Unpacking the Compliance Puzzle. The Case of Turkey‘s AKP under EU Conditionality
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Unpacking the Compliance Puzzle
The Case of Turkeys AKP under EU Condionality
B S
No. 14 | June 2010
Working Paper
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2 | KFGWorking Paper No. 14 | June 2010
KFG Working Paper Series
Edited by the Kolleg-Forschergruppe T Tv Pw E
The KFG Working Paper Series serves to disseminate the research results of the Kolleg-Forschergruppe by making them
vb bd b. I s d x s w s s d bd xs bs
s d x ds sss E d E U.
A KFG W Ps vb KFG wbs www.sf. b dd v
Cy f s ss: B S
Ed sss d d: F As, Ss Abd d Tsy I
S, B 2010: U C P: T Cs f Tys AKP d EU Cdy, KFG W-
P Ss, N. 14, J 2010, K-Fs (KFG) T Tsfv Pw f E, F Uvs-
B.
ISSN 1868-6834 (P)
ISSN 1868-7601 (I)
Ts b s b fdd by G Rs Fd (DFG).
F Uvs B
Kolleg-Forschergruppe
T Tsfv Pw f E:
T E U d Ds f Ids
Is. 26
14195 B
Germany
P: +49 (0)30- 838 57033
Fx: +49 (0)30- 838 [email protected]
www.sf.
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Unpacking the Compliance Puzzle | 3
Unpacking the Compliance Puzzle
The Case of Turkeys AKP under EU Conditionality
B S
F Uv B
Ab
W xs EU f Tys Js d Dv Py (AKP)? S
w 2002, AKP s d sv fs d E Us
bs (.., dy, f w, s d y s). Ts fs
s y d bs f w ds f d
: (1) db EU dy, (2) b s EU dd ss. I
AKPs -EU f d s xd by bf ssby f bs v
d (db dy) b dy. R, d ss d
AKP sy dd. Tw bd vs v dd AKPs f :
(1) v s Tys -EU bs s w s AKPs svv/
s sy s fd f xdd d EU dy, (2) v
s fs w ds s fs (.. y d s) d svv s y
w Iss s Tys s sys. T ss w vd
d f d d f b dy d s w s ss-.
T Ar
B S s s-d s fw Rs C T
Tsfv Pw f E F Uvs B. S ss
d v EU d Ts-EU s, d ds PD f
Uvsy f V. C: [email protected]
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4 | KFGWorking Paper No. 14 | June 2010
Cnts
1. Id 5
2. Ovvw f L 7
2.1 Credible EU Condionality 7
2.2 Liberal Ruling Pares (or Low Polical Compliance Costs) 10
3. D d A 11
3.1 Measurement of Condionality 11
3.2 Measurement of Compliance 14
3.3 AKPs Polical Identy Reconsidered 15
3.4 Argument on AKPs Compliance Trends 21
4. Conclusion 26
L 27
Adx 30
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Unpacking the Compliance Puzzle | 5
1. I
S w 2002, Tys , dy Iss Js d Dv Py (AKP)
s d ss f sv fs d E Us bs
(w dy, f w, s d y s). Ts d
fs ddssd vy f sss f d Ts ys v s
s fd fds d bd Kds ys s. W xs
AKPs EU ?
AKPs f jy ss f EU bs dy d
E f EU dds. T v x s w fs
dvdy ssy d jy s f dds w EUs d ds:
(1) db EU dy (, dby f s f EU bs d
f f C ), (2) s f b s
(dd) ss.
AKPs 2002-2009 fs sy bs s sss d d
AKPs s. Fs, dy1 is not credible for Turkey as the EU has been consistently raising certain
ds, w dd f Tys d d ws f s byd Tys
. Isss v f EUs s-d bs y f y f
Tys s d d sv Cys (w y s qs f
Ts d G Cys) s Ty bs s xy d. Ts s sd EU-wd
vss b w (.. v vd bs ss s ssd by Ns
Sy d A M) w Ty U. Csqy, AKP s w ssby f EU bs v d s s.
Sd, x w AKP ss y b y s sy qsb,
sy AKPs sd (Jy 2007-s). A y s fy dv
s, f w d s, v b dvs f s ,
s vd y f vs ds s s w s b
d f ssd EU s.
I AKPs d f EU d ( w sw-dw fs 2005) s xd
by bf ssby f bs v d (db dy) b
dy. R, AKPs w EUs s sy dd. I ss
s ds vs v dd AKPs f .
Fs, AKP wd s EU fs s s y bd Ts
w s b s j EU y d s sv bs. Sd, y
d E Css wd s dds xs f s
fds (y v v f dsf b f Ms w b ) d
fd f y f . Rsd s dds wd w
1 I s s dy, bs dy d dy by
.
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6 | KFGWorking Paper No. 14 | June 2010
AKP s s s s/svv sy s y d Iss
d.
Td d s s, EU s wd AKP ds sf y
f s dss d- Iss s (.. Wf y) f w d. T EU dwd s y s f s d w s
s ss: Fsy, j f fs, -w y wd dsy
bd AKPs b s vs--vs Tys s sbs (.. y d
s) w s dy sd ys ss. Sdy, s
(w wd b vyd b v ds w EU d fs ddd by
Css) wd AKP w EUs b s Tys s s, sd
s fs AKP d/ by s f v ( s f
Ts y) bsd -s s. Ts, f EU bs
d wd y s AKPs y f y-jd s sbs b sb s fs f d b s EUs s. I y v, EU s
wd s AKPs ds w s s fs.
Ey s, s yss f AKPs (bsd y w d f EU fs)
s s vs. C s sy 2002-2005 b f 2006 d sd
. Ts s bdy ss w s-2004 s E-ss Ts ,
w dd bs f EU fs f AKP ( s v bv). T s
s s ss w E C f H Rs (ECHR) Nvb 2005 ds
vs s b s Ty by Ts , Ly .2 A w s
Ts E-ss, ECHRs ds sd f AKPs EU y. A
ECHR s fy f EU, s s s AKP EU wd d
dsf ss s dy s f ssy Ts fs d fd f s
f . As s, v s EU d wds dds f
s sy ws sdby wd f AKP ( sd v bv).
Y AKPs s w vs wd b svd by EU f d dd
d vs f fs. A sbsq f s sd,3 dy ssd sv
fs w wdw. Ts wd b xd w bv-d d v, y,
v s EUs s s v s s ds s. As AKPs ss
f EU fs fdd s-2005 d, y b sy s -d
ds y, w d s s s Ts Cs C bsd -
s s. W C ddd s AKPs b, d y s f
f -s vs. I w AKPs xs, w ss ws d by EUs
wv s f AKP w f s d EUs f dy. I d v
2 As vsy sd w Is dsf, sd Ts s dsf b
b vss dsd s fds f d d. B ECHR d s ds-
d fv f Ty.
3 S s s vd vs s d f ss; .. f ssd EU-fdy s. Idd, s s b sysy d by Csss yy -
s Tys d ss.
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Unpacking the Compliance Puzzle | 7
b d EUs d s s AKPs s vd d sv
jds ds. H, ds, ss fy f AKP v EU
f d ds bs f s w vs s-2005 d.
T w b w bf vvw f E v dy.I s d, w b d s f w
ss f : db dy d b s. I w d
by y d d , d dsss vd AKPs s.
2. Ovvw L
As ssd bv, fw sd EU dds E4 argues for
w ds f : (1) db EU dy d (2) s f b s
ss. AKPs s vs f w s ssy f s vs dd
d s . T AKP v dd bv dy s db s.
Y s d d s s w ssd ds f s dby
ss. As w b xd bw, s, AKPs ws ss ds
b w, f fw ys, bvd dy (2002-05). Hwv, dy
d s d s s, AKPs y f ws s sd by
vs. As f sd d, AKPs s ss d
bs s ssy f y w EUs dds. C
even under the rule ofseeminglyb s AKP. Bw I dsss w s
s w ds f d sw bs bddd s .
2.1 Credible EU Condionality
T yss s f db dy (CC) f s b
dvd by Sf d s s. I sdy f E f CEECs (C
d Es E s), s ss d CC s ssy b s f
(s ds ss s ) (Sf/Sd 2005). F dds
svy sd EUs C ds, , s v w
s vyd s, dy - sd b db.
Cdby f EUs s f bs d fs (d f xs d -
) s w fs. Fs, dby ss -ss ss dvs,
s, EU wds s. S wds .. bs s - vv
s ss f EU. H, y d, y b sy ss s wd b d f
EU s ss f ss (Sf/Sd 2005: 14). Sd, CC dds
w consistently EU ss f dds (Sf/Sd 2005:
15). If EU w x q d wd dds y (by
4 E, d sd by .
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8 | KFGWorking Paper No. 14 | June 2010
s bs s, bs v s f s
d ), s wd b vd s db dy. Cvsy, f sy
y dd w dd bs f y , s sds,
s wd d CC s w.
B sss f d sy vsd . As f s sy
s by EU s d, Sf . v f bs w
ss y b f s f EU (sy sd EUs f)
sy ss ss s. D sy dd bw EU d
CEECs, bs f b f EU, s-by-s bss. Ts sds
sy Ts s s Ts ss ss sbs ss EU.
Tf, w d s w dds y b sy dv f
EU d s vsd s, s y ssy dby s bs s wy.5
Sd, d y, sss EU s dy consistently
bsd s-d y x6 (Sf . 2006: 8). H, s
bs EU s y f b d ss, bs ds xd y
sv s (.. dds s, , bdy
EU .). Ts s ss w f Ty E U (TEU) w ds
by f bs f y E s (A. 49) w fs Us fd
s f by, dy, s f s d fd fds, d f
w (A. 6). Ady, s, w CEECs y ddd
2004, w f EUs d s bd d f bs bss f EU
ss (Sf . 2006: 151).7
M yss f dy s s ssy (Sf 2008), wsd
2004 w b f E svs b f bss d
EUs f (Lvx/Sf 2006: 137f). Ts svs v b
y w s Tys bs. Idd, y vd s f
Tys 2005 N Fw8 w ss Mb
5 Idd, Nvb 2006, E Css dd f Tys ss -
s. S , s v b ssdd v qs s ( s Tys
xd Add P f 1963 A A w EU b-ss,y G Cys). I ws s ddd s v s wd b sd
Ty d f f P (by s s G Cy vsss d
s).
6 Sy, y x s dd by fs: ds, d
ssy f . I wds, s EU s y bsd
b s, d s y bss f s s vs bs
dds d s s dss.
7 F dd f w s f w EU b y d
by CEECs v s fv f , s Sf (2001).
8 Ts s d Ty sd w EU Ob 2005. I ds s d Tys -
bs s w EU. Ts w vs ss y fd -dd f Tys s w EU d d ssby f Ty E s -
s ss ssb bd (E Css 2005: 2). A s ,
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Unpacking the Compliance Puzzle | 9
Ss dsby f Ts bs s w s [] sqs f bs f
EU d bd (Lvx/Sf 2006: 140). Y, dss f s dvs,
s b d EU s y s s ss d : T
s by s Mb Ss f ss, ss d
f EU, d v fs f bs v fd s f (Lvx/Sf
2006: 152f). H, w by ds EUs y d C, Sb
d Ty s x f s s d (Sf 2008) d
EUs sds.
T b w s s s y d sy vs w EUs y
x ds dy (d b bs ds d EUs
dss). T s w, w d w w EU s reallyd bs ds
( s f dy, f v bs dy w
ddy ds d acquis ) s ssd . As vd by Db 2006 E C, EUs w sy s fsd y
d s b s s s EU y bsb ( EUs s-d bs
y q) d ws dss s sd by E b (xd s d
b by Css).9 Ts vy w w ds w w
sd CEECs w jd EU 2004 d 2007. As s, bs sy d
f ssy EU dy s-2007 d.
T f ss dy, y bw dds
d ss EU ss, s s y sd. R yss f dy v
fd s ( f EU ds s dds) f Fd Hs (FH) ss f
s sdd (Ty, Sb, C) (Sf 2008). Y EUs f
ss f xsv FHs s f dy (w s d w dss,
s d v bs). As s, d sssss f y sd b bsd
dds w EUs s dsssd Csss ss s
d s Css sf ds qv ss f , y sy
d b sd f EU dd.
T s , db dy y dds v ssy b bs
ds d EUs dss. If f s dvs f y x,
w w v s ds CC. I s bw, I ds bs f CC
Ts s by fs f s f ssy (ds), s yss f wd
q Tys ss w dds w v ssd wds
ss.
Css sd sv sss w wd dy Tys EU ss ss (.. EU
bd, ssby f sfds/ s ds).
9 T Css dssss s w sss xsvy s sy s. S, f x,
E Css (2006).
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2.2 Liberal Ruling Pares (or Low Polical Compliance Costs)
W , ds js sd x fs, s, dby f
dy. I s s ds v s f CC s d w b s
dd ss. Aby, s s w v b y w EUs ds s y
dy b - s s y bv d s w d bs (CC). S s s
d sd s f d fs ( ds s, low domesc polical
compliance costs), w f CC s s s. Ib s w y sbsqy
w w v b fw s s ss f f vs wd b v
vsy vd bs f EU d b vs (Sf/Sd
2005, Sf 2005, Sf . 2006).
T b w s s s y s ss bvs ss
bw ()b s, () w ss d ()-. W s dd
s f ss dd f b dy d . As
R Es s, [] dy , ss y w sd
yss s dv w w d x (Es 2006: 27).
Addy, ds ex ante s fs d -EU f ss
vsy b s (.. s s CEECs) w y sd b
s v. N ds b bs f f s s.10
Ts bd sss sd, ds d s d: T ssd
ss bw b b, w ss d y sy b s. Ts
s w AKPs s s y: I s y w b ds d y s sssfy
fwd EU f d s w 2002. Ts s s s s
f AKP s b y w d d db EU dy (w
by d w EUs f ddy Ty Db 1999 Hs E
C) (Sf . 2006).
T s , s w b dsssd d bw, AKPs EU sss y bs
. Fs d s sy, v b s ss s ssy f
, w s s b dy- ss. Sy b
(b dss b y, s xd by AKP) s-b s s f
EUs ds. AKPs sv fs xdd s f s dsss (x b,
s MHP w jd EU-dv, d s) w ( -
v f 1999-2002). T sd s d s s f b s s
d f w ds ss. Esy d 2002 d 2005, AKP fd dd
ss b s ws bs s b d y. Td d s s, w d b
f ss vb. AKPs d bs f
bddd ds s d f s s s s
b dy w d y .
10 F xs, s Sf (2005) d Vdv (2005).
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3. D A
3.1 Measurement of Condionality
I d ssss dys dby Ts s, I s d fwwy d dd EUs ds11 dy dy s f y
(2002-2009). I d dy s linkage between compliance with the Copenhagen polical
criteria and steps in the EU accession process ( f EU ddy s d f
ss s, d f bs). Bsy, db EU dy ss s
sy sbs s s bw ss (d fs, s sd C
1993) d (EU ss) w xd sss d C
.12 Ts, dy ss bw s, s dys
credibility:
0 = N . Isd, ds byd Tys
d w wd Ts ss xy d: s f Tys bs f
EUs bd, ss d/ s ( EUs bs y), Tys bd dss:
Bs Ty s vy y w , EU ds v y
s f b-s, Tys Cys ds s d s bs;
f , s j bs f ss d: W
[ Css C] s/s Tys bs.
1 = I : Ss s s: If Ty fs ,
EU should, could, would have to, has the responsibility to (s sd will) bs.
2 = Ex : If Ty fs , EU will
bs.
3 = Ex w : If Ty fs
, EU w bs s w next year.
4 = Ex v w w: Bs Ty
dd f , EU s delaying the membership talks.
O y v y, v dy vs w s d f EU d ddss
Tys bs d vd w s f ds
dy s. F x, 2003, Css ssd sy d Cd
11 Cdd EU ds d EU ds Ts , y E
Csss yy ss s, Ass Ps ds d E Cs s
dss EU d Tys bs. A f 28 ds w dd. F f
s, s Adx.
12 Of s, s d d acquis ds. S s -
bs ds, I dd w dy ss f EU ds f in addion to
. O d, s EU sss w onlydsssd d qs - w dd s y fs ws dsv x w EU d
bs.
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E w sd E C wd ss s w Ty
f fs by Db 2004. Ts s ws v 3 dy s s
d d fs ssb EU f ss s by s d. Hwv,
Css s sd ds f Tys bs w w v 0
s y dd : d sv Cys b,
y sd bd ds d d sss w Hs E C
ss (E Css 2003: 16). As s, Csss ws dd 0.75
dy (v f 3, 0, 0 d 0). Ts ws vd w ss f ds
(Tss E C: 1, Bsss E C: 2, Csss 2003 ss f
Ty: 0.66, d 2003 Ass Ps: 1) dy s f 1.08 f y
2003 (S F 1).
Figure 2: Exclusive Condionality
0 0,5 1 1,5 2,5 3,52 3
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
4
Figure 1: Overall Condionality
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
0 0,5 1 1,5 2,5 3,52 3 4
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Unpacking the Compliance Puzzle | 13
F 1 sws Ty ws d vs ds ( EUs y bsb
country like Turkey13 d Tys d d by s,14 .. Cys ds
d s w G). Ts wd dy ss y. Hwv, s ds
EU dd s bs f Ty. As s F 2, xsv
dy ( y s EUs sss w )
s v bw 2 s, ss EU ssy ssd Ty d. Y,
s d dby f s sss w wd EU b
b, s s F 1.
A s sss EU dd y dy ssy, d s w d
s db dy Ts s. M y, v s (w s
w EU b s ss ds) w w EU bs d Cys sss
w, d s dd ( w y s , s y f ds ss)
w w y d, bs y s . F x, f s, AKP bs jd EUs Cys d, EU ss s s
f ds s Ty bs (A F Pss
2003). As y s Db 2002 (bf EU d v ddd dy ds b s
w Ty 2004), P Ms Abd G wd f ss f EUs b
Cs Cb f E vs d ds s Ty (Assd Pss
2002). B sss b d f Ts bs f sy v f
Db 2004 Bsss S w d EU-wd vsy b w EU
sd bs s w , Ms y Ty. As P Ms Ed sd
fw dys bf s:
I get the impression Turkey is being held to stricter criteria than other candidates. No other country
had to wait 41 years at the door of the European Union. We have done all that was demanded of
us, and the Europeans are sll hesitang. That can clearly be called discriminaon. (Ts Dy
Nws 2004)
M y, Psd G ddy dd vw Ts s ss f
EU ss s dsd v ys d y bss sd by EU d
bs d sqy, Ty y v v EU y (E 2010).
Y, s wsd dbs b vby f EU bs, AKP
v s sd EU fs, w bs s dd vb.
13 A s ss s d 1993 C E C ss w sbsd
EU bs , s s s s C y fd s
sd s f b U d dd s (E C 1993: 13).
Ts s wy EU vs s d s ss vsy Ty.
14 A Tys d by sss f f s f dss w s y
EUs f d sy y ( qs Ty s y w), s s d
s bs Ts s. Ts s bs s f s sss
ws d d f EU y f s Tys dss (G d G Cys).As s, y s EU ds Ty d ss EU dby ss
Tys bs d.
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3.2 Measurement of Compliance
C s sd s d . I s
d f EUs s vyd by Csss ss s Ty. My
d yss f Ts sws y w wd v s x
(v f CC d s f b dy), s d ss sdy f
2002 2005. Ts d ss bw s w ws sd d d
Csss ss s.15
0 = N : T v vs sd fs js fs, s
s , .. dbs w v b fs, d ws,
s.
1 = Vb : T v ss fs w y bd sf, .. v s ,
f d ws b sbd , sy ss ss.
2 = L I: T v s d w/s d/ sbs
f v.
3 = L II: T dbs d/ vs sd w.
4 = L III: Lws ssd by .
E ys s sss f v f dvd ss f d
s f s dsssd Css s. T v b s
d (d s ss-s d f w ss w d s w):
dy d f w, s vs d f, v d s,
d s s d y d s. I s d dvd ss f
f s s. I vd ss f s-d s ( s x
dy d f w) s d f s s. I y vd
s w dy d f w s f vy y.
15 As s w, w dds , Css ds d qv -
s. Is ss s d ssy b f ws vs v ssd ( w v
ss) y f . N d y wys v w s vss v
b d ( b d) s f dd ( sv) w. A s (d sws b Ts s), sss ss y b d
( y b d dy) sbsq (s). As s, d xs s xy ds.
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Unpacking the Compliance Puzzle | 15
F 3 sws s s s bw dy d ds. I
s d (2002-2005) s s w dy s dw sdy. S w
2006 s dwwd b s vy (bv 2) w d w
xy w dy ss (bw 0 d 1). Ts sss by d , w dby
f dy dd AKPs . R, s AKPs ds s s
w x ds. Iy, AKP d w ss f EU fs, y s
ws s 2005, s-2005 d . I b s
sss bw.
3.3 AKPs Polical Identy Reconsidered
As - y d Iss d, AKP w Nvb 2002 w ss
f b d svv dy16 reminiscent of the ideology of
Es Cs ds. I f y y d f w EU s y
dy w d dd fs s sv f f EU
membership:
We see connuing the reforms as benecial to our people. Meeng the criteria is not a loss for us. It
has advantages. We have to meet the criteria whether [the EU] accept[s] us or not. Therefore we will
connue on the same path with the same sincerity.(Ts Dy Nws 2002)17
16 As xd AKPs 2002 E Mfs (AK P S Bys), s fs ys
d s dy w sv xs s-, d s vs
Ts sy (f bdd vs, s: ://www.b./s/bd/2002-1.
).
17 AKP d Ed d s s w E bby E ds f s f
Figure 3: Condionality and Compliance
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
0 0,5 1 1,5 2,5 3,5 42 3
Compliance
Conditionality
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16 | KFGWorking Paper No. 14 | June 2010
I w s , AKP sssfy d Tys EU ss ss by d v j
sv f s s w s sv s ds, w d f
bs s w EU Ob 2005.18 T y ws -d Nvb 2007
y s d s y dvd f EU bs d b f
d.
A s , b dsy d y, AKP s s dsss sf
f s Iss s d dvd s ds. Py s v ssy
jd b Iss,19 sd y fw Tys s, s d
j d by Msf K A (w fdd d Ts Rb 1923).20
Ts, AKPs b dss js f y w dv dy (s w
s bs) Ty. Gv ys Iss d, f s dss fss
d AKP f s dss Wf Py w dvd I-sy
( by xs, bs) s y f s-d Iss N O Mv
(M G H).
Y, s yss f AKP sss s b dy21 (f dsss
f Is ) s qsb. W s s b AKPs dy s, fw
wds d s f ys b ds. Ts s f AKPs
EU s s b dy.
T s w fs w s db AKPs b . Fs, f s,
AKP fd s vs f sf sf d, svv dy f -. T ys d (.. f b f d fsd
d, E d EU bs) s sy d sds
sd by Ts x. W s ds b s
f d s E ss, s s w w bsv AKPs
s. Sd d s s, AKP s sd EU fs, s s dd sv
s d s w s d s. AKPs dv f bs d s
EUs f bs s w Ty. T d s AKP ssd w Nv -
b 2002 d f ws s s E s Eds y.
18 F dd f fs sd d AKP, s, , bd (2007).
19 As P Ms Ed sd s, w 2002 : W vd vs f
ss f sy d f s. T ws . N s s y y
bsd (Assd Pss 2002).
20 I s b sd s s s s AKPs s. A w y Ts
s, AKPs bs w s. Idd, s y s ds w vsy
wd f Tys Iss Wf Py (w ws fd f w by y Fby 1997
s f v ss, fd f Ts b, d sd dw by
Cs C s ds). B P Ms R Tyy Ed d Psd Abd
G w ss sss f Wf d Eb.
21 By b dy, I dy d fd d s (.. fd- fds, s d f w). As s, ds ssy d s f ss.
T qs w -bsd s (Iss AKPs s) s b w d bs s
sbj f s db byd fs f s . Ts, fw dsss AKPs b-
s w fs s dy ss.
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Unpacking the Compliance Puzzle | 17
s b sy d s-2007 d w ws -d w d b
f vs (47 ) d sd w xd ss f s w ( 2010: 9). Ts
sss AKPs d dy s b d f s s fs
d f EU fs (2002-2005) s sy, vy dd.22
I d ssss AKPs s d d EU s, s d f
svv d d sd b vd s x. As sd bv, AKPs s
b Iss Wf Py. O v f Wf Py (RP)s s by Ts Cs
C Jy 1998 s f Iss, V Py (FP) ws fdd by Wf bs
(Db 1997). W FP fy dsssd sf f RPs Iss d dvd
dy d s, ws sd dw by Cs C (J 2001)
w fd s s v f s f . FPs s d s s
w -bsd s: Fy Py (SP) fd by dss y Wfs s d
Eb (Jy 2001) d fss AKP (As 2001).23
P ds bw Iss s d AKP w dy vd b RP d
SP sd s Ns O Mv (NOM) d fd f s f y
d w Ws d EU. AKP, d, d b fs
s sy d EU d dsy bddd wy fd dy f svv
dy (s sd NOMs Iss dy).
Bsd s ds d AKPs y sd f y d EU
bs, y d AKP qs s Tys s b, d y f -
(s, , Is 2003, bd 2006, Yv 2006). W s sv ys AKP dd s vy Iss s d f Wf d f d
d EU dy, s s vd ss s d s y
vy dd. I wds, wd b f sd AKPs d s d f
s f AKP ds.
AKPs f s b y svv/- d ws d by s
f Ts x. T f s dss Iss s d b bd by
Tys s y-jdy sbs sd AKP d d. T
s-d Fby 28 ss24 vd y dv s d. I f, s B A,
d AKP b d s ss f Wf d Eb bf Fby 28 v,
xd vw ss qs AKPs f:
22 Ts s Sf d Sds x f CEECs EU d s sy dv v
fs w EU s (Sf/Sd 2005).
23 F dd vw f Is Ty s, , C/C (2003) d f
ssys C (2008).
24 Ts fs s-d d d by Ts y s Wf Py
Fby 28, 1997. A N Sy C d dy, s sd vd
Wfs Iss s d vd Wf d Eb s. Ts y d b w
f ss f s s Iss s Ty by y (s sd
y vs f d, 1960 d 1980).
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18 | KFGWorking Paper No. 14 | June 2010
Our slogan since our childhood Prime Minister Erbakan had nally come true. There was a move
forward for a year, but then the government was forced to resign with outside intervenons. The
events we lived during that period showed us the realies of Turkey once again. We saw that those
who are in power cannot simply keep it with popular support [] Aer February 28 process we
realized that we were at an impasse and as a group of long-me criques of [FP]s polics we asked
for the permission to depart.25
T d vd sss f s sbs (y d s)
ws y f bd AKPs f s svv d s sd -EU, Iss
y (Sy 2007: 201-202, P 2007: 343, Y/K 2009, Fs 2004: 162f). B
by AKP ds s dd s d s; s-bsd, b d
sd bd AKPs bs v bs ys y ys f
Ts vs. [I] [ y] sfdd Is fsy d b f d fd
[b s] bdd ys bdd vs (P 2007: 343). As s, ys wd f s d f s f svv/s
ss.
T b s, s s AKP s s s s
Ts s. N ds ss by sf s ssy d b s
bd f, b ds. Y, sy AKPs s sss AKP s
v vy dsd ys y dd b d sv ys
w. T s s vd ss s d s
AKPs s.
W s s d 2002-2007 (s vd AKPs b d f EU
fs) AKPs b s v b sy d d s sd
(s-2007 d).26 Svy vd sss AKPs ssv v s (47 ) Jy
2007 y s ws y s sd dy dd (Ky
f). Y, w, fs f s s-
xs, AKP sd sss dv s d sby:27
[] AKP leadership [] seemed to have moved to precipitate new crises over such polarizing issues as
the trban (headscarf styles of women),28 and increased their aacks on the polical opposion and
the media, which have become increasingly abrasive and visceral by the me of the local elecons of
2009.(Ky f)
25 Ivw w R C, Sb 5, 2007: ://www.b./b_dy.?b_d=9210;
ssd 25 A 2010.
26 Bs s fs s AKPs ds s (2002-s) bdy , dsss s
d s s xs f AKP bs s f ys w b -
.
27 O s , s s (2009: 32-38).
28 Ts fs AKPs s v b (d Tys s s) w f Isdsf by Ms w Tys b ss. Ts vs v d b db-
, by d s -s dvd -b d -b ss, s-
vy. T vsy dd J 2008 w Cs C d AKPs sv s
d b ds vs ss.
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I s s dd d f fs d d, AKPs s v
y sd wy f s f d s. A y sd
d fs d EU dy ( w sw 2005, s w b xd
bw), bw xs d s d ss v wdd,
f ss AKPs b .29
Dvs f d ws bsvd y ds s f f w/
dd jdy d fd fds. C f w, x wd
b vs d f s-d E30 s s 2007. T d w
s dd s dd y jd s s s d v f d f ,
vby f vy d s f v y.31 A s vs f d
ss q E s s y v s d jd ds
Ty,32 E vs s y s dd (d y
ss, fdd) ss Tys y, b d/ d ss. Idd, y
bsvs v d ss s E sss bw js s y
s fd vd.33 Ss f AKP s v d s s.
O AKP b f s by d s w sb y
s y f y xd f s (d D/Rd 2010), y s s
AKP s s E s s f v s ys s sss Iss
s. Sy, AKP d d P Ms Ed ws qd s sy: I s
f E (Tf 2008). I s, s vs d w E s
b dd v sd dbs s AKP vs s f fd fs f
b d s s jd dd, f w d s.34
29 T s bw d d x s d s f w ( -xs) b
dy. As svs s s dsd, [w] d ss f
bv s sv d [], ssd -ss bv ss -
ds-v sss f [] s (S/S 2002: 523). S s, Rss . 1999.
30 E s d s fd by d s, s, f s bs,
jss, ds . I ssdy fs vw AKP v by s f y
v d d s y Iss, -b s.
31 T v b sv d bss ss, d ds f sb b s w -
vsy d b d y ss, d dsd Tys s vss. Tssd f b E v yy b sd f s ( v ys s ss) b-
f y d d f jd. I dd, sd b y sw
v dsy d vss f E sss s w s 56 jds
d ss ssd f b d E (US D f S 2010). AKP s d
s w dd y. B b s sd w b f Ed v
dd svy f ss by sy sd f b d f /s s d
(d : M 2009). Ts d dvs sd E d y s
E s w- d ss s v s f d -
s sy v y (M 2010).
32 Idd, 2008 , Ty vd 75 d 64 vs E C f H Rs f v-
s f f , d by d sy, svy (US D f S 2010).
33 F d dsss f wf s fsy v d y C D f
, s D/Rd (2010).
34 O xs f s d AKPs f f vss s jds w v-
(US D f S 2010).
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20 | KFGWorking Paper No. 14 | June 2010
Sd, s f s fd fds d, AKP s d fds f
ss d xss s ss f f xs d s s s.
T xy s x y sd d D d 2009 s s
. I wds f Css, [] s sd [] y d
vby f G d f freedom of the press in pracce (E Css 2009:
18, ss ). Gv svy f y d D wss d
s AKPs s, s b s y vd (dd s s
s AKP) (E 2009). Idd, P Ms Ed sf s d f by f wss
d vs s wd by D (Fd Hs 2009), fw v f
sd d D F w d bs f AKP v. T
vs ss s d s dsd sf df ss d by
Ed d AKP bs s jss d ss f vs s
(Fd Hs 2009b).35 H s s d s sss v vy dd
v f sf-ss (US D f S 2010).36
M y, v sv ss d s (w ws dd d
y f 1980-83) s s d f y d d Tys
ws s f s E , sss. Y, AKPs s ss
f s b d by Ts s d s37 s w s
EU s.38 Css v d - , -d sss - d d
dy y d s.39 Some observers have even argued
AKP ds s x dd ss s MPs s fs v f
ds f . Aby, s s s s vy b
y s sd v f s s d s (1993,
1999, 2001, 2003) (E 2010).
W s ssb y xs f s bw d s d ,40 the
35 M y, b f sd jss, bss d vss sd f 157 2005
254 2007 d 435 2008 (Fd Hs 2009b). I dd, Ty d w 122 f f 168
s (d y s N K d Sd) NGO Rs W Bds
2009 ss fd dx (E 2009).
36 Idd, s b f ws s ds jss f w -
s f AKP s bs f f f s bsss s ds f v(US D f S 2010).
37 F x, d f Cs C by wd AKP ds f ds f -
y s s f (Rd 2010). Ts ws s s -v w f jdy
b s d s dd.
38 B E Css Sf F d d f EU-Ty J Py Css
H F v sd s f sd s sv ss vv
v, s s d v sy s s wds ssb s sss
sd ds (Y 2010).
39 F dsss ss -dw f ss y s f d f
sd s ds, s Cd (2010).
40 O b xs d vs f s-d Kds v wws fy d s f 2009. T v dd vd f s
dds- Kds (PKK) s d bd s f Kds y. A s x-
s vs f b s, w f xds s f v-
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Unpacking the Compliance Puzzle | 21
s : T AKP ds y s v sfd y w xbs b
dy. As F Ky, Ts ss, s , AKPs v
dy s w, wsd s f d d. R, w ss b s
s AKPs s s f dy (Ky 2010). Csqy, s d bs
f E-sy s d y ss d d Ts
s ( 2009: 22).41
3.4 Argument on AKPs Compliance Trends
Hv s d w xs AKPs s (s
f CC d v b dy), sd s dw fw:
2002-2005:
Lw ss (w d w svv ss)
Rs C
2006-:
Md ss ( d w svv ss)
Sw-dw
As xd Id, AKP fd s vs f d EU s,
s ss f y w EUs ds v y b w d d. F s f
yss, I w ss f ss v vd : (1) , (2) svv. W
f s s f EU f AKPs y, s
w EU f ss wd b AKPs sd s y w Iss
s vs (E 2007). Ls b s s s f sy f f sd svv
sss -bsv Mss (.., v b f ds ss s w s sss
d sq ys d fs d Rd) x f jb s . ss d
s d by AKP (T . 2008). F sss f AKPs f b
d, s, G/S (2010).
41 I s b d AKP s y y w b s Ts x. T -
s s d Rb Ps Py (CHP) s s b d f s d ss d -
f b vs EU fs ( 2009: 30). A s , s s-2005
E s xbs s ( 2010: 13), AKPs (s w b xd bw).
Y, s s s CHP ss b d bs AKP, dd f sy. Ts s vd ys sys s AKPs bv-d s s w s
s b Tys d (D 2010).
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22 | KFGWorking Paper No. 14 | June 2010
d vs--vs s sbs. F s, b vs y sd AKPs
b f f d: [I 2002], s d sd fv f EU, AKP y d
wv f w b s f bs, b s d s svv EU
(P 2007: 342).
W ss f , y qs v ss sf s: W f-
ming for the EU increase my vote share both among the electorate at large and among my constuencies,
narrowly put? T sw s qs ws sv 2005. Fs,
ss ( f), s s EU s sv bs ss Ty (.., EU ddy
.), Ts ws f fs wd f EU bs (w
wd ss f f v). I , v ss v d
s s f f: A s b q ds f (s
s by d dd by vs f Ty),42 complying
EU bs wd bs s y.43
Idd, w b yd f v s, -EU s sy fs vs ds s. As 2006
fd , vw jy f Ts vs (71 ) sd -EU bs
y b f f y x (/Ky
2009: 127).
W EU sds sv bs s (ss bs s s by
d ss s, .. EU ddy, bs s), s s s
b EU: ) bs f bs s w y, b) s
d fs s f bs. Sy , EU sws s ss
b d y Ty ( dds- s d ss bs),
s ss s Ts b b d f bs v fs. I s
EUs Db 1997 Lxb ds w dd Ty EU ddy, 1999 Hs
f ddy ws s s w vsd fs f j by EU.44
42 Ts s y f AKP. Svy vd s ssy sw vs s AKP f -
xs y d/svv bfs (Ky 2007).
43 EU bs s ss f Ts vs y bs s vd s y b
by Ts b. T EUs Eb svys v ssy vd Ts s
y CEECs b svyd - ss bs w w d jbs bv s (E-
Css 2002: 87, 2004: 116, 2005b: 82). Tf, d bs (.., djb s E) s b y s wy b s s ss b bs
Ty (/Ky 2009: 124).
44 T b s, s ss qs f wy Hs s db bs s f
bd Ts b s sd AKP. I ss s s, b s
s dy ddy s s wds bs s y s w f
s bs ds sd by EU ( w y w b f Tys ss). H,
dy d w f s how much EUs bs y Tys Cys ds
w d EUs ds Ty bs sv f Tys d s
d . S b b Tys EU ss sss d s f
C s s d by b d. F x, 2002 svy vd
jy f Ts (58%) d w b C ( . 2002).
Sy, d b f Ts sds ( bw 72% d 82%) v sd yd f fd b ys ss ss (E Css 2002: 9, 2003b: 11, 2004:
157).
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Unpacking the Compliance Puzzle | 23
T vd f w fs d bv s bsd svy d. I ds ,
s d b d. B s ssb f w sy b bvs
w bs f sws qss sd Eb svys. F
x, f sds w d s ys ds d w
s dd b b f EU f sd v s AKP v
ssd d EU-fdy, d s (E Css 2002: 86, 2003b: 139,
2004: 150). Ts sss y b ss f C
: ) Ts s bdy ss C w d, b)
y bv d s ssy f bs.
Other survey data45 sws s d (2002-2005) w s b ssby
f bs. Ts, bd w vd bw d d bs, y
sss AKPs ss f f w w. As sd bv, EUs f ddy
Db 1999 Hs s bsd b s b EU . Ts s vd yb d s s s f EU bs, s EU d bf bs f EU
ss. Psv sss s sd s d.46 This is in sharp contrast to
E-ss sd by EUs 1997 Lxb ds dy Ty ddy. F x,
1998 sdb f sd y sd Tys EU bs d vd
EU ds s Ty. B s v dd 2002, s y dd by sv
s sd Hs ds.47
I s s sv ds, sd d (2005-s) s d by s ss.
A EU f ss d qs f bs s s f ,
s sss s s s y w d f b bvs less in the
d f bs. W w bsv s d s w E-ss sd by EUs
ss sv bs s48 and rising controversy about Turkish membership in some EU
b-ss w qs Us d Ty.
45 Uss sd ws, d dsssd bw s f EUs Eb svys.
46 I y b bvs s s vs f bs ssy ss s s b -
bs. Y, s s b d by s d by Tys d b ys:
[As Ts s] s b ssb bs w, dy s bs
s ws ( 2003: 186). As vd EUs Cdd Cs Eb svys w
w dd f A 2001 S 2004, s f EU bs s f 62% (1998) 74%
(1999) d 75% (Nvb 2001) d 73% (My 2003) d 71% (2004, f
w sd EU bs d ). T f Ts w bvd EU b-
s wd b b f Ty s d d 70-75% (s w s ss bsvd
EU dds svyd). A s , jy f Ts (54%) sd EU 2002 w
s w dd ws y (34%).
47 W ws s s 27.1% 1998 (d 1997 Lxb j), dd 7.4%
2002 (Ed 2004: 115).
48 T w w s s: T EUs Db 2004 Bsss S ds w d -
ss s w Ty y dd s -dd d Ty d b
d E ss ss ssb bd (E C 2004:
23) (ss s s v bs); d Csss Nvb 2006 ds fTys bs s v acquis s, w ws vd s sb Tys -
ss ss. B sss w wdy vd by Ts d.
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24 | KFGWorking Paper No. 14 | June 2010
Ts E-ss s vd b d. S w 2004 ( s, d
f EUs Bsss S d -dd f Tys EU bs s),
b s vs f EU bs v f sdy.49 Public trust in the EU has also decreased50
w s f j by EU v d .51 T -ddss f Tys
ss s (d d s d )52 and arguments voiced by some member-
ss (.. F, Gy, As) fv f vd bs ss f Ts f
bs (P 2007: 344, 2010: 6f, /Ky 2009: 126f) s v vsd
s f s-Hs d d b b b fs f j/ds by
the EU:
Modalies of EU behaviour toward Turkey, mixed signals about its commitment to full Turkish
membership and demands for unilateral concessions have soured Turkish public opinion, with only
44 per cent in spring 2007 regarding membership a posive thing, down from 66 per cent two years
before.(P 2007: 355)
T sd s f ss s s s sy-d. As dsssd
Id, y ssssd bsd w certain EU fs wd AKPs
y s s-svv ss. AKP d Css wd
s f v f Is dsf b f Ts w b ss: [] [I] d
vd sf d s Is sy fw f EU f wd b s
f dvd xsss f f d Is dy (P 2007: 348). L b (w AKP
sds xss f s fd -s, syb) s b
y ss f AKP s jy f s s ss wd s b vd. A
s , dsf ss s y vs bs f Ts s
sbs (w sds v f ss); b ss s f d EU ss
wd b vy s s wd w AKP vd ds s s by y
EU bs d. I s, AKP d s f s fds wd b d
d ss f s svvs s s s s wd b d
EU bs ss ( 2010: 3).
49 I Ob-Nvb 2004, f Ts w sw bs s d dsd
62% (E Css 2005: 30) f 71% ( S 2004). T v w f dw 59%
S 2005 (E Css 2005f: 5) d 55% A 2005 (E Css 2006b: 29). As
vd Eb d, wsd fw xs, sv sss s y f
sdy : 44% (Eb 65, S 2006), 54% (Eb 66, F 2006), 52% (S 2007), 49%
(F 2007), 49% (S 2008), 42% (F 2008), 48% (S 2009).
50 Ts vs EU f f d 51% (F 2004), 41% (S 2005) d 50% (A 2005) bw 50%:
31% (S 2008), 27% (A 2008), 38% (S 2009). Ts ss f bw v s v
bsvd EU-27 (47% - 50%).
51 I A 2004 d S 2005, Ts xssd fs f j by EU s 25 EU
s svyd (10% d 18%, svy) (E Css 2005b: 85, 2005d: 35). A s ,
2006 svy fd w-ds f Ts svyd d xs f f bs EU
(/Ky 2009: 127).
52 Py vs f Ts b ws EUs ( N Fw) f
f v f b v f v f Ts b w
ws wdy dbd Ts d (/Ky 2009: 124).
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Unpacking the Compliance Puzzle | 25
Y, w ECHR d 2005 dsf b dd s v f fd f
Ty, b bvs EU wd s s ss s f Tys f
d. Ts by b AKPs EU y d dd s f ( 2010:
8f):
[] [N]ow that the ECHR helped to sever the e between donning the turban and the freedom of
conscience or freedom of expression, the EU could hardly be wielded as a shield against the enemies
of polical Islam in Turkey [] It was aer 2005 that the AKP government began to slow down its
eorts at engaging in the accession negoaons.(/Ky 2009: 125)53
A AKP d y d sy f ECHR s 2004 (s ws
d sd by Css), s AKP s y dsvd ds,
ECHR jds sd v sd w Ms y bf (Hy 2005). I s f
d v vsd xy -fsd d fw
ECHR ds s f s v d s s s ss (P 2007:
348).
T d bs f EU wsd, ss f ws
vsd. As xd bv, s s by d AKPs v s EU f d s
s f svv s y w Iss s Tys s - sys.
Since 2005 the AKP has dropped the ball on EU reform, yet it is unlikely that the party will abandon
this agenda The AKP does not have credible or viable alternaves to the EU reform process; only
by connuing along this path can it shield itself from andemocrac stast-secularist forces.(P2007: 356)
Gv s AKP s s vv Iss s, AKPs s-2002 f s
s b qsd by s s. B EU f d wd y
j f -, fs y b dsy d y. Ts wd
y b vd sy f s s vs ds s (Tys
jdy d y), b s s EUs v b s f f w s
ss w wd s xs s Iss y.54
53 T s-2005 sw-dw AKPs EU f ss s b wdy dsssd sw. (2009b: 13,
2010: 11) s f s d d AKP (2002-2005) s d f E Ty s
sd s-2005 d f s E. T Csss w ss s v b
f vs dd f ss d f ssd s: []
f s swd 2005 d f fs s v (E Css
2005: 41).
54 Idd, s s ss w EUs s y ss Ty. I w b d
s (sy, fd f ss), EU s sy dd Ty y ws sd
(s ss f s Wf d V s w w sd dw 1998 d 2001, svy).
M y, w Tys f b s, Abd Yy, d ws M 14, 2008
Cs C dd AKP b y dssvd bsd -ss s, EU s sy s v, y s y s s d/
v sd b bd, d w vs d s.
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26 | KFGWorking Paper No. 14 | June 2010
T s , AKPs EU f y s b s: V f
fs, y s ds s -, s y, w
wd b survive w f sy f jdy y. Ts s b
v w EU ss , s vd f fs 2005.
3. C
Ts s d x w EUs C bs
by fs s f Ty d AKP v (2002-2009). T s s f d
w fs f d f EUs ds by EU dds: db EU dy
d b s ss. Rd AKP, d ss s y
fd db EU dy d d f w ss w s b
d dy (s sd s s dd f b dy).
Y, y yss f AKPs s v ws. Fs, v sss EUs
f dy, EUs , d s f bs d
d (d fs d C bs ) s b db
ys f AKP v. Sd d s s, AKP d f , dsy-dv
vs: vs d s d d svv Tys
s sys s y w s bs d Iss s.
T b s, s s dsss xy v f xs d f CEECs E
d by Sf d Sd. Ex vs s s EU ddy v sy b
f d Ts vs y w . Fw wd
fs wd v b sd by 1999-2002 v sbsqy by AKP
bs f EUs 1999 Hs f ddy Ty.55 While the argument presented here
s d ds sy, ds dy yd by x wds
Tys f ss. W x fs, s b sw
sss - w s d f vb f . As xd bv, EUs
Hs ds sd b s f EU bs ss d wd ss
f f s. Ts, x wds d in conjuncon with ensuing
ds dvs.
Sd, s sd by AKPs s, y b ds fs w fv
independentf EU wds d/ dy. AKPs f s d ( w sw
) v s-2005 d w b ss f EU ss fdd
v bs ss s by EU. I d, ss ds s ds y
dsd vs ss EU ss sd by dy.
55 T s s sss v yd by EUs Hs ds f Tys
f ss (s, , Kb 2005, Av 2004, S 2003).
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Unpacking the Compliance Puzzle | 27
L
Agence France Presse 2003: Cys s P Sb B Tys Rd EU, 2 Nvb.
Associated Press 2002: Ty As EU Ey Ts Sd B 2003, 6 Db.
Avci, Gamze 2004: Ts s d EU dss s-Hs d: A s fE, : U, M/Cf, Ns (ds.): Ty d E I:Ass ss d sss, Ld.
Cakir, Rusen 2007: B A , : ://www.b./b_dy.?b_d=9210; 30 A 2010.
Canda, Ays 2010: Dyd Ays Y, : Rd 2, 25 A.
arkolu, Ali/Erzan, Rek/Kirii, Kemal/Yilmaz, Hakan 2002: TESEV svy: Ts Pb O Mbs EU, J.
arkolu, Ali 2003: W ws f bs? Css f Ts b s f EUbs, : C, A/Rb, By (ds.): Ty d E U: Ds
Ps, E I d I Dys, Ld, 171-195.arkolu, Ali/Kalayciolu, Ersin 2009: T Rs Td f Csvs Ty, Nw Y: Pv
M.
Cizre, mit/Cinar, Menderes 2003: Ty 2002: Ks, Iss, d Ps L f Fby 28 Pss, : T S A Qy 102 2/3, 309-332.
Cizre, mit (ed.) 2008: S d Is Ps Ty: T M f Js d DvPy, Nw Y.
Doan, Pinar/Rodrik, Dani2010:Hw Ty Mfd C P, : F Py, 6 A.
Doan, Yalin 2010: B d, d, AKPd dsy bs , Hy, 22 A.
Eki, Oktay2007: AKP Dv, : Hy, 13 Db.
Eki, Oktay2009: Iy , : Hy, 10 Db.
Epstein, Rachel 2006: Cv Csss: I Iss d Lb Wdvw, d f A M f A P S Ass.
Erder, Nejat 2004: Tyd S Ed Y A (1994-2004) [Cs VsPfs Ty (1994-2004)], Isb, Ty: TUSES Yy.
Ergin; Sedat2010: Gd AB Cs, : Hy, 16 A.
Ergin, Sedat2010b:By T ys ds, : Hy, 23 A.
European Commission 2002: Cdd Cs Eb 2001, Rss Sy, Bsss,M.
E Css 2003: C E. Sy P d R f ECss Pss Twds Ass by B, R d Ty, COM (2003)676 , Bsss.
European Commission 2003b: Eb CC-EB 2003.2, Hs, Bsss, J.
European Commission2004: Cdd Cs Eb 2003.4, Bsss, Fby.
European Commission 2005: N Fw, Lxb.
European Commission 2005b: Eb 62, Pb O E U, Bsss, My.
European Commission 2005: Ty 2005 Pss R. SEC (2005) 1426, Bsss.
European Commission 2005d: Eb 63.4, Av Bd Ky. B 2005, Us R,
Ty.
European Commission 2005: Eb 62, Pb O E U, A 2004,Us R, Ty.
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European Commission 2005f: Eb 63, Pb O E U, S 2005,N R Exv Sy, Ty.
European Commission 2006: E Sy d M Cs 2006-2007. Id xds EUs y w bs, COM (2006) 649 F, Bsss.
European Commission 2006b: Eb 64, AB Ky Ass, G 2005, Us R,Ty.
European Commission 2009: Ty 2009 Pss R. SEC (2009) 1334, Bsss.
European Council1993: C C: Css f Psdy, 21-22 J.
European Council 2004: Bsss E C, 16-17 Db 2004, Psdy Css,16238/04, Bsss.
Featherstone, Kevin/Radaelli, Claudio M. (eds.) 2003: T Ps f E, Oxfd: OxfdUvsy Pss.
Fokas, Ee 2004: T Iss v d Ty-EU Rs, : M U, M/Cf,Ns (ds.): Ty d E I: Ass ss d sss, Ld.
Freedom House 2009: Fd Wd Ty.
Freedom House 2009b: Fd f Pss Ty.
Gm, Sebnem/Sert, Deniz 2010: T M 2009 L Es d Iss DTsf f AKP Py Ty, : Mdd Es Cq 19/1, 55-70.
Hrriyet2005: U ss byy, 16 Nvb.
Insel, Ahmet2003: T AKP d N Dy Ty, : S A Qy 102 2/3,293-308.
Kalayciolu, Ersin 2007: Ps f Csvs Ty, : Ts Sds 8/2, 233-252.
Kalayciolu, Ersin f: Js d Dv Py H: Rs f Is
Rs f R f C Pd Py?, : Yd, B/Rb, By (ds.):Is f Ty d AKP R, Ld.
Kubicek, Paul2005: T E U d Gsss D Ty, : Ts Sds6/3, 361-377.
Lavenex, Sandra/Schimmelfennig, Frank2006: Rs w Wd E, : J f CM Sds 44 (A Rvw), 137-154.
Mert, Nuray2009: Sv Isbd, : Rd, 17 Nvb.
Mert, Nuray2010: Db sy, y, : V, 5 Jy.
ni, Ziya 2009: Csvv Gbs Cssds: T Js d Dv Py d Ty P D Csd Ty, : Md Ps 14/1, 21-40.
ni, Ziya 2009b: Bw E d E-Ass: F Py Avs Ty d AKP E, : Ts Sds 10/1, 7-24.
ni, Ziya 2010: Cs f C: Ds Ps, Idy Cs d Cvsyv EU Mbs Ty, W P N. 2, Isb: Isb B Uvsy EIs.
zbudun, Ergun 2006: F P Is Csvv Dy: T Cs f Js dDv Py Ty, : S E Sy & Ps 11 3/4, 543-557.
zbudun, Ergun 2007: D Rfs Ty, 1993-2004, : Ts Sds 8/2, 179-196.
Paon, Marcie J. 2007: AKP Rf F Ty: W s d EU Pss?, :Md Ps 12/3, 339-358.
Radikal2010: Hs K: B y , 3 M.
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Risse, Thomas/Ropp, Stephen/Sikkink, Kathryn (ds.) 1999: T Pw f H Rs. INs d Ds C, Cbd Sds I Rs Cbd: CbdUvsy Pss.
Sayari, Sabri2007: Twds Nw Ts Py Sys?, : Ts Sds 8/2, 197-210.
Schimmelfennig, Frank 2001: T Cy T: Lb Ns, R A, d EsE f E U, : I O 55/1, 47-80.
Schimmelfennig, Frank/Sedelmeier, Ulrich (ds.) 2005: T E f C d Es E,I, NY: C Uvsy Pss.
Schimmelfennig, Frank2005: S C d I S: Mbs Ivs,Py Css, d Ssd C C d Es E, : IO 59 (F), 827-860.
Schimmelfennig, Frank/Engert, Stefan/Knobel, Heiko 2006: I S E: EOs, P Cdy d D C, Nw Y: Pv M.
Schimmelfennig, Frank2008: EU P Ass Cdy 2004 E: Cssyd Evss, : J f E Pb Py 15/6, 918-937.
Schmitz, Hans P./Sikkink, Kathryn 2002: I H Rs, : Css, W/Rss, Ts/Ss, B (ds.): Hdb f I Rs, Ld.
Smith, Thomas 2003: T Ps f Cdy: T E U d H Rs Rf Ty, Kb, P (d.): T E U d D, Ld.
Taraf2008: Ed sv svd, 16 Jy.
Toprak, Binnaz/Bozan, Irfan/Morgl, Tan/ener, Nedim 2008: Tyd F O: D v MfEsd Os, Isb: B Uvss.
Turkish Daily News 2002: Eds D Sss EU Abssds, 8 Nvb.
Turkish Daily News 2004: T W f Dsy w EU, 13 Db.
US Department of State 2010: 2009 H Rs R: Ty.
Vachudova, Milada A. 2005: E Udvdd: Dy, Lv, d I Cs,Oxfd.
Yanik, Lerna/Korkut, Umut2009: C Tw Tsfs: A f Y Ds (FIDESZ) Hy d Js d Dv Py (AKP) Ty, : Rs S C, 1/1:47-66.
Yavuz, Hakan M. (ed.) 2006: T E f Nw Ty: Dy d AK P, S L Cy:T Uvsy f U Pss.
Yilmaz, Mehmet Y. 2010: AB dy : Ay y s!, : Hy, 5 A.
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Ax
Ls f dd EU ds ( svy ds d b f dd ss
):
European Commission:
R ss s Tys ss wds ss (2002, 3; 2003, 3; 2004, 3;
2005, 5; 2006, 4; 2007, 4; 2008, 4; 2009, 4)
C E: Sy P d R f E Css
Pss wds Ass by B, R d Ty (Nvb 5, 2003, 4)
Rd f E Css Tys Pss wds Ass (Ob 6,
2004, 9)
Isss As f Tys Mbs Psv (Ob 6, 2004, 8)
N Fw (Ob 3, 2005, 12)
2005 E Sy P (Nvb 9, 2005, 7)
E Sy d M Cs 2006-2007 (Nvb 8, 2006, 7)
E Sy d M Cs 2007-2008 (Nvb 6, 2007, 6)
E Sy d M Cs 2008-2009 (Nvb 5, 2008, 5)
E Sy d M Cs 2009-2010 (Nvb 14, 2009, 7)
European Council:
Ass Ps Ds (My 19, 2003, 3; Jy 23, 2006, 4; Fby 18, 2008, 4)
Presidency Conclusions:
Sv C (J 21-22, 2002, 5)
Bsss C (Ob 24-25, 2002, 5)
C C (Db 12-13, 2002, 1)
Tss C (J 19-20, 2003, 1)
Bsss C (Db 12-13, 2003, 3)
Bsss C (J 17-18, 2004, 1)
Bsss C (Db 16-17, 2004, 8)
Bsss C (J 15-16, 2006, 2)
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T K-F - E A Ex
Iv R
T K-Fs (KFG) s w fd -d by G Rs Fd 2008. I s -
f KFG vd sy s v w vv s s b d w by dss ddb w s f s d j ss.
T K-Fs T Tsfv Pw f Ebs s E s B-Bd-b d ss w v-ss d s ss. I xs f EU s - d f ds, y ss d sf d x ds sss s s:
Idy d Pb S
C, Cdy d Byd
Cv Rs d Es Ex Rs