EDUCATION AND DEMOCRACY A Dissertation Presented to ... - TDL

EDUCATION AND DEMOCRACY

_______________

A Dissertation

Presented to

The Faculty of the Department

of Political Science

University of Houston

_______________

In Partial Fulfillment

Of the Requirements for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

_______________

By

Yeaji Kim

August, 2017


_________________________ Yeaji Kim

APPROVED:

_________________________ Eduardo Alemán, Ph.D. Committee Chair

_________________________

Pablo M. Pinto, Ph.D.

_________________________ Justin H. Kirkland, Ph.D.

_________________________ David Campbell, Ph.D.

University of Notre Dame _________________________ Antonio D. Tillis, Ph.D. Dean, College of Liberal Arts and Social Sciences Department of Hispanic Studies

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_______________

An Abstract of a Dissertation

Presented to

The Faculty of the Department

of Political Science

University of Houston

_______________

In Partial Fulfillment

Of the Requirements for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

_______________

By

Yeaji Kim

August, 2017

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation assesses how education affects democratic consolidation at the

individual and aggregate levels. First, this dissertation argues that education fosters

democratic consolidation at the macro level by decreasing the risk of authoritarian

reversal in transitional and consolidated democracies. The first empirical chapter

examines the association between education and democratic consolidation using Svolik’s

(2015) change-point models of democratic consolidation. By analyzing 121 countries

from the year 1789 to 2008. I find that education significantly decreases the risk of

authoritarian reversal in transitional democracies, and this democratizing effect of

education is more significant in low-income countries than in high-income countries.

Second, this research posits that education plays a role in fostering critical thinking,

exposing individuals to different political opinions, and strengthening self-esteem at the

individual level. Using Mexican public opinion data of 2008, I find that educational

attainment fosters individuals’ pro-democracy values, including: support for democracy

itself; tolerance of unfamiliar religions, different social classes, and foreigners; and

membership in social organizations. Overall, the democratizing effect of education is

universal, regardless of subnational regime type. Third, as individuals are more educated,

they are more likely to vote. The third chapter examines education’s role on democratic

consolidation by investigating voter turnout in the United States. I explore whether voter

turnout in U.S. has declined since 1960, whether generational effects decrease voter

turnout, and whether the effect of education on voter turnout has changed since 1960. I

demonstrate that voter turnout has been relatively static from 1960 to 2012, contrary to

conventional belief. Using public opinion data from 1972 to 2014, I find that generational

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effects on voter turnout show mixed results, and that the positive effect of education on

voter participation diminishes over time. In other words, I attribute the relatively static

voter turnout to the diminishing effects of education in the United States.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This accomplishment would not have been possible without the lifelong love,

encouragement, and sacrifice of my parents, Sunyoung Ahn and Kipung Kim. I could

never have done anything without my mom who is the wisest woman. Her love and

advice make me strong, enthusiastic, and positive, which enabled me to get through this

long journey. My dad has emphasized that I should not study for myself, but for other

people and our society. His lesson has become my goal as a scholar and teacher. I owe a

great deal of gratitude to my dearly beloved sister, Yerim Kim, who always stands by me

no matter what. Throughout my doctoral career, if I did not have two friends, Eric

DeBruin and Paula Pineda, I could not have survived. They have become my family and

best friends who have believed in me and have always been next to me even when my

apartment got robbed. They have shared all the hardships and joys of this journey with

me.

My work would not have been complete without the invaluable patience, encouragement,

and support of my committee members: Dr. Eduardo Alemán, committee chair; Dr. Pablo

Pinto; Dr. Justin Kirkland; Dr. David Campbell. I would like to be an outstanding

researcher and warm mentor as they have been for me; they have read my dissertation,

provided extensive comments, edited my writings, and listened to my concerns. I have a

profound appreciation for the quality of training and instruction my committee has

afforded me.

My school journey would not have been complete without the inestimable input of many

colleagues. In particular, Dr. Susan Scarrow, Dr. Jeffrey Church, Dr. Jim Granato, Dr.

Jonathan Slapin, Dr. Ryan Kennedy, Dr. Scott Basinger, Dr. Jennifer Clark, Dr. Ling

Zhu, Dr. Jeronimo Cortina, Dr. Kent Tedin, Dr. Elizabeth Simas, Dr. Brandon

Rottinghaus, Dr. Robert Lineberry, Dr. Justin Esarey, Dr. Melissa Marschall, and Dr.

Sunny Wong provided shrewd advice on many occasions. I am very thankful to Dr.

Carlos Gervasoni for sharing his valuable data, Subnational Democracy Index, with me.

I am also very grateful to my graduate colleagues for their genuine friendship. My

colleagues have always empathized, encouraged, and helped me inside and outside of the

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campus: Dr. Rodrigo Nunez-Donoso, Dr. Lucas Williams, Markie McBrayer, Dr.

Zachary Turpin, Leonardo Antenangeli, Matthew Ward, Jonathan Solis, Scott Hofer, Dr.

Abdullah Aydogan, Dr. Alper Bulut, Freke Ette, Emília Carvalho, Dr. Chinghsing Wang,

Dr. Vesa J. Koskimaa, Cong Huang, Dr. Luai Allarakia, Dr. Andrea Eckelman, Roger

Abshire, Marcia Bumgardner, Savannah Sipole, Kenicia Wright, Susan Achury, Kim

Manh, Saadet Konak, Sophia Das, Indrajit Ray, Dr. Laila Sorurbakhsh, Dr. Margarita

Ramirez, Cassandra Khatri, Philip Waggoner, and Jorge Saldaña.

I am deeply indebted to my friends who have loved and supported me across the world. I

express many thanks to Susan DeBruin, Mike DeBruin, Monica Pineda, Dr. Enrique

Pineda, Metin Ilbasmis, Elif Karaduman, Engin Karaduman, Isabel Chen, Nick Kerensky,

Paul Holroyd, Dr. Valentyna Katsalap, Dr. Ksenia Kay, Jihyung Lee, Sukhee Han,

Seungmin Kuk, Wonsoon Choi, Yeongu Ryu, Jinhwi Jeon, Midor Song, Jihyun Park,

Taeyi Kim, Kain Ryu, Taehyun Kim, Nahee Lee, Jinbong Jang, Jiye Kim, Minhee Kim,

Jeehyun Rhee, Jisu Kim, Hyein Park, Narae Jung, Saeyong Jang, Emma Lee, Chohee

Kim, Dr. Dahye Lee, Dr. Junmo Ahn, Dr. Carolina Tchintian, Berk Gulen, Jaehoo Park,

Dr. Liz Blomstedt and Dr. Cathy Wu.

Finally, I want to acknowledge two more names. One is Dr. Jinpyo Yoon, who as my

undergraduate advisor at Sungshin Women’s University, first introduced me to

Comparative Politics and Area Studies. He provided me insightful guidance and warm

encouragement, which inspired me to pursue my academic passion during my school

journey. Another is Dr. Soo Jin Kim, who as my advisor at Ewha Womans University

prepared me not only for graduate school, but also for aiming to be a real intellectual in

academic and personal life. He has willingly and exemplarily embraced the role of

mentor. Studying with him at Ewha became the source of my energy to finish the PhD

program. In many ways, the type of teacher and scholar I aspire to be is the direct result

of Dr. Jinpyo Yoon and Dr. Soo Jin Kim’s influence.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES……………………………………..…………..………………........ix

LIST OF FIGURES…………………………………..……………..……………….….xi

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION…………………………………..…………………...1

CHAPTER 2: EDUCATION AND DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION……..……9

Literature Review…………….……………………………………………………………………10

Education in Transitional Democracies…………………………………………………………...14

Analysis of Education and Democratic Consolidation……………………………………………15

Results………………………………………….…………………………………………...………18

Conclusion………………………………………….……………………………………………..25

CHAPTER 3: EDUCATION AND DEMOCRATIC VALUES IN MEXICO……...27

Related Literature………………………………………….………………………………...……...28

Testable Hypotheses………………………………………….…………………………………...29

An Empirical Test of the Case of Mexico……………………….…………………………..……..31

Results………………………………………….………………………………………………..…34

Conclusion………………………………………….……………………………………………..46

CHAPTER 4: EDUCATION AND VOTER TURNOUT IN THE UNITED STATES,

1972-2014…….…….…….…….…….…….…….…….…….…….…….…….………...48

Explaining Voter Turnout……………………………………….………………………………...49

Reassessing Variation in Voter Turnout.…………………………………….……………………51

Testing Explanations of Voter Turnout.…………………………………….……………………...55

Results……………………………………….…………………………………………...…….……56

Discussion……………………………………….………………………………………………...61

Conclusion……………………………………….………………………………………………..64

CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION…….…….…….…….…….…….…….…….……........66

APPENDIX…….…….…….…….…….…….…….…….…….……………………......70

REFERENCES…….…….…….…….…….…….…….…….………………………….85

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LIST OF TABLES

Table Page

1 Results for a Change-Point Democratic Consolidation Models……………………..19

2 Results for a Change-Point Democratic Consolidation Models with International

Covariates………………………..……………...………..……………………….....23

3 Multilevel Logistic Regression Models on Supporting democracy………………….35

4 Multilevel Logistic Regression Models on Tolerance: Religion…………………….37

5 Multilevel Logistic Regression Models on Tolerance: Social Class…………..…….39

6 Multilevel Logistic Regression Models on Tolerance: Foreigner…………………..41

7 Multilevel Logistic Regression Models on Membership in Organizations………….44

8 The Effect of Education on Voter Turnout (Logistic Regression results)……...……58


Covariates and Interaction Terms………………………………………...……….....71


Covariates and Interaction Terms in Non-OECD Countries………...…………........73

11 Descriptive Statistics.……………………………………………………...................75

12 Descriptive Statistics……………………………………………………....................76

13 The Effect of Absolute Value of Education on Voter Turnout with GSS (Logistic

Regression Results).…………………………….……………………........................77

14 The effect of competitive educational environment on voter turnout with GSS

(Logistic Regression results).……………..,…………………………………………77

15 The Effect of Absolute Value of Education on Voter Turnout with ANES (Logistic

Regression Results) ……………………………………..…………………………...78

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16 The Effect of Competitive Educational Environment on Voter Turnout with ANES

(Logistic Regression Results) …………………………………….............................78

17 The Effect of Education on Voter Turnout with ANES (Logistic Regression Results)

……………………………………...........……………………………………...........79

18 The Effect of Education on Voter Turnout with GSS (without Fixed Effects of Years)

……………………………………...........…………………………………………...81

19 Logistic Regression Results only with Generation (with Fixed Effects of Years)

……………………………………...........…………………………………...…........82

20 Logistic Regression Results only with Generation (without Fixed Effects of Years)

……………………………………...........…………………………………...…........83

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LIST OF FIGURES

Figures Page

1 The Association between Years of Education and the Risk of Democratic

Breakdowns in Transitional Democracies (Model 1).……...………………………..20

2 The Effect of Education on the Risk of Democratic Breakdowns across Income

Levels……………………….....………………………..…………..………………..21

3 The Association between Years of Education and the Risk of Democratic

Breakdowns in Transitional Democracies (Models 4-5) …………..………………..24

4 The Effect of Education on Supporting Democracy across Subnational Democracy

Index...………………………..……………...……………………………..………..36

5 The Effect of Education on Tolerance of Religion across Subnational Democracy

Index...………………...……..……………………………………………..………..40

6 The Effect of Education on Tolerance of Social Class across Subnational Democracy

Index..………………………..……………………………………………..………..42

7 The Effect of Education on Tolerance of Foreigners across Subnational Democracy

Index ……………………………………………………..………………………….42

8 The Effect of Education on Membership in Organizations across Subnational

Democracy Index……………………………………...……………………………..45

9 Voter Turnout Rates, the United States, 1960-1988……….………………………...51

10 Voter Turnout Rates, the United States……………………………….……………..52

(a) Aggregate Voting-Eligible Population Turnout, 1960-2012

(b) Individual Eligible Voters’ Turnout, 1972-2012

11 Marginal Effect of Education on Voter Turnout………….………………………….59

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12 Predicted Probability of Voter Turnout in 2004…………….……………………….59

13 Education Quality, the United States, 1970-2010………………...………………….62


Levels (Models 7-9) …………………………………….…………………………...72


Levels (Models 10-12) …………………………………….………………………...74

16 Marginal Effect of Education on Voter Turnout with ANES………………………..80

17 Marginal Effect of Education on Voter Turnout without Fixed Effects...…………...84

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To my parents,

Sunyoung Ahn and Kipung Kim

For their rootless love

Chapter 1 - Introduction

This dissertation examines the relationship between education and democracy, seeking to un-

cover the ways in which increases in levels of education affect political stability, culture, and be-

havior. The aim of this study is to answer the following questions: Do increases in education help

prevent democratic breakdown and facilitate democratic consolidation? Are these effects more

pronounced in poor countries? Does regime type affect the relationship between level of educa-

tion and individual democratic values? Has the positive association between education and voter

turnout in the United States changed over time, as some literature suggests?

The largest body of work in the democratization literature studies the structural determinants

of democratic development, focusing on socioeconomic variables, institutions, and the interna-

tional political environment. Many scholars have examined how socioeconomic variables impact

democracy, building on the insights of modernization theory. Modernization theory posited that a

civilization’s transition from a traditional to a modern society made that civilization more likely to

democratize. This gradual process involved industrialization, along with increases in urbanization,

education, and other forces that were supposed to create a positive environment for the development

of democracy. Scholars paid particular attention to the effect of economic development by asking

whether increases in income result in a society’s transition to democracy or whether democracy

is more sustainable in countries that achieve economic development (Russell 1939; Lipset 1959;

Friedman 1962; Huntington 1965; Dahl 1971; O’Donnell 1973; Diamond 1992; Gasiorowski and

Power 1998; Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub and Limongi 2000; Epstein, Bates, Goldstone, Kris-

tensen and O’Halloran 2006; Acemoglu, Johnson and Yared 2009; Boix 2011).

In addition to exploring the impact of economic development on democratization, prior studies

have stressed that education is important for democracy. In the literature, education is argued

to improve democracy through many mechanisms at the individual level. For example, scholars

argue that education increases an individual’s socioeconomic status, interest in political issues,

civic attitude, and political participation. Additionally, citizens who have attained higher levels

of education are more likely to have better employment, income, and health (Card 1999; Cutler

and Lleras-Muney 2008). Consequently, these individuals can afford to pay more attention to

political issues and to participate in civic engagements (Verba and Nie 1972). Others argue that

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education enables people to be aware of their own interests as well as the corresponding interests

of the collective by equipping them with political knowledge. In turn, those who are educated are

more likely to be tolerant of people with different opinions and behaviors and to be involved in

organizations. Therefore, these individual-level effects of education have positive influences on

democracy (Almond and Verba 1963; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Verba, Schlozman and Brady

1995; Brady, Verba and Schlozman 1995; Nie, Junn and Stehlik-Barry 1996). However, as Lipset

(1959, 39) points out, education’s pronounced effect on individuals’ values and behaviors within a

single country is well understood, but the effect of education at the aggregate, cross-country level

nevertheless remains unclear.

To this end, there are a few scholars who have examined the democratizing effect of edu-

cation with cross-national analyses. Glaeser, Ponzetto and Shleifer (2007) argue that education

increases the benefits that individuals’ gain from political engagements because it enables them

to share opinions and persuade others. In this context, more educated individuals are more likely

to defend and support democracy even without the expectation of direct reward from the political

system. However, in countries with lower levels of education, citizens may prefer dictatorships

or oligarchies because dictatorship alone is perceived as providing citizens with strong, top-down

incentives, which catalyze their support for authoritarianism. Sanborn and Thyne (2014) assert that

primary education promotes civic skills and attitudes as well as socialization opportunities while

tertiary education promotes analytical thinking about political issues and participation. However,

the authors suggest that the positive effect of education on support for democracy is stronger in

low-income countries. Aleman and Kim (2015) also demonstrate that education’s democratizing

effect is greater in poor countries. They argue that education changes individuals’ values and at-

titudes, strengthening the mobilization abilities of pro-democracy groups. More specifically, the

conflicts between pro-democracy and pro-dictatorship groups become more intense under poor dic-

tatorships as levels of education increase. On the other hand, the social and economic conditions

in high-income countries are already favorable to democracy; individuals in high-income coun-

tries are more supportive of democratic values and political participation. In that sense, additional

schooling is positively associated with democracy; its effect is stronger in low-income countries.

Nonetheless, findings that delineate a positive relationship between education and democracy are

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frequently challenged. Specifically, Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson and Yared (2005a) present

some evidence that education has no effect on levels of democracy by including country fixed ef-

fects in their model. However, these findings have been challenged on empirical grounds by Murtin

and Wacziarg (2014) — with a sample of fewer countries but more years of data — and Bobba and

Coviello (2007) — with alternative estimators and other controls. In sum, although the effect of

education on individual-level civic attitudes and engagements has been well studied, its aggregate

effect on democracy remains debatable.

Prior research has, in general, underlined the effects of schooling on transitions to democracy.

However, the effect of education on the consolidation of democracy has not been fully examined.

Democratic consolidation is often defined as the durability of democracy, which implies that tran-

sitional democracies will not revert to authoritarian regimes. After democratization has occurred,

it is not clearly understood what role an individual’s level of education plays in his or her demo-

cratic values and civic participation, affecting the survival of democracy as a social outcome. For

example, Huntington (1968) argues that in developing countries, increasing levels of education

among the general population render political instability and social conflicts more likely. On the

other hand, some argue that education increases the stability of the democratic regime (Glaeser,

Ponzetto and Shleifer 2007). Given the importance of research on democratic consolidation, the

role of education in transitional democratic countries deserves further scrutiny.

Additionally, conventional wisdom that education fosters individual-level civic attitudes and

political participation has been challenged. For instance, Sullivan, Pierson and Marcus (1982)

failed to find a positive association between education and political tolerance in the United States.

Their findings show that education is related to political ideology and has only a marginal effect on

political tolerance.

Others argue that education’s effect on democratic values is “weaker, nonexistent, or some-

times even reversed in non-liberal democracies” (Weil 1982, 1985; Scheepers, Grotenhuis and Slik

2002; Hello, Scheepers and Gijsberts 2002; Coenders and Scheepers 2003; Peffley and Rohrschnei-

der 2003; Ceobanu and Escandell 2010). This literature asserts that the political environment in

which individuals are raised, taught, and socialized affects what impact education might have on

democratic values. As noted by ?290)gibsonetal1993, “the social learning hypothesis for relatively

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totalitarian systems is that greater socialization to system norms is associated with greater political

intolerance”. The implication of this perspective is that in this context, education exposes individ-

uals to the norms of illiberal regimes, which promote attitudes that do not favor — and may even

be incompatible with — democratic values.

In contrast to these views, scholars have asserted that education has a positive influence on

citizens’ democratic values regardless of regime type. This is the case because “education may

inherently instill or reinforce liberal values such as equality, tolerance, and respect for individual

liberties” (Gibson, Duch and Tedin 1992, 354). For example, Gibson, Duch and Tedin (1992)

demonstrated that even in the Soviet Union, education increases support for democratic values and

enhances political tolerance. In other words, the democratizing effect remains in place, regardless

of regime type (Silver 1987; Gibson and Duch 1993; McIntosh, Iver, Abele and Nolle 1995; Hayes

1995). These studies suggest that people with higher educational attainment are more likely to be

supportive of democratic values even under authoritarian political systems, despite nondemocratic

regime norms in the society, implying that the democratizing effect of education is universal.

Another strand of the literature on education and democracy states that despite the well-established

association between schooling and voter participation in the United States, increases in educational

levels over last few decades have occurred simultaneously with a decline in voter turnout (Brody

1978; Nie, Junn and Stehlik-Barry 1996; Franklin 2004; Campbell 2009). The work of Nie, Junn

and Stehlik-Barry (1996). The work of Nie, Junn and Stehlik-Barry (1996) is particularly relevant

for addressing the paradox that links low voter turnout with high levels of education. Accord-

ing to them, education directly promotes political participation by increasing citizens’ ability to

understand politics and pursue their interests through political means. Moreover, education indi-

rectly affects political engagement through social status, which impacts individuals’ proximity to

political actors. Focusing on this relative effect of education, Nie, Junn and Stehlik-Barry (1996)

explain why we observe the paradoxical relation-ship between education and political participation

via the concept of the “competitive educational environment.” They argue that the structure of rep-

resentative democracy has inherent limitations because the political arena cannot accommodate all

political demands. Even though the educated population has increased, the number of positions that

grant access to political power is limited, which leads to more competition among the population.

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Higher levels of competition decrease the incentives associated with political participation. Conse-

quently, a more competitive educational environment results in declining voter turnout regardless

of increasing levels of education in the general population. Thus, it is critical to reexamine whether

education promotes individuals’ democratic values and political participation.

To this end, this dissertation attempts to answer several unresolved research questions: 1)

whether education decreases the risk of authoritarian reversal, 2) whether the democratizing ef-

fect of education depends on a country’s wealth, 3) whether education promotes individual-level

democratic values regardless of regime type, 4) and whether education remains a significant pre-

dictor of voter turnout in the United States.

This dissertation is composed of three empirical parts that explore these research questions. In

Chapter 2, I examine how structural factors affect democratic consolidation, focusing on the de-

mocratizing effect of education at the aggregate level. It investigates how education affects the risk

of authoritarian reversal in transitional and consolidated democracies, and whether the democra-

tizing effect of education is more significant in low-income countries than high-income countries.

Although several studies have provided evidence that increasing levels of education contribute to

the emergence of democracy, the debate over education’s democratizing effects has not been con-

cluded. Some studies cast doubt on the positive relationship between education and democracy,

arguing that increases in education do not improve levels of democracy in developing societies, but

instead cause political instability. This dissertation seeks to address gaps in past research on the

role that education plays in transitional democracies. Furthermore, the democratizing effect of ed-

ucation is rarely studied in the literature on democratic consolidation. Thus, Chapter 2 contributes

to the democratization and democratic consolidation literature by assessing the impact of education

on democracy across countries. I posit that education provides political information, knowledge,

and socialization opportunities for individuals. These individual-level effects of education create

democratic supporters who form a favorable public opinion of democracy and participate in civic

engagements within society, which reduces the risk of democratic breakdown in transitional and

consolidated democracies.

The empirical analysis, which includes educational, economic, and institutional covariates,

builds on Svolik’s (2015) Bayesian analysis of hidden Markov change-point democratic consol-

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idation models. The results reveal that education significantly decreases the risk of authoritarian

reversal in transitional democracies. However, evidence that this effect is more pronounced in poor

countries is mixed. The results also show that structural factors are less relevant in consolidated

democracies. Neither education nor levels of economic development seem to affect the chances of

a breakdown in consolidated democracies.

In Chapter 3, I analyze the relationship between education and democratic values. According to

social learning theory, educational attainment indicates the extent to which an individual is exposed

to the dominant norms of the political system. Thus, the highly educated in democratic societies

have greater exposure to democratic values, making them more democratic than the less educated,

while those with higher education in nondemocratic countries have less supportive attitudes toward

democratic values than those who are less educated. Contrary to the logic of social learning theory,

I argue that education plays a role in fostering critical thinking, exposing individuals to different

political opinions, and strengthening self-esteem, which promotes citizens’ democratic values re-

gardless of regime type. To test this assertion, I focus on Mexico and exploit regime differences

across subnational units.

Employing Mexico as a case study allows me to empirically explore the country’s democratic

values soon after democratization. Previous research classified Mexico’s political culture as au-

thoritarian (Craig and Cornelius 1980). However, Booth and Seligson (1984)find that democratic

political culture exists in authoritarian regime contexts by exploring survey data from 1978 to

1979. More recently, Moreno and Mendez (2002) examine data from before and after the demo-

cratic transition of 2000, revealing little support for democracy in Mexico; their research could not

confirm whether democratic values are increasing in the country. This dissertation contributes to

the literature on democratic values in Mexico with more recent data.

In addition, this case study contributes to empirical research on the social learning hypothesis

— which holds that education’s effect on democratic values in nondemocratic contexts is weaker,

nonexistent, or reversed — by testing whether different regime types at the subnational level affect

the relationship between education and democratic values. Many scholars argue that Mexico has

several authoritarian enclaves at the state level — regions that fall short on measures such as free

and fair elections for legislative and executive positions, alternation of office, and clean elections.

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Therefore, the case of Mexico enables me to assess educational effects across different subnational

regime types.

For the empirical analysis, I use data from the 2008 National Survey on Political Culture and

Citizen Practices (La Encuesta Nacional sobre Cultura Polıtica y Practicas Ciudadanas: ENCUP)

as well as Subnational Democracy Index data taken from Gervasoni (2012). I test various aspects of

democratic values: support for democracy; tolerance toward unfamiliar religions, different social

classes, and foreigners; and membership in organizations. I find that increases in levels of education

are associated with a greater prevalence of democratic values. Individuals exhibit greater support

for democracy, greater religious tolerance, and greater tolerance toward different social classes and

foreigners as their levels of education become higher. The more educated are also more likely to

participate in social organizations. In addition, and contrary to some prior arguments, I find that

subnational authoritarianism does not decrease the positive relationship between education and

democratic values.

Chapter 4 examines the paradoxical relationship between education and voter turnout in the

United States. In spite of increasing levels of education over time, voter turnout in the U.S. has

not increased. In order to investigate this paradox, I reassess three findings of this literature: 1)

that there is a significant decline in voter turnout, 2) that generational factors impact voter turnout,

and 3) that the impact of education on voter turnout has changed. To start, I shed light on this

subject by examining voter turnout rates over time. Whereas most previous studies have examined

voter turnout rates from the 1960s to the 1980s, I extend the time frame from 1960 to 2012, thus

considering a 52-year time span in relation to the previous average time span of 30 years. The anal-

ysis shows that voter turnout was relatively static from 1960 to 2012, contrary to the conventional

belief that voter turnout decreased. Then, I examine public opinion data from the General Social

Survey (GSS) from 1972 to 2014 in order to analyze the effects of generation and education on

voter turnout. I demonstrate that generational effects on voter turnout differ depending on model

specifications, and that the positive effect of education on voter participation diminishes over time.

In other words, the diminishing positive effect of education results in static voter turnout, despite

increased levels of education over time. Also, contrary to Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-Barry’s (1996)

finding that the competitive educational environment offsets the effect of education itself on voter

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turnout, I demonstrate that the competitive educational environment does not reduce voter turnout

from the 1970s to the 1990s, but does during the post-2000s.

Through the cases of Mexico and the United States, this research contributes to the study of de-

mocratization by examining the effect of education on values and participation. In both instances, I

control for within-country characteristics that affect citizens’ political behavior, including political

culture, history, economic development, and institutions. In other words, this research contributes

to existing research on education’s role in political behavior and values.

In short, the empirical chapters of this dissertation contribute to the rich literature on the polit-

ical consequences of schooling, and it enhances our understanding of how education affects new

democracies. My research lends support to the notion that programs that promote education help

to bring about democratic stability and create citizens who hold democratic values, join social or-

ganizations, and turn out to vote. As Chapter 2 shows, increases in education among transitional

democracies lowers the chances of reverting to authoritarianism. The risk of democratic break-

down is close to 0 when transitional democracies increase levels of education by 10 years. The

other empirical chapters illustrate the political consequences of schooling by strengthening citi-

zens’ democratic attitudes and propensity for political engagement.

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Chapter 2 - Education and Democratic Consolidation

The April 19th Revolution that took place in 1960 was the first democratic movement in the Re-

public of Korea. High school and college students were the driving force behind the pro-democracy

movement, protesting against electoral fraud committed by the authoritarian government of Presi-

dent Syngman Rhee. Students demanded the nullification of the tainted contest and new elections.

As a result of popular pressure, President Rhee stepped down, and South Korea transitioned to

democracy for the first time in its history. The importance of student activism in the process of

democratization is not unique to South Korea. Students are often key participants in democratic

movements. More generally, educated sectors of the population tend to be key supporters of demo-

cratic transitions.

In the democratization literature, abundant empirical evidence supports the view that education

is positively correlated with democracy (Glaeser, Ponzetto and Shleifer 2007; Sanborn and Thyne

2014; Aleman and Kim 2015). However, not all agree. For example, Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson

and Yared (2005b) challenge the view that increases in education improve levels of democracy.

Aside from the impact of levels of education on democratic transitions, previous research has left

some important questions unresolved: what role does education play in democratic consolidation?

And what are the theoretical mechanisms that link education to democratic consolidation?

While there is abundant evidence that education is positively associated with individual-level

democratic values and political participation, the theoretical reasons for the relationship between

education and democratic consolidation remain unexplored. Many years ago, Huntington (1968)

raised the counterargument that increases in levels of education stir up political instability. Al-

though many scholars address education’s positive role in bringing about a transition to democracy

(usually in conjunction with economic variables), the democratizing effect of education is rarely

studied in the literature on democratic consolidation.

The main goal of this chapter is to shed light on the relationship between education and demo-

cratic consolidation while also considering other structural factors: economic, institutional, and

international. Using a change-point model, this dissertation estimates the timing of democratic

consolidation and the factors that impact the risk of authoritarian reversal in transitional and con-

solidated democracies. Across two sets of models, I find support for the hypothesis that education

9

is inversely related to the risk of democratic breakdown in transitional democracies. The evidence

that this effect is more pronounced in poor countries is mixed.

Literature Review

The largest body of work in the democratization literature focuses on the impact of structural

factors, such as socioeconomic variables, political culture, democratic history, or the international

political environment. Studies focused on socioeconomic variables have typically addressed as-

pects of modernization theory. Modernization theory assumes that democratization is a result of

the gradual development of socioeconomic structures. Przeworski et al. (2000, 88-9) argue, “The

specific causal chains consist in sequences of industrialization, urbanization, education, communi-

cation, mobilization, political incorporation, and innumerable other ‘actions’: a progressive accu-

mulation of social changes that make a society ready to proceed to the final one, democratization”.

Many scholars have specifically addressed the positive effect of economic development on democ-

racy (Russell 1939; Lipset 1959; Friedman 1962; Huntington 1965; Dahl 1971; O’Donnell 1973;

Diamond 1992; Gasiorowski and Power 1998; Przeworski et al. 2000; Epstein et al. 2006; Ace-

moglu, Johnson and Yared 2009; Boix 2011). Their main research concerns go back to Przeworski

et al.’s (2000) questions: 1) whether the transition to democracy results from economic devel-

opment and 2) whether democracy is more likely to be sustained in countries that have already

achieved economic development.

The relationship between income and democracy is still debated. Przeworski et al. (2000) con-

clude that economic development does not lead to democratic transitions, although democracy is

more likely to be durable in wealthy countries. More recently, Svolik (2015) explores Przeworski

et al.’s (2000) second question by developing a change-point model of democratic consolidation.1

He demonstrates that “the risk of authoritarian reversals is decreased by economic growth and it is

increased by economic recessions, authoritarian neighbors, the Cold War, and a military authoritar-

ian past” (Svolik 2015, 718). Once transitional democracies are consolidated, these variables have

different influences on the sustenance of democratic consolidation. Svolik (2015, 11) finds empir-

ical evidence that lower levels of economic development raise the risk of authoritarian reversal in1Svolik’s (2015) change-point model is based on Chib (1996, 1998). I will discuss the model and its mechanism in

more depth in Section: Analysis of Education and Democratic Consolidation.

10

consolidated democracies.

In accordance with modernization theory, previous studies have emphasized that education is

also important for the survival of democracy. Numerous mechanisms, including socioeconomic sta-

tus, enlightenment, democratic values, and socialization, explain the role of education in a democ-

racy. More educated people are more likely to have higher income, better health, and employment

(Card 1999; Cutler and Lleras-Muney 2008). Higher socioeconomic status that results from ed-

ucation enables people to pay attention to political issues and develop civic attitudes (Verba and

Nie 1972). Education improves individuals’ knowledge, civic skills, and understanding of poli-

tics, enlightening citizens in a critical and civil manner (Almond and Verba 1963; Rosenstone and

Hansen 1993; Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995; Brady, Verba and Schlozman 1995; Nie, Junn

and Stehlik-Barry 1996). Furthermore, individuals with more education are more likely to em-

brace democratic principles, such as tolerance ((Lipset 1959; Bobo and Licari 1989; Golebiowska

1995). Education provides opportunities for socialization, which allows individuals to share and

experience other people’s opinions and behaviors that are different from their own (Almond and

Verba 1963; Putnam 1993, 2000; Helliwell and Putnam 2000; Glaeser, Ponzetto and Shleifer 2007).

These effects make them more likely to become involved in civic groups and voluntary associa-

tions, all of which have been associated with political participation (Glaeser, Ponzetto and Shleifer

2007). Furthermore, several studies have shown that educated individuals are further motivated to

vote because education exposes them to the prevailing political values (Brody 1978; Mayer 2011).

In short, education has positive influences on democracy by promoting political participation and

values that favor democracy.

The mechanisms listed above describe education’s effect on individual behavior and have been

extensively studied. However, the way that these mechanisms lead to social consequences at the

aggregate level, such as democratic transition and consolidation, is less obvious. Glaeser, Ponzetto

and Shleifer (2007), for instance, argue that schools teach citizens the virtues of political partic-

ipation and how to interact with other people. The authors theorize that education increases the

benefits of civic participation because individuals can share and understand information and per-

suade their peers through socialization in schools (Glaeser, Ponzetto and Shleifer 2007). This

implies that as individuals are more educated, they are more likely to work together and solve

11

collective action problems through political engagement. They argue, “the political success of a

democracy hinges on having a large number of supporters whose benefits of political participation

are sufficiently high that they fight for it even in the absence of direct rewards [...] Conversely, in

countries with low levels of education, dictatorship or oligarchy is more stable than democracy,

because only dictatorships offer the strong top-down incentives needed to induce people to defend

them” (Glaeser, Ponzetto and Shleifer 2007, 79). In that sense, education is positively correlated

with democracy because it creates supporters who can serve as its foundation.

In contrast to this view, Acemoglu et al. (2005b) challenge previous findings and present evi-

dence showing that once country’s fixed effects are included in the model, education has no effect

on levels of democracy. However, Murtin and Wacziarg (2014) challenge these findings with a sam-

ple of fewer countries but more years of data, as do Bobba and Coviello (2007) who use alternative

estimators and other controls.

Also relevant is the work of Sanborn and Thyne (2014), who argue that primary education

provides opportunities for socialization and generates civic skills and democratic values, while ter-

tiary education enables individuals to think analytically about political issues and to be politically

engaged.2 These authors make the claim that the democratizing effect of education is conditional

on the level of wealth in society. They assert that education’s effect is stronger in poor countries

because educated individuals should be more likely to push for democracy in the face of weak

opportunities for advancement than in the more favorable context provided by wealthy countries

(Sanborn and Thyne 2014).

Aleman and Kim (2015) also argue that the democratizing effect of education is stronger in

low-income countries. They examine more countries over an extended time span, from 1955

to 2010, compared to other previous studies.3 Their study posits that increasing levels of edu-

cation alter individuals’ values and attitudes, thus strengthening the mobilization capabilities of

pro-democracy groups. Poor dictatorships with fewer resources will suffer from the conflicts be-

tween pro-dictatorship groups and pro-democracy groups that become more intense as the level

of education increases. In high-income countries, the social and economic context already favors

2Sanborn and Thyne (2014) measure democratization using the Polity IV index. It is defined as democratization ifthe state has +6 or greater Polity Score in the year.

3Aleman and Kim (2015) measure levels of democracy using Polity Score, the Freedom House index, and theUnified Democracy Scores.

12

democracy. Therefore, the benefits of schooling in high-income countries are less pronounced than

in low-income countries (Aleman and Kim 2015).

In sum, prior research has shown that increases in education are likely to bring about a transition

to democracy, and that higher education is more likely to be associated with increases in democracy

in poor than in rich countries. What has not been fully examined is the effect of education on the

consolidation of democracy.4 The term “democratic consolidation” refers to countries that maintain

a democratic regime without the threat of an authoritarian reversal or the denial of democratically

elected representatives by political institutions or groups (O’Donnell 1996; Schedler 1998). In

general, democratic consolidation is related to the durability of democracy, which implies that

transitional democratic countries do not revert to authoritarianism (Gasiorowski and Power 1998;

Schedler 1998).

Several questions about education’s role in transitional democratic countries remain to be an-

swered. Does education decrease the likelihood of democratic breakdown? Huntington (1968)

argued that as countries develop, increasing levels of education would make social conflicts and

political instability more likely.5 Is education’s capability for mobilizing supporters of democracy

maintained after it transitions away from dictatorship? If education promotes individuals’ demo-

cratic values and political participation regardless of regime type, then the educated would favor

democratic stability in transitional democracies, lowering the risk of an authoritarian reversal. In

the same vein, how much does the democratizing effect of education in transitional democratic

countries depend on a country’s wealth?

To conclude, even after countries complete the process of democratization, they still have a pos-

sibility of reverting back to an authoritarian regime. It is therefore necessary to investigate whether

education influences authoritarian reversals and democratic consolidation. It is also important to

examine whether the democratizing effect of education is conditional on economic development in

transitional democracies. The empirical analysis in this chapter examines these questions.

4The common view among political scientists emphasizes the necessity of research on democratic consolidation.5Education increases individuals’ expectations, and the educated are more likely to participate in politics. If ex-

pectations are not satisfied, education may bring about political instability, which would hurt democracy (Huntington1968, 47).

13

Education in Transitional Democracies

I argue that education decreases the risk of democratic breakdown in transitional democratic

countries. The individual effects of education aggregate to provide a positive environment for

democratic stability, thereby helping prevent an authoritarian reversal.

As noted in the existing literature, education fosters democratic values in citizens through en-

lightenment and socialization processes. First of all, education provides cognitive skills, including

reading, learning, and problem solving. These cognitive skills enable citizens to think critically

about their government’s performance, legitimacy, and their roles as citizens in a society. As

Glaeser, Ponzetto and Shleifer (2007) argue, cognitive skills enable people to better communicate

with each other. Education provides opportunities for socialization and facilitates it, broadening an

individual’s views. The socialization process allows citizens to consider a variety of values and to

acknowledge “the complexity and multicausality of society and of individual behavior” (Coenders

and Scheepers 2003, 317). Citizens exposed to different opinions and behaviors via education are

more likely to become embrace a tolerant attitude and acquire the information and values that make

them more likely to participate politically.

In addition, education in a democratic context often teaches individuals the importance of

democratic principles, such as human rights, and the social benefits of civic participation and free

and open elections. Transitional democratic countries may enhance democratic stability by ex-

panding education, which should increase the number of people who have democratic values and

are politically engaged. Increasing levels of education should foster a favorable public opinion of

democracy and enhance civil society. Pressure from educated members of society can diminish

military coups, civil wars, incumbent takeovers, or popular revolt6 that contribute to democratic

breakdowns.

Increasing the number of democracy supporters can provide a foundation for democratic civil

society. This makes reversals to authoritarianism less likely. Education increases the chances that

an individual would volunteer for local communities, attend church, join a trade union, become

a member of a political party, or participate in an NGO. Through these activities, people play an

6Svolik (2015, 16) categorizes four distinct ways of democratic breakdowns: a military coup, an incumbenttakeover, a civil war, or a popular uprising.

14

important role in sustaining democratic governance, monitoring the regime’s performance, and

protecting civil rights. Thus, countries with higher levels of education would be more likely to

avoid the sources of authoritarian reversal and sustain democracy.

Another concern is whether the positive effect of education on democratic stability differs in

poorer and wealthier countries. Prior works have found support for the view that education has a

greater effect in increasing levels of democracy in poorer countries than in rich ones (Sanborn and

Thyne 2014; Aleman and Kim 2015). But these works have not examined whether the effect of

education in preventing authoritarian reversals in transitional and consolidated democraciesdiffers

according to a country’s wealth.

There are reasons to expect that education’s effect in stabilizing democracies may vary with

economic development. Baseline levels of democratic values are likely to be lower in poorer than

in richer countries. Given this condition, increases in levels of education (e.g., enlightenment,

tolerance, and socialization effects) are likely to have a stronger effect in changing pro-democracy

attitudes in poorer countries, where other sources of pro-democracy attitudes are weaker. If this is

true, then we should observe the positive impact of education to be stronger in poor countries. In

the empirical section, I test this proposition and investigate the more general claim that education

helps prevent transitional democracies from sliding back into authoritarianism.

Analysis of Education and Democratic Consolidation

To examine how education affects democratic consolidation using a cross-national framework,

this study builds on Svolik’s (2015) research that examines the relationship between structural fac-

tors and democratic reversals by incorporating the effect of educational attainment. This chapter

assumes that “[a] democracy’s trajectory after a transition is hypothesized to consist of two distinct

stages.” Either countries are “born transitional” or they “face a high risk of an authoritarian rever-

sal” (Svolik 2015, 2). Given these conditions, there are three possible outcomes for transitional

democracies: 1) they have an authoritarian reversal, 2) they may survive but not be consolidated,

leaving them with a high risk of authoritarian reversal, and 3) they may survive and consolidate,

leaving them with a low risk of an authoritarian reversal (Svolik 2015, 2-3). This chapter focuses

on these stages, using two main parameters: the timing of democratic consolidation and the risk of

15

democratic breakdown in transitional and consolidated democratic countries.

This approach to examine democratic consolidation is beneficial for overcoming the limitations

of previous studies. Some scholars have contended that it is unclear when democratic consolida-

tion occurs and what criteria are necessary for it (Huntington 1993; O’Donnell 1996; Gasiorowski

and Power 1998; Schedler 1998; Przeworski et al. 2000; Epstein et al. 2006). Democratic con-

solidation can be conceptualized as a latent status that “cannot be directly observed and must be

inferred” (Svolik 2015, 3). Following Svolik (2015) approach to democratic consolidation, it is not

necessary to directly observe when democratic consolidation occurs. Investigating the risk of au-

thoritarian reversal in transitional and consolidated democracies enables the estimation of criteria

for democratic consolidation to predict when democratic consolidation occurs (Svolik 2015).

Svolik’s (2015) Bayesian analysis of hidden Markov change-point models emphasizes the tran-

sition from transitional democracy state R to consolidated democracy state C, which are latent

states st , at some unknown time τ . The model provides the outcomes of whether a democracy

survives, yit = 0, or reverts to a dictatorship, yit = 1, where t refers to time. In the model, yit implies

a Bernoulli random variable with the parameter θt . According to the author, the states R and C are

a high and low probability of democratic breakdown, θ R and θC, where θ R > θC. In that sense, θ t

= θ R for t ≤ τ and θ t = θC for t > τ . The model estimates two parameters of the process, the states

R and C, as they follow a two-state Markov process and a discrete-time, using the Gibbs sampler.

“The time of consolidation τ then corresponds to the timing of change-points in the draws of the

states. In turn, the covariate effects on t can be modeled through their effects on the transition

probability, p, π” (Svolik 2015, 6). Because this study assumes that “all democracies are born

transitional, s1 = R, and let π = p(st = C|st−1 = R) be the probability that a transitional democracy

at time t-1 consolidates at time t” (Svolik 2015, 6).7

I use replication data from Svolik (2015) that covers 145 countries within the time period be-

tween 1789 and 2008. The models for θ R and θC indicate the reversal model for transitional

democracies and the reversal model for consolidated democracies, respectively. The analysis uti-

lizes the education variable, average years of schooling of people aged 25 and older, taken from

Barro and Lee (2013).8 The data includes 149 countries and ranges from 1950 to 2010 in 5-year

7For a detailed explanation, see Svolik (2015).8Barro and Lee (2013) data is collected from census and survey information based on UNESCO, Eurostat, and other

16

intervals. To merge this data with Svolik’s (2015) yearly data, I had to interpolate the educational

variable. To estimate the unknown time t as much as possible, I impute the missing values of the

educational attainment variable by taking the absolute difference between the values of two con-

secutive periods in a country, dividing the number by 5 (due to the 5-year interval), and adding it

to the value of the first observation successively.9

In addition to the effect of education, I include the economic development variables, such as

the log of annual GDP per capita and GDP growth. The simple model also contains the executive

form of government (presidential, parliamentary, or mixed) and the type of dictatorship (military,

civilian, or monarchy) that a country experienced in the past as institutional factors. The constitu-

tional foundation of the executive is coded as a binary variable 1 if the country has a presidential

system and 0 otherwise. The type of preceded dictatorship is coded as a binary variable 1 if a

country struggled under military dictatorship and 0 otherwise. To examine the second hypothesis,

the democratizing effect of education is even more pronounced in poor countries, I include the

interaction term between years of education and the log of annual GDP per capita.

Moreover, I consider international factors, including neighboring countries that were also demo-

cratic in any given year, to capture diffusion effects on regime transitions and a dichotomous vari-

able called Cold War, which takes the value of 1 if between the years 1945 and 1990 and 0 oth-

erwise. Lastly, the models with international covariates include the dummy variable, fuel exports,

having a value 1 if a country’s fuel amounted to more than 10 percent of its exports and 0 other-

wise. All models include a random effect of region (e.g., Latin America, Sub-Sahara Africa, Asia,

or Other). All the variables in the analyses are lagged by one year, and the economic variables are

standardized.

sources. It has also been evaluated as “the most sophisticated and ambitious” data (Nardulli, Peyton and Bajjalieh 2012,3).

9For example, if a country has an average of 10 years of educational attainment in 1990 and 15 in 1995, 1 is theoutcome of this process (15 - 10 = 5 and 5 / 5 = 1). The value in 1991 is 11 (10 + 1), the value in 1992 is 12 (11 + 1),the value in 1993 is 13 (12 + 1), and the value in 1994 is 14 (13 + 1). As an alternative, I tried interpolating using theaverage value of consecutive periods in a country. For instance, given the same condition of the previous example, Icalculate the average value 12.5 ((10 + 15) / 2) between 1990 and 1995 and impute the value into the missing years.The results of this analysis were very similar with those with the preceding method. However, I use the graduatedinterpolation values instead of the average-state values.

17

Results

The results regarding the effect of education on democratic consolidation appear in Table 1

and Table 2. Table 1 shows models including the educational, economic, and institutional covari-

ates, as well as random effects by region. In Table 1, Models 2-3 include the interaction term

between education and the level of economic development. Model 3 excludes OECD countries

that gained membership in the 1960s and the 1970s.10 Furthermore, Table 2 extends the simple

models, considering international variables.11 Negative coefficients imply that increases in the

variables decrease the risk of authoritarian reversal in transitional and consolidated democracies.

Tables show posterior means and the 95 percent highest posterior density (HPD) in brackets for

each coefficient.

In Table 1, I find that the baseline risk of a democratic breakdown is much larger in transitional

than in consolidated democracies (by considering the constant). The baseline risks in transitional

democracies are 8.92, 8.99, and 11.71 percent in Model 1, Model 2, and Model 3, respectively.

When excluding OECD countries (Model 3), the risk is greater. The baseline risks in consolidated

democracies are close to 0.

More importantly, Models 1-3 show that increases in levels of education reduce the risk of

democratic breakdown in transitional democracies. The covariates capturing levels of education are

negative and statistically significant. Figure 1 illustrates the effect of education on the probability

10The countries include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland,Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, and United States.

11Additional results of analyses with international covariates are shown in Tables 9-10 in the Appendix A. Table9 includes the interaction term between education and economic development. Table 10 shows the same models ofTable 9, excluding OECD countries that joined the OECD in the 1960s and the 1970s. Table 9 shows that educationis a statistically significant covariate that decreases the risk of authoritarian reversal in transitional democracies in themodels with fuel exports, democratic neighbors, and the Cold War, respectively. Nevertheless, it is not a statisticallysignificant covariate in consolidated democracies in Table 9. The effect of education on democratic breakdown across acountry’s income varies in Models 7-9. Figure 14 illustrates the marginal effect of education across a country’s incomelevel in Models 7-9. In Figure 14a, the effect of education in Model 7 is significant when a transitional democracy’sincome is more than $1,419 GDP per capita. When a country has democratic neighbors in Model 8, as shown in Figure14c, education’s reductive effect is significant in transitional countries which have more than $1,113 GDP per capita.On the contrary, in Model 8, the reductive effect of education is statistically significant in consolidated democracieswith low levels of income as shown in Figure 14d. Furthermore, in Table 10, the effect of education is statisticallysignificant and decreases the risk of authoritarian reversal, except for Model 12 that considers the Cold War. The sign ofthe Cold War covariate in Model 12 is negative as expected. The marginal effect of education depending on a country’swealth shows mixed results in Figure 15. Figure 15a and Figure 15c show that the reductive effect of education on therisk of democratic breakdown is more significant as levels of income increase. On the contrary, education’s reductiveimpact is not statistically significant during the Cold War. Therefore, the effect of education mostly decreases thelikelihood of democratic breakdown; however, its reductive effect is more pronounced in high-income countries whenthe model considers fuel exports and democratic neighbors, respectively.

18

Tabl

e1:

Res

ults

fora

Cha

nge-

Poin

tDem

ocra

ticC

onso

lidat

ion

Mod

els

Mod

el1

Mod

el2

Mod

el3

Tran

sitio

nal.

Con

solid

ated

.Tr

ansi

tiona

l.C

onso

lidat

ed.

Tran

sitio

nal.

Con

solid

ated

.

Con

stan

t-1

.346∗∗∗

-7.8

83∗∗∗

-1.3

41∗∗∗

-11.

375∗∗∗

-1.1

90∗∗∗

-11.

082∗∗∗

[-1.

772,

-0.9

19]

[-16

.618

,-2.

388]

[-1.

761,

-0.9

31]

[-18

.319

,-3.

500]

[-1.

656,

-0.7

37]

[-18

.681

,-2.

346]

Yea

rsof

educ

atio

n-0

.174∗∗∗

0.13

9-0

.171∗∗∗

0.19

6-0

.176∗∗∗

0.25

3[-

0.24

0,-0

.110

][-

0.15

8,0.

528]

[-0.

231,

-0.1

07]

[-0.

186,

0.58

4][-

0.24

4,-0

.114

][-

0.15

8,0.

752]

Log

ofG

DP

perc

apita

-0.1

30-2

.235∗

-0.1

09-2

.107

-0.0

52-2

.185

[-0.

301,

0.04

2][-

5.84

2,0.

404]

[-0.

278,

0.05

9][-

5.46

3,1.

175]

[-0.

247,

0.12

3][-

6.43

2,1.

733]

GD

Pgr

owth

-0.0

82∗

-0.8

53∗

0.03

2-1

.725∗

0.08

6-1

.675∗

[-0.

165,

0.00

4][-

2.04

0,0.

040]

[-0.

111,

0.18

2][-

3.71

1,0.

036]

[-0.

083,

0.26

1][-

3.59

2,0.

109]

Pres

iden

tial

0.05

81.

375

0.07

01.

471

0.01

8-0

.735

[-0.

181,

0.30

6][-

4.29

7,6.

249]

[-0.

170,

0.29

8][-

4.47

2,7.

217]

[-0.

229,

0.27

7][-

9.37

6,7.

561]

Mili

tary

-0.0

213.

339

-0.0

496.

032

-0.1

027.

560

[-0.

263,

0.22

2][-

1.60

9,11

.420

][-

0.29

6,0.

185]

[-1.

230,

12.2

40]

[-0.

357,

0.13

5][-

1.47

2,16

.083

]

Edu

catio

n*L

ogof

GD

P-

-0.

127∗∗∗

1.73

60.

158∗∗∗

1.49

2[0

.033

,0.2

28]

[-1.

494,

5.21

3][0

.051

,0.2

73]

[-1.

587,

5.04

3]

Gro

up-l

evel

Var

ianc

e0.

309

0.28

70.

309

[0.1

18,0

.548

][0

.118

,0.4

50]

[0.1

18,0

.548

]

Cou

ntry

-yea

robs

erva

tions

2,93

52,

935

1,74

7Sp

ells

147

147

122

Cou

ntri

es98

9876

Rev

ersa

ls59

5956

Not

e:M

odel

3ex

clud

esO

EC

Dco

untr

ies

that

gain

edm

embe

rshi

pin

the

1960

san

dth

e19

70s

toes

timat

eth

ese

cond

hypo

thes

ison

the

cond

ition

alef

fect

ofec

onom

icde

velo

pmen

twith

outt

hew

ealth

iest

coun

trie

s.Po

ster

iorm

eans

and

the

95pe

rcen

thig

hest

post

erio

rden

sity

(HPD

)in

brac

kets

fore

ach

coef

ficie

nt.T

heec

onom

icva

riab

les

are

stan

dard

ized

and

allv

aria

bles

are

lagg

edby

one

year

.The

regi

onal

dum

mie

sar

eno

tsho

wn

inth

isTa

ble.

Sign

ifica

nce

leve

l∗,∗∗ ,

and∗∗∗

indi

cate

zero

isno

tcov

ered

byth

e90

,95,

and

99pe

rcen

tHPD

regi

on,r

espe

ctiv

ely.

19

(a) Model 1

Figure 1: The Association between Years of Education and the Risk of Democratic Breakdownsin Transitional Democracies (Model 1)

Note: The 95 percent HPD regions are shown in gray. The bottom and top rugs plot the distribution of years ofeducation and democratic breakdowns, respectively.

of authoritarian reversal in transitional democracies, holding other variables constant. The figure

shows that at the mean levels of the other covariates, the risk of authoritarian reversal in a tran-

sitional democracy decreases from 8.92, 1.33, 0.1, to 0 percent as education’s level increases by

5-year increments (0-15). Models 1-3 do not find a statistically significant relationship between

education and the probability of authoritarian reversals in the case of consolidated democracies.

Model 2 and Model 3 include interaction effects. Both show that the impact of education

on preventing breakdown in transitional democracies varies according to wealth, as hypothesized.

Figure 2 illustrates education’s effect at different levels of wealth (Models 2-3). In transitional

democracies, the marginal effect of education on authoritarian reversal is statistically significant at

low and medium income levels, but loses significance at high income levels. A one-year increase

in the level of education decreases the risk of authoritarian reversal in transitional democracies by

56 percent at the minimum levels of economic development. This reductive effect of education

declines as GDP per capita increases. The probability of democratic breakdown decreases 13

percent with a one-year increase in education at the median level of country’s wealth ($8,153).

Once transitional countries have more than $10,907 GDP per capita, education no longer has a

significant impact on the risk of authoritarian reversal. Thus, an increase in years of education

20

(a) Model 2: Transitional Countries (b) Model 2: Consolidated Countries

(c) Model 2: Transitional Countries (d) Model 3: Consolidated Countries

Figure 2: The Effect of Education on the Risk of Democratic Breakdowns across Income LevelsNote: The 95 percent HPD regions are shown. Model 3 shows the outcome without OECD countries which gainedmembership in the OECD in the 1960s and the 1970s.

21

markedly decreases the risk of authoritarian reversal in low-income countries more than in high-

income countries.

In Model 3, which excludes OECD countries, the effect of education is also stronger among

countries with a low level of economic development. However, the reductive effect of education in

Model 3 is greater than the one in Model 2. A one-year increase in the level of education decreases

the risk of authoritarian reversal in transitional democracies by 66 percent at the minimum levels

of economic development. The democratizing effect of education is not statistically significant

when transitional democracies have more than $10,295 GDP per capita. As levels of economic

development increase, the reductive effect of education decreases. For instance, at the median level

of economic development ($5,000), a one-year increase in education decreases the likelihood of

democratic breakdown by 22 percent. On the contrary, the effect of education is not statistically

significant in consolidated democracies, as shown in Figures 2b-2d.

Contrary to Svolik’s (2015) findings, the effects of economic development in transitional democ-

racies become insignificant after I take into account education. GDP per capita is significantly

associated with the risk of authoritarian reversal only in consolidated democracies in Model 1.

However, economic development decreases the risk only in transitional democracies in Models 2-

3. Moreover, in consolidated democracies, the effect of economic growth on the risk of democratic

breakdown is marginal since the baseline risk is approximately 0 percent. In Model 1, an economic

recession corresponding to an interquartile drop in GDP growth (from 4.45 to 0.1 percent) raises

the risk of democratic breakdown by about 11 percent in transitional democracies. Simply put, in

transitional countries, economic development has a reductive effect on democratic breakdown.

To check the robustness of these results, Table 2 shows additional control variables relating

to international factors: fuel exports, democratic neighbors, and Cold War years. I find that the

baseline risk of a democratic breakdown in Models 4-6 is much smaller than in Models 1-3. The

baseline risk in transitional democracies is 4.87 percent in Model 4 when the fuel exports variable

is added. The baseline risk is 3.56 and 0.53 percents in transitional democracies in Model 5 and

Model 6, respectively. The baseline risk of democratic breakdown in consolidated democracies is

close to 0 in Model 4-6.

22

Tabl

e2:

Res

ults

fora

Cha

nge-

Poin

tDem

ocra

ticC

onso

lidat

ion

Mod

els

with

Inte

rnat

iona

lCov

aria

tes

Mod

el4

Mod

el5

Mod

el6

Tran

sitio

nal.

Con

solid

ated

.Tr

ansi

tiona

l.C

onso

lidat

ed.

Tran

sitio

nal.

Con

solid

ated

.

Con

stan

t-1

.658∗∗∗

-3.8

69-1

.804∗∗∗

-6.1

12-2

.558∗∗∗

-7.8

44[-

2.19

5,-1

.140

][-

16.9

99,7

.040

][-

2.35

4,-1

.273

][-

17.7

76,5

.635

][-

3.37

0,-1

.739

][-

19.8

93,3

.130

]

Yea

rsof

educ

atio

n-0

.150∗∗∗

-1.4

71-0

.126∗∗∗

-2.1

44-0

.067

-1.9

71[-

0.14

4,0.

053]

[-3.

765,

0.80

1][-

0.20

8,-0

.046

][-

5.10

2,0.

977]

[-0.

162,

0.03

3][-

5.58

9,0.

919]

Log

ofG

DP

perc

apita

-0.2

10∗∗

3.03

8-0

.187∗∗

-0.3

16-0

.367∗∗∗

2.72

2[-

0.40

2,-0

.019

][-

3.68

6,10

.234

][-

0.37

9,0.

001]

[-6.

332,

6.18

6][-

0.59

1,-0

.143

][-

3.54

2,9.

346]

GD

Pgr

owth

-0.0

75-4

.082

-0.0

80-6

.164∗∗∗

-0.0

89-4

.458∗∗

[-0.

190,

0.04

0][-

8.18

4,-0

.684

][-

0.19

0,0.

039]

[-10

.689

,-1.

424]

[-0.

205,

0.02

9][-

8.71

2,-0

.228

]Pr

esid

entia

l0.

071

1.90

40.

102

1.34

60.

023

0.28

1[-

0.22

5,0.

353]

[-8.

855,

13.6

51]

[-0.

182,

0.38

0][-

9.24

5,12

.985

][-

0.26

3,0.

315]

[-9.

389,

9.69

0]

Mili

tary

0.15

88.

854

0.17

712

.215∗∗∗

0.32

8∗∗

8.96

3∗∗

[-0.

127,

0.43

6][-

0.60

8,16

.483

][-

0.10

8,0.

451]

[4.1

24,2

1.06

0][0

.020

,0.6

28]

[1.5

37,1

7.49

3]Fu

elE

xpor

ts0.

140

-9.9

80-

--

-[-

0.20

4,0.

492]

[-18

.307

,-2.

086]

Dem

ocra

ticN

eigh

bors

--

-0.1

65∗∗

-2.4

51∗∗

--

[-0.

315,

-0.0

18]

[-5.

081,

-0.0

41]

Col

dW

ar-

--

-0.

549∗∗∗

7.87

7∗∗

[0.1

76,0

.920

][0

.017

,16.

401]

Gro

up-l

evel

Var

ianc

e0.

286

0.27

00.

267

[0.1

07,0

.506

][0

.101

,0.4

80]

[0.1

03,0

.471

]

Cou

ntry

-yea

robs

erva

tions

1,94

91,

949

1,94

9Sp

ells

121

121

121

Cou

ntri

es87

8787

Rev

ersa

ls44

4444

Not

e:Po

ster

ior

mea

nsan

dth

e95

perc

enth

ighe

stpo

ster

ior

dens

ity(H

PD)

inbr

acke

tsfo

rea

chco

effic

ient

.T

heec

onom

icva

riab

les

are

stan

dard

ized

and

allv

aria

bles

are

lagg

edby

one

year

.T

here

gion

aldu

mm

ies

are

nots

how

nin

this

Tabl

e.Si

gnifi

canc

ele

vel∗

,∗∗ ,

and∗∗∗

indi

cate

zero

isno

tcov

ered

byth

e90

,95,

and

99pe

rcen

tHPD

regi

on,r

espe

ctiv

ely.

23

(a) Model 4 (b) Model 5

Figure 3: The Association between Years of Education and the Risk of Democratic Breakdownsin Transitional Democracies (Models 4-5)

Note: The 95 percent HPD regions are shown in gray. Model 4 and Model 5 control for fuel exports and democraticneighbors, respectively.

In all models shown in Table 2, the coefficient for education is negative, as expected. In two of

the three models focused on transitional democracies, the covariate for education is also statistically

significant. Only in Model 6, when I introduce a dummy variable that splits the dataset into two

(the Cold War and afterwards) does the covariate for education in transitional democracies lack

statistical significance.

Figure 3 shows education’s effect on the probability of authoritarian reversal when I control for

fuel exports and democratic neighbors, respectively. Holding other covariates constant, in Figure

3a, as transitional democracies increase levels of education from 0 to 5 years, the annual risk of

democratic breakdown lowers by a multitude of 6 (from 4.87 to 0.80 percent). Figure 3b plots

the effect of education on the risk when transitional democracies have the presence of neighboring

democracies. In Model 5, the likelihood of authoritarian reversal decreases from 3.56, 0.74, 0.11,

to 0.01 percent as educational level increases by 5-year increments (0-15).

Models 4-6 also show that the effect of economic development is statistically significant and

in the expected direction for transitional democracies. In other words, transitional democracies are

less likely to survive at low levels of economic development. While economic development does

not affect regime breakdown in consolidated democracies, it appears that economic recession does

pose a significant threat (in Model 4 and Model 5). Military legacy is significantly associated with

24

the risk of democratic breakdown in consolidated democracies in Model 5 and Model 6, and in

transitional democracies in Model 6. The results from the latter show that a transitional country

with a military authoritarian past is more likely to face an authoritarian reversal by 1.29 percent,

while military legacy increases the risk of democratic breakdown 86.85 percent in consolidated

democracies. Presidential regime is never statistically significant predictor. Lastly, in Models

4-6, democratic neighbors and the Cold War have a statistically significant relationship with the

likelihood of reversals in transitional and consolidated democracies. The presence of democracy in

neighboring countries decreases the chances of a regime breakdown, and the Cold War years made

breakdown more likely.

Conclusion

Understanding the effect of education on democratic stability is an important contribution to

the existing literature on democratization and democratic consolidation. Previous studies have,

for the most part, focused on the impact of income on transitions from dictatorship to democracy.

Many scholars have underlined that education is a crucial variable that influences individual-level

democratic values and political participation, which along with economic development, contributes

to democratic transition. While some works have examined the impact of education on democracy

at the aggregate level, research that investigates the effect of education in transitional democracies

are scant. This chapter contributes to fill that void.

I hypothesized that an increase in education decreases the risk of authoritarian reversal. In

addition, I investigated whether education’s democratizing effect is more significant among low-

income than high-income countries. Education provides knowledge, access to information, and

opportunities for socialization. It also exposes individuals to different opinions and behaviors,

which leads them to broaden their views and to promote political tolerance. I argued that these

individual-level effects of education create supporters of democracy, who participate in politics

and strengthen civil society. As a result, I expected that increases in education should reduce the

risk of authoritarian reversal in transitional democracies.

The empirical analysis used a change-point model (Svolik 2015) to examine my expectations.

Results lend support for the view that increases in education reduce the probability of a reversal to

25

authoritarianism in transitional democracies. In all six models, the coefficient trends in the expected

direction, and in five of the six it is statistically significant. I also examined whether the effects of

education are conditional on the level of economic development. Here, the results were mixed. In

transitional democracies, two of the four models that included interactions provide support for the

hypothesized effects. In the other two, there was no such evidence. The results also showed that

in consolidated democracies, structural factors are less relevant. Neither education nor levels of

economic development seems to affect the chances of a breakdown. Only the negative effects of

an economic downturn appear to be relevant in the case of consolidated democracies.

To conclude, the belief that education boosts democracy has a long history in the social sci-

ences. I have advanced this line of inquiry with an empirical analysis that focuses on democratic

stability, which shows that education is important to preventing authoritarian reversals in tran-

sitional countries. Research on this particularly vulnerable type of democracy is rather sparse.

Further work is necessary to arrive at a more comprehensive understanding of the sources of in-

stability in these regimes. Likewise, further research should also clarify whether the effect of

education, which I have explored, varies according to a country’s income. This type of research is

not only important for normative reasons — democracy is a more just and equitable regime type

than authoritarianism — but also because it can illuminate substantive policy prescriptions.

26

Chapter 3 - Education and Democratic Values in Mexico

A major line of research in the study of democracy focuses on individuals’ values and how their

aggregation affects a country’s political culture. According to Gibson, Duch and Tedin (1992), a

democratic political culture includes norms that encourage the formation of individual and col-

lective preferences, participation in the political arena to satisfy such preferences, and support for

political institutions that are responsive to these preferences. Democratic values are supposed to

play an important role in promoting the development of democracy (Dahl 1971).

Education can change individuals’ beliefs and attitudes by providing information and knowl-

edge, facilitating socialization, and improving socioeconomic status. A substantial number of

works in democratization literature have underlined how education encourages values that are com-

patible and favorable to democracy (Almond and Verba 1963; Lipset 1959; Gaasholt and Togeby

1995; Golebiowska 1995; Inglehart 2005). However, some scholars have argued that such asso-

ciation is contingent on regime type. These scholars have argued that the democratizing effect

of education is weaker or nonexistent in nondemocratic countries (Weil 1982, 1985; Scheepers,

Grotenhuis and Slik 2002; Hello, Scheepers and Gijsberts 2002; Coenders and Scheepers 2003;

Peffley and Rohrschneider 2003; Ceobanu and Escandell 2010).

This chapter examines the relationship between education and democratic values, and whether

this effect is contingent on regime type, using the case of Mexico. This allows me to examine

whether different regime types at the subnational level affect the association between education

and democratic values. I analyze various aspects of this dependent variable, including: support

for democracy; tolerance toward unfamiliar religions, different social classes, and foreigners; and

membership in organizations.

The empirical analysis conducted in this chapter uses the 2008 National Survey on Political

Culture and Citizen Practices (Encuesta Nacional sobre Cultura Polıtica y Practicas Ciudadanas:

ENCUP) dataset as well as the Subnational Democracy Index constructed by Gervasoni (2012).

I find that higher levels of education are associated with greater democratic values. Individuals

exhibit greater support for democracy and greater tolerance toward unfamiliar religions, different

social classes, and foreigners as their level of education increases. The more educated are also more

likely to participate in social organizations. In addition, and contrary to some prior arguments, I

27

find that subnational authoritarianism does not decrease the positive relationship between education

and democratic values.

Related Literature

The democratization literature offers much support for the argument that democratic values

promote democratic development (Almond and Verba 1963; Inglehart 1988; Dahl 1989; Gibson,

Duch and Tedin 1992; Putnam 1993; Dalton 2000; Inglehart 2005; Chu, Diamond, Nathan and

Shin 2008). Previous research investigates democratic values, looking specifically at support for

democracy, liberty, equality, freedom, diversity, and democratic institutions as well as political

tolerance.12 Empirical analyses have found that citizens who adopt democratic values tend to

refuse absolute compliance with state and hierarchical institutions (Inglehart 1997, 2005; Halman

2007). This is a result of values that encourage individual autonomy, freedom, equality, diversity,

and demand for democratic governance. Thus, the beliefs, values, and attitudes of ordinary citizens

influence political change (Gibson, Duch and Tedin 1992).

The relationship between education and democratic values is the subject of a vast body of

literature. Studies support the idea that education fosters beliefs and attitudes favorable to democ-

racy (Almond and Verba 1963; Lipset 1959; Gaasholt and Togeby 1995; Golebiowska 1995; In-

glehart 2005). Scholars explain that education promotes greater understanding of others’ views

and behaviors by exposing them to diverse experiences and knowledge (Gibson and Duch 1993;

Golebiowska 1995; Hillygus 2005). Also, a scholastic environment provides opportunities for so-

cialization among people with varied perspectives (Putnam 2000). Individuals with more education

are more likely to have a sense of democratic principles, leading them to be involved in civic groups

and associations (Glaeser, Ponzetto and Shleifer 2007).

Some studies, however, have challenged this widespread belief. One view states that education

does not necessarily promote tolerance, a key democratic value. For instance, Sullivan, Pierson

and Marcus (1982) fail to find a positive association between education and political tolerance in

12In general, democratic values include liberty and equality. Liberty is “the relationship between the citizen andthe state” and involves “freedom of speech, and press, of association, assembly, and religion, the rights of privacyand lifestyle, the right of due process, the protection and tolerance of minorities, and cultural and political diversity”(Thomassen 2007, 424). Equality encompasses “equality of opportunity” and “equality of condition” (Thomassen2007, 426-27).

28

the United States. They begin by asking respondents to identify their least-liked political group.

Those with higher education are more likely to feel threatened by right-wing groups, whereas the

less educated feel threatened by left-wing groups. Their findings show that education has only a

marginal effect on political tolerance.

A second perspective argues that education’s effect on democratic values is “weaker, nonexis-

tent, or sometimes even reversed in non-liberal democracies” (Weil 1982, 1985; Scheepers, Groten-

huis and Slik 2002; Hello, Scheepers and Gijsberts 2002; Coenders and Scheepers 2003; Peffley

and Rohrschneider 2003; Ceobanu and Escandell 2010). This literature asserts that the political

environment in which individuals are raised, taught, and socialized affects the impact of education

on democratic values. As noted by Gibson and Duch (1993, 290), “the social learning hypothesis

for relatively totalitarian systems is that greater socialization to system norms is associated with

greater political intolerance”.13 This perspective implies that in this context, education exposes

individuals to the norms of illiberal regimes, which promote attitudes that do not favor, and may

even be incompatible with, democratic values.

In contrast to these views, scholars have asserted that education has an independently positive

influence on citizens’ democratic values, regardless of regime type. Scholars of this belief argue:

“education may inherently instill or reinforce liberal values such as equality, tolerance, and respect

for individual liberties” (Gibson, Duch and Tedin 1992, 354). In other words, the democratizing

effect remains regardless of regime type (Silver 1987; Gibson and Duch 1993; McIntosh et al. 1995;

Hayes 1995). For example, Gibson, Duch and Tedin (1992) demonstrated that even in the Soviet

Union, education increases support for democratic values and enhances political tolerance. Studies

on democratic values have shown that education might enhance democratic attitudes through many

possible mechanisms, implying that those with higher levels of education can be supportive of

democratic values even under authoritarian political systems and despite nondemocratic norms.

Testable Hypotheses

Education increases citizens’ democratic attitudes even if citizens reside in authoritarian regimes.

Even if the regime norms and curriculums of nondemocratic regimes abstain from directly promot-13For detailed discussion, see Sullivan, Pierson and Marcus (1982); Gibson, Duch and Tedin (1992); Gibson and

Duch (1993).

29

ing democratic values, education itself plants the seeds of such values. Education engenders critical

thinking, tolerance, and participation in social organization, all of which favor democracy.

First, education fosters critical thinking. According to McPeck (1981, 6), “skepticism might

ultimately give way to acceptance, but it does not take truth for granted. Instead, it considers alter-

native hypotheses and possibilities”. Through the learning process, individuals are more likely to

have the critical consciousness to evaluate the legitimacy and performance of the current govern-

ment (Nussbaum 2006). If the educational system in an authoritarian regime attempts to teach indi-

viduals nondemocratic values, the process of education itself is likely lead individuals to challenge

what they are taught. These individuals would begin to question why the authoritarian regime’s

corollary principles may not be reflected in their lives (McPeck 1981; Hytten 2004). As educa-

tion levels expand beyond memorization and toward understanding concepts, evaluating evidence,

and finding alternative explanations, individuals are more likely to dispute the status quo (McPeck

1981; Ohlander, Batalova and Treas 2005). John Dewey argued that through education “we learn

to think critically, to learn how to access and use information to create a vision of a better world

and act to bring it into existence” (as cited in Hytten 2004, 149).

Second, education provides opportunities for socialization that render individuals more accept-

ing of different opinions and values. Socialization leads individuals to consider different beliefs

and attitudes and to acknowledge “the complexity and multicausality of society and of individual

behavior” (Coenders and Scheepers 2003, 317). In that sense, education enables individuals to

share differing opinions and resolve conflicts (Sanborn and Thyne 2014; Dewey 1916), even if the

subnational unit where they are educated falls short of democratic standards.

Third, education tends to increase individuals’ self-esteem as one obtains more knowledge

and a higher socioeconomic status. As a result, those with more education feel less threatened

by people with different political views and values (Sniderman 1975; Coenders and Scheepers

2003). Sniderman (1975, 178) argues that low self-esteem leads individuals to reject “the norms

of democratic politics not because they are motivated to do so but largely because their negative

self-attitudes have impeded the learning of these values”. In addition, educational attainment tends

to increase social status (Lipset 1959; Barro 1999). Individuals with higher social status are also

less likely to be threatened by people who have different opinions (Turner 1982; Coenders and

30

Scheepers 2003). This is because individuals are more likely to be hostile toward others when they

need to compete for limited resources. Coenders and Scheepers (2003, 318) assert that, “intergroup

competition leads to more ingroup solidarity and to more out group hostility”. Thus, if an individual

feels more secure in terms of his or her economic situation, he or she is more likely to be tolerant

of other people.

As noted previously, some scholars have argued that education’s ability to promote democratic

values varies according to the type of regime. According to this perspective, individuals in non-

democratic regimes are less likely to hold democratic values because exposure to authoritarian

norms weakens or nullifies the formation of democratic traits. However, as others before me, I

argue that education itself can promote citizens’ support for democracy and political tolerance

by encouraging critical thinking, socialization, and self-confidence. In that sense, the alternative

hypotheses this chapter seeks to test are as follows:

• Hypothesis 1: As individuals become more educated, they are more likely to hold democratic

values, regardless of subnational regime type.

• Hypothesis 2: The positive association between education and democratic values is con-

ditional on subnational regime type. Therefore, in nondemocratic subnational units, this

association should be weaker or nonexistent.

An Empirical Test of the Case of Mexico

This research empirically explores different democratic values, namely support for democracy,

political tolerance, and civic engagement in Mexico. Until the 1980s, most research on Mexico’s

political culture typically characterized the country as authoritarian (Craig and Cornelius 1980,

342-55). But Booth and Seligson (1984, 118), using survey data from 1978 to 1979, found “a

largely democratic political culture within an essentially authoritarian regime”. More recently,

Moreno and Mendez (2002) investigate political culture in Mexico with data from before and after

the democratic transition (from 1995 to 1997 and from 2000 to 2001). They found comparatively

low support for democracy and could not confirm whether Mexico’s democratic values were ex-

panding or shrinking. Both Booth and Seligson (1984) and Moreno and Mendez (2002) found that

31

education increases support for democracy. The empirical analysis of this chapter builds on this

line of inquiry with more recent data.

According to most accounts, Mexico became a democracy either in 2000, when, after a long

period of authoritarianism, the ruling party (Institutional Revolutionary Party, PRI) finally lost the

presidency, or in 1997, when it became majority in the lower chamber. But the transition actually

started with the electoral reform of 1977 (Moreno 2012), which introduced proportional represen-

tation (PR) for local councils in town and state legislatures, reduced legal obstacles for national

parties, and incorporated new political parties. In 1986, Mexico implemented a second electoral

reform, introducing PR for all local councils and increasing the number of PR seats in the federal

Chamber for Deputies. Also, in 1993, Mexico introduced civic education to the curriculum for

secondary schools (grades 7 to 9, ages 12 to 14 years old), which included lessons on the functions

of democratic institutions (Levinson 2004; Reimers 2007; Reimers and Cardenas 2010).14 Based

on the Polity IV score, Mexico was a closed anocracy from 1977 to 1993, an open anocracy from

1994 to 1997, and has been a democracy since 1997. The largely free and fair elections in 1997

enabled two opposition parties, the Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD) and National Action

Party (PAN), to win a substantial share of congressional seats. In the year 2000, the PRI handed

the presidency to the opposition party, PAN.

It can be argued that Mexico did not fully democratize in 2000, because authoritarian enclaves

persisted at the state level. Scholars point out that Mexico’s subnational regime types vary ac-

cording to some democratic elements, such as free and fair contested elections for legislative and

executive positions, alternation of office, and clean elections. For example, Gervasoni (2012, 8)

has pointed to the subnational dominance of incumbent parties over time. Using data from 1997

to 2006, Gervasoni (2012, 59) finds that “at least ten out of 32 states have remained undemocratic,

and only six states have experienced some political liberalization”.15

The subnational variation in regime type present in Mexico offers an opportunity to examine

the relationship between education and democratic attitudes. If the first hypothesis is true, then

14The new civic education program includes personal knowledge, responsibility of freedom, balancing individualand collective interests, diversity, a sense of belonging to a community and nation, participation, conflict managementand the ability for solutions, as well as a sense of justice and respect for legality (Reimers 2007, 9-10).

15The states with undemocratic regimes are Oaxaca, Puebla, Baja California, Coahuila, Colima, Hidalgo, Tabasco,Tamaulipas, Veracruz, and Yucatan while the states with democratic regimes are Chihuahua, Queretaro, Michoacan,Nuevo Leon, Mexico City, and Zacatecas in Giraudy’s (2010) work.

32

there should not be significant differences between authoritarian and democratic states in terms

of education’s association with democratic values. If, instead, the second hypothesis is correct,

then the relationship between education and democratic values should be weaker or nonexistent in

authoritarian states.

In order to measure subnational regime types, this paper uses Gervasoni’s (2012) Subnational

Democracy Index (SDI) data.16 The SDI is calculated based on institutional and electoral data,

focusing on the existence and extent of electoral contestation for legislative and executive positions

as well as in the legislature in the various subnational units (31 states and one federal district)

(Gervasoni 2012, 7).17

Individual information on democratic values was obtained from the National Survey on Polit-

ical Culture and Citizen Practices (La Encuesta Nacional sobre Cultura Polıtica y Practicas Ciu-

dadanas: ENCUP) undertaken in 2008.18 This dataset provides public opinion survey results on

political perceptions, knowledge, and attitudes among Mexican citizens. It contains data from

4,383 respondents and 230 variables, including demographic variables. The education variable

consists of the following six categories: none, elementary school, middle school, high school,

college, and graduate degrees.19

The first dependent variable is a dichotomous variable indicating whether respondents prefer a

democratic or an authoritarian regime. The question asks respondents whether they prefer democ-

racy even if they might live with economic hardship, or autocracy even if they might sacrifice their

freedom of expression. The second set of dependent variables is dichotomous and seeks to capture

an individual’s political tolerance. I use questions about whether individuals would be willing to

rent a room in their house to (a) a person with different religious beliefs, (b) a person of a different

social class, and (c) a foreigner. The last dependent variable is also dichotomous and measures

whether an individual is a member of at least one of the following organizations: 1) a trade union,

2) political parties, 3) professional groups (Bar of lawyers, Association of doctors, etc.), 4) a co-

16I really appreciate that Gervasoni (2012) shared precious and valuable data with me.17For a detailed explanation, see Gervasoni (2012).18ENCUP provides the most recent data of 2012. However, it does not include personal income variable that this

study attempts to control. Therefore, this chapter uses the data of 2008.19This paper does not specify the difference of educational effect between public and private schools because the

educational system in Mexico is highly centralized by the national government. The national government provides thecontent of the national curriculum (Grindle 2001; Zinny and McBride 2014).

33

operative, 5) political groupings, 6) charity institutions, 7) religious groupings, 8) organizations

of citizens, 9) social assistance groupings (for example, groups formed in defense of indigenous

people, street children, or the environment), 10) neighbors, settlers, or condominium owners, 11)

pensioners and retirees, 12) art and culture groups, 13) agricultural groupings, 14) an association

of parents of the school, and 15) an assembly of members of savings banks or materialists.

In addition, I include a series of control variables including age, income, gender,20 whether the

individual’s education took place after the beginning of civic education classes,21 the individual’s

evaluation of the country’s economic performance, and the individual’s own economic condition.22

The analysis employs multilevel logistic regression models. One possible issue with testing

my theory is that observations within the same state may be related to each other; this potential

dependency can easily lead to Type I errors by underestimating standard errors (Esarey and Menger

2016). To offset the likelihood of such error, I use multilevel logistic regression models to control

for the group effects of states.

Results

Table 3 presents the effect of education on individuals’ support of democracy, controlling for

civic education, retrospective evaluations of national and personal economic conditions, personal

income (logged), gender, and age. Regardless of model specifications, education’s effect on an

individual’s support of democracy is consistent. Educational attainment is a statistically significant

predictor of an individual’s probability of supporting democracy at the 99 percent confidence in-

terval level. In Model 1, the baseline model, results indicate that the odds of favoring democracy20The gender variable is coded as a dummy variable, with 1 if the respondents are male or 0 otherwise.21I created a dichotomous variable that distinguishes individuals who were taught civic education since 1993 with

1 if the respondents were more than 12 years old in 1993 or 0 otherwise. In 1993, Mexico introduced civic educationfor the secondary school curriculum from grades 7 to 9 (age 12 to 14 years old), teaching the functions of democraticinstitutions (Levinson 2004; Reimers 2007; Reimers and Cardenas 2010). The new civic education program includesteaching about personal knowledge, responsibility of freedom to balance individual and collective interests, diversity,a sense of belonging to a community and nation, participation, conflict management and the ability to find solutions,and a sense of justice and respect for legality (Reimers 2007, 9-10).

22Respondents answer to if they feel their national and personal economic conditions have improved compared tothe past year. 0 is worst than it was one year ago. 1 is worse. 2 is just as bad as it was before. 3 is just as goodas it was before. 4 is better now than it was before. 5 is much better now than it was before. Previous researchcontrols for these variables since individuals’ opinion regarding the economic situation might affect their evaluationof the performance of the current regime and their view of democracy in general. As people struggle with economichardship, it is possible that they are more likely to support a regime with economic achievement and report moredissatisfaction with the performance of the current regime. In the Appendix B, Table 11 represents the description ofvariables for the empirical research.

34

Table 3: Multilevel Logistic Regression Models on Supporting Democracy

Dependent variable:

Supporting DemocracyModel 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4

Level of Education 0.302∗∗∗ 0.299∗∗∗ 0.262∗∗∗ 0.262∗∗∗

(0.039) (0.039) (0.064) (0.064)

Subnational Democracy Index (SDI) 0.338∗∗ 0.191∗ 0.261∗

(0.135) (0.111) (0.154)

Education*SDI −0.067∗ −0.034(0.038) (0.052)

Civic Education 0.100 0.095(0.227) (0.227)

Age −0.001 −0.001(0.006) (0.006)

Personal Income 0.075 0.075(0.062) (0.062)

Male −0.160 −0.158(0.141) (0.141)

Evaluation of National Economic Condition −0.187∗∗∗ −0.185∗∗∗

(0.062) (0.062)

Evaluation of Personal Economic Condition −0.036 −0.039(0.061) (0.062)

Constant 0.632∗∗∗ 0.641∗∗∗ 0.801 0.811(0.148) (0.143) (0.535) (0.535)

Observations 2,792 2,792 1,520 1,520Log Likelihood −1,418.642 −1,415.451 −740.615 −740.404Akaike Inf. Crit. 2,843.284 2,840.901 1,501.230 1,502.807Bayesian Inf. Crit. 2,861.087 2,870.574 1,554.495 1,561.398States’ Variance 0.360 0.318 0.244 0.243States’ Standard Deviation 0.600 0.564 0.494 0.492

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses for each coefficient. Significance level ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate zero is notcovered by the 90, 95, and 99 percent confidence interval, respectively.

35


Figure 4: The Effect of Education on Supporting Democracy across Subnational Democracy Index

Note: In this paper, the level of education is coded as follows: 0 is individuals who have no schooling. 1is elementary school. 2 corresponds with middle school. 3 is a high school degree. 4 is a college degree.5 includes a graduate school degree. The 95 percent confidence interval is highlighted in gray.

increase by 35 percent as educational attainment increases by one level. When controlling for other

variables in Model 3, the odds of supporting democracy increase by 30 percent as educational at-

tainment increases by one level. Therefore, these results support the belief that higher education

promotes positive attitudes toward democracy.

Furthermore, Model 2 and Model 4 show that the democratizing effect of education is not

weaker in states with lower levels of democracy (i.e., higher levels of subnational authoritarianism).

In fact, the coefficient for the interaction between education and the Subnational Democracy Index

(SDI) is negative. Figure 4 plots the effect of education on the support of democracy across levels of

subnational democracy (with 95 percent confidence interval). The effect of education is significant

at various levels of SDI in both models. For example, according to Model 2, the effect of education

on individuals’ support for democracy is 0.40 in the state of Coahuila, which has the lowest level of

subnational democracy (SDI= 28.20). The effect is 0.18 in Baja California Sur, which is the most

democratic state based on the Subnational Democracy Index (SDI= 91.17). The effect of education

is somewhat more modest in Model 4, which includes control variables: 0.31 in Coahuila and 0.21

in Morelos, the state with the second highest subnational democracy (SDI= 85.48). Thus, contrary

to social learning theory (H2), the effect of education on an individual’s support for democracy

36

does not decrease alongside levels of subnational democracy.

Table 4: Multilevel Logistic Regression Models on Tolerance: Religion

Dependent variable:

Tolerance: ReligionModel 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8


(0.037) (0.037) (0.063) (0.063)

Subnational Democracy Index (SDI) −0.095 −0.089 −0.177(0.101) (0.079) (0.124)

Education*SDI 0.0003 0.048(0.037) (0.051)

Civic Education 0.058 0.067(0.230) (0.230)

Age −0.012∗∗ −0.012∗∗

(0.006) (0.006)

Personal Income −0.051 −0.052(0.059) (0.059)

Male 0.015 0.010(0.132) (0.132)

Evaluation of National Economic Condition −0.119∗ −0.121∗

(0.063) (0.064)

Evaluation of Personal Economic Condition 0.174∗∗∗ 0.178∗∗∗

(0.062) (0.062)

Constant 0.533∗∗∗ 0.530∗∗∗ 1.478∗∗∗ 1.486∗∗∗

(0.106) (0.104) (0.486) (0.486)



37

Next, I estimate education’s impact on tolerance toward unfamiliar religions, different social

classes, and foreigners. Table 4 shows the results of an individual’s level of education on whether

individuals would rent a room to a person with an unfamiliar religion. The results in Models 5-8

show that education is always positively associated with religious tolerance. In Model 5, the odds

of tolerance toward a person with a different religion increase by 50 percent as levels of education

increase. When considering other covariates — civic education, age, personal income (logged),

gender, and evaluations of personal as well as national economic conditions — a one-unit increase

in educational attainment increases the odds of religious tolerance by 44 percent (Model 7). So,

regardless of model specifications, education is positively associated with individuals’ tolerance of

different religions.

In order to examine the second hypothesis — which states that as people are more educated

under an authoritarian regime, they are less likely to have democratic values than those educated

under a democratic regime — Model 6 and Model 8 include an interaction term between educa-

tional attainment and levels of subnational democracy. Figure 5 displays the effect of education

on citizens’ religious tolerance across all levels of democracy at the subnational level. As Table

4 shows, the effect of education does not vary significantly according to subnational regime type.

The effect of education on religious tolerance among citizens who live in Tamaulipas, a rather au-

thoritarian regime (SDI= 37.20) is 0.11, while the democratizing effect of education among those

who live in Michoacan a rather democratic regime (SDI= 78.95) is 0.12 (Model 6). In Model 8,

which includes other control variables, the slope indicates an increase in the effect of education

as levels of subnational democracy increase, but the high confidence values reflect that predicted

values along this dimension are not statistically different from each other.

Table 5 shows how education affects an individual’s tolerance toward a person of a different

social class. Again, education is positively related to class tolerance in all four models (Models 9-

12). According to the estimates of Model 9, the odds of tolerating a different social class increase

by 58 percent as the level of education increases by one unit. When including various controls

(Model 12), the odds increase by 59. In other words, as citizens become more educated, they are

more likely to be tolerant toward people from different social classes.

Figure 6 illustrates the marginal effect of education on tolerance toward different social classes

38

Table 5: Multilevel Logistic Regression Models on Tolerance: Social Class

Dependent variable:

Tolerance: Social ClassModel 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12


(0.041) (0.041) (0.069) (0.069)


Education*SDI 0.021 0.044(0.043) (0.057)

Civic Education −0.411∗ −0.403∗

(0.231) (0.231)

Age −0.011∗ −0.011∗

(0.006) (0.006)

Personal Income −0.143∗∗ −0.144∗∗

(0.063) (0.063)

Male 0.002 −0.001(0.143) (0.143)

Evaluation of National Economic Condition −0.118∗ −0.119∗

(0.067) (0.067)

Evaluation of Personal Economic Condition 0.157∗∗ 0.160∗∗

(0.066) (0.066)

Constant 0.830∗∗∗ 0.830∗∗∗ 2.233∗∗∗ 2.233∗∗∗

(0.135) (0.134) (0.532) (0.532)



39


Figure 5: The Effect of Education on Tolerance of Religion across Subnational Democracy Index


across the Subnational Democracy Index. Similar to the effects of religious tolerance, the effect of

education is statistically significant regardless of subnational regime type. While the slope again

reflects an upward trend of education’s effect at higher levels of subnational democracy, these

differences across regime type are not statistically significant.

Table 6 shows the results of an individual’s level of education on whether he or she would rent

a room to a foreigner. Regardless of model specifications, as citizens become more educated, they

are more likely to be tolerant. With no controls in Model 13, the odds of tolerance toward foreigners

increase by 51 percent as educational attainment increases one unit. Controlling for other variables

(Model 15), the odds of tolerance increase by 36 percent as education level increases one unit.

Model 14 and Model 16 assess the second hypothesis: whether the democratizing effect of

education is weaker or nonexistent in nondemocratic subnational units. Figure 7 shows the effect

of education on tolerance toward foreigners across levels of democracy at the subnational level.

It shows that the effect of education is statistically significant across the Subnational Democracy

Index. In the results of Model 16, I find that at the minimum level of SDI (state of Coahuila)

the impact of education is not significant at the 95% level (although it is at the 90% level). In

this case, the slope is more pronounced than in the two prior cases (i.e., religion and social class

40

Table 6: Multilevel Logistic Regression Models on Tolerance: Foreigner

Dependent variable:

Tolerance: ForeignerModel 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16


(0.032) (0.032) (0.053) (0.053)

Subnational Democracy Index (SDI) −0.086 0.084 −0.097(0.113) (0.092) (0.128)

Education*SDI 0.049 0.090∗∗

(0.033) (0.045)

Civic Education 0.208 0.224(0.193) (0.193)

Age −0.008 −0.008(0.005) (0.005)

Personal Income 0.042 0.042(0.051) (0.051)

Male 0.210∗ 0.200∗

(0.114) (0.114)

Evaluation of National Economic Condition −0.017 −0.021(0.055) (0.055)

Evaluation of Personal Economic Condition 0.097∗ 0.105∗∗

(0.053) (0.053)

Constant −0.029 −0.027 −0.002 −0.019(0.117) (0.117) (0.429) (0.430)

Observations 3,491 3,491 1,813 1,813Log Likelihood −2,044.256 −2,043.149 −1,033.999 −1,031.956Akaike Inf. Crit. 4,094.512 4,096.299 2,087.998 2,085.911Bayesian Inf. Crit. 4,112.986 4,127.088 2,143.026 2,146.442States’ Variance 0.229 0.228 0.157 0.159States’ Standard Deviation 0.478 0.477 0.396 0.398


41


Figure 6: The Effect of Education on Tolerance of Social Class across Subnational DemocracyIndex



Figure 7: The Effect of Education on Tolerance of Foreigners across Subnational Democracy Index


42

tolerance), such that the coefficient for the interaction is statistically significant and moves in the

direction predicted by the second hypothesis. While the slope again reflects increases in the impact

of education at higher levels of subnational democracy, these differences across subnational regime

type are not statistically significant at the 95% confidence interval level.

Lastly, this chapter examines how education affects individuals’ civic participation using their

membership in social organizations. Table 7 shows that regardless of model specifications, as indi-

viduals become more educated, they are more likely to join an organization. According to Model

17, which does not include other control variables, the odds of being a member of an organization

increase by 13 percent with a one-unit increase in educational attainment. In Model 19, the odds

of having a membership in an organization increase by 16 percent.

Figure 8 plots the direct effect of education on individuals’ membership in social organizations

at various levels of subnational democracy (with 95 percent confidence interval). The result of

Model 18 indicates that additional educational attainment increases the probability of citizens’ civic

participation by 0.11 at low levels of the SDI, which is an authoritarian subnational regime, and

0.12 at high levels of the SDI, which is a democratic subnational regime. Figure 8b depicts results

of Model 20 that controls for civic education, age, personal income, gender, and evaluations of

national and personal economic conditions. A one-unit increase in educational attainment promotes

membership in an organization by 0.16 at low levels of the SDI and 0.14 at high levels of the SDI.

Therefore, the positive effect of education on individuals’ participation in social organizations is

relatively constant across subnational regime types.

In terms of control variables, the results are largely inconsistent. The clearest effect comes

from individuals’ evaluations of their own personal economic situations, which are positive and

significant with four of the five dependent variables tested. This association behaves as expected:

Individuals are more likely to hold democratic values when they feel that their personal economic

situation is improving. The variable capturing individuals’ evaluation of the national economic

condition is statistically significant in three of the five dependent variables. Contrary to expecta-

tions, the sign of the coefficient in these cases is negative. For the other variables, results are not

robust: education after the imposition of civic education is only significant with two of the five

dependent variables (and does not have the expected coefficient); the effect of age is inconsistent

43

Table 7: Multilevel Logistic Regression Models on Membership in Organizations

Dependent variable:

Membership in OrganizationsModel 17 Model 18 Model 19 Model 20


(0.028) (0.028) (0.048) (0.049)


Education*SDI 0.004 −0.004(0.028) (0.039)

Civic Education −0.685∗∗∗ −0.686∗∗∗

(0.175) (0.175)

Age 0.017∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗

(0.005) (0.005)

Personal Income 0.076 0.076(0.048) (0.048)

Male 0.045 0.045(0.106) (0.106)

Evaluation of National Economic Condition 0.051 0.051(0.051) (0.051)

Evaluation of Personal Economic Condition 0.136∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗

(0.049) (0.049)

Constant −0.264∗∗ −0.265∗∗ −1.825∗∗∗ −1.825∗∗∗

(0.131) (0.130) (0.416) (0.416)

Observations 3,529 3,529 1,827 1,827Log Likelihood −2,304.154 −2,303.869 −1,168.240 −1,168.234Akaike Inf. Crit. 4,614.308 4,617.737 2,356.480 2,358.467Bayesian Inf. Crit. 4,632.814 4,648.581 2,411.584 2,419.082


44


Figure 8: The Effect of Education on Membership in Organizations across Subnational DemocracyIndex


(sometimes positive, sometimes negative, and sometimes insignificant); and personal income and

gender are statistically insignificant in four of the five dependent variables.

In sum, additional schooling renders individuals more supportive of democracy, more tolerant

toward individuals of unfamiliar religions, different social classes, and foreigners, and more likely

to join social organizations. Moreover, the results presented in this chapter fail to support the idea,

captured in hypothesis 2, that education’s effect on democratic value is nonexistent or weaker under

less democratic (i.e., more authoritarian) regimes. In terms of education’s effect, I demonstrate

that the positive effect of education on democratic values is statistically significant at all levels

of subnational democracy. There was significant variation across levels of subnational democracy

in only two of the five dependent variables. At the lowest values of subnational democracy the

relationship between education and support for democracy is actually stronger (in contrast to the

expectation of H2). However, the tolerance of foreigners variable provides some indication that

the democratizing effect of education is significantly lower at the lowest values of subnational

democracy. Overall, the results presented in this chapter provide support for the first hypothesis

over the second.

45

Conclusion

Education plays a role in individuals’ “breadth of perspective” (Halman 2007, 314). Demo-

cratic values lead citizens to develop individual and collective demands, present their demands to

the government, and evaluate the performance of the government. Citizens’ democratic values can

help to spur democratic transition and consolidation. In this chapter, I have examined the con-

nection between education and democratic values at the level of the individual. Prior evidence

suggests that education improves levels of democracy; however, its effects on democratic values

in transitional democracies remain empirically unexplored. Several previous studies also have hy-

pothesized that the effect of education is not universal. Because the contents of education vary

across political systems, and education may facilitate the acceptance of official policies and estab-

lished norms, some scholars argue that a positive relationship between education and democracy

should not be present in authoritarian societies.

This chapter contributes to the democratization literature by examining a variety of democratic

values and how education affects them, according to subnational regime type in Mexico. Using

multiple operationalizations of democratic values, such as support for democracy, tolerance for

people with an unfamiliar religion, different foreigners, and people from a different social class, as

well as membership in social organizations, I demonstrate that an increase in educational attain-

ment fosters democratic values. Moreover, I find that this positive effect of education on democratic

values is present at all levels of subnational democracy. The evidence presented in this chapter

shows that the positive effect of education on support for democracy is actually stronger among

individuals who live in more authoritarian subnational regimes. The effect of education on the

likelihood of joining organizations does not vary according to subnational regime type, and for the

most part, this result is also evident when I investigate education’s impact on tolerance. Overall,

the democratizing effect of education appears to be significant regardless of subnational regime

type.

The struggle for democratic development hinges not only on institutions, but also on political

culture. Levy, Bruhn and Zebadua (2006, 268) argue that, “the institutions which support democ-

racy have yet to develop roots as deep as those that long sustained authoritarianism”. The findings

of this chapter indicate that increases in education — and related policies such as literacy cam-

46

paigns, enrollment efforts, greater educational funding, etc. — should work to enhance a political

culture favorable to democracy.

47

Chapter 4 - Education and Voter Turnout in the United States,

1972-2014

Several empirical studies on electoral behavior indicate that voter turnout in the United States

has declined. Given the increase in favorable conditions for active political participation, such

as increases in information, higher levels of education, less restrictive registration processes, the

extension of suffrage to women, and the elimination of restrictions that once hampered the partic-

ipation of racial minorities, the decline seems puzzling. Within the many explanations in the liter-

ature, two stand out: generational factors and the changing nature of educational attainment. The

first highlights how younger generations are politically disengaged, which leads to lower turnout.

Much of the literature also addresses the impact of education on turnout. Many scholars have

shown that education fosters voter turnout. However, more recent works have focused on how

increasing levels of education have coexisted with decreasing turnout, calling into question the

presumed positive relationship between the two variables. Previous studies have argued that the

competitive educational environment cancels out the absolute value of education, and as a result,

education no longer serves as a predictor.23

This chapter addresses these issues by specifically exploring three aspects of the voter turnout

debate: 1) the evidence indicating a decline in voter turnout, 2) the difference in turnout across

generations, and 3) the puzzle of increasing levels of education without a corresponding increase

in turnout. I demonstrate that instead of decreasing, voter turnout has remained relatively static

over time. I shed light on this fact by examining voter turnout rates over a longer period of time

than prior works. Whereas most previous studies have examined voter turnout rates from the 1960s

to the 1980s, I extend the time period up through 2012, to include 52 years of data taken from

McDonald (2016). I also use data from the General Social Survey (GSS) to show that at the

individual level, voter turnout from 1972 to 2014 has remained static.23Nie, Junn and Stehlik-Barry (1996) measure the absolute value of education as “years of education” and the

competitive educational environment as “the mean educational level of the population when an individual was 25years old.” The absolute value of education implies education’s influence on individuals’ civic duty. For example,education is found to promote individuals’ understanding of democratic rule, the recognition of a shared destiny withothers in the political community, and the realization of important collective interests. The competitive educationalenvironment is related to education’s effect on social status by enabling citizen access to political power. For a detailedexplanation, see Section: Reassessing Variation in Voter Turnout.

48

I argue that the generational effect hypothesis is problematic. Some of the scholarship that

supports this claim does not control for the effect of education on voter turnout. Others claim that

the average turnout rate among older generations decreases because a large percentage of them

have little education. In contrast, the average turnout rates among younger generations increase

because a large portion of this group is highly educated. My reexamination of this hypothesis

reveals mixed results of generational effect on voter turnout depending on model specifications.

Lastly, I argue that long-term data is most suitable to examine the effects of the absolute value of

education and of the competitive educational environment. I confirm the long-standing positive

relationship between absolute levels of education and voter turnout from the 1970s to the 2010s.

Moreover, I demonstrate that the competitive educational environment is insignificant from the

1970s to the 1990s. However, the competitive educational environment does reduce voter turnout

in the 2000s and early 2010s.

To undertake this analysis, I use data from the General Social Survey (GSS) from 1972 to

2014. By examining data over a longer time span than existing studies, I am able to observe

more variation in voter turnout, uncovering the effects of both the generational component and

educational attainment. More generally, this analysis contributes to the study of electoral behavior

by demonstrating that the effect of education on voter turnout diminishes over time, that educational

environment measures have significant explanatory power during the 2000s and beyond, but that,

overall, generational influences differ based on specifications.

Explaining Voter Turnout

Institutional- and individual-level characteristics help explain voter turnout. The institutional

characteristics typically refer to features such as registration requirements, the proportionality of

electoral rules, the number of parties, and patterns of competition in electoral districts (Engstrom

2012). Previous research has also demonstrated that individual characteristics, such as education,

income, age, the strength of partisanship, and race, help determine levels of political participation.

One particularly relevant finding within this body of work is that turnout in the United States has

been declining (Brody 1978; Burnham 1982; Abramson and Aldrich 1982; Teixeira 1987; Miller

1992; Stanley and Niemi 1998). This decline has been linked to individual and institutional factors.

49

Researchers attribute low voter turnout to weaker partisanship and decreasing newspaper reader-

ship, political interests, social involvement, and political efficacy (Converse 1972; Rosenstone and

Hansen 1993). Institutional characteristics in the United States, such as the lack of competitive

elections, the weak connection between parties and groups of citizens, and the difficulty of voter

registration, also explain low turnout (Powell 1986). The main arguments dominating this body of

literature are: 1) generational effects and 2) educational attainment.

The main thrust of the generational effects argument is that the younger generations are politi-

cally disengaged, leading to lower turnout (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1967; Langton and Jennings

1968; Miller 1992; Miller and Shanks 1996; Niemi and Chapman 1998; Niemi and Junn 2005;

Galston 2001; Torney-Purta 2002; Galston 2004; Pasek, Feldman, Romer and Jamieson 2007).

Younger generations are thought to have different values from older generations, leading to a de-

cline in turnout. For example, younger generations are theorized to be less interested in politics,

less motivated by political engagement, and more concerned with personal issues than with poli-

tics. However, not all studies agree. For example, Niemi and Weisberg (2001) find no relationship

between generation and voter turnout.

Aside from generational effects, much of the literature also addresses the impact of education on

turnout. Among the individual characteristics that affect political engagement, education is thought

to play the most pronounced role (Franklin 2004; Berinsky and Lenz 2011). The long-established

conventional argument is that there is higher voter turnout among individuals with higher levels

of education (Gosnell 1927; Arneson 1925; Lerner 1958; Almond and Verba 1963). Studies have

concluded that education is a more influential predictor of turnout than income (Wolfinger and

Rosenstone 1967; Leighley and Nagler 2014).

A number of mechanism explain the relationship between educational attainment and political

participation. Education improves an individual’s knowledge and understanding of politics, pro-

vides more free time and better income, and promotes a sense of civic duty leading to involvement

with civic groups and associations, all of which have been associated with electoral participation

(Becker 1964; Riker and Ordeschook 1968; Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes 1980; Brady,

Verba and Schlozman 1995; Nie, Junn and Stehlik-Barry 1996; Barro 1999; Helliwell and Putnam

2000; Kam and Palmer 2008). Some studies have also shown that individuals are further motivated

50

Figure 9: Voter Turnout Rates, the United States, 1960 - 1988

Note: Voter turnout at the aggregate level is created using data from “National Turnout Rates, 1787-2012” of United States Elections Project taken by Michael P. McDonald (2016).

to vote because education exposes them to prevailing political values (Brody 1978; Mayer 2011).

Despite the well-established association between education and voter participation, scholars have

argued that increases in educational levels over the past few decades have occurred simultaneously

with a decline in voter turnout in the United States (Brody 1978; Nie, Junn and Stehlik-Barry 1996;

Franklin 2004; Campbell 2009).

Thus, although education is largely seen as a positive predictor within this body of work, it is

at odds with scholars who find declining voter participation. This paradox has caught scholars’

attention: If education is one of the most important predictors of increasing voting behavior, and

it has increased over time, why hasn’t there been an increase in voter turnout in the United States?

This chapter addresses both this paradoxical relationship and generational effects on voter turnout.

Reassessing Variation in Voter Turnout

Several prominent scholars argue that voter turnout has decreased in the United States in spite

of favorable conditions for active political participation, such as politically aware citizens, dramat-

ically increasing levels of education, less restrictive registration, and extending suffrage to women

51

(a) Aggregate Voting-Eligible Population Turnout, 1960 -2012

(b) Individual Eligible Voters’ Turnout, 1972 - 2012

Figure 10: Voter Turnout Rates, the United States

Note: Voter turnout at the aggregate level is created using data from “National Turnout Rates, 1787-2012” of the United States Elections Project taken by Michael P. McDonald (2016). Individual voterturnout is created using data from General Social Survey (GSS).

and Blacks (Burnham 1982; Abramson and Aldrich 1982; Miller 1992; Niemi and Weisberg 2001).

Most scholars assert that the decline started in 1960, and their supporting evidence is drawn from

turnout data between the 1960s to the 1980s (Abramson and Aldrich 1982; Teixeira 1987; Nie,

Junn and Stehlik-Barry 1996; Niemi and Weisberg 2001; Stanley and Niemi 1998). As shown in

Figure 9, turnout in presidential elections among the voting-eligible population decreased from

63.8 to 52.8 percent from 1960 to 1988.

Despite the conventional belief that turnout has decreased over time, it has actually remained

relatively static. I examine voter turnout rates over a longer, 52-year duration that spans from 1960

to 2012. Figure 9 presents voter turnout rates from 1960 to 1988, a typical time span featured in

the literature. In contrast, in the left panel of Figure 10, I present voter turnout rates from 1960 to

2012. It reveals that voter turnout does not consistently decline over time but is instead relatively

static. It is true that turnout in the 1960s was slightly higher than in the following decades, but

if the 1970s is instead taken as the starting point, voter turnout slightly increases. For instance,

voter turnout during the 2004 and 2008 presidential elections was relatively high. Thus, contrary

52

to existing studies and conventional wisdom, voter participation has not been consistently declining

since 1960.

As previously discussed, the “generational component” (Niemi and Weisberg 2001, 27) has

been one mechanism to explain this theorized decline, wherein younger generations are less likely

to vote than older generations. Blais and Rubenson (2010) recently demonstrated that post-boomers

born after 1960 are less likely to vote because they feel less dutiful and externally efficacious. By

testing American National Election Study (ANES) data from 1952 to 1992, Blais and Rubenson

(2010) conclude that the post-boomer generation is the primary driving force behind the decrease

in voter turnout. However, the decline in turnout is empirically debatable, which calls into question

whether generational effects do indeed explain a decline in voter participation. Moreover, this

previous study on generational effects does not control for educational attainment. Thus, it is

questionable whether values attributed to younger generations (e.g., less dutiful and efficacious)

explain turnout variation once education is considered.

In a recent work, Dalton (2016) addresses generational effects on voter turnout by comparing

voting patterns with levels of education and age, using data from GSS from 2004 to 2014. He

argues that younger generations are less likely to vote and identifies relevant differences in their

educational traits.24 However, he finds that less educated people are more common in older gen-

erations. In contrast, highly educated people are more common within the younger generations.

He argues, “the greater relative size of the lesser educated among the older voters pulls down

their average participation, and the greater size of the better educated among the youngest cohorts

pulls up their overall participation rates” (Dalton 2016, 76). If the highly educated younger gen-

erations increase their average voter turnout, does educational attainment overwhelm the effect of

the generational component on voter turnout? To address the generational effect on voter turnout,

educational attainment must be considered.

The second view emphasizes two separate values of education to explain low turnout: the

absolute and the relative value. The work of Nie, Junn and Stehlik-Barry (1996) is particularly

relevant for addressing the paradox of low voter turnout among the highly educated. They contend

that education affects democratic citizenship through two different channels: democratic enlight-

24Dalton (2016) defines more educated people as those who had more than twelve years of schooling.

53

enment and democratic engagement. Democratic enlightenment signifies the understanding of

democratic rule, the recognition of a shared destiny with others in the political community, and

the realization of important collective interests. Democratic engagement indicates one’s capability

to understand politics, comprehend one’s own interest, and pursue that interest through political

means. According to the authors, democratic enlightenment is directly affected by education and

leads to political participation, while democratic engagement is directly affected by social status,

both in employment and social networks, which grants access to political power. In other words,

the argument is that education shifts an individual’s social position closer to the central power.

The effect of education upon democratic enlightenment and, in turn, political participation is ab-

solute because education increases cognitive capacity. However, education’s effect on democratic

engagement is relative and bounded as it is primarily determined by a “competitive educational

environment” (Nie, Junn and Stehlik-Barry 1996). Even though the educated population has in-

creased, the number of positions that grant access to political power is limited, which leads to

greater competition among the population. The authors offer some evidence to support the view

that civic enlightenment occurs through cognitive proficiency measured by verbal proficiency, and

that civic engagement occurs through an individual’s centrality in social networks measured by

personal acquaintance with elected officials and members of the media.

Furthermore, Nie, Junn and Stehlik-Barry’s (1996) explanation of this paradox stems from

these distinct paths through which education affects participation. They argue that the structure of

representative democracy has inherent limitations because the political arena cannot accommodate

all political demands of all the people (Nie, Junn and Stehlik-Barry 1996, 103). As individuals

become more educated, the political marketplace becomes saturated with demands. The political

system becomes less efficient amid increasing demands on a stable supply of representatives. The

authors test their theory regarding democratic engagement and enlightenment using data from GSS

and National Election Survey from 1972 to 1994. They find that increases in absolute values of ed-

ucation are associated with increases in both civic enlightenment and civic engagement. However,

the educational environment, measured as the mean educational level of the population when an

individual reaches 25 years of age, is negatively associated with civic engagement. Therefore, they

conclude that the positive effects of absolute levels of education on civic engagement are offset by

54

increasing the educational competition over time. Because the work of Nie, Junn and Stehlik-Barry

(1996) examines the absolute and relative values of education on voter turnout by focusing on the

data from 1972 to 1994, which is the time period that most previous studies consider, it is important

to assess how the two separate values of education affect voter participation in the recent decades,

extending the time period from 1972 to 2014.

Previous studies have shown that voter turnout has declined; however, these studies focus on the

years from 1960 to 1988. When I extend the time period to 2012, I find that the overall voter turnout

has been relatively static. However, variations over the 52-year period reveal a U-shape curve, with

a small decline in turnout from 1960 to 1980, a stabilization from 1980 to 1990, and an increase

from 1990 to 2012. In light of this new trend, previous findings on generation and educational

attainment should be reassessed to ensure the results persist across each decade. Additionally,

the absolute and relative values of education should be tested using a longer time frame to better

evaluate the paradoxical relationship between education and voter participation. The next section

presents the data and statistical model I used to test the impact of education and generation on voter

turnout.

Testing Explanations of Voter Turnout

The survey questions analyzed in this chapter come from the General Social Survey (GSS)

cumulated from 1972 to 2014, which consists of 59,599 eligible voters. Each survey from 1972

to 2014 includes English speakers who were at least 18 years old. Since 2006, it also includes

Spanish speakers. The goal of this chapter is to assess three controversies: 1) whether increases in

educational attainment increase voter turnout, 2) whether the competitive educational environment

decreases voter turnout, and 3) whether there are generational differences in the propensity to vote.

I start with the following model:

VoterTurnoutit = αYearso f Educationit +βEducationalEnvironmentit

+ γAgeit +δAge2it +θPreBoomersit +λPostBoomersit +κMaleit +∆Whiteit

+σStrengtho f Partisanshipit +ζ PersonalIncomeit +µt + x0 + εit

55

The dependent variable is voter turnout, which is coded as a dichotomous variable indicating

whether the respondents i voted in the previous presidential election, at time i.25 On the right-hand

side, I include the highest year of education that individuals attained at the time of the survey and

the educational environment. Following Nie, Junn and Stehlik-Barry (1996), the measure of the

educational environment is equal to the mean educational level (years) of the birth cohort when

an individual reaches 25 years of age. Concerning the third hypothesis, I also include age, age-

squared, and two generational effect dummy variables to measure whether individuals were born

before or after the baby boomer era.26 The model also controls for the strength of partisanship27,

personal income28, gender29, and race.30 I build a logistic regression model with time fixed effects

captured by the set of year dummies, µt , to evaluate whether the effect of education on voter turnout

varied over time.31 Lastly, there is an error term, εit , capturing omitted factors.

Results

Table 8 presents the results of a logistic regression predicting the effect of education on voter

turnout. Each model shows the effect of education for the 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s/2010s

respectively.32 The results show a positive relationship between educational attainment and voter

25This chapter only considers eligible voters.26I followed Blais and Rubenson’s (2010) measure of generational effects. The pre-boomers are individuals who

were born before 1945. The post-boomers are those who were born after 1960. The baby boomers are the referencegroup who were born between 1945 and 1960.

27This chapter coded the strength of partisanship as 0 if respondents are independent, 1 if respondents are leaningtoward an independent stance, 2 if individuals are weakly partisan, and 3 if respondents are strongly partisan.

28GSS provides a personal income variable as the income range corresponding to percentiles in each year. This chap-ter coded the personal income variable by choosing the lowest number in each income range for each year. For instance,the intervals are under $1,000, $1,000-2,999, $3,000-3,999, $4,000-4,999, $5,000-5,999, $6,000-6,999, $7,000-7,999,$8,000-9,999, $10,000-14,999, $15,000-19,999, $20,000-24,999, and $25,000 or over. For this, I coded $0 if respon-dents belong to under $1,000, $1,000 if respondents belong in the range of $1,000-2,999, $3,000 if they belong to$3,000-3,999, $4,000 if they fall in $4,000-4,999, $5,000 if they are in $5,000-5,999, and so on. Subsequently, thischapter adjusted the variable for inflation with Consumer Price Index (CPI) by making the income in 2012 as a baseyear. Then, it is divided by $1,000.

29The gender variable is coded as a dichotomous variable, with 1 if respondents are male or 0 otherwise.30The race variable is coded as a dummy variable, with 1 if respondents are White or 0 otherwise.31All the empirical results in this chapter use GSS weights provided by the dataset. Also, in the Appendix C, Table

12 represents the description of variables for the empirical research.32 Each model includes the set of year dummies, such as 1975-1980, 1983-1991, 1994-2000, and 2004-2012 respec-

tively. In the Appendix C, Table 13 shows the results of bivariate analysis on the relationship between the absolutevalue of education and voter turnout for the decades of the 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s/2010s respectively. I findconfirmation of the long-standing positive relationship between absolute levels of education and voter turnout overtime. Table 14 shows the results of bivariate analysis on the relationship between educational environment and voterturnout over time. In the bivariate logistic regression model, the competitive educational environment is statisticallysignificant and reduces individuals’ voter participation across the time period analyzed in this study.

56

turnout across the time period analyzed. As individuals become more educated, they are more

likely to vote, controlling for gender, race, the strength of partisanship, personal income, and gener-

ational effects. Thus, the absolute value of education has a positive influence on voter participation

over time.

Model 1 shows that a one-year increase in years of education corresponds to an increase in the

odds of voting by 31 percent during the 1970s. In addition, this chapter finds strong positive coef-

ficients for the years of education in Models 2-4. Those who are more educated are significantly

more likely to vote than those who are less educated. Figure 11 compares the marginal effect of a

year of education in each decade by holding all other conditions constant at the mean values. The

marginal effect of education increases voter turnout by 4.6, 4.4, 3.9, and 3.7 percent in the 1970s,

1980s, 1990s, and 2000s/2010s respectively. Overall, the logistic regression analysis shows that

the positive effect of education on voter turnout diminishes as time passes.33

With regard to the educational environment, results show that it is a statistically significant

predictor of the probability of voting only in Model 4. A one-unit increase in the competitive

educational environment leads to a decrease in the odds of voting by 62 percent. Consequently,

an increase in the competitive educational environment is negatively associated with individuals’

participation in voting in the 2000s and early 2010s. In order to show the relative effect of educa-

tion on voter turnout, I show the predicted probability of voter turnout for people who are male,

White, lean independent, and are born in 1957 (baby boomers) by varying their birth cohort’s av-

erage years of education, the educational environment, in Figure 12. It shows that the competitive

educational environment has a negative impact on turnout across individuals’ levels of education.

In general, individuals are less likely to vote as the population becomes more educated during the

2000s and early 2010s. However, the educational environment is less likely to affect the probability

of voter turnout among those with the highest educational attainment. On the other hand, it’s more

33I show the results of alternative specifications using GSS in the Appendix C. Regardless of alternative specifica-tions, there is evidence that additional schooling increases voter turnout and its effect declines over time. Table 18 isthe same models of Table 8 with no fixed effects of years. I demonstrate that education is positively associated withvoter turnout over time in Table 18. Figure 17 plots the marginal effect of education on voter turnout in Models 9-12by holding all other conditions constant at the mean values. The graph shows that education’s positive effect on voterturnout declines over time, which is consistent with my previous outcome with fixed effects of years. Moreover, Ispecify further models, excluding age and age-squared since age and generation variables are highly correlated. Table19 considers year fixed effects while Table 20 excludes year fixed effects. In Tables 19-20, both model specificationswith and without year fixed effects show that an additional year of schooling is positively related to voter turnout;however, this positive effect of education diminishes over time as it is in other specifications.

57

Table 8: The Effect of Education on Voter Turnout (Logistic Regression Results)

Dependent Variable:

Voter Turnout

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4

(1970s) (1980s) (1990s) (2000s/2010s)

Years of Education 0.270∗∗∗ 0.257∗∗∗ 0.233∗∗∗ 0.238∗∗∗

(0.015) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011)

Educational Environment 0.731 −0.106 0.561 −0.969∗∗∗

(0.839) (0.381) (0.364) (0.354)

Age 0.091 0.067∗∗∗ 0.041∗ 0.091∗∗∗

(0.060) (0.020) (0.022) (0.024)

Age2 0.0002 −0.0002 0.0003 −0.001∗∗

(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004)

Pre-Boomers 0.291∗ −0.051 0.003 −0.401(0.175) (0.136) (0.176) (0.244)

Post-Boomers 0.063 −0.028 −0.032(0.125) (0.110) (0.104)

Male −0.179∗∗ −0.250∗∗∗ −0.245∗∗∗ −0.208∗∗∗

(0.080) (0.055) (0.058) (0.056)

White 0.160 0.331∗∗∗ 0.413∗∗∗ 0.436∗∗∗

(0.111) (0.067) (0.069) (0.063)

Strength of Partisanship 0.370∗∗∗ 0.585∗∗∗ 0.633∗∗∗ 0.699∗∗∗

(0.038) (0.028) (0.028) (0.027)

Personal Income 0.010∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗

(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)

Constant −15.886 −4.689 −13.054∗∗∗ 6.449(12.124) (5.362) (4.806) (4.497)

Observations 4,870 9,114 7,863 8,729Log Likelihood −2,437.374 −5,472.931 −4,559.546 −4,084.992Akaike Inf. Crit. 4,904.748 10,985.860 9,149.093 8,201.983

Note: Standard errors are in parenthesis for each coefficient. Year dummies are not shown. Significance level ∗,∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate zero is not covered by the 90, 95, and 99 percent confidence interval, respectively.

58

Figure 11: Marginal Effect of Education on Voter Turnout

Note: The 95 percent confidence intervals are shown.

Figure 12: Predicted Probability of Voter Turnout in 2004

Note: The 95 percent confidence interval is highlighted in gray.

59

likely to influence those with the lowest educational attainment. Therefore, this negative impact of

educational environment is significant among less educated people as shown in Figure 12.

This result contradicts Nie, Junn and Stehlik-Barry’s (1996) work, raising the question of why

the competitive educational environment is only significant during the 2000s and early 2010s. Un-

like the previous studies, I find that the estimated coefficients for the competitive educational en-

vironment are not statistically significant and do not reduce voter turnout from the 1970s to the

1990s. On the contrary, I demonstrate that individuals are less likely to vote as their educational

environment becomes more competitive in the 2000s and beyond.

Nonetheless, in the alternative specifications, the covariate of the competitive educational en-

vironment shows mixed results. Contrary to the outcome of Table 8, the outcome of the models

without year fixed effects demonstrates that the educational environment is not statistically signif-

icant in the 1970s, the 1990s, the 2000s, and beyond. In the model specification without age and

age-squared, the estimated coefficients of the competitive educational environment are statistically

significant across the time period and negative directions as Nie, Junn and Stehlik-Barry (1996)

expected. This implies that the effect of the competitive educational environment shows mixed

results depending on model specifications.

Lastly, the results indicate that there is no generational effect on voter turnout. When the

generational effect is tested with educational attainment, the educational impact overwhelms the

generational influence on voter participation. In Model 1, pre-boomers are more likely to vote than

baby boomers. However, generational effects are not statistically significant in Models 2-4.

In the additional model specifications, the effect of generation shows mixed results. In models

without year fixed effects, I demonstrate that there is no generational effect in Table 18. However,

in models without age and age-squared, the pre-boomer generation is less likely to participate in

voter turnout in the 2000s and early 2010s and the post-boomer generation is less likely to vote

from the 1980s to the 2000s and beyond compared to the baby boomer generation regardless of

whether I include year fixed effects or not in Tables 19-20. In that sense, the generational effects

on voter turnout differ according to specifications.

More educated individuals are more likely to vote. However, the positive effects of education

diminish over time. The relative effect of education on voter turnout does not predict citizens’

60

voter turnout from the 1970s to the 1990s. However, the competitive educational environment is

statistically significant and decreases voter turnout during the 2000s and early 2010s. Neverthe-

less, these findings challenge the results of previous studies. The educational environment does

not statistically predict individuals’ voter turnout and cancels out the absolute value of education

from the 1970s to the 1990s. Finally, younger generations are not less likely to vote than older

generations.34

Discussion

In this study, I present two principal findings regarding the impact of education on voter turnout.

First, the positive effect of educational attainment diminishes over time. Second, the competitive

educational environment does not have an influence on voter turnout until the post-2000 period.

These findings deserve further commentary.

First, what explains the diminishing effect of education on voter turnout? One possible reason

may be that education itself has changed, and as a result, its impact on turnout has become less

effective. In the last few years, several reports have argued that the quality of education in the

United States has decreased. For example, one of the main findings from the Council on Foreign

Relations’ “Renewing America” initiative quoted repeatedly in the media was that the U.S. educa-

tion system has worsened, slipping in international rankings over the past three decades.35 If the

quality of education is associated with education’s role in democratic enlightenment, this decrease

in educational quality may have an effect on participation in the political system.

34These results are consistent with results using data from American National Election Studies (ANES) from 1972to 2012. The results are shown in the Appendix C. ANES does not provide years of education, but levels of education.I recode levels of education as 1 if respondents finished less than high school, 2 if respondents finished some highschool but no diploma, 3 if respondents completed high school or equivalency, 4 if respondents finished vocationaltraining, 5 if respondents finished some college, 6 if respondents finished bachelor-level degrees, and 7 if respondentscompleted advanced degrees. ANES does not provide personal income variable, but family income. Other variablesare coded in the same way as I describe in Section: Results. Because the data does not employ the same variables as theGSS, the results might include measurement errors. Table 15 and Table 16 show the results of bivariate analysis on theeffects of the absolute value of education and educational environment on voter turnout for the decades of the 1970s,1980s, 1990s, and 2000s/2010s. In the bivariate logistic regression model, as individuals become more educated, theyare more likely to participate in voter turnout. The competitive educational environment is statistically significantand reduces individuals’ voter participation across the time period analyzed in this study. As shown in Table 17, Ifind that as levels of education increase, individuals are more likely to participate in voting over time. However, thepositive effect of education on voter turnout diminishes over time as shown in Figure 16. The competitive educationalenvironment does not decrease voter turnout over time. Also, the educational environment does not offset the absolutevalue of education. The results suggest that there is no generational effect on voter turnout.

35Rebecca Strauss. “Schooling Ourselves in an Unequal America.” The New York Times, June 16, 2013.

61

Figure 13: Education Quality, the United States, 1970 - 2010

Note: Education quality is created using data from “A Global Data Set on Education Quality” of theWorld Bank. This data set is constructed from international achievement tests, such as PISA andTIMMS.

In order to assess this explanation, I have collected education quality data from the World Bank.

This variable measures quality of education based on international achievement tests. Figure 13

shows the average adjusted test scores from 1970 to 2010. As we can observe, the measure of

education quality is relatively static across time, though there is a slight variation in the average

adjusted test score. These numbers suggest that education’s quality is unlikely to be the cause

of decreasing levels of voter turnout. In short, the findings of this chapter underline the need for

further research on why levels of education have a lower impact on turnout in the United States

now than in earlier decades, and suggest that this trend is unlikely to be caused by the quality of

education itself.

Furthermore, it is necessary to consider what types of education have been prioritized in the

U.S. education system. The World Bank’s global dataset on education quality is constructed from

international achievement tests, such as the Program for International Student Assessment (PISA)

and the Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMMS). These tests are assessed

based on students’ knowledge and performance in science and mathematics. Individuals’ abilities

in science and mathematics are important because these skills are needed in the workplace and

62

in order to achieve technological innovation. However, education in history, literature, civics, and

government may be key to enabling democratic citizens by increasing individuals’ abilities to think

critically about political issues, write about their opinions, understand others’ views, and recognize

the importance of civic values and their roles as citizens in society. It is possible that science

and math education in the United States has remained competitive over time while education in

history, literature, civics, and government has decayed. Therefore, further studies on the impact

of education in history, literature, civics, and government may specifically answer education’s

diminishing effect on voter turnout.

The second finding that deserves further explanation concerns the mostly insignificant effect

of the competitive educational environment, which was a key argument in Nie, Junn and Stehlik-

Barry’s (1996) study. One shortcoming may be with the operationalization of a competitive edu-

cational environment, which may not adequately capture individuals’ positions in social networks

(Tenn 2005; Campbell 2009; Persson 2011). Specifically, Nie, Junn and Stehlik-Barry (1996) op-

erationalize this variable by birth cohort group for each respondent. Individuals are placed into a

birth cohort group with everyone between the ages of 25 and 50 in the year the respondent turned

25. Then, Nie, Junn and Stehlik-Barry (1996) calculate the average years of education for this

birth cohort group. According to the authors, as more people are educated, one’s relative position

in the network will worsen because there is greater competition for accessing politically influen-

tial actors. But, do individuals compete only within their own birth cohorts? It could be argued

that people are not only competing within their birth cohort groups, but also with younger cohorts.

Thus, Nie, Junn and Stehlik-Barry (1996)’s measure may not fully capture individuals’ competitive

educational environment.

Another issue related to the educational environment is whether individuals’ decisions to vote

are affected by their proximity to politically powerful actors, such as representatives and gov-

ernment agencies. Nie, Junn and Stehlik-Barry (1996, 46) argue that education affects citizens’

proximity to elected officials and people who work for mass media. Individuals who are far away

from political power have much more difficulty conveying their opinions and preferences to these

actors. The more educated the birth cohort, the less connected to powerful political actors any

one individual may be, which indirectly lowers political engagement propensity. However, Nie et

63

al.’s measure of proximity to political power shows that it is not important for voter turnout during

most of the studied period. While this may lead some to dismiss this causal argument, the results

of this chapter show that in the most recent period, it has a statistically significant effect. Thus,

it is still premature to draw definitive conclusions about how competitiveness of the educational

environment impacts voter turnout. This is another area that would benefit from further research.

Conclusion

The analysis in this study examines trends in voter turnout in the United States, focusing on

generational differences and the impact of education. Contrary to existing studies and conventional

belief, this chapter shows that voter turnout has remained relatively static over the period from 1960

to 2012.

Overall, this chapter confirms the view that as individuals become more educated, they are more

likely to vote. But the findings in this study also show that the positive effect of education on voter

turnout has diminished over time. These results are robust across model specifications and different

data. In addition, the analysis shows that the amount of competition in educational environments

does not affect voter turnout prior to the 2000s, contrary to prior findings. The results show that

competitive educational environment reduces voter turnout only after the year 2000. However, the

effect of educational environment provides mixed results depending on model specifications. With

no fixed effects of years, the covariate of educational environment is not statistically significant

except for the 1980s. Also, without age and age-squared, the educational environment decreases

voter turnout from the 1970s to the 2000s and beyond. Unlike previous studies, the results of this

study conclude that the post-boomer generation is not less likely to vote than the generations before

them. Using data from the American National Election Study (ANES) from 1972 to 2012 yields

similar results. However, the generational effect on voter turnout shows mixed results; the effect

differs depending on model specifications. Models with no fixed effects demonstrate that there is

no generational effect; nonetheless, regardless of considering time fixed effects, the post-boomers

are less likely to vote than the baby boomers in the models without age and age-squared.

These findings contribute to a rich literature that seeks to understand individuals’ voting be-

havior. It has implications for policies designed to promote voter turnout through education. This

64

study also highlights some areas for further research. For instance, it is worthwhile to next examine

why levels of education do not increase voter turnout as much now as they did in the past. The im-

pact of the competitive educational environment on voter turnout is also a worthwhile relationship

for future study. While some authors have emphasized its impact on voter turnout, the findings in

this chapter raise some challenges to this view.

65

Chapter 5 - Conclusion

This dissertation has tackled the relationship between education and democracy. While the

work on democratization, democratic culture, and political behavior is incredibly rich, the role that

education plays in these areas remains to be fully explored. My work has sought to contribute to

distinct areas of research on education and politics. The three empirical chapters of this disserta-

tion have explored the role of education on democratic stability, the development of democratic

attitudes, and voter turnout. More specifically, I have sought to investigate the following top-

ics. First, I examine the impact of education on regime stability in transitional and consolidated

democracies. Furthermore, I examine whether the effect of education differs among poor and rich

democracies. Second, I focus on the relationship between education and individual attitudes usu-

ally associated with democratic values. I examine the case of Mexico to uncover whether there

is a positive relationship between education and support for democracy, tolerance, involvement in

social organizations, and to what extent this relationship is weaker or nonexistent in authoritarian

contexts. Lastly, I tackle the debate about education and voter turnout in the United States. Here, I

investigate how robust the relationship between education and voter turnout over time, and whether

generational effects and the relative value of education affect this relationship.

The findings of this dissertation move this research agenda further. Chapter 2 shows that edu-

cation plays a significant role in strengthening transitional democracies. After authoritarian break-

down, increases in levels of education help prevent an authoritarian reversal. I expected the impact

of education to be stronger among poor countries than the wealthy; the evidence points in that di-

rection but it is not conclusive. In consolidated democracies, reversals to authoritarianism are rare,

and the evidence shows that changes in levels of education do not play a significant role in such

rare occurrences.

Chapter 3 expands our understanding of Mexico’s political culture and the debate about the

interaction between education’s democratizing effect and regime type. In Mexico, education is

strongly associated with individuals’ democratic attitudes. Support for democracy, tolerance for

others, and participation in organizations is strongly associated with an individual’s education.

Overall, cross-state variation in democratic attitudes is not associated with the state’s position in

the index of democracy. This appears incompatible with theories that argue that the link between

66

education and democratic values is conditional on regime type.

Chapter 4 revisits the debate about education and voter turnout in the United States. The data

shows that variation in turnout rates does not reflect a consistent decline over time. More impor-

tantly, I find that education remains a strong predictor of voter turnout over 52 years, despite some

weakening in recent decades. While the direct effect of education on turnout is consistently sig-

nificant, the indirect effect through the competitive educational environment does not appear to be

relevant for most of the period studied (only after 2000).

Overall, the results of these chapters contribute a more nuanced empirical analysis of education

and democracy. They also highlight areas for future research. With regard to the comparative anal-

ysis of the effect of education on democratic stability, this dissertation signals that there is further

research needed on the micro-foundation of education’s role in democratic consolidation. Previous

studies have, for the most part, focused on education’s complex impact on democracy. This dis-

sertation also suggests that the effect of education is likely to operate in three ways: 1) providing

knowledge, 2) influencing individuals’ psychology, and 3) fostering socialization. This complex in-

fluence of education on individuals’ democratic values and political participation should be further

scrutinized. It is important to better understand each channel through which education enhances

democracy, such as civic attitudes and participation. For example, future research could benefit

from investigating whether education’s enlightenment shapes individuals’ opinions of democracy;

whether education’s effect on self-esteem allows citizens to be more politically engaged; or whether

socialization in schools motivates voter turnout. Likewise, further work should explore how civic

education matters, including curriculum variations in civic classes across different contexts, and

how it interacts with the national context (regime type, and transitional vs. consolidated democra-

cies).

Subsequently, this line of work needs to develop more clear theoretical explanations on how the

individual-level effects of education can produce more democratic societies at the aggregate level,

including the decreased risk of democratic breakdown in transitional and consolidated democra-

cies. By identifying specific effects of education on citizens’ political behavior, further research

can clarify which characteristics are effective to avoid authoritarian reversals in transitional and

consolidated democracies and why additional schooling is not a significant factor in consolidated

67

democracies.

Moreover, it is necessary to reassess whether the democratizing effect of education is more sig-

nificant in low-income countries than in high-income countries. Depending on the model specifica-

tions, this dissertation finds either support or inconclusive results. By utilizing different empirical

models and controlling for different regime circumstances, additional research can explore whether

the effect of education is contingent on levels of a country’s wealth or other structural character-

istics. Because the effect of education in consolidated democracies appears not to be statistically

significant (Chapter 2), further research on this topic should concentrate on countries outside this

group.

The analysis of subnational variation in the effect of education on political culture in Mexico

also could benefit from further work that addresses the theoretical underpinnings of subnational

variance and civic attitudes. Based on empirical findings provided in this dissertation, education’s

effect on individuals’ democratic values is not weaker, nonexistent, or reversed in nondemocratic

subnational units. Further work is needed to clarify why this dissertation yields null findings against

social learning theory. By shedding light on the variance within local politics in Mexico, further

work should strengthen the theoretical foundation on the impact of education in authoritarian and

democratic settings. It may be the case that under centralized educational systems, education’s

quality and contents do not significantly vary across subnational units. However, further research

can separately test the effect of education on democratic values in subnational authoritarian units

so that they can verify education’s effect as a universal solvent.

Moreover, additional work should identify which levels of education matter for generating civic

attitudes and political participation in nondemocratic subnational units. This research employed

educational attainment as an independent variable; however, further research should empirically

investigate the effect of specific educational levels or categories (e.g., primary, middle, secondary,

and tertiary education) on democratic values. In doing, specialized educational policy initiatives

can be tailored to help consolidate democratic regimes.

With regard to the effect of education and political behavior in the United States, further work

should explore how the absolute and relative values of education affect a variety of measures of

political participation. Unlike Nie et al’s (1996) argument, some aspects of the political arena are

68

not a zero-sum game. For example, participating in a political campaign is unlikely to generate a

zero-sum situation. Give the rapidly changing context of political campaigns and the widespread

use of social media, it is also worth to further investigate whether individuals’ proximity to political

actors (as traditionally defined in the literature) remains an important predictor of participation.

In conclusion, this dissertation advances our understanding of the impact of educational attain-

ment on multiple dimensions of democracy. But this is a vast area of research with substantively

relevant outcomes that still require further investigation. This dissertation has underlined several

important areas of study, the normative relevance of such tasks, and the potential policy implica-

tions of continuing to learn about these topics.

69

Appendix A

70

Tabl

e9:

Res

ults

fora

Cha

nge-

Poin

tDem

ocra

ticC

onso

lidat

ion

Mod

els

with

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71



(e) Model 9: Transitional Countries (f) Model 9: Consolidated Countries

Figure 14: The Effect of Education on the Risk of Democratic Breakdowns across Income Levels(Models 7-9)

Note: The 95 percent HPD regions are shown.

72

Tabl

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73



(e) Model 12: Transitional Countries (f) Model 12: Consolidated Countries

Figure 15: The Effect of Education on the Risk of Democratic Breakdowns across Income Levels(Models 10-12)

Note: The 95 percent HPD regions are shown. These models show the outcome without OECD countries thatjoined the OECD in the 1960s and the 1970s.

74

Appendix B

Table 11: Descriptive Statistics

Variable N Mean St. Dev. Min MaxSupporting Democracy 3,398 0.763 0.425 0 1Tolerance of Different Religions 4,302 0.780 0.414 0 1Tolerance of Foreigners 4,243 0.669 0.471 0 1Tolerance of Different Social Classes 4,270 0.825 0.380 0 1Memberships in Organizations 4,283 0.461 0.499 0 1Educational Attainment 4,379 2.011 1.287 0 5Civic Education 4,383 0.180 0.384 0 1Age 4,383 42.252 16.189 18 96Personal Income (logged) 2,310 7.087 1.255 1.386 12.206Male 4,383 0.436 0.496 0 1Evaluations of National Economic Condition 4,267 1.733 1.165 0 5Evaluations of Personal Economic Condition 4,310 2.009 1.214 0 5States 3,607 16.291 8.427 1 32Subnational Democracy Index (SDI) 3,607 58.284 17.753 28.203 91.177

75

Appendix C

Table 12: Descriptive statistics

Variable N Mean St. Dev. Min MaxVoter Turnout 52,984 0.701 0.458 0 1Years of Education 59,434 12.794 3.183 0 20Educational Environment 58,720 12.343 1.205 9.094 13.505Age 59,388 45.839 17.482 18 89

Age2 59,388 2,406.847 1,763.768 324 7,921Pre-Boomers 59,388 0.405 0.491 0 1Baby-Boomers 59,388 0.322 0.467 0 1Post-Boomers 59,388 0.273 0.446 0 1Male 59,599 0.441 0.497 0 1White 59,599 0.809 0.393 0 1Strength of Partisanship 58,323 1.744 1.012 0 3Personal Income (Adjusted by CPI, $1,000) 34,892 25.722 15.910 0 116.500Year 59,599 1993.018 12.296 1972 2014

76

Table 13: The Effect of Absolute Value of Education on Voter Turnout with GSS (Logistic Regres-sion Results)

Dependent Variable:

Voter Turnout1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s/2010s


(0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007)

Constant −0.654∗∗∗ −1.148∗∗∗ −1.623∗∗∗ −2.179∗∗∗

(0.078) (0.077) (0.099) (0.095)


Note: Standard errors are in parenthesis for each coefficient. Significance level ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicatezero is not covered by the 90, 95, and 99 percent confidence interval, respectively.

Table 14: The Effect of Competitive Educational Environment on Voter Turnout with GSS (LogisticRegression Results)

Dependent Variable:


Educational Environment (years) −0.477∗∗∗ −0.416∗∗∗ −0.469∗∗∗ −0.730∗∗∗

(0.019) (0.017) (0.024) (0.033)

Constant 6.342∗∗∗ 5.883∗∗∗ 6.781∗∗∗ 10.402∗∗∗

(0.227) (0.211) (0.306) (0.431)



77

Table 15: The Effect of Absolute Value of Education on Voter Turnout with ANES (Logistic Re-gression Results)

Dependent Variable:


Levels of Education 0.332∗∗∗ 0.411∗∗∗ 0.445∗∗∗ 0.441∗∗∗

(0.018) (0.024) (0.021) (0.023)

Constant −0.156∗∗ −0.568∗∗∗ −0.648∗∗∗ −0.606∗∗∗

(0.063) (0.090) (0.081) (0.093)



Table 16: The Effect of Competitive Educational Environment on Voter Turnout with ANES (Lo-gistic Regression Results)

Dependent Variable:


Educational Environment −0.558∗∗∗ −0.592∗∗∗ −0.616∗∗∗ −0.803∗∗∗

(0.049) (0.061) (0.059) (0.093)

Constant 2.819∗∗∗ 3.080∗∗∗ 3.418∗∗∗ 4.480∗∗∗

(0.167) (0.226) (0.233) (0.389)



78

Table 17: The Effect of Education on Voter Turnout with ANES (Logistic Regression Results)

Dependent Variable:

Voter TurnoutModel 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8(1970s) (1980s) (1990s) (2000s/2010s)


(0.025) (0.033) (0.028) (0.028)

Educational Environment −2.510 −0.420 −0.723 0.786(1.791) (1.333) (0.568) (0.681)

Age −0.030 0.112∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗ 0.006(0.080) (0.052) (0.018) (0.023)

Age2 −0.0003 −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗ 0.0004(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003)

Pre-Boomers −0.161 −0.406 0.080 0.180(0.200) (0.272) (0.235) (0.279)

Post-Boomers 0.043 0.219 0.265∗ 0.082(0.413) (0.245) (0.152) (0.156)

Male 0.229∗∗∗ −0.078 −0.091 −0.164∗∗

(0.069) (0.090) (0.077) (0.079)

White 0.156 0.035 0.062 0.058(0.099) (0.108) (0.090) (0.088)


(0.035) (0.045) (0.039) (0.041)

Family Income 0.286∗∗∗ 0.367∗∗∗ 0.404∗∗∗ 0.295∗∗∗

(0.035) (0.045) (0.040) (0.039)

Constant 7.844 −3.790 −1.657 −6.626∗∗

(8.735) (6.830) (2.533) (2.688)



79

Figure 16: Marginal Effect of Education on Voter Turnout with ANES


80

Table 18: The Effect of Education on Voter Turnout with GSS (without Fixed Effects of Years)

Dependent Variable:



(0.015) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011)

Educational Environment −0.341 −0.720∗∗∗ −0.354 −0.210(0.251) (0.163) (0.255) (0.291)

Age 0.019 0.048∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗

(0.027) (0.017) (0.021) (0.021)

Age2 0.0001 −0.0005∗∗ −0.0004 −0.00002(0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003)

Pre-Boomers 0.182 −0.157 −0.191 −0.266(0.157) (0.123) (0.168) (0.238)

Post-Boomers −0.088 −0.140 0.047(0.093) (0.105) (0.101)

Personal Income 0.010∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗

(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)

Male −0.182∗∗ −0.250∗∗∗ −0.247∗∗∗ −0.207∗∗∗

(0.080) (0.055) (0.057) (0.055)

White 0.148 0.341∗∗∗ 0.427∗∗∗ 0.404∗∗∗

(0.111) (0.066) (0.069) (0.063)


(0.038) (0.028) (0.028) (0.026)

Constant −0.380 4.130∗ −0.909 −2.918(3.597) (2.202) (3.327) (3.706)


Note: Standard errors are in parenthesis for each coefficient. Significance level ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate zero is notcovered by the 90, 95, and 99 percent confidence interval, respectively.

81

Table 19: Logistic Regression Results only with Generation (with Fixed Effects of Years)

Dependent variable:



(0.015) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011)


(0.062) (0.068) (0.114) (0.178)

Pre-Boomers 0.125 −0.068 −0.254 −0.669∗∗∗

(0.120) (0.112) (0.162) (0.236)

Post-Boomers −0.256∗∗∗ −0.458∗∗∗ −0.389∗∗∗

(0.076) (0.077) (0.092)

Personal Income 0.010∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗

(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)

Male −0.175∗∗ −0.266∗∗∗ −0.269∗∗∗ −0.240∗∗∗

(0.080) (0.055) (0.057) (0.055)

White 0.153 0.329∗∗∗ 0.412∗∗∗ 0.436∗∗∗

(0.111) (0.067) (0.069) (0.063)


(0.038) (0.028) (0.028) (0.027)

Constant 5.315∗∗∗ 5.411∗∗∗ 4.885∗∗∗ 11.853∗∗∗

(0.789) (0.875) (1.487) (2.322)



82

Table 20: Logistic Regression Results only with Generation (without Fixed Effects of Years)

Dependent variable:



(0.015) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011)


(0.062) (0.068) (0.114) (0.177)

Pre-Boomers 0.117 −0.067 −0.260 −0.676∗∗∗

(0.120) (0.112) (0.162) (0.235)

Post-Boomers −0.250∗∗∗ −0.458∗∗∗ −0.374∗∗∗

(0.074) (0.077) (0.092)

Personal Income 0.010∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗

(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)

Male −0.183∗∗ −0.266∗∗∗ −0.268∗∗∗ −0.228∗∗∗

(0.079) (0.055) (0.057) (0.055)

White 0.147 0.341∗∗∗ 0.413∗∗∗ 0.403∗∗∗

(0.111) (0.066) (0.069) (0.062)


(0.038) (0.028) (0.028) (0.026)

Constant 5.265∗∗∗ 5.499∗∗∗ 4.881∗∗∗ 11.391∗∗∗

(0.786) (0.873) (1.485) (2.309)


Note: Standard errors are in parenthesis for each coefficient. Significance level ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate zero is notcovered by the 90, 95, and 99 percent confidence interval, respectively.

83

Figure 17: Marginal Effect of Education on Voter Turnout without Fixed Effects


84

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