International Journal of Operations & Production ManagementEmergent change and planned change competitors or allies?: The case of XYZconstructionBernard Burnes

Article information:To cite this document:Bernard Burnes, (2004),"Emergent change and planned change competitors or allies?", InternationalJournal of Operations & Production Management, Vol. 24 Iss 9 pp. 886 - 902Permanent link to this document:http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/01443570410552108

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Users who downloaded this article also downloaded:Bernard Burnes, (1996),"No such thing as a one best way to manage organizational change",Management Decision, Vol. 34 Iss 10 pp. 11-18 http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/00251749610150649Sharyn E. Herzig, Nerina L. Jimmieson, (2006),"Middle managers' uncertainty management duringorganizational change", Leadership & Organization Development Journal, Vol. 27 Iss 8 pp. 628-645http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/01437730610709264Steven H. Appelbaum, Sally Habashy, Jean-Luc Malo, Hisham Shafiq, (2012),"Back to the future: revisitingKotter's 1996 change model", Journal of Management Development, Vol. 31 Iss 8 pp. 764-782 http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/02621711211253231

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Emergent change and plannedchange competitors or allies?

The case of XYZ construction

Bernard BurnesManchester School of Management, UMIST, Manchester, UK

Keywords Organizational change, Process planning, Change management, Emergent strategy

Abstract In a fast-moving and unpredictable world, there can be little doubt that organizationalchange is one of the most important issues facing organizations. This is especially so, when it isclaimed that over 60 per cent of all change projects are considered to fail. Not surprisingly,therefore, there is also much debate about which approach to change is the best. Over the past20 years, the emergent approach appears to have superseded the planned approach as the mostappropriate. However, as this paper will argue, the idea that planned and emergent changes arecompeting approaches, rather than complementary, is contestable. This paper looks at the case ofXYZ construction which, between 1996 and 2000, used both emergent and planned approaches totransform itself. The paper concludes that organizations need to avoid seeking an one best wayapproach to change and instead seek to identify the approach which is best suited to both type ofchanges they wish to undertake, according to the organizations context.

IntroductionIf there is one thing that organization theorists and practitioners agree upon, it is thatchange which is more frequent, of a greater magnitude and much less predictable thanever before (Carnall, 2003; Cummings and Worley, 2001; Kanter, 1997; Kotter, 1996;Peters, 1997). Most commentators appear to share Hammer and Champys (1993, p. 23)view that . . .change has become both pervasive and persistent. It is normality.However, as Stace and Dunphy (2001) show, change comes in many shapes and sizes;sometimes change is incremental and hardly noticed, whilst at other times change islarge and dramatic. It is therefore, important not to see change as some amorphousmass but to understand the range and variety of change situations. It is also importantto recognise that successful change is difficult to accomplish. For example, Beer andNohria (2000) estimate that about two-thirds of change projects fail, whilst a review ofthe literature by Burnes (2004b) suggests that for some types of change, the figure maybe even higher. Therefore, the importance of organizational change appears to bematched by the difficulty in successfully accomplishing it.

This, of course, directs attention to how these change efforts are managed. In arecent paper in this Journal, Bamford and Forrester (2004) examined organizationalchange from the perspective of both planned and emergent approaches to change.Though their findings could be construed as an argument against the plannedapproach and in favour of the emergent, they state that: This is not the case at all. Ourmain dispute is with the increasingly unreflective manner of most organizationalchange initiatives (Bamford and Forrester, 2004, pp. 555-6). In essence, theirargument, as with that of many others (Beer and Nohria, 2000; Burnes, 2004b; Kanteret al., 1992; Stace and Dunphy, 2001) is that there are a variety of approaches to change,and that an important element in achieving successful change is to choose the mostappropriate approach for the type of change being undertaken and the circumstances

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International Journal of Operations &Production ManagementVol. 24 No. 9, 2004pp. 886-902q Emerald Group Publishing Limited0144-3577DOI 10.1108/01443570410552108

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in which it is being undertaken. This paper presents a longitudinal case study of anorganization which, between 1996 and 2000, transformed its culture, managementpractices and structure through a combination of emergent and planned changes. Thepaper begins by revisiting the change management debate. It then presents thebackground and methods used in the case study. This is followed by a description andanalysis of the case study. The paper concludes by arguing that successful changedepends on those who manage organizations, recognising the need to use a variety ofapproaches to change rather than favouring one in all situations.

The change management debateThough there are many different approaches to organizational change and many waysof categorising these, there is a general agreement that the two dominant ones are theplanned and emergent approaches (Burnes, 2004b; Cummings and Worley, 2001;Dawson, 1994; Kanter et al., 1992; Pettigrew, 2000; Stace and Dunphy, 2001; Weick,2000; Wilson, 1992). From the 1950s until the early 1980s, the field of organizationalchange was dominated by the planned approach, which originated with Kurt Lewin.Though often portrayed by its critics as a simplistic approach to change, Lewinsapproach, as Burnes (2004a) shows, comprised of four complex elements.

(1) Field theory. This is an approach to understand group behaviour by mappingout the totality and complexity of the field in which the behaviour takes place(Back, 1992).

(2) Group dynamics. Lewins view was that it was not possible to change thebehaviour of a group successfully unless one understood the interactions(dynamics) between its members (Allport, 1948; Bargal et al., 1992).

(3) Action research. Lewin conceived action research as a two-pronged processwhich would allow groups to identify and achieve change. First, it emphasisesthat change requires action, and is directed at achieving this. Second, itrecognises that successful action is based on analysing the situation correctly,identifying all the possible alternative solutions and choosing the one mostappropriate to the situation at hand.

(4) Three-step model. A successful change project, Lewin (1947) argued, involvedthe following three steps.. Step 1: unfreezing. Lewin believed that the stability of human behaviour was

based on a quasi-stationary equilibrium supported by a complex field ofdriving and restraining forces. He argued that the equilibrium needs to bedestabilised (unfrozen) before old behaviour can be discarded (unlearnt) andnew behaviour successfully adopted.

. Step 2: moving. As Schein (1996, p. 62) notes, unfreezing is not an end initself; it . . .creates motivation to learn but does not necessarily control orpredict the direction. Instead, one should seek to consider all the forces atwork to identify and evaluate, on a trial and error basis, all the availableoptions (Lewin, 1947).

. Step 3: refreezing. This is the final step in the three-step model. Refreezingseeks to stabilise the group at a new equilibrium in order to ensure that thenew behaviours are relatively safe from regression.

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Lewin saw these four elements as being used and working together rather than beingseen as separate theories. As Burnes (2004a) notes, in order to achieve successfulchange, Lewin believed it was necessary:

(1) to analyse and understand how social groupings were formed, motivated andmaintained. This requires the use of both field theory and group dynamics.

(2) to change the behaviour of social groups. This requires the use of both actionresearch and the three-step model of change.

Lewin saw that planned change is primarily aimed at improving the operation andeffectiveness of the human side of the organization through participative, group- andteam-based programmes of change (Burnes, 2004a; French and Bell, 1999). Lewin died in1947, but his approach to planned change was broadened out and updated by theorganization development movement and applied to organization-wide initiatives suchas culture and structural change programmes (Cummings and Worley, 2001).Nevertheless, by the early 1980s, with the oil shocks of the 1970s, the rise of corporateJapan and the severe economic downturn in the West, it was clear that manyorganizations needed to transform themselves rapidly and often brutally if they were tosurvive (Burnes, 2004b; Dunphy and Stace, 1993; Kanter, 1989; Peters and Waterman,1982). Given its group-based, consensual and relatively slow nature, planned changebegan to attract criticism as to its appropriateness and efficacy, especially from theculture-excellence school, the postmodernists and the processualists (Burnes, 2004b).

Proponents of culture-excellence argued that Western organizations were toobureaucratic, inflexible, and slow to change (Peters and Waterman, 1982). Their viewof planned change is probably best summed up by Kanter et al.s (1992, p. 10) scathingcomment that:

Lewins model was a simple one, with organizational change involving three stages;unfreezing, changing and refreezing . . . This quaintly linear and static conception theorganization as an ice cube is so wildly inappropriate that it is difficult to see why ithas not only survived but prospered. . . . Suffice it to say here, first, that organizationsare never frozen, much less refrozen, but are fluid entities with many personalities.Second, to the extent that there are stages, they overlap and interpenetrate one anotherin important ways.

In place of Lewins model, culture-excellence called for organizations to adopt flexiblecultures which promote innovation and entrepreneurship and that encouragebottom-up, continuous and co-operative change. Its advocates maintained thattop-down coercion, and rapid transformation, might also be necessary to create theconditions in which this type of approach could flourish (Kanter, 1983; Peters andWaterman, 1982).

At the same time, others were drawing attention to the role of power and politics indecision-making. Writers such as Pfeffer (1981, 1992) claimed that the objectives andoutcomes of change programmes were more likely to be determined by powerstruggles than by any process of consensus-building or rational decision-making. Forthe postmodernists, power is also a central feature of organizational change, but itarises from the socially-constructed nature of organizational life:

In a socially-constructed world, responsibility for environmental conditions lies with thosewho do the constructing. . . . This suggests at least two competing scenarios for

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organizational change. First, organization change can be a vehicle of domination for thosewho conspire to enact the world for others . . . An alternate use of social constructionism is tocreate a democracy of enactment in which the process is made open and available to all . . .such that we create opportunities for freedom and innovation rather than simply for furtherdomination (Hatch, 1997, p. 367-8).

The other important perspective on organizational change which emerged in the 1980swas the processual approach. Processualists argue that change is continuous,unpredictable and essentially political in nature (Pettigrew and Whipp, 1993; Wilson,1992). As Dawson (1994, pp. 3-4) comments:

The processual framework . . . adopts the view that change is a complex and dynamic processwhich should not be solidified or treated as a series of linear events. . . . central to thedevelopment of a processual approach is the need to incorporate an analysis of the politics ofmanaging change.

As Weick (2000) noted, the main critics of planned change tend to assemble under thebanner of emergent change. Weick (2000, p. 237) states that:

Emergent change consists of ongoing accommodations, adaptations, and alterations thatproduce fundamental change without a priori intentions to do so. Emergent change occurswhen people reaccomplish routines and when they deal with contingencies, breakdowns, andopportunities in everyday work. Much of this change goes unnoticed, because smallalterations are lumped together as noise in otherwise uneventful inertia . . .

The rationale for the emergent approach stems, according to Hayes (2002, p. 37), fromthe belief that:

. . . the key decisions about matching the organizations resources with opportunities,constraints and demands in the environment evolve over time and are the outcome of culturaland political processes in organizations.

Underpinning the rise of the emergent approach were new perspectives on the natureof change in organizations. Up to the late 1970s, the incremental model of changedominated. Advocates of this view see change as being a process whereby individualparts of an organization deal incrementally and separately with one problem and onegoal at a time. By managers responding to pressures in their local internal and externalenvironments in this way, over time, their organizations become transformed (Cyertand March, 1963; Hedberg et al., 1976; Lindblom, 1959; Quinn, 1980, 1982).

In the 1980s researchers began to draw attention to two new perspectives onchange: the punctuated equilibrium model and the continuous transformation model.The former approach to change:

. . . depicts organizations as evolving through relatively long periods of stability (equilibriumperiods) in their basic patterns of activity that are punctuated by relatively short bursts offundamental change (revolutionary periods). Revolutionary periods substantively disruptestablished activity patterns and install the basis for new equilibrium periods (Romanelli andTushman, 1994, p. 1141).

The inspiration for this model arises from two sources: first, from the challenge toDarwins gradualist model of evolution in the natural sciences (Gould, 1989); andsecondly, from research showing that whilst organizations do appear to fit the

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incrementalist model of change for a period of time, there does come a point when theygo through a period of rapid and fundamental change (Gersick, 1991).

Proponents of the continuous transformation model of change reject bothincrementalist and punctuated equilibrium models. They argue that in order to surviveorganizations must develop the ability to change themselves continuously in afundamental manner. This is particularly the case in the fast-moving sectors such asretail and computers (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997; Greenwald, 1996). Like arapidly-growing number of academics and practitioners, many supporters of thecontinuous transformation model base their ideas on the work of complexity theorists(Bechtold, 1997; Black, 2000; Boje, 2000; Choi et al., 2001; Gilchrist, 2000; Lewis, 1994;Macbeth, 2002; Shelton and Darling, 2001; Stacey et al., 2002; Tetenbaum, 1998).

Kanter et al. (1992), addressing the issue of transformational change, noted that itcan be achieved either by a bold stroke approach (rapid overall change) or a long marchapproach (incremental change leading to transformation over an extended periodof time).

In a similar vein, Beer and Nohria (2000) identify two basic archetypes or theories ofchange: Theory E, which is similar to Kanter et al.s bold stroke, and Theory O, whichis similar to Kanter et al.s long march. The main objective of Theory E change is tomaximise shareholder value. It is applied in situations where an organizationsperformance has diminished to such an extent that its main shareholders demandmajor and rapid change to improve the organizations financial performance.Typically, this is a hard approach based on downsizing, divestment of non-core orlow-performing businesses, and the heavy use of financial incentives. Theory O is alsoaimed at improving an organizations performance, but this is more a soft approachwhich is based on incrementally developing the organizations culture and its humancapabilities, and promoting organizational learning.

Beer and Nohria (2000) believe that both of these are valid models of change but thatboth have their flaws. Theory E can achieve short-term financial gains, but at the costof denuding an organization of the human capabilities and organizational culturenecessary for long-term survival. Theory O, whilst focusing on people and culture, fallsinto the trap of not restructuring to concentrate on core activities, thus failing to delivershareholder value. To achieve the gains of both these approaches, whilst avoiding thepitfalls, Beer and Nohria advocate using these in tandem by focusing on the rapidrestructuring elements of Theory E but following this with the human capabilitydevelopment offered by Theory O.

Therefore, whilst there has been a growing chorus of disapproval of planned changeover the last 20 years, and increasing support for a more emergent view of change,there is also a view that just one approach to change may be sub-optimal. As thefollowing will show, in the case of XYZ construction, success came from matching theapproach to change to the type of change being undertaken.

MethodologyAs the above literature review shows, the theory and practice of organizational changeis neither a simple nor uncontested area. Nevertheless, it is an area which is of crucialimportance to organizations. In a rapidly-changing world, the ability to align anorganizations internal arrangements with the demands of the external world is crucialfor its survival. Though, as mentioned in the introduction, a majority of change

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initiatives appear to fail, the case study of XYZ construction shows that someorganizations are successful. The case study, which was conducted over a 12-monthperiod starting in June 1999, explores what XYZ did, why it did it and how it did it inorder to understand why the company appears capable of managing even the mostcomplex changes speedily and successfully. As the case study will show, this stemsfrom its ability to involve managers and staff in planning and implementing change,and its recognition that different change situations require different approaches.

In designing the research, a case study approach was chosen because, as Yin (1994)argued, this type of approach is preferred when how or why questions are beingasked. In this case, we were interested in why the company was making the change,how it was approaching the change and what factors had assisted it to manage changesuccessfully in the previous three years. A case study methodology was also seen asappropriate because, as Yin (1994) argues, case studies can provide a richunderstanding of the organization or organizations in question. Similarly, Denzinand Lincoln (1998) and Robson (1993) also point to the ability of qualitative research tocapture the real-life context within which events take place and to capture the essenceof events, especially as they unfold. In this instance, we were offered virtuallyunlimited access to the company and its activities at a time when it was beginning theprocess of changing its structure. In effect, we were given a ringside seat during amajor change initiative. The main data collection methods were as follows.

(1) Interviews. Both formal and informal interviews were conducted with the staffin the company. The process began with one-to-one interviews with directorsand senior managers, and extended to individuals and groups at all levels in thecompany. In many cases, repeated interviews were conducted. For example,discussions took place with the managing director and key change agents on analmost weekly basis.

(2) Observation of key meetings. The researchers were present at all the mainformal meetings and a large number of informal meetings between the keyparties.

(3) Documentary data. Throughout the change process, a large amount of writtenmaterial was produced by the company, e.g. minutes of meetings, newsletters,change proposals, etc. All this material was made available to the researchers.

(4) Feedback. As the research progressed, formal and informal feedback wasprovided to the company by the researchers. This allowed the researchers tocheck their understanding of events, and to open or reopen lines of enquiry.

As the following case study will show, this data provided a rich source of informationin terms of both real-time changes taking place in the company and also of the eventsin its recent past.

The case study: XYZ constructionXYZ construction based in the UK, employs 500 staff and is part of a European-basedmultinational enterprise. Its main business is the provision of specialist services tomajor construction projects. As is typical for the construction industry, XYZ operatesin a highly competitive and at times hostile and aggressive environment. Disputesbetween contractors and sub-contractors can become bitter and frequently end inlitigation, though there have been a number of attempts over the last decade to create

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better relationships. Just as relationships between organizations tend to be hostile,relationships within organizations were also less than friendly. Till 1996, XYZ hadbeen run by an autocratic managing director who was feared by his colleagues andwho treated the company as his own personal fiefdom. His style of management wasnot liked and many felt that it was counter-productive but, as one manager commented,You didnt challenge him, you didnt put your head above the parapet, or hed makelife hell for you. When he retired, the parent company took the view that XYZ wasunderperforming and that much of this was due to poor management and lack ofco-operation within the company. His replacement was appointed with the remit toimprove the performance of the company and develop its managerial competency. Thishe did to great effect. Over a four-year period, he transformed the operation, cultureand structure of the organization.

Focussing on people and performanceThe new managing director was appointed in 1996. He had been trained as an engineerat XYZ, but had then left and worked for a number of other companies in theconstruction industry. However, the UK construction industry is a close-knitcommunity and he still knew XYZ and its staff quite well. He returned to XYZ with areputation as an enlightened manager who could deliver performance improvements.The construction industry was notorious for the antagonistic relations between themain contractors and sub-contractors such as XYZ, who specialise in one aspect of theconstruction process. However, the managing director recognised that the industrywas attempting to change, and conflict was being replaced by partnership initiatives contractors and sub-contractors working in a more co-operative and team-basedmanner (Burnes and Coram, 1999). The managing director also recognised thatexternal partnerships needed internal partnerships and teamworking if they were to besuccessful. In turn, this would require a new style of participative management in XYZ.Therefore, the managing director set out not just to upgrade XYZs management, butto undertake a root and branch overhaul of the companys operations and culture.

As a signal of his way of working and, as a first step in creating better relationshipsamongst managers, he broadened out the senior management team to include key staffwho were not directors. In what had been a very hierarchical and status-consciouscompany, this was a significant change. The managing director knew that the staff inthe company, particularly at a senior level, were experienced and competent people. Hebelieved that it was the companys interest to retain staff rather than replace them.However, he also believed that they would need to change their attitudes andbehaviours and upgrade their managerial skills if the company was to achieve thechanges that he believed were necessary. His strategy for transforming the companyrested on carrying out two crucial activities in parallel: to introduce new practices andtechniques into the company to provide a better service to customers (and thus,improve the companys overall performance), and to change attitudes and behaviourswithin the company, especially those of managers. He did not see these as beingseparate activities or programmes: he saw them as being linked. New practices, such ascustomer care and customer partnering, were not mere technical exercises. Theyrequired behavioural changes and new managerial skills. Therefore, the managingdirector wanted to create a change programme whereby any change designed toimprove the organizations performance, whether it be new skills, new techniques, or

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whatever, also had to promote and reinforce behavioural and culture change. Theconverse was also the case: any effort designed to change culture or behaviour also hadto have the objective of improving the organizations performance.

Between 1996 and 2000, the company undertook a series of organizational,management and staff development initiatives designed collectively to transform theorganizations performance and culture. The main initiatives are shown in Table I.

The managing directors first initiative was to introduce a small-scale Kaizenprogramme. The managing director saw his Kaizen initiative as delivering fourbenefits: it would show the organization that improvements could be achieved on aquick low-cost/no-cost basis; it would promote teamworking; it would give managersconfidence to delegate to and empower their staff; and it would allow both staff andmanagers to acquire new skills. In a traditional company, such as XYZ, it was not easyto introduce new ideas and new ways of working, especially where managers mightperceive them as a threat. But the managing director was persuasive in selling thebenefits of change to managers and staff, and he also made it clear that he wascommitted to this initiative and that it had to work. Over the next few years the Kaizenapproach was rolled out throughout the organization.

The next initiative, in October 1996, was a customer care programme. This wasdesigned to engender a positive view of customers by promoting joint teamworking.In an industry where antagonism between customers and suppliers (contractors andsub-contractors) was the order of the day, where settling disputes through the courtswas almost a standard practice, it was never going to be easy to promote customercare. However, the managing director knew that the future of the company dependedon working with customers to understand what they wanted and to give it to them.Once again, this initiative was a combination of organizational change andmanagement development; but, much more than the Kaizen initiative, it was alsocentral to change the culture of the organization. It began with a few key customersand a few key managers, but such was its perceived success that a year later it wasextended to the actual construction sites.

Date Event

June 1996 New managing director appointedAugust 1996 Kaizen phase 1October 1996 Customer care programme launchedMarch 1997 Investors in people launchedApril 1997 Kaizen phase 2September 1997 Customer care programme extended to

construction sitesJanuary 1998 Construction supervisors new role launchedJune 1998 New SMT formedNovember 1998 Kaizen phase 3March 1999 Site-based trainers appointedJune 1999 XYZ culture redefinedJuly 1999 Leadership and behaviours reviewSeptember 1999 Begin to develop Team XYZMarch 2000 Team XYZ up and running

Table I.Key changes at XYZ

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Other initiatives were introduced over the next few years including investors in people,and a redesigning of the construction supervisors role to ensure that the post-holderspossessed the skills, competencies and behaviours necessary to work closely withcustomers and staff under the new regime. Once again this was designed to achieve acombination of aims, including changes to working practices, the upgrading ofmanagerial competency on the construction sites, and the promotion and developmentof a more team-based culture in the organization.

In 1999, XYZ decided that it was time to redefine its culture and change itsstructure. As a number of writers have emphasised, structure and culture need to bealigned, but it takes much longer to change the latter than the former (Allaire andFirsirotu, 1984; Burnes, 1991; Handy, 1993). However, the company had already madesufficient changes to its behaviour and practices to believe that its culture was verymuch different from what it was when the managing director took over in 1996. It wentthrough a company-wide process of identifying and redefining its culture. This thenled into a process of reviewing each managers leadership abilities and behaviours.With these activities underway, the scene was set for redrawing the companysstructure in order to promote and reflect its new ways of working and its developingculture.

Towards team XYZBy 1999, the company was a much more cohesive, open and efficient organization.However, its basic structure remained the same when the new managing director hadtaken over. There was a head office, which dealt with large, national projects, and fiveregional offices which dealt with smaller, local projects. Each of these offices wasorganised on a functional basis; each had separate departments for finance, estimation,design and engineering. In addition, the head office had a human resources functionwhich covered the entire company. This structure gave rise to a number of problems:rivalry between the head office and the regional offices; rivalry and lack ofcommunication within the various offices between departments and functions.A particular problem was the relationship between estimation and design in the headoffice. The former was responsible for dealing with customers and setting the price fora job. However, the cost of a job was based on the design provided by the design office.Though based at the same building, there was friction between the two functions, witheach seeking to second-guess the other. The large jobs were often very complex andeven within the two functions of estimation and design there could be disputes aboutthe best way to carry out a job. However, there was much more dispute between thetwo functions. Estimation felt that design sometimes made jobs too complex andcostly, and design felt that estimation did not understand the technical aspects of whatthey were suggesting to customers. This caused problems for engineering, which wasresponsible for the actual construction process. The engineers sometimes foundthemselves starting jobs where there were still disagreements between estimation anddesign over what had been quoted for and what was required. Nevertheless, thegeneral view was that the company was more efficient, better-run and a friendlier placethan it had been four years earlier.

In 1999, the managing director and his deputy began to have discussions in thecompany restructuring. Their basic aim was to remove functional barriers and create amore teamwork-based, process-focussed organization. However, they did not

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underestimate how difficult this would be. It would need a complete reorganizationwithin and between the offices. It would reduce the power of the regional managers andamalgamate the head office empires of some directors. The managing directorrecognised that such changes could and probably would create friction and resistance.He also recognised that XYZ lacked the skills to plan and implement such a change.Therefore, he brought in a change consultant to assist with the exercise. Afterdiscussions with the consultant, a five-stage change process was agreed comprising ofthe following activities:

(1) change readiness audit,

(2) evaluation and planning workshops,

(3) communication,

(4) implementation and team-building, and

(5) evaluation.

Stage 1. The consultant undertook a change readiness audit to identify key issues andconcerns which need to be addressed. This consisted of face-to-face interviews with allsenior managers, and interviews and discussions with other staff from all levels of thecompany. It also involved a SWOT exercise to assess the companys competitiveposition. About 70 people, at all levels, were involved in the SWOT. The interviewsshowed that there was a general recognition of the problems brought about by theexisting structure, but little agreement about any new structure, and some concernover potential loss of status and career opportunities, especially if the new structureinvolved multi-functional teams and a reduced number of departments. However, theaudit also showed that managers and staff alike had faith in and respect for themanaging director. They also felt that the changes that had taken place over theprevious three years had been positive. In addition, there was a strong sense ofself-belief in the company that whatever changes were required, they could achievethem. The SWOT exercise showed that there was a considerable agreement that thecompany had a strong technical base, but concerns about lack of team-working andentrepreneurial flair. In particular, staff in the regional offices felt that opportunities fornew business were being missed. They also felt that their skills were under-utilised bybeing devoted mainly to small jobs rather than having an opportunity to participate inthe larger contracts. The findings from the change audit were used to structure andbegin the second stage of the change process, the evaluation and planning workshops.

Stage 2. There were five one-day workshops spread over a two-month period. Thepurpose of these workshops was to establish a set of criteria for evaluating alternativestructures, identify what alternatives existed, test these against the evaluation criteria,select a preferred structure and develop plans for implementing it. This was seen as aniterative process. Even when the evaluation criteria had been agreed, it was expectedthat further discussions about alternative structures and planning would lead to someof these being questioned, challenged and amended. Similarly, once a preferredstructure had been agreed, it could still be amended if the planning process threw upissues that had not been considered. At the end of each workshop, participants hadagreed a set of actions which they had to undertake, the key one being to go out anddiscuss what had emerged from the workshops with their colleagues in the rest of thecompany. A newsletter was also issued from each workshop.

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The first two workshops were for the senior management team (SMT) only, and theremaining three for the SMT plus the next layer of managers down, an additional 15-20people. The results of the audit were presented at the first workshop, which began withthe process of developing a set of evaluation criteria and generating alternativestructures. At the end of workshop 1, a consensus seemed to be emerging with regardto a preferred structure. At the end of workshop 2, it was agreed that the new structureshould be built around the three core activities of the company which were labelled: getwork, do work, and get paid. It was also agreed that whilst it was important to keep theregional offices, their staff should be merged into the new structure. In effect, whatemerged was a process-orientated flat, matrix structure with staff in the regionaloffices being responsible to both regional manager and process manager at the headoffice. For the head office staff, in the main, their line manager and process managerwould be the same person. As might be expected, this new structure did not emergewithout much discussion, debate and in some cases soul-searching. The SMT alsorecognised that this was probably the most radical of the proposals they had looked at,and the one that is likely to meet the most resistance both from regional managers,whose power would be much reduced, and functional specialists in estimation anddesign who would have to be merged to create the get work group. In addition, it wasclear that some directors were not happy to see their own department dismantled andtheir own position threatened.

The first of the remaining three workshops was devoted to present the proposedstructure to the new participants, testing it and in some cases agreeing to amend it. Theremaining two workshops concentrated on the details of implementing the newstructure. This covered everything from where people would sit, to whom they wouldreport, new job descriptions, communication and team-building. This latter exercisewas seen as vital to ensure that staff in the reorganised structure worked as teams andco-operated with other teams rather than merely creating another set of functionalbarriers. It was at this point that it was agreed that the new structure be named TeamXYZ to emphasise that the intention was to create a company where everyone feltthey were members of one team. There was also much discussion and consultationbetween the workshops with staff in the rest of the company. At the end of stage 2,almost all managers and supervisors in the company and a great number of theworkforce had been involved in the process, and by November 1999, the company wasready to communicate the new structure both internally and externally (to their parentcompany and customers).

Stage 3. The communication stage was both short and intense. Members of the SMTwere given the task of visiting all areas of the company and briefing them on the newstructure and how it would impact on them. Though there were newsletters andinformation on the companys Intranet, it was these face-to-face briefings with smallgroups of staff which generated the most debate. They also raised some questions,mainly of a detailed nature, which had not been addressed. However, in general, thenew structure received a positive welcome and the implementation stage then began.

Stage 4. The new structure was rolled out over a three-month period. Ideallyeverything would have changed overnight, but the logistics of moving staff around onegroup to another, physically altering office accommodation, and training managers totake on their new roles took time. Also, the intention was to ensure that all managersand supervisors, including those on sites, went through Team XYZ team-building

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workshops. Although, as expected, there were some hiccups and some unanticipatedproblems, by the end of March 2000 the new structure was fully up and running withremarkably little difficulty.

Stage 5. In April, a two-day meeting of all the companys senior and middlemanagers was held to evaluate the change that had taken place, identify issues thatneed to be addressed, and ensure that the new structure would be sustained anddeveloped, and that staff did not fall back into old ways of working. As part of thisprocess, each manager was asked to identify two steps that they personally would taketo increase the effectiveness and acceptance of the new structure, and to promoteteamworking. These were all written on flip charts and pinned to the walls foreveryone to see. At the beginning of the two-day meeting, there was something of anair of exhaustion about the managers; they had been through a period of majorupheaval and, as one said, We need a period of consolidation. At the end of thetwo-day meeting, they not only left having agreed that the new structure was workingremarkably well but also with a whole host of new changes they wanted to make forimproving the structure further.

DiscussionThough the development and implementation of a new structure at XYZ was notwithout its difficulties, it was achieved remarkably quickly and with relatively littledisruption. There was significant potential for those who might lose out from thechanges to try to prevent, or at least slow down, their implementation. All the regionalmanagers and a number of the directors saw their areas of responsibility, and thus,power reduced. Many of the functional specialists found themselves operating inmulti-functional teams where their promotion prospects depended less on theirtechnical abilities per se and more on their ability to work and manage as a teamplayer. There was also the fact that people who did not like each other suddenly foundthat they were working side by side. One explanation as to why the potential dangersto the change process did not emerge is clearly a result of the way it was managed.It was an open process that involved a great number of people either directly orindirectly. At some point, all the issues that need to be considered, even personalityissues, were brought out on the table and discussed, sometimes quite often. There wasalso a tenacity and momentum to the process. It was clear from the start that themanaging director wanted to see a new structure and would not be fobbed off with asub-optimal compromise. It was also clear from the change audit that many otherpeople in the company recognised that its structure required change, even if they werenervous about such a change. In essence, the company was ready for such a change,even if some were uncomfortable with the outcome. This of course raises the question:Why were they ready?

For organizations to work effectively, it is necessary for the structure and culture tobe aligned, but whilst structure can be changed quickly, changing culture is a muchslower and less certain process (Allaire and Firsirotu, 1984; Handy, 1993). Asmentioned earlier, Kanter et al. (1992) identified two basic approaches to change: boldstrokes and long marches. The former refers to rapid and major structuraltransformation initiatives. The latter covers slow, incremental change programmesthat run over a number of years and which are geared to achieving changes in cultureand behaviour. The wisdom received is that when companies need to transform

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themselves, they should change their structures first because this is the quickest andeasiest change to make. They should then embark on a process of developing a cultureto support and align with the new structure. This is why Kanter et al. (1992) note thatbold strokes often need to be followed by long marches for organizations to seek todevelop a culture and behaviours suitable for their new structure. In the case of XYZ,this logic was turned on its head. As Table I shows, the bold stroke, the new structure,followed the long march to create a new culture in the company, and this is why itcould be implemented so quickly, so successfully and with relatively little resistance.XYZ already possessed the culture to go along with its new structure. It alreadypossessed a management and workforce orientated to work in a team-basedenvironment. The new structure was necessary to formalise and facilitate the newteamworking ethos of the organization, and to reinforce the new culture itself.

The changes in the company up to 1999, whilst touching on all levels of thecompany and crucial for its development, were in the main small-scale anddecentralised. Though initiated by the managing director, they relied on everyone inthe company participating in them and becoming committed to them. Theresponsibility for their success ultimately rested with those involved rather thanbeing managed or driven by senior managers. Therefore, the many changes whichoccurred between 1996 and 1999, and which began to reshape managerial behaviourand the organizations culture, can be seen to be emergent in nature. However, thestructure change initiative which began in 1999 was a different animal.

The development and implementation of the new structure at XYZ can be seenmuch as a case of planned change rather than emergent change. Indeed, the five stagesseem very much like Lewins 3-stage model. The structure change process began bygathering information on the shortcomings of the existing structure and to understandthe degree of readiness to change. It also served to prepare staff and managers in thecompany for change. Therefore, it was the beginning of the unfreezing process. Thesecond stage continued this unfreezing, but began to initiate the moving phase byidentifying options and choosing the preferred option. This was followed in stage 3with the communication exercise and in stage 4 by implementation. In stage 5 therefreezing phase began by getting managers not only to recognise the legitimacy of thenew structure but to make further changes designed to reinforce (refreeze) the newstructure. Nevertheless, the planned approach to structure change needs to be viewedwithin the context of a series of changes that had emerged in XYZ since 1996. It wasthese changes which created the change of culture in the company and paved the wayfor the relatively rapid change in the organizations structure.

ConclusionsAs Stickland (1998, p. 14) remarks:

. . . the problem with studying change is that it parades across many subject domains undernumerous guises, such as transformation, development, metamorphosis, transmutation,evolution, regeneration, innovation, revolution and transition to name but a few.

XYZ demonstrates the accuracy of Sticklands remarks. It experienced a wide varietyof change initiatives. During the first few years of the managing directors tenure, thechanges were relatively small-scale, decentralised, and aimed at improvingperformance and changing behaviour. These changes tended to be emergent rather

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than all being planned in advance as part of an integrated programme of change.Whilst the managing director believed that the company required to change radicallyto survive, the details of this radical change and the timescale for achieving it werevague. Only as one initiative succeeded another did the overall objective and timescalebegan to emerge and take shape. However, the change to the organizations structurewas a different animal. It was a planned approach which was driven from the top withclear objectives and timescale.

By the end of 2000, XYZ was an organization which had made significant changesto its culture, structure and performance over a number of years. The impetus for thechanges came with the appointment of a new managing director. The new managingdirector, supported by the parent company, saw the need to transform radically howXYZ worked if it was to improve its competitiveness in a highly competitive industry.The managing director saw that the changes he believed were necessary within thecompany paralleled changes that were being attempted across the UK constructionindustry as whole. Therefore, to an extent, he was trying to align the company towardsthe changing nature of the industry. However, in order to do that, he had to overcomesignificant cultural and structural constraints within the company. His first prioritywas to begin developing a new culture in the organization. He pursued this through astream of emergent, open-ended and, to an extent, experimental changes aimed atchanging the behaviour and attitudes of managers and staff. Only when he felt that theorganizations culture was ready, did he begin the process of changing its structure.However, he adopted a planned approach to change the organizations structure ratherthan an emergent one. Though emergent change had served the company well inbringing about changes in the attitudes and behaviour of managers and staff, and inimproving the organizations performance, the managing director believed thatstructural change could not be achieved by a range of slow, local and changeinitiatives. He saw that it needed to be a relatively quick and co-ordinated approach,which was capable of involving many people and winning over the majority of theorganization, especially those who might be in a position to block change.

The recognition that the emergent approach to change was inappropriate forachieving a change in the organizations structure demonstrated one of the keycompetencies necessary to achieve successful change: understanding theorganizational context. From the day he took over as the new managing director weshowed a deep understanding of the nature of XYZ, what changes need to take placeand how, given the circumstances of the organization, they should be introduced.As Burnes (2004b) shows, it is only by understanding the context within which changetakes place, that the most beneficial types of change can be introduced in the mosteffective way. Given XYZs experience, and that of most other organizations, it seemsstrange, as Pettigrew (2000) noted that there are those who argue for just one approachto change. It is clear from the XYZ experience that planned and emergent changes arenot competitors, with each one seeking to show that it is better than the other. Nor arethey mutually exclusive or incapable of being used in combination. Rather they areallies, each one appropriate to particular change situations but neither appropriate forall change situations. As Bamford and Forrester (2004) concluded, there is no one bestway to manage change. The key issue for managers is to understand what they aretrying to achieve, the context in which their organization is operating and the strengthsand weaknesses of the various approaches to change.

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