearning was negative (p
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____________ and Brian P. Mathews (1994), The Specification ofPricing Objectives: EmpiricalEvidence form an Oligopoly Firm, Managerial and Decision Economics, Vol. 15 , pp. 73-85.
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Table 1 Pricing Strategy Definitions
PrincipalStrategy Description Related Strategies
New Product Pricing StrategiesPrice Skimming W e se t the initial price high and then Premium Pricing, Value-in-Usesystematically reduce it over t ime. Customers Pricingexpect prices to eventually fall.
Penetration W e initially se t th e price low to acceleratePricing product adoption.
Experience W e se t the price low to build volume an d reduce Learning Curve PricingCurve Pricing costs through accumulated experience.
Competitive Pricing StrategiesLeader Pricing We initiate a price change and expect th e other Umbrella Pricing, Cooperativefirms to follow. Pricing, Signaling
Parity Pricing We match the price s e t b y the overall market or Neutral Pricing, Follow erth e price leader. Pricing
Low-Price We always strive to have th e low price in t he Pa ra ll el P ri cing , Adap ti veSupplier market. Pricing, Opportunistic Pricing
Product Line Pricing StrategiesComplementaxy W e price the core product low w hen Razor-and-Blade PricingProduct Pricing complementary items such as accessories,
supplies, spare pans, services, etc. can be pricedw ith a higher premium.
Price Bundling W e offer this product as part ofa bundle of System Pricingseveral products, usually at a total price thatgivesour customers an attractive savings over
th e sum ofindividual prices.
Customer Value W e price on e version ofour product a t very Economy PricingPricing competitive levels, offering fewer features than
are available on other versio ns.
Cost-Based Pricing Strategies
Cost-Plus W e establish th e price ofthe product a t a point Contribution Pricing, Rate-ofPricing that gives us a specified percentage profit Return Pricing, Target Return
margin over our costs. Pricing, Contingency Pricing,Markup Pricing
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Table 2: Determinants ofPricing Strategies
New Product Pricing Strategies Skim Pricing
Penetration
Pricing
Experience Cur
Pricing
Unique to Strategy Product ag eType:
New (1.10) New (1.10) New (10.11)
Within-type ProductDeterminants: differentiation
High (4.8.10) Low (4,8,10) L ow (4.8.10)
Significance of
product change
Maior (6.10) Minor (6,10) Minor (6.8.10)
Costs Hi2h (4.10) Low (4) L ow (4)
Scale or experience
curve effectsDemand
Disadvanta2e (10)
Inelastic (4.8.10)
Advantaae: scale
(3.4.8.10.11)Elastic (1.3,4.6.8)
A dvant a~ i e :
experience (4.8.10.1Elastic (1.3.4,6.8.9)
Factorvcapacity
utilization
Hi~h(3.l0) Low(l0.1l) Low(10.l1)
Price Low-Price
Competitive Pricing Strategies Leadership Parity Pricing Supplier
Unique to Strategy Product Life CycleType:
Mature (5) Mature (3.5) Mature (5)
Ease ofdeterminingdemand
Easy (4) Ea~ (4) Easy (4)
Within-type Market shareDeterminants:
High (4.5) Low (8) Low (2,5)
C osts L ow (4) Hi2h (2.3.4) L ow (8)
Scale or experiencecurve effects
Advantage (2,4) Disadvantaae (3 ) Advantage (4 )
Ease ofdetectingprice changes
Easy (2 ) Easy (3,8) Difficult (2)
Total demand Inelastic (2,3) Inelastic (3) Elastic (3)
Factory capacity
utilization
High (10) High (10) Low (5 )
Other Determinants: Product
differentiation
L ow (8) L ow (8)
Brand Demand Elastic (3) Elastic (3)
3 6
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Product Line Pricing StrategiesComplementaryProduct Pricing
Customer Va
Bundling Pricing Pricing
Unique to StrategyType:
Common (within-type) Determinants:
Firm sells entireproduct line (othermodels, ancillaryproducts. supplemen-tan products)
Profitability ofaccompanying orsupplementary sales
Switching costs
Per sale/contractpricing
Market appealMarket growth rate
Ease ofdetecting
price changes
Hi!h (3.5
H ii~h (1 1
Y es (4
Narrow
Low
Difficult
Other Detenninants: Brand demand Elastic (3 ) Elastic (3.7.8. 10)
Cost-Based Pricing Strategies
Unique to Strategy Ease ofdetermining Diflicult (3 )Type: demand
Common (within- nonetype) Determinants:
Other Determinants: none
References:I. Dean (1950)2. Greer(1984)3 . Guiltinan, Paul and Madden (1997)
4. J a m (1993)
6. Mercer (1992)
7. Monroe (1990)8 . Nagle andHolden (1995)9. Oxenfeldt (1975)
1 0 . Schoell and Guiltinan (1995)1 1 , Tellis (1986)
Y es (3 Yes (3 Y es (3
Cost-Plus
Pricing
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Table 3 Determinants ofPricing Strategies
Definition of Determinant
Market Conditions
Sensitivity ofcustomers to price differences between brands
Sensitivity oftotal demand to changes in average price
Ease ofdetermining market demand
Market growth
Switching costs
Competitive Conditions
Ease ofdetecting competitive price changes
Concentration: Three firm concentration ratio
Product differentiation
Product/Company Conditions
Age ofproduct in years
Cost (dis)advantage due to experience curve
Cost (dis)advantage due to economies ofscale
Capacity utilization (relative)
Costs (relative to competitors)
Major Product Change: Significance ofmost current design
change
Market Coverage
Market Share
Per Sale/Contract Pricing
Profitability ofaccompanying sales ( e.g., other products)
Profitability ofsupplementary sales (e.g.. spare parts. service)
Scale in Survey
= insensitive, 7 = sensit ive
I = insensitive, 7 = sensit ive
=easy, 7 = difficult
I = low , 7 =high
= low, 7 high
=difficult, 7 = easy
I =K5%, 7=> 80%
I = low . 7 high
1 =notyet available, 2 =< 1 year,6= lO+years
I = (dis)advantage, 0 = otherwise
= (dis)advantage, 0 = otherwise
I = low , 7 high
1 =advantage, 7 =disadvantage
1 = totally new product,
o = otherwise
=all segments, 7 =one segment
1 = low, 7 =leader
1 =yes, 0 =no
1 = low , 7 high
I = low , 7 high
3 8
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Table 4 Mailing List by SIC Code and Revenue
4-digit SIC Code Industry Number ofFirms
3523 Farm 1 3 8353 1 Construction 1423532 Mining 6 3
3 5 3 7 I n d u s t r i a l T r u c k s a n d T r a c t o r s 933541 Machine Tools, Cutting 573542 Machine Tools, Forming 773549 Metal Working Machines 323554 Paper Industry Machines 8 33571 Electronic Computers 2693663 Radio and TV Communication Equipment 1883711 Tractor and Tractor Trucks 18
3721 Aircraft 413743 Railroad Equipment 643812 Search and Navigation Equipment 1183823 Process Control Instruments 151
Total 1534
Company Size Number ofFirms in Number ofFirms
(Annual Revenue in millions) Mailing List / Sample Responding
$5-$14 836/427 9 3$15-$49 393/342 77
$50-$149 149/130 3 6$150-$499 75/65 2 4
$500+ 81/70 3 9
unknownTotal 1534/1034 270
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Table 5 Cross-Validation ofPricing Strategy Using Relative Price
Strategy
Skim Pricing
Leader Pricing
Parity Pricing
Customer Value
Pricing
Experience CurvePricing
Complementary
Product Pricing
Penetration Pricing
Low Priced
Supplier
Entire Sample
Number of
Respondents
3 7
3 1
82
2 9
3 2
24
2 5
2 4
Expected
Relative
Price
High
High
Same
Low
Low
Low
Low
Low
270
Mean of
Relative
Price
4.11
3 . 9 7
3.35
3 . 3 7
3. 6 8
3 . 2 1
2.68
2 . 0 0
Std. Dev. Of
Relative
Price
1 . 5 1
1 . 4 0
1 . 2 0
1.42
1 . 4 9
1.25
1 . 7 7
1 . 2 5
t-statistic
(p-value)*
2 . 2 2 ( 0 . 0 2 )
1 . 6 3 ( 0 . 0 6 )
1 . 5 9 ( 0 . 1 2 ) * *
- 0 . 7 2 ( 0 . 2 4 )
-0.46 (0.33)
- 1 . 3 7 ( 0 . 0 9 )
- 2 . 4 9 ( 0 . 0 1 )
-6.46 (0.00)
3 . 5 6
* p-value calculated for 1-tail t-test except for ** which is the p-value forthe 2-tailed t-test.
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Table 6 Test ofUniaue Determinants ofStrategy Types
New Product Strategies Estimate Std. Error Chi-square Prob>Chi2
ProductAge(-)
InterceptModel Chi-squareModel FitPositive Responses
Competitive Strategies
-0.31
0.3212.24
p
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Table 7 : Test ofDeterminants ofIndividual Pricing Strategies
Estimate (Prob > Chi2)
Restricted Full Tobit
TobitSkim Pricing
Unique Determinants1Product Differentiation (+)Major Product Change (+ )Cost (+)
Cost disadvantage: scale (+ )Cost disadvantage: learning (+ )Market Elasticity (-)Brand Elasticity (-)
Capacity Utilization (+ )
1 9 . 2 2 ( 0 . 0 1 )
1 . 0 7 ( 0 . 9 6 )
2 . 0 7 ( 0 . 8 2 )
4 0 . 6 5 ( 0 . 0 8 )
-65.46 (0.14)
0.85 (0.90)
-10.16 (0.15)
2 . 3 5 ( 0 . 7 0 )
-185.61 (0.00)Intercept
Model Fit p K 0.043 7Sample
Penetration Pricing
Unique Determinants
Cost advantage: scale (+ )
Common Determinants
Product Differentiation (-)Major Product Change (-)
Cost (-)
Market Elasticity (+ )Brand Elasticity (+)Capacity Utilization (-)Intercept
55.88 (0.02)
- 1 5 6 . 9 8 ( 0 . 0 0 )
43.49 (0.05)
8.65 (0.24)
1 2 . 7 6 ( 0 . 5 6 )
-14.61 (0.11)
19.23 (0.01)-17.69 (0.01)-0.82 (0.89)
141.17 (0.03)
Model Fit
Sample
Experience Curve Pricing
Unique Determinants
Cost advantage: learning (+ )
Common Determinants
Product Differentiation (-)Major Product Change (-)
Market Elasticity (+ )Brand Elasticity (+)Capacity Utilization (-)
Intercept
Model FitSample
4.09 (0.84)
-125.91 (0.00)
p
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Price Leadership
Unique Determinants
Market Share (+)
Common Determinants
Cost (-)
Cost advantage: scale (+)Cost advantage: learning (+ )Ease: detecting price changes (+)Market Elasticity (-)Capacity Utilization (+)Intercept -148.29(0.00)
1 2 . 1 2 ( 0 . 2 0 )
3 1 . 0 5 (0.13)
3 3 . 0 3 ( 0 . 1 1 )
9.52 (0.10)
-3.86 (0.50)-0.11 (0.98)
- 3 2 1 . 6 3 ( 0 . 0 0 )
Model FitSample
Parity Pricing
Unique Determinants
Cost (+)
Cost disadvantage: scale (+ )Cost disadvantage: learning (+ )
Common DeterminantsMarket Share (-)Ease: detecting price changes (+ )Market Elasticity (-)Capacity Utilization (+)
Intercept
15.55 ( 0 . 0 0 )
20.55 (0.13)16.39 (0.38)
-94.23 (0.00)
16.57 (0.00)1 0 . 2 4 ( 0 . 4 4 )
5.60 (0.76)
-9.15 ( 0 . 0 0 )
-0.18 (0.96)9.12 (0.01)6.07 (0.07)
-113.06 (0.00)
Model FitSample
Low-Price Supplier
Unique DeterminantsEase : detecting price changes (-)Market Elasticity (+)
Capacity Utilization (-)
C o m m o n DeterminantsMarket Share (-)Cost (-)
Cost advantages due to scale (+ )Cost advantage: learning (+ )Intercept
Model FitSample
1.54 (0.82)-5.93 (0.42)
-15.52 (0.04)
-82.93 (0.11)
p
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Bundling Pricing Full Tobit
Unique DeterminantsPer Sale/Contract Pricing (+ )Intercept
38.32 (0.02)
-99.25 (0.00)
Model FitSample
p < 0.0135
Complementary Product Pricing
Unique DeterminantsProfitability ofaccompanying
sales (+)Profitability ofsupplementary
sales (+)Switching Costs (+ )Intercept
- 0 . 2 3 ( 0 . 9 6 )
1 5 . 1 7 ( 0 . 0 1 )
2 . 0 1 ( 0 . 5 6 )
- 1 6 0 . 0 9 ( 0 . 0 0 )
ModelFitSample
p
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Table 8: Validated Pricing Strategy Framework
Strategy
Type
New ProductPricing
Determinants
.New model
Principal Strategies
related strategies
Skimming
Premium Pricing Value-in-Use Pricing
Penetration Pricing
Unique Determinants
High productdifferentiation in the
market Cost disadvantage
due to scale
Cost advantage dueto scale
Experience/LearningCurve Pricing
Competitive Mature marketPricing
Product LinePricing
Firmsells
substitute or
complement
ary products
Cost-Based Difficult toPricing determine
demand
* based on t-tests in Table 5
Leader Pricing
UmbrellaPricing Cooperative Pricing
SianalingParityPricing
Neutral pricing
Follower pricing
High costs
Additional
Favorable
Conditions
Elastic marketdemand
Inelastic branddemand
N ot a majorproduct change
High productdifferentiation inthe market
Low capacity
utilization Cost advantages
due to learning Easy to detectprice
changes
Low market share
Elastic marketdemand
High capacityutilization
Low costs
Cost advantagesdue to scale
No cost advantagedue to learning
Low -price Supplier Lowfactory Parallel pricing utilization
Adaptive pricing
Opportunistic pricing
Bundling Per saleI contract
System Pricing pricing
Complementary Product High profit onPricing supplementa~ sales
Razor-and-bladepricing
Customer Value Pricing Hard to detect price
Economy pricing changes
Narrow marketappeal
Cost-plus pricing Contribution Pricing Target return pricing
Markup pricing
Relative
Price
High
Low
el-liali
Equal
Low
Low
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Table 9 ImportanceWeight Distribution by Pricing Strategy
Strategy 10% 20% 30% 400/0 50% 60% 70% 800/o 90% 100% Total
New Product Pricing Strate ies
SkimPricing
Penetration Pricing
ExperienceCurvePricing
2 6
2 5
4 5
5
5
5
0
0
0
3
3
3
1 2
0 3
1 3
1
1
1
0
0
0
16
5
9
36
25
3 1
ies[1 3 6 210 4 [31
1 2 5 3 6f1 2 2 8 1
112 0 3 3 j 0 7 f 2 4
Strategies . . .
C om plem entary Product 7 9 3 1 2 0 1 0 0 1 2 4Pricing
BundlePricing 8 9 3 2 1 .2 4 2 0 4 2 4
Customer Value Pricing 2 9 8 0 1 2 1 1 0 6 3 0
Competitive Pricing Stratef 5
Ill
3
LeaderPricing
ParityPricing
Low-PriceSuppl ier
4
4
4
1
1
1
7
7
Product Line Pricing
Cost-based Pricing Strategies
Cost-Plus Pricing 1 0 8 1 0 9 1 4 1 3 1 2 1 4 3 5 7 1 50
Importance Weight
Note: Median is indicated by underlined type.
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Figure 1: Overview ofIndustrialPricing Framework
New model ofproduct
Company sellsc o m p l e m e n t a r y o r
substitute products
P e r s a l e . / c o n t r a c t
p r i c i n g
Narrow market appeal Low market growth
Difficultto detectp r i c e c h a n g e s
Complementary
Product Pricing( low)
BundlingPricing
CustomerValue Pricing( low)
D i f f i c u l t t o
e s t i m a t e demand
C o s t - b a s e d P r i c i n g
S t r a t e g i e s
S t r a t e g y T y p eD e t e r m i n a n t s
S t r a te g y T y p e s U n i q u e P r i n c ip a lS t r a t e g y D e t e r m i n a n t sPrincipal Pricing
Strategies(relative price)
H i g h p r o d u c t
d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n
S i g n i f i c a n t d e s i g nc h a n g e
H i g h r e l a t i v e c o s t s C o s t d i s a d v a n t a g e d u e
to scale or experience Inelastic demand Low factory
u t i l i z a t i o n
Skim Pricing(high)
High relative costs
Cost disadvantage dueto scale or experience
S
0
Difficultto detect
p r i c e c h a n g e s
E l a s t i c t o t a l demand
Low c a p a c i t yutilization
H i g h p r o f i t a b i l i t y o f
a c c o m p a n y i n g o rs u p p l e m e n t a r y s a l e s
H i g h s w i t c h i n g c o s t s
Cost-PlusPricing
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Figure 2: Managerial Pricing Strategy Survey
GENERAL PRODUCF E NFORM ATION pale
lam interested in th e most recent pricing decision you were involved with in th e last 1 2 months forthe U.S. market. The
decision you describe should b e fo r a s i n g l e d u r a b l e good9 sold in business-to-business markets. Please provide some
general back~ound information for your product. Answer for one oroduct only
1. This specific product is best described as : _____________________________________________________
2 . The p r i n c i p a l i n d u s t r y you consider th e product to he part of (e.g., heav y truck, machine tool, etc.):
3 . Your a p p r o x i m a t e ~wi~selling price i s :
u n d e r from $ 1 , 0 0 0 f r o m $ 3 , 0 0 0 from SIO .000 from S30.000 f r o m $ 10 0 , 0 0 0 $ 30 0 , 0 0 0$ 1.000 t o $2,999 to S9.999 t o $ 2 9 , 9 9 9 t o $ 9 9 , 9 9 9 t o S2 9 9 , 9 9 9 o r o v e r
00 0 0 0 0 0
4. How often do you (or your company) set th e pricing for this product?
weekly monthly quarterly semi-annually annually each saledcontmct Otlw ____________
o 0 0 0 0 0 05. Wha t percent ofth e annua l dollar sales of your division (or company, as appropriate) does this product represent?
~ lessthan atleas: 1% atleastS% atleast2.5% 50%I Division I 1 % bu t under 5% but under 25% but under 3 0 % or over0 0 0 0 0
6. W hen th e current model w as znti~oduced, how significant w as th e design change?
totally new p ro du ct m aj or revision m inor revision no change
0 0 0 0
7. We offer other products to th i s m arket which , relative to th i s product. ar e (check al l that apply):sub s t i tu t e s c om p l e m e n t s h a v e n o r e la t io n s h i p to this p r oduc t no o ther produc t s are ava i lab leo o 0 0
8. How would yo u charecterize ~ in relation toy~ THREE l a rges t competitors?
morethan5% 2%to5% about 2%to5% mored~an5% Suchacompauisonisbelow below equal above above meaningless in m y situation
o 0 0 0 0 09 . Approximately what percentage ofth e dollar sales fo r this product categoiy in the U.S. market is made by the
THREE largest manufactiws? Ifthere ar e fewer than three manufacturers in total, mark 8 0% or more.
-lessihan atleast20%but atleast3S%hut a:leaszS0%but arie ,as t65% bsn 80%or20 % under35% under50% under65% wider80% mom0 Ii 0 0 0 0
10. H ow extensive is y o u r coverege of th e various market segments for th i s product? Mark an X at the p o i n t on th e
scale that best describes th e number ofmarket segments in which you ar e active:
al l segments i!l~i~~I only one segment
I I. H ow easy is it to determine the m ark et demand for th r ~ single product? M ark an X at the appropriate po int .
very d i f W u l i
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STRATEGY USED IN YOUR PRICING DECISION page 2
Consider which ofthe follow ing best describes th e pricing strategy that you used fo r the product you just described on the
previous page. Remember that this is fo r th e decision made in th e past 12 months fo r a single product.
IEAIE~X
A. Price Skimming
B. PenetrationPricing
C. Experience CurvePricing
D. ComplementaryProduct Pricing
E . Price Bundling
F. Customer ValuePricing
G. Price Leader
H. Parity Pricing
I. Low PriceSupplier
J. Cost-pluspricing
DE S CRIPTION
We se t th e initial price high an d then systematically reduce it o v e r t i m e . C u s t o m e r s e x p e c tprices to eventually fall.Related Strategies: Premium Pricing, Value-in-Use Pr ic ing
W e initially se t the price low to accelerate product adoption.
W e se t the price low to build volume and reducecosts through accumulated experience.Related Strategies: Learning Curve Pricing
We price th e core product low when complementary i tems such as accessories, supplies,spare parts, services, etc. can be priced with a higher margin.Related Strategies: R azor -and-B lade Pricing
We offer this product as part ofa bundle ofseveral products , usually at a to ta l price th a tgives our customers an attractive savings over th e stun of th e individual prices.Related Strategies: System Pr ic ing
We price one version ofou r product at very competitive levels, offering fewer features thanare available on other versions.Related Strategies: Economy Pricing
We initiate a price change an d expect th e other f irms to follow.Related Strategies: Umbrella Pricing, Co operative Pricing, Signaling
We match th e price set by th e overall market or by th e price leader.Related Strategies: Neutral Pricing, Price Follower Pricing.
We always strive to have the low price in the market .Related Strategies: Parallel Pricing, Adaptive Pricing,Opportunistic P ricing
We establish th e price ofthe produ ct at a point that gives us a specified percentage profitmargin over our costs.Related Strategies: Con tribution Pricing, Rate-of-Return Pricing, Target-ReturnPricing, Contingency Pricing, Markup Pricing
Questions:
I. Ifyo u used a pricing strategy not listed above p l ea s e ~ ~
2. Which pricing strategy ~ describes what yo u used for pricing this
product? Enter the appropriate letter from above: s t ra t egy :
3. Ifyou used more than one strategy in your decision, enter th e letter ofeach strategy an d its relative importance in
your decision b dividing l00~ among the various strategies used:
strategy: [J : _________ strategy: III: ..........................%; s t ra t egy :~IJ: _________
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SITUATION WHEN Y O U MADE THE PRICING DE CIS ION page 3
I. Circle th e number on th e scale w hich best describes th e situation atth e t u n e th e p r ic ingdecision ~ made.
1.1 YOUR MARKET
a. Market growth rate:
b. Sensitivity ofmarket demand to changes in th e average
m a r k e t p r i c e :
c. Sensitivity ofcusto