Election Law Cases III

8/12/2019 Election Law Cases III

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EN BANC

[G.R. No. 122391. August 7, 1997]

FELIPE L. LAODENIO,petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE MUNICIPALBOARD OF CANVASSERS OF MAPANAS, NORTHERN SAMAR and ROGELIOLONGCOP, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

BELLOSILLO,J.:

FELIPE L. LAODENIO, petitioner, and ROGELIO LONGCOP, respondent, were

candidates for the position of Mayor of Mapanas, Northern Samar, during the 8 May1995 elections. On 15 May 1995 Longcop was proclaimed winner by the MunicipalBoard of Canvassers.

On 20 May 1995 Laodenio filed a petition with respondent Commission onElections (COMELEC) to annul the proclamation of Longcop and to declare illegal theconstitution of the Municipal Board of Canvassers as well as its proceedings. Healleged in his petition that -

During the canvass, respondent board of canvassers adjourned repeatedly starting May9, 1995, after the poll clerk of precinct no. 7-A testified before the Board that the

election returns for the said precinct was tampered with and falsified to increase thetotal votes cast in favor of respondent Longcop from 88 to 188.

On 10 May 1995, the Board resumed its canvass but it adjourned again at past 5:00o'clock in the afternoon as it has (sic) not yet decided on what to do with the electionreturns for precinct (sic) nos. 7-A and 5-A. When it adjourned on May 10, 1995 itannounced that it will (sic) only resume canvass on 12 May 1995 at the capital town ofCatarman, Northern Samar. The Board however reconvened on 12 May 1995 inMapanas and proceeded with the canvass. The respondent board thereafter adjournedand surreptitiously reconvened on 15 May 1995, with a new chairman who wasallegedly appointed by the Provincial Election Supervisor.

When the election returns from Precinct (sic) Nos. 5-A and 7-A were (sic) about to becanvassed, petitioner manifested his oral objections thereto and likewise submittedhis written objections on the same day, 12 May 1995.

The respondent board however did not give the petitioner opportunity to file anappeal (from?) its decision to proceed with the canvass of the election returns fromprecinct (sic) nos. 7-A and 5-A.


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The respondent board of canvassers was informed by Elie Acquiat (poll clerk) that theelection returns from precinct no. 7-A was tampered, and the votes for therespondent Longcop was increased from 88 to 188. Similarly, the BEI Chairman ofPrecinct 5-A Arnulfo Nueva and the third member Dolor Rowela informed the board ofcanvassers that the election returns from precinct 5-A was tampered by increasing the

votes for the respondent Longcop from 117 to 173. With the testimony of thosewitnesses, the board should have proceeded in accordance with Section 235 of theOmnibus Election Code but the board disregarded the clear mandate of the law andclosed its eyes to the overwhelming evidence of falsification and lent its hand to theconsummation by canvassing the falsified election returns.[1]

On 25 May 1995 petitioner filed an election protest before the Regional TrialCourt.

On 28 August 1995 respondent COMELEC dismissed the petition of Laodenio forlack of merit.[2]It was of the view that the adjournments were justified and were notimproperly prolonged as claimed by petitioner; he was in fact deemed to have

acquiesced to the new composition of the Municipal Board of Canvassers when heactively participated in the proceedings therein; there was no showing that hemanifested on time his intent to appeal the rulings of the Board, neither was thereany proof that he appealed therefrom; and, on the authority of Padilla v. Commissionon Elections[3]the pre-proclamation controversy was no longer viable since Longcophad already been proclaimed and had assumed office. On 23 October 1995 themotion for reconsideration was denied.[4]

Petitioner raises these issues: (1) The direct filing of a petition with COMELEC tocontest the illegal conduct of the Board of Canvassers is allowed under Rule 27, Sec.4, of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure; and, (2) The pre-proclamation controversy was

not rendered moot and academic by the filing of an ordinary election protest.Laodenio claims that a petition may be filed directly with COMELEC pursuant to

Rule 27, Sec. 4, of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure when, as in this case, the issueinvolves the illegal composition of the Board of Canvassers or the canvassing was aceremony that was pre-determined and manipulated to result in nothing but a shamproceeding and there was disregard of manifest irregularities in the questionedreturns. In particular, petitioner argues that the Board was illegally constituted on 15May 1995 since the new Chairman was appointed merely by the Provincial ElectionSupervisor and not by respondent COMELEC, in clear contravention of Sec. 10 ofCOMELEC Resolution No. 2756. Also, the Board proceeded illegally when it canvassedtampered election returns unmindful of Sec. 235 of the Omnibus Election Code whichrefers to election returns that appear to be tampered with or falsified.

This argument is devoid of merit. Apparently, it emanates from amisapprehension of the applicability of certain election laws. Sec. 17 of R.A.7166[5]provides -

Sec. 17. Pre-proclamation Controversies: How Commenced. - Questions affecting thecomposition or proceedings of the board of canvassers may be initiated in the board
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or directly with the Commission. However, matters raised under Sections 233, 234,235 and 236 of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to the preparation,transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of the election returns, and thecertificates of canvass shall be brought in the first instance before the board ofcanvassers only.

As evidenced by the Minutes of the Board, petitioner indeed raised the matter ofillegal composition of the Board at the first instance before said Board when hiscounsel questioned the authority of the new Chairman. However, after seeing thenotice of the Provincial Election Supervisor, his counsel agreed to the opening of thecanvassing. In fact, petitioner thereafter actively participated in theproceedings. Consequently, COMELEC concluded that -

x x x x Such acts could be justifiably taken as acquiescence to the new composition ofthe Board. Otherwise, had he felt aggrieved thereby, he should have elevated theissue on appeal to the Commission x x x x[6]

Particularly, Sec. 19 of R.A. 7166 provides -

Sec. 19. Contested Composition or Proceedings of the Board; Period to Appeal;Decision by the Commission. - Parties adversely affected by a ruling of the board ofcanvassers on questions affecting the composition or proceedings of the board mayappeal the matter to the Commission within three (3) days from a ruling thereon x x xx

Although Sec. 17 of R.A. 7166 and Sec. 5, par. (a)(1) (not Sec. 4 as erroneouslycited by petitioner), of Rule 27 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure also allow filing of

a petition directly with respondent COMELEC when the issue involves the illegalcomposition of the Board, Sec. 5, par. (b), of the same Rule requires that it must befiled immediately when the Board begins to act as such, or at the time of theappointment of the member whose capacity to sit as such is objected to if it comesafter the canvassing of the Board, or immediately at the point where the proceedingsare or begin to be illegal. In the present case, the petition was filed five (5) daysafter respondent Longcop had been proclaimed by the Board. At any rate, the realissue appears to be - not what it appears to petitioner - whether he can still disputethe composition of the Board after having actively participated in the proceedingstherein. In this regard, we sustain respondent COMELEC.

Section 20 of R.A. 7166 (not Sec. 235 of the Omnibus Election Code as mistakenly

invoked by petitioner) outlines the procedure in the disposition of contested electionreturns -

Sec. 20. Procedure in Disposition of Contested Election Returns. - (a) Any candidate,political party or coalition of political parties contesting the inclusion or exclusion inthe canvass of any election returns on any of the grounds authorized under Article XXor Sections 234, 235 and 236 of Article XIX of the Omnibus Election Code shall submit
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their oral objection to the chairman of the board of canvassers at the time thequestioned return is presented for inclusion in the canvass. Such objection shall berecorded in the minutes of the canvass.

x x x x

(c) Simultaneous with the oral objection, the objecting party shall also enter hisobjection in the form for written objections to be prescribed by theCommission. Within twenty-four (24) hours from and after the presentation of suchan objection, the objecting party shall submit the evidence in support of theobjection x x x x The board shall not entertain any objection or opposition unlessreduced to writing in the prescribed forms x x x x

(d) Upon receipt of the evidence, the board shall take up the contested returns,consider the written objections thereto and opposition, if any, and summarily andimmediately rule thereon. The board shall enter its ruling on the prescribed form and

authenticate the same by the signatures of its members.

(e) Any party adversely affected by the ruling of the board shall immediately informthe board if he intends to appeal said ruling. The board shall enter said informationin the minutes of the canvass x x x x

(f) After all the uncontested returns have been canvassed and the contested returnsruled upon by it, the board shall suspend the canvass. Within forty-eight (48) hourstherefrom, any party adversely affected by the ruling may file with the board awritten and verified notice of appeal; and within an unextendible period of five (5)days thereafter, an appeal may be taken to the Commission.

The Minutes of the Board revealed the following facts -

May 10, 1995 - The Board resumes at 8:00 a.m. Precinct 7-A, Jubasan, was receivedby the Board. While the Board was about to open said returns, a written protest wasfiled by Laodenio. The protest was for two precincts; precinct 7-A and precinct 5-A;informing the board to stop counting on the ground that the returns are (sic)tampered. Although the protest was not in proper form, the Board deferred thecanvass of said return to give protestant enough time to present his evidence.

After a thorough discussion of the two legal counsel, the members of the board of

canvassers denied the objections of Laodenio on the ground that an oral objectionshould simultaneously be filed with a written objection in a proper form. Majority ofthe board voted for the inclusion of the returns from precinct 7-A on the ground thatthe protest was not in proper form. The parties were notified of the ruling of theBoard in open session. The Chairman of the Board start(ed?) to open the envelope ofprecinct no. 7-A and the same was examined by counsel of both parties.[7]
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The Board, upon examination of the returns from precinct 7-A, found it to beinside an envelope with serial no. 073983 signed by all the members of the Board andwith paper seal no. 516478 likewise signed by all of them. The returns bore therespective signatures and thumbmarks of the poll clerk, the third member and all sixwatchers. The Minutes disclosed further -

May 12, 1995, at 2:00 p.m., the members of the Board resume to canvass the electionreturns for precinct 7-A. It was supposed to canvass last May 10, 1995, but wasdeferred because the Board waited for protestant Laodenio to file his appeal from ourruling on May 10, 1995. Since there was no appeal, the Board proceeded with thecanvass of precinct 7-A.

At 2:37 p.m., Laodenio filed his protest in proper form but the board denied theprotest on the ground that it was filed out of time. The protest was filed after thecanvass of the election returns was completed.[8]

With regard to the action of the Board on the election returns from precinct 5-A,the Minutes narrated as follows -

Precinct 5-A. - An envelope with serial no. 073973 signed by all the members of theboard with paper seal. The envelope is in good condition. The election returns wasproperly signed by all members of the board with their thumbmarks and the watchershave also their signatures and thumbmarks in the corresponding spaces. An oralprotest was filed by petitioner. At 4:49 p.m., a protest in prescribed form wasfiled. At 8:00 p.m., the Board of Canvassers voted as follows: The chairman forexclusion and the two members for inclusion because on its face the election returnsdoes not have any sign of tampering and that when the election returns copy for the

Municipal Trial Court was opened to compare with the contested returns the entriesare (sic) the same. The parties were informed of the ruling in open session. After theruling, the protestant did not indicate his intention to appeal.[9]

Clearly, the proceedings of the Board were in accordance with law.

Petitioner argues next that the election protest was filed ad cautelam or as aprecautionary measure to preserve his rights which did not thereby oust respondentCOMELEC of jurisdiction. He invokes Samad v. COMELEC[10]where it was held that, asa general rule, the filing of an election protest or a petition for quowarrantoprecludes the subsequent filing of a pre-proclamation controversy oramounts to the abandonment of one earlier filed, thus depriving the COMELEC of the

authority to inquire into and pass upon the title of the protestee or the validity of hisproclamation. The reason is that once the competent tribunal has acquiredjurisdiction of an election protest or a petition for quo warrantoall questions relativethereto will have to be decided in the case itself and not in another proceeding,otherwise, there will be confusion and conflict of authority. Conformably therewith,we have ruled in a number of cases that after a proclamation has been made a pre-proclamation case before the COMELEC is, logically, no longer viable.[11]The rule
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admits of exceptions, however, as where: (a) the board of canvassers was improperlyconstituted; (b) quo warranto was not the proper remedy; (c) what was filed was notreally a petition for quo warranto or an election protest but a petition to annul aproclamation; (d) the filing of a quo warranto petition or an election protest wasexpressly made without prejudice to the pre-proclamation controversy or was

made ad cautelam; and, (e) the proclamation was null and void.Petitioner relies on the fourth exception and invokesAgbayani v. Commission on

Elections[12]where the Court found that petitioner's real intention in filing theelection protest ad cautelamwas to insure the preservation of all the ballot boxesused in the local elections. Thus -

Under COMELEC Res. No. 2035 dated September 7, 1988, all such ballot boxes wouldbe made available for the then forthcoming barangay elections as long as they werenot involved in any pre-proclamation controversy, election protest or officialinvestigation. As the above-mentioned cases involved only nine precincts, it was onlyprudent for the petitioner to file his protest ad cautelam in case the pre-

proclamation controversy was ultimately dismissed and it becomes necessary for himto activate his protest. The protest would involve all the precincts in the province. Ifhe had not taken this precaution, all the other ballot boxes would have been emptiedand their contents would have been burned and forever lost.

But, a distinction must be drawn betweenAgbayaniand the instantcase. Petitioner here simply alleges that the election protest was filed as aprecautionary measure to preserve his rights without bothering to elaboratethereon. There is no reason at all for the exception to apply in the case beforeus. Rather, COMELEC's reliance on Padillais the more appropriateremedy.[13]Respondent Longcop having been proclaimed and having assumed office -

x x x x pre-proclamation controversy is no longer viable at this point of time andshould be dismissed x x x x Pre-proclamation proceedings are summary innature. There was no full-dress hearing essential to the task of adjudication withrespect to the serious charges of 'irregularities,' etc., made by petitioner. An electioncontest would be the most appropriate remedy. Instead of the submission of mereaffidavits, the parties would be able to present witnesses subject to the right ofconfrontation, etc. Recourse to such remedy would settle the matters in controversyconclusively and once and for all.

In the absence of any jurisdictional infirmity or error of law, the conclusion

reached by respondent COMELEC on a matter that falls within its competence andprimary jurisdiction is entitled to utmost respect.[14]

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The Resolution of respondentCommission on Elections of 28 August 1995 dismissing the pre-proclamationcontroversy as well as its Resolution denying reconsideration thereof is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
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EN BANC

G.R. No. 120823 October 24, 1995

HADJI HAMID PATORAY, petitioner,vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, (NEW) MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OFTAMPARAN, LANAO DEL SUR AND TOPAAN D. DISOMIMBA, respondents.

MENDOZA,J.:

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition for the annulment of the resolution,dated June 30, 1995, of the Second Division of the Commission on Elections and theresolution, dated July 12, 1995, of the COMELEC en banc, ordering the exclusion oftwo election returns from the canvass for the mayoralty of the Municipality ofTamparan, Lanao del Sur.

Petitioner and private respondent were among the candidates for mayor of Tamparanin the election of May 8, 1995. During the canvassing of votes by the Municipal Board

of Canvassers (MBC), private respondent objected to the inclusion of the electionreturns from Precinct Nos. 16, 17, 19 and 20-A on the grounds that the returns hadbeen "prepared under duress, threats, coercion, and intimidation" and that they were"substituted, fraudulent and obviously manufactured returns." 1

On May 31, 1995, the MBC, after receiving the evidence of the parties, denied privaterespondent's objections and included the four (4) questioned election returns, notingthat they appeared to be "clean, genuine and regular on [their] faces."

On June 3, 1995, private respondent filed an appeal (docketed as SPC No. 95-266)from the rulings of the MBC. Among the record transmitted to the COMELEC was the

report of the MBC on the canvass of the election returns from 45 precincts, whichshowed, among the other things, the total number of votes received by each of theparties as follows:

Hadji HamidPatoray

3,778votes

TopaanDisomimba

3,753votes


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Difference 25 Votes

On June 30, 1995, the Second Division of the COMELEC, after hearing, affirmed theruling of the MBC with respect to the election returns from Precinct Nos. 17 and 19

but reversed it with respect to the election returns from Precinct Nos. 16 and 20-A.The Second Division ordered these returns excluded from the count. 2As petitioneralleges, this ruling would erase his margin of twenty-five (25) votes and give privaterespondent instead a lead of 193 votes, thus:

Petitioner Private

Respondent

Votes credited beforeexclusion

3,778.00 3,753.00

Less: Precinct No.

16

(237.00) (107.00)

Precinct No.20-A

(122.00) (34.00)

TOTAL 3,419.00 3,612.00

On July 3, 1995, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the COMELEC enbanc denied his motion in its resolution of July 12, 1995, even as the COMELEC enbancgranted private respondent's motion for the constitution of a new MBC toimplement the Second Division's resolution.3

Hence, this petition.

In ordering the exclusion of the two returns, the Second Division held: (1) that thestatus of the two election returns asprima facieevidence of the results of theelections had been overcome by the affidavits of the chairpersons of the Board ofInspectors of Precinct Nos. 16 and 20-A to the effect that the election returnscontained different number of votes from what they had tallied and therefore thereturns in question should be considered "manufactured, substituted or falsified;" (2)that contrary to the finding of the MBC that the election returns were "clean, genuineand regular on [their] faces," Election Return No. 661290 from Precinct No. 16,according to the minutes of the MBC, showed a discrepancy between the "taras" andthe written figures, while Election Return No. 661295 from Precinct No. 20-A lackeddata as to provincial and congressional candidates; and (3) that the Certificates ofVotes cast in the two precincts, which showed different number of votes, constituteevidence of tampering, alteration, and falsification as provided in 17 of R.A. No.7166.

Petitioner contends that the COMELEC excluded from canvass the questioned returnswithout examining other authentic copies of the questioned returns or ordering the


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opening of the ballot boxes solely on the basis of the affidavits of the BEI chairpersonswhose recollection of the votes obtained by the parties herein was at best unreliable.

Petitioner claims that it was not possible to commit any falsification in thepreparation of the returns since this was done in the presence of the parties'

pollwatchers. He contends that election returns areprima facie evidence of theirgenuineness and due execution whereas the affidavits presented by privaterespondent to show that the copy of the return given to the MBC was manufacturedcame from biased sources.

He argues that the COMELEC should have ordered other authentic copies of theelection returns to be used or directed a recount of the votes to determine privaterespondent's claim, as provided in 235 and 236 of the Omnibus Election Code.

Private respondent, on the other hand, defends the use of the Certificates of Votesand affidavits of the BEI chairpersons on the ground that all copies of the election

returns in question (i.e., those for the COMELEC, the Provincial Board of Canvassers,the Municipal Treasurer and the Municipal Trial Court) had been delivered to theElection Officer, who had the election returns in his possession for eight days, fromMay 18 to 26, 1995, until the MBC, of which he was the chairperson, used them.Private respondent implies that all copies of the election returns could have beensubstituted by spurious ones because of the opportunity which the Election Officerhad and that therefore it was futile for the COMELEC to use the other copies of theelection returns.

For its part the COMELEC cites R.A. No. 6646, 17 which provides that notwithstandingthe provisions of 235-236 of the OEC, Certificates of Votes may be used to prove

"tampering, alteration,falsification or any other anomalycommitted in the electionreturns concerned" and maintains that on the basis of the affidavits of the BEIchairpersons the election returns in question were unquestionably manufactured andsubstituted for the genuine returns.

We hold that the COMELEC's Second Division correctly ordered the exclusion ofElection Return No. 661290 (Precinct No. 16), it appearing that it contained adiscrepancy between the "taras" and the written figures. In addition, however, theCOMELEC's Second Division should have ordered a recount of the ballots or used theCertificate of Votes cast in the precinct in question to determine the votes for each ofthe parties in this case.

Thus 236 of tile Omnibus Election Code provides:

Sec. 236. Discrepancies in election returns. In case it appears to theboard of canvassers that there exists discrepancies in the otherauthentic copies of the election returns from a polling place ordiscrepancies in the votes of any candidate in words and figures in thesame return, and in either case the difference affects the results of the


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election, the Commission, upon motion of the board of canvassers or anycandidate affected and after due notice to all candidates concerned,shallproceed summarily to determine whether the integrity of theballot box had been preserved, and once satisfied thereof shall orderthe opening of the ballot box to recount the votes cast in the polling

place solely for the purpose of determining the true result of the countof votes of the candidates concerned. (Emphasis added)

On the other hand, 17 of R.A. No. 6646 (Electoral Reforms Law of 1987)provides:

Sec. 17. Certificate of Votes as Evidence. The provisions of Sections235 and 236 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 notwithstanding, the certificateof votes shall be admissible in evidence to prove tampering, alteration,falsification or any anomaly committed in the election returnsconcerned, when duly authenticated by testimonial or documentary

evidence presented to the board of canvassers by at least two membersof the board of election inspectors who issued the certificate: Provided,That failure to present any certificate of votes shall not be a bar to thepresentation of other evidence to impugn the authenticity of theelection returns.

The Certificate of Votes is evidence not only of tampering, alteration, falsification orany other anomaly in the preparation of election returns but also of the votesobtained by candidates. (See Balindong v. COMELEC, 27 SCRA 567 [1969])) TheCertificate of Votes in Precinct No. 16 4shows that petitioner Hadji Hamid Patorayreceived 207 votes (not 237 as indicated in the election return), while private

respondent obtained 137 (not 107 as indicated in the election return). The differencecould thus affect the result of the voting for mayor. The COMELEC's Second Divisioncould also have ordered a recount of the votes cast after determining that the ballotbox has not been tampered with in accordance with 236 of the OEC. The failure ofCOMELEC to do either, after excluding the election return will result in thedisfranchisement of the voters in Precinct No. 16.

On the other hand we hold that the COMELEC's Second Division erred in ordering theexclusion of Election Return No. 661295 on the basis of the Certificate of Votes cast inPrecinct No. 20-A and the affidavit of the chairperson of the BEI of Precinct No. 20-A.As already stated, the COMELEC's Second Division ordered the exclusion of the

election return from this precinct for being incomplete in the sense that it lackeddata as to provincial and congressional candidates. This is, therefore, not a case ofdiscrepancy in an election return, justifying resort to the Certificate of Votes under236 of the OEC, in relation to R.A. No. 6646, 17, but one involving material defectsin an election return under 234 of the OEC. Consequently, the case does not comewithin the purview of R.A. No. 6646, 17. Rather, the applicable provision is 234 ofthe OEC which states:


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Sec. 234. Material defects in the election returns. If it should clearlyappear that some requisites in form or data had been omitted in theelection returns, the board of canvassers shall call for all the membersof the board of election inspectors concerned by the most expeditiousmeans, for the same board to effect the correction: Provided, That in

case of the omission in the election returns of the name of anycandidate and/or his corresponding votes, the board of canvassers shallrequire the board of election inspectors concerned to complete thenecessary data in the election returns and affix therein theirinitials: Provided, further, That if the votes omitted in the returnscannot be ascertained by other means except by recounting the ballots,the Commission, after satisfying itself that the identity and integrity ofthe ballot box have not been violated, shall order the board of electioninspectors to open the ballot box, and, also after satisfying itself thatthe integrity of the ballots therein has been duly preserved, order theboard of election inspectors to count the votes for the candidate whose

votes have been omitted with notice thereof to all candidates for theposition involved and thereafter complete the returns.

The right of a candidate to avail of this provision shall not be lost oraffected by the fact that an election protest is subsequently filed by anyof the candidates.

Moreover, the Certificate of Votes cast in Precinct No. 20-A cannot be used even ifR.A. No. 6646, 17 were applicable, because it was signed only by the chairperson ofthe BEI. R.A. No. 6646, 16 requires that it be signed and thumbmarked by eachmember of the BEI which issued the certificate.

Consistently with the summary nature of the proceedings, what the COMELEC's SecondDivision could have done was simply to order a recount of the votes cast in the twoprecincts and direct the proclamation of the winner accordingly.

WHEREFORE, the questioned resolutions of the Commission on Elections are set asideand the Commission is ordered to issue another one in accordance with this decision.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-25444 January 31, 1966


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WENCESLAO RANCAP LAGUMBAY,petitioner,vs.THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CESAR CLIMACO,respondents.

Wenceslao R. Lagumbay for the petitioner.

Ambrosio Padilla for the respondents.

BENGZON, C.J.:

This petition prays for revision of an order of the Commission on Elections declining toreject the returns of certain precincts of some municipalities in Mindanao. TheConstitution provides for review by this Court of the rulings of the said Commission.

The matter being urgent, and having reached the conclusion that the returns ofcertain questioned precincts were "obviously manufactured" within the meaning ofpertinent jurisprudence, particularly Mitchell v. Stevens,1we issued on December 24,

1965, a short resolution upholding the Commission's power and duty to reject thereturns of about fifty precincts.

It appearing therein that contrary to all statistical probabilities in the firstset, in each precinct the number of registered voters equalled the number ofballots and the number of votes reportedly cast and talliedfor each andevery candidate of the Liberal Party, the party in power; whereas, all thecandidates of the Nacionalista Party got exactly zero; and in the second set, again contrary to all statistical probabilities all the reported votes were forcandidates of the Liberal Party, all of whom were credited with exactly thesame number of votes in each precinct, ranging from 240 in one precinct to 650

in another precinct; whereas, all the candidates of the Nacionalista Party weregiven exactly zero in all said precincts.

We opined that the election result to said precincts as reported, was utterlyimprobable and clearly incredible. For it is not likely, in the ordinary course of things,that all the electors of one precinct would, as one man, vote for all the eightcandidates of the Liberal Party, without giving a single vote to one of the eightcandidates of the Nacionalista Party. Such extraordinary coincidence was quiteimpossible to believe, knowing that the Nacionalista Party had and has a nationwideorganization, with branches in every province, and was, in previous years, the party inpower in these islands.

We also know from our experience in examining ballots in the three ElectoralTribunals (Presidential, Senate, and House) that a large portion of the electors do not

fill all the blanks for senators in their ballots. Indeed, this observation is confirmedby the big differences in the votes received by the eight winning senators in this aswell as in previous national elections;2almost a million votes between the first placeand the eight. Furthermore, in 1965, the total number of electors who cast theirvotes was 6,833,369 (more or less). If every voter had written eight names on his


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ballot, the total number of votes cast for all the candidates would be that numbermultiplied by 8, namely 54,666,952. But the total number of the votes tallied for thecandidates for senator amounted to 49,374,942 only. The difference between the twosums represents the number of ballotsthat did not containeight names for senators.In other words, some 5 million ballots did not carry eight names. Of course, this is a

rough estimate, because some ballots may have omitted more names, in which case,the number of incomplete ballots would be less. But the general idea and thestatistical premise is there.

The same statistical result is deducible from the 1963 election data: total number ofelectors who voted, 7,712,019; if each of them named eight senators, the total votestallied should have been 61,696,152; and yet the total number tallied for all thesenatorial candidates was 45,812,470 only. A greater number of incomplete ballots.

It must be noted that this is not an instance wherein one return gives to onecandidate all the votes in the precinct, even as it gives exactly zero to the other. This

is not a case wheresome senatorial candidatesobtain zero exactly, while some othersreceive a few scattered votes. Here, all the eight candidates of one partygarnered all the votes, each of them receivingexactly the same number, whereas allthe eight candidates of the other party got precisely nothing.

The main point to remember is thatthere is no block-voting nowadays.

What happened to the vote of the Nacionalista inspector? There was one in everyprecinct. Evidently, either he became a traitor to his party, or was made to sign afalse return by force or other illegal means. If he signed voluntarily, but in breach offaith, the Nacionalista inspector betrayed his party; and, any voting or counting of

ballots therein, was a sham and a mockery of the national suffrage.

Hence, denyingprima facie recognition to such returns on the ground that they aremanifestly fabricated or falsified, would constitute a practical approach to theCommission's mission to insure free and honest elections.

In Mitchell vs. Stevens,supra, the returns showed a noticeable excess of votes overthe number of registered voters, and the court rejected the returns as obviously"manufactured". Why? The excess could have been due to the fact that, disregardingall pertinent data, the election officers wrote the number of votes their fancydictated; and so the return was literally a "manufactured", "fabricated" return. Or

maybe because persons other than voters, were permitted to take part and vote; orbecause registered voters cast more than one ballot each, or because those in chargeof the tally sheet falsified their counts. Hence, as the Mitchell decision concluded,the returns were "not true returns . . . but simply manufactured evidences of anattempt to defeat the popular will." All these possibilities and/or probabilities wereplain fraudulent practices, resulting in misrepresentation of the election outcome."Manufactured" was the word used. "Fabricated" or "false" could as well have beenemployed.


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The sameratio decidendi applies to the situation in the precincts herein mentioned.These returns were obviously false or fabricated prima facie. Let us take forexample, precinct No. 3 of Andong, Lanao del Sur. There were 648 registered voters.According to such return all the eight candidates of the Liberal Party got 648each,3and the eight Nacionalista candidates got exactlyzero. We hold such return to

be evidently fraudulent or false because of the inherent improbability of such a result against statistical probabilities specially becauseat least one vote should havebeen received by the Nacionalista candidates, i.e., the vote of the Nacionalistainspector. It is, of course, "possible" that such inspector did not like his party'ssenatorial line-up; but it is not probable that he dislikedall of such candidates, and itis not likely that he favored all the eight candidates of the Liberal Party. Therefore,most probably, he was made to sign an obviously false return, or else he betrayed hisparty, in which case, the election therein if any was no more than a barefacedfraud and a brazen contempt of the popular polls.

Of course we agree that frauds in the holding of the election should be handled and

finally settled by the corresponding courts or electoral tribunals. That is thegeneral rule, where testimonial or documentary evidence, is necessary; but where thefraud is so palpable from the return itself (res ipsa loquitur the thing speaks foritself), there is no reason to accept it and give itprima facie value.

At any rate, fraud or no fraud, the verdict in these fifty precincts may ultimately beascertained before the Senate Electoral Tribunal.4All we hold now, is that the returnsshow "prima facie" that they do not reflect true and valid reports of regular voting.The contrary may be shown by candidate Climaco in the corresponding electionprotest.

The well-known delay in the adjudication of election protests often gave thesuccessful contestant a mere pyrrhic victory, i.e., a vindication when the term ofoffice is about to expire, or has expired. And so the notion has spread amongcandidates for public office that the "important thing" is the proclamation; and to winit, they or their partisans have tolerated or abetted the tampering or the"manufacture" of election returns just to get the proclamation, and then let thevictimized candidate to file the protest, and spend his money to work for an emptytriumph.

It is generally admitted that the practice has prevailed in all previous elections. Neverwas the point pressed upon us in a more clear-cut manner. And without, in any way,

modifying our stand as outlined in the Nacionalista Party vs. Commission decision, wefeel the mores of the day require application even extension of the principle inthe Mitchell decision, which is realistic and common sensical even as it strikes a blowat such pernicious "grab - the - proclamation - prolong - the - protest" slogan of somecandidates or parties.

It is strongly urged that the results reported in these returns are quite "possible",bearing in mind the religious or political control of some leaders in the localities


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affected. We say, possible, not probable. It is possible to win the sweepstakes tentimes; but not probable. Anyway, judges are not disposed to believe that such"control" has proved so powerful as to convert the electors into mere sheep or robotsvoting as ordered. Their reason and conscience refuse to believe that 100% of thevoters in such precincts abjectly yet lawfully surrendered their precious freedom to

choose the senators of this Republic.

Indeed, social scientists might wonder whether courts could, consistently withmorality and public policy,5render judgment acknowledging such "control" orvalidating such "controlled votes" as candidate Climaco chose to call them.

In view of the foregoing, and overlooking some intemperate language which detractsfrom the force of the arguments, we hereby deny the motion to reconsider ourresolution of December 24, 1965, as well as the petition for a re-hearing.

Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L. Dizon and Makalintal, concur.

EN BANC

VIRGINIO VILLAMOR, G.R. No. 169865

Petitioner,Present:

Panganiban, C.J.,Puno,Quisumbing,Ynares-Santiago,

Sandoval-Gutierrez,- versus - Carpio,

Austria-Martinez,Corona,

Carpio-Morales,Callejo, Sr.,Azcuna,Tinga,Chico-Nazario,Garcia, andVelasco, Jr.,JJ.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS


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and AMYTIS*DE DIOS-BATAO, Promulgated:Respondents.

July 21, 2006x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO,J.:

This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeks to annulthe April 11, 2005 Resolution[1]of the Second Division of the Commission on Elections(COMELEC) in EAC No. A-11-2004 as well as the Order of the COMELEC En Bancdated August 5, 2005. The assailed resolution affirmed the Order[2]dated July 23,2004 of the Regional Trial Court of Danao City, Branch 25 in Case No. EP-2004-02

which reconsidered its Order

[3]

dated June 24, 2004 dismissing the election protestfiled by respondent Amytis De Dios-Batao.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

On May 13, 2004, petitioner Virginio Villamor was proclaimed as mayor ofCarmen, Cebu, by the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC) in the elections heldon May 10, 2004 over his opponent, respondent Amytis De Dios-Batao. On May 17,2004, respondent filed a petition to annul the proclamation of petitioner alleging asgrounds the illegal composition of the MBC and its proceedings. The case wasdocketed as SPC No. 04-083 and raffled to the COMELEC Second Division.[4]

Subsequently, or on May 24, 2004, respondent filed an election protest withthe Regional Trial Court of Danao City which was docketed as Case No. EP-2004-02and raffled to Branch 25 thereof. Petitioner filed hisAnswer to the Petition withCounter Proteston June 7, 2004.[5]However, in its Order[6]dated June 24, 2004, thetrial court dismissed the election protest for lack of jurisdiction because it was filedone-day late.

Under Section 3, Rule 35 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, an electionprotest should be filed within 10 days from the date of proclamation of the results ofthe election. Since petitioner was proclaimed on May 13, 2004, respondent had

until May 23, 2004 to file an election protest. However, respondent filed the sameonly on May 24, 2004, thus, it was dismissed by the trial court in an Order dated June24, 2004.[7]

A Motion for Reconsideration was filed by the respondent which was granted bythe trial court in an Order dated July 23, 2004 because it found that the electionprotest was actually filed on time. Since the last day to file the protest fell on May23, 2004 which was a Sunday, thus, under Section 1, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court,
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the time should not run until the next working day which was May 24, 2004. Section5, Rule 135 of the Rules of Court gives the courts inherent power to amend andcontrol its processes and orders to conform with law and justice.[8]

Petitioner appealed the Order granting respondents motion for reconsideration

to the COMELEC and was docketed as EAC No. A-11-2004 and was raffled to its SecondDivision. In the assailed Resolution dated April 11, 2005, the Second Division of theCOMELEC dismissed the appeal for lack of merit. On August 5, 2005, the COMELEC EnBancdenied petitioners motion for reconsideration.

In the meantime, the Second Division of the COMELEC issued on May 9, 2005 aResolution[9]in SPC No. 04-083 which is the petition to annul the proclamation ofpetitioner, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition To DeclareNull And Void Proclamation dated 17 May 2004 filed by petitioners

Amythis De Dios Batao, et al., is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.[10]

Hence, this petition raising the following issues:

1. MAY A REGULAR COURT, IN AN ELECTION PROTEST, ACTON A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION FROM AN ORDER OF DISMISSAL OFTHE ELECTION PROTEST CONSIDERING THAT A MOTION FORRECONSIDERATION IS A PROHIBITED PLEADING?
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2. MAY A REGULAR COURT ADMIT AN ELECTION PROTEST

PREMATURELY CONSIDERING THAT THE PROTESTANT HAS STILL APENDING PETITION FOR PRE-PROCLAMATION CONTROVERSY IN THEANNULMENT OF THE PROCLAMATION OF THE PROTESTEE IN THE

COMELEC AND IF IT DOES SO, MAY THE PERIOD FOR THE FILING OF THECOUNTER-PROTEST BE COUNTED FROM THE RECEIPT OF THE RESOLUTIONOF THE COMELEC DENYING THE PETITION FOR THE ANNULMENT OF THEPROCLAMATION?[11]

The core issues for resolution are as follows: (1) whether the trial court can acton a motion for reconsideration in an election protest; and (2) whether the trial courtprematurely admitted respondents election protest pending a pre-proclamationcontroversy.

We shall first discuss the second issue. As a general rule, the proper remedy

after the proclamation of the winning candidate for the position contested would beto file a regular election protest or a petition for quo warranto.[12] The filing of anelection protest or a petition for quo warrantoprecludes the subsequent filing of apre-proclamation controversy or amounts to the abandonment of one earlier filed,thus depriving the COMELEC of the authority to inquire into and pass upon the title ofthe protestee or the validity of his proclamation.[13] The reason is that once thecompetent tribunal has acquired jurisdiction of an election protest or a petitionfor quo warranto, all questions relative thereto will have to be decided in the caseitself and not in another proceeding. This procedure will prevent confusion andconflict of authority.[14]

Moreover, not all actions seeking the annulment of proclamation suspend therunning of the period for filing an election protest or a petition for quowarranto.[15] For it is not the relief prayed for which distinguishes actions under 248[16]from an election protest or quo warrantoproceedings, but the grounds onwhich they are based.[17]

In the case at bar, respondents petition to annul the proclamation restedmainly on the alleged illegal composition of the municipal board of canvassers[18]andits proceedings which is an issue that may be properly raised in a pre-proclamationcontroversy.[19] Under paragraph (b) of Section 5 of Rule 27 of the COMELEC Rules ofProcedure, if the petition involves the illegal composition of the board of canvassers,

it must be filed immediately when the board begins to act as such, or at the time ofthe appointment of the member whose capacity to sit as such is objected to if itcomes after the canvassing of the board, or immediately at the point where theproceedings are or begin to be illegal. Thus, we held in Laodenio v. Commission onElections[20]that when the issue involves the illegal composition of the Board, thesame cannot be questioned after the proclamation of the winner, to wit:
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Although Sec. 17 of R.A. 7166 and Sec. 5 par. (a)(1) (not Sec. 4 aserroneously cited by petitioner), of Rule 27 of the COMELEC Rules ofProcedure also allow filing of a petition directly with respondentCOMELEC when the issue involves the illegal composition of the Board,Sec. 5, par. (b), of the same Rule requires that it must be filed

immediately when the Board begins to act as such, or at the time of theappointment of the member whose capacity to sit as such is objected toif it comes after the canvassing of the Board, or immediately at thepoint where the proceedings are or begin to be illegal. In the presentcase, the petition was filed five (5) days after respondent Longcop hadbeen proclaimed by the Board. At any rate, the real issue appears to be not what it appears to petitioner whether he can still dispute thecomposition of the Board after having actively participated in theproceedings therein. In this regard, we sustain respondent COMELEC.[21]

In the instant case, respondents petition to annul petitioners proclamation

based on the alleged illegal composition of the board of canvassers is a pre-proclamation controversy which should have been filed prior to petitionersproclamation. However, respondent filed the petition on May 17, 2004 only or fourdays after petitioners proclamation. As such, the filing of the petition to annul theproclamation of petitioner did not suspend the running of the reglementary periodwithin which to file an election protest and inevitably, it did not suspend the lattersperiod to file anAnswer with Counter Protest. Accordingly, the subsequent filing ofthe election protest on May 24, 2004 by respondent amounted to the abandonment ofthe pre-proclamation controversy earlier filed.

Anent the first issue, petitioner asserts that a motion for reconsideration of the

election protest filed by respondent was a prohibited pleading thus its filing did nottoll the running of the period to appeal. Consequently, when the latter failed toappeal within five days from theJune 24, 2004 Order of the trial court, the dismissalof the election protest became final.

On the other hand, respondent alleges that a motion for reconsideration is nota prohibited pleading and claims that even if the motion was not filed, the trial courtcould reinstate the petition motu propriobefore the said order became final.

We agree with petitioner.

Under Section 256 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC),[22]

the trial courtcannot entertain a motion for reconsideration of its decision in an election contestaffecting municipal officers filed by the aggrieved party. However, the latter mayappeal to the Intermediate Appellate Court (now COMELEC) within five days after thereceipt of a copy of the decision. Likewise, Section 19, Rule 35 of the COMELEC Rulesof Procedure implementing the abovementioned Section 256 provides:
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Sec. 19. Promulgation and Finality of Decision. The decision ofthe Court shall be promulgated on a date set by it of which due noticemust be given the parties. It shall become final five (5) days after itspromulgation. No motion for reconsideration shall be entertained.(Emphasis supplied)

Respondent received a copy of the Order dismissing the election protest forlack of jurisdiction on June 25, 2004. Thus, respondent had until June 30,2004 within which to file an appeal with the COMELEC but failed to do so. Instead,respondent filed a motion for reconsideration which is a prohibited pleading. As such,it did not toll the running of the prescriptive period.

In Veloria v. Commission on Elections,[23]a case involving candidates formunicipal mayor, vice-mayor, and members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Manaoag,Pangasinan, where instead of perfecting an appeal within five days as provided bylaw, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, we held that:

The COMELEC, therefore, correctly ruled that the motion forreconsideration filed by the petitioners in the trial court on March 20,1990 did not suspend the period to appeal since a motion forreconsideration is prohibited under Section 256 of the Omnibus ElectionCode.

Since the right to appeal is not a natural right nor is it a part ofdue process, for it is merely a statutory privilege that must be exercisedin the manner and according to procedures laid down by law, x x x andits timely perfection within the statutory period is mandatory and

jurisdictional x x x, Judge Abasolo gravely abused his discretion when hegave due course to the petitioners tardy appeal from his predecessors xx x resoluti(o)n x x x dismissing the petitioners election protest. Saidresolution had become final and unappealable.[24]

The rules in ordinary civil procedure do not apply in election cases except byanalogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable andconvenient.[25] Section 256 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 19, Rule 35 ofthe COMELEC Rules of Procedure clearly state that no motion for reconsiderationshould be entertained. Thus, there is no room to apply the rules of ordinary civilprocedure suppletorily. Nor can resort be made by the trial court to Section 5(g)[26]of

Rule 135 of the Rules of Court to sustain its actions. The trial court did not conformto law and justice when it granted the motion for reconsideration which is aprohibited pleading.

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. TheResolution dated April 11, 2005 of the COMELEC Second Division and the Orderdated August 5, 2005 of the COMELEC En Banc in EAC No. A-11-2004 which affirmedthe Order dated July 23, 2004of the Regional Trial Court of Danao City, Branch 25 in
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Case No. EP-2004-02 granting the motion for reconsideration of respondent Amytis DeDios-Batao, are ANNULLEDand SET ASIDE. The Order dated June 24, 2004 of theRegional Trial Court dismissing respondents election protest for lack of jurisdictionis REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 105323. July 3, 1992.]

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. POLITICAL LAW; JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT; POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW OVER OTHERBRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT; RULE; CASE AT BAR. The alleged inaction ofrespondent Comelec in ordering the deletion of Melchor Chavezs name in the list ofqualified candidates does not call for the exercise of the Courts function of judicial

review. This Court can review the decisions or orders of the Comelec only in cases ofgrave abuse of discretion committed by it in the discharge of its quasi-judicial powersand not those arising from the exercise of its administrative functions. RespondentCommissions alleged failure to implement its own resolution is undoubtedlyadministrative in nature, hence, beyond judicial interference (see FilipinasEngineering Co. v. Ferrer, 135 SCRA 25 [1985]; Aratuc v. Commission on Elections, 88SCRA 251 [1979]; see also Pungutan v. Abubakar, 43 SCRA 1 [1972]). As aptly observedby the Solicitor General, respondent Comelec can administratively undo what it hasadministratively left undone (Manifestation, p. 2). Moreover, respondent Comelec hasin fact, on May 6, 1992 to be exact, ordered the deletion of Melchor Chavezs namenot only on the official list of candidates, but also on the election returns, tally sheet

and certificate of canvass (Comment, p. 7). Hence, petitioners allegation thatrespondent Comelec failed to implement Res. No. 92-132 does not hold water.

2. ID.; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; HOUSE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL; SHALL BE THE SOLEJUDGE OF ALL CONTEST RELATING TO THE ELECTION, RETURNS AND QUALIFICATIONSOF THEIR RESPECTIVE MEMBERS. Thus, Sec. 17, Art. VI of the Constitution providesthat" (t)he Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an ElectoralTribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns,


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and qualifications of their respective Members. . . ." (Emphasis supplied). The word"sole" underscores the exclusivity of the Tribunals jurisdiction over election contestsrelating to their respective Members (Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House ofRepresentatives, 199 SCRA 692 [1991]; Lazatin v. House of Representatives ElectoralTribunal, 168 SCRA 391 [1988]; Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 [1936]).

It is therefore crystal clear that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the instantpetition. It is the Senate Electoral Tribunal which has exclusive jurisdiction to act onthe complaint of petitioner involving, as it does, contest relating to the election of amember of the Senate. As aforesaid, petitioners proper recourse is to file a regularelection protest before the Senate Electoral Tribunal after the winning senatorialcandidates have been proclaimed.

3. ELECTION LAW; ELECTION CONTEST; PRE-PROCLAMATION CONTROVERSY; NOTALLOWED IN ELECTIONS FOR PRESIDENT, VICE-PRESIDENT, SENATORS AND MEMBERS OFHOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVE. While the Commission has exclusive jurisdiction overpre-proclamation controversies involving local elective officials (Sec. 242, Omnibus

Election Code), nevertheless, pre-proclamation cases are not allowed in elections forPresident, Vice-President, Senator and Member of the House of Representatives asprovided in Sec. 15 of Republic Act 7166.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT A PROPER RECOURSE IN CASE OF ERRORS IN THE APPRECIATION OFBALLOT; REASON THEREFOR. The function of ballots appreciation is performed bythe boards of election inspectors at the precinct level. "3. The scope of pre-proclamation controversy is limited to the issues enumerated under Sec. 243 of theOmnibus Election Code. The enumeration therein of the issues that may be raised inpre-proclamation controversy is restrictive and exclusive. In the absence of any clearshowing or proof that the election returns canvassed are incomplete or contain

material defects (sec. 234), appear to have been tampered with, falsified or preparedunder duress (sec. 235) and/or contain discrepancies in the votes credited to anycandidate, the difference of which affects the result of the election (sec. 236), whichare the only instances where a pre-proclamation recount may be resorted to, grantedthe preservation of the integrity of the ballot box and its contents, Sanchez petitionmust fail. The complete election returns whose authenticity is not in question, mustbe prima facie considered valid for the purpose of canvassing the same andproclamation of the winning candidates. . . . "7. The ground for recount relied uponby Sanchez is clearly not among the issues that may be raised in pre-proclamationcontroversy. His allegation of invalidation of "Sanchez" votes intended for him bear norelation to the correctness and authenticity of the election returns canvassed. Neither

the Constitution nor statute has granted the Comelec or the board of canvassers thepower in the canvass of election returns to look beyond the face thereof, oncesatisfied of their authenticity (Abes v. Comelec, 21 SCRA 1252, 1256)."cralawvirtua1aw library

5. ID.; ID.; CORRECTION OF MANIFEST ERROR IN THE CERTIFICATE OF CANVASS ORELECTION RETURNS; MAY BE ALLOWED IN ELECTION FOR PRESIDENT, VICE PRESIDENT,SENATORS AND MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVE. It is clear from the


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above-quoted provision of the law that "pre-proclamation cases (are) not allowed inelections for President, Vice-President, Senator and Member of the House ofRepresentatives." What is allowed is the correction of "manifest errors in thecertificate of canvass or election returns." To be manifest, the errors must appear onthe face of the certificates of canvass or election returns sought to be corrected

and/or objections thereto must have been made before the board of canvassers andspecifically noted in the minutes of their respective proceedings.

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT SATISFIED IN CASE AT BAR. It is quite obvious thatpetitioners prayer does not call for the correction of "manifest errors in thecertificate of canvass or election returns" before the Comelec but for the re-openingof the ballot boxes and appreciation of the ballots contained therein. Indeed,petitioner has not even pointed to any "manifest error" in the certificates of canvassor election returns he desires to be rectified. There being none, petitioners properrecourse is to file a regular election protest which, under the Constitution and theOmnibus Election ode, exclusively pertains to the Senate Electoral Tribunal. In the

case at bar, petitioners allegation that "Chavez" votes were either invalidated ordeclared stray has no relation to the correctness or authenticity of the electionreturns canvassed. Otherwise stated, petitioner has not demonstrated any manifesterror in the certificates of canvass or election returns before the Comelec whichwould warrant their correction. As the authenticity of the certificates of canvass orelection returns are not questioned, they must be prima facie considered valid forpurposes of canvassing the same and proclamation of the winning candidates (Sanchezv. Comelec, supra)

R E S O L U T I O N

BIDIN,J.:

This case was originally on urgent petition ad cautelam praying, among others, for theissuance of a temporary restraining order enjoining respondent Commission onElections (Comelec) from proclaiming the 24th highest senatorial candidate.

The antecedents facts are as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

On May 5, 1992, this Court issued a Resolution in GR No. 104704, entitled "FranciscoChavez v. Comelec, Et Al.," disqualifying Melchor Chavez, private respondent therein,from running for the Office of Senator in the May 11, 1992 elections.

The above-mentioned resolution was received by respondent Comelec on May 6, 1992.On the same day, petitioner filed an urgent motion with the Comelec praying that it(1) disseminate through the fastest available means this Courts Resolution dated May5, 1992 to all regional election directors, provincial election supervisors, city and


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municipal election registrars, boards of election inspectors, the six (6) accreditedpolitical parties and the general public; and (2) order said election officials to deletethe name of Melchor Chavez as printed in the certified list of candidates tally sheets,election returns and "to count all votes cast for the disqualified Melchor, Chavez infavor of Francisco I. Chavez . . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library

On May 8, 1992, the Comelec issued Res. No. 92-1322 which resolved to delete thename of Melchor Chavez from the list of qualified candidates. However, it failed toorder the crediting of all "Chavez" votes in favor of petitioner as well as thecancellation of Melchor Chavez name in the list of qualified candidates.

According to petitioner, the Comelec failed to perform its mandatory function underSec. 7, RA 7166 which states that if a candidate has been disqualified, it shall be theduty of the Commission to instruct without delay the deletion of the name of saidcandidate.

Thus, the name of Melchor Chavez remained undeleted in the list of qualifiedcandidates on election day.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

Confusion arose, allegedly nationwide, as the "Chavez" votes were either declaredstray or invalidated by the Boards of Election Inspectors (BEIs).

On May 11, 1992, Commissioner Rama of respondent Comelec issued a directive overradio and TV ordering all "Chavez" votes to be credited in favor of petitioner.Petitioner contends that the radio and TV announcements did not reach the BEI at the170,354 precincts nationwide. As a result, "Chavez" votes were not credited in favorof petitioner.

On May 12, 1992, Comelec issued another Resolution directing all municipal and cityelection registrars throughout the country to examine the minutes of voting submittedby the BEIs and to credit all the "Chavez" votes, which have been declared stray orinvalidated by the BEIs, in favor of petitioner.

Petitioner maintains that the said resolution proved futile because it did not reach allthe various BEIs of the 170,354 election precincts throughout the country on time forimplementation and that the minutes of voting did not indicate the number of"Chavez" votes which were declared stray or invalidated.

On May 14, 1992, petitioner sent a letter to the Comelec requesting the latter todevise ways and means in crediting "Chavez" votes in his favor but the respondentCommission failed to act on said letter/complaint.

On May 23, 1992, petitioner filed an urgent petition before the respondent Comelecpraying the latter to (1) implement its May 12, 1992 resolution with costs de officio;(2) to re-open the ballot boxes in 13 provinces including the National Capital Regioninvolving some 80,348 precincts (p. 9 of petition) and to scan for the "Chavez" votes


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for purposes of crediting the same in his favor; (3) make the appropriate entries inthe election returns/certificates of canvass; and (4) to suspend the proclamation ofthe 24 winning candidates.

Dissatisfied with the failure of respondent Comelec to act on his petition, petitioner

filed, as aforesaid, this urgent petition for prohibition and mandamus, with prayer forthe issuance of a temporary restraining order, enjoining the Comelec fromproclaiming the 24th highest senatorial candidate, without first implementingrespondent Comelecs resolution of May 12, 1992 and acting upon petitionersletter/complaint dated May 14, 1992 and urgent petition dated May 22,1992.chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph

It is the submission of petitioner that assuming only ten (10) "Chavez" votes wereinvalidated per precinct, he would have lost at least 1.7 million votes (consideringthat there are more than 170,000 precincts nationwide); the result of which willaffect the 24 ranking senatorial candidates.

Petitioner alleges that respondent Comelec acted capriciously and whimsically andwith grave abuse of discretion and therefore prays that the Comelec be enjoined fromproclaiming the 24th winning senatorial candidate until after his petition before theCommission is resolved.

On June 4, 1992, the Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoiningrespondent Comelec from proclaiming the 24th winning senatorial candidate and setthe case for hearing on June 9, 1992.

On the same day (June 4, 1992), petitioner filed a manifestation stating that on May

30, 1992, his urgent petition dated May 22, 1992 was dismissed by respondentComelec and prayed that the petition ad cautelam at bar be considered a regularpetition.

On June 8, 1992, Senator Agapito Aquino ** filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene withComment in Intervention praying for the dismissal of the instant petition on theground that the law does not allow pre-proclamation controversy involving theelection of members of the Senate.

After hearing the arguments of the parties on June 9, 1992, the Court resolved to liftthe temporary restraining order in the afternoon of the same day (June 9, 1992).

Coming now to the merits, We find the petition devoid of any.

As stated earlier, petitioners urgent petition dated May 22, 1992 was dismissed byrespondent Comelec on May 30, 1992. Had it not been prayed that the proclamationof the 24th winning senatorial candidate be suspended, which this Court granted onJune 4, 1992, the instant petition would have been dismissed outright for havingbecome moot and academic. But even then, this Court could have acted favorably on


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petitioners plaint.

The alleged inaction of respondent Comelec in ordering the deletion of MelchorChavezs name in the list of qualified candidates does not call for the exercise of theCourts function of judicial review. This Court can review the decisions or orders of

the Comelec only in cases of grave abuse of discretion committed by it in thedischarge of its quasi-judicial powers and not those arising from the exercise of itsadministrative functions. Respondent Commissions alleged failure to implement itsown resolution is undoubtedly administrative in nature, hence, beyond judicialinterference (See Filipinas Engineering Co. v. Ferrer, 135 SCRA 25 [1985]; Aratuc v.Commission on Elections, 88 SCRA 251 (1979); see also Pungutan v. Abubakar, 43 SCRA1 [1972]). As aptly observed by the Solicitor General, respondent Comelec canadministratively undo what it has administratively left undone (Manifestation, p. 2).Moreover, respondent Comelec has in fact, on May 6, 1992 to be exact, ordered thedeletion of Melchor Chavezs name not only on the official list of candidates, but alsoon the election returns, tally sheet and certificate of canvass (Comment, p. 7).

Hence, petitioners allegation that respondent Comelec failed to implement Res. No.92-132 does not hold water.

Be that as it may, there are other compelling reasons why the instant petition isbound to fail.

A simple reading of the petition would readily show that petitioner has no cause ofaction, the controversy presented being one in the nature of a pre-proclamation. **

While the Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over pre-proclamation controversiesinvolving local elective officials (Sec. 242, Omnibus Election Code), nevertheless, pre-

proclamation cases are not allowed in elections for President, Vice-President, Senatorand Member of the House of Representatives.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad

Sec. 15 of Republic Act 7166 provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Sec. 15. Pre-proclamation Cases Not Allowed in Elections for President, Vice-President, Senator, and Member of the House of Representatives. For purposes ofthe elections for President, Vice-President, Senator and Member of the House ofRepresentatives, no pre-proclamation cases shall be allowed on matters relating tothe preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of the electionreturns or the certificate of canvass, as the case may be. However, this does not

preclude the authority of the appropriate canvassing body motu propio or uponwritten complaint of an interested person to correct manifest errors in the certificateof canvass or election returns before it. (Emphasis supplied)

x x x

"Any objection on the election returns before the city or municipal board of


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canvassers, or on the municipal certificates of canvass before the provincial boards ofcanvassers or district board of canvassers in Metro Manila Area, shall be specificallynoted in the minutes of their respective proceedings."cralaw virtua1aw library

It is clear from the above-quoted provision of the law that "pre-proclamation cases

(are) not allowed in elections for President, Vice-President, Senator and Member ofthe House of Representatives." What is allowed is the correction of "manifest errors inthe certificate of canvass or election returns." To be manifest, the errors must appearon the face of the certificates of canvass or election returns sought to be correctedand/or objections thereto must have been made before the board of canvassers andspecifically noted in the minutes of their respective proceedings.

In the case at bar, however, petitioner prays not only for a restraining order enjoining"the proclamation of the 24th highest ranking senatorial candidate without first actingupon petitioners letter/complaint dated May 14, 1992 and urgent petition dated May22, 1992" but also prays that judgment be rendered requiring the Comelec to re-open

the ballot boxes in 80,348 precincts in 13 provinces therein enumerated (Petition, p.9) including Metro Manila, scan the ballots for "Chavez" votes which were invalidatedor declared stray and credit said scanned "Chavez" votes in favor of petitioner.

It is quite obvious that petitioners prayer does not call for the correction of"manifesterrors in the certificates of canvass or election returns" before the Comelec but forthe re-opening of the ballot boxes and appreciation of the ballots contained therein.Indeed, petitioner has not even pointed to any "manifest error" in the certificates ofcanvass or election returns he desires to be rectified. There being none, petitionersproper recourse is to file a regular election protest which, under the Constitution andthe Omnibus Election Code, exclusively pertains to the Senate Electoral Tribunal.

Thus, Sec. 17, Art. VI of the Constitution provides that" (t)he Senate and the House ofRepresentatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge ofall contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respectiveMembers. . . ." (Emphasis supplied). The word "sole" underscores the exclusivity ofthe Tribunals jurisdiction over election contests relating to their respective Members(Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 199 SCRA 692 [1991];Lazatin v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 168 SCRA 391 [1988]; Angarav. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 [1936]). It is therefore crystal clear that thisCourt has no jurisdiction to entertain the instant petition. It is the Senate ElectoralTribunal which has exclusive jurisdiction to act on the complaint of petitioner

involving, as it does, contest relating to the election of a member of the Senate. Asaforesaid, petitioners proper recourse is to file a regular election protest before theSenate Electoral Tribunal after the winning senatorial candidates have beenproclaimed.

Petitioner argues, on the other hand, that a recount before the Senate ElectoralTribunal where he would be forced to shell out the expenses imposes not only aproperty requirement for the enjoyment of the right to be voted upon but also a price


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on the right of suffrage which would ultimately stifle the sovereign will.

The argument, however, is beside the point. The law is very clear on the matter andit is not right for petitioner to ask this Court to abandon settled jurisprudence,engage in judicial legislation, amend the Constitution and alter the Omnibus Election

Code. The mandatory procedures laid down by the existing law in cases like the oneat bar must be faithfully followed lest we allow anarchy to reign. The proper recourseis for petitioner to ask not this Court but the Legislature to enact remedialmeasures.cralawnad

Finally, the instant petition falls squarely with the case of Sanchez v. Commission onElections (153 SCRA 67 [1987]) and the disposition arrived therein finds application inthe case at bar, mutatis mutandis:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Sanchez anchors his petition for recount and/or reappreciation on Section 243,paragraph (b) of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to Section 234 thereof with

regard to material defects in canvassed election returns. He contends that thecanvassed returns discarding "Sanchez" votes as stray were "incomplete" and thereforewarrant a recount or reappreciation of the ballots under Section 234. . . .

". . . The fact that some votes written solely as Sanchez" were declared stray votesbecause of the inspectors erroneous belief that Gil Sanchez had not been disqualifiedas a candidate, involves an erroneous appreciation of the ballots. It is established bythe law as well as jurisprudence . . . that errors in the appreciation of ballots by theboard of inspectors are proper subject for election protest and not for recount orreappreciation of ballots.

"2. The appreciation of the ballots cast in the precincts is not a proceeding of theboard of canvassers for purposes of pre-proclamation proceedings under Section 241,Omnibus Election Code, but of the boards of election inspectors who are called uponto count and appreciate the votes in accordance with the rules of appreciationprovided in Section 211, Omnibus Election Code. Otherwise stated, the appreciationof ballots is not part of the proceedings of the board of canvassers. The functions ofballots appreciation is performed by the boards election inspectors at the precinctlevel. (Emphasis supplied)

"3. The scope of pre-proclamation controversy is limited to the issues enumeratedunder Sec. 243 of the Omnibus Election Code. The enumeration therein of the issues

that may be raised in pre-proclamation controversy is restrictive and exclusive. In theabsence of any clear showing or proof that the election returns canvassed areincomplete or contain material defects (sec. 234), appear to have been tamperedwith, falsified or prepared under duress (sec. 235) and/or contain discrepancies in thevotes credited to any candidate, the difference of which affects the result of theelection (sec. 236), which are the only instances where a pre-proclamation recountmay be resorted to, granted the preservation of the integrity of the ballot box and itscontents, Sanchez petition must fail. The complete election returns whose


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authenticity is not in question, must be prima facie considered valid for the purposeof canvassing the same and proclamation of the winning candidates.

x x x

"7. The ground for recount relied upon by Sanchez is clearly not among the issues thatmay be raised in pre-proclamation controversy. His allegation of invalidation of"Sanchez" votes intended for him bear no relation to the correctness and authenticityof the election returns canvassed. Neither the Constitution nor statute has grantedthe Comelec or the board of canvassers the power in the canvass of election returnsto look beyond the face thereof

Election Law Cases III

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