1. Paras v. COMELECG.R. No. 123169 (November 4, 1996)

FACTS:A petition for  recall  was  filed against  Paras,  who is  the incumbent  Punong Barangay. The recall election was deferred due to Petitioner’s opposition that under Sec. 74 of RA No. 7160, no recall shall take place within one year from the date of the official’s  assumption to office or  one year  immediately preceding a regular  local election. Since the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election was set on the first Monday of May 2006, no recall may be instituted.

ISSUE:W/N the SK election is a local election.

HELD:No. Every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to its context, and it must be considered together  and kept subservient to its general  intent. The evident intent of Sec. 74 is to subject an elective local official to recall once during his term, as provided in par. (a) and par. (b).  The spirit,  rather than the letter of a law, determines its construction.  Thus,  interpreting the phrase “regular local  election” to include SK election will unduly circumscribe the Code for there will never be a recall  election rendering inutile the provision.  In interpreting a statute, the Court assumed that the legislature intended to enact an effective law. An interpretation should be avoided  under  which  a  statute  or  provision  being construed  is  defeated, meaningless, inoperative or nugatory.

2. LUCERO VS. COMELEC

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

After the issues had been joined in these consolidated cases, the Court resolved to give due course to the petitions therein and to decide the cases on the merits. It can no longer allow the parties to delay these cases. Their legal skirmishes, which have unduly magnified uncomplicated issues, have effectively deprived the people of the Second Legislative District of Northern Samar of representation in the House of Representatives for more than two years now.

These cases are sequels to G. R. No. 105717, entitled "Jose L. Ong, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections and Wilmar P. Lucero," which we finally resolved on 22 April 1993. 1 The petitioners were two of the five candidates 2 for the Second Legislative District of Northern Samar in the synchronized national and local elections held on 11 May 1992.

The canvass of the Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBC) of Northern Samar credited Jose L. Ong, Jr. with 24,272 votes and Wilmar P. Lucero with 24,068 votes, or a lead by Ong of 204 votes. However, this tally did not include the results of Precinct No. 7 of the municipality of Silvino Lobos, where the submitted election returns had not been canvassed because they were illegible; of Precinct No. 13 of Silvino Lobos, where the ballot boxes were snatched and no election was held; and of Precinct No. 16, also of Silvino Lobos, where all copies of the election returns were missing.

On 22 May 1992, Lucero asked the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), in SPA No. 92-282, to:

1. Forthwith order Respondent Provincial Board of Canvassers for Northern Samar to suspend the proclamation of Private Respondent Jose L. Ong, Jr.;

2. Direct Respondent Provincial Board of Canvassers for Northern Samar to correct the Certificate of Canvass (CEF 20) for Las Navas and, accordingly, to correct the total votes so far counted by it for Petitioner from 24,068 to 24,088, thus reducing the margin it found in favor of Private Respondent Jose L. Ong, Jr. from 204 to 184 votes only;

3. Order a special election in Precinct 13, Barangay Gusaran, Silvino Lobos, pursuant to Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code;

4. Order a recount of the votes for Representative of the Second District of Northern Samar in Precinct 16, Barangay Tubgon, and Precinct 7, Barangay Camayaan, both of Silvino Lobos, pursuant to Section 234 of the Omnibus Election Code;

5. Order a recount of the votes for Representative in the 52 precincts herein above enumerated in order to correct "manifest errors" pursuant to Section 15 of Republic Act 7166 and for this purpose order the impounding and safekeeping of the ballot boxes of all said precincts in order to preserve the integrity of the ballots and other election paraphernalia contained therein. 3

On 2 June 1992, the COMELEC, acting on Lucero's urgent manifestation, directed the PBC to desist from reconvening until further orders.

On 8 June 1992, Ong moved to lift the suspension of the proceedings by the PBC, which Lucero opposed on 10 June 1992 on the ground that the canvass could not be completed even if the PBC were to reconvene because no election was held in Precinct No. 13 (Barangay Gusaran) of Silvino Lobos and there was no canvassing of the votes in Precinct No. 7 (Barangay Camayaan) and Precinct No. 16 (Barangay Tubgon) both of Silvino Lobos.

On 13 June 1993, the COMELEC en banc promulgated a resolution, the dispositive portion of which reads:

Accordingly, the Commission hereby orders the Provincial Election Supervisor of Northern Samar to bring to the Commission within three (3) days from receipt hereof the ballot boxes from Precinct 7 and 16 of Silvino Lobos, to be escorted by representatives from the petitioner and the respondents as well as other parties who have an interest to protect, and to notify said parties hereof. The Municipal Treasurer of said town is directed to turn over custody of said ballot boxes to the Provincial Election Supervisor, and the keys thereof shall likewise be turned over by the appropriate officials in custody thereof to the PES, who shall in turn give one key for each ballot box to the duly authorized representatives of the petitioner and the respondent.

The Commission likewise orders the Election Registrar of Silvino Lobos, Northern Samar, and the Chairman and members of the Boards of Election Inspectors of Precincts 7 and 16 of said municipality to appear before the Commission within three (3) days from receipt hereof.

Below the signatures of the Chairman and the six Commissioners, however, Chairman Christian S. Monsod and Commissioners Haydee B. Yorac, Dario C. Rama and Regalado E. Maambong directed as follows:

We vote in favor of this resolution except that portion which denied the correction of the Certificate of Canvass for Las Navas. Correction of the Certificate of Canvass for Las Navas is in order in view of the testimony of the election registrar of Las Navas to the effect that Wilmar Lucero garnered 2,537 votes for Las Navas and not 2,517. Petition for correction was duly filed by Lucero with the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Northern Samar on May 19, 1992. The Provincial Board of Canvassers of Northern Samar is therefore directed to retabulate the total number of votes for Las Navas for Lucero and enter the same in the Provincial Certificate of Canvass. 4

On 15 June 1992, Lucero filed an urgent motion to constitute a Special Board of Election Inspectors (SBEI) to count the votes of Precincts Nos. 7 and 16 of Silvino Lobos. 5

On 20 June 1992, Ong, in a special civil action for certiorari filed with this Court and subsequently docketed as G. R. No. 105717, questioned the order for the recount of ballots in Precincts No. 7 and 16. Despite the pendency of this petition, the COMELEC ordered the recount of the ballots in Precinct No. 16 by a SBEI which recorded 43 votes for Lucero and 2 votes for Ong. 6

On 25 June 1992, this Court issued in G. R. No. 105717 a temporary restraining order against the implementation by the COMELEC of its Order of 2 June 1992 and its Resolution of 13 June 1992.

On 23 December 1992, this Court promulgated its decision in G. R. No. 105717, 7 the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED and a writ of preliminary injunction is hereby ISSUED directing the COMELEC to CEASE and DESIST from implementing its order of June 2, 1992, and its resolution dated June 13, 1992, and the same are hereby declared NULLIFIED. Consequently, the election returns based on the recounted ballots from Precinct 16 are hereby DISCARDED and in lieu thereof, authentic returns from said precinct should instead be made a basis for the canvassing. The Provincial Board of Canvassers of Northern Samar is hereby directed to PROCEED WITH DISPATCH in the canvassing of ballots until completed and to PROCLAIM the duly elected winner of the congressional seat for the Second District of Northern Samar.

This decision is immediately executory. 8

Acting on the motions for reconsideration and clarification respectively filed by the COMELEC and Lucero, this Court, on 22 April 1993, modified 9 its aforesaid disposition in G. R. No. 105717 as follows;

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the dispositive portion of the December 23, 1992 Decision is hereby MODIFIED to read as follows;

"WHEREFORE, THE PETITION IS GRANTED. THE JUNE 2, 1992 ORDER OF RESPONDENT COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS IN SPA NO. 92-282 IS HEREBY ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE. ITS JUNE 13, 1992 RESOLUTION THEREIN IS LIKEWISE ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE INSOFAR AS IT AFFECTS PRECINCT NO. 7 OF SILVINO LOBOS, THE RECOUNT OF VOTES IN THE 52 OTHER PRECINCTS AND THE CORRECTION OF THE CERTIFICATE OF CANVASS OF LAS NAVAS, BUT IS AFFIRMED WITH RESPECT TO THE ISSUE OF HOLDING A SPECIAL ELECTION IN PRECINCT NO. 13 AND THE RECOUNT OF THE BALLOTS IN PRECINCTNO. 16.

THE RESPONDENT COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS IS HEREBY DIRECTED TO ASSIGN SPA NO. 92-282 TO ANY OF ITS DIVISIONS PURSUANT TO ITS RULE ON RAFFLE OF CASES FOR IT TO RESOLVE THE PRE-PROCLAMATION ISSUES THEREIN, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE ABOVE PRONOUNCEMENTS AND THE EXCEPTIONS PROVIDED FOR IN SECTION 15 OF R. A. NO. 7166.

WHENEVER WARRANTED BY THE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE COMMISSION MAY (A) CALL A SPECIAL ELECTION IN PRECINCT NO. 13 OF SILVINO LOBOS, NORTHERN SAMAR, AND (B) RECONVENE THE SPECIAL MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS AND THE SPECIAL PROVINCIAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS IT HAD EARLIER CONSTITUTED OR CREATE NEW ONES.

ALL THE FOREGOING SHOULD BE DONE WITH PURPOSEFUL DISPATCH TO THE END THAT THE WINNING CANDIDATE FOR CONGRESSMAN REPRESENTING THE SECOND CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT OF NORTHERN SAMAR MAY BE PROCLAIMED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE." 10

As to the certificate of canvass of the municipality of Las Navas, this Court explicitly stated;

The correction of the certificate of canvass of Las Navas is likewise in order. Even though a pre-proclamation issue is involved, the correction of the manifest error is allowed under Section 15 of R. A. No. 7166. 11

Conformably with the aforesaid modified judgment in G. R. No. 105717, SPA No. 92-282 was raffled to the First Division of the COMELEC which conducted hearings thereon and received the arguments and evidence of both parties who then submitted their respective memoranda on 25 June 1994. However, during the consultations on the case by the Members of the First Division, the concurrence of at least two of them could not be obtained; accordingly, pursuant to the COMELEC Rules, the case was elevated for proper disposition to the COMELEC en banc to which the parties submitted their respective memoranda on 19 November 1993. 12

On 7 January 1994, the COMELEC en banc promulgated a resolution 13 whose dispositive portion reads as follows:

1. To direct the special Provincial Board of Canvassers for Northern Samar (a) to include in the municipal certificate of canvass of Silvino Lobos the forty-three (43) votes of petitioner Lucero and the two (2) votes of private respondent Ong as reflected in the election returns of Precinct No. 16 (Barangay Tubgon) prepared by the special Board of Election Inspectors constituted by the Commission to recount the votes (ballots) in said precinct, as canvassed by the special Municipal Board of Canvassers for Silvino Lobos; (b) to include in the municipal certificate of canvass of Silvino Lobos, the sixty-one (61) votes of private respondent Ong and 29, 30, or 31 votes of petitioner Lucero as reflected in the election returns (MBC Copy submitted as "Comelec Copy") of Precinct No. 7 (Barangay Camaya-an), as canvassed by the special Municipal Board of Canvassers for Silvino Lobos; (c) to retabulate the total number of votes of petitioner Lucero for the Municipality of Las Navas and to enter in the provincial certificate of canvass the correct total which is two thousand five hundred thirty-seven (2,537) as reflected in the Statement of Votes (C. E. Form 20-A) prepared and submitted by the Municipal Board of Canvassers for Las Navas; and (d) to submit to the Commission a computation of the votes of the contending parties including therein all the votes of petitioner Lucero (with alternative totals) and private respondent Ong, in Precinct Nos. 7 and 16 of Silvino Lobos and the total votes of petitioner Lucero in the Municipality of Las Navas as corrected. However, under no circumstances should the Board proclaim any winning candidate until instructed to do so by the Commission;

2. To issue an Order calling for a special election in the last remaining Precinct No. 13 (Barangay Gusaran) of the Municipality of Silvino Lobos if justified by the result of the canvass by the Provincial Board of Canvassers for Northern Samar, and to notify the parties of the schedule of election activities for that precinct; and

3. After including in the tabulation the results of the special election of Precinct No. 13, to decide the issue of the recount of the votes (ballots) of Precinct No. 7 of Silvino Lobos, pursuant to Section 236 of the Omnibus Election Code, to resolve the discrepancy of the

votes of petitioner Lucero in the same return, if such discrepancy of votes of the candidates concerned would affect the over-all results of the election after the totality of the votes of the contending parties shall have been determined.

Both Lucero and Ong have come to this Court by way of separate special civil actions for certiorari to challenge the Resolution.

In G. R. No. 113107, Lucero maintains that (1) the count of the ballots in Precinct No. 7 of Silvino Lobos must be unconditional because the election returns therefrom are invalid; and (2) his chances in the special election in Precinct No. 13 of Silvino Lobos would be spoiled if the returns for Precinct No. 7 were to be included beforehand in the canvass.

In G. R. No. 113509, Ong questions (1) the authority of the COMELEC to order the correction of the alleged manifest error in the Municipal Certificate of Canvass of Las Navas despite the absence of any appeal; and (2) the authority of the COMELEC to call for a special election in Precinct No. 13 almost two years after the regular election.

As we see it, the core issues in these consolidated cases are:

(1) Whether there should first be a count of the ballots of Precinct No. 7 of Silvino Lobos before determining the necessity of holding a special election in Precinct No. 13 of Silvino Lobos:

(2) Whether the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in ordering the correction of the alleged manifest error in the Municipal Certificate of Canvass of Las Navas; and

(3) Whether the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in calling for a special election in Precinct No. 13 after almost two (2) years, or more specifically after one (1) year and ten (10) months, following the day of the synchronized elections.

We shall take up these issues seriatim.

I.

The answer to the first issue is in the affirmative.

We find the COMELEC's disposition regarding Precinct No. 7 to be unclear. In the first paragraph of the dispositive portion of the challenged resolution, it directs the Provincial Board of Canvassers "to include in the municipal certificate of canvas of Silvino Lobos the sixty-one (61) votes of private respondent Ong and 29, 30, or 31 votes of petitioner Lucero as reflected in the election returns (MBC copy submitted as "COMELEC Copy") of Precinct No. 7 (Barangay Camaya-an), as canvassed by the special Municipal Board of Canvassers for Silvino Lobos," and "to submit to the Commission a computation of the votes of the contending parties including therein all the votes of petitioner Lucero (with alternative totals) and private respondent Ong, in Precinct Nos. 7 and 16 of Silvino Lobos. . . ." On the other hand, in the fourth paragraph of the said dispositive portion, it orders the Provincial Board of Canvassers, after "including in the tabulation the results of the special election of Precinct No. 13," to "decide the issue of the recount of the votes (ballots) of Precinct No. 7 of Silvino Lobos, pursuant to Section 236 of the Omnibus Election Code [and] to resolve the discrepancy of the votes of petitioner Lucero in the same return, if such discrepancy of votes of the candidate concerned would affect the over-all results of the election after the totality of the votes of the contending parties shall have been determined."

Obviously, instead of ordering an outright recount of the ballots of Precinct No. 7, the COMELEC would first give full faith and credit to the questioned election returns thereof, which it describes as the "Comelec Copy," and, accordingly, direct the PBC to include in the municipal certificate of canvass of Silvino Lobos the 61 votes for Ong and the uncertain votes for Lucero — 29, 30, or 31. The recount would only be made if after a special election in Precinct No. 13 shall have been held, it shall be determined that such a recount would be necessary.

We fail to grasp the logic of the proposition. First, it is clear to us that the COMELEC, which has in its possession the so-called "Comelec Copy" of the questioned election returns of Precinct No. 7 and heard the witnesses who testified thereon, doubts the authenticity of the so-called "Comelec Copy" of the election returns of Precinct No. 7;14 hence, it authorizes the PBC to decide the issue of a recount "pursuant to Section 236 of the Omnibus Election Code." Since it doubts such authenticity, it could not, without arbitrariness and abuse of discretion, order the inclusion of the "votes" of Ong and Lucero found in the doubtful "Comelec Copy" of the election returns in the municipal certificate of canvass. Second, it is an uncontroverted fact that an election was held in Precinct No. 7. None was held in Precinct No. 13 for reasons the parties fully knew. Pursuant to Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), a special election may be held in Precinct No. 13 only if the failure of the election therein "would affect the result of the election." This "result of the election" means the net result of the election in the rest of the

precincts in a given constituency, such that if the margin of a leading candidate over that of his closest rival in the latter precincts is less than the total number of votes in the precinct where there was failure of election, then such failure would certainly affect "the result of the election"; hence, a special election must be held. Consequently, the holding of a special election in Precinct No. 13 can only be determined after the votes in Precinct No. 7 shall have been included in the canvass by the Provincial Board of Canvassers.

We may further state that the so-called "Comelec Copy" of the election returns of Precinct No. 7 can by no means be validly included in the municipal canvass. The summary of the evidence in the "preparation" of the election returns of Precinct No. 7, both in the challenged Resolution and in the separate Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of Commissioners Gorospe and Claravall, leaves no room for doubt that there was actually no counting of the votes in Precinct No. 7. Quoted in the challenged Resolution is a portion of the testimony of Sabina T. Jarito, Precinct Chairman of Precinct No. 7, which clearly shows that on questions by COMELEC Chairman Christian S. Monsod and Commissioner Vicente B. de Lima, the witness candidly admitted that the election returns were prepared at the "munisipyo" or municipal building and not at the polling place of Precinct No. 7 in barangay Camaya-an. 15 This "munisipyo" is located at the poblacion of Silvino Lobos. Under the law, the board of election inspectors shall prepare the election returns simultaneously with the counting of votes in the polling place. 16There is no evidence whatsoever that the COMELEC had, for valid reasons, authorized the transfer of venue of the counting of the votes of Precinct No. 7 from the polling place in barangay Camaya-an to the municipal building and that the counting did in fact take place at the latter. Although in the Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of Commissioners Gorospe and Claravall there is a reference to Exhibit "E," the Joint Affidavit of Sabina Jarito and Mevilyn Surio wherein they declare that after the voting the Board of Election Inspectors unanimously approved to transfer the counting of votes to the Municipal Building in the Poblacion of Silvino Lobos, which was allegedly concurred in by all the watchers of political parties and the candidates present, the alleged "counting" at the municipal building was denied by no less than the Municipal Election Officer of Silvino Lobos, Antonio Tepace, and the Municipal Treasurer thereof, Mr. Gabriel Basarte, in their affidavits marked as Exhibit "F" and Exhibit "G,"respectively. 17

Since there was no counting of the votes of Precinct No. 7, no valid election returns could be made and any copy of election returns purporting to come therefrom is a fabrication. A recount thereof, which presupposes a prior count, would obviously be unwarranted.

Only a count then of the votes of Precinct No. 13 would heretofore be in order. Sections 234, 235, and 236 of the Omnibus Election Code are thus still inapplicable. And, in the light of what we stated before in relation to the holding of a special election, such a count of the votes of Precinct No. 7 must, perforce, precede the special election in Precinct No. 13.

II.

Ong's first grievance in G. R. No. 113509 is without merit.

The order of the COMELEC for the correction of the manifest error in the municipal certificate of canvass of Las Navas was made pursuant to the declaration made by this Court in G. R. No. 105717 (Ong vs. COMELEC) 18 that:

The correction of the certificate of canvass of Las Navas is likewise in order. Even though a pre-proclamation issue is involved, the correction of the manifest error is allowed under Sec. 15 of R. A. No. 7166.

Since no motion for reconsideration was filed in that case, the decision therein became final and entry of judgment was made on 4 August 1993. Consequently, Ong cannot now re-litigate the issue of the correction of the certificate of canvass of Las Navas.

III

On the authority of the COMELEC to order the holding of a special election, Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code provides:

Sec. 6. Failure of election. — If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or after the voting and during the preparation and the transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect, and if in any of such cases the failure or suspension of election would affect the result of the election, the Commission shall, on the basis of a verified petition by any interested party and after due notice and hearing, call for the holding or continuation of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect on a date reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause of such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect.

The first paragraph of Section 4 of R. A. No. 7166 likewise provides:

Sec. 4. Postponement, Failure of Election and Special Elections. — The postponement, declaration of failure of election and the calling of special elections as provided in Sections 5, 6 and 7 of the Omnibus Election Code shall be decided by the Commission sitting en banc by a majority votes of its members. The causes for the declaration of a failure of election may occur before or after the casting of votes or on the day of the election.

There are, therefore, two requisites for the holding of special elections under Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code, viz., (1) that there is a failure of election, and (2) that such failure would affect the results of the election. The parties admit that the failure of the election in Precinct No. 13 was due to ballot-box snatching and do not dispute the finding of the COMELEC as to the necessity and inevitability of the holding of a special election in said precinct, even if the result of Precinct No. 7 should be based on the questionable "Comelec Copy" of its election returns. The COMELEC held:

Based on the adjudged correction of the votes in favor of petitioner Lucero in the Municipality of Las Navas, the results of the recount of votes (ballots) of Precinct No. 16 (Silvino Lobos), and the votes reflected in the available copy of the election returns for Precinct No. 7 (Silvino Lobos), it is safe to predict that when the special Provincial Board of Canvassers will reconvene to sum up the votes of the contending parties, the original lead of private respondent Ong of two hundred four (204) votes against petitioner Lucero — 24,272 as against 24,068 — will be reduced to either 175 or 173 depending on whether Lucero will be credited a low of 29 or a high of 31 votes as reflected in the election returns of Precinct No. 7.

Without preempting the exact figures which only the special Provincial Board of Canvassers can correctly determine, undoubtedly it is inevitable that a special election will have to be held in Precinct No. 13 (Barangay Gusaran) of the Municipality of Silvino Lobos.

. . .

Given the established lead of private respondent Ong over petitioner Lucero, We answer in the affirmative. According to Comelec records, the number of registered voters in Precinct No. 13 istwo hundred thirteen (213). Since the lead of respondent Ong is less than the number of registered voters, the votes in that precinct could affect the existing result because of the possibility that petitioner Lucero might get a majority over Ong in that precinct and that majority might be more than the present lead of Ong. 19

On the basis of the additional votes credited so far to the parties, 20 the following computation is in order: to Ong's 24,272 votes will be added 2 more from Precinct No. 16, to make a total of 24,274, while to Lucero's 24,068 votes will be added 20 more from Las Navas and 43 from Precinct No. 16, for a total of 24,131. Ong's earlier lead will thus be reduced to 143, which is admittedly less than the 213 registered voters in Precinct No. 13. 21

The two requirements then for a special election under Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code have indeed been met.

In fixing the date of the special election, the COMELEC should see to it that: (1) it should be not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause of the postponement or suspension of the election or the failure to elect, and (2) it should be reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended, or which resulted in failure to elect. The first involves questions of fact. The second must be determined in the light of the peculiar circumstances of a case. In the instant case, the delay was not attributable to the poor voters of Precinct No. 13 or to the rest of the electorate of the Second Legislative District of Northern Samar. The delay was, as stated in the opening paragraph of this ponencia, primarily caused by the legal skirmishes or maneuvers of the petitioners which muddled simple issues. The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that G. R. No. 113509 is the third case Ong has brought to this Court. 22 Considering then that the petitioners themselves must share the blame for the delay, and taking into account the fact that since the term of the office of the contested position is only three years, the holding of a special election in Precinct No. 13 within the next few months may still be considered "reasonably close to the date of the election not held." Ong's postulation should then be rejected.

In the course of the deliberations on these cases, the Court considered the possible application, by analogy, of Section 10, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution providing that no special election in the event of a vacancy in the Offices of the President and Vice President "shall be called if the vacancy occurs within eighteen months before the date of the next presidential election," and of the second paragraph of Section 4 of R. A. No. 7166 which provides:

In case a permanent vacancy shall occur in the Senate or House of Representatives at least one (1) year before the expiration of the term, the Commission shall call and hold a special election to fill the vacancy not earlier than sixty (60) days nor longer than ninety (90) days after the occurrence of the vacancy. However, in case of such vacancy in the Senate, the special election shall be held simultaneously with the next succeeding regular election.

A view was expressed that we should not hold the special election because the underlying philosophy for the prohibition to hold the special election if the vacancy occurred within a certain period before the next presidential election or the next regular election, as the case may be, is obviously the avoidance of the expense to be incurred in the holding of a special election when a regular election is, after all, less than a year away. The Court ultimately resolved that the aforesaid constitutional and statutory proscriptions are inapplicable to special elections which may be called under Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code. First, the special election in the former is to fill permanent vacancies in the Office of the President, Vice President, and Members of Congress occurring after the election, while the special election under the latter is due to or by reason of a failure of election. Second, a special election under Section 6 would entail minimal costs because it is limited to only the precincts involved and to the candidates who, by the result of the election in a particular constituency, would be affected by the failure of election. On the other hand, the special election for the Offices of the President, Vice President, and Senators would be nation-wide, and that of a Representative, district-wide. Third, Section 6, when specifically applied to the instant case, presupposes that no candidate had been proclaimed and therefore the people of the Second Legislative District of Northern Samar would be unrepresented in the House of Representatives until the special election shall ultimately determine the winning candidate, such that if none is held, they would have no representation until the end of the term. under the aforesaid constitutional and statutory provisions, the elected officials have already served their constituencies for more than one-half of their terms of office. Fourth, if the law had found it fit to provide a specific and determinate time-frame for the holding of a special election under Section 6, then it could have easily done so in Section 4 of R. A. No. 7166.

Another serious obstacle to Ong's proposition is that, considering the COMELEC's disposition of Precinct No. 7 in the challenged Resolution, he would then be declared and proclaimed the duly elected Representative of the Second Legislative District of Northern Samar despite the fact that as earlier observed, there was no counting of the votes of Precinct No. 7, and the results of the district elections for Representative would be affected by the failure of the election in Precinct No. 13. To accept the proposition is to allow a proclamation based on an incomplete canvass where the final result would have been affected by the uncanvassed result of Precinct No. 7 and by the failure of the election in Precinct No. 13 and to impose upon the people of the Second Legislative District of Northern Samar a Representative whose mandate is, at the very least, uncertain, and at the most, inexistent.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered:

I. DISMISSING, for lack of merit, the petition in G. R. No. 113509; and

II. In G. R. No. 113107, DIRECTING the respondent Commission on Elections to:

(1) Reconvene, in its main office of Manila, within five (5) days from notice hereof, the Special Board of Canvassers of the municipality of Silvino Lobos, Northern Samar, which shall then, as a special Board of Election Inspectors of Precinct No. 7 of said municipality, within forty-eight (48) hours from its reconvening, count the ballots of said Precinct No. 7, and deliver to the special Provincial Board of Canvassers of the said Province a copy of the election returns;

(2) Reconvene, in its main office in Manila, within the same period as aforestated, the special Provincial Board of Canvassers of Northern Samar which shall then, within seventy-two (72) hours from its reconvening:

(a) Include in the Municipal Certificate of Canvass of Silvino Lobos (1) the total number of votes for petitioner Wilmar P. Lucero and for petitioner Jose L. Ong, Jr., respectively, in Precinct No. 7 of Silvino Lobos as recorded in the election returns submitted by the aforementioned special Municipal Board of Canvassers, and (2) the forty-three (43) votes for petitioner Wilmar P. Lucero and the two (2) votes for petitioner Jose L. Ong, Jr. as reflected in the election returns of Precinct No. 16 (Barangay Tubgon) prepared, after a recount of the ballots, by the special Board of Canvassers; and after such inclusions to enter the new totals of the votes for the petitioners in the Certificate of Provincial Canvass;

(b) Retabulate the total number of votes for Wilmar P. Lucero for the Municipality of Las Navas, Northern Samar, which shall be two thousand and five hundred thirty-seven (2,537) as reflected in the Statement of Votes (C.E.

Form 20-A) prepared and submitted by the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Las Navas, and to enter the same in the Certificate of Provincial Canvass;

(c) After the accomplishment of all the foregoing, to sum up anew in the Certificate of Provincial Canvass the canvassed municipal certificates of canvass of all the municipalities of the Second Legislative District of Northern Samar and if the same would establish that the difference in votes between petitioner Wilmar P. Lucero and petitioner Jose L. Ong, Jr. is less than two hundred and thirteen (213), hence the failure of the election in Precinct No. 13 would unavoidably and inevitably affect then the result of the election, to report to the Commission on Elections such fact and to furnish the latter with a certified photocopy of the Certificate of Provincial Canvass;

(3) Within three (3) days after receipt of the aforesaid report from the special Provincial Board of Canvassers, to CALL a special election in Precinct No. 13 of Silvino Lobos, which shall be held not later than thirty (30) days from such call; a copy of the election returns of said special election shall forthwith be transmitted to the Special Provincial Board of Canvassers of Northern Samar, which shall then enter the results thereof in its canvass and make a final summation of the results in the Certificate of Provincial Canvass, and thereafter, pursuant to the Omnibus Election Code, pertinent election laws and rules and resolutions of the Commission, proclaim the winning candidate for Representative of the Second Legislative District of Northern Samar.

If for any reason whatsoever it would not be possible to immediately reconvene the Special Municipal Board of Canvassers of Silvino Lobos and the Special Provincial Board of Canvassers of Northern Samar, the COMELEC may create new ones.

 3. SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY vs. COMELEC FACTS: On March 13, 1992, Congress enactedRA. 7227(The Bases Conversionand Development Act of 1992), which created the Subic EconomicZone. RA 7227 likewise created SBMA to implement the declarednational policy of converting the Subic military reservation intoalternative productive uses. On November 24, 1992, the American navy turned over the Subicmilitary reservation to the Philippines government. Immediately,petitioner commenced the implementation of its task, particularly thepreservation of the sea-ports, airport, buildings, houses and otherinstallations left by the American navy. On April 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan passed Pambayang Kapasyahan Bilang 10 ,Serye 1993, expressing therein itsabsolute concurrence, as required by said Sec. 12 of RA 7227, to join the Subic Special Economic Zone and submitted such to the Office of the President. On May 24, 1993, respondents Garcia filed a petition with the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong toannul Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg.10, Serye 1993

 The petition prayed for the following: a) to nullify PambayangKapasyang Blg. 10 for Morong to join the Subic Special Economi Zone,b) to allow Morong to join provided conditions are met. The Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong acted upon the petition by promulgating Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 18, Serye 1993, requesting Congress of the Philippines so amend certain provisions of RA 7227. Not satisfied, respondents resorted to their power initiative under the LGC of 1991. On July 6, 1993, COMELEC denied the petition for local initiative on the ground that the subject thereof was merely a resolution and not an ordinance. On February 1, 1995, the President issued Proclamation No. 532  defining the metes and bounds of the SSEZ including therein the portion of the former naval base within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Morong. On June 18, 19956, respondent Comelec issued Resolution No. 2845and 2848, adopting a "Calendar of Activities forlocal referendum and providing for "the rules and guidelines to govern the conduct of the referendum On July 10, 1996, SBMA instituted a petition for certiorari contesting the validity of Resolution No. 2848 alleging that public respondent is intent on proceeding with a local initiative that proposes an amendment of a national law

 ISSUE:

1. WON Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Resolution No. 2848 which governs the conduct of the referendum  proposing to annul or repeal Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10

2. WON the questioned local initiative covers a subject within the powers of the people of Morong to enact; i.e., whether such initiative "seeks the amendment of a national law.

HELD:1. YES. COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion. FIRST. The process started by private respondents was an INITIATIVE but respondent Comelec made preparations for a REFERENDUM only. In fact, in the body of the Resolution as reproduced in the footnote below, the word "referendum" is repeated at least 27 times, but "initiative" is not mentioned at all. The Comelec labeled the exercise as a "Referendum"; the counting of votes was entrusted to a "Referendum Committee"; the documents were called "referendum returns"; the canvassers, "Referendum Board of Canvassers" and the ballots themselves bore the description "referendum". To repeat, not once was the word "initiative" used in said body of Resolution No. 2848. And yet, this exercise is unquestionably an INITIATIVE. As defined, Initiative is the power of the people to propose bills and laws, and to enact or reject them at the polls independent of the legislative assembly. On the other hand, referendum is the right reserved to the people to adopt or reject any act or measure which has been passed by a legislative body and which in most cases would without action on the part of electors become a law. In initiative and referendum, the Comelec exercises administration and supervision of the process itself, akin to its powers over the conduct of elections.

These law-making powers belong to the people, hence the respondent Commission cannot control or change the substance or the content of legislation.

2. The local initiative is NOT ultra vires because the municipal resolution is still in the proposal stage and not yet an approved law. The municipal resolution is still in the proposal stage. It is not yet an approved law. Should the people reject it, then there would be nothing to contest and to adjudicate. It is only when the people have voted for it and it has become an approved ordinance or resolution that rights and obligations can be enforced or implemented there under. At this point, it is merely a proposal and the writ or prohibition cannot issue upon a mere conjecture or possibility. Constitutionally speaking, courts may decide only actual controversies, not hypothetical questions or cases. In the present case, it is quite clear that the Court has authority to review Comelec Resolution No. 2848 to determine the commission of grave abuse of discretion. However, it does not have the same authority in regard to the proposed initiative since it has not been promulgated or approved, or passed upon by any "branch or instrumentality" or lower court, for that matter. The Commission on Elections itself has made no reviewable pronouncements about the issues brought by the pleadings. The Comelec simply included verbatim the proposal in its questioned Resolution No. 2848. Hence, there is really no decision or action made by a branch, instrumentality or court which this Court could take cognizance of and acquire jurisdiction over, in the exercise of its review powers.

4. PERALTA vs. COMELEC

Facts: Section 4 of the 1978 Election Code provides that the election period shall be fixed by the Commission on Elections in accordance with Section 6, Article XII[C] of the Constitution. The period of campaign shall not be more than forty-five days immediately preceding the election, excluding the day before and the day of the election. Petitioners questioned the constitutionality of the 45-day campaign period because: (a) it was decreed by the President and not by the Commission on Elections as provided by Section 6 of Article XII-C and (b) the period should cover at least ninety days (90). They argue that Section 6 of Article XII-C of the Constitution provides that the election period shall commence ninety days before the day of election and shall end thirty days thereafter.” 

Issue: Whether or not the 45-day period is unconstitutional 

Held: The 45-day campaign period is constitutional. Although the campaign period prescribed in the 1978 Election Code for the election of the representatives to the interim Batasang Pambansa is less than 90 days and was decreed by the President and not by the Commission on Elections as provided by Section 6 of Article XII-C of the Constitution, the same does not violate the Constitution, because under Amendment 1, the manner of election of members of the interim Batasang Pambansa shall be prescribed and regulated by law, and the incumbent President under Amendment No. 5, shall continue to exercise legislative power until martial law shall have been lifted. Moreover, the election for members in the interim Batasang Pambansa is an election in a state of emergency requiring special rules, and only the incumbent President has the authority and means of obtaining information on the peace and order condition of the country within which an electoral campaign may be adequately conducted in all regions of the nation. But even assuming that it should be the Commission on Elections that should fix the period of campaign, the constitutional mandate is complied with by the fact that the Commission has adopted and is enforcing the period fixed in Section 4, Article 1, of the 1978 Election Code.

5. Occena vs. Commission on Elections 

Facts: The challenge in these two prohibition proceedings against the validity of three Batasang Pambansa Resolutions proposing constitutional amendments, goes further than merely assailing their alleged constitutional infirmity. Samuel Occena and Ramon A. Gonzales, both members of the Philippine Bar and former delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention that framed the present Constitution, are suing as taxpayers. The rather unorthodox aspect of these petitions is the assertion that the 1973 Constitution is not the fundamental law, the Javellana ruling to the contrary notwithstanding.

Issue: Whether the 1973 Constitution was valid, and in force and effect when the Batasang Pambansa resolutions and the present petitions were promulgated and filed, respectively.

Held: It is much too late in the day to deny the force and applicability of the 1973 Constitution. In the dispositive portion of Javellana v. The Executive Secretary, dismissing petitions for prohibition and mandamus to declare invalid its ratification, this Court stated that it did so by a vote of six to four. It then concluded: "This being the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect." Such a statement served a useful purpose. It could even be said that there was a need for it. It served to clear the atmosphere. It made manifest that as of 17 January 1973, the present Constitution came into force and effect. With such a pronouncement by the Supreme Court and with the recognition of the cardinal postulate that what the Supreme Court says is not only entitled to respect but must also be obeyed, a factor for instability was removed. Thereafter, as a matter of law, all doubts were resolved. The 1973 Constitution is the fundamental law. It is as simple as that. What cannot be too strongly stressed is that the function of judicial review has both a positive and a negative aspect. As was so convincingly demonstrated by Professors Black and Murphy, the Supreme Court can check as well as legitimate. In declaring what the law is, it may not only nullify the acts of coordinate branches but may also sustain their validity. In the latter case, there is an affirmation that what was done cannot be stigmatized as constitutionally deficient. The mere dismissal of a suit of this character suffices. That is the meaning of the concluding statement in Javellana. Since then, this Court has invariably applied the present Constitution. The latest case in point is People v. Sola, promulgated barely two weeks ago. During the first year alone of the effectivity of the present Constitution, at least ten cases may be cited.

6. Laban ngDemokratikong Pilipino vs COMELEC

Facts:The General Counsel of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) informed the COMELEC by way of Manifestation that only the Party Chairman, Senator Edgardo J. Angara, or his authorized representative may endorse the certificate of candidacy of the party’s official candidates. The same Manifestation stated that Sen. Angara had placed the LDP Secretary General, Representative Agapito A. Aquino, on "indefinite forced leave." In the meantime, Ambassador Enrique A. Zaldivar was designated Acting Secretary General.However, Rep. Aquino filed his comment, contending that the Party Chairman does not have the authority to impose disciplinary sanctions on the Secretary General. As the Manifestation filed by the LDP General Counsel has no basis, Rep. Aquino asked the COMELEC to disregard the same.Prior to the May 2004 elections, the Laban ngDemokratikong Pilipino (LDP) has been divided because of a struggle of authority between Party Chairman Edgardo Angara and Party Secretary General Agapito Aquino, both having endorsed two different sets of candidates under the same party, LDP.The matter was brought to the COMELEC. The Commission in its resolution has recognized the factions creating two sub-parties: LDP Angara Wing and LDP Aquino Wing.

Issue:Whether or not the COMELEC committed a grave abuse of discretion in recognizing the two sets of nominations and endorsements by the same party.

Held:Yes. The COMELEC erred in its resolution. Only those Certificates of Candidacy (COC) signed by the LDP Party Chairman Angara or his duly authorized representative/s shall be recognized.

7. Ang Bagong Bayani vs. Comelec

Facts: Herein case involves two Petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, challenging Omnibus Resolution No. 3785 issued by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) on March 26, 2001. This Resolution approved the participation of 154 organizations and parties, including those herein impleaded, in the 2001 party-list elections. Petitioners seek the disqualification of private respondents, arguing mainly that the party-list system was intended to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented; not the mainstream political parties, the non-marginalized or overrepresented.

Issues:1.Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list elections. 2.Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to ‘marginalized and underrepresented’ sectors and organizations. 3.Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Omnibus Resolution No. 3785.”

Held:

1. Yes. Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified from the party-list elections, merely on the ground that they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides that members of the House of Representatives may “be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.”

2. Yes. The requisite character of these parties or organizations must be consistent with the purpose of the party-list system, as laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941. (e.g. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution)

While the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not exclusive, it demonstrates the clear intent of the law that not all sectors can be represented under the party-list system. It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that words employed in a statute are interpreted in connection with, and their meaning is ascertained by reference to, the words and the phrases with which they are associated or related. Thus, the meaning of a term in a statute may be limited, qualified or specialized by those in immediate association.

8. Peralta vs Comelec (SAME WITH # 4 CASE)

9. FRIVALDO VS. COMELECFACTS: Private respondent questioned petitioner governor’s candidacy and election for being null and void ab initio due to his alienage. Petitioner governor contends that his active participation in the elections had divested him of American citizenship under the laws of the US, and restored him of his Philippine citizenship.

ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of a certificate of candidacy by a naturalized American effectively recovers his Philippine citizenship.

HELD: No, Philippine citizenship previously disowned is not that cheaply recovered. Citizenship once lost may be reacquired either by naturalization or repatriation or by direct grant by law (CA 63) which was not invoked by the petitioner

10. LABO VS. COMELECGR No. 86564, August 1, 1989 (Constitutional Law – Loss of Citizenship)

FACTS: Herein petitioner, claiming for recognition as a Philippine citizen is a mayor-elect who, through his marriage with an Australian national, was naturalized and took an oath of allegiance as an Australian citizen. Said marriage was found to be bigamous and therefore was annulled. Petitioner claims that his naturalization made him only a dual national and did not divest him of his Philippine citizenship.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was divested of his Philippine citizenship.

HELD: Yes, because Commonwealth Act No. 63 clearly stated that Philippine citizenship may be lost through naturalization in a foreign country; express renunciation of citizenship; and by oath of allegiance to a foreign country, all of which are applicable to the petitioner.

11. Caasi vs. Comelec

FACTS:Mateo Caasi is seeking the disqualification of Merito Miguel as candidate for municipal mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan on the ground that he (Miguel) is a green card holder, hence, a resident of the United States. Miguel admits possessing a green card but contends that he only uses it for convenience to freely enter US for his medical treatment and to visit his children. He also alleges that he voted in all previous elections, including the plebiscite on 2 February 1987 for the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, and the congressional elections on 18 May 1987.

ISSUE:WON a green card is a proof that the holder is a US resident

HELD:In Miguel’s “Application for Immigrant Visa and Alien Registration" (Optional Form No. 230, Department of State) which he filled up in his own handwriting and submitted to the US Embassy in Manila before his departure for the United States in 1984, Miguel's answer to Question No. 21 therein regarding his "Length of intended stay (if permanently, so state)," Miguel's answer was, "Permanently." On the green card itself, it identifies Miguel as a Resident Alien. Miguel’s immigration to the United States in 1984 constituted an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines. To be “qualified to run for elective office” in the Philippines, the law requires that the candidate who is a green card holder must have “waived his

status as a permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country.” Also, Miguel only resided in Bolinao for 3 months after returning to the country which is in violation of the 1 year residency requirement.

*Miguel is disqualified to run for mayor.

12. Dela Torre vs COMELEC (Municipal Corporation, Disqualification of Local Elective Officials, Moral Turpitude)

Facts: Section 40 (a) of Republic Act 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991) provides that a prior conviction of a crime becomes a ground for disqualification from running for any elective local position – i.e. “when the conviction is for an offense involving moral turpitude.”

Citing above as ground, the COMELEC in a resolution, declared petitioner disqualified from running for the position of Mayor of Cavinti, Laguna. COMELEC held that petitioner was found guilty by the MTC for violation of the Anti-Fencing Law, an offense whose nature involves moral turpitude.

Petitioner claimed that Section 40 (a) of the Local Government Code does not apply to his case inasmuch as the probation granted him by the MTC which suspended the execution of the judgment of conviction and all other legal consequences flowing therefrom, rendered inapplicable Section 40 (a) as well. However, he admits all the elements of the crime of fencing.

Issue: WON the petitioner applicant is disqualified for the coming elections due to a crime involving moral turpitude.

Held: Yes. Moral turpitude is defined as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.From the definition of fencing in Sec. 2 of PD 1612, an element of the crime of fencing may be gleaned that “the accused knows or should have known that the said article, item, object or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft.

Moral turpitude is deducible from this. Actual knowledge by the “fence” of the fact that property received as stolen displays the same degree of malicious deprivation of one’s rightful property as that which animated the robbery or theft which, by their very nature, are crimes of moral turpitude. And although the participation of each felon in the unlawful taking differs in point in time and in degree, both the “fence” and the actual perpetrator/s of the robbery or theft invaded one’s peaceful dominion for gain – thus deliberately reneging the process “private duties” they owe their “fellowmen” in a manner “contrary to accepted and customary rule of right and duty, justice, honesty and good morals.”

Note: In determining whether a criminal act involves moral turpitude, the Court is guided by one of the general principle that crimes mala in se involve moral turpitude while crimes mala prohibita do not. However, SC admitted that it cannot always be ascertained whether moral turpitude does or does not exist by merely classifying as crime as mala in se or as mala prohibita. Whether or not a crime involves moral turpitude is ultimately a question of fact and frequently depends on all the circumstance 

13. Grego vs Comelec

Facts: In 1981, SC found Humberto Basco, then Deputy Sheriff of the City Court of Manila, guilty of

serious misconduct in an administrative complaint lodged by Nena Tordesillas. SC ordered Basco dismissed from service with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and with prejudice to reinstatement to any position in the national or loca government, including its agencies and instrumentalities, or GOCCs ("Tordesillas ruling").

Subsequently, Basco ran for and won as Councilor in the Second District of the City of Manila during the 1988 local elections.

He sought reelection in the 1992 election and won again. However, a case for quo warranto was filed by Cenon Ronquillo (another candidate for councilor),

who alleged Basco's ineligibility to be elected councilor on the basis of the Tordesillas ruling. Other complaints were filed before the Office of the Ombudsman and in the DILG.

In 1995, Basco ran for the third time as councilor. William Grego, claiming to be a registered voter of District II, City of Manila, filed with the COMELEC

a petition for disqualification, praying for Basco's disqualification, suspension of his proclamation, and declaration of Romualdo S. Maranan as the sixth duly elected Councilor of Manila's Second District. T

Manila BOC however proclaimed Basco as a duly elected councilor of the Second District of Manila. In view of the proclamation, Grego filed an urgent motion seeking to annul the illegal proclamation. The COMELEC dismissed the petition for disqualification ruling that the administrative penalty

imposed by the SC on Basco was wiped away and condoned by the electorate who elected him.

Issue 1 : WON Section 40 (b) 1 of Republic Act No. 7160 applies retroactively to those removed from office before it took effect on January 1, 1992.

Petitioner: Although the Code took effect only on January 1, 1992, Section 40 (b) must nonetheless be given

retroactive effect because the provision of the law as worded does not mention or even qualify the date of removal from office of the candidate in order for disqualification thereunder to attach.

Hence, as long as a candidate was once removed from office due to an administrative case, regardless of whether it took place during or prior to the effectivity of the Code, the disqualification applies.

Since the past tense is used in enumerating the grounds for disqualification, the provision must have also referred to removal from office occurring prior to the effectivity of the Code

Held: NO. While the Legislature has the power to pass retroactive laws which do not impair the obligation of contracts, or affect injuriously vested rights, it is equally true that statutes are not to be construed as intended to have a retroactive effect so as to affect pending proceedings, unless such intent is expressly declared or clearly and necessarily implied from the language of the enactment. There is no provision in the statute which would clearly indicate that the same operates retroactively.2 That the provision of the Code in question does not qualify the date of a candidate’s removal from office and that it is couched in the past tense are noy deterrents to applying the law prospectively. The basic tenet in legal hermeneutics that laws operate only prospectively and not retroactively. A statute, despite the generality in its language, must not be so construed as to overreach acts, events or matters which transpired before its passage. Lex prospicit, non respicit. The law looks forward, not backward

Issue 2: WON private respondent's election to office as City Councilor of Manila in the 1988, 1992 and 1995 elections wipe away and condone the administrative penalty against him, thus restoring his eligibility for public office.

Petitioner: According to Frivaldo v. COMELEC, a candidate’s disqualification cannot be erased by the electorate alone through the instrumentality of the ballot.

Held: ISSUE IS IRRELEVANT. Petitioner's argument proceeds on the assumption that he was in the first place disqualified when he ran in the three previous elections. This assumption, of course, is untenable considering that Basco was NOT subject to any disqualification at all under Section 40 (b) of the Local Government Code which, as said earlier, applies only to those removed from office on or after January 1, 1992.

Petitioners' allegations that (1) Basco circumvented the Tordesillas ruling and that (2) the term "any position" therein is broad enough to cover without distinction both appointive and local positions merit any consideration are unmeritorious. Contrary to petitioner's assertion, the Tordesillas decision did not bar Basco from running for any elective position. The term used was "reinstatement." Under the former Civil Service Decree (PD 807), the law applicable at the time Basco was administratively dismissed, the term "reinstatement" had a technical meaning, referring only to an appointive position. Thus, what is contemplated by the prohibition in Tordesillas is reinstatement to an appointive position.

Issue 3: Is Basco's proclamation as sixth winning candidate on May 17, 1995, while the disqualification case was still pending consideration by COMELEC void ab initio?

Petitioner: Basco violated the provisions of Section 20, paragraph (i) of Republic Act No. 7166 3, Section 6 of Republic Act No. 66464, as well as the rulings in Duremdes v. COMELEC, Benito v. COMELECand Aguam v. COMELEC.

Held: NO. RA 7166 Section 20(i) does not apply considering that the same refers only to a void proclamation in relation to contested returns and NOT to contested qualifications of a candidate.

On the other hand, RA 6646 Section 6 does not support petitioner's contention that the Manila City BOC, should have suspended the proclamation. The use of the word "may" indicates that the suspension of a proclamation is merely directory and permissive in nature and operates to confer discretion. What is merely made mandatory, according to the provision itself, is the continuation of the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest. Moreover, there is no reason why the Manila City BOC should not have proclaimed Basco as the sixth winning City Councilor. Absent any determination of irregularity in the election returns, as well as an order enjoining the canvassing and proclamation of the winner, it is a

1 SEC. 40, LGC. Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position: xxx (b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case; xxx

2 Aguinaldo v COMELEC, reiterated in Reyes v COMELEC and Salalima v COMELEC.

3 Section 20, paragraph (i) of Rep. Act 7166: The board of canvassers shall not proclaim any candidate as winner unless authorized by the Commission after the latter has ruled on the objections brought to it on appeal by the losing party. Any proclamation made in violation hereof shall be void ab initio, unless the contested returns will not adversely affect the results of the election.

4 Section 6 of RA 6646: Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason, a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.

mandatory and ministerial duty of the Board of Canvassers concerned to count the votes based on such returns and declare the result.

Finally, the cases of Duremdes, Benito and Aguam cited by petitioner are all irrelevant and inapplicable, These three cases do not in any manner refer to void proclamations resulting from the mere pendency of a disqualification case.

Issue 4: WON Romualdo S. Maranan, a seventh placer, be legally declared a winning candidate

Held: NO. Basco was a duly qualified candidate. Petitioner's emphatic reference to Labo v. COMELEC, where we laid down a possible exception to the rule that a second placer may not be declared the winning candidate, finds no application in this case. The exception is predicated on the concurrence of two assumptions, namely: (1) the one who obtained the highest number of votes is disqualified; and (2) the electorate is fully aware in fact and in law of a candidate's disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety but would nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible candidate. Both assumptions, however, are absent in this case. Petitioner's allegation that Basco was well-known to have been disqualified in the small community where he ran as a candidate is purely speculative and conjectural.

14. REYES vs. COMELEC

FACTS:

Dr. Manalo filed with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan an administrative complaint against incumbent Mayor Reyes of Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro. It was alleged that Reyes exacted and collected P50,000,00 from each market stall holder in the Bongabong Public Market. Also, that certain checks issued to him by the National Reconciliation and Development Program of the DILG were never received by the Municipal Treasurer nor reflected in the books of accounts of the same officer; and that he took 27 heads of cattle from beneficiaries of a cattle dispersal program. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan found petitioner guilty of the charges and ordered his removal from office.

Reyes filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with the RTC of Oriental Mindoro. Later, the Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan issued an order for Reyes to vacate the position of mayor and to turn over the office to the incumbent vice mayor but he refused to accept the service of the order.

Thereafter, Reyes filed a certificate of candidacy with the Comelec but a petitionfor disqualification was filed against him. Thus, the Comelec canceled Reyes’s certificate of candidacy. However, the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Bongabong unaware of the disqualification of Reyes by the Comelec, proclaimed him the duly-elected mayor.

The COMELEC en banc declared him to have been validly disqualified as candidate and, consequently, set aside his proclamation as municipal mayor.  Hence thepetition in G.R. No. 120905, which was filed on July 20, 1995, alleging grave abuse of discretion by the COMELEC on the ground that the decision in the administrative case against petitioner Reyes was not yet final and executory and therefore could not be used as basis for his disqualification. Invoking the ruling in the case of Aguinaldo v. Santos, petitioner argues that his election on May 8, 1995 is a bar to his disqualification.

Garcia, who obtained the highest number of votes next to Reyes, intervened, contending that because Reyes was disqualified, he was entitled to be proclaimed mayor. The Comelec en banc denied Garcia’s prayer.

ISSUES:1. WON the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is not yet final because he has not been served a copy thereof.2. WON petitioner’s reelection rendered the administrative charges against him moot and academic3. WON the candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes may not be proclaimed winner in case the winning candidate is disqualified.

HELD:1. No. The failure of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to deliver a copy of its decision was due to the refusal of petitioner and his counsel to receive the decision. Repeated attempts had been made to serve the decision on Reyes personally and by registered mail, but Reyes refused to receive the decision. If a judgment or decision is not delivered to a party for reasons attributable to him, service is deemed completed and the judgment or decision will be considered validly served as long as it can be shown that the attempt to deliver it to him would be valid were it not for his or his counsel's refusal to receive it . Reyes’s refusal to receive the decision may, therefore, be construed as a waiver on his part to have a copy of the decision.

Petitioner was given sufficient notice of the decision. Rather than resist the service, he should have received the decision and taken an appeal to the Office of the President in accordance with R.A. No. 7160 Section 67. But petitioner did not do so. Accordingly, the decision became final 30 days after the first

service upon petitioner. Thus, when the elections were held the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan had already become final and executory. The filing of apetition for certiorari with the RTC did not prevent the administrative decision from attaining finality. An original action of certiorari is an independent action and does not interrupt the course of the principal action nor the running of the reglementary period involved in the proceeding.

Consequently, to arrest the course of the principal action during the pendency of the certiorari proceedings, there must be a restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction from the appellate court directed to the lower court.  In the case at bar, although a temporary restraining order was issued by the Regional Trial Court, no preliminary injunction was subsequently issued. The temporary restraining order issued expired after 20 days. From that moment on, there was no more legal barrier to the service of the decision upon petitioner.

2.  No. Petitioner invokes the ruling in Aguinaldo v. COMELEC, in which it was held that a public official could not be removed for misconduct committed during a prior term and that his reelection operated as a condonation of the officer’s previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. But that was because in that case, before the petition questioning the validity of the administrative decision removing petitioner could be decided, the term of office during which the alleged misconduct was committed expired. Removal cannot extend beyond the term during which the alleged misconduct was committed.  If a public official is not removed before his term of office expires, he can no longer be removed if he is thereafter reelected for another term.  This is the rationale for the ruling in the two Aguinaldo cases.

The case at bar is the very opposite of those cases.  Here, although petitioner Reyes brought an action to question the decision in the administrative case, the temporary restraining order issued in the action he brought lapsed, with the result that the decision was served on petitioner and it thereafter became final on April 3, 1995, because petitioner failed to appeal to the Office of the President.  He was thus validly removed from office and, pursuant to § 40 (b) of the Local Government Code, he was disqualified from running for reelection.

It is noteworthy that at the time the Aguinaldo cases were decided there was no provision   similar to   § 40 (b) which disqualifies any person from running for any elective position on the ground that he has been removed as a result of an administrative case.  The Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160) could not be given retroactive effect.

Indeed, it appears that petitioner was given sufficient opportunity to file his answer.  He failed to do so.  Nonetheless, he was told that the complainant would be presenting his evidence and that he (petitioner) would then have the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses.  But on the date set, he failed to appear.  He would say later that this was because he had filed a motion for postponement and was awaiting a ruling thereon.  This only betrays the pattern of delay he employed to render the case against him moot by his election.

3. The candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes may not be proclaimed winner in case the winning candidate is disqualified. To simplistically assume that the second placer would have received the other votes would be to substitute our judgment for the mind of the voter. The second placer is just that, a second placer.   He lost the elections.   He was repudiated by either a majority or plurality of voters. He could not be considered the first among qualified candidates because in a field which excludes the disqualified candidate, the conditions would have substantially changed.  We are not prepared to extrapolate the results under the circumstances. The votes cast for Reyes are presumed to have been cast in the belief that Reyes was qualified and for that reason cannot be treated as stray, void, or meaningless. The subsequent finding that he is disqualified cannot retroact to the date of the elections so as to invalidate the votes cast for him.

● Rule 13, §§ 3 and 7 of the Rules of Court provide for the service of final orders and judgments either personally or by mail.  Personal service is completed upon actual or constructive delivery, which may be made by delivering a copy personally to the party or his attorney, or by leaving it in his office with a person having charge thereof, or at his residence, if his office is not known. Hence service was completed when the decision was served upon petitioner’s counsel in his office in Manila on March 3, 1995. 

In addition, as the secretary of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan certified, service by registered mail was also made on petitioner Reyes. Although the mail containing the decision was not claimed by him, service was deemed completed five days after the last notice to him on March 27, 1995.If a judgment or decision is not delivered to a party for reasons attributable to him, service is deemed completed and the judgment or decision will be considered validly served as long as it can be shown that the attempt to deliver it to him would be valid were it not for his or his counsel’s refusal to receive it.

Indeed that petitioner’s counsel knew that a decision in the administrative case had been rendered is evident in his effort to bargain with the counsel for the Sangguniang Panlalawigan not to have the decision served upon him and his client while their petition for certiorari in the Regional Trial Court was pending. His refusal to receive the decision may, therefore, be construed as a waiver on his part to have a copy of the decision.

The purpose of the rules on service is to make sure that the party being served with the pleading, order or judgment is duly informed of the same so that he can take steps to protect his interests, i.e., enable a party to file an appeal or apply for other appropriate reliefs before the decision becomes final.

In practice, service means the delivery or communication of a pleading, notice or other papers in a case to the opposite party so as to charge him with receipt of it, and subject him to its legal effect.

In the case at bar, petitioner was given sufficient notice of the decision.  Prudence required that, rather than resist the service, he should have received the decision and taken an appeal to the Office of the President in accordance with R.A. No. 7160, § 67. But petitioner did not do so.  Accordingly, the decision became final on April 2, 1995, 30 days after the first service upon petitioner.

15. Mercado vs Manzano [307 SCRA 630] (Municipal Corporation, Local Government Code)

Facts: Under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code, those holding dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective local position.Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent Eduardo B. Manzano were candidates for vice mayor of the City of Makati.

The proclamation of private respondent was suspended in view of a pending petition for disqualification. The Second Division of the COMELEC issued a resolution, dated May 7, 1998, granting the petition and ordered the cancellation of the COC of private respondent on the ground that he is a dual citizen.

Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration. The motion remained pending even until after the election held on May 11, 1998.

Pursuant to Omnibus Resolution No. 3044, of the COMELEC, the board of canvassers tabulated the votes cast for vice mayor of Makati City but suspended the proclamation of the winner.

Subsequently, petitioner sought to intervene in the case for disqualification. Private respondent opposed contending that at the time of the Elections, the resolution of the Second Division adopted on 7 May 1998 was not yet final so that, effectively, petitioner may not be declared the winner even assuming that Manzano is disqualified to run for and hold the elective office of Vice-Mayor of the City of Makati.

Issue: WON petitioner who intervened prior proclamation will hold the elective office of the Vice-Mayor when respondent is disqualified.

Held: Yes. Private respondent argues that petitioner has neither legal interest in the matter in litigation nor an interest to protect because he is “a defeated candidate for the vice-mayoralty post of Makati City who cannot be proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City even if the private respondent be ultimately disqualified by final and executory judgment.”

The flaw in this argument is it assumes that, at the time petitioner sought to intervene in the proceedings before the COMELEC, there had already been a proclamation of the results of the election for the vice mayoralty contest for Makati City, on the basis of which petitioner came out only second to private respondent.  The fact, however, is that there had been no proclamation at that time.  Certainly, petitioner had, and still has, an interest in ousting private respondent from the race at the time he sought to intervene.  The rule in Labo v. COMELEC, reiterated in several cases, only applies to cases in which the election of the respondent is contested, and the question is whether one who placed second to the disqualified candidate may be declared the winner.  In the present case, at the time petitioner filed a “Motion for Leave to File Intervention” on May 20, 1998, there had been no proclamation of the winner, and petitioner’s purpose was precisely to have private respondent disqualified “from running for an elective local position” under par 40(d) of R.A. No. 7160.

16. Valles vs. COMELEC

Principle of jus sanguinisHow Philippine citizenship is acquiredEffect of filing certificate of candidacy: express renunciation of other citizenship

FACTS:Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Australia to a Filipino father and an Australian mother. In 1949, at the age of fifteen, she left Australia and came to settle in the Philippines, where she later married a Filipino and has since then participated in the electoral process not only as a voter but as a candidate, as well. In the May 1998 elections, she ran for governor but Valles filed a petition for her disqualification as candidate on the ground that she is an Australian.

ISSUE: Whether or not Rosalind is an Australian or a Filipino

HELD:

The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis. There under, a child follows the nationality or citizenship of the parents regardless of the place of his/her birth, as opposed to the doctrine of jus soli which determines nationality or citizenship on the basis of place of birth.

Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born a year before the 1935 Constitution took into effect and at that time, what served as the Constitution of the Philippines were the principal organic acts by which the United States governed the country. These were the Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of Aug. 29, 1916, also known as the Jones Law.

Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899 and resided therein including their children are deemed to be Philippine citizens. Private respondents father, Telesforo Ybasco, was born on Jan. 5, 1879 in Daet, Camarines Norte.... Thus, under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law, Telesforo Ybasco was deemed to be a Philippine citizen. By virtue of the same laws, which were the laws in force at the time of her birth, Telesforo’s daughter, herein private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is likewise a citizen of the Philippines.

The signing into law of the 1935 Philippine Constitution has established the principle of jus sanguinis as basis for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship, xxx

So also, the principle of jus sanguinis, which confers citizenship by virtue of blood relationship, was subsequently retained under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Thus, the herein private respondent, Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is a Filipino citizen, having been born to a Filipino father. The fact of her being born in Australia is not tantamount to her losing her Philippine citizenship. If Australia follows the principle of jus soli, then at most, private respondent can also claim Australian citizenship resulting to her possession of dual citizenship.

17. Marquez vs COMELEC GR 112889 (April 18, 1995)

FACTS:Bienvenido Marquez, a defeated candidate in the Province of Quezon filed a petition for certiorari praying for the reversal of the COMELEC Resolution which dismissed his petition for quo warranto against Eduardo Rodriguez, for being allegedly a fugitive from justice. It is averred that at the time private respondent filed his certificate of candidacy, a criminal charge against him for ten (10) counts of insurance fraud or grand theft of personal property was still pending before the Municipal Court of Los Angeles Judicial District, County of Los Angeles, State of California, U.S.A. A warrant issued by said court for his arrest, it is claimed, has yet to be served on private respondent on account of his alleged “flight” from that country. Petitioner’s subsequent recourse (in G.R. No. 105310) from the COMELEC’s May 8, 1992 resolution was dismissed without prejudice, however, to the filing in due time of a possible post-election quo warranto proceeding against private respondent.Before the 11th May 1992 elections, petitioner filed a petition with the COMELEC for cancellation of respondent’s CoC on account of the candidate’s disqualification under Sec. 40 (e) of the LGC. Private respondent was proclaimed Governor-elect of Quezon on 29 May 1992. Forthwith, petitioner instituted quo warranto proceedings (EPC 92-28) against private respondent before the COMELEC.

ISSUE:Whether private respondent who, at the time of the filing of his certificate of candidacy (and to date), is said to be facing a criminal charge before a foreign court and evading a warrant for his arrest comes within the term “fugitive from justice” contemplated by Section 40(e) of the LGC and is, therefore, disqualified from being a candidate for, and thereby ineligible from holding on to, an elective local office.

HELD:Section 40(e) of the LGC (RA 7160) provide that a “Fugitive from justice in criminal cases here and abroad” are “disqualified from running for any elective local position”.It has been held that construction placed upon law by the officials in charge of its enforcement deserves great and considerable weight (Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corp. vs. CA, 182 SCRA 166,181). However, when there clearly is no obscurity and ambiguity in an enabling law, it must merely be made to apply as it is so written. An administrative rule or regulation can neither expand nor constrict the law but must remain congruent to it.

The confinement of the term “fugitive from justice” in Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the LGC of 1991 to refer only to a person “who has been convicted by final judgment” is an inordinate and undue circumscription of the law. Unfortunately, the COMELEC did not make any definite finding on whether or not private respondent is in fact a “fugitive from justice” as such term must be interpreted and applied in the light of the Court’s opinion. The omission is understandable since the COMELEC outrightly dismissed the petition for quo warranto on the basis instead of Rule 73 of the Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Oversight Committee. The Court, not being a trier of facts, is thus constrained to remand the case to the COMELEC for a determination of this unresolved factual matter.

18. RODRIGUEZ vs. COMELEC

Facts: The petitioner Eduardo T. Rodriguez was a candidate for Governor in the Province of Quezon in the May 8, 1995 elections. His rival candidate for the said position was Bienvenido O. Marquez, Jr., herein private respondent. Private respondent filed a petition for disqualification before the COMELEC based principally on the allegation that Rodriguez is a “fugitive from justice.” Private respondent revealed that a charge for fraudulent insurance claims, grand theft and attempted grand theft of personal property is pending against the petitioner before the Los Angeles Municipal Court. Rodriguez is therefore a “fugitive from justice” which is a ground for his disqualification/ ineligibility under Section 40 (e) of the Local Government Code according to Marquez. 

Rodriguez, however, submitted a certification from the Commission of Immigration showing that Rodriguez left the US on June 25, 1985- roughly five (5) months prior to the institution of the criminal complaint filed against him before the Los Angeles Court. 

Issue: Whether or not Rodriguez is a “fugitive from justice.” 

Held: No. The Supreme Court reiterated that a “fugitive from justice” includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise who, being charged, flee to avoid prosecution. The definition thus indicates that the intent to evade is the compelling factor that animates one’s flight from a particular jurisdiction. And obviously, there can only be an intent to evade prosecution or punishment when there is knowledge by the fleeing subject of an already instituted indictment or of a promulgated judgement of conviction.

19. PANGKAT LAGUNA vs. ComelecBUENA, J.:

In this specie of controversy which involves, to a large extent, the determination of the true will of the electorate and, which by its very nature, touches upon the ascertainment of the people’s choice as gleaned from the hallowed medium of the ballot, this Court finds cogency to reiterate – at the outset – that the factual findings and determinations of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) ought to be accorded great weight and finality, in the absence of any remarkable trace of grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of its constitutionally mandated tasks.

Sought to be reversed in this special civil action for certiorari is the Resolution[1] of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) en banc in S.P.A. 01-218 promulgated on 24 May 2001, which set aside the Resolution[2] of the COMELEC Second Division dated 11 May 2001, ordering the disqualification of herein private respondent Teresita “Ningning” Lazaro as candidate for Governor of the Province of Laguna in the 14 May 2001 Elections.

The antecedents unfold.On 30 January 2001, respondent Lazaro, who was then Vice Governor of Laguna, assumed by

succession the office of the Governor, when then Laguna Governor Jose D. Lina, Jr.  was appointed Secretary of Interior and Local Government by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. On 28 February 2001, respondent Lazaro filed her certificate of candidacy[3] for the gubernatorial position of Laguna.

On 04 May 2001, herein petitioner Pangkat Laguna, a duly registered political party, filed with the COMELEC a petition[4] which sought to disqualify respondent Lazaro as candidate in the gubernatorial race. Docketed as SPA No. 01-218, the disqualification petition alleged in the main that respondent Lazaro committed acts violative of Section 80 (Election campaign or partisan political activity outside the campaign period) and Section 261(v) (Prohibition against release, disbursement or expenditure of public funds) of the Omnibus Election Code.

In its petition for disqualification, petitioner Pangkat Laguna specifically alleged that private respondent Lazaro, upon assuming – by succession – the Office of the Governor on 30 January 2001, “publicly declared her intention to run for governor” in the May 2001 elections. Thus, according to petitioner, respondent Lazaro on 07 February 2001, ordered the purchase of 14,513 items such as trophies, basketballs, volleyballs, chessboard sets, and t-shirts, allegedly worth Four Million Five Hundred Fifty Six Thousand and Five Pesos (P4,556,005.00) “serving no public purpose but to promote her popularity as a candidate.”[5]

In addition, petitioner alleged that on 08 February 2001, respondent directed the purchase and distribution of “1,760 medals and pins valued at One Hundred Ten Thousand Pesos (P110,000.00) to various schools in Laguna, serving no meaningful public purpose but to again promote her forthcoming candidacy.”[6] According to petitioner, the abovementioned acts, in effect, constituted “premature campaigning” inasmuch as the same were done prior to the start of the campaign period on 30 March 2001. Petitioner adds that these acts constitute a ground for disqualification under Section 68, in relation to Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code.

Moreover, petitioner argues that respondent Lazaro violated Section 261 (v) of the Omnibus Election Code, as implemented by COMELEC Resolution No. 3479, when the latter caused the bidding of seventy nine (79) public works projects on 28 March 2001. 

On 08 May 2001, respondent Lazaro filed an answer denying the allegations in the petition for disqualification. In a Resolution dated 11 May 2001, the COMELEC Second Division granted the petition to

disqualify respondent as candidate for the gubernatorial post of Laguna, prompting respondent Lazaro to file a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc.

On May 17, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion to Suspend Proclamation Under Sec. 6, R.A. 6646.[7]

On 19 May 2001, the Provincial Board of Canvassers proclaimed respondent Lazaro as the duly elected Governor of Laguna in the 14 May 2001 Elections. On 22 May 2001, petitioner Pangkat Laguna filed a Motion to Annul Proclamation and/or to Suspend Effect of Proclamation under Sec. 6, R.A. 6646.[8]

On 24 May 2001, the COMELEC en banc promulgated a resolution, the dispositive portion of which declares:

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent Lazaro is hereby granted. The resolution issued by the Second Division dated 11 May 2001 is hereby correspondingly REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.

“SO ORDERED.”

Through the expediency of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, petitioner now assails the Resolution of the COMELEC en banc dated 24 May 2001, for having been “issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.”

The petition is devoid of merit.Doctrinally entrenched is the rule that in a petition for certiorari, findings of fact of administrative

bodies, such as respondent COMELEC in the instant case, are final unless grave abuse of discretion has marred such factual determinations.[9] Stated differently, factual findings of the COMELEC based on its own assessments and duly supported by evidence, are conclusive upon the Court, more so, in the absence of a substantiated attack on the validity of the same. The COMELEC, as the government agency tasked with the enforcement and administration of election laws, is entitled to the presumption of regularity of official acts with respect to the elections.[10]

First, as to the issue of “premature campaigning”, this Court holds that respondent Lazaro was not guilty of violating the provisions of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code, to wit:

“SEC. 80. Election campaign or partisan political activity outside campaign period. – It shall be unlawful for any person, whether or not a voter or candidate, or for any party, or association of persons, to engage in an election campaign or partisan political activity except during the campaign period: Provided, that political parties may hold political conventions or meetings to nominate their official candidates within thirty days before the commencement of the campaign period and forty-five days for Presidential and Vice-Presidential election.”

On this score, it bears stressing that the act of respondent Lazaro – as Chief Executive of the Province of Laguna – in ordering the purchase of various items and the consequent distribution thereof to the constituents of Laguna, in line with the local government unit’s sports and education program, is – to our mind – not constitutive of the act of election campaigning or partisan political activity contemplated and explicitly proscribed under the pertinent provisions of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code.

To this end, we quote with affirmance respondent COMELEC’s observation on the matter:

“Not every act of beneficence from a candidate may be considered ‘campaigning.’ The term ‘campaigning’ should not be made to apply to any and every act which may influence a person to vote for a candidate, for that would be stretching too far the meaning of the term. Examining the definition and enumeration of election campaign and partisan political activity found in COMELEC Resolution 3636, the Commission is convinced that only those acts which are primarily designed to solicit votes will be covered by the definition and enumeration.

“In this present case, the respondent was not in any way directly (or) indirectly soliciting votes. Respondent Lazaro was merely performing the duties and tasks imposed upon her by law, which duties she has sworn to perform as the Governor of the Province of Laguna.

“Respondent has satisfactorily shown the regularity of the implementation of the questioned sports and education programs. The number of items purchased and the amount involved were within the regular purchases of the provincial government. How the funds were sourced and how the program was implemented, as correctly pointed out by respondent, (are) not for us to resolve for such issue is way beyond our constitutionally mandated jurisdiction.”[11] (Emphasis ours). 

In Lozano vs. Yorac,[12] this Court in upholding the findings of the COMELEC negating the charge of vote-buying, in effect, affirmed the dismissal of the petition for disqualification filed against Makati mayoralty candidate Jejomar Binay, thus:

“We uphold the foregoing factual findings, as well as the conclusions reached by respondent COMELEC, in dismissing the petition for the disqualification of respondent Binay. No clear and convincing proof exists to show that respondent Binay was indeed engaged in vote buying. The traditional gift-

giving of the Municipality of Makati during the Christmas Season is not refuted. That it was implemented by respondent Binay as OIC Mayor of Makati at that time does not sufficiently establish that respondent was trying to influence and induce his constituents to vote for him. This would be stretching the interpretation of the law too far. Petitioner deduces from this act of gift-giving that respondent was buying the votes of the Makati residents. It requires more than a mere tenuous deduction to prove the offense of vote buying. There has to be concrete and direct evidence, or, at least, strong circumstantial evidence to support the charge that respondent was indeed engaged in vote-buying. We are convinced that the evidence presented, as well as the facts obtaining in the case at bar, do not warrant such finding.”  (Emphasis ours.)

Notably, upon a close perusal of the entirety of circumstances attendant in the instant case, this Court is of the firm view that herein petitioner failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the questioned purchase and distribution of the aforesaid items were, in any significant way, perpetrated for the purpose of promoting the candidacy of respondent Lazaro or were, in any manner, calculated to directly or indirectly solicit votes on behalf or in favor of respondent. Similarly, the records are bereft of any clear and convincing proof that the purchase and distribution of the items were deliberately or consciously done to influence and induce the constituents of Laguna to vote for respondent, in direct violation of the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code.

To us, respondent’s acts do not fall within, and are not contemplated by, the prohibition embodied in Section 80 of the Code so as to effectively disqualify her from the elections and bar her from holding office.

Second, as to the charge of violation of the 45-Day Public Works Ban,[13] petitioner asserts that respondent Lazaro transgressed the provisions of Section 261 (v) of the Omnibus Election Code, as implemented by COMELEC Resolution No. 3479, when the latter caused or directed the bidding of 79 public works projects on 28 March 2001.

We do not agree. Section 261 (v) of the Omnibus Election Code is explicit:

“Sec. 261. Prohibited Acts. – The following shall be guilty of an election offense:

“x x x

“(v) Prohibition against release, disbursement or expenditure of public funds. – Any public official or employee including barangay officials and those of government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, who, during forty-five days before a regular election and thirty days before a special election, releases, disburses or expends any public funds for:

“(1) Any and all kinds of public works, except the following:

“x x x

“(b) Work undertaken by contract through public bidding held, or by negotiated contract awarded, before the forty-five day period before election: Provided, that work for the purpose of this section undertaken under the so-called ‘takay’ or ‘paquiao’ system shall not be considered as work by contract; x x x.” 

Beyond this, evidence is wanting to sufficiently establish and substantiate petitioner’s bare allegation that – in furtherance of the public bidding conducted on 28 March 2001 – public funds were ever released, disbursed or expended during the 45-day prohibitive period provided under the law and the implementing rules. Absent such clear and convincing proof, we find no cogent reason to disturb the factual findings and conclusions of respondent COMELEC – the constitutional body tasked by no less than the fundamental law to“decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections.”[14]

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is DENIED. ACCORDINGLY, the Resolution of the Commission on Elections en banc dated 24 May 2001 is hereby AFFIRMED. 

20. PNOC vs NLRCConstitution; Under the 1987 Constitution, the Civil Service shall include government-owned or controlled corporations only if created under a special law.

In National Service Commission (NASECO),et al. v. NLRC, et al., etc., decided on November 29, 1988, it was ruled that the 1987 Constitution “starkly varies” from the 1973 charter—upon which the Juco doctrine rested— in that unlike the latter, the present constitution qualifies the term, “government owned or controlled corporations,” by the phrase, “with original charter;” hence, the clear implication is that the Civil Service no longer includes government-owned or controlled corporations without original charters, i.e., those organized under the general corporation law. NASECO further ruled that the Juco ruling should not apply retroactively, considering that prior to its promulgation on January 17, 1985, this Court had expressly recognized the applicability of the Labor Code to government-owned or controlled corporations.

Same; Election Laws; Under the Omnibus Election Code, employees of government-owned or controlled corporations, whether with or without original charters, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from office upon the filing of their certificate of candidacy.—Be this as it may, it seems obvious to the Court that a government-owned or controlled corporation does not lose its character as such because not possessed of an original charter but organized under the general law. If a corporation’s capital stock is owned by the Government, or it is operated and managed by officers charged with the mission of fulfilling the public objectives for which it has been organized, it is a government-owned or controlled corporation even if organized under the Corporation Code and not under a special statute; and employees thereof, even if not covered by the Civil Service but by the Labor Code, are nonetheless “employees in government-owned or controlled corporations,” and come within the letter of Section 66of the Omnibus Election Code, declaring them “ipso facto resigned from * * office upon the filing of * *(their) certificate of candidacy.”

 Same; Same; Labor Laws; Termination; Filing of certificate of candidacy of employees of government-owned or controlled corporations subject to the Labor Code constitutes a just cause for termination of employment.—In other words, Section 66 constitutes just cause for termination of employment in addition to those set forth in the Labor Code, as amended. SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION for certiorari of the decision and resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission. The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. Alikpala, Gomez & Associates Law Office for petitioners

21. YEALN VS CANEJA, 81 PHIL 773

22. Rep. Ma. Catalina Loreto – Go v. COMELECGR No. 147741 , May 10, 2001

Facts:- Petitioner Loreto-Go filed Certificates of Candidacy for Mayor of Baybay, Leyte and for Governor of

the province of Leyte.

- She filed an affidavit of withdrawal for the position of Mayor with the provincial election officer, which the latter refused to receive stating that she should file the same with the municipal election officer of Baybay, hence, she filed the same with the proper office by fax.

- However, she filed the withdrawal 28 minutes after the deadline.

- Respondents Felipe Montejo and Arvin Antoni filed separate petitions to deny due course and/or to cancel the certificates of candidacy of petitioner.

- The case was referred to the Law Department of COMELEC which gave due course to respondents’ petitions without affording petitioner an opportunity to be heard or to submit responsive pleadings.

- Based on the report of the COMELEC’s Law Department, the COMELEC en banc disqualified petitioner to run for both positions; hence, this petition.

Issues:

1. WON petitioner is disqualified to be a candidate for governor.2. Was there a valid withdrawal of the certificate of candidacy for mayor of Baybay, Leyte?3. Was there denial to petitioner of procedural due process of Law?

Held: 1. No. Petitioner’s withdrawal of her certificate of candidacy for mayor of Baybay, Leyte was

effective for all legal purposes, and left in full force her certificate of candidacy for governor.2. Yes. Section 73, BP Blg. 881, does not mandate that the affidavit of withdrawal must be filed

with the same office where the certificate of candidacy to be withdrawn was filed. While it may be true that Sec. 12 of the COMELEC Resolution No. 3253-A requires that the withdrawal be filed before the election officer where the certificate of candidacy was filed, such requirement is merely directory, and is intended for the convenience. Hence, the filing of petitioner’s affidavit of withdrawal of candidacy for mayor of Baybay with the provincial election supervisor of Leyte sufficed to effectively withdraw such candidacy.

3. Yes. Sec. 3, Rule 23 of COMELEC Rules of procedure provides that a petition to deny due course to or cancel certificates of candidacy shall be heard summarily after due notice. In the case, the COMELEC Law department conducted an ex-parte study of the cases without giving petitioner an opportunity to be heard, or requiring her to submit a comment or opposition to the petitionsm or setting the case for hearing. Hence, the COMELEC en banc deprived the petitioner of due process of law in approving the report and recommendation of the Law Department.

23. ABCEDE VS IMPERIAL

1. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; MINISTERIAL DUTY TO RECEIVE CERTIFICATES OF CANDIDACY; MANDATORY DUTY TO GIVE DUE COURSE TO THE SAME. — When the Revised Election Code imposes upon the Commission on Elections the ministerial duty to receive certificates of candidacy, it implies thereby that said certificates should be given due course. 

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; POWER OF DECISION LIMITED TO PURELY ADMINISTRATIVE QUESTIONS. — While the Constitution has given the Commission on Elections the "exclusive charge" of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections," the power of decision of the Commission is limited to purely "administrative questions." (Art. X, Sec. 2, Constitution.) It has no authority to decide matters "involving the right to vote." It may not even pass upon the legality of a given vote (Nacionalista Party v. Commission on Elections, 47 Off. Gaz., 2851). For more reason, it cannot determine who among those possessing the qualifications prescribed by the Constitution, who have complied with the procedural requirements relative to the filing of certificates of candidacy - should be allowed to enjoy the full benefits intended by law therefor. This is a matter of policy, not of administration and enforcement of the law, which policy must be determined by Congress in the exercise of its legislative functions. 

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; DUTY TO PREPARE AND DISTRIBUTE COPIES OF CERTIFICATES OF CANDIDACY LIKEWISE MINISTERIAL. — Whether or not the Commission on Elections should incur the expenses incident to the preparation and distribution of copies of the certificates of candidacy of those who, in its opinion, do not have a chance to get a substantial number of votes, is another question of policy for Congress, not the Commission, to settle. Compliance with the provision of law requiring the preparation and immediate distribution of copies of the certificates of candidacy is, likewise ministerial. If the Commission believes, however, that the effect thereof is to unnecessarily impose a useless burden upon the Government, then the remedy is to call the attention of Congress thereto, coupled with the corresponding proposals, recommendations, or suggestions for such amendments as may be deemed best.

D E C I S I O N

CONCEPCION, J.:

Prior to September 7, 1957, petitioner Alfredo Abcede filed, with the Commission on Elections, his certificate of candidacy for the Office of the President of the Philippines, in connection with the elections to be held on November 12 of the same year. On or about said date, Abcede and other candidates were summoned by the Commission on Elections to appear before the same on September 23, 1957, "to show cause why their certificates of candidacy should be considered as filed in good faith and to be given due course," with the admonition that their failure to so appear would be sufficient ground for the Commission to consider said certificates of candidacy as not filed in good faith and not to give due course thereto. After due hearing, at which Abcede appeared and introduced evidence, the Commission issued a resolution dated October 4, 1957, ordering that the certificates of candidacy of the persons therein named, including that of said petitioner, "shall not be given due course." A reconsideration of such resolution having been denied, Abcede filed with this Court a petition for certiorari and mandamus, praying that the resolution be annulled and that his aforementioned certificate of candidacy be given due course. Upon motion of petitioner herein, this Court issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering the respondent to refrain and desist from carrying out the resolution above referred to, pending the final disposition of the case at bar. 

Insofar as petitioner herein is concerned, the action taken by the Commission on Elections is based upon the following facts, set forth in its said resolution, from which we quote:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Alfredo Abcede was a candidate for senator in 1953, again in 1955, in both of which his votes were nil. In this election he presents his candidacy for President of the Philippines, with the redemption of the Japanese war notes as his main program of government. It is of record that the Bureau of Posts, by Fraud Order No. 2, dated November 2, 1955, banned from the use of the Philippine mail all matters of whatever class mailed by, or addressed to, the Japanese War Notes Claims Association of the Philippines, Inc., and its agents and representatives, including Alfredo Abcede and Marciana Mesina-Abcede, which order was based on the findings of the Securities and Exchange Commission, confirmed by the Secretary of Justice, that said entity and its agents and representatives, including Alfredo Abcede, are engaged in a scheme to obtain money from the public by means of false or fraudulent pretenses. The Commission is convinced that the certificate of candidacy of Alfredo Abcede was filed for motives other than a bona fide desire to obtain a substantial number of votes of the electorate."cralaw virtua1aw library

In holding that it has, under these facts, the power not to give due course to petitioner’s certificate of candidacy, the Commission on Elections gave the following reasons:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The Commission believes that while Section 37 of the Revised Election Code imposes upon the Commission the ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge certificates of candidacy, the law leaves to the Commission a measure of discretion on whether to give due course to a particular certificate of candidacy should it find said certificate of candidacy to have been filed not bona fide. We also believe that a certificate of candidacy is not bona fide when it is filed, as a matter of caprice or fancy, by a person who is incapable of understanding the full meaning of his acts and the true significance of election and without any political organization or visible supporters behind him so that he has not even the tiniest chance to obtain the favorable indorsement of a substantial portion of the electorate, or when the one who files the same exerts no tangible effort, shown by overt acts, to pursue to a semblance of success his candidacy. 

"The law requires the certificate of candidacy to be under oath in acknowledgment of its serious character as an indispensable segment in the process of election, the first step that a citizen has to take in seeking public trust and in avoiding service to the common weal. It is a solemn matter, not to be taken lightly. 

"The giving due course to a certificate of candidacy is a process of no mean proportion, particularly for the offices of President and Vice President of the Philippines and Senator which involve the printing at public expense of around 136,000 copies of each certificate of candidacy; the printing of the names of the candidates in several election forms; the mailing, sorting, and distribution of the copies of said certificates of candidacy and forms among the 34,000 polling places throughout the country; the entering of the names of the candidates by the board of inspectors in still other forms; etc. Considering all these, the Commission is satisfied with the view that Congress could not have meant to make as a ministerial duty of the Commission to give due course to every certificate of candidacy, no matter how senseless said certificate of candidacy may be, thus in effect authorizing a meaningless expenditure of a considerable amount of public funds, and in the process put added routinary burden on the already heavily burdened election machinery, as well as shear off the election much of its dignity as a solemn process of democracy. 

"Based on existing records of the Commission and on evidence adduced during the hearing on the certificates of candidacy mentioned above, the Commission finds, and so declares, that the said certificates of candidacy have not been filed in good faith on grounds hereunder stated."cralaw virtua1aw library

Section 36 of the Revised Election Code provides that "certificates of candidacy of candidates for President . . . shall be filed with the Commission on Elections which shall order the preparation and distribution of copies for the same to all the election precincts of the Philippines . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library

It further provides that said certificates shall be distributed as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . the Commission on Elections . . . shall immediately send copies thereof to the secretary of the Provincial Board of each province where the elections will be held, and the latter shall in turn immediately forward copies to all the polling places. The Commission on Elections shall communicate the names of said candidates to the secretary of the provincial board by telegraph. If the certificate of candidacy is sent by mail, it shall be by registered mail, and the date on which the package was deposited in the post- office may be considered as the filing date thereof if confirmed by a telegram or radiogram addressed to the Commission on Elections on the same date."cralaw virtua1aw library

Moreover, pursuant to section 37 of said Code:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The Commission on Election, the secretary of the provincial board, and the municipal secretary, in their respective cases, shall have the ministerial duty to receive the certificates of candidacy referred to in the preceding section and to immediately acknowledge receipt thereof."cralaw virtua1aw library

The foregoing provisions give the Commission no discretion to give or not to give due course to petitioner’s certificate of candidacy. On the contrary, the Commission has, admittedly, the "ministerial" duty to receive said certificate of candidacy. Of what use would it be to receive it if the certificate were not to be given due course? We must not assume that Congress intended to require a useless act — that it would have imposed a mandatory duty to do something vain, futile and empty. 

Moreover, in the words of section 37, the Commission "shall immediately send copies" of said certificates to the secretaries of the provincial boards. The compulsory nature of this requirement, evinced by the imperative character generally attached to the term "shall", is stressed by the peremptory connotation of the adverb "immediately."cralaw virtua1aw library

Again, the Constitution fixes the qualifications for the office of the highest magistrate of the land. All possessors of such qualifications are, therefore, deemed legally fit, at least, to aspire to such office and to run therefor, provided that they file their respective certificates of candidacy within the time, at the place and in the manner provided by law, and petitioner herein has done so. 

Lastly, as the branch of the executive department — although independent of the President — to which the Constitution has given the "exclusive charge" of the "enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections," the power of decision of the Commission is limited to purely "administrative questions." (Article X, sec. 2, Constitution of the Philippines.) It has no authority to decide matters "involving the right to vote." It may not even pass upon the legality of a given vote (Nacionalista Party v. Commission on Elections, * 47 Off. Gaz., [6], 2851). We do not see, therefore, how it could whether, if so granted — in the vague, abstract, indeterassert the greater and more far-reaching authority to determine who — among those possessing the qualifications prescribed by the Constitution, who have complied with the procedural requirements relative to the filing of certificates of candidacy — should be allowed to enjoy the full benefits intended by law therefor. The question whether in order to enjoy those benefits — a candidate must be capable of "understanding the full meaning of his acts and the true significance of election," and must have — over a month prior to the elections (when the resolution complained of was issued) "the tiniest chance to obtain the favorable indorsement of a substantial portion of the electorate," is a matter of policy, not of administration and enforcement of the law, which policy must be determined by Congress in the exercise of its legislative functions. Apart from the absence of specific statutory grant of such general, broad power as the Commission claims to have, it is dubious minate and undefined

manner necessary in order that it could pass upon the factors relied upon in said resolution (and such grant must not be deemed made, in the absence of clear and positive provision to such effect, which is absent in the case at bar) — the legislative enactment would not amount to undue delegation of legislative power. (Schechter v. U.S., 295 U.S. 495, 79 L. ed. 1570.) 

The case of Ciriaco S. Garcia v. Imperial, L-12930 (October 22, 1957) cited in respondent’s answer is not in point. That case referred to the certificates of candidacy of Ciriaco S. Garcia of San Simon, Pampanga, Carlos C. Garcia of Iloilo City, and Eulogio Palma Garcia of Butuan City, all for the Office of the President of the Philippines, filed in September, 1957. The facts therein are set forth in the pertinent resolution of the Commission on Elections from which we quote:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Ciriaco S. Garcia, . . . admitted, . . . that he had not up to the date of the hearing held any public meeting relative to his candidacy; had not posted any handbills or posters or banners announcing his candidacy; had not established any national headquarters; and had no line-up for vice-president, senators, or members of Congress. In connection with the case of Ciriaco S. Garcia, counsel for the intervenor presented documents as exhibits. . . . all showing that Ciriaco S. Garcia had not shown any active interest in his candidacy. Relative to the case of Carlos C. Garcia, counsel for intervenor presented a witness, Salvador del Rosario, who testified to the effect that he knows personally said Carlos C. Garcia as a former dress maker and now maintains a bar in the city of Iloilo that he has not done anything to promote his supposed candidacy; and that he is a brother- in-law of Atty. Tomas Vargas, a prominent Liberal Party leader in the province of Iloilo. He also submitted as evidence the telegram of the provincial commander of Iloilo reporting that said Carlos C. Garcia is not a well known person in Iloilo. And as regards Eulogio Palma Garcia, counsel for intervenor likewise submitted a telegram of the provincial commander of Agusan to the effect that said Eulogio Palma Garcia is an unknown person in Agusan. He further pointed out that the address of said Eulogio Palma Garcia, as appearing in this certificate of candidacy, is c/o Tranquilino O. Calo, Jr., a nephew of ex- congressman Calo, and official candidate of the Liberal Party for Senator." (Emphasis ours.) 

The findings of the Commission were as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The Commission is convinced that the failure of Carlos C. Garcia, a bar tender, and Eulogio Palma Garcia, a person who has not even a residence of his own, to appear before the Commission, notwithstanding the mandatory statement issued them, which had been received in their behalf, to the effect that failure to appear on their part before the Commission as required would be sufficient for the Commission to consider their certificates of candidacy, as filed in bad faith, shows that they are not actually interested in the outcome of their pretended candidacy, and/or that they fear that their personal appearance before the Commission would not expose too clearly the true motives behind the filing of their certificates of candidacy. 

"As regards Ciriaco S. Garcia, a former chief of police, with no visible property to his name, . . . the Commission is likewise satisfied . . . that his certificate of candidacy was filed without the least idea of actively pursuing the same, but simply to prejudice a legitimate and bona fide candidate, President Carlos P. Garcia. 

"Each of said three certificates of candidacy is a well fitted piece in an overall conspired scheme to fairly prejudice the candidacy of President Carlos P. Garcia. Even the circumstances of geography and of course of names have been suitably played upon to achieve in the most of active way the desired objective of destroying legitimate votes for the bona fide candidate. Ciriaco S. Garcia hails from Central Luzon; Carlos C. Garcia is from Central Visayas; and Eulogio Palma Garcia is from Northern Mindanao. The names used are such that all votes for ‘Carlos Garcia’, ‘C. Garcia’, ‘P. Garcia’, and ‘Garcia’ would be declared stray. The mischief aimed to be realized by the plan is too plain to be missed by any impartial mind. . . . . 

"The Commission, . . . is clear in the conclusion that all said three certificates of candidacy have been filed not for the purpose of winning the election or even to obtain a substantial number of votes for the presidency of the Philippines but for the purpose of prejudicing the candidacy of a candidate in good faith by nullifying the votes cast for the same name and/or surname of said candidate in good faith. 

. . . 

"We reiterate here what the Commission has already said in the similar case of Re-Certificate of Candidacy of Eduardo A. Barreto. (Case No. 179):chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

‘The duty of the Commission under these circumstances is too plain to be mistaken. The law could not have intended nor will the Commission allow itself to be made a party to fraud against the integrity and purity of election. Election is not a game of mean political tricks where deceit wins a premium. It is an honest process, governed by fair rules of law and good conduct. In election as well as in any other field of fair contest, deceit cannot be allowed to clothe itself in legal technicalities end demand a prize. It must be condemned and never tolerated." ‘ (Emphasis ours.) 

In other words, the candidates in question did not really aspire to be elected President of the Philippines. Their certificates of candidacy were filed merely for the purpose of nullifying, in effect, all votes cast in favor of "Garcia", "C. Garcia", and "P. Garcia", even if the voters intended to vote for Carlos P. Garcia, the incumbent of said office. The objective was, evidently, to prevent a faithful determination of the true will of the electorate. Had the certificates of candidacy in question been given due course, maintained, whether

or not such tax, penalty, or sum has been paid election inspectors, who would be at a loss as to whom to credit the votes cast for "Carlos Garcia", "C. Garcia", "P. Garcia", and "Garcia" or whether said votes should not be counted, as stray votes. Thus, an opportunity would be created to subject the election officers throughout the Philippines to complaints, either by the opponents of the incumbent President, if the votes were credited to him, or by the Nacionalista Party, if the votes were counted in favor of either Ciriaco S. Garcia, or Carlos C. Garcia, or Eulogio Palma Garcia, or considered as stray votes. What is more, this could have led to, or given an excuse for, public disorders which may not have been altogether unlikely, in the light of the conditions then existing. Worse, still, there would have been no means, under the law, to ascertain whether the aforementioned votes were intended for the incumbent President Carlos P. Garcia, or for the petitioners in said case. The action of the Commission therein tended, therefore, to insure free, orderly and honest elections, which is its main concern, under our fundamental law and the Revised Election Code. Such, however, is not the situation obtaining in the case at bar. 

Whether or not the Commission on Elections should incur the expenses incident to the preparation and distribution of copies of the certificates of candidacy of those who, in its opinion, do not have a chance to get a substantial number of votes, is another question of policy for Congress, not the Commission, to settle. When the Revised Election Code imposes upon the Commission the ministerial duty to receive those certificates and provides that said Commission shall immediately prepare and distribute copies thereof to the offices mentioned in section 36 of said Code, it necessarily implies that compliance with the latter provision is, likewise, ministerial. If the Commission believes, however, that the effect thereof is to unnecessarily impose a useless burden upon the Government, then the remedy is to call the attention of Congress thereto, coupled with the corresponding proposals, recommendations, or suggestions for such amendments as may be deemed best, consistently with the democratic nature of our political system. 

Needless to say, the vigilant attitude of the Commission on Elections and the efforts exerted by the same to comply with what it considers its duty, merit full and unqualified recognition, as well as commendation of the highest order. In this particular case, however, the action of the Commission as regards petitioner’s certificate of candidacy is beyond the bounds of its jurisdiction, and, hence, void. 

Wherefore, the aforementioned resolution of the Commission on Elections is hereby annulled, insofar as petitioner Alfredo Abcede is concerned, and the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued made permanent, without special pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered. 

Paras, C.J. Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J. B. L., Endencia and Felix, JJ., concur. 

24. CIPRIANO VS COMELEC

ELLAN MARIE P. CIPRIANO, a minor represented by her father ROLANDO CIPRIANO, (AND OTHER YOUTH OF THE LAND AFFECTED AND SIMILARLY SITUATED), petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, Election Officer LOPE GAYO, JR., 1st District, Pasay City, SANGGUNIANG BARANGAY thru its Chairman JOHNNY SANTIAGO of Barangay 38, Pasay City, GREG PAOLO ALCERA in his capacity as SK Federation President of Pasay City, EDNA TIBAR – a minor assisted by parents, KRISTAL GALE BONGGO – a minor assisted by parents, SK Chairman RUEL TAYAM DECENA of Barangay 142, Pasay City, THE PRESIDENT OF THE PAMBANSANG KATIPUNAN NG MGA SANGGUNIANG ABATAAN, and ALL SK OFFICERS AND YOUTH OF THE LAND SIMILARLY SITUATED and THEIR AGENTS AND REPRESENTATIVES,respondents.

D E C I S I O NPUNO, J.:

May the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), on its own, in the exercise of its power to enforce and administer election laws, look into the qualifications of a candidate and cancel his certificate of candidacy on the ground that he lacks the qualifications prescribed by law?  This is the issue that needs to be resolved in this petition for certiorari filed by Ellan Marie P. Cipriano, the duly elected SK Chairman of Barangay 38, Pasay City, whose certificate of candidacy was cancelled by the COMELEC motu proprio on the ground that she was not a registered voter in the barangay where she intended to run.

On June 7, 2002, petitioner filed with the COMELEC her certificate of candidacy as Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) for the SK elections held on July 15, 2002.[1]

On the date of the elections, July 15, 2002, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 5363 adopting the recommendation of the Commission’s Law Department to deny due course to or cancel the certificates of candidacy of several candidates for the SK elections, including petitioners. The ruling was based on the findings of the Law Department that petitioner and all the other candidates affected by said resolution were not registered voters in the barangay where they intended to run.[2]

Petitioner, nonetheless, was allowed to vote in the July 15 SK elections and her name was not deleted from the official list of candidates.  After the canvassing of votes, petitioner was proclaimed by

the Barangay Board of Canvassers the duly elected SK Chairman of Barangay 38, Pasay City. [3] She took her oath of office on August 14, 2002.[4]

On August 19, 2002, petitioner, after learning of Resolution No. 5363, filed with the COMELEC a motion for reconsideration of said resolution.  She argued that a certificate of candidacy may only be denied due course or cancelled via an appropriate petition filed by any registered candidate for the same position under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to Sections 5 and 7 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6646.  According to petitioner, the report of the Election Officer of Pasay City cannot be considered a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, and the COMELEC cannot, by itself, deny due course to or cancel one’s certificate of candidacy.  Petitioner also claimed that she was denied due process when her certificate of candidacy was cancelled by the Commission without notice and hearing.  Petitioner further argued that the COMELEC en banc did not have jurisdiction to act on the cancellation of her certificate of candidacy on the first instance because it is the Division of the Commission that has authority to decide election-related cases, including pre-proclamation controversies.  Finally, she contended that she may only be removed by a petition for quo warranto after her proclamation as duly-elected SK Chairman.[5]

On October 7, 2002, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 5781, [6] resolving petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.  It cited its previous resolution, Resolution No. 5584, in relation to Resolution No. 4801.  The Commission stated in Resolution No. 5584 its policy on proclaimed candidates found to be ineligible for not being registered voters in the place where they were elected.  It explained:A portion of Resolution No. 5584 explained the procedure adopted by the Commission in denying due course the certificate of candidacy of a candidate.  It reads:

Under COMELEC Resolution No. 4801, Election Officers were given the duty to:  (1) verify whether all candidates for barangay and sangguniang kabataan positions are registered voters of the barangaywhere they filed their certificates of candidacy; and (2) examine the entries of the certificates of candidacy and determine on the basis of said entries whether the candidate concerned possesses all the qualifications of a candidate.

Further, Election Officers are mandated to report by registered mail and by rush telegram to the Law Department of this Commission the names of candidates who are not registered voters in the place where they seek to run for public office within three (3) days from the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy.  The names of these candidates, however, shall still be included in the certified lists of candidates until the Commission directs otherwise.

By virtue of the said report, the Law Department makes a recommendation to the Commission En Banc, and the latter, by virtue of an En Banc Resolution either gives due course to or denies/cancels the certificates of candidacy of the said candidates.

Verily, the administrative inquiry of the Commission on the eligibility of candidates starts from the time they filed their certificates of candidacy.  The candidates, by virtue of the publication of COMELEC Resolution No. 4801 on May 25, 2002 in the Manila Standard and Manila Bulletin are deemed to have constructive notice of the said administrative inquiry.  Thus, the Commission, by virtue of its administrative powers, may motu proprio deny/cancel the certificates of candidacy of candidates who are found to be not registered voters in the place where they seek to run for public office.

Any registered candidate for the same office may also file a verified petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy pursuant to Section 69 (nuisance candidate) or Sec. 78 (material misrepresentation in the certificate of candidacy) of the Omnibus Election Code either personally or through a duly authorized representative within five (5) days from the last day for filing of certificate of candidacy directly with the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor or with the Office of the Election Officer concerned.

Hence, as long as the Election Officer reported the alleged ineligibility in accordance with COMELEC Resolution No. 4801, or the petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy was filed within the reglementary period, the fact that the Resolution of this Commission, denying due course to or canceling the certificate of candidacy of an ineligible candidate, was not promulgated or did not arrive prior to or on the day of the elections is therefore of no moment.  The proclamation of an ineligible candidate is not a bar to the exercise of this Commission’s power to implement the said Resolution of the Commission En Banc because it already acquired the jurisdiction to determine the ineligibility of the candidates who filed their certificates of candidacy even before elections by virtue of either the report of the Election Officer or the petition to deny due course to or cancel the certificate of candidacy filed against them.

On the matter of petitions for disqualification, the provisions of COMELEC Resolution No. 4801 are likewise clear:  (1) ‘A verified petition to disqualify a candidate on the ground of ineligibility or under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code may be filed at anytime before proclamation of the winning candidate by any registered voter or any candidate for the same office,’ (2) ‘All disqualification cases filed on the ground of ineligibility shall survive, although the candidate has already been proclaimed.’

Clearly, by virtue of the above-quoted provisions, the proclamation of a candidate who is found to be disqualified is also not a bar to the Commission’s power to order a proclaimed candidate to cease and desist from taking his oath of office or from assuming the position to which he was elected.

By way of contrast, in case of proclaimed candidates who were found to be ineligible only after they were elected and proclaimed, the provisions of Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code are clear:  The remedy of losing candidates is to file a petition for quo warranto before the metropolitan or municipal trial court.  This is logical – The Commission did not acquire jurisdiction over these proclaimed candidates prior to election (i.e., There was no report from the Election Officer regarding their ineligibility and no petition to deny due course to or cancel certificate of candidacy and/or petition for disqualification was filed against them.)  Thus, the Commission has no jurisdiction to annul their proclamation on the ground of ineligibility, except in cases wherein the proclamation is null and void for being based on incomplete canvass.

Thus, the Commission ruled:

Premises considered, the Commission, RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to establish a policy as follows:

ON PROCLAIMED CANDIDATES FOUND TO BE INELIGIBLE FOR BEING NOT REGISTERED VOTERS IN THE PLACE WHERE THEY WERE ELECTED.

(a)     For a proclaimed candidate whose certificate of candidacy was denied due course to or cancelled by virtue of a Resolution of the Commission En Banc albeit such Resolution did not arrive on time.

1.       To DIRECT the Election Officers concerned to implement the resolution of the Commission deleting the name of the candidate whose certificate of candidacy was denied due course;

2.       To DIRECT the candidate whose name was ordered deleted to cease and desist from taking his oath of office or from assuming the position to which he was elected, unless a temporary restraining order was issued by the Supreme Court;  and

3.       To RECONVENE the Board of Canvassers for the purpose of proclaiming the duly-elected candidates and correcting the Certificate of Canvass of Proclamation.[7]

The Commission further stated:Considering that there are queries as to the status of the proclamation of disqualified candidates as an offshoot of Resolution No. 5584, the same was amended by virtue of Resolution No. 5666, the dispositive portion of which now reads:

Considering the above-quoted provision, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to APPROVE the recommendation of Commissioner Sadain to amend Resolution No. 5584 promulgated on 10 August 2002 with modification.

Accordingly, Resolution No. 5584 shall now read as follows:

ION PROCLAIMED CANDIDATES FOUND TO BE INELIGIBLE FOR BEING NOT REGISTERED VOTERS IN THE PLACE WHERE THEY WERE ELECTED XXX  XXX

(a)   xxx(b)   xxx(c)   xxx

(d)   For both (a) and (b), in the event that the disqualified candidate is proclaimed the winner despite his disqualification or despite the pending disqualification case filed before his proclamation, but which is subsequently resolved against him, the proclamation of said disqualified candidate is hereby declared void from the beginning, even if the dispositive portion of the resolution disqualifying him or canceling his certificate of candidacy does not provide for such an annulment.[8]

Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition seeking:a)   To declare illegal and unconstitutional the COMELEC Resolution No. 5363 promulgated on 15 July

2002 and COMELEC Resolution No. 5781 promulgated on October 7, 2002 and any other COMELEC actions and resolutions which are intended to summarily oust and remove petitioner as SK Chairman of Barangay 38, Pasay City without any notice, inquiry, election protest, petition forquo warranto, investigation and hearing, and therefore a clear violation of due process of law.

b)   To declare illegal the aforesaid COMELEC Resolutions sitting en banc which does not have authority to decide election related case, including pre-proclamation controversies, in the first

instance, in consonance to this Honorable Court’s ruling in the cases of Sarmiento vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 87308, August 29, 1989 and Garvida vs. Sales, G.R. No. 124893, April 18, 1997.

c)   To declare unconstitutional Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. 9164 and also to declare the age of membership and its officers of the KK or SK organization from 15 to 21 years old in accordance with Sec. 39 (f) and Sec. 423 (b) and other provisions of R.A. 7160 otherwise known as Local Government Code of 1991.

d)   If Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. 9164 are sustained as constitutional to direct all SK Officers and Members who are now more than 18 years old to cease and desist from continuously functioning as such SK Officers and Members and to vacate their respective SK Officers position, as they are no longer members of the Sangguniang Kabataan organization or Katipunan ng Kabataan organization for being over age upon attaining the age of 18 years old.

e)   To direct respondents to pay the salary, allowance and other benefits of the petitioner as SK Chairperson of Barangay 38, Pasay City.[9]

Stripped of the non-essentials, the only issue in this case is the validity of Resolution No. 5363 of the COMELEC.

Petitioner argues that she was deprived of due process when the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 5363 canceling her certificate of candidacy.  She claims that the resolution was intended to oust her from her position as SK Chairman without any appropriate action and proceedings.

The COMELEC, on the other hand, defends its resolution by invoking its administrative power to enforce and administer election laws.  Thus, in the exercise of such power, it maymotu proprio deny or cancel the certificates of candidacy of candidates who are found to be unqualified for the position they are seeking.  The Commission further contends that the publication of COMELEC Resolution No. 4801 governing the conduct of the Barangay and SK elections in two newspapers of general circulation is sufficient notice to the candidates regarding the Commission’s administrative inquiry into their certificates of candidacy.

The petition is impressed with merit.The COMELEC is an institution created by the Constitution to govern the conduct of elections and to

ensure that the electoral process is clean, honest, orderly, and peaceful. It is mandated to “enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall.”[10] As an independent Constitutional Commission, it is clothed with the three powers of government - executive or administrative, legislative, and quasi-judicial powers.  The administrative powers of the COMELEC, for example, include the power to determine the number and location of polling places, appoint election officials and inspectors, conduct registration of voters, deputize law enforcement agencies and government instrumentalities to ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections; register political parties, organization or coalitions, accredit citizens’ arms of the Commission, prosecute election offenses, and recommend to the President the removal or imposition of any other disciplinary action upon any officer or employee it has deputized for violation or disregard of its directive, order or decision.  It also has direct control and supervision over all personnel involved in the conduct of election.[11] Its legislative authority is found in its power to promulgate rules and regulations implementing the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code or other laws which the Commission is required to enforce and administer.[12] The Constitution has also vested it with quasi-judicial powers when it was granted exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial and city officials; and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.[13]

Aside from the powers vested by the Constitution, the Commission also exercises other powers expressly provided in the Omnibus Election Code, one of which is the authority to deny due course to or to cancel a certificate of candidacy.  The exercise of such authority, however, must be in accordance with the conditions set by law.

The COMELEC asserts that it is authorized to motu proprio deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy based on its broad administrative power to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of elections. 

We disagree.  The Commission may not, by itself, without the proper proceedings, deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy filed in due form.  When a candidate files his certificate of candidacy, the COMELEC has a ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge its receipt.  This is provided in Sec. 76 of the Omnibus Election Code, thus:Sec. 76.  Ministerial duty of receiving and acknowledging receipt. - The Commission, provincial election supervisor, election registrar or officer designated by the Commission or the board of election inspectors under the succeeding section shall have the ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge receipt of the certificate of candidacy.

The Court has ruled that the Commission has no discretion to give or not to give due course to petitioner’s certificate of candidacy.[14] The duty of the COMELEC to give due course to certificates of candidacy filed in due form is ministerial in character.  While the Commission may look into patent defects in the certificates,

it may not go into matters not appearing on their face.  The question of eligibility or ineligibility of a candidate is thus beyond the usual and proper cognizance of said body.[15]

Nonetheless, Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code allows any person to file before the COMELEC a petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy on the ground that any material representation therein is false.  It states:Sec. 78.  Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. - A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false.  The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.

Under Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the petition shall be heard summarily after due notice.It is therefore clear that the law mandates that the candidate must be notified of the petition against

him and he should be given the opportunity to present evidence in his behalf.  This is the essence of due process.  Due process demands prior notice and hearing.  Then after the hearing, it is also necessary that the tribunal shows substantial evidence to support its ruling.  In other words, due process requires that a party be given an opportunity to adduce his evidence to support his side of the case and that the evidence should be considered in the adjudication of the case.[16] In a petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy, since the proceedings are required to be summary, the parties may, after due notice, be required to submit their position papers together with affidavits, counter-affidavits, and other documentary evidence in lieu of oral testimony.  When there is a need for clarification of certain matters, at the discretion of the Commission en banc or Division, the parties may be allowed to cross-examine the affiants.[17]

Contrary to the submission of the COMELEC, the denial of due course or cancellation of one’s certificate of candidacy is not within the administrative powers of the Commission, but rather calls for the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions.  Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental organs. [18] We have earlier enumerated the scope of the Commission’s administrative functions. On the other hand, where a power rests in judgment or discretion, so that it is of judicial nature or character, but does not involve the exercise of functions of a judge, or is conferred upon an officer other than a judicial officer, it is deemed quasi-judicial.[19]

The determination whether a material representation in the certificate of candidacy is false or not, or the determination whether a candidate is eligible for the position he is seeking involves a determination of fact where both parties must be allowed to adduce evidence in support of their contentions.  Because the resolution of such fact may result to a deprivation of one’s right to run for public office, or, as in this case, one’s right to hold public office, it is only proper and fair that the candidate concerned be notified of the proceedings against him and that he be given the opportunity to refute the allegations against him.   It should be stressed that it is not sufficient, as the COMELEC claims, that the candidate be notified of the Commission’s inquiry into the veracity of the contents of his certificate of candidacy, but he must also be allowed to present his own evidence to prove that he possesses the qualifications for the office he seeks.

In view of the foregoing discussion, we rule that Resolution No. 5363 and Resolution No. 5781, canceling petitioner’s certificate of candidacy without proper proceedings, are tainted with grave abuse of discretion and therefore void.

We need not rule on the question raised by petitioner as regards the constitutionality of Sections 6 and 7 of Republic Act No. 9164 lowering the age of membership in the SK as it is not the lis mota of this case.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, COMELEC Resolution No. 5363 promulgated on July 15, 2002 and COMELEC Resolution No. 5781 issued on October 7, 2002 are hereby SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.Davide, Jr., C.J., Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-

Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., on leave.

25. GARCIA vs. COMELEC

FRANCISCO, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 seeking to nullify the Resolution of the COMELEC en banc dated June 30, 1995[1] in SPA No. 95-034 entitled "Isidro B. Garcia vs. Augusto M. Garcia," for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.  The assailed resolution reversed the previous Resolution of the Second Division of the COMELEC promulgated on May 4, 1995,[2] wherein respondent Augusto M. Garcia was declared a nuisance candidate resulting in the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy for the mayoralty seat of Tagig.

During the May 8, 1995 local elections, petitioner Isidro B. Garcia and respondent Augusto M. Garcia were both candidates for mayor in Tagig, Metro Manila.  Claiming that respondent filed his certificate of candidacy for no other legitimate purpose but to cause confusion and disarray among the voters of Tagig considering the similarity in their surname, petitioner filed a petition with the COMELEC for the declaration of respondent as a nuisance candidate pursuant to Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code.

In its Resolution dated May 4, 1995, the COMELEC (Second Division) granted the petition and declared respondent as a nuisance candidate.  The COMELEC based its ruling on the following: 1) dubious veracity of respondent's certificate of nomination by the PDP-LABAN; 2) failure of respondent to actively campaign; and 3) the absence of any campaign materials.

On May 10, 1995, two days after the election, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration [3] with the COMELEC seeking the reversal of the aforementioned resolution.  In the meanwhile, the canvassing of the election returns proceeded which eventually resulted in the proclamation of petitioner on May 23, 1995 as the winning candidate.  However, another losing candidate, Ricardo Papa filed a petition for annulment of the proclamation, and an election protest as well, with the COMELEC and the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, respectively, against petitioner.

On June 30, 1995, the COMELEC en banc promulgated the assailed resolution, granting private respondent's motion for reconsideration and reversing the previous resolution declaring him a nuisance candidate, despite admitting that the motion has been rendered moot and academic as a result of petitioner's proclamation on May 23, 1995 as winning candidate.

The COMELEC discarded petitioner's claim that respondent lacked the logistical means and machinery to pursue a serious political campaign due to the absence of propaganda materials, and ruled that such assumption has no bearing on the qualification of respondent to seek public office.

Petitioner is now before us seeking to nullify and set aside the resolution of the COMELEC en banc.

It is argued that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it granted respondent's motion for reconsideration despite having been rendered moot and academic by the proclamation of petitioner as duly elected mayor of Tagig.  Petitioner bewails the fact that the motion was granted with the end in view of benefiting the pending electoral protest filed by losing candidate Ricardo Papa who, according to petitioner, was the one who instigated and conspired with respondent to run for mayor to confuse the voters and undermine petitioner's chances of winning.

Private respondent however denies the abovementioned imputation and contends that his only purpose in filing a motion for reconsideration from the resolution declaring him a nuisance candidate was solely to reacquire his legal status as a legitimate and qualified candidate for public office.

Well entrenched is the rule that where the issues have become moot and academic, there is no justiciable controversy, thereby rendering the resolution of the same of no practical use or value.[4]

Surprisingly, despite respondent COMELEC's admission that private respondent's motion for reconsideration has already been rendered moot and academic due to petitioner's proclamation as duly elected mayor of Tagig in the May 8, 1995 elections, it nevertheless resolved to grant the motion.

Obviously, the assailed resolution would no longer be of any practical use or value to private respondent considering that he did not even dispute the proclamation of petitioner as the winning candidate.  In fact, even private respondent's sole purpose in filing his motion for reconsideration — to regain his legal status as a legitimate and qualified candidate for public office — has been rendered inconsequential as a result of petitioner's proclamation.

Petitioner was proclaimed mayor of Tagig as early as May 23, 1995, while the assailed resolution was promulgated by respondent COMELEC on June 30, 1995.  Undoubtedly, there was more that ample opportunity for the COMELEC to be apprised of supervening events that rendered private respondent's motion moot and academic, which in turn should have guided it to properly deny the motion.   But having failed to do so, respondent COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting the motion.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby GRANTED.  The resolution of the COMELEC dated June 30, 1995 in SPA No. 95-034 is hereby SET ASIDE and a new one entered denying private respondent's motion for reconsideration for being moot and academic.

SO ORDERED.

26. GARVIDA VS SALES

271 SCRA 767 – Law on Public Officers – Ineligibility – SK Chairman – “Labo Doctrine” Applied

In 1996, Lynette Garvida filed her candidacy to the position of Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) of a barangay in Bangui, Ilocos Norte. Her candidacy was opposed by her rival Florencio Sales, Jr. on the ground that she is over 21 years old (21 years old, 9 months at the time of the filing). Nevertheless, the trial court ordered that she be admitted as a candidate and the SK elections went on. Sales, in the

meantiume, filed a petition to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Garvida. When the elections results came in, Garvida won with a vote of 78, while Sales got 76. Garvida was eventually proclaimed as winner but had to face the petition filed by Sales.

Garvida, in her defense, averred that Section 424 of the  Local Government Code (LGC) provides that candidates for the SK must be at least 15 years of age and a maximum age of 21 years. Garvida states that the LGC does not specify that the maximum age requirement is exactly 21 years hence said provision must be construed as 21 years and a fraction of a year but still less than 22 years – so long as she does not exceed 22 she is still eligible because she is still, technically, 21 years of age (although she exceeds it by 9 months).

ISSUE: Whether or not Garvida met the age requirement.

HELD:  No. Section 424 of the Local Government Code provides that candidates for SK must be:1. Filipino citizen;2. an actual resident of the barangay for at least six months;3. 15 but not more than 21 years of age; and4. duly registered in the list of the Sangguniang Kabataan or in the official barangay list.The provision is clear. Must not be more than 21 years of age. The said phrase is not equivalent to “less than 22 years old.” The law does not state that the candidate be less than 22 years on election day. If such was the intention of Congress in framing the LGC, then they should have expressly provided such.Sales claims that he obtained the second highest number of vote, hence he should be declared as the SK Chairman, is this a valid contention?No. Applying the ruling in Labo vs COMELEC, a defeated candidate, though obtaining the second highest number of vote, is not deemed to have been elected by reason of the winner’s eventual disqualification/ineligibility. He cannot be declared as successor simply because he did not get the majority or the plurality of votes – the electorate did not choose him. It would have been different if Sales was able to prove that the voters still voted for Garvida despite knowing her ineligibility, this would have rendered her votes “stray”.Under Section 435 of the LGC, the SK Chairman should be succeeded by the SK member who obtained the highest number of votes, should the SK member obtaining such vote  succeed Garvida?**(**Not to be confused with Sales’ situation – Sales was a candidate for SK chairmanship not SK membership.)The above argument can’t be considered in this case because Section 435 only applies when the SK Chairman “refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, is convicted of a felony, voluntarily resigns, dies, is permanently incapacitated, is removed from office, or has been absent without leave for more than three (3) consecutive months.” Garvida’s case is not what Section 435 contemplates. Her removal from office by reason of her age is a  question of eligibility. Being “eligible” means being “legally qualified; capable of being legally chosen.” Ineligibility, on the other hand, refers to the lack of the qualifications prescribed in the Constitution or the statutes for holding public office. Ineligibility is not one of the grounds enumerated in Section 435 for succession of the SK Chairman.

27. Villaber v COMELEC GR No. 148326 11.15.01

F: Petitioner seeks to annul Comelec resolution disqualifying him as congressional candidate of Davao Del Sur and for the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy and denial of motion for reconsideration. Petitioner was disqualified upon the petition of his rival candidate for disqualification on grounds of his previous conviction in violation of BP 22 (bouncing check law) which constitutes moral turpitude, a ground for disqualification for electoral candidacy under the Omnibus Election Code.

I: WON a violation of BP 22 constitutes a disqualification for electoral candidacy.

R: A violation of BP 22 involves the following elements:1. Accused makes, draws, issues any check to apply to account or for value;2. Accused knows at the time of the issuance that there is no sufficient fund on the drawee bank for

the payment of the check in full upon its presentment.3. The check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank.

The presence of the 2nd element represents moral turpitude as stated in the ruling of People v Atty. Fe Tuanda where conviction for violation of BP 22 involves deceit and affects the good moral character of a person.

28. LOONG vs. COMELECFacts: On 15 January 1990, petitioner filed with respondent Commission his certificate of candidacy for the position of Vice-Governor of the Mindanao Autonomous Region in the election held on 17 February 1990. On 5 March 1990 (or 16 days after the election), respondent Ututalum filed before the respondent Commission a petition seeking to disqualify petitioner for the office of Regional Vice-Governor, on the ground that the latter made a false representation in his certificate of candidacy as to his age. 

Petitioner Loong sought the dismissal of the petition on the ground that the respondent COMELEC has no jurisdiction. The motion to dismiss was denied by the COMELEC in a resolution which is the subject of this petition. 

Petitioner Loong contends that SPA No. 90-006 (a petition to cancel the certificate of candidacy of petitioner Loong) was filed out of time because it was filed beyond the 25-day period prescribed by Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. 

Issue: Whether or not SPA No. 90-006 was filed within the period prescribed by law. 

Held: No. The petition filed by private respondent Ututalum with the respondent COMELEC to disqualify petitioner Loong on the ground that the latter made a false representation in his certificate of candidacy as to his age, clearly does not fall under the grounds of disqualification as provided for in Rule 25 but is expressly covered by Rule 23 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure governing petitions to cancel certificate of candidacy. Moreover, Section 3, Rule 25 which allows the filing of the petition at any time after the last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy but not later than the date of proclamation, is merely a procedural rule issued by respondent Commission which, although a constitutional body, has no legislative powers. Thus, it can not supersede Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code which is a legislative enactment.

29. Codilla vs ComelecG.R. No. 150605, December 10, 2002

Facts:

Petitioner Eufrocino M. Codilla, Sr. was mayor of Ormoc City, while respondent Ma. Victoria L. Locsin was the incumbent representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte. Both were candidates in the 14 May 2001 elections for the position of representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte.

A registered voter of Kananga, Leyte filed with COMELEC a petition for disqualification against petitioner alleging that petitioner used the equipments and vehicles owned by the city government of Ormoc to extract, haul, and distribute gravel and sand to the residents of Kananga and Matag-ob, Leyte for the purpose of inducing, influencing or corrupting them to vote for him.

The case was assigned to the COMELEC’s Second Division, which issued an order delegating the hearing and reception of evidence on the disqualification case to the Office of the Regional Director of Region VIII. The same division sent notice to the petitioner through telegram.

At the time of the elections, the Regional Election Director had yet to hear the case. Eventually, petitioner was included in the list of candidates and voted for; initial results showed that petitioner was the winning candidate.

Respondent filed a Most Urgent Motion to Suspend Proclamation of Respondent with the COMELEC Second Division. A copy was allegedly served on the petitioner by registered mail but no registry receipt was attached thereto. She also filed a second motion, a copy of which was sent to petitioner with the corresponding registry receipt; however, there’s no indication when petitioner received the motion.

The COMELEC Second Division issued an Ex-Parte Order directing the (a) Provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte to suspend the proclamation of the petitioner and (b) the Regional Election Director to speed up the reception of evidence and to forward immediately the complete records together with its recommendation to the office of the Clerk of the Commission. At this time, petitioner has yet to be summoned to answer the petition for disqualification.

Petitioner filed a Motion to Lift Order of Suspension alleging that (a) he did not receive a copy of the Motion to Suspend his Proclamation, hence he was denied of his right to rebut and refute the allegations against him; (b) he did not receive a copy of the summons on the petition for disqualification; and (c) he received the telegraph order of the COMELEC Second Division suspending his proclamation four days after it was sent to him. Said motion was not resolved; instead, the COMELEC Second Division promulgated its Resolution that found the petitioner guilty of indirect solicitation of votes and ordered his disqualification. The same order declared the votes cast in favor of the petitioner as stray votes and directed the immediate proclamation of the candidate who garnered the highest number of votes. As a result, respondent was declared as having the highest number of votes and she was proclaimed, took her oath of office, and assumed office as the duly elected representative of the 4th district of Leyte. A copy of the said Resolution was sent by fax to petitioner’s counsel.

The petitioner filed with the COMELEC en banc a Motion for Reconsideration and a petition for declaration of nullity of proclamation. Said motion was granted and the COMELEC en banc (a) reversed the resolution of the Second Division and (b) declared the proclamation of respondent null and void. Respondent did not appeal from this decision.

Eventually, petitioner was proclaimed the duly-elected representative of the 4th district of Leyte. Petitioner took his oath of office before the Executive Judge of the Ormoc Regional Trial Court. Petitioner wrote a letter-appeal to the House of Representatives through respondent De Venecia, but no action was taken by the latter. Hence, this petition.

Issues:

1. WON the proclamation of respondent Locsin is valid.2. WON the proclamation of respondent Locsin directed the COMELEC en banc of jurisdiction to

review its validity.3. WON it is the ministerial duty of the public respondents to recognize the petitioner as the legally

elected representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte.

Held:1. NO. First, the petitioner was denied due process during the entire proceedings leading to the proclamation of respondent Locsin. The essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard. When a party is deprived of that basic fairness, any decision by any tribunal in prejudice of his rights is void.

Second, the votes cast in favor of the petitioner cannot be considered “stray” and respondent cannot be validly proclaimed on that basis.

The order of disqualification is not yet final, hence the votes cast in favor of the petitioner cannot be considered “stray”. Considering the timely filing of a motion for reconsideration, the COMELEC Second Division gravely abused its discretion in ordering the immediate disqualification of the petitioner and ordering the exclusion of the votes cast in his favor.

Also, Respondent Lim, as a mere second placer, cannot be proclaimed. It is a settled doctrine that the candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes may not be proclaimed winner in case the winning candidate is disqualified. In every election, the people’s choice is the paramount consideration and their expressed will must at all times be given effect. When the majority speaks and elects into office a candidate by giving him the highest number of votes cast in the election for the office, no one can be declared elected in his place.

2. NO. The petitioner seasonably filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the order of the Second Division suspending his proclamation and disqualifying him; hence, the COMELEC en banc was not divested of its jurisdiction to review the validity of the said Order of the Second Division. The said order was yet enforceable as it has not attained finality; thus, it cannot be used as the basis for the assumption in office of the respondent as the duly elected Representative of the 4th

Legislative district of Leyte. For these reasons, the HRET cannot assume jurisdiction over the matter.

3. YES. If the Law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion or judgment. In the case, the administration of oath and the registration of the petitioner in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives is no longer a matter of discretion on the part of the public respondents because of the following reasons: the petitioner garnered the highest number of votes; the order of the COMELEC Second Division, which ordered the proclamation of Respondent Locsin was set aside by the COMELEC en banc which ordered the proclamation of the petitioner; said decision by the COMELEC en banc was not challenged by the respondent and has become final and executory.

30. Grego vs COMELEC [274 SCRA 481] (Municipal Government, Disqualification, Non-Retroactive effect)Facts: Sec 40 (b) of Republic Act 7160 (the Local Government Code) which took effect on January 1, 1992, disqualifies a person for any elective position on the ground that “had been removed from office as a result of an administrative case”.On October 31, 1981, Basco was removed from his position as Deputy Sheriff upon a finding of serious misconduct in an administrative complaint.

He ran as a candidate for Councilor, won and assumed office for three terms during the Elections of January 18, 1988; May 11, 1992 and May 8, 1995. As in the past, respondent’s right to office was contested.

On May 13, 1995, petitioner, seeks for the respondent’s disqualification, pursuant to the above provision, contending that as long as a candidate was once removed from office due to an administrative case, regardless of whether it took place during or prior to the effectivity of the Code, the disqualification applies.

Respondent contends that the petitioner is not entitled to said relief because Section 40 par. b of the LGC may not be validly applied to persons who were dismissed prior to its effectivity. To do so would make it ex post facto, bill of attainder, and retroactive legislation which impairs vested rights

Issue: WON Section 40 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160 applies retroactively to those removed from office before it took effect on January 1, 1992.

Held: No. It is a settled issue that Section 40 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160 does not have any retroactive effect. Laws operate only prospectively and not retroactively.A statute, despite the generality in its language, must not be so construed as to overreach acts, events or matters which transpired before its passage: “Lex prospicit, non respicit.” The law looks forward, not backward.