Electoral Success of AKP. Insight Turkey Vol 13 No 4 2011 by M. Çınar

8/13/2019 Electoral Success of AKP. Insight Turkey Vol 13 No 4 2011 by M. nar

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Te Electoral Success of the AKP: Cause for Hope and Despair

107

MENDERES INAR*

* Vice President of Institute of European Union and InternationalRelations at Bakent University.

Te 2011 elections marked the

emergence o the AKP as a political

brand that is likely to win all

the elections in the oreseeable

uture. Te partys overwhelming

popularity is linked to its image as

the most reliable and trustworthypolitical party today. Te ambitious

democratization promises o the AKP

created hopes or a paradigm shif

in urkish politics in the afermath

o the elections. However the AKPs

overemphasis on its brand name and

its consequent monopolization o the

democratization process, excluding

urkeys other parties, have raised

concerns over the ulfillment oa more prooundly democratic

participatory system in urkey.

Moreover, the AKPs adoption o

populist rhetoric and stereotypes,

which is usually the hallmark o

urkeys right-wing traditionalist

parties, raises urther concerns.

Finally, the ailure o the main

opposition CHP to orm a coherent

platorm to challenge the AKPs

monopoly over urkeys politicalscene has contributed to the growing

skepticism or a new democratic

political paradigm in urkey.

ABSTRACT

Insight urkey Vol. 13 / No. 4 / 2011pp. 107-127

The Electoral Success of theAKP: Cause for Hope and

Despair

Introduction

It was obvious to almost anyone keepingan eye on urkish politics that the Justice andDevelopment Party (AKP) would emerge vic-torious rom the June 12,2011 elections in ur-key. Te actual election results surprised manyonly because o the margin o the AKPs vic-tory, or ew expected an increase in the AKPsshare o votes or a third consecutive term. Teelection results have shown that since the lastelections in 2007, the AKP has increased itsvotes by 3% and reached the threshold o 50%,which in effect meant twice as much support

as its closest ollower, the Republican PeoplesParty (CHP). Moreover, the AKPs popular-ity or the first time since 2002 elections didnot seem to involve reaction votes against theinringements o the military-led Kemalistestablishment into the political sphere. o thecontrary, the AKP seemed to owe a consider-able part o its popularity to the electorates

retrospective voting approving its past peror-mance in engaging with the Kemalist establish-


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ment and delivering material improve-

ments in the daily lives o people in ur-key. Te 2011 elections, in this respect,marked the emergence o the AKP as apolitical brand that guarantees the elec-torates satisaction, or at least, that is themost trustworthy, reliable and capable

political party more likely than any o its competitors to satisy the electoratesdemands. Tis was a huge success that firmly declared the AKP a predominantparty, unusually ree rom the depleting impact o running the country and likelyto win each and every ree and air election or the oreseeable uture. Te AKPselection declaration entitled urkey is Ready, arget is 2023, indicating a politi-cal horizon reaching as ar as the centennial o the Republic, has thereore turnedout to be not a pretentious assertion, but an acknowledgement o the act that it isthe most ormidable political party planning and, all things being equal, likely towin at least three more elections until 2023.

Tis stunning success relied less than ever on the political qualities o indi-

vidual members and candidates. Instead, it illustrated another aspect o the AKPsemergence as a political brand in which all members and candidates were ren-dered to a status o personnel o a highly coordinated and coherent party organi-zation built around the personal charisma o its leader Recep ayyip Erdoan andrun practically by him. Tis peculiarity o the AKP came to light in both candidateselection and election campaign process. All candidates, including some promi-nent figures like AKP ministers and ounders, were treated as personnel at theservice o the party, owing their positions to the party, liable to non-nominationor removal rom their traditional electoral districts and lacking any autonomoussphere o political sel-realization. Te AKP was so convinced o its brand namethat it could afford not to nominate locally rooted strong candidates like sometribe leaders in the Southeastern provinces o Ura and Siirt. Te election cam-paign illustrated that it was the party itsel and not the individual members thatwas the source o its power and success. In addition, the emphasis was not placedon the qualities o its candidates but on its uture promises and projects. More-over, none o the other parties, the election campaign and results have shown,matched the AKP in terms o organizational and ideational resources.

Compared to the internal struggle, organizational stagnation, and politicalincoherence that marred its two other competitors or the urkish votes, the CHPand the Nationalist Action Party (MHP), the AKP was able to mobilize a highlycoherent and coordinated organizational structure or the elections. It started

All candidates, including some

prominent figures like AKPministers and ounders, weretreated as personnel at theservice o the party


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preparing or the elections as early as

February/March 2010, i.e., even beorethe High Election Council announcedthe schedule or the elections. o coor-dinate the preparations or the elections,the country was divided into six elec-toral regions with a member responsibleor each. Tese coordinators acted as thedeputies o the deputy chair responsible

or the AKPs election campaigns. In some districts like Izmir, Antalya, and Mersin,where it previously ared poorly, the AKP changed the members o the local orga-nization entirely and named stronger candidates. In other districts, where thehead o the organization was likely to be nominated, s/he was taken off rom thepost in time so that the risk o working with a reshly appointed administrationwould be avoided. Meanwhile, the party organization was expanded by organizingin 957 sub-provinces, 1875 towns (belde), and 53,375 villages, and deepened byestablishing nine-member Ballot Box Executive Committees (Sandk YnetimKurullar) in 45% o the total number o ballot boxes. Tis way, a total o 741,251AKP members were mobilized or canvassing the area o their ballot box. owardsthe end o the election campaign, the AKP leader Erdoan also called to dutyaround 3 million members by sending a personal text message to their mobilephones, to which they apparently responded positively. Moreover, most o thosewho were turned down by the AKP or candidacy, i.e. the vast majority o the5,599 applicants, 167 o which were the AKP parliamentarians, have continuedto work or the AKP in the election campaign. Finally, or the last three monthsbeore the Election Day, the party organizations were kept open, serving tea and

coffee or 24 hours.1

What made the 2011 elections more interesting than the magnitude o theAKPs anticipated victory was that the unprecedented hope or a new paradigmo politics, which existed beore the election campaign, quickly aded when theelection campaign started. Te hope was or realizing the constitutive,2and con-stitution-making capacities o civilian politics or the first time since the transi-tion to multiparty politics in 1950. Tis hope by and large was generated by the

reduced political weight o the Kemalist establishment3

throughout the course othe last ew years. raditionally, the Kemalist establishment defined the legitimatesphere o politics in rather narrow terms and acted as the most effective politicalorce checking and balancing the civilian politics rom an unaccountable above-politics position. It was such circumcision o the constitutive capacities o politics

raditionally, the Kemalist

establishment defined thelegitimate sphere o politics inrather narrow terms and acted

as the most effective politicalorce checking and balancing

the civilian politics


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that aggravated many o urkeys political problems. With the transormation o

the Kemalist establishment into an ineffective network, the whole political struc-ture built on its anticipated power has started to crumble and created a space orthe emergence o potential partners to constitutive politics, in which such peren-nial problems as the Kurdish issue could finally be resolved in a collaborative anddemocratic manner. Te main opposition CHPs decision in the Spring o 2010 tochange the staunchly Kemalist leadership and policies as well as the AKPs elec-tion promise o delivering advanced democracy seemed to have substantiatedthis hope. Indeed, the talk o promulgating a new constitution, finding a final

resolution o the Kurdish issue, and deending the autonomy o politics to theveto imposed by the High Election Council on some independent candidatessupported by the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) urthered thehopes or a new politics in urkey.

Te legacy o the AKPs engagement with the Kemalist establishment and theAKPs campaign strategy, however, hold the seeds o a ading hope. Te ormerresulted in the consolidation o the polarization along the pro and anti AKP lines,which hinders the possibilities o compromise and consensus that are essential or

a constitutive politics. Te latter, in contrast, entailed not only an ill-defined andunsubstantiated promise o advanced democracy, but also a populist politicallanguage which, while claiming to be the one and only democratic and democra-tizing political orce, inevitably degraded the rest as unviable and unreliable polit-ical orces, deserving to be excluded rom a possible constitutive politics. In theelection campaign, all the deects o experiencing democratization as a delivery othe AKP, or the monopolization o urkeys recent democratization by the AKP,came to the ore. Tereore, the possibilities o realizing the constitutive capacities

o politics in a cooperative manner seemed no less difficult now, than when it wasunder the gloomy weight o the Kemalist establishment.

In what ollows, this paper first seeks to unravel what is negative in the posi-tive by ocusing on the legacy o the orced retreat o the Kemalist establishment.Once this negative legacy is identified, the paper will turn to the analysis o theAKPs election campaign, so as to reveal its shortcomings in overcoming the chal-lenges that the negative legacy poses to it as the would-be initiator o constitutivepolitics.

Forced Retreat of the Kemalist Establishment

Free and air elections in the old urkish politics did not provide the electedgovernments with sufficient wherewithal to run the country. Tey only determined


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the partner(s) o the Kemalist establish-

ment in power-sharing. Te AKP was notapproved as a legitimate partner to sharepower by the Kemalist establishment. othe contrary, despite being elected withan overwhelming majority, it had beendefined and treated as a serious threatto the secular regime in urkey since2002. Tis in turn compelled the AKP toa struggle o survival as a political entityand as the duly elected government othe county. In this struggle, the AKPs sel-empowerment vis--vis the Kemalistestablishment epitomized democratization and has become a precondition orany talk o urther democratization in urkey.4Te AKPs survival/power strat-egy prioritized boosting its own legitimacy by showing a positive perormance ina number o policy areas to deliver concrete improvements in daily lie, and byconsistently upholding the principle o the supremacy o the national will, i.e., theconstitutionally elected governments, over the non-elected and non-accountable

Kemalist state apparatus. Tese two have constituted the material and normativebasis o the AKPs popularity respectully.

One policy perormance area that boosted the AKPs legitimacy was oreignaffairs.5Te AKPs pro-EU membership and pro-Western policy line helped toinject the urkish people with a hope o a better uture, change urkeys image asan underperorming democracy, improve the investment climate, and emphasizethat unlike its predecessor the Welare Party (RP), it is not a reincarnation o anti-Western and illiberal Islamism. Te AKP also delivered other concrete improve-ments in the daily lives o the urkish people by maintaining economic stabilityand growth, by increasing the purchasing power, and by improving the conditionsand services especially in three major areas, namely education, healthcare andsocial security, and transportation systems. All o the AKPs material deliveries,which in the election campaign provided the basis o a series o newspaper adver-tisements with the banner o it was a dream that came through (Hayaldi GerekOldu), have enabled the AKP to claim that it has ulfilled its 2002 promise odelivering modernization, understood in terms o better inrastructure and pub-

lic services, and effective public administration matching the Western standards,rather than cultural Westernization along Kemalist lines.

Te positive policy perormance has helped the AKP to maintain a high degreeo popularity and escape rom the ate that the underperorming and weak centrist

Te positive policy

perormance has helpedthe AKP to maintain a high

degree o popularity andescape rom the ate that theunderperorming and weak

centrist governments havetraditionally suffered


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governments have traditionally suffered:

executing and administrating the will oKemalist establishment on a wide range okey issues. Te AKP has prevailed overthe Kemalist establishment in a numbero ways. First, it successully resisted theKemalist initiatives, like the militarys

e-memorandum and the Constitutional Courts arbitrary redefinition o the ruleso the game in 2007. Both initiatives aimed at preventing the AKP rom installingits candidate as the President o the Republic. o the e-memorandum, affirmingthe militarys willingness and readiness to intervene directly should the AKP insiston its choice o the presidential candidate, the AKP government responded bytaking an unprecedented course o action. It reasserted, in a televised press con-erence, the subservient position o the armed orces in democracies and calledor early elections to renew its legitimacy, in which it increased its votes by 12%to 47%. o the Constitutional Courts arbitrary redefinition o the parliamentaryquorum in presidential elections, it responded by amending the constitution, so asto change the election method o the president to popular vote.

Second, as it endured in the government, the AKP could gradually take over thekey positions or infiltrate into key institutions that once were exclusively reservedor the Kemalists. Te staunchly Kemalist constitutional lawyer that once occu-pied the seat o the President o the Republic was replaced with an AKP ounderin 2007. Aferwards, the presidency o High Education Council, which monitorsthe universities and plays a crucial role in the appointment o their rectors, wastaken over by AKP-riendly figures. Similarly, the top echelons o the judiciary

is no longer reserved or members o a caste-like network o Kemalist lawyersthanks to a number o constitutional amendments approved by the people in the2010 reerendum.

Tird, the AKP has restricted the legal-institutional sphere o the militarysinfluence through a series o reorms. For example, it altered the compositionand political profile o the National Security Council, which once was the realpolitical decision-making body. Te annulment o the EMASYA protocol, whichallowed the military authorities to by-pass civilian authorities in responding to

social incidents, can also be considered as an example o the legal-institutionalreorms introduced by the AKP governments.

Finally, the AKP governments have rendered the military subject to publicscrutiny by creating an atmosphere conducive to the publicizing o scandalous

Te AKP did not betray the

trust o the people, and orthis it was seen as protectingthe democratic regime romKemalist encroachments


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instances o the military personnels arbitrariness and irresponsible behaviour, as

well as the plots to destabilize and eventually overthrow the government. More-over, unlike the centrist governments o the past, the AKP did not perpetuatethe militarys institutional autonomy by reerring these cases to high militaryauthorities only. Instead, the AKP displayed a willingness to hold those respon-sible accountable by submitting them to judicial and administrative investiga-tions. Consequently, the AKP has orced the military and its allies to retreat andthereby shook the whole political structure built on its anticipated political role.Tat the AKPs prevailing victory over the Kemalist establishment has compelled

the pro-establishment mass media outlets and the main opposition CHP to adoptmoderate policies is a testament to its proound impact. With this track record,the AKP can, and did, take pride in delivering material improvements, and in notsurrendering to the Kemalist establishment. Tus, the AKP did not betray thetrust o the people, and or this it was seen as protecting the democratic regimerom Kemalist encroachments.

Te Negative Legacies for Constitutive Politics

Tese positive developments, however, have carried elements hindering thepossibility o a paradigm shif to constitutive politics in the afermath o the 2011elections. First o all, the retreat o the military-led Kemalist establishment was aresult o the AKPs alteration o power balance in its own avour. I the militarynow remains muted on many o the issues it once monopolized, it is because theAKP governments have managed to change the terms and conditions o its opera-tion. Te apparent supremacy and autonomy o civilian politics, in other words,does not necessarily indicate an institutionalization and internalization o it on

the part o the military-led Kemalist establishment.6

In act, the military sincethe last days o 2010 has publicly expressed its concerns about the recognitiono Kurdish as the second language o the country and about the alternative non-official narrations o republican history.7It has also publicly criticized the detain-ments o the officers suspected o plotting coups against the AKP government andmade gestures o solidarity with them.8Te current supremacy o civilian politics,thereore, is dependent upon the power o the AKP. As such, it runs the risk obeing a circumstantial situation, perpetuated by the power position o the AKP

only. Te AKP leader Erdoan himsel described the current situation as a caseo strengthened-belie in democracy rather than broken-resistance o those will-ing to divert to anti-democratic paths.9Tis statement implicitly acknowledgesthe need or more-to-do to ensure a ull-scale institutionalized civilianization.However, whether the AKP is willing to do more or remain content with main-


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taining the current status quo by only

prolonging its power position is anotherquestion that has important implica-tions or the possibilities o constitutivepolitics.

Secondly, urkeys civilianization-cum-democratization in the orm othe AKPs prevailing position over theKemalist establishment seems to have

deepened and consolidated the socialand political polarization that was initiated by the military in the mid-1990s, be-tween secular and Islamic societal sectors. Tis can be seen in the election processo the new members to high judicial bodies like the Supreme Board o Judges andProsecutors, Council o the State and Court o Appeals to ulfill the stipulationso the 2010 Constitutional amendments. In all o these elections, lawyers weredivided into two groups, voting en bloc or the candidates o their own group.Tat the lists o one group was prepared by the AKP-run Ministry o Justice, and

not by the autonomous organization o the non-Kemalist judges and prosecutorstestifies to a tendency to lean on the power o the AKP, which in turn empowersthe AKP urther.

Moreover, civilianization and democratization in the orm o the AKPsempowerment and prevailing over the Kemalist establishment did not seem tomake the pro-Kemalist societal sectors come to terms with the rules o the demo-cratic game. A considerable part o urkish society still takes the political role othe military as exercised rom an above-politics guardian-o-the-regime position

and welcomes a military intervention to save the regime rom the AKP. Tis wasshown in the findings o a nationwide survey, in which 29% o the respondentsagreed with the statement that the Ergenekon investigation (into the network omilitary-led coup plotters) is to intimidate the opposition, 52.3% o respondentsdid not see the investigation as an opportunity to strengthen democracy, 44.7%did not find the judiciary impartial, and 46% thought that Ergenekon trials werenot proceeding airly.10Hence, the new CHP, like the old one, continues toclaim that the Ergenekon investigation is an AKP plot to arrest and intimidate

AKP opponents.11

It is not just a mouthpiece o the Kemalist establishment, butalso represents a considerable portion o society. Tis deep social divide wasillustrated even at the level o the top businessmens association, USIAD. Aferstrongly backing a progressively liberal constitution proposal in a well-publicizedmeeting, USIADs administration, in the ace o harshly-worded internal oppo-

A considerable part o

urkish society still takes thepolitical role o the militaryas exercised rom an above-politics guardian-o-the-regimeposition and welcomes amilitary intervention to savethe regime rom the AKP


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sition, was obliged to shif its position

to being an impartial platorm-provideror the drafers o the proposal.12 Fromanother angle, Islamic circles increasingintegration within the state apparatussince 2002, and the consequent impover-ishment o Islamism as well as the criticaloutlook that comes with it, resulted in analmost unconditional support or the AKP government.13Tese trends, resistanceo certain segments o urkeys political scene, and entrenched opposing socialblocks, thereore, can be considered as illustrations o the consolidation o socialpolarization that hinders the establishment o constitutive politics in urkey.

Tirdly, afer the bankruptcy o pro-Kemalist opposition strategies bankingon yet another military-led intervention to oust the AKP rom government, themain opposition CHP had to be ready or a change o strategy. But what seems toshape the new CHP is a shallow Kemalist diagnosis that explains the rise andpredominance o the AKP because o the demise o the center-right political tra-

dition without ever considering what were the real causes o its demise in the firstplace. Consequently, the new CHP decided to stop being a pro-military negativ-ist political party, criticizing anything and everything the AKP government does,without offering any policy alternatives. It finally chose to model itsel afer thecenter-right political parties. In so doing, the CHP, usually known to be on thelef side o the political spectrum, accepted that two thirds majority o the urk-ish electorate is right wing and rebranded itsel as a center right political party toappeal to them. Hence, the new CHP tried to realize its declared intention to gainthe support o the center-right electorate14by recruiting some center right politi-cians as candidates, by making anti-militarist and pro-democratization gestures,and by taking on all the populist and personalistic eatures o the center righttradition in urkey.

Setting aside the viability and validity o center right politics in the currenturkish political context, the CHP ailed to revive social democracy and recruitpeople into its ranks. More importantly, the problem still remained that the newCHP did not seem genuine, sincere, principled, coherent, and credible enough

to make promises and deliver on them. o cast off its image as a pro-militarypolitical party, it called or the investigation o those responsible or posting thee-memorandum on the web site o the Chie o the Staff during presidential elec-tions in 2007. However, it did so in a way that confirmed its pro-military image.In act, the new CHP considered the e-memorandum more as a conspiracy or

Te new CHP decided to stop

being a pro-military negativistpolitical party, criticizing

anything and everything theAKP government does, withoutoffering any policy alternatives


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the re-election o the AKP than as an

inringement on democracy and wantedits perpetrators to be investigated onthese grounds.15 Te new CHP alsosubmitted a bill to change article 35 ourkish Armed Forces Internal ServiceLaw, which is ofen claimed to providethe legal pretext or military interven-tions in politics, or it assigns the military

the task o protecting the Republic. Butthen, the bill it proposed seemed to clariy the acceptable types o military inter-vention rather than indicate a categorical reusal o them.16Similarly, the newCHP produced a democratization program, but rerained rom disclosing it to abroader audience than a select group o columnists, perhaps not to commit itselto it. It recognized that the Kurdish issue is not just a matter o armed violence oreconomic development, but also a matter o expressing the Kurdish identity in thepublic and political spheres. But then, it removed its own campaign bills printedin Kurdish rom the billboards in unceli, the Kurdish speaking hometown o itsleader Kemal Kldarolu.17Kldarolu also emphasized his willingness to solvethe Kurdish issue at any cost,18but then made his contribution to the resolutiono the issue conditional upon either the disclosure o the secret talks with the PKKleader Ocalan or the Prime Ministers apology first on misleading the people thatthe CHP is avoring a ederal system.19

Te new CHP also tried to go beyond its traditionally affluent and well-edu-cated constituency by coming up with concrete proposals and projects o material

improvement in the daily lie o the lower classes, like amily insurance and reeeducation or all. But then, when questioned about the availability o resources torealize such promises, Kldarolu resorted to the populist and personalistic lan-guage o the center-right, either by claiming that he can find the resources simplybecause his name was Kemal or by pledging that he would resign i he could notdeliver on his promises by the end o our months.20As such, like the center rightpolitical parties in the past, the CHP also seemed ready to promise anything andeverything to gain the votes o the electorate. Meanwhile, discrediting the AKP

by borrowing rom the vocabulary o right-wing politics, such terms as unruitul(bereketsiz), corrupt (hortumcu), and rentier21did neither match the reality, norfit into the language o a lefist secularist party. In the final analysis, thereore, thenew CHP seemed to be both maladapted and unrealistic or uture constitutivepolitics.

Te new CHP also tried to go

beyond its traditionally affluentand well-educated constituencyby coming up with concreteproposals and projects omaterial improvement in thedaily lie o the lower classes


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Is the AKP an Asset for Democratization?

Lessons from the Election Campaign

Te possibility o constitutive politics was created by the AKPs win over theKemalist establishment, which quintessentially has been at the core o urkeysrecent democratization. Tis enabled the AKP to take pride in democratizing thecountry and at the same time gave it an opportunity to show its credentials inurthering urkeys democratization. In act, the AKP in its election campaignpromoted itsel as the one and only genuine and capable democratizing politi-

cal orce in urkey. Other than an emphasis on its track record in engaging withthe Kemalist establishment, this sel-promotion entailed a vague promise o anill-defined advanced democracy. Te AKP, in other words, did not put orwarda coherent and concrete political vision or urkeys uture democratization andcommit itsel to it. Moreover, since its election promise o advanced democracy

Te AKP seemed to owe a considerable part of its popularity to the electorates retrospective votingapproving its past performance in engaging with the Kemalist establishment and delivering materialimprovements.

Photo:AA,

bra

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akut


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was weak in content, the AKP seemed to emphasize its positive track record in

struggling against the Kemalist establishment more than its uture ideas and proj-ects. As such, the AKPs sel-portrayal as the one and only democratizing orcewas in effect asking or the electorates trust in the AKP, or more accurately in itscharismatic leader Erdoan, as the only reliable and capable political orce thatwould deliver whatever is deliverable in terms o democratization. Such a claim ocredibility and monopolization o the democratization agenda was made possibleby the past perormance o the AKP. Tis means that urkeys recent democratiza-tion was delivered by the AKP in spite o the opposition, which still continued to

ail in generating a viable alternative to the AKP in terms o democratization. Still,the monopolization o the democratization process by simply asking the elector-ate to trust the AKP in matters o democratization and without commitment to acoherent democratization agenda runs counter to democratic constitutive politicsor two reasons. First, the monopolization o the democratization process involvesa populist language that categorically excludes the others rom urkeys utureconstitutive politics. Second, the AKPs trust us we can and will democratizewhenever and wherever it is possible approach does not bode well or the spirito democratic politics. Still, judging by the share o its votes, one could suggestthat the AKP has established such a relationship o trust with the electorate anddeclares that it is the political brand standing or democratization in urkey. Tatis perhaps where the real success o the AKP lies. Yet, it is precisely this successthat can also be one o the biggest obstacles to constitutive politics or democrati-zation, because it should not be an issue delegated to a single party.

In its election campaign, the AKP has promoted itsel as the only true andbenevolent provider o the nation regardless o the nature o the goods to be pro-

vided, be it modernization in the orm o improving the daily lie or democratiza-tion mostly in the orm o civilianization and expansion o the political sphere. TeAKPs belie in being the only democratizing orce is reflected in its sel-definitiono its raison dtreto overcome urkeys democracy deficit, and in the claim thatthere is no alternative to the AKP in resolving societal issues, including the Kurd-ish issue.22Facilitated by the past and present absence o an equally democratizingorce, the AKPs tendency to monopolize the task o democratization resulted inits ownership o the democratization process, which ran contrary to the nature

o democracy as a collective good and, thus, produced somewhat paradoxicalcounter-democratic maniestations. For instance, in realizing the main item o itsadvanced democracy promise, i.e., the replacement o the current constitutionpromulgated by the 1980-1983 coup administration with a liberal democratic one,the AKP promised to be consensus-seeking. At the same time, however, it carried


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out an election campaign with the prior-

ity o gaining enough seats (between 330and 367) to make the new constitutionalone or to be able to submit its own drafto reerendum. Te apparent paradoxhere, between the willingness to draf anew constitution on its own and searchor a consensus, can only be understood in the context o the AKPs distrust orother political parties and subsequent monopolization o the democratization

process. Tis is also the reason why the AKP considers entering into any politi-cal race o proposing these democratizing reorms as utile. Tis was illustratedin the AKPs response to the new CHPs proposal to render the military Chieo Staff responsible to the Minister o Deense rather than the Prime Minister.Te adopted proposal had become a symbol o civilian supremacy, at least sincethe early 1990s. Erdoan, however, did not jump into the CHPs bandwagon inearnest, but drew attention to the importance o taking action to realize it: Manyleaders have passed saying these sorts o things, which one o them ever tookaction? We will do it in time, i.e., when the time is ripe.23In this way, he not onlyclaimed credibility on the basis o being the only realistic and capable politicalorce, but also implicitly discredited the CHP or engaging in electoral politickingby making empty promises.

Defining the progress achieved thus ar in democratization as normaliza-tion and taking pride in normalizing the country, the AKP promised to deliveradvanced democracy in its third term. However, leaving aside the question ian advanced democracy can be the work/delivery o a single political party, the

AKPs advanced democracy itsel was weak in content. wo key promises in theadvanced democracy section o the election declaration were: (1) the promulga-tion o a new constitution, and (2) the resolution o the Kurdish issue.24 Sincenumerous amendments to the constitution have toned down its anti-democraticspirit and stipulations, the resolution o the Kurdish issue has become a strongerreason or making a new constitution and a more decisive litmus test or any partyclaiming to be democratic and democratizing. Since its rise to the office in 2002,the AKPs overall approach to the Kurdish issue has differed rom the militarist

approach that had been the conventional wisdom until recently. Te AKP recog-nized the identity aspects o the Kurdish issue, acilitated a relatively open-mindedpublic debate about the possible resolutions o it, oscillated between acceptingand rejecting the pro-Kurdish BDP as a partner to the solution o the issue, andeventually produced a Kurdish opening. Te Kurdish opening was stalled due to

Te AKPs overall approach to

the Kurdish issue has differedrom the militarist approach

that had been the conventionalwisdom until recently


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Kemalist resistance and the AKPs mis-

management. But more importantly, thevalidity and viability o it was questionedor being an ad hocprocess o politick-ing in response to the institutionaliza-tion and increased electoral strengtho the PKK-affiliated ethno-nationalistKurdish movement, represented in thepolitical arena by the BDP.25 Althoughthe relatively open political debate on the

Kurdish issue has created a sense o democratization, the AKP was also criticizedor trying to define and resolve the Kurdish issue in the AKPs own terms, andwithout recognizing the existence o a Kurdish issue, as defined by the politicalrepresentatives o the Kurdish movement, i.e., the BDP and without recognizingthem as partners. In act, the AKP in its election declaration and rallies consid-ered the BDP a part o the problem, but not the solution.26

In act, the AKPs approach towards the Kurdish issue was determined by an

effort to sideline its main competitor or the Kurdish votes, the BDP. Te AKP wasintent on emerging as the true representative o the Kurdish people in urkey, andthereby substantiate its claim to be the one and only democratic and democratiz-ing orce. Tis entailed, first, declaring the Kurdish issue over, so that the wholediscourse and indeed the reason or the existence o the BDP could be rejected.Erdoan declared the Kurdish issue over on the grounds that the AKP govern-ments in the last years had brought the policies o denial, rejection, and assimila-tion o the Kurdish identity to an end.27In declaring the Kurdish issue over and,thus, rejecting the need or the BDP, Erdoan, however, employed the politicaldiscourse o the militarist 1990s, i.e., Kurds can be parliamentarians, ministersand presidents.28He thus rejected the need or urther legal-institutional reormsor the resolution o the Kurdish issue and wanted to maintain the status quo thatavors the AKP. In this respect, he declared the 10% national electoral thresh-old, which allows the AKP to ampliy its electoral power in regions dominated byKurdish populations at the expense o that o the BDP, irrelevant to the democra-tization process.29

Secondly, the AKP tried to sideline the BDP by highlighting its own past anduture capability o delivering economic development and material improvementsto the Kurds in urkey. Here, the BDP was depicted as a political party concernedexclusively with the public/political expression o the Kurdish identity and asresponsible and responsive only to the PKK organization, which intimidates the

Te AKP tried to sideline the

BDP by highlighting its ownpast and uture capabilityo delivering economicdevelopment and materialimprovements to the Kurds inurkey


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Kurds into supporting the BDP by using

armed violence. As such, the BDP wasunable and unwilling to deliver materialgoods to the Kurds. Perhaps more impor-tantly, Erdoan emphasized the AKPsability to deliver material improvementsin a manner rejecting the identity aspectso the issue, and overlapping and com-peting with the discourse o the ultrana-

tionalist MHPs leader, Devlet Baheli.Like Baheli, who in his Diyarbakr election rally desperately tried to persuadethe Kurds to drop their demands or education in their mother tongue becauseit will not fill their stomachs, Erdoan questioned the demands or changing thename o Diyarbakr to Amed in Kurdish by asking will your garbage be collectedand streets be clean afer that? In this way, the AKP tried to outdo not only theBDP in its expression o the level o concern about the well-being o the Kurdishelectorate, but also the MHP, its main competitor or the urkish nationalist votes,trying to show off a higher degree o nationalism. Te latter strategy was urtheredby cornering the MHP or acquiescing to the suspension o the execution o PKKleader Ocalans death sentence in 1999. In an attempt to show up the MHP in itscommitment to nationalism, Erdoan declared that he would have had Ocalanhanged.30 In this way, both the MHP and the BDP were declared as politicallyredundant, as ar as representing the true interests o the people, because the AKPhad it covered.

Tirdly, in line with its emphasis on religion as the bond that unites the urks

and the Kurds, who are generally said to be religious people, the AKP tried to mar-ginalize the BDP by reerring to its weak/alse religiosity. Here, the BDPs reactionto what it deemed the political use o religion by the AKP provided the AKP withraw material to make a case that the BDP is anti-religion and, thus, not deservingthe support o the religious Kurds. In response to the mobilization o the personnelo the Directorate o Religious Affairs in the Southeastern provinces, a reimple-mentation o the statist recipe o the late 1980s, the BDP reacted by mobilizingits supporters to reuse praying with state-appointed prayer leaders and to orga-

nize alternative prayers in alternative places. Erdoan and the pro-Islamic mediaharshly criticized these reactions. Erdoan urthered his claims criticizing thealse/weak religiosity o the BDP by drawing attention to statements made by theBDP-riendly circles declaring the PKK leader calan as the prophet o the Kurds,and Zoroastrianism as their true religion.31Moreover, Erdoan accused the BDP

Te AKP has sustained its

claim to be the one and onlydemocratizing political orce

representing the true interestso the Kurdish people by trying

to render its main competitoror the Kurdish vote redundant


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o being so anti-religion as to prevent

Kurdish children rom learning theirreligion and leveling accusations againstthe BDP o committing arson o the reli-gious Prayer Leader and Preacher Schoolstudents dormitories.32 Finally, whenit hit the headlines o the pro-Islamicmass media outlets that pro-BDP circlesrecited the call to prayer in Kurdish, the

AKP did not lose a moment to make analogous reerences to the authoritarian andmilitantly secular single party era (1923-1946) and depict the BDP as anti-religionas the CHP, which in 1938 prohibited the reciting o call to prayer in Arabic.33

o sum up, the AKP has sustained its claim to be the one and only democra-tizing political orce representing the true interests o the Kurdish people by try-ing to render its main competitor or the Kurdish vote redundant. In so doing, iteither declared the BDP as a part o the problem or accused it o generating theproblem, which in Erdoans terms was resolved in the course o last years. Tis

strategy was urthered by charging the BDP with being unconcerned about thewell-being and religious sensitivities o the Kurds, and thus out o touch with thereal hopes and demands o the Kurdish people.

Tis attitude o rejecting the other political parties as potential partners inconstitutive politics continued in the AKPs election strategy against the predomi-nantly urkish political parties as well. In promoting itsel as the only capable andreliable political brand in providing the nation with all sorts o goods, the AKP putall the other political parties in the same basket and did so by using the main popu-

list stereotypes o urkish politics.34Te most recent source o the AKPs strategyto create two blocks, the AKP versus the rest o the political parties, can be tracedback to the 2010 reerendum on the constitutional amendments, in which all majorpolitical parties positioned themselves against the AKP. Te AKP vs. the Rest strat-egy was also reminiscent o its predecessor, the Islamist Welare Partys portrayal othe elections as a competition between two parties: the party o the absolute rightrepresenting the true will o the nation and represented by the WP itsel and theparties o the absolute wrong, representing the interests o the imperialist-Zionist

West and comprising all the rest o the political class. In the 1980s, the MotherlandParty governments used a similar populist strategy. Te Motherlands leader, ur-gut zal, reproduced the anti-political language o the 1980-83 coup administra-tion and categorized all the rest o the political class as ideological, conflict ridden,unable to serve people and responsible or the political instability and violence that

Te AKP vs. the Rest strategy

was also reminiscent o itspredecessor, the IslamistWelare Partys portrayal othe elections as a competitionbetween two parties


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had resulted in the 1980 coup. Te AKP

did not exactly reproduce the WelarePartys polarizing approach or it claimedto represent a break rom the Islamisttradition. But in an attempt to appeal tothe pragmatist sentiments o the centristelectorate, the AKP, in its election cam-paign, has borrowed considerably romthe anti-political language o the 1980s

and reproduced the main stigmas andstereotypes o urkeys right-wing populism. According to the AKP, the competi-tion o the 2011 elections was a fight between the new politics o the AKP, whichhas the ability to meet the nations true hopes and demands, and the dirty oldpolitics o the Rest, which is based on making exaggerated promises to deceivepeople. Te Rest, in essence, is unconcerned with the wellbeing o the peopleand would, thereore, not rerain rom risking the long-term economic stability othe country or the sake o outdoing the AKP in its promises o material improve-ment. In this way, the AKP stated that it stood or neoliberal economic orthodoxy,but it used a considerable amount o political and cultural populism to achieve itsmessage.

Te AKP centered its election campaign on the concrete improvements it hasdelivered in the course o the last nine years. As a corollary, it asked the elector-ate to vote retrospectively on the basis o the services and improvements (hizmet)they have received, and not on the basis o ideological convictions, which Erdoanassociated with narrow-mindedness and an mentality. Te AKP strengthened

this emphasis on service-delivery and modernization by coming up with suchlandmark projects as constructing an artificial canal, a third bridge and two satel-lite cities in Istanbul, building satellite cities in Ankara and zmir, and increasinginvestment to utilize such technological applications as smart board and e-booksbroadly in education. In calling the electorate to vote retrospectively and prag-matically on the basis o the improvements they have enjoyed, and will enjoy inuture, Erdoan, however, showed that he barred ideological criticism rom thepolitical sphere and reduced politics to delivery o goods only. Here, the rest o

the political parties were portrayed either as unconcerned with the well-beingo people or as blind to their needs and demands because o their ideologicalconvictions and priorities. Tey were, thus, not only incapable o delivering ontheir excessive promises and unrealistic projects, but also a threat to the stability,growth, and modernization achieved under the AKP governments.

Te rest o the political parties

were portrayed either asunconcerned with the well-being o people or as blind

to their needs and demandsbecause o their ideological

convictions and priorities


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Tis strategy o categorization o the rest o the political actors as irrelevant

as ar as urther democratization and modernization in urkey is concerned hasbecome most visible in Erdoans discourse against the main opposition CHP.Recognizing the CHPs oscillation between the old and the new, Erdoan rejectedthe process o change the CHP is going through and claimed that there is no suchthing as the new CHP. Te CHP, according to Erdoan, was the same old CHPo coup plotters and supporters, who would never come to power by winningelections because they were disrespectul to the values o the nation, unconcernedabout the well-being o the people, and even willing to obstruct those who work

or serving the people. Tis claim was substantiated by drawing attention regu-larly to the CHPs above-mentioned portrayal o the Ergenekon investigation asintimidation o the opponents and to the nomination o some Ergenekon suspectsas candidates upon the advice o Sleyman Demirel, whose name epitomizes themilitary-riendly and populist center-right tradition in urkey. Accordingly, theCHP was the same old party o tutelary regime and pro-status quo orces that wanturkey to return to the days o instability and poverty and that now, ollowing itsnew mentor Demirel, engages in cheap populist politics o making any promise to

deceive the people into voting or them. As such, the CHP was still trying to ob-struct those who work or serving the nation, i.e., the AKP. Te portrayal o AKPsupporters as idiots (beyinsiz) by some CHP circles and the criticism o a Quranicverse (every living body shall taste death) engraved on the gate o a cemetery in Is-tanbul by an CHP candidate were the most ofen cited cases to illustrate the CHPsdisrespect or the values and choices o the nation.35Tese positions, according toErdoan, have shown once again that the CHP is the same anti-religion tutelaryparty that provoked and supported the 1960 coup against the Democrat Party(DP) government, which in 1950 took over the government rom the CHP in thefirst ree and air elections in Republican urkey. It is also the same party thathelped the military authorities to hang the DP leader Adnan Menderes, whichclosed the mosques or turned them into stables and that banned the reciting ocall to prayer in Arabic.36Now that this party is trying to appear as sympathetic tothe demands and hopes o the people, Erdoan argued, is a deception as the richhistory o unmet promises o the center right political parties illustrates.

Conclusion

Te AKP believes that it is the one and only democratizing and modernizingpolitical orce in urkey. Given the act that the recent progress in both has beenits handy work, despite a pro-Kemalist conservative opposition, this belie is notungrounded. Moreover, the continuing ailure o the main opposition CHP and


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the Kurdish BDP to act as political orces

autonomous rom extra-political organi-zations has consolidated this sel-belie inbeing a singular democratizing orce. TeAKP has built its election campaign onthis belie-cum-act. Its goal or the 2001elections was to obtain as many seats inParliament or it to be able to draf the new constitution on its own. Although theAKP increased its share to almost 50% o the votes cast, the actual election results,however, ell short o the AKPs expectations in terms o the number o seats itgained. With its 326 seats, the AKP was our seats short to submit any constitu-tional bill to reerendum. Tis configuration compels the AKP to seek a consensusin making the new constitution. However, this approach is difficult because theAKPs leadership has vehemently dismissed the rest o the political class.

A crisis in the immediate afermath o the elections gave the AKP the opportu-nity to reaffirm its pre-election political stance. Te crisis began first with an irre-versible decision o the High Election Council, annulling the election o a BDP-

affiliated independent candidate rom Diyarbakr, Hatip Dicle, on the grounds oa court decision convicting and thus rendering him ineligible to stand or elec-tions. Tis was ollowed by the judiciarys decision to decline the requests o threedetained Ergenekon suspects, elected on the tickets o the CHP and MHP, to bereleased so that they could join the parliament. Te BDP and the CHP reacted tothese decisions by reusing to take oath, which is a constitutional obligation totake part in the parliamentary activities. Tey both argued that the sanctity o theballot-box had been violated by the judiciary, allegedly under the heavy influenceo the AKP. Te BDP also declared that it would convene its parliamentary groupmeetings in Diyarbakr until the AKP amends the relevant laws to make Dicle eli-gible or election and renews the elections or Diyarbakr. Te CHP, on the otherhand, called on the AKP to use its influence/control over the judiciary or amendthe relevant laws so that its imprisoned deputies could be released. Tis in actwas an implicit conession by the CHP itsel o its sense o powerlessness and sur-render to the will o the AKP.

Te AKP, not surprisingly, did not take any initiative or the release o the

imprisoned deputies, so as not to all into the trap o proving the BDPs and CHPscase that the judiciarys decisions were political or the judiciary was under thecontrol o the AKP. Instead, the AKP accused the CHP and the BDP o vacat-ing the legitimate political platorms at the expense o representation assignedto them by the people. Tis, in turn, was portrayed as a confirmation o the act

A crisis in the immediate

afermath o the electionsgave the AKP the opportunity

to reaffirm its pre-electionpolitical stance


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that neither the CHP, nor the BDP were responsible and responsive to the people,

and that they were being held hostage by two extra-political organizations, theErgenekon and the PKK respectively. Te CHP deputies took the oath beore theparliament recessed, thanks to a common declaration between the CHP and theAKP stating some general principles like we all want to see the elected deputiesin the parliament. Tis involved no commitments on the part o the AKP, butproviding the CHP with an honorable exit. Te BDP is yet to join the parlia-ment. Te crisis o oath-taking was a bad start or the new parliament as ar as thepossibilities o constitutive politics is concerned. Te AKP, however, did not anddoes not surrender to the oppositions threats o moratorium and sel-righteouslycontinued to set the terms o the legitimate political debate and activity. Te actthat it does not eel under pressure to immediately draf a new constitution, sinceit already amended the most important/unctional articles, and that it is the mostormidable political organization enjoying wide popularity certainly helps theAKP continue its political project.

Endnotes

1. See, Yzde 50nin Srrn Stara Anlatt, Star, July 15, 2011.

2. Constitutive capacities o politics reer to rule-making and institution-building powers opolitics in the course o accommodating and resolving the identity and interest differences andconflicts through compromise and consensus.

3. Te Kemalist establishment reers to a military-riendly network o judges, academicians,bureaucrats, politicians, civil society organizations and think-tanks, which generate and exercisepower through a matrix o ormal and inormal relations between themselves.

4. Menderes nar, urkeys Present Ancien Regime and the Justice and Development Party,Marlies Cassier and Joost Jongerden (eds.) Nationalism and Political Islam in urkey(London: Rout-ledge, 2010), pp. 13-27; Menderes nar, Anti-Vesayetiliin tesinde Bir Demokrasi Gndemi

Olacak m?, Birikim, No. 266 (2011), pp.10-25.5. Burhanettin Duran, AKP and Foreign Policy as an Agent o ransormation, Hakan Yavuz

(ed.), Te Emergence of a New urkey (Salt Lake City: Te University o Utah Press, 2006).

6. For the intangible and potentially persistent aspects o the militarys resistance to the idea ocivilian supremacy see, akan Sayn, Exploring the Military Mindset: Phenemenological Insightsor Security Sector Reorm in urkey, New Perspectives on urkey, No. 43 (2010), pp.97-133.

7. Genelkurmay: ki Dilden Endieliyiz, Hrriyet, December 18, 2010; arih Muhtrasnaepki, araf, May 21 2011.

8. SKdan Balyoz k, Vatan, April 7, 2011.

9. Herkes Konumunu Gayet yi Biliyor, Yeni afak, May 29, 2011.10. Ali Bayramolu, Ergenekon, Yarg ve oplum, Yeni afak, March 26 2011; see also inter-

view with Bekir Agadr, rkiye Alarm Veriyor, zgr Gndem, May 30, 2011.

11. Fikret Bila, Kldarolu: Kadn ve Genlik Devrimi Yaptk,Milliyet, April 12, 2011.

12. Dik Duracaz,Milliyet, April 24, 2011; 13 Maddeli Geri Adm, araf, April 29, 2011.


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13. Burhanettin Duran, Te Experience o urkish Islamism: Between ransormation andIslamism,Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, Vol.12, No.1 (2010), pp. 5-22; Murat okayinterview with Ali Bula and Etyen Mahcupyan, Islamclar Kendileriyle Yzlemekten Kayormu?, Zaman, June 5, 2011; Emeti Saruhan interview with Ahmet Arslan, Kamusal Alan DindarlarAndrd, Yeni afak, June 19, 2011; Muhaazakarlar AKPnin Yaptklarn Sorgulamyor, Cumhu-riyet, May 21, 2011.

14. Fikret Bila, Kldarolu: Kadn ve Genlik Devrimi Yaptk,Milliyet, April 12, 2011.

15. Fikret Bila, Ayrma ok ehlikeli ve Endie Verici,Milliyet, July 28, 2010.

16. Yetersizse Konuuruz, araf, July 30, 2010.

17. Dersimliler CHPye Zazaca Hayr Diyecek, araf, May 24, 2011.

18. Krt Sorununu Kemal Kardeiniz zecek, araf, June 1, 2011.

19. Erdoan zr Dilemezse, Krt Sorunun zmne Katk Salamam, Zaman, June 5,2011; mraliya Ne Szler Verildi Aklansn, June 22, 2011.

20. Yapamazsam Drt Ayda Brakrm,Milliyet, May 26, 2011.

21. Ye Ye Doymaz Bunlar,Milliyet, May 1, 2011; AKP Rantn, CHP Halkn Partisi, Vatan, May30, 2011; Hortumlarn Keseceiz, Cumhuriyet, May 30, 2011.

22. AK Party, Election Declaration: urkey is Ready, arget is 2023, pp. 9, 13.

23. Hala Reormcu Erdoanm, araf, June 7, 2011.

24. Changing the Civil, the Associations and the Foundations Laws to strengthen the civil soci-

ety and expand its participation; improvements in the judicial systems, security and public admin-istration systems to render them more effective and efficient were the other promises made as parto advancing democracy in urkey.

25. Marlies Cassier, Joost Jongerden and Nic Walker Fruitless Attempts? Te Kurdish Initia-tive and the Containment o the Kurdish Movement in urkey, New Perspectives on urkey, No. 44(2011), pp. 103-128.

26. AK Party, Election Declaration, p. 13.

27. Apoyu Peygamber lan Ediyorlar,Milliyet, May 1, 2011.

28. June 9 2011,AV V Channel.

29. Size Soracak Deiliz, Hrriyet, 1 April 4, 2011.30. Biz calan Asardk, Radikal, June 10, 2011.

31. Apoyu Peygamber lan Ediyorlar,Milliyet, May 1, 2011.

32. Mslman Yetimesin Diye Krt ocuklarn Yakyorlar, Hrriyet, May 30, 2011.

33. Krte Ezan ek Parti Zlm, Star, June 9, 2011.

34. For an examplary speech o Erdoan see the ull text o his election rally in Giresun on14 May, 2011, avalaible at: http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/haberler/bizim-kitabimizda-ayrimcilik-yoktur/7728.

35. Meydanda Beyinsiz Atmas, araf, May 31, 2011; Allahn Ayetine Sinir Bozucu Dedi,36. See or example the ull text o Erdoans election rally in Giresun, available at: http://www.

akparti.org.tr/site/haberler/bizim-kitabimizda-ayrimcilik-yoktur/7728

Electoral Success of AKP. Insight Turkey Vol 13 No 4 2011 by M. Çınar

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