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THE CHRONOLOGIST'S DURKHEIMAND SOCIOLOGY

Roland RobertsonProfessor of Sociology, Universities of York and Pittsburgh

Emile Durkheim : His Life and Work, by Steven Lukes . London: Allen Lane,The Penguin Press, 1 973 . pp. xi+676, ,E6.5o

The raison d'etre, not to speak of the mode of construction, of studies ofindividual sociologists has received very little attention . If one maintainsthat a comprehensive study of the work of, say, Georg Simmel is badlyneeded, upon what lines might one be arguing? To celebrate the brillianceof a particular man? To debunk a diffusely established position of influenceon modern sociology? To learn from Simmel something substantive whichwill enhance the discipline in the immediate or long-term future? Tocomprehend the ways in which a highly respected man grappled withserious sociological problems, so that we may utilize that knowledge inthe solution of modern problems? These are only a few of the possibilities .

In his long, searching study, Steven Lukes seeks an historical under-standing of Durkheim's ideas and the formation of `critical judgementsabout their value' (p. 1) . In sum, for Lukes his is `a study in intellectualhistory which is also intended as a contribution to sociological theory'(p. r) . Unfortunately neither the term `intellectual history' nor the phrase`contribution to sociological theory' is clearly defined . In the broad sweepof his study we learn-by default-that intellectual history is, for Lukes,the presentation of Durkheim's ideas in chronological order of Durkheim'sown writing . Similarly, by default we learn that contribution to socio-logical theory means what is left-over after Lukes himself has (selectively)criticized some aspects of Durkheim's work . In the latter respect Lukescuriously speaks of introducing critical analysis where appropriate. But weare given no elaboration whatsoever as to what the criterion of appro-priateness involves . This is, in my view, the overriding weakness of thebook. In one respect it is an inevitable and understandable weakness .Given the widespread-and sometimes contradictory-impact of Durk-heim's writing and teaching it would be an almost impossible task to dealcritically with every facet of Durkheim's substantive sociology-unless onewere willing to take the time to become a modern expert in the sociologiesof education; religion and knowledge ; politics ; law and deviance; suicide ;

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kinship ; and linguistics ; not to speak of methodological theory and thevarieties of modern general theory . Thus under the guise of the term`where appropriate' Lukes criticizes Durkheim whenever he detects adeficiency in terms of Durkheim's mode of reasoning and wherever hefeels confident enough about his own familiarity with the theme inquestion, in terms of the modern state of the relevant sub-discipline, tocope with it. But we are not provided with any relatively independent,crystallized conception of a substantive basis for the assessment ofDurkheim's sociology .

Lukes suggests that historical understanding and critical judgements ofvalue are to some extent contradictory aims ; but they may well not be ascontradictory as he makes them out to be. Lukes himself writes in a par-ticular historical and sociocultural context and he never indicates whichaspects of that context-notably in its `purely' sociological aspects-hefinds attractive. For example, Lukes says that there is `the sociologists'Durkheim (strongly coloured by the Parsonian interpretation)' and thatthere are a number of other kinds of Durkheim . And yet Parsons is invokedon only three occasions in a book which, excluding the indexes, runs to656 pages. If Lukes is attempting to make a contribution to sociologicaltheory, and clearly at the same time has very little respect for Parsons'interpretation of Durkheim, then surely it behoves him to show in whatrespects `the sociologist's Durkheim' is inadequate, misconceived, orwhatever. A combination of historical understanding and the making of acontribution to sociological theory should surely involve a willingness toestimate the fruitfulness of the various trajectories of sociological influencewhich have been mounted via Durkheim's work. The combination is notin any way contradictory if by historical understanding we mean thelocation of Durkheim's work in the triple-faceted circumstance ofDurkheim's precursors (acknowledged and objectively discerned) ;Durkheim's immediate intellectual and sociocultural context ; and thecourses which sociology has taken since Durkheim died . The idea ofestablishing and maintaining fidelity to what Durkheim said (and thereis much of that in this book) could hardly be in any sense a contributionto sociological theory, unless one clearly regarded Durkheim as correct orhighly persuasive in respect of more or less everything he wrote-whichLukes very clearly does not . The only sensible alternative would seem to beto estimate what is fruitfully relevant to here-and-now sociology in Durk-heim's work and those aspects of his work upon which post-Durkheimsociologists have built. If some sociologists have got Durkheim wrong andyet built-up promising analytic schemes, established relatively solidempirical generalizations, and so on, then this as such is neither acriticism of Durkheim nor of the work of those more recent sociologicalcontributions .

To these criticisms of the conception of his study and its structure Iwould add that many of Lukes' own appraisals have in fact been producedby others. This is not in any sense whatsoever meant as a comment on theintellectual honesty of Lukes' study, but rather as a simple suggestion

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that much of his book is redundant . I would say that this is particularly-but by no means exclusively-true of the chapters on religion . Virtuallyall of the assessments which Lukes produces have been adumbratedpreviously and specialists in the study of religion would learn nothing newfrom this book. Indeed even though there are a number of references torecent work in a broadly Durkheimian tradition the selectiveness of Lukesis jarring . He says, for example, that `no evidence is offered in PrimitiveClassification or The Elementary Forms to show that particular morphologicalor organizational features of particular societies cause particular classi-ficatory or conceptual schemes; indeed, the evident lack of a correspond-ence in many cases cited is especially damaging to this claim .' I doubtwhether anybody would wish to deny this argument ; but the fact thatDurkheim exhibited both analytic and empirical weaknesses in this areashould not disguise the fact that others-notably Swanson-have beenrather more successful, having adopted stances in a directly Durkheimianmode. The same kind of point can be made in respect of Lukes' discussionof Suicide . In a chapter which is very penetrating in teasing out theminutiae of Durkheim's presentation, Lukes invokes Halbwachs' assertionthat motivations having to do with suicide can be explained by socialcauses. As the relevant quotation shows, Halbwachs says that this wouldbe to travel further along the Durkheimian path than Durkheim himselfwas seemingly willing to go (at that stage of his sociological development,one might add) . Yet Lukes seems entirely oblivious to the implicationsof invoking Halbwachs, for the line of Lukes' argument throughout thediscussion of Suicide is the conventional anti-Durkheimian thrust, namelyits failure to deal with internal, individual perceptions and definitions, soperpetuating the bifurcation of the reality with which the sociologist dealsand which has had such unfortunate consequences for modern sociology.What Halbwachs was seeking was a genuinely sociological study ofmotivation-perfectly conceivable in Durkheimian terms (althoughDurkheim did of course cling to a different kind of dualism, the splitwithin the individual between sensational-sensual and the intellectual-moral) .

As I see it, this kind of deficiency in Lukes' book arises from hisdecision to deal with Durkheim on an entirely chronological basis (exceptfor thirty-six pages of introductory conceptual discussion) . For within lessthan fifteen pages of the discussion of Halbwachs, Lukes is saying that bythe time of his latest writings Durkheim `came very close to maintainingthat symbolic thought is a condition of and explains society .' The choiceof words could perhaps be criticized, but nobody who is familiar withDurkheim's sociology could deny this assessment. Lukes is not interested-or so it seems-in asking why Durkheim shifted his position? Indeed heseems to concur with the synchronic assessment of Levi-Strauss thatDurkheim was `torn between two contradictory claims' concerning therelationship between the social and the intellectual . To produce suchjudgments at one point in a diachronically conceived exercise is peculiar .In any case, piecemeal evaluation of Durkheim's work prevents Lukes

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from undertaking adequately that which he wants to do, namely make acontribution to sociological theory . A more gestalt-type view would haveallowed him to become interested in a sociological theorist at work overtime. Perhaps the best example of this weakness is provided by Lukes'failure ever to consider the issues raised by Durkheim's oft-characterizedsociologism, as an issue in its own right.

By way of contrast we are treated to one Lukesian thematic constant,namely the claim that Durkheim was frequently guilty of arguing byelimination (of rival theories) and committing petitio principii . I doubtwhether many experts on Durkheim would disagree with this assessment .Moreover, it would indeed be irresponsible not to point out weaknessesin reasoning . And yet to emphasize the latter at the expense of directconfrontation with the viability of Durkheim's sociology is perhapsirresponsible .

Thus Lukes' book is lacking in a sense of constructiveness . For all theproblems raised by that characteristic and the expository deficiencieswhich I have indicated, many sociologists and historians of ideas are goingto be grateful to Lukes for his sheer comprehensiveness at the level ofdetails about Durkheim's life and work. In that sense it is now our mostimportant source book-but it could have been much more .