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Economics of Avian Influenza Management and Control in a World withCompeting AgendasAuthor(s): Anni McLeodSource: Avian Diseases, 54(s1):374-379. 2010.Published By: American Association of Avian PathologistsDOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1637/8904-043009-REVIEW.1URL: http://www.bioone.org/doi/full/10.1637/8904-043009-REVIEW.1

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Review Article—

Economics of Avian Influenza Management and Control in a World withCompeting Agendas

Anni McLeodA

Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations, Viale dell Terme di Caracalla, Rome 00153, Italy

Received 30 April 2009; Accepted and published ahead of print 14 October 2009

SUMMARY. This article explores the economic and related institutional issues at macro and micro levels, in different productionsystems and in different countries that influence avian influenza (AI) management and control. It does this by examining three groupsof stakeholders with different agendas and concerns. For the ‘‘international community,’’ the overriding driver has been and still isconcern for human safety. This is reflected in the high level of contributions to emergency response programs, a strong focus onpandemic prevention and preparedness, and the pressure put on countries to develop prevention and control plans. For the mostinfluential countries and companies in the global poultry sector, those that control the largest commercial poultry populations, tradegrowth and stability are major concerns. Private investment in biosecurity, reorganization of supply chains, and an increasing interestin compartments are all indications of a perceived need to secure the boundaries. Poor poultry-keeping households must focus on day-to-day livelihoods and food security, whereas small-scale commercial producers are driven by small margins and short credit cycles.Although these people operate a little differently, they have in common a necessity to focus on the short term and a limited willingnessand ability to invest in their flocks. There is also very little information that we can provide either of them on financially viable ways toupgrade their enterprises. Noncompliance or partial compliance with AI regulations often makes good economic sense. Differenthighly pathogenic AI management and control measures are economically viable in different circumstances. The article discusses thepositive and less-positive impacts created by each stakeholder perspective and the conflicts and trade-offs that can arise, and suggestssome approaches for reconciling differences and thus improving AI control.

RESUMEN. Estudio Recapitulativo—Economıa en el manejo y control de la influenza aviar en un mundo con agendas encompetencia.

Este artıculo analiza los aspectos economicos e institucionales en macro y micro-niveles, en diferentes sistemas de produccion yen diferentes paıses que tienen influencia sobre el manejo y control de la influenza aviar. Esto se hizo mediante el examen de tresgrupos con capacidad de decision que tenıan agendas y preocupaciones diferentes. Para la ‘‘comunidad internacional’’, el principalobjetivo ha sido y continua siendo la preocupacion por la seguridad humana. Esto se refleja en el alto nivel de contribuciones a losprogramas de respuesta de emergencia, con el enfoque principal en la prevencion y preparacion para pandemias, y por la presionejercida sobre otros paıses para desarrollar planes de prevencion y control. El crecimiento y la estabilidad del comercio son lasprincipales preocupaciones de los paıses mas influyentes y de las empresas del sector avıcola a nivel mundial que controlan lasmayores poblaciones de aves de corral comerciales. La inversion privada en materia de bioseguridad, la reorganizacion de las cadenasde abastecimiento y un creciente interes en la compartimentalizacion son indicadores de una necesidad general para incrementar laseguridad de las fronteras. Los hogares pobres que mantienen aves de corral deben centrarse en su subsistencia diaria y en laseguridad alimentaria, mientras que los pequenos productores comerciales son influenciados por escasos margenes de ganancia yciclos de credito cortos. Si bien estas personas operan un poco diferente, tienen en comun la necesidad de enfocarse en plazos cortosy ademas de tener voluntad y capacidad limitadas para invertir en sus parvadas. Tambien hay muy poca informacion disponiblesobre la manera economicamente viable para mejorar sus empresas. El incumplimiento o cumplimiento parcial de las regulacionessobre la influenza aviar frecuentemente tienen un fondo economico. Diferentes medidas de manejo y control de la influenza aviar dealta patogenicidad son economicamente viables bajo circunstancias diferentes. El artıculo analiza los efectos positivos y no tanpositivos que han sido creados por las perspectivas de cada grupo de opinion y decision, ası como los conflictos y negociaciones quepueden surgir y sugiere algunos enfoques para conciliar las diferencias y ası mejorar el control de la influenza aviar.

Abbreviations: AI 5 avian influenza; FAO 5 Food and Agriculture Organisation; HPAI 5 highly pathogenic avian influenza;ICASEPS 5 Indonesian Center for Agro-socioeconomic and Policy Studies; OIE 5 World Organisation for Animal Health;USDA 5 U.S. Department of Agriculture; WHO 5 World Health Organization

The economic and social impact of avian influenza has been risingsince the start of the current global epidemic of H5N1 highlypathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) in 2003. If a human influenzapandemic originated from avian influenza, it could cost betweenseveral billion and several trillion dollars in lost lives and disruption tonational economies (14). Against this, approximately $2.7 billion hasbeen pledged and $1.5 billion disbursed by the international donorcommunity (24) for prevention and preparation, and probably more

than this by the corporate sector and national governments. Theseglobal figures highlight the scale of the problem—they tell us why thisdisease is a concern to many people and why continued action isneeded. But large aggregate figures, while they are important to showthe scale of the problem, are of less use in helping to solve it. In order todesign control strategies that work, we need to understand what isunderneath the large numbers: the way in which different stakeholdersperceive this problem and are affected by it, and the differential effectsof the disease itself and the measures used to control it.

There are many stakeholders in avian influenza control: rich andpoor countries; large-, medium-, and small-scale producers;ACorresponding author. E-mail: Anni.Mcleod@fao.org

AVIAN DISEASES 54:374–379, 2010

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consumers; researchers; suppliers of feed, drugs, and vaccines; thecommunication media; the general public; and the internationalorganizations concerned with human and animal health. This articleexamines just three of these stakeholders whose perspectives on avianinfluenza (AI), and particularly H5N1 HPAI, are sufficientlydifferent that they illustrate the trade-offs and compromises thatmust be made. They are the international community, the bigplayers in export trade, and the small-scale producers.

THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

For the purposes of this discussion, the international communityrefers to a number of large organizations including the World HealthOrganization (WHO), the Food and Agriculture Organisation(FAO), World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE), UnitedNations Children’s Emergency Fund, United States Agency forInternational Development, the U.S. Department of Agriculture(USDA), and others with similar concerns. This definition includesthe international organizations that give technical advice and help onhuman and animal health, and the donor and lending agencies thatfinance the effort. Their overriding driver has been and still is toprevent a human influenza pandemic originating from the currentlycirculating avian influenza strains. The reasons for this are obvious; ifand when a severe pandemic does occur, the economic and socialcosts will be huge. The effort has been twofold—investment indisease control in poultry in order to reduce the pandemic risk and, atthe same time, investment in preparedness of medical facilities sothat, should a pandemic arise, the world will be better prepared todeal with it.

Spending by international agencies to date has been in the regionof $2.7 billion (24), of which the larger part has gone to pandemicpreparedness. An influenza pandemic is a likely future event, even ifit does not come from H5N1 HPAI (at the time of writing a humanpandemic associated with a novel H1N1 virus of possible porcineorigin had occurred), and this means that preparations are needed bygovernments and the private sector to mitigate the worst effects. Butpreparedness is costly. H5N1 HPAI, as an imminent threat, hasmade it possible to justify diverting resources from other activitiesand using emergency funding that can be tapped at short notice.

There have been some important positive consequences of thisinternational perspective. One has been the investment in neglectedhuman and animal health services in the countries most affected byH5N1 HPAI. Infrastructure, equipment, and training have all beenprovided in the countries affected and some of those at risk.

There has also been a huge international collaborative effort withhuman and animal health services and several large internationalorganizations making considerable efforts to work more closelytogether for a better result, although not always smoothly or easily(4,21). This seems likely to continue under the banner of ‘‘one health’’or ‘‘one world one health’’; an expert consultation entitled ‘‘OneWorld, One Health: From Ideas to Action’’ was held in Winnipeg inMarch 2009 (19) that recommended leadership by intergovernmentalorganizations to build partnership and capacity at all levels. If wellmanaged, with sufficient attention to the institutional needs andpossible transaction costs, it could lead to good returns on futureinvestment in the prevention and control of livestock diseases.

However, there have also been some problems and it is importantthat we learn from these. Avian influenza has been surrounded by agreat deal of public fear and worry (21). In the rush to deal with anescalating problem, there were large market shocks, particularly butnot only during the first years of the current epidemic. Marketshocks occur when consumers panic and decide to stop eating

poultry meat, and/or importing countries ban products frominfected poultry populations. They result in sharp drops in demandand prices, which may persist for several weeks, and in continueddisruption even after prices rise again, while farms are restocked andthe supply chain is re-established (9,11,26,27). These shocks canimpact producers located far from outbreak locations. Shocks aredevastating at first, but tend to diminish with time. Trade banscontributed to the shifting of the export market away from Thailandand toward Brazil (17). The strong international focus and mediaattention on this disease undoubtedly contributed to the magnitudeof these market effects. There is little that can be done to prevent thefirst shocks, but effective communication from the industry canmitigate their effect, as seen in Turkey and Thailand, and there maybe ways of maintaining business continuity and reducing disruption.

Some hasty decisions have been made, with negative consequencesfor the livelihoods of the poor. Up to 300 million birds have died orbeen culled since 2003, the majority of which were culled and manywithout full compensation (11,25). Small-scale producers havefound it particularly difficult to access compensation. For the mostpart, countries that have experienced repeated outbreaks havemodified their culling by making it more targeted and some haveimproved compensation, but there is further work to be done tomake compensation more rapidly and widely available. Hastydecisions to ban production, for example, city flocks or extensiveducks, have generally proved unsuccessful in that people continuedto keep illegal birds, but also suffered loss of livelihood because theirflock sizes were reduced and it became difficult to market the birds(7,13). Experience has shown the importance of planning in advanceof emergency situations and with adequate consultation to avoidadverse effects on vulnerable people.

Much of the investment in animal and human health systems hasbeen made with emergency financing. Although this was beneficialbecause funds could be mobilized very quickly, it is also unsustainableand in the author’s opinion has been somewhat skewed toward short-term actions. There has not been a smooth transition to longer-termdevelopment efforts and funds are still lacking from both national andlonger-term international sources to build on this initial investmentand expand it beyond avian influenza.

THE BIG PLAYERS IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE

For most influential countries, regions, and companies in theglobal poultry sector, those that control the largest commercialpoultry populations, the major concern with H5N1 HPAI has beenthe impact that it has had on markets, particularly internationalmarkets. These stakeholders include the United States, Brazil, theEuropean Union, and Thailand, and a handful of large companieswith a combined production value surpassing that of manycountries. The market shocks previously mentioned have been aneconomic problem for the industry as a whole, although there havebeen opportunities for uninfected exporting countries.

The members of this stakeholder group compete with each otherin the world market but share common aims centered on marketgrowth and stability, market share for poultry products, reducing thedowntime created by disease, and rationalizing costs. Disease is onlyone of the problems they face; rising feed costs has been a morepressing problem in the past year, and water may be a longer-termproblem (6). Their response to H5N1 HPAI (22,23) has includedsystematic risk assessment, improved biosecurity, attempts to protectcommercial trade, and product diversification. Those that applygood biosecurity can also benefit from market price increases thatfollow disease outbreaks.

Economics of AI management and control 375

One positive impact of this perspective has been serious attentionto the question of biosecurity and the safety of market chains, notonly for large companies, for whom it is a routine part of businessdevelopment, but also for smaller commercial producers linked intomarket chains supplying urban retailers and food markets. Examplesinclude attempts to establish compartments in Thailand and Turkey (acompartment is a subpopulation under a common biosecurity plan)(18)—investment in rural infrastructure, for example, can be providedby government (e.g., Viet Nam, where pilot production zones arebeing established)—and attempts to develop biosecurity guidelinesthat will work for commercial producers of different sizes (5).

It has also been necessary for government and private industry towork closely together on dealing with the business impacts of diseasecontrol, one example being the negotiations between U.S. industryand government on business continuity during outbreaks (10),although in the worst affected countries this type of negotiation islagging behind. There have also been some attempts on a small scaleat corporate social responsibility initiatives where big businessprovides knowledge to smaller producers (20).

On the negative side, the response to H5N1 HPAI driven by the bigplayers may be accelerating the concentration and integration ofpoultry market chains even in countries that are not themselves bigplayers, leaving small-scale commercial producers vulnerable. Theyhave little voice in determining the future and are unable to competewhen rapid changes and new investment are required. This trend isprobably inevitable in growing economies because the poultry sector isone in which economies of scale are strong and where those who wishto survive must be adaptable, but the response to H5N1 HPAI appearsto be accelerating the effect. In Thailand, for example, the number ofextensive duck producers appears to have been reduced; in Viet Nam,small-scale commercial producers were slower to recover than large-scale operators and lost market share (1); in Indonesia negotiations areunderway to reshape the market chains leading into Jakarta, which willmake it harder for small-scale producers and traders to reach markets.Compartments are inaccessible to small-scale participants because it istoo hard to certify and monitor many small premises.

SMALLHOLDER POULTRY PRODUCERS

Smallholder poultry flocks come in two types, which can be thoughtof as safety net and asset building (16). Most poultry keepers indeveloping countries are the owners of safety net flocks, the small flocksthat obtain much of their feed from scavenging and are kept for homeconsumption or very local markets, a feature of rural societies in alldeveloping countries. The asset-building flocks are owned by small-scale commercial producers with as few as 20 birds or as many as 500or 1000; the products are sold in local markets or longer market chains,depending on opportunity and price. The systems can be interlinked—in the BRAC model in Bangladesh (BRAC is a very largenongovernmental organization based in Bangladesh that has for manyyears supported small-scale poultry development; http://www.brac.net/index.php?nid5284) and the ‘‘kuroiler’’ market chains in India (2)some farmers raise young birds that are sold to others to keep as egglayers or fatten for meat. Farmers may also switch between the twosystems; for example, after small urban flocks were banned in Jakarta,some farmers did not get rid of their flocks, but downsized them (13).Both types of flock contribute in many ways to livelihoods in ruralhouseholds and communities (15) and to some extent also in poorurban households. But one distinguishing feature of the asset-buildingflocks is that they have been seen as a pathway out of poverty, anenterprise that can be developed from very small investment, and onein which women can invest.

For both types of flock owner, their response to H5N1 HPAI andthe control measures imposed during outbreaks is driven by a focuson short-term survival and tight household cash flow. This focus canmake it very difficult to invest in biosecurity measures to preventdisease. It also means that flock owners may be disinclined to complywith veterinary regulations that depopulate farms and restrict evenlocal movement of birds.

What may seem to be a perverse response actually carries benefits.These stakeholders are in some sense the guardians of specializedlocal products that are important to local culture and diet and can becompetitive even against intensive systems—these include extensiveducks and duck eggs, local chicken breeds farmed extensively, andguinea fowl. When the systems from which these originate are badlydepleted they can be very difficult to rebuild. By avoiding cullingand continuing to keep their birds, small-scale producers preservethese specialized local products.

Small-scale producers are also creative, flexible, and in the author’sopinion, very well adapted within their own systems. By notcomplying with rules they force us to rethink strategies and measuresand find approaches that will be cost effective and socially acceptablewithin those systems.

However, these stakeholders are vulnerable to outside shocks—including outbreak control measures. Financially viable decisions forthem may run counter to the needs of animal health services and thewider society, and they have limited ability to pay for prevention orcontrol measures. If the profit from a small flock is $25 dollars a year(11), paying for two H5N1 HPAI vaccinations per bird against aremote chance of an outbreak will not be appealing and there will belimited flexibility to invest in biosecurity. Smallholders also havelimited interest to invest in technologies that they do not know orhave not seen tested, and this raises the cost of introducing anddelivering new measures.

RECONCILING DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES

The conflicts arising from these different stakeholder perspectivescannot all or easily be resolved, and it is hard to suggest alternativesthat will be economically or socially beneficial to everyone, but thereare ways to deal with some of these problems, which are groupedhere under three headings.

1. Solutions tailored for local conditions. One very obviousapproach is to look for local adaptations to general solutions thatprovide a good return on investment to the stakeholders mostimmediately involved. It is particularly important at present forpublic funds to be used in working on adaptations for small-scaleflocks, where knowledge and technologies are particularly lackingand in the market chains where there is greatest risk.

For example, when using outbreak stamping out in nonendemicareas, a balance needs to be maintained between getting rid of disease(particularly important to the international community and large-scalecommercial systems) and alienating small-scale producers or destroyingtheir livelihoods. The best way to avoid this is to have fast reporting, agood and fast response so that wide-scale culling can be avoided, and arapid compensation scheme that pays a sufficient amount. In thedeveloped countries, both reporting and response systems seem to beworking. In the developing countries that have been infected, responsetimes to reported outbreaks do seem to be improving, culling hasbecome more targeted, and the cost of culling has reduced. Yet few ofthem have invested in a sustainable surveillance system that works wellat village level and can be maintained with national funds once donorprojects are withdrawn. Most countries have a compensation scheme,but in few cases does it work well for smallholders.

376 A. McLeod

Vaccination is being used in some countries (notably China, VietNam, and Egypt) to reduce the number and extent of outbreaks, andin the case of Viet Nam, to reduce the virus load in the environmentand the risk to humans. It can be made to work provided thatprotection levels and virus changes are monitored well and farmers arewilling to take some responsibility in ensuring that it is done correctly.But currently, the costs are too high and effectiveness too low for this tobe a good tool for safety net flocks (J. Hinrichs, Avian InfluenzaEconomist, FAO, pers. comm., from unpublished research findings inIndonesia). It may offer some potential for long-cycle birds in evenquite small commercial flocks if the costs can be kept down. Owners ofeven quite small commercial flocks may be willing to pay forvaccination if a good vaccine is available when they need it and if theyperceive that there is a risk, but these conditions do not yet exist forH5N1 HPAI. Where the main benefit is to society and not the flockowner, vaccination needs to be highly subsidized from public funds, asit has been in Viet Nam because of public health concerns.

Biosecurity is the first line of defense in keeping disease out offlocks and making products safer. Most of the systems andtechnology currently available were developed for large flocks, andare routinely used by the best farmers. Many large flocks indeveloping countries do not have good biosecurity because it is notrequired of them; consumer demand for safe products would providean economic incentive to encourage more farmers to boost theirbiosecurity using measures that are already known and welldescribed. For small-scale flocks, there is a bigger challenge, becausethe available measures have not been adapted for small-scale use, andthere is hardly any information available on the benefits and costs ofapplying biosecurity on a small scale (5). The attraction of improvedbiosecurity will come from a general level of improvement inproductivity and not only in protection against HPAI, because therisk of HPAI infection for any individual small flock is quite low.

It is inevitable that the poultry sector will continue to develop andreshape itself or, as some would say, ‘‘restructure.’’ This termcommonly applies to moving farms and markets, although it can beused for a wider range of measures that change the shape of marketchains. Experience has shown that economic incentives can workbetter than forced relocation of farm premises; in Thailand, taxincentives have been used to good effect to encourage pig farmers tomove away from Bangkok (8). But locally designed approaches arelikely to be particularly necessary here, to take account of humanpopulation density, planned or expected industrial development,land tenure systems, and the wish to preserve some land for staplecrops. We may not have considered carefully enough the benefit ofpreserving specialized products in their unique market chains (freshmeat, local birds), not only because of local custom, but because theymay provide a way to compete in a highly globalized sector. Thereare some efforts underway to find out whether it is possible to certifythis type of product and help it to comply with safety and qualityregulations (12). It is also important not to forget the contributionof poultry-producing smallholders to local food security in countrieswhere such producers exist in large numbers.

2. Working together. Collaboration is hardly a new topic—theconcepts of cross-disciplinary work, cross-sector work, and public-private partnerships have been around for years. But what do theymean in the current efforts toward avian influenza control?

There appear to be three separate themes within existinginitiatives. One is international collaboration, central to thediscussions on ‘‘one health’’ and ‘‘one world one health.’’ Anotheris discussions between industry and government in Thailand,Turkey, Malaysia, the United States, Canada, and European Unioncountries, to mention a few, aimed at protecting markets from risks

of both HPAI and low-pathogenic AI and promoting businesscontinuity. The third theme, a much weaker one at present, is thediscussion that ties H5N1 HPAI control to food security andlivelihoods. This topic has appeared at many international meetings;most recently, it was included in the conference results of the 6thInternational Ministerial Conference on Avian & PandemicInfluenza, held in Sharm El-Shiekh, October 24–26, 2008, whichnoted that: ‘‘An intensified effort is needed to identify and recognizethe impacts of interventions on vulnerable people and define ways tomitigate negative impacts.’’ (http://www.imcapi2008.gov.eg/Contents/ResultForm.aspx?Tab55, accessed April 2009) and it is also the subjectof some country-level evaluation and assessment, but it has notcoalesced around any major efforts to plan AI control programs orpoultry-sector development from the perspective of preservinglivelihoods.

The three themes each appear to be addressing the needs ofdifferent stakeholder perspectives, but with little practical effort untilnow to balance them or consider the trade-offs between them.

There are things that can be learned from each theme that may begenerally useful. The One World One Health strategic documentsacknowledge the transaction costs of working with many and diversestakeholders and call for more investment to make this possible. Itwill be important to find areas where collaboration is essential for abetter result, and to define manageable projects with defined targets,in order to justify the additional effort required for multiplestakeholders to plan together and collaborate on activities. Currentlythe emphasis is on emerging zoonotic diseases, where the animalhealth, human health, and environment/wildlife professions willeach add value, provided that they can find a common language inwhich to communicate. Some private-sector players are also involvedin One World One Health, although mostly at present these appearto be mainly limited to the private foundations with financing andinnovative technology.

The discussions between government and industry and betweenindustry and industry (e.g., the Canadian feather industry, whereturkey and chicken producers have jointly examined their AI risksand risk management) have mostly been focused on very specificactions to assess and manage risk within the industry, such as thepotential for compartments, ways to minimize market restrictionsduring outbreaks, better risk communication, and ways to improvethe performance of vaccine. There is also a history in Australia (3)and New Zealand of jointly funding and managing animal health.More recently there have been discussions of the potential for sharedpublic-private funds in a wider range of countries that would covercompensation and other aspects of emergency control, for example,in a regional meeting held in Indonesia in March 2009 (reportforthcoming from USDA and FAO). These various initiatives havehighlighted the need for understanding and trust between thedifferent groups involved and also for having both shared objectivesand a road map against which to chart progress.

There is some potential for industry to support improvements inbiosecurity and business planning in the more entrepreneurial small-scale poultry producers. Efforts of this kind have already been madein small-scale dairy development, and they may be applicable to alimited extent with small-scale poultry development.

Discussions on tying AI control to food security and livelihoodsare mostly in the domain of research at present, with twomulticountry projects funded by International DevelopmentResearch Council and UK Department for International Develop-ment each examining the potential for livelihood-friendly or pro-poor HPAI control (http://www.hpai-research.net/index.html; http://www.crdi.ca/saro/ev-129039-201_104319-1-IDRC_ADM_INFO.html).

Economics of AI management and control 377

There has been a limited impact on country strategies; most notable is theimportance now placed on compensation and targeted (limited) cullingduring outbreaks but not yet visible in any published longer-term plans forpoultry-sector development or HPAI control. Lessons to date suggest thatengaging small-scale producers and traders and those who represent orwork with them is important. This is not easily done in an emergencysituation, because they are rarely represented on decision-makingbodies, but it may be more feasible if emergency and developmentcommunities communicate well and if there has been advanceplanning. A recent review in Egypt linking impacts of soaring foodprices and impacts of H5N1 HPAI on food security (M. Smulders,FAO, pers. comm., report in preparation) suggests that when poultrycontributes strongly to the food security of poor households, it may beimportant to look at the situation first from the perspective ofpreserving livelihoods and then as a disease-control problem, and toapproach the control effort in a way that acknowledges small-scaleproducers as an asset instead of primarily a problem. Linked to this isthe need to make more effort to provide information to men andwomen smallholder farmers and to provide opportunities for them tolearn about and evaluate new management practices.

Private sector, national government, and the internationalcommunity would all benefit from a safer and more securesmallholder sector. As well as engaging small-scale producers inplanning and implementation of AI control, it will be important tofind ways to improve market chains for specialist local products, toprovide information on financially viable solutions for small-scaleproducers, and to use incentives like credit. Finally, those whocannot compete or choose not to will need help to find decent workin other sectors, and this may require a wider constituency to beinvolved beyond the livestock sector.

3. Finding sustainable funding. No discussion on avianinfluenza control would be complete without a plea for morefunding. Specifically, though, there is a real need to harmonizeinternational emergency funding much more closely with long-termdevelopment efforts. Avian influenza and similar zoonotic diseasecrises are very different from natural disasters like earthquakes orfloods. The usual steps in an emergency response, including needsassessment, supplying inputs to cover immediate needs, and buildingback, are challenging to apply to a crisis that is building as you try todeal with it and where the containment measures you use may inthemselves cause damage. It will be important in the longer term tohave a greater surge capacity within hot-spot countries by makingnational funding systems more sustainable, and this will requireadvocacy with planning and finance ministries to secure funding,combining local, central, and private in more streamlined ways andbuilding accountability and governance.

In conclusion, there is room for considerably more effort toresolve these competing agendas and build robust systems to manageand control AI. But there is also cause for optimism. Poultry are anideal form of livestock for the 21st century. Poultry systems arecompetitive, flexible, dynamic, low-fat, gender-friendly, small. Theyjustify a continued effort to find workable disease-control solutionsbecause of the many benefits that they bring.

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