DUNSTERFORCE AND BAKU: A CASE STUDY IN BRITISH

IMPERIAL/INTERVENTIONIST FOREIGN POLICY WITH RESPECT

TO TRANSCAUCASIA 1917-1918

A Master’s Thesis

by

CENGIZ INCEOGLU

The Department of History

İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University

Ankara

May 2012

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in

quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in History.

------------------------------

Prof. Norman Stone

Supervisor

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in

quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in History.

------------------------------

Assoc. Prof. Cadoc Leighton

Co-Supervisor

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in

quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in History.

------------------------------

Asst. Prof. Nur Bilge Criss

Approval of the Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences

------------------------------

Prof. Dr. Erdal Erel

Director

To My Loving Parents

DUNSTERFORCE AND BAKU: A CASE STUDY IN BRITISH

IMPERIAL/INTERVENTIONIST FOREIGN POLICY WITH RESPECT

TO TRANSCAUCASIA 1917-1918

Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences

of

İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University

by

CENGIZ INCEOGLU

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

in

The Department of History

İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University

Ankara

May 2012

iii

ABSTRACT

DUNSTERFORCE AND BAKU: A CASE STUDY IN BRITISH

IMPERIAL/INTERVENTIONIST FOREIGN POLICY WITH RESPECT

TO TRANSCAUCASIA 1917-1918

Inceoglu, Cengiz

M. A., Department of History

Supervisor: Prof. Norman Stone

May 2012

This thesis will examine the actions of the British Empire in Transcaucasia during

the latter half of the First World War, more specifically, after the collapse of Imperial

Russia into a state of revolution in March of 1917. Western sources tend to defend the

British Intervention in the Caucasus in 1917 as a necessity to what was then an ongoing

military conflict, rather than, being based on imperialist initiatives. Simultaneously,

Soviet historians denounce every action of the British in Transcaucasia as premeditated

imperialist intervention aimed at annexation and colonization. The purpose here will be

to examine the decision making process of the pertinent committees involved in

formulating British policy towards Transcaucasia in 1917 and 1918. Through an analysis

of the relevant material it is then possible to determine the impetus behind the

formulation of General Dunsterville’s mission, “Dunsterforce”, and its subsequent

intervention at Baku in August of 1918. This thesis is divided into five parts. The first

iv

part will focus on policy creation and the committees involved, as well as the importance

of oil as a resource. The next three sections focus on the British perception of the

intentions of their enemies in Transcaucasia based off of primary sources, starting with

the Turks, then the Germans, and lastly the Bolsheviks. The last chapter focuses on the

British response to the perceived actions of their enemies, characterized by the eventual

approval granted to Dunsterforce to proceed to Baku and help in its defence. Determining

to what extent the members of the Imperial War Cabinet and the Eastern Committee – the

committee that generated policy for Transcaucasia – were influenced by imperialistic

ambitions with regard to Transcaucasian policy is of cardinal importance here.

Key Words: Bolsheviks, Baku, Dunsterville, Dunsterforce, Eastern Committee,

Germany, Imperialism, Lord Curzon, Ottoman Empire, Pan-Islam, Pan-Turanism,

Transcaspia, Transcaucasia.

v

ÖZET

DUNSTERFORCE VE BAKÜ: İNGİLİZ EMPERYAL/MÜDAHALECİ

DIŞ POLİTİKASINDA BİR VAKA ANALİZİ: TRANSKAFKASYA

1917-1918

Inceoglu, Cengiz

Master, Tarih Bölümü

Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Norman Stone

May 2012

Bu tez, Britanya İmparatorluğu’nun I. Dünya Savaşı’nın ikinci yarısında,

özellikle de Rusya İmparatorluğu’nun 1917 yılının Mart ayında devrim rüzgarına

kapılmasından sonraki süreçte Transkafkasya’daki eylemlerini incelemektedir. Batılı

kaynaklar, İngilizlerin 1917’deki Kafkaslara müdahalesini emperyalist teşebbüslere

bağlamak yerine askeri çatışmaların olduğu bir dönemde bir gereklilik olarak savunma

eğilimindedirler. Bunun yanı sıra, Sovyet tarihçileri, İngilizlerin Transkafkasya’daki tüm

eylemlerini ilhak ve sömürgeleştirme amaçlı, önceden planlanmış emperyalist

müdahaleler olarak görmektedir. Bu tezin amacı, 1917 ve 1918’de Transkafkasya’da

İngiliz politikasını oluşturmada etkin olan komitelerin karar verme süreçlerini

incelemektir. İlgili belgelerin incelenmesiyle, General Dunsterville’in “Dunsterforce”

görev gücünün oluşturulmasındaki ve bunu takiben 1918 yılının Ağustos ayında Bakü’ye

müdahalesinin arkasındaki itici güçleri tespit etmek mümkün olacaktır. Bu tez beş

bölümden oluşmaktadır. İlk bölüm politika yaratımı ve bununla ilgili komitelere

odaklanacak, ayrıca bir doğal kaynak olarak petrolün önemini inceleyecektir. İlk bölümü

takip eden sonraki üç bölümde İngilizlerin düşmanlarının Transkafkasya'daki niyetleri

üzerine algıları sırasıyla Türkler, Almanlar, ve son olarak Bolşevikler özelinde birincil

kaynaklardan incelenecektir. Son bölüm, düşmanlarının eylemlerini kendi algılarına göre

yorumlayan İngilizlerin bu eylemlere kendi değerlendirmeleri minvalinde karşılık

vermesine; yani Dunsterforce’a Bakü’ye ilerlemesi ve şehrin savunulmasında yardım

vi

etmesi yönünde verilen nihai onay ile şekillenen İngilizler tarafından verilen karşılıklara

odaklanacaktır. İmparatorluk Savaş Kabinesi ve Transkafkasya için politika üreten Doğu

Komitesi üyelerinin Transkafkasya politikasında emperyalist emellerden ne ölçüde

etkilendiğinin tespit edilmesi bu tezin en önemli unsurudur.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Bolşevik, Bakü, Dunsterville, Dunsterforce, Doğu Komitesi,

Almanya, sömürgecilik/emperyalizm, Lord Curzon, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu, Pan-

İslamizm, Turancılık, Transhazar, Transkafkasya.

vii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First and foremost, I would like to thank my two supervisors on this project,

Professor Norman Stone and Associate Professor Cadoc Leighton. The extent in which

they helped me cannot be underestimated. I am greatly indebted to the both of them for

all of their time and effort spent helping me with this thesis.

I would also like to thank Assistant Professors Paul Latimer, Kenneth Weisbrode,

David Thornton, Sean McMeekin, and Edward Kohn, for all of their assistance. Their

help during the preliminary stages of this work was most thoughtful and truly beneficial.

I am also grateful to the History Department Secretary, Eser Sunar, for all of her

help with my “technical difficulties”. Having her expertise in these matters was most

useful and greatly appreciated.

I am indebted as well to the entire staff at the Bilkent University library for their

immeasurable aid in finding and procuring the necessary research material that was

required to produce my thesis.

Last, but not least, I would like to express thanks to my whole family for all of

their support during my university career. Without their love and support this would not

have been possible.

viii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT…………………………………………………………………………...…iii

ÖZET…………………………………………………………………...……………....…v

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS……………………………………………………….....….vii

TABLE OF CONTENTS……………………………………………………….…..…..viii

CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION………..……………………………………………..…1

CHAPTER II: POLICY CREATION AND THE INFLUENCE OF OIL........................16

CHAPTER III: PAN-ISLAM AND PAN-TURANISM: THE PERCEIVED

THREAT TO THE BRITISH EMPIRE………………………………………………....32

CHAPTER IV: THE DRANG NACH OSTEN: GERMAN INTEREST IN

TRANSCAUCASIA AND BEYOND…………………………………………….....…..56

CHAPTER V: THE RUSSIAN SITUATION: THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT,

THE BOLSHEVIKS, AND BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY……………………,………81

CHAPTER VI: BRITISH INTERVENTION IN TRANSCAUSIA: DUNSTERFORCE

AND BAKU……………………………………………………………………….……..99

CHAPTER VII: CONCLUSION……………………………………………….………124

BIBLIOGRAPHY……………………………………………………………….….…..141

APPENDICES………………………………………………………………………….147

1

CHAPTER I:

INTRODUCTION

If we take the Oxford Dictionary’s definition of Imperialism – a policy of

extending a country’s power and influence through colonization, use of military force, or

other means – we can then apply these criteria to the actions of those countries who were

involved in the First World War. Being designated ‘Imperialist’ in nature, therefore,

essentially means the protection and expansion of one’s own interest and influence. This

can then be used to acquire, through military force, yet more ‘Imperial’ possessions, i.e.

colonies or annexed territories and thus, perpetuating an ever increasing incremental

system that is characterized by the growth in the necessary categories inherent in an

imperialistic design. These categories are represented by the marked growth in resources,

the economic sector, as well as growth in a State’s power and prestige. It is no wonder

that imperial systems of government have proved throughout history to be, albeit, with

efficient administrations, rather effective in creating large and powerful empires.

However, it must be understood that the purpose here is not to argue whether or not

imperialism was a cause of the Great War, but rather, to look at certain British military

undertakings in Transcaucasia and determine the extent in which they were the result of

2

wartime military necessities or instead as reactionary and opportunistic imperialist

ambitions. It will be important here to distinguish to what degree Britain’s war policy in

Transcaucasia was motivated by real time war concerns, or instead, imperialist ambitions

aimed at a post-war structuring of an expanded British Empire.

Diplomatic, strategic, and political policy formation drives a system of

imperialism and is used to acquire the ‘Growth’ of the previous paragraph. If used and

implemented correctly diplomatic, strategic, and political policy creation can continue to

be used in the service of perpetuating the imperial process of incremental expansion

throughout the world. On 29 January 1918 a small and elite British force under the

command of Major-General L. C. Dunsterville departed Baghdad, Mesopotamia in Ford

vehicles heading north toward the Georgian capital of Tiflis. Ahead lay a multifarious

environment of collapsing empires, competing national groups, and a complex system of

political rivalries. On 16 August 1918 what would be known as “Dunsterforce,” or as the

“Hush-Hush Brigade,” due to the early secrecy involved, entered the oil port of Baku on

the Caspian Sea, carrying out a mission that was uncertain and had been changed many

times. This mission was the British manifestation of Imperial Interventionist Policy. The

policy that was generated by British officials within the Eastern Committee, a sub-

division of the Foreign Office, and adopted by the members of the Imperial War Cabinet,

was characteristic of Transcaucasian and Transcaspian policy carried out by the British in

that region during the latter years of the First World War. More specifically, this was

during the time of Tsarist Russia’s collapse into a torrent of revolution, symbolized by

civil and political chaos.

3

The First World War is often referred to and remembered as a conflict that

germinated the roots of nationalist movements. However, it must be remembered that

World War I was a war of Empires and in order to understand the policies of the

belligerents, one must take into account the enormous impact of imperialism; the war

was, after all, an imperial struggle that would determine the international balance of

power. In the aftermath of the fighting, the world witnessed the destruction of not one,

but four of the great imperial dynasties, the Hohenzollerns, the Habsburgs, the Ottomans

and the Romanovs, accompanied by their respective empires.1 “In addition to the

horrifying human toll, four empires – those of Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and

Russia – had perished amidst the wreckage of the Drang nach Osten [the German “Drive

to the East,” however, not intended for an invasion of Russia].”2 Therefore, when viewed

in this light, the doctrine of nationalism – based on the concept of mobilizing groups of

people based on common ethnic identity, with the intent of asserting a claim to political

sovereignty – was, at minimum, a consequence of, if not the cause of imperial collapse.3

Not all of the empires involved in the world struggle would meet their doom as a

result of misplaced imperial ambitions. Indeed, those on the winning side would only

grow more extensive from the result of war spoils; most notably, the British, French, and

Japanese.4 The British, in fact, finished the war with a more extensive empire than that

with which they had started, acquiring territories in the Middle East and Near East, as

1 Bülent Gökay, A Clash of Empires: Turkey between Russian Bolshevism and British Imperialism, 1918-

1923 (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 1997), 1. 2 Peter Hopkirk, On Secret Service East of Constantinople: The Great Game and the Great War (Oxford:

Oxford University Press, 1995), 381. 3 Michael Reynolds, Shattering Empires: The Clash and Collapse of the Ottoman and Russian Empires

1908-1918 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 9. 4 Reynolds, Shattering Empires, 9.

4

well as in the former German colonial possessions in Africa and the Pacific.5 This view

of the culmination of events prompted Fromkin to contest that, “Lenin had it the wrong

way around. Imperialism – defined as the quest for colonies – did not cause the war; the

war engendered imperialism. Their staggering losses drove the belligerent powers to try

to compensate by seeking new gains. The collapse of the Russian Empire answered the

need for new worlds to conquer; its domains were there to be taken.”6

For the various political groups that emerged in revolutionary Russia, especially

the Bolsheviks, the winners of the 7 November 1917 Revolution and successors in power

to that of the Provisional Government, the Revolution was to be essentially anti-

Imperialist in nature. Therefore, any form of a co-operative alliance with an imperial

power was out of the question; the British were aware of this! The Bolsheviks co-

operation with the German imperialists on the other hand was coercive in essence and it

was only under duress from the continued German offensive in the East, which had

continued due to the Bolsheviks early refusals to accept German demands at Brest-

Litovsk that the Russians finally buckled under German pressure. The Bolsheviks gave

into whatever designs that Germany might have been contemplating on Russia proper, as

well as her former imperial possessions. Nonetheless, the Soviets accepted an anti-

Imperialist platform accompanied by a more definitive goal of carrying out successful,

worldwide social revolutions. These revolutions intended the overthrow of the old regime

represented by imperialism, in the category of which the Bolshevik’s German coercers

were also included; coupled with the eventual replacement of imperialism that would

5 Gökay, A Clash of Empires, 1.

6 David Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the

Modern Middle East (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1989), 351.

5

follow in the wake of the initial stages of revolutionary fervor. However, while the

Bolsheviks were busy trying to bring down imperialism, even at times co-operating with

it to achieve their end results, at the same time the British imperialists were busy with

ambitions of their own. British actions were influenced in the first instance by the

imperialistic ambitions of their enemies, the Turks and Germans, not to mention the

amount of influence that was applied by that of the Bolsheviks and their sure to be anti-

Imperialist intentions.

The British foreign policy officials were reviewing the situation in the region with

both their current and post-war prospects in mind. At the same time the policy-makers,

either in the Imperial War Cabinet or those within the Eastern Committee, were also

acting in the best interests of securing and protecting the British Imperial Empire in the

East. These officials were also interested, if possible, in broadening their imperialist

ambitions so as to bring yet more parts of the globe under their wing. With the collapse of

the old regime in Russia to the currents of revolution, the British were able to use

imperialistic foresight and apply it to policy and decision making concerning a

prospective region of the world, Transcaucasia and that of Transcaspia.

Geographically, Transcaucasia corresponds to the lands south of the main

Caucasus mountain chain, while Transcaspia refers to those adjacent to the eastern coast

of the Caspian Sea and on into Central Asia. These regions are strategically important in

that they connect Anatolia with the crossroads of the world, Istanbul, and beyond to the

Balkans and the gates of Europe. In reverse, the region allows access across the Caspian

Sea and into the Central Asian steppe, which leads beyond to the borders of India and the

markets of China. All of this, if acquired, would potentially link the region to British

6

possessions in India, across the Persian Gulf and Mesopotamia, eventually meeting up

with British occupied Egypt and its access to the all important Suez Canal. The Suez, in

turn connects the entire Eastern Imperial chain by sea, of which the British had already

been masters of for some time. In the end the connection leads all the way back to Britain

itself.

With the above considerations in mind it is exemplified that the British

Interventionist Policy in the Transcaucasian region has many component parts that are

not always so easily distinguishable and must be defined in detail for the picture to truly

be painted properly. One of the most important interests stipulated by the British

leadership and the wartime governing apparatus meant that to intervene was to do so in

the quest to protect the Imperial Jewel, i.e. India; not to mention the protection of the

Empire’s newly acquired products of imperial outpouring, the British possessions in the

Persian Gulf. These possessions also served a dual purpose, that of a buffer region with

respect to India, as well as a staging point for acquiring other territories in the Middle

East. All of these were identified correctly as worthy colonial possessions for their

abundance of raw materials, more generally, oil. Without such abundance it can hardly be

imagined that the British policy-makers would have approved any militaristic enterprises

in the region except with the intention of combating the Turks on yet another front and

thus, attempting to increase the pressure on an already propped up and aged Ottoman

Empire. Moreover, the Gallipoli Campaign had showed that this was more easily said

than done.

The benefits of oil for use in both warfare and civilian life (the transportation

industry), not to mention the economic benefits that an immense oil industry could

7

provide in the modern era of technological innovation, were not aspects that would have

been lost on British policy-makers. The increases in gasoline use in warfare had been

noticeable for quite awhile and the British knew that the acquisition of oil could

“literally,” fuel their military apparatus into the modern age. The idea of thrusting the

British Empire backed by its oil industry past all the opponents of British imperialism and

paving the way for British dominance and the continuance of the imperial system was a

grand one indeed. This logic even allowed for the prospect of British imperialism in the

future with the possibility of escaping the same fate that befell Russian imperialism. This

would be done by providing the empire with a modern, oil fueled, army and navy, whose

power could be used to simply crush anti-Imperialist opponents that had recently cropped

up on the world stage, similar to their more recent emergent foe, the Bolsheviks.

Therefore, with a dual sense of British imperialist designs during the period, i.e.

the protection of India and the acquisition of the material wealth of the Caucasus, more

specifically, that of the city of Baku, it is no surprise that Britain’s wartime policy-makers

within the Imperial War Cabinet and the Eastern Committee were keen towards

intervention in the Caucasus and Transcaspia. The British Interventionist Policy that was

formulated was based off of perceived threats that were emanating from Britain’s

enemies in the region; the Turks, the Germans, and the Bolsheviks. The actions of her

enemies and the similar interests that they expounded with respect to the Caucasus and

Baku, made the British realize that not only was there material wealth to be gained

through intervention in the Caucasus, but also that intervention was a means of protecting

British interests from the practical threat that emerged through the opening of the

Caucasian Front. Simultaneously, due to the British military campaign against the Turks

8

in Mesopotamia, the British were also forced to secure their eastern and northern flanks,

gaps that had opened due to the fall of the Tsar. More importantly, Mesopotamia was

precisely the region where Britain had acquired some of her most recent imperial

possessions, afforded by her country’s timely involvement in World War I, which,

ironically, corresponded directly to the emergence of oil on the world scene as an

important natural resource.

The First World War is sometimes referred to as a war of nationalist ideologies

and movements and somewhere along the line it has been forgotten that the war was

essentially imperialistic in its subsequent conduct. When referring to the war overall and

the objectives of the States that were involved, it is possible to see that the foundation of

Britain’s intervention in Transcaucasia, characterized by the Dunsterville Mission to

Baku, was imperialistic in its drive. This is to say that the means by which Britain

secured and safeguarded her interests from the encroachment of the Turco-German

alliance in the region was supposedly not imperialist in nature and was instead being

propelled by the Turkish ideological outpourings of pan-Turanism and Pan-Islamism

(which were egged on by Germany throughout the war by her support of the Ottoman

Jihad, aimed at the Muslim subjects of the enemy powers, but most notably towards those

of the British Empire, of which there were many). Moreover, the Turkish threat was

coupled with knowledge of the German notions of Weltpolitik and the Drang nach Osten,

as well as their political and economic ties with the Ottomans; the Berlin-Baghdad

Railway being the most recent manifestation of these ambitious Turco-German plans for

co-operation and imperial grandeur. With the emergence of the Bolsheviks, the British

9

had yet one more dynamic that needed to be taken into account, one that could easily be

manipulated to portray a threat to the British position in the East.

It will be argued that the original British mission, under the command of General

Dunsterville, that was designed to get to the Georgian capital of Tiflis and later directed

towards Baku, was merely a mission of opportunity and dash, an imperialistic gamble for

oil. The British at the time of the Russian Revolution were already stretched thin

militarily and had been counting on the Russians to hold their weight. Therefore, the

British policy-makers who were aware of German, Turkish, and Bolshevik designs

towards the Caucasus could only sit back and somehow formulate a plan that might block

the vacuum that had been thrust opened. While running concurrently, these policy-

makers were keeping in mind the potential for imperialist expansion in the region; the

floodgates had been opened and the Bolsheviks were now the enemy. Old Russia was

ripe for the taking, but at the same time the war continued. However, when it became

apparent that such designs could not possibly bear fruit, the Imperial War Cabinet,

influenced by the Eastern Committee, pushed the Dunsterville mission into a defensive

stance and forced Dunsterville to review the unfolding events. When the time proved to

be right there formed quite possibly one of the most imperialistic endeavors ever to be

conceived in history: A small and elite unit (in “Dunsterforce,” we see the beginnings of

a special military unit, possibly a precursor to modern Special Forces units, one that was

comprised of handpicked troops from both the British homeland units and from those of

its Dominion troops),7 that was given permission to attempt to hold an advancing army of

some 15,000 Ottoman troops and irregular infantry, repel their attack and hold the city of

7 Lieutenant Timothy C. Winegard, “Dunsterforce: A Case Study of Coalition Warfare in the Middle East,

1918-1919,” Canadian Army Journal 8.3 (Fall 2005): 93.

10

Baku for the British Empire. This was to be done with only a small British force of some

1,200 troops, which were to be aided by local irregulars who numbered close to 6,000. If

this plan was to work the prizes told would have been unimaginable. With the expense of

just a few thousand troops, minimally supplied, the great oil producing centre of the

Caucasus, Baku, could be in British hands and secured for the Empire. Simultaneously,

the action would serve to block the door across the Caspian Sea and thus, cut the Central

Powers’ access to Krasnovodsk and the Central Asian railway, which led to the gates of

India. Moreover, the imperial prestige and hero-worship that would be bestowed upon the

commander of such a mission, if successful, would be immense. If Dunsterville failed,

then he would be remembered in history as a failed leader who botched a military

undertaking that was of his own creating, one that had only came into being anyway due

to his insistence on the potential success of the mission. Or at least this is how the

Imperial War Cabinet would classify failure. The Imperial War Cabinet, essentially the

head policy-making apparatus, true to their imperialist nature, could not dream of a better

deal considering the possible options. Already stretched thin, Dunsterville’s opportune

proposal of seeking permission to assist Baku in its defense seemed worth a shot.

The policy-makers saw that if a Caucasian mission could be undertaken during

the power vacuum left behind from the exodus of the Imperial Russian armies and

followed by the social and political chaos that accompanied the Russian Empire’s

downfall, then it was quite possible that from the Imperial Russian woes, British imperial

undertakings could take advantage. Also, if British possessions in the Middle East, the

Persian Gulf, and India could be protected through intervention in the Caucasus,

particularly at Baku, then the Empire would be secured. At the same time the Empire

11

would also be placed within striking distance for future imperial acquisitions in the

Caucasus and Central Asia at a later date when the opportunity once again provided

itself. Prior to the war the British had already acquired a substantial foothold in Persia

and by 1916 British forces in Persia – the South Persian Rifles – under the command of

Sir Percy Sykes, were busy enforcing British prerogatives in the land of the Shah.8 This

is the background behind the War Cabinet’s Interventionist Policy towards the Caucasus

based from official reports provided to them through various governmental organizations.

The primary sources for this research have been derived from CAB Files from the

Public Record Office, London and include Eastern Reports, Western and General

Reports, and Imperial War Cabinet and Eastern Committee minutes. Translations of

German and Russian official documents and memoirs of those individuals who were

directly involved on the British side were also consulted. The relevant organizations

include the Eastern Committee (part of the Foreign Office) and other various

Interdepartmental Committees, including the Political Office of the Intelligence Bureau.

These committees were reporting information on the Caucasus with reference to the

designs of the Germans, the Turks, and the Bolsheviks towards that same region. The

majority of information was being relayed back to the Eastern Committee through agents

in the field. For 1917 and up until May of 1918 it is not possible to comment on the

actual reception of these reports within the Eastern Committee, as minutes of the

Committee are only available from May of 1918 onwards. Thus, only speculation can be

generated concerning the reception of reports as the basis for the policy decisions

undertaken by the British towards Transcaucasia and with reference to the intentions of

8 For an overview of the British position in Persia and the actions of the South Persian Rifles and Sir Percy

Sykes see, Anthony Wynn, Persia in the Great Game: Sir Percy Sykes Explorer, Consul, Soldier, Spy

(London: John Murray, 2003).

12

the Central Powers and the Russians before May of 1918. After May of 1918 it is

possible to look at the Eastern Committee minutes and formulate interpretations based on

the actual conversations of Eastern Committee’ officials.

From this occurred the approval of Dunsterville’s proposed plan, which had

deviated from its original intent of trying to organize autonomous counter-revolutionary,

and ironically, anti-Imperialist factions, in order to provide a buffer against a Turco-

German onslaught of aggressive incursions into the Caucasus. Turco-German incursions

were aimed at Baku and beyond, the control of which could ultimately affect the stability

and relative harmony of the British Empire’s adjacent holdings. Dunsterville never made

it to Tiflis in time to organize an oppositional government, as the Turks and the Germans

beat him there. Rather, Dunsterville found himself ill-supplied, ill-equipped, and

unprepared to deal with an undertaking of such momentous magnitude. British Imperial

policy-makers were indeed marginal in their allocations towards such a policy as the

Empire was stretched thin and the possible threat of a Turco-German invasion and

destabilization of the Eastern Empire seemed remote. However, it was still quite possibly

a reality that could manifest itself in the distant future, as neither the Turks nor the

Germans were capable of such a tremendous scheme as they too were stretched thin. This

would be the case even if they were aided in the task through the resources that they

would acquire from taking the Caucasus; the reality was transparent.

This lack of allocation on the part of the British policy-makers with respect to the

Dunsterville mission well demonstrates its significance on a hypothetical scale of priority

with regard to wartime agendas. The very justification for such a mission was that it was

to protect imperial possessions, which were in fact under a remote chance of threat, but

13

yet the notion was used as the basis for the most purely imperialistic mission of all. In

reality it was intended to be a mission that could be carried out with little financial capital

or great loss of life. On the flip side, if conducted properly, and concluded with the

intended result, the mission could in the short run provide the Empire with tremendous

gains in the long run. In essence this mission was the very definition of an imperialist

adventure. Dunsterville’s eventual orders and mission are a superb example of imperialist

policy in action, in that the mission was allocated and carried out with superficial

numbers when compared to the other theatres and campaigns undertaken by the British

during the First World War. And, if by chance, something beneficial was to result then it

meant that Britain’s Empire would be strengthened by the low wage gamble. In fact,

Britain had the opportunity to essentially come into possession of Imperial Russia’s

former proverbial “goose which lays the golden egg,” i.e. the industrial oil centre of the

Caucasus region and one of the largest oil producing cities of the First World War era,

the Caspian port city of Baku.

Why the British did not allocate more resources for a mission that seemed to

provide the possibility of immeasurable gains is startling, while at the same time not very

surprising. Most likely, it was due to the years of constant warfare and the strain on the

military apparatus and the Empire as a whole. Instead we see the result of a peripheral

policy manifested by the formation of “Dunsterforce,” one which was to employ troops in

smaller concentrations. Imperial Britain is seen here wagering low, with the prospect and

hopes of striking it big. This is a case of good old fashion carpe diem. All that was

needed was a capricious leader who could recognize such an opportunity and who would

be brazen enough to organize a mission and attempt its successful culmination.

14

This paper is essentially an examination of British Imperial foreign policy during

the First World War, targeting the Transcaucasus and the city of Baku as a case study.

The time period in question is concerned with the expanse of time just after the first

Russian Revolution in February (March) 1917 up until the British entrance into Baku in

August of the following year. British policy-making will also be examined with respect to

the strategic, diplomatic, ideological, and economic/imperialistic variables weighed

against the British by their enemies and how the British policy-makers interpreted such

actions. In turn, we can see how Eastern Committee officials eventually formulated,

developed, and put into action an “Interventionist Policy” towards the Caucasus and

Baku with the approval of the Imperial War Cabinet. It will be demonstrated that the

Interventionist Policy towards Baku was ultimately directed by imperialistic interests.

These interests were calculated with respect to their strategic and economic advantages

and their importance towards the British wartime participation in the region, as well as

the overall wartime and projected post-wartime imperial ambitions with regard to the

British Eastern Empire in India, the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, and potentially the

former Tsarist areas of Transcaucasia, Transcaspia, and Central Asia.

It must not be forgotten that these policy decisions were made during the context

of a war, a world war, and the ideological, strategic, and militaristic ambitions of the

British Empire’s wartime enemies, the Central Powers, more specifically, Germany and

the Ottoman Empire, as well as the newly founded products of the Russian Revolution,

the Bolsheviks, were all influential in developing British wartime Interventionist Policy

with regard to the Caucasus and Baku. The opinions of Western and Soviet historians

concerning the imperialistic nature of British intervention in Transcaucasia during the

15

First World War contradict one another. An attempt at determining which side has

grasped the reality of the situation the closet, is of cardinal importance here. Without an

understanding of all the major players that were involved, the British case is merely

isolated and the impetus behind their policy formulation cannot be fully comprehended

and identified. This in particular is what this research will intend to illuminate.

16

CHAPTER II:

POLICY CREATION AND THE INFLUENCE OF OIL

The ripest areas that were ready to be picked by imperial on-lookers with the

coming of the Russian collapse were those of Transcaucasia and Transcaspia. These were

two regions on the periphery of the former Tsarist domains, and ones which were

increasingly being incorporated into the overall “Grand Strategy” of British officials

formulating policy in the wake of the Russian collapse. That policy was to eventually

result in military intervention. One historian goes so far as to suggest that, “[t]he British

intervention, however, was an important phase in the history of British Imperialism in

Asia. It was the last desperate attempt of Britain to expand her Empire.”1 If it were not

for the occurrence of the Russian Revolution and coincidentally, the abundance of natural

resources, as well as the strategic importance of the regions, these two areas might have

remained backwaters.2

The Caucasus theatre of war is often viewed as a side-show of the much larger

conflict that was taking place primarily in Europe. Ever since the beginning of the war

the participants tended to focus their gaze on the Western Front, which had stagnated into

1 T. R. Sareen, British Intervention in Central Asia and Trans-Caucasia (New Delhi: Anmol Publications,

1989), 4. 2 John Keegan, The First World War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999), 383.

17

brutal trench warfare after the initial German offensive had run out of steam. Due to the

significance of the European theatre of war the events that occurred on the fiery border

situated between the empires of the Ottomans and the Russians, often receive little

attention in the historiography of the war, if any at all.3 Therefore, not surprisingly, some

of the more obscure allied campaigns, such as “Dunsterforce,” receive notably less

historical coverage and are usually crammed together under the more general heading of

“Allied intervention in Russia”.4 Most histories of the campaigning in the Middle Eastern

theatre tend instead to focus on the Mesopotamian and Palestinian Fronts.5 Some

historians contend that lack of documentation in printed reports pertaining to the area in

question was the result of the inaccessibility of the region to war correspondents and not

because the fighting was any less intense.6 Nevertheless, contemporary British military

historians considered British intervention in Transcaucasia simply as an “expedition,”

while a British participant writing nearly a half century later, categorized the events that

transpired as little more than a military “episode.”7 8 However, Soviet historians, writing

during the Cold War era, dismiss such remarks as concealing the real intent of British

Interventionist Policy: an imperialist one.

The participant, Colonel C. H. Ellis, claims that he was moved by two

considerations when he decided to record the events that he took part in. These

considerations included the absence of any authoritative account by a participant of what

3 Sean McMeekin, The Berlin-Baghdad Express: The Ottoman Empire and Germany’s Bid for World

Power (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010), 318. 4 Lieutenant Timothy C. Winegard, “Dunsterforce: A Case Study of Coalition Warfare in the Middle East,

1918-1919,” Canadian Army Journal 8.3 (Fall 2005): 94. 5 McMeekin, 318.

6 Reynolds, Shattering Empires,

7 Sareen, 4.

8 C. H. Ellis, The British “Intervention” in Transcaspia 1918-1919 (Berkeley: University of California

Press, 1963).

18

unfolded and to clear up, what was in his opinion, the distorted view of British policy and

of the role of British forces in the region. Ellis contended that the distortion had been

generated by Soviet academicians.9 However, the most prominent of these Soviet

academicians, Leonid Mitrokhin, suggests that Ellis’ denials of any premeditated

imperialistic British intent, “do not stand up against criticism: the documents in the

archives of the British colonial authorities in India indicate the precise opposite:

intervention in Transcaucasia and Central Asia was a premeditated, anti-Soviet and

expansionist action.”10

Mitrokhin brands Ellis’ book as an, “extremely biased” account,

one which, “reveals the attitude of modern bourgeois historians to events in

Transcaucasia and Central Asia.”11

Such Marxist views are often disregarded. However,

unearthing the true intentions of the British, while simultaneously coming to a conclusion

on what is most convincing about this subject, is of extreme importance. It is a topic with

reference to official British foreign policy during a wartime situation and one which

seems to be hotly debated and contested for some time now between Western and Soviet

historians.

To understand British wartime foreign policy creation it is necessary to look at the

officials and institutions that formulated and issued directives for the implementation of

that foreign policy, namely, the members of the Imperial War Cabinet and its sub-

division, the War Office. The Foreign Office – also a sub-division of the War Cabinet –

and its own sub-group, the Eastern Committee, were to be involved in policy formulation

9 Ellis, 13.

10 Leonid Mitrokhin, Failure of the Three Missions: British diplomacy and intelligence in the efforts to

overthrow Soviet government in Central Asia and Transcaucasia and prevent contacts between the Soviet

state and the national liberation movements in Afghanistan, Iran and India, 1917-1921(Translated by

Sergei Sossinsky. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1987), 12. 11

Ibid, 12.

19

with regard to Transcaucasia. The India Office and the Indian government were able to

voice their opinion, but did not have a direct say in policy formation.12

13

Nevertheless,

the Indian government was continuously at odds with the new British strategy, mostly

because they would have to bear the burden, both financially and in terms of resources.

However, the India Office and Foreign Office enthusiastically gave their support to the

military policy that was to be created.14

Direction of policy was firmly in the hands of the most senior British military

officials and politicians by 1917 and these were the men who would direct the British

Empire until the signing of the Armistice. David Lloyd George was one of these

prominent individuals who had just recently assumed even more power of policy

direction with his elevation to the office of Prime Minister. He had replaced Lord

Asquith, who had recently fallen out of good standing. His conduct of the war had been

much in question since it seemed to be nowhere near drawing towards a conclusion of

hostilities. Pessimistic emotions began to emerge from those caught up in the conflict and

the overall Allied position was looking bleaker than ever.

By spring 1917, the Russian war effort was quite obviously beginning to

falter. By the end of the summer it was failing. By the autumn, following

the Bolshevik coup, it had collapsed. Moreover, on the Western Front,

Britain’s offensive in Flanders was failing to make headway despite

extremely heavy casualties. To make matters worse, the French army, by

June 1917, was convalescent at best; by winter, the Italian army was

virtually comatose; the American army, meanwhile, remained a pledge

rather than a fighting force. Therefore, it seemed certain that the war was

about to enter an entirely new phase.15

12

Frederick Stanwood, War, Revolution and British Imperialism in Central Asia (London: Ithaca Press,

1983), 20. 13

John Ellis, The World War I Databook: The Essential Facts and Figures for all the Combatants

(London: Aurum Press, 2001), 73. See Appendix A for a table of the U. K. Government and High

Command Structure during WWI. 14

Stanwood, 83. 15

Brock Millman, “The Problem with Generals: Military Observers and the Origins of the Intervention in

Russia and Persia, 1917-1918,” Journal of Contemporary History 33, no. 2 (April 1998): 293.

20

Moreover, the previous year’s fighting saw the defeat of the British at both Gallipoli and

Kut-el-Amara at the hands of the Turks. On the Western Front in the battle of

Passchendaele, little had been achieved at the staggering cost of 300,000 to 400,000

casualties, and this strengthened the convictions of those within the ruling circle that the

defeat of Germany might indeed be unattainable.16

As a result of previous events, by mid-

1917 a reappraisal of war aims directed towards peripheral campaigns was underway.17

“The evolution of the Allied strategy during the First World War resulted in many

attempts by the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) to expedite victory by deploying

missions that circumvented the Western Front.”18

Once in office Lloyd George set about implementing new war aims, and

concomitant changes in policy and strategy with respect to Britain’s overall role in the

war. By the end of 1917 it had been decided that the previous Allied strategy of

“concentric” attacks needed to be revaluated. The new strategy would employ Britain,

which alone was able to challenge the enemy in multiple theatres, to carry-out a

“peripheral” strategy to counter a Germany that was winning on the continent.19

A

peripheral strategy seemed to have a secondary purpose as well. With the Russian

collapse the Central Powers sought to gain from this moment of Russian weakness and a

peripheral strategy by the British would also serve to counter any of the advantages that

their enemies could hope to gain through occupation of Transcaucasia. At the same time

any British gains that might be acquired while countering the enemy in the region would

16

V. H. Rothwell, British War Aims and Peace Diplomacy 1914-1918 (Princeton: Princeton University

Press, 1968), 109. 17

Ibid, 96. 18

Winegard, 93. 19

Millman, The Problem with General, 294.

21

be considered important, as they could be used at the negotiating table, if that eventuality

arose.20

The prime minster did not bring about such change without opposition. Many of

the top generals - Field Marshal Douglas Haig included - who had committed to so much

on the Western Front, were not so willing to have their theatre of operations demoted in

such a fashion and continued to cling to the notion that the war would be determined by

the events that occurred there. In retrospect, they were correct.

Lloyd George needed individuals whom he could trust to devote their energy to

the new strategy. When Sir Henry Wilson, who was sympathetic to the prime minister’s

plans, replaced William Robertson as Chief of the Imperial General Staff after the

Robertson-Lloyd George duel, there only remained Field Marshal Haig and a few other

“western” voices.21

Lloyd George then began courting the support of the Dominions. The

assembling of the Imperial War Cabinet for the first time in the spring of 1917 allowed

fresh ties to be created. The Dominion premiers wanted a more imperial war policy, in

particular, colonial conquests to be included in British war aims as, “all of the

Dominions, except Canada, [had] made important conquests in the course of the war.”22

On the ground as well, Lloyd George began changing key positions so that he would be

able to implement the change in strategy by military means. Thus, for the peripheral war,

just prior to British intervention in the Caucasus, “a new chief of the expeditionary army,

who understood its logistical requirements, re-opened the campaign under a new

Secretary of State for India, a new Viceroy, and a new commander-in-chief of the Indian

20

Brock Millman, “A Counsel of Despair: British Strategy and War Aims, 1917-18,” Journal of

Contemporary History 36, no. 2 (April 2001): 242. 21

Millman, The Problem with General, 293. 22

Millman, A Counsel of Despair, 255-256.

22

Army.”23

Edwin Montagu was appointed Secretary of State for India, Frederic John

Napier Thesiger, 1st Viscount Chelmsford, served as the new Viceroy, and General Sir

Charles Carmichael Monro became the new C-in-C of the Indian Army. However, as the

Imperial General Staff was busy directing all aspects of British participation in the war, it

was understood that a particular body had to be created that could generate policy on

Transcaucasia and remedy the special situation that the British encountered with the

withdrawal of the Russian troops.

The formation of British policy towards Transcaucasia prior to the March

Revolution had been carried out by numerous committees and strategy was therefore

muddled. In a secret document, ‘The Present Situation in Russia & the Near East,’

written to the War Cabinet on 7 March 1918, by Sir Henry Wilson, – Lloyd George’s

new ally – we see the previous policy coming under attack for the first time.

In spite of the fact that the British share in military and foreign policy in

the East has been predominant and that consequently the necessity for

delays inseparable from inter[nal] consultation is largely absent, important

measures have been rendered impossible or delayed with grave

consequences by the lack of co-ordination involved by the present

machinery. The existing machinery consists of:- ( a) The Russian

committee, (b) The Persian committee, (c) The Middle East committee.

The above committees meet nominally about once a week, but in practice

meetings are liable to be postponed owing to pressure of work of

individual members. The composition, status and executive powers of

these committees vary.24

In the same document we see Wilson highlighting the necessity of forming a single

committee in response to the new Russian situation and the need to counter enemy

ambitions. “In view of the situation created by the collapse of Russia and of the two main

objectives of the enemy, i.e. the exploitation of Russian resources and the penetration for

23

Fromkin, 305. 24

CAB 24/44: Secret Memoranda, The Present Situation in Russia & the Near East, 7 March 1918.

23

military purposes of Central Asia, it is vitally necessary that Allied policy in the East no

less than in the West should be regarded from the standpoint of the single front.”25

Wilson also stressed the fact that the committee that was to be created should have

“executive functions” to deal with all matters of general policy with respect to

Transcaucasia, so as to speed the policy creation process forward. The proceedings of the

committee were to be circulated to the War Cabinet and to all Departments concerned, so

that policy would flow directly to the top.26

At much the same time, the Secretary of State

for War, Lord Alfred Milner, set about as well urging for the creation of a single body to

handle Transcaucasian policy. In a letter from 20 March 1918 to Lloyd George, Milner

urged for the creation of an “Eastern Committee”. Milner was concerned with the issues

created by the Russian situation and recommended that such a situation be handled by a

single committee to be formed by merging the existing committees into one. The next

day at a meeting of the War Cabinet the motion was raised and the Committee was

formed.27

For the direction of the Eastern Committee Lloyd George decided upon Lord

George Curzon, the former Viceroy of India and a grand “Imperial Statesmen”. Curzon

was a man most capable of handling the situation, but whose reputation was a bit

tarnished from his days in India and he wanted to use the war to revitalize his imperial

interest in Asia.28

“Curzon dominated the Eastern Committee with his agile mind and

consuming ambition. He took interest not only in the determination of general policy, but

25

Ibid. 26

Ibid. 27

Richard H. Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Relations 1917-1921 (Anglo-Soviet Accord) (Princeton: Princeton

University Press, 1973) 307ff. 28

Stanwood, 24.

24

in daily operations.”29

Some say Curzon took to the position with zeal and chaired the

committee with a “strong hand,” which allowed him to have considerable influence in the

development of Transcaucasian policy, as well as policy on Middle Eastern questions

within the Committee’s sphere.30

Nevertheless, Curzon felt himself challenged within the

Committee by Arthur Balfour, the British Foreign Secretary. Stanwood describes the

atmosphere of the Committee.

There was an obvious tendency to be carried away by the imperial

rhetoric. But where Curzon was prepared to pursue actively imperial

goals, Balfour was not: if the tendency for the map to turn red was natural,

he was prepared to let nature take its course. Balfour’s passivity contrasted

with Curzon’s more overtly expansionist ideas; but the Eastern Committee

proved to be a hothouse in which ideas could flourish.31

The attendance of other members of the Eastern Committee fluctuated. However, the

following individuals, and of course Curzon and Balfour, were at nearly all of the most

important cessions for developing policy: General Jan Smuts of South Africa; Lord

Robert Cecil (Assistant Foreign Secretary); Lord Charles Hardinge (permanent under-

secretary at the FO); Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson; Edwin Montagu (Secretary of

State for India), and Major General Macdonough (Director of Military Operations). It is

also worthy of noting that Lloyd George and Milner, both ardent advocates of a

peripheral strategy, were not part of the Committee that was established to formulate that

strategy.32

The Eastern Committee quickly began to devote all its interest to

understanding Transcaucasia, socially, culturally, economically, and more importantly,

politically. What was it that cast the region from the shadows and witnessed an

29

Ibid, 108. 30

Briton Cooper Busch, Britain, India, and the Arabs 1914-1921 (Berkeley: University of California Press,

1971), 29. 31

Stanwood, 120. 32

Ullman, 307ff.

25

international power struggle which, at times, even saw allies fighting against one

another?

The strategic and military significance of Transcaucasia cannot be

underestimated. Whoever held the Caucasus controlled access into Europe or, vice versa,

into the Middle East and beyond, across the Caspian, into Central Asia and to the gates of

India. Another attractive attribute of the area was its vast mineral wealth. “Its mineral

wealth seems to be practically unlimited, copper, zinc, iron, tin, and many other metals

being found throughout the region, in most cases in exceedingly rich deposits.”33

There

were also large deposits of manganese ore, one of the main requirements of the steel

industry. The Caucasus generated half of the world’s supply, which was exported from

the two important Black Sea ports of Batum and Poti.34

However, the most important

resource of the region was certainly oil. And, the city of Baku was former Tsarist

Russia’s proverbial “goose that laid the golden eggs,” and with a stroke of good fortune

for imperial onlookers, it was up for grabs.

By the mid-nineteenth century with the American drilling of the first oil-well by

Edward Drake in Titusville, Pennsylvania, Baku had began its ascent to importance.35

By

the turn of the century Baku by itself accounted for one half of the world’s production of

oil36

and it was said that at a certain point Baku’s oil production had exceeded that of all

the wells in the United States combined.37

In 1916, before the October Revolution, Baku

33

Reynolds J. Francis, Allen L. Churchill, and Francis Trevelyan Miller, eds. The Story of the Great War:

History of the European War from Official sources (8 vols.) (New York: P. F. Collier & Son, 1916), 288. 34

Ibid, 288. 35

Ronald, G. Suny, The Baku Commune 1917-1918: Class and Nationality in the Russian Revolution

(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), 4. 36

John P. McKay, “Baku Oil and Transcaucasian Pipelines, 1883-1891: A Study in Tsarist Economic

Policy,” Slavic Review 43, no. 4 (Winter 1984): 606. 37

Hopkirk, 332.

26

produced about 8 million tons of oil out of a total of 10 million.38

39

Along with industrial

and commercial growth there occurred a population boom that altered the dynamic with

respect to intervention.

Baku’s dramatic population increase that accompanied the rise in industry meant

that the population had jumped from that of a small town of 2,500 in the early 1800’s to

an industrial and commercial center with a bustling population of almost 200,000 in just

one hundred years. This population explosion was a direct result of oil being

discovered.40

Due to the rich cultural diversity of the Caucasus, people from all ethnic

backgrounds flocked to live life in the city. Of the six and one half million or so people

living in the Caucasus there was to be found a mix, both ethnically and confessionally,

between Muslims of Turkic origin, Armenian and Georgian Christians, as well as a mix

of various mountain tribes.41

“[I]n Baku alone, were to be found no fewer than forty-five

different nationalities and ethnic groups.”42

Nevertheless, the ethnic majority in Baku was

comprised of Muslim Azeris, which meant for the British that the prospects of Ottoman

success in acquiring the oil city would be much greater.

Of course, anyone who had ambitions to control Transcaucasia and exploit its oil

wealth to the full extent, needed to build, maintain, and effectively control a vast railroad

network. The Russians knew this all too well and had created an extensive railway

network during their time in possession of the Caucasus. That network was connected to

38

Heinrich Hassmann, Oil in the Soviet Union: History, Geography, and Problems (Princeton: Princeton

University Press, 1953), 69. 39

See Appendix B for oil production figures. Ellis, The World War I Databook, 285. See also Appendix C, Charles van der Leeuw, Oil and Gas in the Caucasus & Caspian: A History (Richmond: Curzon Press,

2000), 88. 40

Bülent Gökay, “The Battle for Baku (May-September 1918): A Peculiar Episode in the History of the

Caucasus,” Middle Eastern Studies 34, no.1 (January 1998): 30. 41

Marian Kent, ed., The Great Powers and the End of the Ottoman Empire (London: Frank Cass and Co.

Ltd., 1996) 89-90. 42

Hopkirk, 259.

27

Russia proper by a rail link through the Caucasian mountains, a barrier that had in the

past essentially separated the north Caucasus from the south. By 1917 the Russians had a

rail line from Moscow directly to Baku and from Baku to Tiflis, the Georgian capital,

located in roughly the mid-section of the region. From Tiflis rail lines radiated outward

like spokes from the center of a wheel, a literal hub, continuing to Kars in Anatolia and

northwest to the Black Sea ports of Baku and Poti, as well as southeast in the direction of

Tabriz in British Persia (Iran).43

44

Tiflis had strategic importance because of its position

of close proximity to the Turkish frontier and it was just forty-five miles from the fortress

at Kars. The line to Tiflis was one of the few railroads in the whole of the rough terrain.45

The significance of the Batum railway connection was enhanced by the fact that the oil

pipelines from Baku also used Batum as their terminus, making that city exponentially

more strategic.46

Among the imperial competitors who wished to use Baku’s oil to drive

their war machines there was a common consensus that full occupation and control of the

Transcaucasian railway network was essential to the process of occupying the region

effectively and to acquire the region’s oil.

Prior to World War I the British and, for that matter, many of the other world

powers of the time had recognized that oil had begun to revolutionize warfare and the

estimations for its further use suggested much wider importance. The British Empire had

already acquired extensive oil interests in Persia and in the region of the Gulf. Their need

for oil came with the advent of the internal combustion engine, which in the course of the

43

Major M. H. Donohoe, With the Persian Expedition (London: Edward Arnold, 1919), 134-135. 44

For a map of the railway network of the Caucasus see Appendix D. Briton Cooper Busch, Mudros to

Lausanne: Britain’s Frontier in West Asia, 1918-1923 (Albany: State University of New York Press,

1976). 45

Reynolds, The Story of the Great War, 9. 46

Gökay, The Battle for Baku, 46.

28

war had, “changed every dimension of warfare, even the very meaning of mobility on

land and sea and in the air.”47

The discovery of oil helped to strengthen British imperial

interests in the region, where the Anglo-Persian Oil Company had a refinery and from

this the British Royal Navy derived the bulk of its oil supply. This had become even more

considerable, due to the introduction of the most recent addition of oil-burning

Dreadnoughts (the Royal Sovereign and Queen Elizabeth classes). Under Winston

Churchill’s instigation the company was deemed vital and the British government set

about acquiring a commanding number of shares in 1913.48

Inventions and improvements

during the course of the war would also generate more oil driven machines, such as tanks,

airplanes, and armored cars. Not long after the Armistice, with reference to the army of

motor lorries on the Western Front, Lord Curzon boastfully declared that, “[t]he Allied

cause had floated to victory upon a wave of oil.”49

A more restricted example of oil playing a role in warfare can be seen in the

mission under study here, that of Dunsterforce. Yes, it was true, Dunsterforce was small.

However, it was meant to be a fast and mobile unit comprised of modern machines. The

amount of gas needed to fuel Dunsterville’s force alone was tremendous. This is a

personal account by Dunsterville of the Ford vans and armored cars that he had attached

to his unit as it organized in Hamadan in May of 1918. Fuel supplies at this point were

being conveyed all the way from Baghdad, originating from the British oil possessions in

the Persian Gulf. The importance that oil played in the functioning of his unit can be seen

here.

47

Daniel Yergin, (The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money and Power (New York: Free Press, 2008),

151. 48

Keegan, 218. 49

Yergin, 167.

29

At the beginning of June I got the welcome news that troops were on their

way in sufficient numbers to meet the demands of the moment. The

remainder of the 14th

Hussars were marching to Hamadan, eight armoured

cars were at Kermanshah, and a mobile column of a thousand rifles of the

¼ Hants Regiment and the ½ Gurkhas with two mountain guns were on

their way up with all speed in 500 Ford motor-vans, and would probably

arrive in Kasvin by June 12th

. The movement of so many cars was

rendered difficult by the shortage of petrol, but we just managed to

accumulate sufficient to get them all through.50

Obviously, supplying such forces required copious amounts of fuel, but the advantages

they could provide for an army on the battlefield were immense! Dunsterville records the

advantage that an aeroplane could provide. “Neither the Russians nor the Turks had been

able to use aeroplanes in these parts, and the effect of our aeroplane was much enhanced

by its novelty.”51

The use of oil for fuel comes at once to mind, but indeed, oil is used for

so much more. The British had even managed to discover an ingenious method of

extracting one of the key ingredients that is contained in TNT from certain types of crude

oil. Much of the TNT that was used by the British during the war was created in this

manner, allowing the British to meet their quotas for TNT supplies.52

All this talk of oil as a major component in warfare and, therefore, instrumental in

policy formation, seems an oversimplification, especially within the context of currents

events in the Middle East. However, at this crucial juncture in history the importance of

oil in developing policy was an unmistakable reality. It was not merely the British who

were imperial oil-seekers in Transcaucasia. The other players involved were all keenly

planning for the acquisition of Baku and its oil. Speaking of the British, that oil helped to

shape policy was a known fact: the government’s purchase of a majority-shareholding in

the Anglo-Persian Oil Company had made that clear. The British government in all its

50

Major-General L. C. Dunsterville, The Adventures of Dunsterforce (London: Edward Arnold, 1920), 156. 51

Dunsterville, 83. 52

Yergin, 158-159.

30

history had never tied themselves so closely to a private enterprise.53

Wartime saw the

tendency continue. The desire for Mesopotamian oil as well as Transcaucasian oil

contributed to shaping policy and strategy more extensively after chaos erupted in Russia.

“In fact, consistency with pre-war policy is one of the striking features in this quest for

oil.”54

The Eastern Committee was prepared to implement policy towards the

procurement of territories with an abundance of oil if events took them along that road.

Lord Curzon was by all means willing to acquire more oil for the Crown; but for the time

being he had to settle with gathering information on the newly opened Tsarist domains.

Curzon noticed from the beginning the previous deficiencies in policy formation

with respect to the region and, therefore, he decided to hold regular meetings of the

Committee, once a week, in which “Eastern Reports,” were to be reviewed and, later,

from which policy was to be formulated, based on the information received. These

eastern reports were generated by agents in the field; these were intelligence officers of

the Department of Information, part of the Intelligence Bureau. There was also the

Political Intelligence Department, part of the Foreign Office. From these sources the

Eastern Committee was able to derive information from eye-witness accounts, as well as

official military and intelligence reports that were dispatched by cable. Other sources

provided more. It seems that in the initial eastern reports the Eastern Committee was

being continuously informed about the Ottoman position and the Ottoman efforts at using

Pan-Turanian and Pan-Islamic ideology towards achieving their goals in the Caucasus, as

well as the threat posed from Germany and the Bolsheviks. To top it all off, the

53

Marian Kent, Moguls and Mandarins: Oil, Imperialism and the Middle East in British Foreign Policy

1900-1940 (London: Frank Cass and Co. Ltd., 1993), 1. 54

Helmut Mejcher, Imperial Quest for Oil: Iraq 1910-1928 (London: Ithaca Press, 1976), 29.

31

Committee had to access knowledge of internal political events in Transcaucasia.

However, at the moment we shall focus on the most immediate of the threats to the

British position in the East, due to its close proximity to the region in question, that of the

Turks.

32

CHAPTER III:

PAN-ISLAMISM AND PAN-TURANISM: THE PERCEIVED

THREAT TO THE BRITISH EMPIRE

It was common knowledge that the Allies in the initial stages of the war

considered the Ottoman threat to be rather negligible. The “Eastern Question” that was

debated by rulers all across the world concerned the vast territories of the Sultan and

what was to happen to them when the “sick man of Europe,” keeled over and died.1 It

was not surprising, therefore, that the British decided that the Turks were the weakest link

in the Central Powers’ chain despite their failures in the Dardanelles-Gallipoli campaign.

The British believed that if they could undermine Germany’s allies by employing their

new strategy of peripheral war, they could then finish the Turks off by advancing from

the south through Mesopotamia where Sir Stanley Maude captured Baghdad on 11 March

1917, and Palestine where Sir Edmund Allenby entered Jerusalem on 9 December 1917.

These operations were to be accompanied by interventions to begin in Persia and from

there into Transcaucasia, Transcaspia, Central Asia, and eventually all the way to

Siberia.2

1 Gökay, A Clash of Empires, 2-3.

2 Millman, A Counsel of Despair, 260.

33

During the war the Caucasian Front campaigns had for the most part been going

in favor of the Russians. After Enver Pasha’s failed Sarikamish campaign the Turks

found themselves on the defensive in Anatolia; what offensive power they had had was

now gone. However, within weeks of the March Revolution the Russian soldiers had

heard the news and were already vacating their positions all along the front, except for in

the southern sector in Azerbaijan and northern Persia, even though the hastily formed

Provisional Government pledged to continue fighting. The Turks reacted quickly and

immediately initiated plans for the occupation of territory seized by the Russians up to

that point in the war, but also, with a keen eye towards further acquisitions. The Turks

also stood poised to recover territory lost in previous wars. “It was no longer enough that

the Ottomans win back Bitlis, Erzincan, Erzurum, Muş and Trabzon to restore the status

quo ante of 1914: nationalistic Turks now wanted Elviye-i Selâse, the three lost provinces

of Batumi, Ardahan and Kars, to reverse Russian gains during the war of 1877.”3 The

Germans had initially agreed to support Turkish claims with respect to the 1877 borders

and at Brest-Litovsk the Germans pushed the Russians into accepting the agreement. The

Germans were under the impression that they could buy the Turks off in the Caucasus by

giving in to their original demands of the 1877 borders, appeasing them to some degree.

It was no secret that the German High Command had an eye on the Caucasus. The

Germans wished to exploit the region for their own purposes.4 Therefore, in a document

written by the First Quartermaster General of the German Army, Erich Ludendorff, from

9 June 1918, the author insisted that the Turkish position be taken into account when

deciding the fate of the Caucasus. He was aware that the Batum-Tiflis-Djulfa railway line

3 McMeekin, 323.

4 See Appendix E for German War Aims in the East, 1917-1918. Martin Gilbert, The Routledge Atlas of the

First World War: The Complete History (London: Routledge, 1994), 105.

34

was particularly important for future Ottoman military operations and he was under the

impression that the Turks should gain possession of it in order to facilitate their troop

movements.5 However, the German stance towards a Turkish presence in the Caucasus

was not necessarily so clear cut; there were internal differences between civilians and the

military within Germany. The OHL – The German Army High Command during the First

World War – wanted the Turks to have a common front with Persia and the British

position there, while the Foreign Ministry was averse to Turkish territorial expansion in

the region because of their own distinct ambitions in Transcaucasia. There was also, the

cordial, albeit shaky, relationship with the Russians that had been established at Brest-

Litovsk.6 Richard von Kühlmann, the German foreign minister, especially opposed

advancing the Ottomans to any advantageous position in the region.7 Nevertheless, just as

Chamberlain’s appeasement failed to win over Hitler before World War II, the German

attempt at winning over the leadership of the Committee of Union and Progress with

regard to Russian territory was unsuccessful in its own right.

The Turks were aware of how weak the position of the newly formed

Transcaucasian Government really was and while negotiations over the disposition of the

Caucasus were still taking place the Turks decided upon military intervention, believing

that further demands could be extracted at sword point. The German OHL and their

Foreign Ministry immediately became concerned by the turn of events when the Turks

advanced in early 1918 and officially disregarded the lines that were fixed at Brest-

5 Z. A. B. Zeman, ed. and trans, Germany and the Revolution in Russia 1915-1918: Documents from the

Archives of the German Foreign Ministry (London: Oxford University Press, 1958), 134. 6 Fritz Fischer, Germany’s Aims in the First World War (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc.,

1967), 551. 7 Michael Reynolds, “Buffers, Not Brethren: Young Turk Military Policy in the First World War and the

Myth of Panturanism,” The Past and Present Society 203, no. 6 (May, 2009): 152.

35

Litovsk.8 For Germany, this dramatic alteration of events was sure to complicate their

position with the Bolsheviks and the overall German plan of subordinating Russia with

the intent of fueling the German war effort.9 For the time being at least it looked as if the

Turks were attempting compensation in the former possessions of the Tsar for territorial

losses suffered elsewhere at the hands of the British. “Even the normally unexcitable

Talaat thought that the Russian Revolution had ‘opened the doors to the realization of

Turkey’s eastern empire’.”10

Ever since the advent of the Young Turks to power, along

with the enthusiastic supporter of Pan-Turkic ideology – the notion of uniting all peoples

who have share a common Turkic language and culture – Enver Pasha, they had been

relying on a gambit of multiple ideologies to achieve their political goals. Ottomanism,

Pan-Islamism, and Pan-Turanism/Pan-Turkism, were the main ideologies employed in

the service of the Young Turk’s schemes of an Ottoman Empire newly focused towards

the East. “Now that his dream of a vast pan-Turanian empire was becoming a reality at

long last, the retrocession of lost territories, a pipe dream only a few months earlier,

would not suffice: Turkey had to incorporate the entire Transcaucasian landmass into its

empire, up to the Iranian and the Afghan borders.”11

This is a bit of an exaggeration of

course, but the fact that Pan-Turanian ideology helped to influence the Ottoman Empire’s

policies is not.

The Young Turk Revolution of 1908 effectively gave the C.U.P – Committee of

Union and Progress – control over the Ottoman Empire, ruled by the triumvirate of Enver

8 See Appendix F for a map of the Turkish Advance, 1918. John Ellis, The World War I Databook, 64.

9 Ulrich Trumpener, Germany and the Ottoman Empire, 1914-1918 (Princeton: Princeton University Press,

1968), 177. 10

McMeekin, 323. 11

Efraim Karsh and Inari Karsh, Empires of the Sand: The Struggle for Mastery in the Middle East, 1789-

1923 (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1999), 148.

36

Pasha, Talaat Pasha, and Cemal Pasha. In the previous century various sultans had set

about modernizing the empire on a western basis. Ottomanism was the first ideology to

be incorporated into the state system. However, when its prospects began to wane,

represented by the various nationalist revolts throughout the empire, the Sultan began to

focus more on the ideology of Pan-Islamism – the idea of uniting the peoples of the

empire based upon a common religion – rather than through a common tradition found in

Ottomanism. Sultan Abdülhamid II had been the first Ottoman ruler to try and use the

embracing ideology of Pan-Islamism to unite the various groups within his empire. He

wanted to take advantage of rising Islamic awareness and support a Pan-Islamic

movement.12

With the rise of the Young Turks to power Pan-Islamism began to take a

back seat to the more modern ideological movement of Pan-Turanism and onto Pan-

Turkism, as Toynbee put it: “Young Turk ideals rapidly narrowed. Liberalism gave way

to Panislamism, Panislamism to Panturanianism, and the “Ottoman State Idea” changed

from “Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity” to the Turkification of non-Turkish nationalities

by force.”13

Toynbee was a political agent for the British Intelligence Bureau and his

comments from 1917 should be taken with a grain of salt. Nevertheless, they can still

provide us with insight into the mind of an individual that was directly involved in the

events that transpired in Transcaucasia.

This is not to say that once the Turks adopted a new ideology they simply threw

the old one out the window. Rather, the C.U.P leadership during the First World War

simultaneously used both Pan-Islamist and Pan-Turanian ideology interchangeably to

achieve political and military goals. In an eastern report from 29 November 1917 we see

12

Stanford J. Shaw, The Ottoman Empire in World War I, vol 2: Triumph and Tragedy, November 1914-

July 1916 (Ankara: Turkish Historical Society, 2006), 1149. 13

A. J. Toynbee, Turkey: A Past and a Future (New York: George H. Doran Company, 1917), 15.

37

that the Eastern Committee had been well informed in these developments concerning

Ottoman policy and that they were aware of the dual nature of Ottoman strategy.

The opportunism of the C.U.P. appears most clearly in their attempt to

drive Pan-Turanianism and Pan-Islamism in double harness, though the

two creeds are diametrically opposed to one another. The C.U.P. are

devotees to neither, but exploit them both. Pan-Islamism is not really a

religious doctrine. If it were, it would not be so incompatible with Pan

Turanianism as it is. Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turanianism are rival political

programmes for increasing the power of the Ottoman Empire abroad.14

In fact, the Eastern Committee had received reports of a shift in Ottoman policy on

ideological emphasis just about one month prior and they were aware of the Ottoman

strategy that entailed engaging in the use of multiple ideologies. We see in the reports the

British attempt to gain a general understanding of the ideologies that were being used

against them by their enemy, as the Committee was being informed of the C.U.P

leadership’s leaning towards embracing yet another ideology and hence, creating a

conglomeration of threats to the British in the East.

Three main ideals, have successively animated the government of Turkey

by the Young Turk party since the deposition of Sultan Abdul Hamid, viz.,

(1) Unity or Ottomanism, (2) Pan-Islamism, and (3) Pan-Turanianism. The

first, which was designed to unite under the constitution the different

elements of the Ottoman empire irrespective of race or creed, failed owing

to the strong national spirit inherent in the non-Turkish elements. This

ideal is now dead, and the causes of its failure may have indirectly helped

to inspire the third. The second, Pan-Islamism, which was designed to

unite, not only all the Moslem, peoples of the Ottoman empire, but all the

Moslem peoples of the world, under the banner of the Ottoman caliphate,

continued for some years side by side with, and assisting the growth of,

the Pan-Turanian movement. The seeds of this third ideal, “Yeni-Turan,”

Neo-Turanianism, and (in its most expanded form) Pan-Turanianism, had

long existed in the writings and efforts of a few antiquaries. It had been

manifested mainly in literary spheres, where a small party were intent

upon reviving the Turanian language, literature, and folklore; but it had no

political force, and its few apostles were regarded with indifference or

derision.15

14

CAB 24/144: Eastern Report 44, 29 November 1917. 15

CAB 24/144: Eastern Report 40, 1 November 1917.

38

This information allows us to perceive that the members of the Eastern Committee

understood the potential for the success of Ottoman ideological sympathies and their

proliferation throughout the Islamic and Turkic worlds. The Committee was partial to

thinking that these ideologies would be the main tool used by the Young Turks to

accomplish their war goals. In a report from the previous month, on 9 August 1917, we

see the objectives of the ruling party of the Ottoman Empire as viewed from the British

perspective on Ottoman actions. “It must be remembered that the objects of the

Committee have hitherto been to ensure for the Ottoman Government— 1. A powerful

military position in the world. 2. Full opportunity to crush and massacre small subject

races. 3. Pan-Islamic and pan-Turanian expansion in Central Asia, India, and Africa. 4.

Facilities for promoting dissensions among the Powers.”16 Clearly, the British were

seriously concerned with understanding the threat emanating from the Turks as fully as

possible.

The threat of a Pan-Islamic movement to the British position in the Middle East

and Near East was grave indeed. The Sultan of the Ottoman Empire might have been the

Caliph of all Sunni Muslims, but it was the British who laid claim to the most populous

empire of Muslim subjects. In these terms it was the British who had a special

relationship to Islam, one that it was thought could be challenged by the Sultan-Caliph,

by virtue of his status as the supreme leader of the Sunni faith and this was exactly what

the Ottomans and their German allies were hoping to capitalize upon.

The Ottoman State entered the war proclaiming it a jihad (“holy war”) and

calling on Muslims all over the world to support its cause. The circular

that the CUP sent to its local branches was more specific than the fetva

(Islamic legal ruling) on the jihad concerning the war aims of Turkey; it

16

CAB 24/144: Eastern Report 28, 9 August 1917.

39

reflected both Pan-Islamic and Turanian aspirations of the Young Turkish

leadership.17

The Ottoman government’s proclamation of Holy War was directly aimed at

destabilizing the British Empire in the areas where it was predominately populated by

Muslims. As part of the Germans’ Weltpolitik and interest in the East, they had

encouraged the Ottomans to incite religious fervor among the Muslims of the world,

hoping to rally the Muslims of the British Empire to the banner of the Central Powers. It

was thought by the German government that independent Islamic states would rise in the

Caucasus and that Persia and Afghanistan would be freed as well. The Turks were to

receive compensation for initiating this by receiving territories in the Aegean and in

Egypt, while Germany would oversee the guidance of an autonomous India. Max von

Oppenheim, the head of the German Intelligence Bureau for the East, advocated that,

“[i]n this struggle, the rising up of Muslims would be a severe blow to England. We must

do everything to destroy England and we must use all possibilities.”18

The combined Turco-German Holy War campaign to break up the British Empire

involved directing attention towards the Emir of Afghanistan, whose juxtaposition of

lands next to British India afforded the Turks and Germans an apparently useful tool to

implement their grand ambitions. However, the two allies were not always working in

concert. At times Enver resented German interference in Ottoman policy and he therefore

sent his own separate mission to Kabul. In the meantime, on the initiative of Oppenheim,

the Germans had sent their own mission to the Afghan Emir. Max von Oppenheim was

the leader of Germany’s Intelligence Bureau for the East and one of the primary

17

Taseusz Sweitochowski, Russian Azerbaijan 1905-1920 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,

1985), 76. 18

Shaw, The Ottoman Empire in World War I, vol 2, 1152.

40

architects of the Turco-German Holy War. Oppenheim had persuaded the German Kaiser

that such a scheme would work. Once approval was granted, Oppenheim set about his

task by sending Oskar von Niedermayer, along with some fifteen fellow officers, as

special envoys to the Emir.19

The Germans tried to entice the Emir with talk of

independence, something they knew the British had not offered. “For the Germans were

aware that Britain’s refusal to accept Afghanistan as a fully independent state, with its

own foreign policy, was the cause of intense resentment among proud Afghans, not

excluding the Emir himself.”20

Although the Emir was reluctant to openly challenge the

British, in due course, both the Turks and Germans, were able to get the Emir to sign

treaties of assistance. However, these treaties were such only in name and contributed

little towards actually being able to threaten the British position in India, as the Turco-

German alliance was unable to provide the Emir with either the troops or the supplies that

would be needed to carry-out such ambitious plans. Nevertheless, Afghan acceptance of

co-operation breathed life into the Turco-German scheme and provided it with weight

among potential Muslim recruits elsewhere in the region. “Still, unrealistic as these

conditions appeared, by agreeing to an alliance treaty at all the Emir had implicitly

recognized the superiority of German arms and had sanctified the Turco-German holy

war.”21

At the same time, any success that the plan for Holy War generated did serve to

frighten the British, but only strengthened their resolve to counter the combined threat.

By the year 1917 the Turco-German plan for a Holy War had largely floundered,

producing only minimal results. However, the collapse of the Russian armies helped to

serve in making the British think that the threat was more imminent than ever.

19

McMeekin, 212. 20

Hopkirk, 161. 21

McMeekin, 229.

41

“Particularly to those with a professional interest in the Muslim world and the defense of

India, Turkish acquisition of Russian and Persian Azerbaijan presented the horrifying

possibility of a hostile Muslim coalition.”22

Moreover, isolated cases of revolt were still

present in the back of policy officials’ minds. On 15 February 1915 there was a mutiny

by the 5th

Light Infantry at Singapore. Sepoys were the backbone of the British Indian

Army and their ranks were predominately filled by Punjabi Muslims. In this particular

case they had risen up and murdered many Europeans while setting free a number of

German prisoners, hailing them as friends in the Jihad.23

Even though up to this point in

the war the plans for inciting the Muslims of the world to Holy War had achieved little

and suggested little need for alarm, the information contained in reports indicated the

contrary. The British were highly concerned by the situation and they were afraid of the

possibilities that the Russian Revolution might provide the Central Powers. At the

beginning of August 1917, in a memorandum by the Department of Information about the

“Panturanian Movement,” the British are seen reflecting on the potential for Turkish

penetration into the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the possibility of the Turks harnessing

Pan-Islamic sentiments side-by-side with Pan-Turanic ideology to threaten Britain’s

eastern empire. “It is therefore clear that the C.U.P. can only take up Panturanianism as a

Turkish irredentist policy (a) in so far as it does not clash with Panislamism and (b) in so

far as they are given opportunities by the course of events in Russia.”24

The

memorandum went on:

[f]or geographical reasons the breakup would hardly extend; to (a) Kazan,

(b) Crimea, or (c) Siberia; but the Caucasian Tatars might be incorporated

in the Ottoman Empire, and the C.U.P. might organise the Central Asiatic

22

Busch, Britain, India, and the Arabs 1914-1921, 24. 23

Keegan, 218. 24

CAB 24/25: Secret War Cabinet Memoranda on the Panturanian Movement, 7 August 1917.

42

block into an independent Turco-Moslem-State under Ottoman hegemony.

In this instance the Panturanian and Panislamic policies would he in

harmony, and the change would be intensely prejudicial to the position of

Great Britain in India.25

We see that the British were indeed taking the threat from the Turkish use of Pan-Islamic

ideology very seriously and, with this, they decided upon a course that would counter the

effects of the Turco-German proclamation of worldwide Islamic Holy War.

Early British attempts at countering the dual “Pan-Islamic/Holy War” threat

involved appeasing their own Muslim subjects. The British realized that the most

efficient and effective counter to the Turco-German scheme was simply to treat their

Muslim subjects well and to give them no reason to revolt against their masters. To do

this, the British made sure that the Islamic routes taken to Mecca for the annual Hajj were

left open so that their Muslim subjects were free to travel on their pilgrimage. In an

eastern report from 26 April 1917 we see that the Committee was firmly aware of the

advantages of this.

The maintenance of the Haj is one of the most vital elements in our policy,

both from the Arabian and Indian point of view. Every effort should be

made to secure reasonable facilities for the journey to Mecca for such

Moslem subjects of the King-Emperor as are willing and able to undertake

it. The keeping open of the Haj during the war will have very lasting effect

upon our position after the war, and in this matter the long view is very

necessary.26

These duties normally fell under the jurisdiction of the Sultan-Caliph; but with so many

Muslim subjects of their own, the British were forced to make similar arrangements.

A second, but more immediately practical plan aimed at keeping their Muslim

subjects happy, related to the enemy that the British Muslim troops were to fight against.

Fearing for a similar incidence to that in Singapore, the British decided on a policy which

25

Ibid. 26

CAB 24/143: Eastern Report 13, 26 April 1917.

43

determined that, in general, none of their Muslim soldiers would have to fight their co-

religionists. The British decided to employ them instead against the other members of the

Central Alliance. “In four other cases the British decided not to risk using battalions

largely Muslim in composition against the Turks; yet large numbers of Muslims did fight

against the Sultan-Caliph’s soldiers without demur [namely, the Tatars of Russia]. The

numerous Muslim regiments of the French army fought the Germans without paying the

Sultan’s call to jihad any attention whatsoever.”27

These two rather straight-forward

strategies undertaken by the British helped to counter the Turco-German threat from Pan-

Islamic ideology. Nevertheless, the threat that was conjured up by fear of the C.U.P’s

and, more specifically, Enver’s, use of pan-Turanian ideology to achieve ambitious war

goals was deemed much more dangerous by those within the Eastern Committee.

In order to understand the threat to the British position generated from the

adoption of Pan-Turanian ideology by the Young Turk leadership, it is firstly important

to have a general understanding of the ideology itself. If the British Empire had more

Muslim subjects than the Ottoman Sultan, the Russian empire of the Romanovs had a

larger concentration of subjects of Turkic origin than that of the Ottomans. Thus, it is

hardly surprising that the origins of the Pan-Turkic movement derived out of Russia. A

linguistic/religious revitalization of sorts among the Turks of Russian origin began to

emerge in Russia in the mid-nineteenth century and gained steam towards the end of the

century. At first it was predominantly an Islamic phenomenon: the Muslim subjects of the

Russian Empire identified themselves more closely with the culture and religion of Islam

than they did with any ethnic group.28

However, as time progressed intellectuals who

27

Keegan, 218. 28

Serge A. Zenkovsky, Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), 8.

44

were part of the movement began to realize the deficiencies in supporting religion as the

route to success; the Ottomans by this tune had come to a similar consensus. Thus,

individuals began to move towards a new set of ideological notions that would be

encompassed in Pan-Turanian and Pan-Turkic thought.

Defining Pan-Turanism and distinguishing it from the similar ideological stance

of Pan-Turkism is not too difficult. The terms are more often than not used

interchangeably and for the purposes of this study they will be as well. The British who

were assessing the Turkish use of such ideologies tended to mold them into one category

and for that reason the same is done here. Still, the main differences between the two

should be cleared up to avoid any misunderstanding. “Turanism (sometimes called Pan-

Turanism), which had as its chief objective rapprochement and ultimately union among

all peoples whose origins are purported to extend back to Turan, an undefined Shangri-

La-like area in the steppes of Central Asia.”29

On the other hand Pan-Turkism sought to

form some sort of union among all members of the Turkic race, with no reference to their

status as either Ottoman subjects or subjects of other rulers.30

For the British the

irredentism that would arise from the Young Turk’s support for these ideologies in the

Middle East, Transcaucasia, and Central Asia, meant a direct challenge to British

imperial interests in that region.

Pan-Turkic intellectuals had caused such a stir in Russia in the years 1905-1907

that the Tsarist government became alarmed. The Russians were aware of Tatar

sympathies oriented towards Istanbul and the Ottomans, whose help they wanted in

29

Jacob M. Landau , Pan-Turkism: From Irredentism to Cooperation (London: Hurst and Company,

1995), 1. 30

Bülent Gökay, “Turkish Settlement and the Caucasus, 1918-1920,” Middle Eastern Studies 32, no. 2

(April 1996): 48.

45

uniting all Turkic peoples.31

However, as the Young Turk Revolution demonstrated, an

inclination towards revolution in the Ottoman Empire was once again in fashion after the

deposition of the Sultan. The Young Turks, unlike Sultan Abdülhamid II, who was weary

of political dissidents, welcomed expressions of Tatar and Azerbaijani nationalist

sentiments. The Young Turks, after all, had been conspirators themselves at one point.

Therefore, when the Tsarist regime began to be more hostile towards Pan-Turkic

intellectuals and their ideology, many Pan-Turkic leaders fled to the safety of Istanbul.

Istanbul once more emerged as the centre of refuge for Russian Pan-Turkists in the five

or six years before World War I and served as an area of consolidation for the Turkish

emigrants arriving from Russia.32

Moreover, the heartland of the Ottoman Empire,

Anatolia and Istanbul, saw an influx of Muslims of Turkic origin due to the constant wars

and losses in territory to the Russians. Those who chose to stay became subjects of the

Tsar, while the others reunited with their brethren.

The leading intellectuals of the Pan-Turkic movement included Ismail Bey

Gasprinski. Gasprinski used his newspaper, Tercüman (The Translator), to emphasize the

unity of all Turks within the confines of the Russian Empire and who were faced with the

prospect of Russian nationalism. Ismail Bey hoped that some form of common literary

dialect could be created so that all those of Turkic origin could understand it.33

Gasprinski’s efforts at producing Pan-Turkic media in the form of newspapers and

pamphelts, “had awakened among Azerbaijanis the feeling of belonging to the Islamic

and Turkic world, which had lain dormant for so long under Persian and Shiite

31

Zenkovsky, 105. 32

Ibid, 106-108. 33

Stanford J. Shaw History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey: Volume II: Reform, Revolution,

and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808-1975 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977),

261.

46

hegemony.”34

This meant that from a British perspective, the Ottomans would most likely

be aided in their ambitions in the Caucasus. A second individual, no less influential, Ziya

Gökalp, had also been emerging onto the Pan-Turkic scene. Gökalp aided in the Ottoman

transformation of Pan-Turanian and Pan-Turkic ideology into a form of Turkish

nationalism. “The chief theoretician of this ideology was Mehmet Ziya, alias Ziya Gökalp

(d. 1924), a sociologist, poet, and essayist from southeastern Anatolia. According to

Gökalp, the Turks were an ancient nation with a glorious past and superior qualities that,

regrettably, had never fulfilled its potential for greatness.”35

He was an essential figure in

the development of intellectual life in the last days of the empire and into the Turkish

Republican era.36

Gökalp’s stance and writings to advance the Pan-Turkic movement was

brought to the attention of the C.U.P leadership, who were more than willing to embrace

an ideology that seemed to have tremendous potential. Gökalp would eventually be

elected as a member of the party’s executive council, demonstrating the C.U.P’s

sympathies towards Pan-Turkism.37

Tekin Alp was yet another leading Pan-Turkic

intellectual who advocated that the realization of Pan-Turkic goals could never become a

reality until the “Muscovite monster [was] crushed”.38

With this acceptance of Pan-

Turkic ideology and the removal of the Russian threat, the Young Turks now

“promulgated vague but vast pretensions to all the Russian territories in Asia inhabited by

Turkish-speaking peoples, and, where appropriate, supplemented Pan-Turanian with Pan-

Islam incitements.”39

For the British, as they operated in the Middle East, talk of this

34

Zenkovsky, 95. 35

Karsh, 100. 36

Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, 301-302.

37 Ibid, 301.

38 Toynbee, 35-36.

39 W. E. D., Allen, and Paul Muratoff, Caucasian Battlefields: A History of Wars on the Turco-Caucasian

Border 1828-1921 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 229.

47

nature provoked growing alarm among policy-making officials. The Turks could now be

seen as posing a threat to the British position in India.

The British policy-making officials within the Eastern Committee showed great

concern over Ottoman Pan-Turkic ideology and its prospects and, therefore, set about

understanding the ideology as well as the movement. As early as February 1917 the

Committee was receiving information about the Pan-Turanian movement within the

Ottoman Empire in the form of maps of the Middle East and Central Asia. The maps in

this secret and very extensive report set about highlighting the areas believed by the

British to be regions that generally spoke Turkish and/or Turanian languages. This shows

the British efforts during February 1917 at coming to an understanding of the potential

that a Turkish Pan-Turanian movement might have in succeeding in the former provinces

of the Tsar.40

In a report not long after in September of the same year, Arnold Joseph

Toynbee, working for the Political Intelligence Department of the Foreign Office, drew

attention to the valuable and interesting memo on the Turkish Pan-Turanian movement.

“The memorandum summarises the history, scope, and prospects of this important

political move of the Young Turks, which is, briefly, an endeavour to substitute for a

necessarily Arabic-thinking Pan-Islam the principle of the victorious Turkish race.”41

Within ten months of the Committee receiving its earliest reports on Pan-Turkic ideology

and the movement it produced, they had finally, on 29 November 1917, received a full

thirty-two page report on the Pan-Turanian movement. The report went into extreme

detail and had an omniscient air about it. It highlighted the origins of the movement and

included maps of regions where Turkic languages were spoken, and discussed the policy

40

CAB 24/143: Eastern Report 4, 21 February 1917. 41

CAB 24/144: Eastern Report 34, 19 September 1917.

48

of the Ottoman government towards Pan-Turanian ideology, as well as detailing the

prospects of Pan-Turanian success, both abroad and within the empire.42

The British were

perfectly aware of the fact that the Turks and the Germans were both co-operating in the

scheme to spread Pan-Turkic ideology.

One of the ways in which the leaders of the Pan-Turkic movement hoped to

spread their ideology was through the formation of Pan-Turkic societies and unions. An

example of one such group and its functions can be seen in the following extract.

The Turkish Homeland Society (Türk Yurdu Cemiyeti) was supplemented

by the Turkish Hearth (Türk Ocağı)… the Turkish Hearth established units

in every city, school, and major public organization. The Turkish Hearth

was mainly a nonpolitical organization. Its duty was to combat the ideas of

Islamism and Ottomanism and to convince the Turkish people of the

empire that they could survive only if they accepted the ideals of Turkish

nationalism as developed mainly by Gökalp.43

In a report created for the Eastern Committee and presented on 1 November 1917, we see

the Committee being informed about Pan-Turkic societies and unions.

Turk Ojaghe,” or the society of the Turkish Hearth, which issued the

circular found on the person of Prince Shakib Ghalib Bey, is one of the

most powerful of the institutions formed to foster “Yeni-Turan.” It was

founded on the 25th March, 1912, in Constantinople with the approval of

the Ottoman Government, and is subsidised by the state. It had in 1915

sixteen branches in different Turkish towns of the Ottoman empire, and

was then developing apace.44

Once again the British appear to have been going to great lengths to uncover the true

nature of the Pan-Turkic movement within the Ottoman Empire as well as its potential

elsewhere. However, societies and unions were not the only concern. Propaganda too was

noted by the Eastern Committee.

42

CAB 24/144: Eastern Report 44, 29 November 1917. 43

Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, 309. 44

CAB 24/144: Eastern Report 40, 1 November 1917.

49

Prior to the Russian collapse the direction of Turco-German Pan-Turkic

propaganda was aimed primarily at Russia, inevitably, in view of the geographical

distribution of Turkic peoples. Pro-Turkish propaganda, although not necessarily Pan-

Turkic or Pan-Islamist in nature, was also carried out by both Turkish and German

agents. This propaganda was aimed at the Turkic speaking peoples of Transcaucasia,

wherever their ideological sympathies lay. Albeit, precise figures are very hard to come

by and mostly never existed, estimates can still be offered, if not accepted. “[T]he

Russian census of 1897 indicated their [Turkic-Speaking people] total number as

13,600,000 out of a total population of 125,600,000, i.e. almost 11 per cent.”45

There was

thus reason for the British to be concerned about Turco-German efforts at a propaganda

campaign in Transcaucasia. From a report on 16 November 1917 we see that the Eastern

Committee had been informed of the situation there and its prospects of success.

There is a great deal of Turkish propaganda among the Tartars and

Circassians, with the object of raising the whole of the Russian Moslems.

It does not seem to have taken a violent hold, but sooner or later will do

so, the officers believe, unless met by strong counter-propaganda. They

themselves tried this line, and found that it was very easy to counter

Turkish propaganda for the moment, but that there was no effort made to

stop it. The Russian Moslems are nearly as stupid as the Russians; they

cheered equally loudly pro-Turkish speeches and anti-Turkish speeches

made in succession.46

And, by 3 January 1918, the Eastern Committee had been receiving reports of anti-

British, pro-Turkish propaganda in the Caucasus. Possibly it was intended to prepare the

way for Ottoman intervention in the region. “General Shore, telegraphing from Tiflis a

week ago, said that a very serious propaganda, which was at once Turcophile and anti-

45

Landau, 7. 46

CAB 24/144: Eastern Report 42, 16 November 1917.

50

British, had been started at that place and at Baku by the Tartars.”47

Coupled with the

Turkish menace of Pan-Turanian ideology the British had to also contend with the fact

that Germany was adamantly involved in supporting the movement as well. This

revelation for the British hardened their efforts towards understanding German

participation.

The Germans were keen on supporting their ally’s Pan-Turanian ideology, both

politically and economically, as long as it did not conflict with their own aims and

interests. It has already been noted that the Germans hoped to appease the Turks by

guaranteeing their claims. However, they had no doubts about who should acquire the

Caucasus and they were not about to let the Turks come into possession of the area that

they coveted.48

In a section of a report for the Eastern Committee from 29 November

1917 entitled, German Support of Pan-Turanianism, a British agent calls to attention the

fact that Germany had for some time been supporting the formation of Pan-Turanic

societies and unions. The movement was reported to be spreading and Germany, by

spending millions on the project, was the main culprit in its success.49

Whatever concerns

the British had about Ottoman ideologies and the support they received from Germany,

the British were concerned primarily with the strategic and economic consequences of the

Turkish advance and what that might mean for the Central Powers’ ability to continue the

war.

Not only did the Ottomans want to direct their attention towards creating a new

Turkic empire through the use of Pan-Islamic and Pan-Turkic official ideologies, but they

47

CAB 24/144: Eastern Report 49, 3 January 1918. 48

A. L. Macfie, The End of the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1923 (Turning Points) (New York: Longman Group

Limited, 1998), 154-155. 49

CAB 24/144: Eastern Report 44, 29 November 1917.

51

were also economically interested in the lands of their new found brethren. It is debatable

whether or not the support for Pan-Turkism, emanating from the C.U.P triumvirate, was

indeed genuine. Many historians point to Enver’s proclamations from early in the war for

evidence, whereby he proclaims wild and fantastic support for the movement and its

objectives. “Enver’s expectations were great. His Pan-Turanic views were expressed

through circulars distributed on November 12 by Ittihad ve Terakki, calling for

destruction of Russia, expansion of the natural frontiers, and unification with all Turkic

peoples in the Moslem world’s struggle for liberation from the infidel oppressors.”50

Whether or not the Ottoman advance into Transcaucasia in 1918 was the realization of

Enver’s and the Ottoman Governments’ combined Pan-Turanic dream of uniting the

Turkic race is under hot debate at the moment. Reynolds argues in, Buffers not Brethren,

that it was geopolitics, not nationalist or proto-nationalist intent that drove C.U.P policy.

He suggests that the Ottomans were indeed not interested in the annexation of

Transcaucasia, but rather they deemed it necessary to create a buffer to guard themselves

in the future from a resurgent Russia.51

The argument that the Turks were merely using

multiple ideologies to achieve war goals and not for some larger, all encompassing

purpose, such as the creation of a new Pan-Turanic empire is not the question under

debate here. However, it is interesting to note that there was the possibility that the

Ottomans were simply employing ideological tactics to acquire the possession of an area

that was highly prized economically. As Reynolds suggests, “[t]o argue that the

ideologies of Panislam or Panturkism did not drive Ottoman policies is not to claim that

50

Richard G. Hovannisian, Armenia on the Road to Independence (Berkeley: University of California

Press, 1967), 41. 51

Reynolds, Shattering Empires, 219.

52

these ideas were non-existent… Rather, the argument is that these ideologies were the

instruments of the policies rather than their cause.”52

The real concern of this study is in the Eastern Committee’s perception of Turkish

intent, as against what was possible or likely. The British policy-makers understood the

dual nature of the Ottoman threat. The Ottoman government might well have been

intending to create a Pan-Turkic empire. This was a notion which they indeed needed to

take into consideration. There was also the fact that the British knew the importance of

Transcaucasia with respect to its ability to aid the Turks in the continuance of the war.

This the policy-makers viewed as highly detrimental to the new peripheral strategy that

they were trying to implement in order to win the war.

The Ottomans were not ignorant of the importance of oil in warfare. The

Ottomans, like the British, had keenly judged the value of oil. They were also aware of

the fact that with the collapse of the Russians they could, like Jack, steal the giant’s

goose. The C.U.P government was reliant on imports for most of their oil needs and the

opportunity to come into possession of Baku was too valuable simply to discard.53

McMeekin seems to suggest that he agrees with Reynolds in his assessment of the

situation, when stating that,

[f]ar from being the blindly romantic pan-Turanian of legend, who

dreamed only of conquering the Central Asiatic steppe on horseback,

Enver had coolly calculated the importance of Caspian oil for the Ottoman

future, and – again contrary to his reputation as Germany’s gullible tool –

he was not willing in the least to trust the Germans to supply it to

Turkey.54

52

Reynolds, Buffers, not Brethren, 140. 53

McMeekin, 326. 54

Ibid, 326.

53

The Eastern Committee was aware of the Ottomans’ lack of oil and viewed the

impending Turkish advance as the possibility of the Turks achieving not one, but two of

their war aims: they might, at the same time, gain access to Baku’s oil and unite the

Turkic peoples of Transcaucasia under the single banner of a Pan-Turkic/Islamist empire.

“For the defense and economic viability of Turkey, it was necessary to transform the

Caucasus into a solid Islamic stronghold and to insure the inclusion of Baku in the

remolded state.”55

In the report mentioned previously from 29 November 1917, the

Eastern Committee is seen being warned by one of their agents in the field about the

importance that Baku has to play in a reorganized Turkic empire. However, the agent

suggests that if the Russians could harness the sympathy of the Turks then it could be to

their benefit, but if handled incorrectly it would be the Ottomans who would gain from

such a situation.

If there is a government in Russia liberal enough to grant national

autonomy, and strong enough to do justice between the various national

claims, they will remain loyal to Russia, and in that case it may be

predicted that Baku will in the end supersede Kazan as a political centre

for the Turkish-speaking populations of Russia, and perhaps ultimately for

all the Turks in the world. Kazan leads at present in virtue of its older

culture, but Baku, with its oilfields, has a greater industrial future; and

while Kazan is on the periphery of the Turkish world, Baku lies at its

middle point.56

The report further states the importance that Baku would play in carrying out further Pan-

Turanic acquisitions after the occupation of that city. “Kazan and Crimea, Anatolia and

Azerbaijan, and the Central Asiatic bloc (via the Trans-Caspian Railway), are ranged in a

circle round Baku, and are in easy communication with it.”57

However, the agent

emphasizes that the success or failure of this project depends upon the achievements of

55

Hovannisian, 177. 56

CAB 24/144: Eastern Report 44, 29 November 1917. 57

Ibid.

54

Russian federalism. He comes to the conclusion that if there is chaos or repression in

Russia – which there was at that point in time – then the Turkic peoples of the Caucasus

would most certainly join in arms with the Ottomans and it will be them, not Russia who

will benefit from a newly formed Turkic block centered on Baku. Their incorporation

would be easy and swift due to their closeness to Anatolia and the fact that they share the

same literary language as the Ottomans and had not yet distanced themselves from their

culture.58

At the time that this was written, the Bolshevik Revolution was already

underway, and the fear of success based on the prospects mentioned and the real events

that had been occurring, must have given the impression to the officials of the Eastern

Committee that something had to be done to block the opening of the Russian dam,

which had collapsed and allowed in a flood of Turkish troops.

What the real intentions of the C.U.P leadership were towards Transcaucasia may

never be unearthed. Still, the fact remains that the Turks were preparing to advance into

the region in 1917. All the information that the Eastern Committee was receiving and

interpreting pointed to an imminent threat to the British wartime position in

Transcaucasia and the Near East, as well as to the overall Allied position in the war if the

Turks were successful in their ventures. This was the case even though the British at the

time were successful on both the Mesopotamian and Palestinian Fronts and had the Turks

reeling from their respective offensives. Indeed, the speed of the Ottoman advance into

the Caucasus surprised all parties, even their ally, Germany. “With no Russian Caucasian

army left to oppose them, the Turks had reversed three years of Russian gains in less than

two months, restoring the 1914 borders (and going slightly past them) while hardly

58

Ibid.

55

breaking a sweat.”59

From the British perspective, however, Turkish military might alone

would not gain them the upper hand in Transcaucasia. The reports received by the

Eastern Committee indicated to the British that the successful use of ideologies by the

Ottomans ran hand-in-hand with the potential for Ottoman military success. The British,

therefore, felt that Ottoman ventures in the region would ultimately be decided upon their

ability to rally local support through the use of Pan-Turanian and Pan-Islamist ideologies

and a well aimed Pro-Turkic propaganda campaign.

The ending of the year 1917 saw revived turmoil in Russia and it appeared as if

the fears induced by the eastern reports were not ill-founded. All signs suggested that the

Turks were going to occupy all of Transcaucasia, with an eye eastward towards further

acquisitions, and that they might be supported by the former Tsar’s subjects of Turkic

origin.60

Nevertheless, the situation confronting the Eastern Committee was more drastic

than could be imagined. The Ottomans were not the only competitors in the race for

Transcaucasia and Baku. In fact, the Committee had also to evaluate the threat to their

own eastern position to a possible, indeed most probable, advance of the German army

into Transcaucasia in support of their ally. We shall turn now to that threat.

59

McMeekin, 330. 60

Gökay, Turkish Settlement and the Caucasus, 1918-1920, 32.

56

CHAPTER IV:

THE DRANG NACH OSTEN: GERMAN INTEREST IN

TRANSCAUCASIA AND BEYOND

With the coronation of Kaiser Wilhelm II as German Emperor in 1888 and his

subsequent removal of Prince Otto von Bismarck from the position of Chancellor, the

German Empire reoriented its stance on foreign policy to a stance that was more

aggressive and imperialist in nature. The Kaiser dreamed of an expanded German Empire

in the East, one that could incorporate British possessions in that region. This plan was to

be supported by Germany becoming the new world power that oversaw the fledgling

Ottoman Empire. This was a position that the French and British had upheld in the

previous century, in the interest of keeping Russia isolated and without possession of

Istanbul, which would have provided the Russians with access to the Mediterranean and

beyond.

Germany’s policy of Weltpolitik was best symbolized by her economic interests in

the Ottoman Empire prior to war, primarily, the Berlin-to-Baghdad railway. Captain

Donohoe, a member of Dunsterville’s unit, has his own contemporary analysis of

Germany’s policy with respect to Weltpolitik and the possible outcomes of such a policy

if left unchecked by the British.

57

It was all part of the German Weltpolitik to oust us from these lucrative

markets of the Middle East, and to secure for German shipping a

monopoly of the Gulf carrying trade. With the German-controlled Bagdad

Railway approaching completion, one shudders to realize what would

have been our fate economically, if the sea-borne trade of Basra and

Koweit had passed under the flag and into the hands of the enterprising

Hun.1

Simultaneously the manifestation of the German Drang nach Osten was apparent through

Germany’s economic ties with the Ottoman Empire and their eventual union that was to

culminate in a military alliance just before the outbreak of hostilities.

The Kaiser’s interest in the East was sparked by many avid supporters of the idea

within Germany. Influential individuals comprising various sections of the German

establishment, such as the Prussian steel king August Thyssen, dreamed of one day

having access to all the priceless minerals contained within the lands of Britain’s eastern

empire. In a most forward and tenacious in tone manner, Thyssen urged for Germany’s

policy to be directed towards the East and the acquisition of the most vital resources that

were needed for German industry. Of course, contained on his list of resources were the

ore and oil producing regions of the Caucasus.2 The Eastern Committee was aware of the

influence of non-military sources upon the foreign policy decisions of the Kaiser. Part II

of Western and General Report sixty, highlights a statement in an article written in the

Tägliche Rundschau, by one Dr. E. Uetrecht of Berlin. In this article Uetrecht points out

that the raw materials of the world are controlled by the British and the United States of

America, who he believes, will certainly hinder or prevent their export to Germany for

years to come. “Thus Germany must regard the economic war as lost,” and must

therefore penetrate economically the Balkans, the Black Sea countries, Caucasus,

1 Donohoe, 18

2 Hopkirk, 55.

58

Transcaspian Persia, and Siberia. The Central Powers—Germany in particular—must

create their own fields for raw materials.”3 British officials were receiving reports in early

1917 that were to bring them up to speed on the current Turco-German interest in the

East now that the Russians were no longer serving as a barrier.

The French had even weighed in on their perception of German interest in the

East and the prospects of success that Germany was faced with in 1917. In an eastern

report from February 1917, there is a translation provided from an article by the former

French Minister of Foreign Affairs, which first appeared in the Figaro, on 22 January

1917. In it M. Gabriel Hanotaux states that, “Germany has ambitions which stretch far

into the East, ambitions aiming at Anatolia, Persia, and even, it is said, India. The only

means of working out this plan is the economic, administrative, and political conquest of

Turkey. Germany then could support Turkey, but only as the rope supports a man that is

being hanged.”4 This article seems as if the French not only sanction, but wish for an

Allied campaign directed at Transcaucasia, so as to block German ambitions in the

region. Adding to the menace of a German advance into the Caucasus was a notion

floating around that suggested the Germans had reoriented their eastern policy.

British and Allied policy officials alike began theorizing on the concept that the

Germans had reoriented the direction of their Drang nach Osten towards Transcaucasia.

The capture of Baghdad by the British in the spring of March 1917 officially robbed the

Germans of the terminus to their great economic project in the Ottoman domains, the

Berlin-to-Baghdad railway. The railway was originally designed to connect Haydar Pasha

Station on the Asiatic side of the Bosphorus with Basra on the Persian Gulf. However,

3 CAB 24/148: Western and General Report 60 part II, 20 March 1918.

4 CAB 24/143: Eastern Report 2, 7 February 1917.

59

when war came the British quickly advanced into the region to protect their oil interests

and seized Basra. The railway was already under construction by 1917 and was

somewhat close to being finished. The design was a grand imperial project, worthy of

recognition and acclaim.5

Running the entire length of this great strategic corridor – stretching 2,000

miles from west to east, and safely beyond the range of British naval guns

– was the Berlin-to-Baghdad railway. This mighty project had become, in

the eyes of the world, the symbol of the German Emperor’s ambitions in

the East and the main instrument for their accomplishment.6

Nevertheless, with the British pushing hard on the Mesopotamian and Palestinian Fronts,

the idea emerged that Germany would now substitute its ambitious project for one that

was, arguably, even grander.

The new notion emanating from Allied circles was that Turkish Pan-Turanian

ambitions were meeting with success in the East and, therefore, the Germans would be

able to substitute their economic railway project with one that would incorporate the new

domains of the Ottoman Empire. The new notion envisioned that the Turks would

substitute the old line for one running through Transcaucasia, possibly even across the

Caspian to Krasnovodsk and connecting with the Central Asian Railway already in

existence. Or, if that was not an option, they could direct the railway around the Caspian

Sea, through northern Persia.7 Dunsterville describes the scenario that British officials

had been contemplating and worrying about for some time.

One of the big items in the deep-laid pre-war schemes of Germany for

world-domination was the absorption of Asia Minor and the penetration

into further Asia by means of the Berlin-Baghdad railway. When Baghdad

was taken by the British in March 1917, and the prospect of its recapture

5 Gökay, A Clash of Empires, 5.

6 Hopkirk, 239.

7 Kaya Tuncer Çağlayan, British Policy towards Transcaucasia 1917-1921 (Istanbul: The Isis Press,

2004), 37.

60

by the Turks appeared very remote, the scheme for German penetration

into Asia had to be shifted further north and took the obvious line

BERLIN-BAKU-BOKHARA.8

This was not just some concept floating around the military command structure. The

Eastern Committee was informed by agents on the ground that enemy intentions were

following such a line. Contained in eastern report 44, dating from 29 November 1917, the

new consensus was that, “[t]he Berlin-Baghdad Railway may die, but the Berlin-Bokhara

line through Asia Minor and Northern Persia will live. This is the new German

ambition.”9 Again, in report 51 on 17 January 1918 we see British agents reiterating their

knowledge of such a strategy being thought of as a replacement to Germany’s previous

economic investment in the Ottoman Empire that had been thwarted by the British.10

The

British firmly believed that the Germans were seeking alternative ways to the East to

acquire resources in order to continue the war. The British also feared a German Empire

that might hold onto these regions if a negotiated peace were to occur.

British agents began reporting on the potential route that the new railway might

take and the ease in which it could be accomplished. Agents had been studying the pre-

existing railway networks of the Transcaucasus, Transcaspia, and Anatolia and tried to

put together the most logical route that the new project would take. These agents

presumed that the Germans, in hopes of saving time and money, would merely combine

and add to the existing rail lines in order to make them one complete chain.

This new strategic railway, if it is really projected, would presumably

follow the existing line from Constantinople to Angora; the next section,

from Angora to Sivas, is said to be under construction already; from Sivas

the route would run, viâ Erzindjan and Erzerum, to join the Caucasian

Railway system at Sarykamish. This would at once bring Constantinople

8 Dunsterville, 1.

9 CAB 24/144: Eastern Report 44, 29 November 1917.

10 CAB 24/144: Eastern Report 51, 17 January 1918.

61

into connection with Baku and Tabriz, and from these termini two

alternative routes are available: (a) The sea-passage across the Caspian

from Baku to Krasnovodsk, and from Krasnovodsk by the existing Trans-

Caspian Railway to Bokhara and beyond; or (b) a new railway, starting

from Tabriz, running across Northern Persia (where there would be no

great engineering difficulties), and joining the Trans-Caspian Railway at

Merv. This all-laud route would be a direct menace to the British position

in the Persian Gulf, and would seriously threaten India from the West and

North-west.11

The British officials within the Eastern Committee and the Imperial War Cabinet were

extremely perplexed by the new developments being reported to them by their agents in

the field and it seemed, at least for the time being, that they would have one more

difficulty to overcome in protecting their eastern empire.

The British blockade of Germany had been in place ever since the beginning of

the war and except for a few attempts at challenging British naval power in the North

Sea, most notably at Jutland in 1916, the Germans were unable to break the blockade.

The Germans had, therefore, tried to implement a blockade of their own of the British

Isles through their efforts at unrestricted submarine warfare. The British view was that

Germany was firmly behind expansion eastward and because her ambitions for assuming

control over the Balkans, Egypt, and the Persian Gulf had been derailed, she was now

seeking solace in the use of Transcaucasia as a new route to the East. The ultimate goal

was for Germany to gain a position, whereby she could challenge the British hold on

India.12

They believed that the German plan was to substitute the Berlin-Baghdad line for

either a, Berlin-Baku-Bukhara line, or a Hamburg-Herat line via Transcaucasia and that

by threatening the British in India they might induce them to negotiate for peace.13

11

CAB 24/144: Eastern Report 44, 29 November 1917. 12

F. J. Moberly, History of the Great War based on Official Documents: The Campaign of Mesopotamia

1914-1918, vol. IV (Nashville: Battery Press, Inc., 1927), 138. 13

Hovannisian, 178.

62

However, if this plan was to be realized the incorporation of Georgia into the German

sphere of influence remained an essential element.

The British were under the impression that the Germans were reorienting their

railway ambitions and that Georgia was going to play a key role in that refocusing of

strategy. From Baku to Batum was the all important oil pipeline of the Caucasus with the

rail line running parallel to it, both of which also ran through the Georgian capital of

Tiflis. In light of this, McMeekin contends that, “the Transcaucasian railway and oil

pipeline were at the heart of the new German Great Game strategy.”14

This relationship

between the railway and pipeline with Georgia meant that for the Germans the only way

they could realize their new ambitions, as well as control over the Caucasus and its

wealth of resources, was to effectively bring Georgia within its sphere of influence. This

was to be done either through force of arms, or better yet, through the art of politics. The

amazing thing was that the British were to realize that the Germans had been diligently

working towards such a goal, not when the Russians had virtually ceased to exist as a

force, but at a much earlier date.

In the months between the March and November Revolutions the situation in

Transcaucasia was precarious. The three nation states of Georgia, Azerbaijan, and

Armenia had since the end of February 1917 been trying to reach some sort of

compromise in the Caucasus with the Turks regarding the future borders of the region.

The result was that the three nation states decided for security sake that they would mold

into a single government, a type of “Transcaucasian Federation”.15

“A convocation of

political and social organizations in Tiflis resolved on November 11 [1917] to establish

14

McMeekin, 324. 15

Edward J. Erickson, Ordered to Die: A History of the Ottoman Empire in the First World War (London:

Greenwood Press, 2001), 185.

63

an interim government for the region under the title, the Transcaucasian Commissariat, or

Zakavkom. In this manner Transcaucasia joined the rush to create regional centers of

power that was taking place throughout Russia.”16

The British within one week of the

new government’s creation had been receiving reports on the current political situation in

Transcaucasia. In a secret memorandum on Georgia, produced by the Intelligence

Bureau, the policy-makers were busy discussing the information contained within these

reports concerning the main political elements that had emerged in Transcaucasia. This

memorandum demonstrates British interest in the region. That interest is represented by

their intelligence gathering efforts, in an attempt to understand the situation more clearly

before intervention occurred.17

Officials became primarily disturbed by the internal

political situation and if something was to be done the focus would have to be directed

towards support for the newly formed government.

The British were within close proximity to the Caucasus, as Mesopotamia is

directly adjacent. However, any attempt at supporting the Transcaucasian Commissariat

and injecting pro-British sympathies was sure to be hampered by the Turks and Germans.

Indeed, the newly formed government’s position was like walking on a razor’s edge.

They had to contend with one another’s interests for starters, as well as dealing with the

ambitions of the Ottomans, Germans, Bolsheviks, and British within the lands of their

federation. British officials were aware of the government’s weaknesses after the

Bolshevik Revolution and because it looked as if from the information available the

Turks and Germans were going to be able to impose themselves upon the Commissariat it

was, therefore, deemed necessary to plan a mission of their own. In a memorandum from

16

Sweitochowski, 106. 17

CAB 24/32: Secret War Cabinet Memoranda on Georgia, 19 November 1917.

64

18 February 1918, Colonel Jones, an agent working for the Intelligence Bureau in the

Caucasus, reported on the local information that he had gathered from print media. Jones

gives a rather grim picture of the unfolding events.

The grave element is that, as we foretold, apparently no confidence is felt

in the ability of the present Trans-Caucasian Government to cope with the

situation…It is apparent that the Bolshevik party is growing in strength

and aggressiveness and if, as is probable, they are reinforced by another 25

to 30 thousand troops returning from the front, amongst whom all ideas of

discipline and patriotism have disappeared, the Caucasus may be the scene

of such chaos as characterises European Russia at present.18

Colonel Jones own assessment was that the Russian troops were completely anarchical

and without discipline. He also notes that the Tatar population was participating in full

scale massacres of the rival Christian Armenian population, accompanied by civil

disorder and a boundless number of revolts. He concludes that the Transcaucasian

Government’s authority was practically non-existent and that only the National Councils

were reliable pieces of the political framework.19

The original objective of Dunsterville’s

mission when he set out from Baghdad in January 1918 was to proceed to the Georgian

capital and to get involved in the political free-for-all by supporting pro-British counter-

revolutionary elements in an attempt to win over the Transcaucasus to the Allied cause.

However, as the British were to be made aware of, Georgia was within the grip of the

Germans, who, at that very moment were tightening their grasp.

The Germans had established political contacts with the Georgians from early on

in the war by offering them assistance in the form of supplies, in order to harass the

Russians on the Caucasian Front. Georgian nationalists in September of 1914 met with

the German Chief of the General Staff, Erich von Falkenhayn, who offered the

18

CAB 24/42: Secret War Cabinet Memoranda on the Political Situation in the Caucasus, 18 February

1918. 19

Ibid.

65

nationalists thousands of rifles and millions of rounds of ammunition for their use.20

Some Georgian nationalists had even been conspiring with the Ottomans, who they

hoped could help rescue them from Russian rule. They even maintained anti-Russian

committees on Ottoman territory.21

Nevertheless, it was the Germans who eventually

won Georgian favor when all the chaos erupted. Germany’s early political contacts and

aid to Georgian nationalists paved the way for much closer political contacts when the

opportunity arose.22

Even Dunsterville was aware of Georgia’s pre-war orientation. “The

truth of the matter is that Tiflis, long before the war, had what the Russians called a

German “orientation.” In their deep preparation for this great war the German left no

stone unturned, and the Caucasus, north and south, had been thoroughly exploited by

them in view of possible eventualities.”23

The Germans needed a strategic foothold in the

Caucasus to achieve their war aims there and in 1917 they immediately set about making

that a reality.

The Germans had a complexity of reasons behind their support for the Georgians,

more so than merely aiding the Georgians in their quest for independence. Richard Pipes

contends that the Germans wanted to preserve what had been decided upon at Brest-

Litovsk, with respect to the Caucasus, and they hoped to direct the Turks in a more

southerly direction, towards Persia and on to India.24

Ludendorff was of the opinion that

the occupation of Georgia by German troops was a precursor to full exploitation of the

20

Stanford J. Shaw, The Ottoman Empire in World War I, vol. 1: Prelude to War (Ankara: Turkish

Historical Society, 2006), 425. 21

Shaw, The Ottoman Empire in World War I, vol. 1, 447. 22

Fischer, 136. 23

Dunsterville, 4. 24

Richard Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union: Communism and Nationalism 1917-1923

(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954), 194.

66

region. “If Georgia is our advanced base, it is to be hoped that the Caucasian territory will

be gradually pacified and that we should be able to draw from there the raw materials we

so urgently need.”25

Not only would it serve the purpose of controlling the raw materials

of the Caucasus it would in the future provide a land bridge for the ultimate goal of

challenging the British position in the East.26

It might also serve in the realization of

whatever ambitious economic projects the Germans may have been contemplating. It was

decided by the German High Command that in order to counter the Turkish invasion of

the Caucasus and their demand for territories, Germany would have to protect her

interests in the region via supporting Georgia. The Germans immediately dispatched

General Kress von Kressenstein to Tiflis in the spring of 1918, pulling him from his

position assisting the Turks on the Mesopotamian Front, to establish a German presence

in the capital. This was very similar in style to the British plan that was to be carried out

by the mission assigned to Dunsterville.27

Some time later in April of 1917, after the

proceedings of 3 March 1918 at Brest-Litovsk, the Bavarian von Lossow would be sent

to Georgia with a few thousand men. Lossow was a strong advocate for a Caucasus

dominated by Germany and was in no way prepared to fold to Turkish demands and

ambitions in that region.28

The British on the other hand viewed the new developments with growing alarm.

They were not just under the impression that the Germans hoped to use Georgia as a

means to exploit the Caucasus, but instead they were firmly tied to the notion that the

Germans would only use the occupation of Georgia as a stepping stone to further

25

Zeman, 134. 26

Macfie, 155. 27

Sweitochowski, 127. 28

Fischer, 555.

67

conquests together with the Ottomans. In an eastern report, just prior to Dunsterville’s

advance to Baku, in a telegram from The Hague published in The Daily Mail on 12 June

1918, Mr. Charles Tower called attention to German preparation of routes to the East.

Germany's through routes to the East viâ, the Caspian Sea, leading to

Afghanistan and viâ Tiflis in the Caucasus, on the road to Persia, are being

prepared step by step. The latest development is an effort to extend

German control to the new republic of Georgia, which has split from the

Trans-Caucasian combination. The new Georgian Foreign Minister,

Tchenkeli, has arrived in Berlin to ask for a conference with the Germanic

Powers, which, as now arranged, will take place in Constantinople.

Tchenkeli was one of the two best speakers of the Social Democratic Party

in the fourth Duma According to the “Vorwärts” the Georgians are

appealing to Germany with the object of conserving as far as possible the

territories with Georgian and Armenian population abandoned to Turkey

by the Brest-Litovsk treaty.29

After the war Major Donohoe of Dunsterforce weighed in on the situation and expressed

his opinion in regard to the fracturing of the Transcaucasian Government and the

Georgian betrayal in siding with Germany.

Tiflis fell, and arrayed itself under the Red Banner of National Shame;

Armenians, Georgians, and Tartars, all victims of Turkish misrule, but

hating each other more cordially than they collectively hated the Osmanli

oppressor, wrangling over their respective claims to independent

nationhood, varied by the absorbing passion of slitting each other’s

throats, were all too busy to seek to make common cause against the

Bolshevik wolf when it appeared before their fold in the guise of the

German lamb.30

In fact, the political information contained in the above document is true. The Georgians,

who were in fear of the impending 1918 Turkish Caucasian Offensive, had secretly

decided to break away from the Transcaucasian Commissariat.

The main impetus of the German courting of Georgia lay in the fact that the

Georgians were facing a dire situation that was being projected from multiple directions,

29

CAB 24/145: Eastern Report 72, 13 June 1918. 30

Donohoe, 67.

68

leaving Georgia with little chance of retaining its autonomous status. Ironically, it was

Germany’s ally, Ottoman Turkey that was causing all the problems. “The Transcaucasian

government under Gegechkori was confronted not only by the usual Bolshevik threat but

even more importantly by the imminent threat of a Turkish invasion, which had the

barely concealed sympathy of Azerbaidzhan.”31

The Germans had neither sufficient

military personnel in Transcaucasia nor any way of aiding the Georgians in fending off

the Turks imperialistic designs. The closet troop concentration the Germans had was in

the Ukraine, the bulk of which were being used for occupation duty and little could be

spared in time to help the Georgians. Therefore, Kühlmann proposed to the OHL that all

available German effort should be concentrated on making Georgia an independent state

under German protection.32

Warning of the prospect of misrule under the Ottoman

Muslims, Lossow attempted to persuade the Georgian Christians into accepting

Germany’s protection in secret conversations held between him and Georgian political

officials. He suggested that Georgia should secede from the federation by establishing

their independence. Presented with little alternative the Georgians accepted the German

initiative.33

“Continually pressed by the Turks, who with their Moslem Tartar allies held

nearly all of Russian Armenia and Azerbaijan, the Georgians turned for aid to Germany.

Interested in forestalling their Turkish allies in seizing control of petroleum and other

natural resources in the region, the Germans encouraged the Georgians.”34

The Germans

under Kress also managed to benefit economically from the deal, procuring an agreement

31

George A. Brinkley, George A. The Volunteer Army and Allied Intervention in South Russia, 1917-1921:

A Study in the Politics and Diplomacy of the Russian Civil War (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame

Press, 1966), 38. 32

Trumpener, 182. 33

Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union, 194. 34

James Bunyan, Intervention, Civil War, and Communism in Russia (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press,

1936), 51.

69

with the Menshevik Georgian government. They agreed to give the Germans a mining

monopoly over manganese and other minerals, as well as German control of the Georgian

railway network for the transfer of troops and supplies. All this was given in return for

German protection from the Ottomans.35

However, the Georgians were not mere puppets,

they were aware of the Turco-German rivalry vying for control of the Caucasus. They

were keen enough to realize the political situation and use the Germans to secure their

own protection from the Turks. The exchange of their resources for such a bargain was

considered more than appropriate.36

Germany of course justified her actions as well.

In much the same way that the Turks were to justify their own Caucasian

intervention, the Germans were to appeal to humanitarian considerations. The Turks had

proclaimed that their Azeri brethren were being massacred by the Armenians with the

withdrawal of the Russian troops. Vehip Pasha, the commander of the Ottoman

Caucasian Army Group, justified intervention by stating that, “the Armenians are

resolved to destroy and annihilate Ottoman Muslims.”37

Therefore, Ludendorff, writing

to the German State Secretary, Kühlmann, on 9 June 1918, suggested that, “[a]n ethical

point should be taken into consideration in this case; Georgia is a Christian state whose

hopes we have been raising for a long time. Germany’s recognition and protection will at

the same time give Georgia security against the greedy Turks. Otherwise the difficulties

there will never be over.”38

It is quite obvious that the Germans and the Turks alike were

using such rhetoric to achieve their goals. However, the Georgians had to reach an

35

Frank G. Weber, Eagles on the Crescent: Germany, Austria and the Diplomacy of the Turkish Alliance,

1914-18 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1970), 246. 36

Artin H. Arslanian, “Dunsterville’s Adventures: A Reappraisal,” International Journal of Middle East

Studies 12, no. 2 (September 1980): 204. 37

McMeekin, 331. 38

Zeman, 134.

70

agreement with the Bolsheviks in Moscow concerning Georgia as a German protectorate

before the Germans could proceed wholeheartedly with formal recognition and economic

support.39

The logic behind a Georgian/Bolshevik agreement for the Germans meant that

their position in the annexed Russian lands would not be compromised and stability could

be ensured for the extraction of raw materials to aid in the continuance of the war. The

Germans wanted to avoid getting involved in the internal affairs of Russia as much as

possible. Therefore, they wanted the Bolshevik government to agree to Georgian

independence first, so as to not be accused of meddling.40

In the meantime the Germans were busy negotiating with the Bolsheviks as a

counter to the Turks in Caucasia. The Bolsheviks were coercively forced into an alliance

of sorts with the Germans at Brest-Litovsk. The German government had contempt for

the Bolsheviks and Ludendorff’s opinion of them does much to explain the tense

relationship between the two.

The Soviet government procrastinates as far as all the, for us, important

decisions are concerned and works as often as it can against us. We can

expect nothing from this government, although, it lives by our mercy. It is

a lasting danger to us which will diminish only when it recognizes us

unconditionally as the supreme Power and becomes pliable through its

fear of Germany and concern for its own existence. Therefore a strong and

ruthless treatment of this government appears to me still to be indicated.41

Nevertheless, the Germans were aware of the fact that the main Bolshevik stronghold in

Transcaucasia was located in Baku and that they needed to push the Bolsheviks for

access to its oil. Kühlmann reminded the Bolshevik ambassador to Berlin, Adolf Ioffe, of

the impending Turkish threat to the oil city. Ioffe was more than aware of the situation,

39

Brinkley, 39. 40

Richard K. Debo, Revolution and Survival: The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia 1917-18 (Toronto:

University of Toronto Press, 1979), 304. 41

Zeman, 136.

71

for it was he who had complained bitterly to the Germans of the Turkish violation of the

Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. Kühlmann now suggested to Ioffe that it was imperative to both

Germany and Bolshevik Russia to stop the Turks from gaining possession of Baku. He

hinted that the Germans could aid in the success of such an enterprise if only the

Bolsheviks would provide the Germans with some oil.42

“Once the war between Baku

and the Azerbaijani-Turkish forces began in June, German and Soviet interests in

Transcaucasia coalesced. Both powers wanted to keep the Turks out of Baku. The Soviets

were now prepared to make a further concession to the Germans on the Georgian

question if Baku was kept for the Bolsheviks.”43

Having Bolshevik recognition of

Georgia merely to support their cause was not what Germany intended. Germany, after

all, was interested mostly in the raw materials of the region and acquiring access to them.

Therefore, one can clearly see that the Germans were achieving two goals at once by

negotiating with the Bolsheviks. They were securing their foothold in the Caucasus by

gaining Bolshevik recognition of Georgia, while simultaneously attempting to acquire

access to Baku’s oil for the German war effort.

The Bolsheviks were not adverse to the idea of working with the Germans to

stave off the Turkish advance. The Russians learned from the Georgians and took

advantage of conflicting German and Turkish interests for the protection of their own.

Lenin was especially interested in retaining Baku as part of the Bolshevik state. He

immediately informed Stalin at his headquarters in Tsaritsyn on 8 July 1918 to contact

Stepan Shaumian, the head of the Bolshevik government in Baku, and inform him that

42

Debo, 304. 43

Suny, 283.

72

they were readily willing to accept the proposed German deal.44

The details of the deal

were set forth in supplementary treaties to Brest-Litovsk. The Germans agreed to

guarantee Russian possession of Baku and even went as far as to proclaim to the

Bolsheviks that they would stop a “third power,” i.e. the Ottoman Empire, from acquiring

territories not negotiated upon at Brest-Litovsk. The Bolsheviks in return were to supply

the Germans with copious amounts of oil.45

The British eventually became aware of the

deal and determined that such an agreement was detrimental to their war effort.

Prior to German intervention in the Caucasus the Germans were fully aware of the

potential advantages that could be extracted from occupation of that region. “Ludendorff

later wrote in his memoirs that he considered it essential for Germany to take tons of raw

stuffs and barrels of oil from the area in order to win the war.”46

The Germans were also

extremely discontented with their calculation that the Turks were determined to keep the

resources of the Transcaucasus for themselves. Ludendorff was under the impression that

the Ottomans could not be trusted and the Turkish disregard for the Brest-Litovsk Treaty

seemed to prompt his misgivings.47

The German General Staff could not hide their

dependence on acquiring Transcaucasia for the continuance of the war.

Economic as well as political factors influenced the shaping of the

Kaiser’s Transcaucasian policy. Three years of warfare had depleted

Germany’s raw materials, and the Caucasus was an untapped reservoir

that could be gainfully exploited. Both Ludendorff and Field Marshal Paul

von Hindenburg have testified to German dependence on oil, copper,

manganese, and cotton from this region.48

44

Sweitochowski, 133-134. 45

Macfie, 155-156. 46

Weber, 246. 47

Fromkin, 361. 48

Hovannisian, 178.

73

Although, the British were aware of Germany’s deficiency with regard to resources, they

were also concerned with German access to the same resources after the conclusion of

peace.

It must be remembered that up until this point in the war the situation did not

necessarily point towards an all out Allied victory. The British had contemplated a

negotiated peace that would leave Germany in possession of the territory that she had

conquered during the war. Therefore, British officials had interpreted that not only was

Germany’s annexation of the Caucasus important for her economic wartime agenda, but

also for her resurgence after the war. Such resurgence it was thought might end up posing

a much larger threat in the future. Contained in a western and general report from 20

March 1918, Sir W. Townley reports on a speech made by Oskar von Sydow, Minister of

Commerce, in the Prussian House of Deputies on 13 March. Sydow declared that.

[T]he war was made economically necessary for Germany by the

"encircling" policy of the Entente, and that from the first it had been

conducted by England in a manner to destroy German trade and

industry… In conclusion, he said that if Germany was ever to recover,

peace must give her security from every point of view especially in the

matter of raw materials. The economic war aims were at least as important

as the general war aims. The most important thing for Germany was the

supply of raw materials, and the guaranteeing of an outlet for her

manufactures.49

Similar information permeated in a western and general report on 29 May 1918, entitled

German Penetration into the Caucasus and Turkestan. This report instead demonstrated

not only the wealth of resources Germany would gain from possession of the Caucasus,

but also in Transcaspia and even Siberia as well.

The Foreign Office is informed that the Germans will, before long have

obtained possession of the Caucasus, which, apart from facilitating

49

CAB 24/148: Western and General Report 60 part II, 20 March 1918.

74

possible attacks upon Baghdad and Jerusalem, will put them in a position

to secure wool, leather, and cotton from Turkestan. In a Memorandum

(G.T. 4609), dated May 18th, the Political Intelligence points out that they

can obtain cereals from Northern Caucasia, oilcake, from Ekaterinodar

and Novorossisk. silver-lead, and copper at Grozny. The oilfields at

Grozny would give them control of the river-boat industry on the Volga,

the shipping in the Caspian, and, in a measure, Siberia.50

The British were not about to let the resources of these regions come to the aid of

Germany and counter their naval blockade of that country.

The Germans had felt the noose tightening around their neck. The Allied strategy

of blockading Germany by sea was seen taking hold and the Germans were desperate for

other sources of war matérial. Bolshevik/German co-operation over Baku and the deal

for oil was trickling in from Tiflis to London. Policy officials came to the consensus that

the Bolsheviks were either unwilling or unable to resist German persuasion. For this

reason the British felt that it was compulsory to intervene in Baku in order to prevent

precious raw materials from falling into the hands of the Germans. Moreover, it was felt

that the situation of mutual aid between the Bolsheviks and Germans meant that for the

British yet another enemy would have to be contended with.51

The German High

Command was restricted in their supply of oil after the Galician oil-fields had been

destroyed by the retreating Russians. All that was left for Germany’s oil needs was to

come from the newly acquired Romanian oil-fields, which were far from sufficient. Even

those had been damaged by British efforts at sabotage in 1916. The British and their

allies on the other hand could be supplied from Britain’s oil refineries in the Gulf and by

those that the Americans possessed.52

In must be remembered that Germany’s access to

oil in the Caucasus was not the only threat her intervention could entail. There were many

50

CAB 24/148: Western and General Report 70 part II, 29 May 1918. 51

Ellis, The British “Intervention” in Transcaspia 1918-1919, 37. 52

McMeekin, 324.

75

other raw materials that were available in the Caucasus that could not be found in

Germany, or were either in short supply besides oil. “The Caucasus could provide the

Central Powers with countless material resources, including the rich oil reserves of Baku,

the coal mines of Tkibuli and Tkvarcheli in Georgia, the manganese mines of Chiatura

(in Georgia), copper in Armenia, and iron of Azerbaijan.”53

The British were fully aware

of German prospects in the Caucasus, as well as their particular weakness with regard to

resources.

Early in the war the Allied powers had developed a strategy to utilize the strength

of the British Navy to strangle Germany’s supply lines from the sea and hopefully starve

her into submission. The British, therefore, had reason for concern when Russia withdrew

from the war, as the Germans could now find a possible outlet for the blockade via

Transcaucasia. This would offset any Allied gains made in the war up until that point.

Policy-makers in turn came to the conclusion that German occupation of the Caucasus

was of greater strategic concern to Europe than it was to Asia.54

By 8 May 1918 British

agents had been sending back information to London pertaining to the potentially

advantageous situation the Germans had found themselves in once the Russian wall had

been removed. British agents were aware of the fresh missions sent out by the Germans.

However, the particulars were still somewhat of a mystery. “Our information about this

second phase of German activity in the Middle East is inevitably vague and defective,

but, in view of the dangerous developments that may follow from it, it may be

worthwhile to set out briefly as many as possible of the facts or rumours in our

53 Gökay, A Clash of Empires, 16. 54

Stanwood, 138.

76

possession.”55

The Eastern Committee had been receiving a plethora of varied reports

concerning German penetration into Transcaucasia as they were attempting to understand

the extent of German intentions.

In numerous reports and memoranda British policy-makers were constantly

bombarded with information of the German threat to Transcaucasia and the resources to

be acquired there. In a secret report from 8 June 1918 that was prepared for the General

Staff pertaining to the Caucasus and its importance to the German position, we see a

highly detailed and systematized account of the Caucasus. The report breaks down the

demographics, geographical and climate features, agricultural products, animals, cotton,

wool, tea, timber and tobacco production, fisheries, mineral resources, - including oil -

manganese, and copper to name but a few, as well as a section on the infrastructure of the

region in terms of railways and communication.

The production of Oil and Manganese is already developed so far that

large supplies are available for export: there is also no inconsiderable

quantity of wool, besides certain quantities of cotton, two commodities of

immense value to Germany. There are also ample resources of valuable

timber and important deposits of copper. Cotton at present is not to be

found anywhere within the German Empire, a fact which emphasises the

value of this territory; the same can be said of tea, and it seems certain that

the Germans will be able to obtain supplies of the rarer minerals from the

hitherto unexploited resources of the country. Thus it is no exaggeration to

say that in the future the Caucasus could provide for Germany, besides a

very large supply of foodstuffs, nearly every raw material she requires.

The immediate value to the Germans of the Caucasus depend almost

entirely on the extent to which it may prove possible to overcome

transport difficulties.56

A very similar western and general report just eleven days later, entitled, Germany and

the Caucasus, was a reiteration of the facts presented above. This served to provoke fear

55

CAB 24/51: Secret War Cabinet Memoranda on German and Turkish Activities in the Middle East since

the Russian Revolution, 8 May, 1918. 56

CAB 24/54: Secret War Cabinet Memoranda: Note by the General Staff on the Caucasus and its value to

Germany, 8 June 1918.

77

among policy officials and much unnecessary alarm.57

All of this information led Milner

to conclude that, “[i]f Germany is allowed to help herself to anything she wants in all

Russia - not only supplies but ultimately men – then Germany cannot possibly be

beaten.”58

Milner was not the only top policy-maker causing a stir. Lord Curzon was quick

to weigh in on the threat from Germany in the Caucasus too. Curzon basically

regurgitated all the information the Eastern Committee had received through their agents

in the field and the subsequent reports that constituted their findings. Contained in the

minutes of an Imperial War Cabinet meeting on 25 June 1918 Curzon spoke of the

potential mineral wealth to be found in the Caucasus.

We must look at the Caucasus as one of the greatest sources of supply of

materials essential to Germany that exists in the world. It is a country of

great economic value. The natural product of cereals is very great; there is

an immense amount of threshed corn preserved there in stacks; there are

mines of silver, lead, copper, and manganese, capable of being developed

to a greater extent than anything previously attained. On the eastern shores

of the Black Sea tea is already cultivated and is capable of much wider

development, and when you get towards the western shores of the Caspian

you come to Baku and to Grozny on the railway line that runs to Petrovsk,

and you find at these two places the most valuable oil wells in the whole

of Asia.59

As far as Caucasian oil was concerned Curzon estimated that twenty percent of the

world’s supply originated from that region and he proceeded to raise the horrifying

spectre that German acquisition of the region might imply. Thus, allowing Germany to

wash her hands of American supply after the conflict was over. All of this Curzon

57

CAB 24/148: Western and General Report 73 part II, 19 June 1918. 58

Rothwell, 195. 59

CAB 23/43: Imperial War Cabinet Minutes, 25 June 1918.

78

suggested to his listeners, emphasized the enormous economic caliber of Transcaucasia,

apart from its inherent political value.60

The significance that can be taken from Curzon’s statement is that it shows us his

firm belief in the validity of the reports that had been coming in to the Committee or at

least his choice of words conveys such a message. This is important because Curzon was

the head of the Committee. As head of the Committee, Lord Curzon oversaw the

direction of policy with regard to Transcaucasia and that policy was based on reports that

might have been either completely false or exaggerated to some extent. Nonetheless,

those within the Eastern Committee were forced to make judgments with reference to

Transcaucasian policy solely founded upon information from secondary sources and

without any personnel knowledge or assessment of the situation in person. This system of

interpreting facts contained in reports ran parallel in implementation to the Eastern

Committee’s assessment of the perceived threats from the Ottomans and Bolsheviks as

well. An example of one such envisaged exaggeration that had taken hold in the minds of

Eastern Committee officials can be seen with respect to the Central Asian prisoner of war

problem.

Many of the Austro-Hungarian prisoners of war apprehended by the Russians

were sent to camps in Central Asia. With the downfall of the Tsarist regime these POWs

were essentially set free by their Russian watch dogs and the British were concerned with

this prospect. General Dunsterville, who was operating in the region, had also been aware

of the threat that the POWs could possibly impose upon the British position when he

stated that,

60

Ibid.

79

[a]ny enemy scheme of penetration into Asia through Turkestan would be

greatly facilitated by the large numbers of released Austrian prisoners set

at liberty in that country by the revolutionaries, and now wandering about

ready to undertake any task that would procure them their daily bread. It

was probable that there were as many as 30,000 of these released

Austrians.61

The members of the War Cabinet and the Eastern Committee were hampered by the

POW problem and they estimated that the 40,000 or so men might not be in the best

physical shape, but that they could still present the British with trouble if they were to

link up with the incoming German or Turkish troops. Lord Curzon brought to the

attention of the Imperial War Cabinet this information on 25 June 1918; determining that

the POWs had the ability, “of exercising a very disturbing influence upon the situation.”62

The fact of the matter was that these prisoners had been sitting in camps, some for years,

mostly likely malnourished and unfit for combat. Moreover, they were too far away for

there being any possibility of the Turks or Germans linking up with them in the near

future. Granted, if occupation of the Caucasus was to occur by the Central Powers this

potentiality could have become a reality in one or two year’s time. However, the tone of

dire imminence that protrudes from the reports on the POW situation only served to

provoke undue alarm among policy-makers sitting at their desks back in London. These

officials whether genuinely believing in the reports or not, presented them in such a

manner to the Imperial War Cabinet so as to give weight to the argument for military

intervention in Transcaucasia.

In light of all the information being received from the reports about the Turco-

German threat posed to Transcaucasia, it seems fair to comment that Lord Curzon and his

61

Dunsterville, 140. 62

CAB 23/43: Imperial War Cabinet Minutes, 25 June 1918.

80

associates developing policy for that region might have been accurate in the concern they

were voicing. The Turks were using ideological tactics of utilizing Pan-Islamist and Pan-

Turkic sentiments to rouse the Muslim Turkic population of Caucasia to arms, while

running concurrent to Turkish actions were those of their ally, Germany. Germany

seemed to be employing every method possible to get her hands on the mineral wealth of

Transcaucasia, even fighting a skirmish with the Turks near Tiflis. This was the first non-

friendly engagement of the war between the pair, which was Germany’s attempt to come

through on her promise to the Bolsheviks. Turkish and German aims in the Caucasus in

no way coalesced, in fact, they were largely at odds with one another. Meanwhile, the

Bolsheviks had interests of their own, primarily centered on Baku and the ownership of

its oil. For the next installment of the narrative we must now turn towards the Russians in

Transcaucasia and their relationship to the development of British policy. It shall begin

with Britain’s relationship to the Russian Provisional Government and will move on to

the situation generated by the Bolshevik’ seizure of power and the subsequent change in

British policy with regard to the new regime.

81

CHAPTER V:

THE RUSSIAN SITUATION: THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT,

THE BOLSHEVIKS, AND BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY

British relations with Russia in 1917 following the March Revolution were not as

straightforward as one might think. The initial Provisional Government, based upon

Alexander Kerensky’s leadership, was the focus of continued Anglo-Russian relations.

The officials in London decided upon a course of action that stipulated direct British and

Allied support for Russia as long as the Provisional Government was willing to continue

fighting on the Eastern Front and not make a separate peace with the Germans. By mid-

1917, however, the internal political situation in Russia was destabilizing and chaos

ensued in almost every region; further change was considered imminent. Bolshevik

factions within Russia had been planning the overthrow of the Kerensky government and

in 7 November of 1917 they succeeded in usurping the previous revolutionary regime,

installing themselves as Russia’s new leaders. The November Revolution changed the

situation drastically for the British, who were now faced with yet another political

dilemma with respect to their former ally. The fact that the Bolsheviks came into power

with different political objectives and a new foreign policy direction only served to

further complicate the issue.

82

Prior to 1917 the Russian Army had served as virtually the only barrier to Turco-

German expansion into the East, making the region richly strategic in terms of the war.

Policy-makers, therefore, deemed it necessary to encourage and support the newly

created Provisional Government, with the hope that the southern Russian armies could be

encouraged to hold the Caucasian Front and continue to resist the Germans and Turks in

Transcaucasia.1 The British were originally skeptical of the Provisional Government’s

intentions and their ability to keep Russia under control. On 16 March 1917, less than one

week after the successful seizure of power, Foreign Secretary Arthur James Balfour

instructed Sir George Buchanan, Britain’s ambassador to Russia, to recognize, if and

when he thought it logical, the revolutionaries as the de facto government of Russia. Of

course, Balfour recognized that Buchanan’s decision would be determined by the new

government’s stance towards the war. Buchanan was to fight zealously against any

Russian attempt at securing a separate peace with the Central Powers.2 Luckily for the

British, Kerensky had no qualms with Russia continuing to fight.

In a proclamation issued by the President of the Council of the Provisional

Government, Prince Georgi Lvov, the new government vowed to support the Allied cause

and continue to resist the encroachments of the Central Powers.

The blood of many sons of the fatherland has been shed freely during

these two and a half long years of war, but the country, which is now in

the very birth-throes of Russian liberty, is still exposed to the attack of the

powerful adversary who occupies whole territories of our State and is

threatening us with a new and decisive thrust. Whatever be the cost, the

defence of our national patrimony and the deliverance of the country from

the enemy who has invaded our borders constitutes the principal and vital

problem before our soldiers who are defending the liberty of the people.3

1 Brinkley, 28.

2 CAB 24/143: Eastern Report 7, 15 March 1917.

3 Note from the Russian Provisional Government and the British reply respecting Allied war aims.

83

Not only was this the Provisional Government’s pledge, but they also insisted that the

words contained in the proclamation would be the basis of their foreign policy, with the

intent of saving Russia from destruction.

These principles will constitute the basis of the foreign policy of the

Provisional Government, which is carrying out without fail the popular

will and is safeguarding the rights of our fatherland, while observing the

engagements entered into with our Allies. The Provisional Government of

free Russia has no right to hide the truth from the people. The State is in

danger. Every effort must be made to save it.4

On 8 June 1917 the British sent a reply to the Russian proclamation regarding

Allied war aims. The British were extremely happy with the Provisional Government’s

stance towards the war and that happiness exudes in their written reply. “The British

Government heartily join their Russian Allies in their acceptance and approval of the

principles laid down by President Wilson in his historic message and declaration of war

on 2 April 1917 to the American Congress. These are the aims for which the British

peoples are fighting. These are the principles by which their war policy is and will be

guided.”5 The possibility that they would not lose their ally and that the Eastern Front

might be restored excited policy-makers within the Eastern Committee. Contained in an

eastern report from 22 March 1917, the Eastern Committee had knowledge of the

Provisional Government’s proclamation and their determination to carry-out the war

effort, making the Committee’s policy towards the new government quite simple to form.

“The Government believes that the highly patriotic spirit displayed by the people in their

struggle with the old autocracy will also inspire our soldiers on (? field) of battle. The

government, on its part, will exert all its strength towards supplying our army with all

4 Ibid.

5 Ibid.

84

that is necessary for the prosecution of the war to a victorious finish.”6 Recognition of the

Provisional Government became official on 22 March by the representatives of Great

Britain, France, Italy, and the United States. In an attached appreciation of eastern report

17, from 24 May 1917, the War Office commented with respect to Kerensky and his

pledges that, “M. Kerensky's evident determination to restore discipline and fighting

power to the army is the most satisfactory news received since the outbreak of the

revolution. Should he prove strong enough to carry out his expressed intentions he may

yet save Russia and the Eastern Front.”7 Nevertheless, in the following weeks there was

much apprehension on whether or not the Provisional Government’s word towards the

continuation of the war could indeed be fulfilled.

By June of 1917 the Eastern Committee had been receiving a plethora of reports

referring to the internal political situation of Russia. The policy officials had become

concerned with the Provisional Government’s position and ability to come through on the

promises it had issued. In a report from 7 June 1917 the British are apprehensive of

Kerensky’s pledge to continue the war, as their agents report that the internal situation in

Russia is anything but satisfactory.

REPORTS from various sources in Russia are anything but encouraging.

M. Kerensky's triumphal tour cannot be regarded as being likely to have

any very lasting effect. The vast mass of the proletariat are thinking not

about the war but about the division of land, higher wages, and shorter

hours of labour. Industrial trouble is general, and if the Provisional

Government are unable to assert their authority in Kronstadt, how can they

be expected to have any real control elsewhere? At any rate the situation is

one of extreme instability…M. Tereshchenko's optimism seems to be still

maintained, and no one can doubt his good intentions. It is difficult,

however, to see the grounds upon which his optimism is based.8

6 CAB 24/143: Eastern Report 8, 22 March 1918

7 CAB 24/143: Eastern Report 17, 24 May 1917.

8 CAB 24/143: Eastern Report 19, 7 June 1917.

85

However, even with the internal situation looking grave, the Provisional Government

continued to assert its support of the Allied cause. Kerensky reassured the British that the

situation was under control and that Russia would prevail in its goal to continue fighting.

In a telegram dated 27 June, Buchanan said that Prince Lvov had told him that the

military situation was improving daily and Lvov referred to the fears which he (Sir G.

Buchanan) had expressed of Russia's inability, on account of the economic situation, to

continue the war after the autumn as being unfounded. Lvov saw no grounds for

supposing that Russia would be compelled to withdraw from the war effort; the

Government had not contemplated such an eventuality.9 Nevertheless, British policy-

makers were hard pressed by this point to accept Russian assurances due to the fact that

all signs pointed to a deterioration of the Russian situation. The British were beginning to

feel that way even though the above statement by Prince Lvov and another statement to

Balfour by the Russian Charge d’Affaires, M. Nabokoff, one month earlier at the

beginning of May declared that, “[t]he declarations of the Provisional Government,

imbued with this new spirit of a freed democracy, cannot of course afford the least

pretext for assuming that the collapse of the old structure has entailed any diminution of

Russia’s share in the common struggle of all the Allies.”10

In light of the reports that the Eastern Committee had been receiving, the officials

were aware that the Provisional Government’s words were hollow. By mid-August it was

becoming apparent to the British that although the Provisional Government continued to

reaffirm their support of the war the reality rather was that the internal situation in Russia

at this point was looking bleak due to unfolding events. “In the same telegram the

9 CAB 24/143: Eastern Report 23, 5 July 1917.

10 Note from the Russian Provisional Government and the British reply respecting Allied war aims.

86

military attaché said that he had asked M. Tereschenko whether he really thought that

Russia could continue the war through the winter, and had suggested that there were three

internal causes which might interfere with it— the breakdown of the railways, the general

economic situation, and the peasants holding back grain.”11

It seems as if the Provisional

Government began to be worried about the counter-revolutionary elements that had been

emerging ever since their seizure of power from the Tsar and that England might be

willing to support such forces. However, approximately one month before the Bolshevik

Revolution was in full swing we see the British on 4 October 1917 continuing to place

their faith in the Provisional Government, even though contrary events suggested that

such a position was unwise. In this secret report the British are seen replying to these

accusations while simultaneously reasserting their support of a Russian government that

would be willing to fight the Central Powers until the culmination of the war.

They assert that England really wants a reactionary Government in Russia

again. To these allegations His Majesty's Government have prepared a

telegram to the effect that England has both officially and unofficially

welcomed the entrance of a democratic Power into the struggle against

Prussian autocracy. It was only when the Revolution began to tend

towards anarchy that it was felt that licence should be curbed and

discipline re-established in the army. His Majesty's Government are

entirely opposed to reaction and will continue to support with all their

sympathy and aid any Russian Government endeavouring to secure the

defeat of German militarism.12

The British were not single-track minded however and they chose to watch the Russian

situation carefully and report on their findings to policy-makers. By mid-November the

Bolshevik acquisition of power was complete and thus, forced the British to reevaluate

their foreign policy with respect to Russia and the emergence of a new ruling political

faction. By 16 November, in the aftermath of the political struggle, reports indicated that,

11

CAB 24/144: Eastern Report 29, 16 August 1917. 12

CAB 24/144: Eastern Report 36, 4 October 1917.

87

“[i]t is impossible to make any observation on the Russian situation, which is now so bad

that it is difficult for it not to improve.”13

With the situation in such a condition the

Eastern Committee would have to assess the Bolsheviks as a new element and come to a

conclusion of their loyalties and intentions. The dynamic had changed and the threat to

Transcaucasia and the British position in the East was to have yet another player.

The first goal of the Eastern Committee in the aftermath of Russia’s second

revolution in less than a year entailed that they determine Bolshevik politics with respect

to the continuance of the war. For the British it did not matter if it was Kerensky in

control or Lenin and Trotsky, as long as revolutionary Russia was dedicated to fighting

the Central Powers. However, such a scenario did not look promising. The fact that the

Bolsheviks had used German subsidies to pay for party organization and propaganda,14

coupled with their apparent interest in coming to terms with the Germans through

negotiations at Brest-Litovsk and not to mention the inherent anti-Imperialism in

Bolshevik party propaganda aimed at the established world order, all helped to signify to

British officials that they would find no friends among the Bolsheviks. “The war against

Turkey was almost more unpopular than that against Germany, and since April

revolutionary crowds had been demonstrating against the ‘Imperialists’ War’…Any

organized Russian resistance on the Caucasian front became impossible after the

Bolshevik coup d’état of 7 November.”15

It, therefore, seemed highly probable that the

friend the British thought they had lost in February, but which they ended up not losing,

was now indeed in jeopardy of becoming a reality by the end of November 1917.

13

CAB 24/144: Eastern Report 42, 16 November 1917. 14

Richard Pipes, A Concise History of the Russian Revolution (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1995), 122. 15

W. E. D. Allen, and Paul Muratoff, 457.

88

The original Allied policy towards Bolshevism was undecided, as the course of

events had transpired so quickly and had left little time for a reappraisal of the situation.

This is not to suggest that the British were uninterested in Russian affairs, on the

contrary, the military situation in Russia that would result from the Bolshevik Revolution

was current in the minds of Eastern Committee members. Lord Robert Cecil, British

Assistant Foreign Secretary, commented that, “[n]othing but a strong military

government offers the slightest hope for the Allied cause.”16

However, British hopes

seemed to have been shattered when they realized that the new Bolshevik regime was

content with making a separate peace with the Central Powers and that they had no

intentions of continuing the war on the Allied side. Immediately following the Bolshevik

seizure of power a decree had been issued by the new government which stated their

intentions with respect to the war, it was entitled the, “Decree on Peace, Passed by the

Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers’, Soldiers’, and Peasants’ Deputies,

Nov. 8th

, 1917.” The decree proposed to, “all belligerent peoples and their Governments

the immediate opening of negotiations for a just and democratic peace…By such a peace

the Government understands an immediate peace without annexations (i.e. without

seizure of foreign territory, without the forcible incorporation of foreign nationalities),

and without indemnities.”17

For the British the decree was an irretrievable blow towards

Anglo-Russian relations and the Allied goal of achieving total victory in the war. By 29

November 1917, the Bolsheviks had assumed governmental power in Russia. In an

official note from the Bolshevik leadership contained in an eastern report it became

apparent where the Bolshevik position lay concerning the war.

16

Debo, 23. 17

Jane Degras, ed., Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy (Volume 1 – 1917-1924) (Oxford: Oxford

University Press, 1951), 1.

89

You, citizen Commander-in-Chief, are instructed by the Council of the

People's Commissioners, in execution of the decision taken by the All-

Russian' Congress of Soviets of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies

immediately on receipt of the present instructions, to address yourself to

the military authorities of the enemy armies with a proposal for the

immediate cessation of military operations, with a view to the opening of

peace negotiations… —(Signed) LENIN, TROTSKY, KRILENKO.18

More than explicit in the Bolshevik proclamations and decrees was an anti-Imperialist

tone. The Bolsheviks considered it a crime against humanity to continue a war that was

intent on carving up the world for the benefit of the imperialist governments that were

participating in the world struggle for power. Therefore, the Bolsheviks sought a general

peace to the war, rather than simply the exit of Russia.19

In a reply from Leon Trotsky,

Commissar for Foreign Affairs, to the statement of the British Embassy on the Soviet

peace proposals, dated 30 November 1917, we see Trotsky claiming justification for the

Bolshevik stance. He declared that they were not under any residual formal obligation to

the pacts entered into by the old regimes and they hoped that through the unified efforts

of the common people they could successfully combat imperialism, at home and

abroad.20

By December 1917 it was apparent to the officials within the Eastern Committee

that this was not just mere Bolshevik propaganda and rhetoric, but that they indeed

intended to follow through on their, “No war, No peace,” proposals. In a report from 29

November 1917, Sir George Buchanan is seen reporting on the, “Negotiations for an

Armistice,” and telegraphed to London on the 28 November that,

an official announcement had been that day published by the Minister of

War and the supreme commander-in-chief of the present administration,

Krilenko, stating that under his instructions on the afternoon of the 26th

18

CAB 24/144: Eastern Report 44, 29 November 1917. 19

Degras, 2. 20

Ibid, 14.

90

November a truce party entered the German trenches, opposite that portion

of the line held by 5th Army, with a proposal to open negotiations for an

immediate armistice on all fronts of all belligerents, with a view to the

commencement of peace negotiations.21

It was also very apparent by January of 1918 that negotiations between the Germans and

the Bolsheviks had been taking place at Brest and that a separate peace was in the process

of being secured. Buchanan telegraphed again on 6 January that Trotsky, who was

negotiating on the behalf of the Bolsheviks at Brest-Litovsk, had decided to come to

terms with the enemy. On that very same day he telegraphed to London that in a

conversation he had had with a Russian delegate, who had recently returned from Brest,

that, “a separate peace, at any price, was considered necessary by the Bolsheviks, who

would sign it to retain power.”22

This complete reversal in policy from that of the

previous revolutionary regime guaranteed that Anglo-Russian relations would be strained

and that co-operation between the two was irreconcilable due to the Bolsheviks inherent

and explicit disgust towards imperialism.

The Bolsheviks were not afraid to voice their ideological anti-Imperialist rhetoric;

in fact, they voiced it openly and with conviction. Dunsterville, while in northern Persia,

happened to come across some Bolshevik propaganda from, “The News of the Council of

Workmen, Red Army, Sailors, and Peasant Deputies of the Baku Area,” and he decided

to record what was contained. “Away with the English Imperialists! Away with their paid

agents! Away with the Bourgeois Counter-Revolutionaries!…What can the English give

you? Nothing! What can they take from you? Everything! Away with the English

Imperialists!”23

In February, at much the same time that Dunsterville came into contact

21

CAB 24/144: Eastern Report 44, 29 November 1917. 22

CAB 24/144: Eastern Report 50, 10 January 1918. 23

Dunsterville, 214.

91

with the above statement, Dunsterville met with the Bolshevik Committee that had taken

control of the south Caspian port city of Enzeli. The Committee emphasized to the British

General that they had made peace with the Central Powers, “and among all nations, and

they mistrusted only Great Britain as a symbol of Imperialism.”24

As Captain Donohoe

points out, the Bolsheviks were also resolutely against the Turkish advance past the

borders decided at Brest-Litovsk. However, they were equally determined to deny any

proposals for military aid aimed at fighting the Central Powers in Transcaucasia.25

All of

this prompted Dunsterville to remark that, “[t]he meeting with the Russian Army in

revolution, and especially with the Bolshevik portion of it, seemed to promise insuperable

difficulties, as the Bolsheviks had already, in resentment at the British Government’s

refusal of recognition, adopted a strongly anti-British attitude.”26

Anglo-Russian relations

had obviously reached an all-time low ever since the Great Game era, giving British

policy-makers reason for concern.

The Bolsheviks were not only intent on breaking relations with the British, but in

their convictions aimed against the established world order of imperialism, they were also

seeking to expose Allied imperialist actions to the rest of the world. The Bolsheviks

appealed to a two-volume work written at the turn of the century by General MacGregor,

who was an ardent supporter of British expansion in the East. The work, entitled, “The

Defense of India,” concluded that British expansion and power in the East depended upon

the division of Russia. The fact that revolution and civil war were rife in Russia only

meant to the Bolsheviks that conditions were ripe for British sponsored dismemberment,

24

Winegard, 103. 25

Donohoe, 204. 26

Dunsterville, 14.

92

followed by British intervention and expansion.27

This plan did not seem far-fetched

when considered in the context of the documents that the Bolsheviks uncovered when

they began going through the Tsarist diplomatic archives. The Bolsheviks unearthed

various secret treaties concluded between the Allies, including the Sykes-Picot

agreement,28

which was related to the age old “Eastern Question” and the division of the

Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire among the Allies; demonstrating that the war was

one of imperialism. The Bolsheviks immediately published these documents,

embarrassing no doubt, which created a fire storm of contempt for the Allies. The new

Russian regime repudiated those treaties entered into by the Tsarist regime.29

These

documents revealed to the Bolsheviks, and to the world for that matter, the true

imperialist intentions of the former Tsarist regime and its allies; thus, generating

suspicions concerning the British intentions in Transcaucasia, Transcaspia, Central Asia,

and more specifically, Baku.

Yet another challenge posed by the Bolshevik seizure of power to the position of

the British Empire in the East was the Bolshevik support for Asiatic self-determination.

Whether or not Bolshevik support for the issue derived from genuine sympathies or was

merely a politically analogous scheme aimed at gaining power in the Muslim regions of

former Tsarist Russia is debatable. Nevertheless, the issue of self-determination ran

counter to British policy with reference to her empire and was, therefore, a direct threat to

the British in the region. “It was clear that Bolshevik support for Asiatic self-

determination was as dangerous as Russian imperialism had been, and the Foreign Office

27

Mitrokhin, 12-13. 28

See Appendix G for Allied Plans for Turkey 1915-1917. Gilbert, 40. 29

Hopkirk, 230.

93

tended to regard the proclamation as a direct challenge to British power in Asia.”30

In the

final month of 1917 the Bolsheviks issued an appeal to the Muslims of the world signed

by both Lenin and Stalin, promising aid in return for their support for Soviet Russia.31

The famous, “Declaration of the Rights of Peoples,” as it was to become known,

recognized, “the prerogative of the empire’s peoples to exercise self-determination and

even to form sovereign states.”32

Bolshevik support for such an issue presented a

conundrum of sorts for British policy-makers as it could not be easily ignored and they

would be expected to clearly define their own stance towards the issue.

The British policy officials found themselves in a bind with respect to the issue of

Asiatic self-determination. British plans for intervention in the region would find

difficulty in gaining support among the Muslim populations if they chose to disregard

and openly deny the Bolshevik proclamation.

“Internally, denying self-determination had its dangers, as any obvious

step in the direction would have shattered the myth that imperial rule led

subject people naturally to a knowledge of democratic institutions.

Therefore, however much they disliked the idea, British statesmen were

compelled by circumstances to seek a modus vivendi with the principle of

self-determination.”33

Lenin supported the issue, believing that national movements among colonial peoples

would help to undermine the established world order and eventually help in its

overthrow.34

For Eastern Committee members, such as Lord Curzon and Hardinge, as

well as Sir Charles Murray Marling, a member of the Persian Committee, who supported

British imperial projects for expansion in that region of the world, viewed nationalism as

30

Stanwood, 42. 31

Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union, 155. 32

Reynolds, Shattering Empires, 192. 33

Stanwood, 43-44. 34

Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union, 155.

94

much an obstacle to British imperialist ambitions in that region as they did direct enemy

military action.35

British intervention in the region was to rely on support from local

populations, populations that would most likely avoid giving support to the British when

the Bolsheviks and the Germans as well, were willing to support their nationalist

aspirations. The Germans had clearly supported Caucasian national aspirations, namely

that of Georgia, for their own political reasons, as was discussed early, and this was

something that the British had always refused to emulate.36

It is not surprising, therefore,

that the British, who had imperial ambitions in the Transcaucasus, had been presented

with another precarious element in the increasingly growing equation of military

intervention in that region.

The Bolsheviks had their own political ambitions of course in Transcaucasia and

they no doubt viewed their anti-imperialist and self-determinant ideological stances as a

means of achieving their aims, in much the same manner as the Young Turks were using

multiple ideologies for similar purposes. The Bolshevik leadership viewed Transcaucasia

as an essential piece in the puzzle concerning the future existence of Soviet Russia, due to

the fact that so much had been taken from them at Brest-Litovsk by the Germans, who

were using forceful military coercion to control the Bolsheviks and make it harder for

them to resist increased German demands. Germany had taken 780,000 square kilometers

of land, which included 56 million people of the Russian population, at Brest-Litovsk.

Although, the non-Russian peoples of these regions had their own national aspirations.

Accompanied by these seizures, Germany also acquired one-third of Russia’s railway

network, almost seventy-five percent of its iron ore production, and eighty-nine percent

35

Stanwood, 61-62. 36

Ibid, 138.

95

of its coal supply.37

This meant that it was logical for the Bolshevik leadership to seek

compensation for their losses in Eastern Russia by retaining possession of their

Transcaucasian territory, especially Baku. An example from after the war gives a clear

picture of the economic compensation that the Bolsheviks were hoping to receive in

Transcaucasia. “A book published by the Soviet State Publishing House in 1921 on “The

Caucasus and Its Significance for Soviet Russia” pointed out that this region had

provided pre-revolutionary Russia with two-thirds of its oil, three-fourths of its

manganese, one-fourth of its copper, and much of its lead.”38

For Moscow the revocation

of their Transcaucasian claims was never a reality, they regarded its loss as a temporary

setback that would be remedied in due course; the importance of Transcaucasia and

Baku, after all, was economic and their retention was extremely important for the

Bolshevik regime.39

“The Soviet point of view was, however, categorically expressed:

Baku must remain with the Russian Soviet Republic, since the oilfields were absolutely

necessary to the economy of Russia.”40

The regime’s policy was quite evident in their

willingness to deal with the Germans in the hope of staving off the Turkish advance and

their unwillingness to work with the British in the same endeavor, from whom they felt,

they would never again gain possession of Baku if the British imperialists were to

successfully acquire it.

The one bright side for the British concerning the Bolshevik threat in

Transcaucasia was that Bolshevik power in that region was rather limited and except for

their control over Baku, there was not much they could be happy with. The elections that

37

Debo, 158. 38

Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union, 217 39

Ibid, 217. 40

W. E. D. Allen, and Paul Muratoff, 480.

96

were held in Transcaucasia on 26-28 November 1917 by the Constituent Assembly

revealed that the Bolsheviks could not hold popular support in Transcaucasia anywhere.

In fact, they received just less than four percent of the vote, except in Baku, where they

came in first with 22,276 votes out of a total of 111,050.41

“As one historian subsequently

put it: ‘Baku was a Bolshevik island in the midst of an anti-Bolshevik sea’.”42

This

outcome might well have been because the Transcaucasian Government, largely

composed of Mensheviks, was angry at the Bolsheviks for their counter-revolutionary

actions and their toppling of the Provisional Government.

The Tiflis Revolutionary Executive Committee of the Soviets did not

indicate any enthusiasm for the Bolshevik triumph in Petrograd and

Moscow. On the contrary, the resolution of their meeting on November 8,

was hostile in tone stating that the Bolsheviks’ seizure of power by force

was fundamentally wrong since it would lead to counter-revolution and

consequently, the loss of freedoms already acquired.43

The only support in Transcaucasia for the Bolsheviks emanated from the Russian troops

who were vacating the front lines. After the disappointing elections, the Bolsheviks in

December 1917 decided to try and seize power in the region through intrigue and force.

Unsuccessful as it was, this only further cemented distrust and ill-feelings towards the

Bolshevik Party in the regional center of Tiflis.44

Bolshevik power in Baku was a

different story but it was not as definite as it first might have seemed.

Even Bolshevik power in Baku had been a bit shaky. The Baku Soviet was

originally comprised of four main political units including Socialist Revolutionaries,

Mensheviks, Musavatists, and Dashnaks. However, by the beginning of 1918 large

41

Sweitochowski, 108. 42

Hopkirk, 287. 43

Çağlayan, 20. 44

George F. Kennan, Russia Leaves the War: Soviet-American Relations, 1917-1920 (Princeton: Princeton

University Press, 1989), 167.

97

amounts of soldiers had been returning from the front and were congregating in and

around Baku. Those numerous soldiers who supported the Bolsheviks, because they

promised an end to the war and the return to their homes, helped to incline the political

situation more towards the left, eventually placing power in Bolshevik hands.45

The

charismatic, Stepan Shaumian, was elected Chairman of the Soviet, and he expeditiously

set about dominating the discussions and reforms in Baku. The Bolshevik position,

however, rested upon an uneasy alliance that they had formed with the Armenian

Dashnak Party as a counter to the majority Muslim/Turkic population, represented by the

Musavatist Party. Lenin knew that he had no way of reinforcing the Baku Bolsheviks if

the Musavatists decided to usurp their power.46

In March 1918 differences culminated

and the various factions succumbed to infighting within the city’s environs, these events

became known as the “March Days” or the “Muslim Revolt”.

The “March Days” saw a clash between the majority Muslim/Azeri Turkic

population, who held pent up resentment towards the Armenians and their ally, the

Bolsheviks. The Muslim population was encouraged by the arrival in Baku of the famed

Russian “Savage Division”. This division was formed by the Tsarist Government from

the wildest tribesmen of the northern Caucasus. They were specially equipped and

comprised fully of volunteers and led by Muslim officers and, “they were the terror of all

who came in contact with them, whether friend or foe.”47

Prior to their arrival in Baku the

Savage Division had disarmed pro-Bolshevik units in Lenkoran; these events ran

concurrent with other anti-Bolshevik Muslim actions throughout Transcaucasia. These

antecedent events demonstrated not only the lack of Bolshevik support throughout the

45

Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union, 98. 46

Reynolds, Shattering Empires, 209. 47

Ranald MacDonell, “And Nothing Long” (London: Constable & Co. Ltd., 1938), 198.

98

Transcaucasus, but also the encouragement for Turkish intervention due to the

preponderance of Islamic support.48

In Baku the flame was sparked when the Bolsheviks

attempted to disarm the Savage Division, who had been aboard their own ship in Baku’s

harbor, and this aggressive posture further fueled the Muslim population of the city

against the Baku Soviet.49

By mid-April the fighting had finished and the result was that

the Bolsheviks had assumed even greater power within Baku through their defeat of the

Muslim population. Shaumian exalted to Lenin that, “[o]ur Bolshevik influence was

already strong in Baku and now we are masters of the situation in the full sense of the

word.”50

The Bolshevik position was fully entrenched after the Muslim Revolt, but would

have to face another obstacle in its future in the form of the British mission,

Dunsterforce. The British had their gaze set upon Baku and from their vantage point it

looked as if the Bolsheviks could be pushed out and that the Social Revolutionaries, who

would fill the void, could be induced into allowing the British under Dunsterville to be

invited into the city and aid in its defense against the Turks. However, for the British, the

Bolsheviks inexorable anti-imperialist stance, along with the presumptive threats of the

Germans and the Turks, had added yet another explicitly hostile element to British plans

towards intervention in Transcaucasia.

48

Sweitochowski, 113. 49

Ibid, 115. 50

Ibid, 118.

99

CHAPTER VI:

BRITISH INTERVENTION IN TRANSCAUCASIA:

DUNSTERFORCE AND BAKU

Almost immediately following the news of the collapse of Russia into revolution

in early 1917, the Eastern Committee began the process of acquiring information

concerning the intentions of Britain’s enemies in Transcaucasia. The Committee’s

members decided upon a course of intervention due to the perceived threat to the British

Empire in the East that was emanating from the Germans and the Turks. By October

1917, the British encountered yet another threat in the form of the Bolsheviks. In

response to the opening of the northern sector of the East Persian Cordon, the policy-

makers within the Committee deemed it necessary to create a small, but agile force,

which might have enough striking power in order to secure the region that the retreating

Russian troops had vacated. Sir Henry Wilson suggested that,

the building up of ‘local organizations on the foundation of military

strength’ from Baghdad to the Caspian and into the Caucasus, together

with a military mission to Turkestan, was needed. This policy was adopted

by the Eastern Committee of the War Cabinet on 6 May where it was

supported by General H. Cox, military secretary at the India Office.1

1 Rothwell, 187.

100

The force that was created for such purposes was to be headed by Major-General

L. C. Dunsterville and was known formally as “Dunsterforce”. Informally, the mission

assumed the title of the “Hush Hush Brigade” due to the early secrecy of the mission and

its objectives. Dunsterforce was originally intended to proceed to Tiflis and to make

contact with the political elements of the Transcaucasus. However, as events transpired

on the ground throughout 1917 the objectives of Dunsterville’s mission were to be

altered, so as to react to the changing situation. Through a careful examination of the

orders given to Dunsterforce from its inception, until after its unsuccessful attempt at

defending Baku from the Turks, it will then be possible to analyze the intentions of the

British in Transcaucasia. Accusations hurled by historians have categorized British

intervention as premeditated imperialist intent with the aim of expanding the British

Empire in the Tsar’s former domains. While running concurrent to these accusations

there are others who seek to absolve the British of such intentions. Nevertheless, there

must be a thorough look into British policy formation by the Eastern Committee and the

implementation of that policy by military ground forces before a conclusion can be drawn

regarding the true nature behind British intervention in Transcaucasia.

The chaos in Russia had opened a virtual Pandora’s Box for the British in the

East. The strains of the war upon British manpower and supplies were being felt and the

opening of the Caucasian Front did little to ease that strain. Therefore, the officials within

the Eastern Committee decided that allocating a substantially large force to meet the

Russian situation head on was out of the question. Instead, it was thought that a smaller,

more modern force should be composed. “[T]he War Office considered a large force out

of the question, even though they might prefer it, and instead talked of improvising a

101

small force of armoured cars, cavalry and guns to constitute a mobile force.”2 This

mobile force was to be comprised of handpicked specialists, who were to proceed to

Tiflis and Baku, secure Baku’s oil and the Caspian Fleet, as well as organize local units

to provide a barrier against a Turco-German advance.3 The selection of these specialists

for Dunsterforce represented the new British peripheral policy in that they were, in large

part, drawn from units of Dominion troops that had proven themselves throughout the

course of the war. Major Donohoe attributes Brigadier-General Byron with the selection

of units for Dunsterforce from the Dominion troops. “[H]imself an able and experienced

solider with a brilliant South African fighting reputation. He went across to Flanders and

picked out the cream of the fighting men from the South African contingent and from the

magnificent Australian and Canadian Divisions.”4 Dunsterville’s own words better

portray the selection process and the composition of the men involved.

These officers and N.C.O.’s were chosen from all the units in the various

theatres of the war, from France, Salonika, Egypt and Mesopotamia. They

were chiefly from the Canadian, Australian, New Zealand and South

African contingents. All were chosen for special ability, and all were men

who had already distinguished themselves in the field. It is certain that a

finer body of men have never been brought together, and the command

was one of which any man might well be proud.5

More importantly, however, for the success of the mission, was the selection of a man in

late 1917, who had the ability to lead such a force into combat on a mission as dangerous

and unpredictable as the one created for intervention in Transcaucasia.

Major-General Dunsterville was no stranger to combat. Dunsterville had served

previously in the Indian Army on the northern frontier and, “[h]is knowledge of Russian

2 Stanwood, 85.

3 Angus Hay, “Dunsterforce: The British in Northern Persia and Baku, 1918,” Asian Affairs 34, no. 3 (Nov.

2003): 387. 4 Donohoe, 3.

5 Dunsterville, 9.

102

and Persian was probably instrumental in his appointment as the head of the British

mission to Transcaucasia at the end of 1917.”6 Rudyard Kipling, a boyhood friend of

Dunsterville, had used him as the basis of the main character of his novel, Stalky & Co.

As if his reputation preceded him, Lieutenant-Colonel A. Rawlinson, who was assigned

to Dunsterforce, recalled on his first meeting with Dunsterville that, “never in the course

of a very varied career have I met any personality so instantly claiming or so permanently

retaining my respect and sympathy.”7 It was almost as if the composition of Dunsterforce

and the selection of Dunsterville as its commander reflected imperial ideals, in that men

were needed who could be counted on to carry-out special endeavours such as this. The

force which Dunsterville was expected to take into Transcaucasia was tiny compared to

World War I standards on other fronts. However, the key difference was that its officers

were chosen for their special talents as political agents, rather than as soldiers. It could be

expected that the members of the mission hoped of duplicating the exploits of Lawrence

of Arabia. No doubt, similar hopes had been floating around in the minds of the political

thinkers tasked with overseeing the creation of a worthy enough unit.8 And, according to

Rawlinson’s evaluation of the man, there was no one who better reflected such a

personality of character more so than General Dunsterville.

Possessed of an exceptional sense of humour, no difficulties were ever so

great, nor situations so hopeless, that he could not, and did not, see and

appreciate the brighter side of every event, however tragic. Himself

possessed of the great and inestimable gift of courage in the face of

adversity, he knew how to communicate to others, less gifted than himself,

that confidence in themselves to which is due the measure of success

6 Arslanian, 200.

7 Lt.-Col. A. Rawlinson, Adventures in the Near East, 1918-1922 (London: Andrew and Melrose, 1923),

59. 8 Stanwood, 64.

103

achieved by the force under his command in the face of the apparently

impossible task with which they found themselves confronted.9

It is not surprising; however, that the officials who were formulating policy should be so

caught up in the selection of troops and someone able enough to command them. The

task in front of Dunsterforce was, after all, daunting and the outcome of the mission more

than uncertain. “This was to be the nucleus of a force which we hoped would combat and

overthrow Bolshevism, make common cause with Armenians, Georgians, and Tatars,

raise and train local levies, and bar with a line of bayonets the further progress of Turk

and German by way of the Caspian Sea and Russian Turkestan towards the Gates of

India.”10

The British policy officials decided that in order to make Dunsterville’s mission

in Transcaucasia a more probable success, he would have to enlist the aid of whatever

friendly local units that were available. The British were firmly aware of the pro-Turk

sympathies of the Tatar Azeri population. The estimated 2,000,000 million or so who

inhabited the Caucasus had been exempt from service in the Tsarist army and, therefore,

their numbers were still intact.11

In was thought that, “[t]he Tartars, who comprised the

finest fighting material, appeared to be solidly pro-Turk and were believed to be able to

produce 30,000 irregulars.”12

The political arm of the Muslim/Turkic population was the

Musavatist Party. It was particularly apparent that a political party whose organization

had adopted the slogan, “Turkism, Islamism, and Modernism,”13

was highly unlikely of

giving any form of backing for the British Empire over that of the Ottoman. This meant

9 Rawlinson, 59.

10 Donohoe, 3.

11 Moberly, 111.

12 Ibid, 180.

13 Hovannisian, 72.

104

for the British that there were only two possibilities left, the Christian population

consisting of Georgians and Armenians. In a memorandum on the political situation in

the Caucasus by the intelligence officer, Colonel Jones, from 16 January 1918, he is

under the opinion that the, “Georgians are gentlemen and good fighters, and are prepared

to fight not merely in defence of Georgia, but against the possibility of Turco-German

domination in Asia Minor.”14

This report is highly detailed and pertains to the emerging

situation in the Caucasus. There is a heavy focus on the Georgian situation and their

status as a potential ally in the region for the British with the hope of securing a position

in Georgia to block a Turco-German entrance. However, as it was already noted earlier,

the Turks had advanced into the Caucasus and passed the lines set at Brest-Litovsk rather

unexpectedly. This meant that for the Georgians, whom Dunsterville’s mission was

intended to court upon arrival in Tiflis, immediate protection was needed. The Georgians

were aware of the fact that the likelihood of the British being able to provide a substantial

enough force to block the incursions of the Turks, and the Germans for that matter, if

they decided to opt for British aid instead, was next to nothing. They, therefore, opted for

German protection. All of this, plus the Bolsheviks inherent anti-Imperialism spelled out

to the Eastern Committee officials that their only hope of friendly co-operation in

Transcaucasia was to be found in the Armenian population.

The Armenians had previously supported the Russians versus the Turks in large

numbers. Therefore, their most recent transgressions against the Turks were unlikely to

be forgiven. In place of British troops the prospect of aiding the Armenians in an attempt

to block Turkish entry into the Caucasus seemed to be a viable alternative. “On the other

hand, we have in the anti-Bolsheviks of Trans-Caucasia and the conquered Turkish

14

CAB 24/39: Secret War Cabinet Memoranda on the Political Situation in the Caucasus, 16 January 1918.

105

provinces, especially the Armenians, the nucleus of an army, which, if organised and led,

would certainly fight, as it is a question of life and death to them to resist a Turkish

invasion.”15

In an eastern report from 28 June 1917 we see that Sir George Buchanan

telegraphed on 20 June that a letter had been received from Colonel Marsh. Marsh

proposed that the British should be responsible for arming and organizing the Armenians.

He estimated that there were some 50,000 men of military age who had good leaders,

along with plenty of English interpreters, and were more than willing to fight. The

Colonel noted that they only required arms and organization, which he believed the

British could amply provide.16

The report concludes that, “Colonel Marsh’s suggestion in

regard to Armenians in the Caucasus is important. In the Armenians we have a people of

intelligence and capacity who desire victory for the Allies.”17

Contained in another

eastern report, some two weeks later, on 11 July 1917 with regard to the previous notion

of arming the Armenians in the Caucasus, this report reaffirms the Eastern Committee’s

opinion on the matter. “The proposed Armenian force is a most useful suggestion and one

which may give real vitality to the Russian operations on the Caucasus front.”18

For the

Armenians, who were seeking an independent nation state, British assistance seemed to

be the only option. However, for the British, who had not yet come to a consensus on the

issue of self-determination, support for the Armenians needed a politically justifiable

reason.

Once the Armenians realized that the Russian collapse meant that for their

position protection was no longer available, they immediately began pressing London for

15

CAB 24/144: Eastern Report 51, 17 January 1918. 16

CAB 24/143: Eastern Report 22, 28 June 1917. 17

Ibid. 18

CAB 24/143: Eastern Report 24, 11 July 1917.

106

the recognition of their national claims. The Armenians were also not bashful in their

requests for financial and military assistance to combat the Turks. The feasibility of

London being able to procure such aid was next to nil, however, the temptation to use the

Armenian people for Britain’s own interests in the region overcame any scruples policy-

makers might have had.19

In an eastern report from 11 October 1917 we see that the

policy-makers, who no doubt had moral and ethical reasons for championing the

Armenian cause, were now more concerned with using the Armenian people to achieve

their own political and military goals.

The Armenians are the only possible barrier between the Turks and their

great Central-Asian objective, and no efforts will be spared to remove the

obstacle. British interest in the fate of the Armenians now passes from

mere sentimental and humanitarian feeling to a matter of grave material

concern. The pan-Turanian scheme is to mobilise simultaneously Central-

Asian man power and pseudo-Moslem fanaticism under Istanbul control

against South Persia, Afghanistan, and India. The menace, though perhaps

seemingly distant, is exceedingly real, and our only real weapons against it

are the Arabs and Armenians, who have sufficient racial vitality to repel

the Turanian policy.20

The report further contemplates what must be done in order to effectively use the

Armenians as a barrier to Turco-German ambitions. Firstly, the report suggests warning

their compatriots so that they can begin arming and organizing on their own as quickly as

possible until further British aid can be provided. Secondly, it is suggested with extreme

urgency that the Armenian soldiers who had been serving the Tsar on the Galician Front

should promptly be returned to the Caucasus to fight alongside their brothers in arms.21

British officials were expressly intent on having the Armenians from the Galician

Front return to the Caucasus for two reasons. The main reason was that these troops were

19

Stanwood, 49. 20

CAB 24/144: Eastern Report 37, 11 October 1917. 21

Ibid.

107

battle hardened soldiers and not mere irregulars, which the Armenians in the Caucasus

were for the most part. A supplementary reason for their return, and also a rather

straightforward one, was that these troops would significantly increase the overall pool of

available troops to combat a Turco-German thrust in the Transcaucasus. General Barter,

Chief of the British Military Mission to the Russian General Headquarters, noted that

some 150,000 Armenians had been recruited by the Tsar. However, less than 35,000 of

them were serving actively in and around their homeland. The majority had been

stationed on the Eastern Front against the Germans and now that the front had collapsed

the Armenian leaders, as well as British policy-makers were intent on having them

returned to the Caucasus. General Barter was under the impression that these Armenian

troops, if brought to the Caucasus, could help fill the vacuum left by the demoralized and

vacating Russian troops.22

Nevertheless, British support for the Armenians was not as

clear cut as it might have seemed. Indeed, the political situation in the Caucasus in 1917

was complicated and any potential British aid would need to judge the situation

accordingly.

The British had originally decided to give their backing to the Armenians because

they would provide the best possibility of checking Turco-German intentions in the

Caucasus, as well as helping to combat Bolshevism. However, the creation of the

Transcaucasian Commissariat on 28 November 1917, a combined Transcaucasian

federation consisting of Georgians, Armenians, and Azerbaijanis, altered the situation

with respect to British policy in the region. “This had now become difficult of realization,

owing to the series of bewildering and kaleidoscopic changes in Transcaucasia which had

22

A. H. Arslanian, and R. L. Michaels, “The British Decision to Intervene in Transcaucasia during World

War I,” Armenian Review, no. 27 (Summer 1974): 149.

108

profoundly affected the entire political and military situation.”23

This government was

intended to maintain order until an All-Russian Constituent Assembly generated a

government that would represent the whole of Russia. The Transcaucasian Commissariat

was headed by the Georgian Menshevik, E. G. Gegechkori, and included two or three

representatives from each of the major ethnic groups in Transcaucasia.24

The occupation

of Odessa on 13 March and the impending entry of the Germans into the Caucasus

shortly after, coupled with the capture of Batum, Ardahan, and Kars at the end of the

month by the Turks,25

had prompted the peoples of the Caucasus that some type of co-

operation in the form of a multi-ethnic federation was necessary if national aspirations

were to be realized. Therefore, for Eastern Committee officials a stance towards the

newly formed Transcaucasian Commissariat had to be contemplated and decided upon

swiftly, so as to not lose out on the opportunity of gaining an ally in the region. Present in

the appendix of an eastern report there is a memorandum by Lord Milner entitled, “The

New Embryo Governments in South Russia,” written on 9 January 1918, where Milner

expresses exactly that.

Of all the various districts of southern Russia which are struggling for

local autonomy, Trans-Caucasia seems thus to be both the most promising

and by far the most vital from the point of view of British interests. I think

we ought, in the first instance at any rate, to concentrate our efforts upon

keeping the Trans-Caucasia Provisional Government and its new army

upon their legs. If we succeed in doing so, we shall also indirectly

strengthen the South-Eastern Federation.26

Part of the British plan to support the newly formed Transcaucasian Government and

whatever counter-revolutionary forces in the region that were available and sympathetic

23

Donohoe, 203-204. 24

Trumpener, 177. 25

Moberly, 120. 26

CAB 24/144: Eastern Report 51, 17 January 1918.

109

to the Allied cause entailed that intelligence officers from the Political Department of the

Intelligence Bureau would be sent to Transcaucasia.

From the outset unity in Allied thinking towards the planning of intervention was

confused and incoherent. The British favored direct military intervention when feasible,

if ever the opportunity presented itself; Dunsterforce was indeed created for such a

purpose. However, for the time being, the British were willing to support separatists and

nationalists who they could be sure of opposing the Central Powers in the region.27

During the waiting period that saw Dunsterforce being created and assembled, planning

to depart from Baghdad for the Caucasus, intelligence officers were sent by the

government of India to the Caucasus. Captain Jarvis and Captain Teague Jones were

responsible for rallying counter-revolutionary sentiment and to support it financially. “In

London the war cabinet decided ‘to support any responsible body in Russia that would

actively oppose the Maximalist movement and at the same time give money freely,

within reason, to such bodies as were prepared to help the allied cause.’ In both countries,

generals began to unroll maps of Russia.”28

These two officers played a predominant role

in the politics of Transcaucasia and Transcaspia and in 1918 would be responsible for the

overthrow of Bolshevik power in Baku and Ashkhabad.29

After the Bolshevik Revolution

another intelligence officer, Captain Edward Noel, was given a blank check, so to speak,

with regard to supporting and subsidizing counter-revolutionary elements against

Bolshevik power in Transcaucasia. Noel was sent to carry-out subversive activity even

though the British were still in the process of trying to persuade the Bolsheviks to

continue fighting for the Allied cause. “It was his duty to report as and how he could, to

27

John Bradley, Allied Intervention in Russia (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1968), 11. 28

Debo, 28. 29

Sareen, 37.

110

take all measures to counteract German and Turkish propaganda and to persuade such

loyal elements as he could find to remain loyal to whatsoever cause or front he

indicated.”30

Members of the India Office were confused with the dual policy that was

being undertaken by His Majesty’s Government.31

This dual policy was put in place by

policy-makers due to the multitude of threats. The Bolshevik takeover had added yet

another element to the already confusing situation. Thus, a dual policy was deemed

necessary. “The most plausible way of thwarting the bolsheviks seemed to be to

challenge them indirectly by means of the opposition forces on the spot. Thus a dual

policy vis à vis the bolsheviks was adopted by all the Allies, namely keeping in touch

with both the bolsheviks and the opposition and aiding the latter.”32

Nonetheless, for the

most part, these intelligence officers were charged with supporting pro-Allied groups

financially until a powerful enough military mission could be assembled.

The primary objective of the Eastern Committee’s policy, aimed at propping up

the local Transcaucasian population, was to help the counter-revolutionary and pro-

autonomous groups in whatever way possible. The logic behind such a strategy was that

these units would be made capable of standing on their own feet and thus, able to oppose

the Turco-German threat, as well as the Bolshevik threat.33

In essence, if these groups

proved able enough, the British would be able to buy some time in the region until

intervention was possible. With intelligence officers paving the way, it was then up to

Dunsterville to make his way to the Caucasus and to organize these miscellaneous

30

MacDonell, 188. 31

Sareen, 29-30. 32

Bradley, 9. 33

Sareen, 3.

111

elements into a coherent body of resistance.34

Generated by multiple fears of losing the

strategic positions that the Transcaucasus afforded and the prospect of handing the

valuable natural resources of the region to the Central Powers, the British government

encouraged the Christian peoples of the Caucasus to bar entry to their enemies. At the

same time, it was hoped that the Allied-supported bloc would keep the key routes of

movement out of the hands of the Germans and their Turkish ally. Dunsterville’s mission

was to achieve this aim by making it to Tiflis. However, the Germans essentially beat

him to it and succeeded in securing their own foothold in the region at the expense of the

Georgians.

By the end of January 1918, two months before the main body of Dunsterforce

arrived in Baghdad, General Dunsterville assembled a small group of soldiers from the

Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force. This group, with Dunsterville at its head, had twelve

officers, two clerks, and forty-one drivers. With four Ford touring cars and forty Ford

vans the small force departed on the long trek to Tiflis from Baghdad on 29 January

1918.35

Dunsterville decided that the quickest route his force could take to Tiflis meant

leaving Baghdad for Enzeli, a port on the southern shore of the Caspian Sea. This route

would take the force through neutral Persia via the cities of Kermanshah, Hamadan, and

Kasvin.36

Due to the difficulty of the terrain and weather, Dunsterville and his small force

finally arrived in Enzeli six weeks later only to be denied access across the Caspian by

the Bolshevik forces that were holding the town. This was in mid-March 1918, just after

Trotsky signed the Brest-Litovsk Treaty and it is unclear whether or not Dunsterville

34

Winegard, 93. 35

Ibid, 103. 36

See Appendix H for a map of the route taken by Dunsterforce via the Baghdad-Kermanshah-Kasvin-

Enzeli road. Donohoe, xvi.

112

knew the terms of the treaty at this particular time. Referring to his meeting with the

Bolshevik Committee at Enzeli in late February, Dunsterville recalled that, “[t]he result

of the meeting may be summed up as follows: The Committee stated that Russia was no

longer our Ally. Russia had made peace with the Germans, Turks, and Austrians, and

among all nations mistrusted only Great Britain, as a symbol of Imperialism and the

Tiflis people whom we proposed to help, as being anti-Bolshevik.”37

Dunsterville tried to

reassure the Bolshevik committee in Enzeli of the British intentions in Transcaucasia

when he told them that, “I may tell you briefly that we are animated only by feelings of

friendship for Russia, and have no ideas of setting up any counter-revolutionary

movement.”38

However, in fact, this was a lie; Dunsterville’s intended mission to Tiflis

was exactly for such reasons. Dunsterville, in a note recorded from a conversation

between him and comrade Cheliapin – the same leader who presided at the meeting in

February – in Enzeli on 28 June, noted that he had tried to persuade Cheliapin that they

had judged his force incorrectly. “My frank statement to him that we took no side in the

revolution, and that we came to the Caucasus only to help the people to keep out the

Germans and the Turks, was the only thing that made him smile during the whole

conversation.”39

Most probably Cheliapin found Dunsterville’s statements amusing

because he saw right through such lies, as if he was being taken for a fool. Nevertheless,

Dunsterville found that his permission to proceed to Tiflis, via Enzeli and Baku, was now

being denied. Access had originally been granted by the Bolshevik leader of Baku,

Shaumian, in late February 1918,40

but now Dunsterville had no choice but to retrace his

37

Dunsterville, 45. 38

Ibid, 40. 39

Ibid, 191. 40

Gökay, The Battle for Baku, 39.

113

steps back to the relative safety of Hamadan due to the smallness of his force and the

threat of imprisonment by the Bolsheviks.

Until June of 1918 Dunsterville was forced to consolidate his position in

Hamadan and wait for reinforcements. Having failed to make it to Tiflis his orders had

changed as well. Dunsterville was now tasked with confining his attention to holding the

line from North-West Persia as far as the Caspian Sea.41

“Dunsterville was instructed to

stay in Hamadan and to devote his energies to raising volunteers from among the local

population and retreating Russian soldiers. It was hoped that his force would be able to

prevent the penetration of enemy agents into northwestern Persia.”42

Dunsterville,

therefore, began to devote all his energy towards strengthening his force through

agreements with anti-Bolshevik counter-revolutionary forces that would aid him in his

advance when his orders changed. Dunsterville enlisted the help of two former Tsarist

commanders, General Baratov and Colonel Lazar Bicherakov. As Donohoe points out,

these men were loyal to the cause of Imperial Russia and her allies. These men were

firmly anti-Bolshevik and were in a sense mercenaries for hire.43

Major Donohoe also

describes why Dunsterville decided to elicit the aid of men like Bicherakov. “He was pro-

Russian – that is to say, anti-Bolshevik; and it was felt that his own personal influence, no

less than the presence of his troops at Baku, would serve as a powerful antidote to

Bolshevik activity in Southern Caucasia.”44

Dunsterville was well aware of the fact that

his force was quite small and if he was to proceed to the Caucasus to fight the Turco-

German threat he would need these Russians to achieve his mission. He sought and

41

L. C. Dunsterville, “Baghdad to the Caspian in 1918,” The Geographical Journal 57, no. 3 (March

1921): 153-154. 42

Arslanian, 204. 43

Donohoe, 71. 44

Ibid, 206.

114

obtained an agreement, which was to see a co-operative effort to get their combined force

into the Caucasus.45

General Dunsterville knew that until reinforcements arrived he would have to rely

upon the support of his newly founded alliance with the Russian counter-revolutionaries.

He also knew that when it was time to once again march on Enzeli he would need the

Russian forces to help clear the road of the nationalist Persian forces known as the

Jangalis, – receiving their name from the province of Gilan in which they inhabited –

who were under the command of Mirza Kuchik Khan. These forces had impeded

Dunsterville’s progress during the original advance to Enzeli. “Kuchik Khan, as Persians

go, was relatively honest, and was possibly inspired by patriotic zeal; but this did not

prevent his becoming a pliant and very useful military asset in the hands of the enemies

of the Entente Powers. At their behest he bolted and barred the door giving access to the

Caspian, and for the British, at all events, labeled it, “On ne passe pas!”46

Kuchik Khan

was assisted by a number of Turkish, Austrian, and German officers, who were acting as

a “fifth column” of the Turkish advance. The Jangalis were violently anti-British and

intent on blocking the road to Enzeli.47

“The Jungalis, as his followers were called, under

German instruction became proficient in trench warfare. Selecting a good defensive

position, they dug themselves in along the Manjil-Resht road, and their advanced

outposts held the bridge head at Manjil itself.”48

These Persians wanted an independent

nation state and were angry with the British for breaking Persian neutrality and for

disregarding the interests of the Persian people.

45

Brinkley, 61. 46

Donohoe, 73 47

Ellis, The British “Intervention” in Transcaspia 1918-1919, 21. 48

Donohoe, 73.

115

The British and Russians had previously, during the Great Game era, effectively

divided Persia into spheres of influence. The British received the southern sphere and the

Russians the northern, while the Persians, under the command of the Shah, nominally

received the central section that separated the two. With the withdrawal of the Russian

troops the politicians in London immediately began to worry because there was not a

sufficient amount of troops to occupy the Russian sector of Persia. Accompanying the

withdrawal of the Russians was the rise of pro-Nationalist Persians.49

The Eastern

Committee was aware of this fact and they were also concerned with the possibility of

such nationalist sentiments being used advantageously alongside Ottoman ideological

schemes. In a report from 28 June 1917 the Committee is seen contemplating this

possible eventuality.

The Persian situation and the Government of India's views thereon deserve

careful study. The influence of the Russian revolution on Persian

nationalism is having its anticipated effect. It is worth considering that the

Turkish Pan-Turanian politicians may be impressed with the fact that the

present anarchy gives them a good opportunity of linking up Asia Minor

with Bokhara, Samarcand, and Afghanistan.50

Nevertheless, the Persian government in Teheran denounced Dunsterville’s mission in

northern Persia, claiming that it violated their neutrality and threatened the independence

of Persia. They also objected to the presence of Sir Percy Sykes and the British-officered

South Persian Rifles, who were busy maintaining the East Persian Cordon.51

This force,

authorized by the Shah’s government somewhat reluctantly, had replaced the pro-German

Gendarmerie and was to restore law and order in southern Persia.52

Kuchik Khan’s forces

were opposed to the Shah’s government. The nationalist forces saw the Shah’s

49

Mitrokhin, 22. 50

CAB 24/143: Eastern Report 22, 28 June 1917. 51

Hopkirk, 300-301. 52

Ibid, 208.

116

government as complacent and more as a puppet of the British imperialists than anything

else. However, justification for breaking Persian neutrality as the British saw it was not

an act of imperialism, but rather a necessity that had been generated by the circumstances

of the war.

With North Persia in a state of Bolshevism, the remainder of Persia

following suit and linking up with Turkestan, and whole of Central Asia

and Afghanistan would be thrown into chaos. This was exactly what the

Germans were playing for in these parts, and it makes one’s blood run

cold to think how near they were to a gigantic success. It may be fairly

claimed that the action of our force was the sole cause of complete failure

of this far reaching effort of German diplomacy.53

Dunsterville’s position in Hamadan did not, however, mean security for the British

position in the East. He first had to deal with the nationalist Persian forces of Kuchik

Khan, clear the road to Enzeli and seize the port city from the grasp of the Bolsheviks.

During this waiting period Dunsterville’s orders were to change several times.

The Eastern Committee was unable to come to a consensus on what exactly Dunsterforce

was to accomplish. We know that by early June 1918 Dunsterville was intent on making

his way to Baku, but that his permission to proceed had been denied and his new mission

was to secure the Khanikin-Resht road until further developments presented

themselves.54

Sir Charles Marling, however, was under a different impression when he

became aware of Dunsterville’s mission being countermanded. He suggested to the

Committee that Dunsterville be permitted to proceed, stating that, “he had a better chance

of achieving something than ever before, and when it seemed most necessary to take any

risk in order to make things safe at Baku.”55

Lord Curzon was quick to point out that the

consideration involved an expansion of Dunsterville’s original program, while General

53

Dunsterville, 173-174. 54

CAB 27/24: Eastern Committee Minutes, 31 May 1918. 55

Ibid.

117

Smuts viewed it as an opportunity to review the entire situation again in light of recent

events. Opinion within the Committee was split. Many of the members felt that

Dunsterville’s objective should have been Enzeli and that any attempt at moving to Baku

without securing Enzeli would leave the British position in northern Persia exposed.

Montagu pointed out that Dunsterville’s proposal to get to Baku virtually suggested the

abandonment of the Hamadan-Kasvin line. Nevertheless, Lord Robert Cecil said that

even though there was opposition to his opinion, he was still in favor of Dunsterville’s

proposal. He pointed out that Dunsterville was an officer with much experience and one

that had a high reputation in India, stating that, “he had been a long time in the district,

and was aware of all the difficulties and dangers…He was not a man to put up a madcap

scheme, and must have good reasons for the advice he had given.” Lord Curzon thought

that Dunsterville’s insistence to proceed to Baku was a “giant gamble” and for the time

being the Committee was not willing to grant approval to such a suggestion.56

Dunsterville’s orders were to remain holding the line and his position in northern Persia.

Within a week’s time, at another Eastern Committee meeting on 5 June 1918, it

was decided by the Committee that Dunsterville should be allowed to proceed to Baku,

but not with his whole force. He was given permission to proceed with just a handful of

his officers as the Committee deemed Dunsterville’s position at Hamadan as more

important and that his troops would be needed to hold that position. Dunsterville’s new

orders entailed that he proceed to Baku to organize the destruction of the oilfields and to

secure the Caspian fleet.57

Securing the Caspian Fleet was considered extremely

important for multiple reasons. Firstly, the Caspian Fleet in British hands would mean

56

Ibid. 57

CAB 27/24: Eastern Committee Minutes, 5 June 1918.

118

control of the Caspian Sea and any movement upon it. The Caspian flotilla numbered

some sixteen ships, including two gunboats, though the Bolsheviks controlled warships

up the Volga.58

Without the Caspian Fleet the Central Powers would be unable to

transport troops across the Caspian Sea to either Krasnovodsk or Enzeli. It was thought

that if the Germans got their hands on the fleet, then in short order, the British would find

themselves dealing with the Germans and the Turks at both Krasnovodsk and Enzeli.

Securing the fleet would effectively extinguish such a threat. Lord Curzon was of the

opinion that the only way of stopping such an eventuality was to either buy or sink the

fleet.59

Secondly, any troops that the British wished to transfer to Baku in the future

would be greatly aided in the acquisition of the Caspian Fleet and the advantages that it

could provide with respect to troop movements was great. However, Dunsterville was

aware of the fact that all of his orders would be much easier to accomplish if he no longer

had to deal with the threat being generated from the Persian nationalists.

Dunsterville had been anxious to clear the Hamadan-Enzeli road of the Persian

nationalists and make his next move, but his force was too small and reinforcements were

needed before the task could be undertaken. By June of 1918 Dunsterville received the

reinforcements that he had been expecting. His force consisted of a cavalry regiment, an

artillery battery, two regiments of infantry, as well as a number of armored cars and two

airplanes. Dunsterforce, with its new complement of some 1,000 British and Gurkha

troops, fighting alongside Bicherakov’s men was able to inflict defeat upon Kuchik Khan

and his men. In a report from 20 June 1918, Sir Charles Marling reported that

Dunsterville had informed him that his forces had defeated the Jangalis and that they had

58

Fred T. Jane, Jane’s Fighting Ships 1919 (New York: Arco Pub. Co., 1969), 586. 59

CAB 27/24: Eastern Committee Minutes, 11 June 1918.

119

taken flight along with the German officers that had been aiding them.60

Now that

Dunsterville and his men had become complete masters of the Gilan province the area

was to be turned into a British base. The defeat of the Persian nationalists meant that a

relatively secure supply route had been created all the way back to Baghdad. Food, water,

and reinforcing troops could now be effectively sent to Dunsterville without the

possibility of interception.61

The most important outcome of defeating the Jangalis,

however, was that Dunsterforce was now in a position to concentrate its efforts on

Transcaucasia more thoroughly.

In the meantime, British agents in Transcaucasia had been diligently working to

replace the Bolshevik government in Baku with one that was pro-British. Major Aeneas

Ranald MacDonell was a former British diplomat who was now an intelligence officer

and he had been stationed in the Caucasus for some time now. It was his task to organize

a coup in Baku. His orders were to, “devise or create a situation that would enable

General Dunsterville to enter Baku and organise its defence against the advancing Turks.

In effect, this meant arranging the overthrow of those members of the Baku Soviet,

including Shaumian, who opposed British military intervention.”62

By the summer of

1918 the Turks had been drawing closer and closer to Baku and MacDonell found

himself running out of time. Dunsterville needed the Bolsheviks out of power and a pro-

British government in place in Baku that would ask for the assistance of his force,

otherwise entry into Baku would continue to be denied. MacDonell, therefore, became

involved in a plot to overthrow the Bolshevik government of Baku and was granted full

approval for such a scheme from London. Working with ex-Tsarist officers and Social

60

CAB 24/145: Eastern Report 73, 20 June 1918. 61

Mitrokhin, 39. 62

Hopkirk, 282.

120

Revolutionaries, MacDonell was to help finance the plot that was to remove the

Bolsheviks from power.63

With the help of MacDonell and other intelligence officers,

Dunsterville was convinced that the Social Revolutionaries would carry-out a successful

coup d’etat, throw out the Bolsheviks, and establish a government that would invite

British assistance.64

By the end of July 1918 exactly that happened and the Centro-

Caspian Dictatorship emerged as the new governing body in Baku, replacing the Baku

Soviet.

In late July 1918 a proposal was put forward in the Baku Soviet by the Social

Revolutionaries to invite British assistance in forestalling the Turkish attack. The

Bolsheviks were adamantly opposed to any aid that the British might provide and would

rather have seen Baku fall to the Turks than to the British. In a report from 7 August

1918, it is seen that a British agent telegraphed on 30 July that the Baku Soviet had

decided to accept British assistance.65

Despite the opposition of Shaumian and the other

Bolsheviks the vote for British military aid narrowly passed, 259 to 236. Shaumian

viewed the results of the vote as a betrayal and along with the other Bolsheviks he

withdrew from the Baku Soviet.66

This new government was closely aligned with the

British and had been in close touch with Dunsterville, agreeing on a common line of

action. Thus, the British role in expelling the Bolsheviks from Baku was instrumental.

Not surprisingly one of the first acts of the Centro-Caspian Dictatorship was to ask the

British for assistance.67

63

Ibid, 319. 64

Sareen, 63. 65

CAB 24/145: Eastern Report 80, 7 August 1918. 66

Gökay, The Battle for Baku, 43. 67

Arslanian, 207.

121

Now that the opportunity was presenting itself, Dunsterville immediately began

sending requests to the officials back in London insisting upon permission to proceed in

full force. However, as Baku was not a military or strategic necessity to the British

position in the East, the Committee first had to consider the drawbacks of allowing

Dunsterville to proceed to Baku. Strategically, Dunsterforce had secured the East Persian

Cordon and a second mission sent under the command of Major-General Wilfred

Malleson to Central Asia had succeeded in securing the northern sector of the cordon that

was to bar entry to the approaches of India. He also effectively secured the British

position at Krasnovodsk. Therefore, dispatching Dunsterforce to Baku would only

weaken the British position in Persia and expose the British flank if the Turks were to

launch a concentrated attack from the direction of Tabriz, which indeed, they had

attempted some months earlier. General Smuts was worried that an attack from Tabriz

would compromise the whole Persia situation and General Macdonogh concurred with

General Smuts’ strategical analysis. Once again Lord Robert Cecil was under the

impression that everything depended upon the control of the Caspian Fleet, which could

be used to transfer troops back to northern Persia if the position there was threatened by a

Turkish advance in that direction.68

The Caspian Fleet had recently become loyal to the

British with the expulsion of the Bolsheviks from the Baku Soviet. However, the fleet

was loyal to the British, but not under their complete control; loyalties could change in

time. Lord Cecil also advocated caution as the situation and loyalties were precarious,

stating that, “the object of sending troops to Baku was to secure the shipping and to deny

the oil to the enemy. Apart from the question of oil, there was no purpose in holding

Baku. On the other hand, if we destroyed the oil, the fleet would become immobile, and

68

CAB 27/24: Eastern Committee Minutes, 8 August, 1918.

122

we should estrange the Central Caspian Government, which controls the fleet.”69

Nevertheless, the risk was deemed worth the possible reward to be gained in oil and

Dunsterville was granted permission to proceed. On 4 August Dunsterforce began to land

units in Baku and by the end of the month Dunsterville’s full force had arrived.

For Dunsterville opportunity virtually knocked and as Donohoe put it, “[i]t was

the chance for which Dunsterville had lived and waited, and he lost no time in grasping

it.”70

The situation and the accompanying risks that were facing Dunsterville were grave

indeed. The Turks had some 30,000 to 40,000 troops in the Caucasus and the Germans

had two divisions either in Georgia or being formed there.71

Dunsterville only had

roughly 1,200 of his own British troops to defend the city alongside some 6,000 irregular

Armenian and Social Revolutionary troops, whose fighting skills were questionable. “The

troops or, more properly, the local levies available to hold this line were, when we

arrived, about 6,000 men, in some twenty battalions of 200 to 400 men each, consisting

of Armenians and Russians entirely wanting in discipline, experience, and, most

important of all, any fighting instinct.”72

Dunsterville himself even questioned the

enterprise, which seems odd considering he was the one who asked for and prompted the

Eastern Committee for permission to proceed. “The Baku situation is obscure… How can

we help them in any way that would hold out a chance of success? It appears to me quite

impossible. Troops alone could restore order – and we have no troops. A few officers, a

few armoured cars and liberal finance would not turn the tide; in fact such an effort

69

CAB 27/24: Eastern Committee Minutes, 13 August, 1918. 70

Donohoe, 212. 71

Ellis, The British “Intervention” in Transcaspia 1918-1919, 66. 72

Rawlinson, 73.

123

would probably add fuel to the flames.”73

The British intelligence officer Teague-Jones

was of the same opinion as well, writing in his diary that, “in practice the venture was

doomed to failure because of two main factors (among many other): the force was too

small for the task assigned to it, and it arrived much too late.”74

The Turks began to siege

the city by the end of August and on 26

August they attacked the positions of

Dunsterforce. On 14 September Dunsterville decided to evacuate his forces by sea, when

all other options had been exhausted. Dunsterforce returned to Enzeli after being in Baku

for six weeks.

The question then remains: “Why was it that the Eastern Committee was willing

to approve a mission that held little or no strategic or military importance and was one in

which all or most of the signs pointed to the likely failure of that mission?” An analysis

of the available information leading to British intervention in Transcaucasia, coupled

with an overview of policy implemented on the ground by the British military under the

directive of the Eastern Committee and the Imperial War Cabinet, has been presented

here with the hope of shedding light on the impetus for British intervention in

Transcaucasia and more specifically, the mission of Dunsterforce and its attempt at

holding Baku for the Allied cause. In the concluding chapter a more thorough

examination of the facts will hopefully allow for the answer to the preceding question, as

well as many more answers to questions concerning British intervention in Transcaucasia

during the First World War with respect to British imperialism.

73

Dunsterville, 123. 74

Gökay, The Battle for Baku, 45.

124

CHAPTER VII:

CONCLUSION

It is now time to thoroughly discuss the perceived threats to the British position in

the East generated by the reports that the Eastern Committee was receiving and to

determine the imperialistic nature, if any, of the implementation of policy through the use

of military force. When the threats are broken down individually, many of the British

reactions to them can be justified, not as premeditated imperialistic intent, but rather as

necessities to the ongoing military operations of the British in the region. Whether or not

the origins of the war in general can be classified as imperialistic is irrelevant to the

events that transpired. Once the war was under way subsequent events need to be

considered in the context of their military necessity, while others need to be wholly

separated with reference to their imperialist intentions. The course taken here is to

determine which of the actions that were undertaken by the British were in particular,

necessities, or even justifiable reactions, with respect to safeguarding the British military

position in the region after the exodus of Allied Russian troops in 1917, as well as being

justifiable in terms of the protection of the overall war effort aimed at the defeat of the

Central Powers. In order to determine the imperialistic intentions formulated by policy-

125

makers within the Eastern Committee and approved by the Imperial War Cabinet for the

purpose of intervention in Transcaucasia, it is important to understand the underlying

objectives behind certain policy directives. Distinguishing, whether or not, the initiative

behind policy directives was militarily influenced or instead primarily economic in nature

is difficult, due to the fact that the events occurred during the course of a continual world

conflict. If the events had been undertaken in a time of peace, then their aggressive and

imperialistic nature would be much easier to expose. However, unearthing the intentions

of the policy officials within the Eastern Committee with regard to imperialistic

motivations towards Transcaucasia is much harder, as the impetus for policy formation

can be disguised rather easily behind a cloak of wartime military imperatives.

Indentifying such disguises will help to expose the potential imperialistic nature of

British policy formation towards Transcaucasia and Baku during 1917 and 1918.

The imminence of Turkish military operations aimed at Transcaucasia in 1917

with the collapse of the Russians is not under question here. Militarily, the situation for

the British in Transcaucasia was dire. It was apparent that a substantially large British

force that could be put into position as a barrier to a Turkish invasion was out of the

question. Moreover, because the British could not meet the Turkish or German invasion

forces head on, the potential resources that the Ottoman and German Empires could gain

and use towards the continuance of the war was also a reality. Therefore, the creation of a

military unit such as Dunsterforce, whose aim it would be to speedily advance to the

Georgian capital of Tiflis and organize any pro-Allied local political or para-military

resistance seems completely justifiable in terms of wartime necessities. Simply letting the

Turks and the Germans acquire the whole of Transcaucasia without putting up any form

126

of resistance would have been ludicrous. With a large force unavailable a policy that

dictated the creation of a small and mobile, elite unit, along with the dispatching of

political and intelligence officers for the purposes of subterfuge and propaganda were

anything but imperialistic. Rather, such a policy ensured that some form of action would

at least delay the ambitions of their enemy in the region. The perplexing issue, however,

has to deal with the policy-makers insistence of the threat being generated from Turkish

ideological initiatives that were being supported by the Germans.

The British response aimed at understanding and combating the potential success

of Turco-German ideological and military operations in Transcaucasia and, more

importantly, beyond, is of extreme importance here in understanding possible

imperialistic intentions. The threat of Ottoman ideological undertakings was one that was

not necessary to invoke in order to have a policy of intervention in Transcaucasia

approved. Knowledge of German ambitions in the East coupled with the Ottoman

military threat and their potential profit in resources through the acquisition of

Transcaucasia would have been enough to sway public and political opinion towards

backing a policy of intervention. Therefore, the only purpose that could be behind the

creation of a larger threat and not one merely confined to Transcaucasia, but Central

Asia, Persia and on to India as well, would be to gain permission for a policy aimed at

acquiring Baku through military force. As was stated earlier, the British did not have a

strong complement of troops available to take over the Caucasian Front that the Russians

had been holding. Therefore, all effort was being directed towards securing the East

Persia Cordon with what little resources were available. Although the British would have

preferred to acquire Transcaucasia and its vast resources for themselves, the reality

127

dictated that such a plan was impossible. However, if the creation of a much larger threat

could be presented, one which would be under the guise of a military necessity directed at

the strategic importance of Baku to the entire British position in Asia, it would then be

possible to have a policy approved which might ensure the acquisition of that city. Baku

was a gigantic prize in terms of its oil wealth; however, strategically it was not essential

to the overall British military position.

The British had secured northern Persia and the important Caspian port city of

Enzeli through the dispatch of Dunsterforce and had barred entry by way of the southerly

route to their eastern empire. Simultaneously, the mission of General Malleson to

Turkestan had succeeded in securing the northern sector by way of Central Asia.

Moreover, the important port city on the eastern shore of the Caspian and the head of the

Central Asian railway, Krasnovodsk, had also been secured. Essentially what all of this

meant was that even if the Central Powers came into possession of the Caspian Fleet, the

transfer of their troops successfully to the other side was out of the question as the ports

needed for facilitating such a movement were in British hands. In fact, the British

argument that Baku was all important strategically to their position is clearly undermined.

Having a British enclave in Transcaucasia at Baku that would be completely surrounded

by enemy troops runs counterproductive to the British plan of securing the approaches to

India. The transfer of troops from the Eastern Persia Cordon would have only served to

weaken that position in the event that the Turks or Germans attempted to circumnavigate

the Caspian Sea and penetrate the British position by land; an eventuality which in its

own right had little chance of becoming a reality.

128

The government in London was instrumental in provoking undue alarm

concerning the advance of the Germans and Turks towards India, who were being aided

by Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turanianism. “India’s concerns about events in Persia and

Caucasia grew out of a preoccupation with the political elements of Islam, and these were

not confined to any limited geographical area.”1 Such a high concern for Pan-Islamism

should not have been apparent considering the British had knowledge that the Turco-

German plan to ignite a Holy War had largely foundered. The Chief of the General Staff

in India, General G. M. Kirkpatrick, was aware of the fact that the threat to India was

minimal. “The efforts required for German-Turkish force to move eastward through

Persia will be very great and will require a long time to prepare.” Either way it was hard

for the officials in India to ignore the reports that were coming from London, which

constantly emphasized a real threat by way of Persia and Afghanistan.2 Nevertheless, the

Turco-German spy activity with regard to inciting Holy War in the Middle East and

Central Asia that both Hopkirk and McMeekin go into detail about, might have served to

justify this paranoia. There were planned missions to Tehran, Kabul, the Caucasus, and

Central Asia, as well as plans to foment rebellion in British India. Even though these

missions were unsuccessful for the most part, India still claimed to be threatened even

though Sir Henry Wilson and others had made it apparent that such a threat was not real.

In a secret document from 30 April 1918 Wilson answers in the report that, “[i[n all

recent telegrams from C-in-C., India, the underlying idea is that the security of India is at

stake… nothing emanating from the War Office could possibly have induced India to

believe she is going to be attacked by either German or Turkish troops, except in the

1 Stanwood, 134.

2 Sareen, 18.

129

remote future .”3 India’s government was also afraid of the potential of these ideologies’

conflagration in the region and what that might mean for the safety of British India. This

view of the situation seems only to have one purpose, to generate a perceived threat much

larger than what was a reality in order to come into possession of Baku. The fact that

some Eastern Committee officials genuinely accepted the alarm bells ringing in India

only helped to drive an imperialist policy aimed at acquiring territory that was not

essential to the British military effort and one that arguably instead could have threatened

the British position more so than it would have helped.

In some sense the policy-makers had judged the situation correctly in that they

were aware of the importance of acquiring control of the Caspian Fleet. The acquisition

of this fleet would have denied Germany or the Ottoman Empire access across the

Caspian, indefinitely postponing any military invasion of the British Empire in Asia.

Lord Curzon in fact pointed out that, “[t]he Caucasus had been invaded by Turks and

Germans. It then became our object to hold the Caspian, to keep the enemy from access

to the Transcaspian Railway; we had held Baku for a short time, and then we had been

expelled; we still held the Caspian.”4 He makes it clear what the British objectives were,

however, what the possession of Baku would have provided to such a scheme is vague.

Militarily controlling the Caspian was, after all, the main aim of the British; therefore, a

move to Baku with minimal forces signifies something more.

It seems as if British imperialistic ambitions were fitting in with their new

peripheral policy, taking precedence over military strategy and necessity. Once again,

from the minutes of an Imperial War Cabinet meeting from 25 June 1918 we see Lord

3 CAB 24/50: Secret War Cabinet Memoranda on the Security of India, 30 April 1918.

4 CAB 23/42: Imperial War Cabinet Minutes, 23 December 1918.

130

Curzon dictating to the Cabinet the extreme importance of the Caspian Fleet in the plan

to safeguard India, mentioning nothing of Baku.

The possession of the Caspian Fleet is valuable for three reasons, firstly,

because it gives the Germans, if they obtain it, the control of the mouths of

the Volga at Astrakhan; secondly, because it gives them the means of

transport across the Caspian Sea to the eastern side, where you will see

Krasnovodsk as the starting point of a new advance; thirdly, it gives them

an opportunity of conveying their forces, if so required, to the northern

shores of Persia. With Persia I will deal in a moment, but you will see how

the success which is effected by the seizure of the Caspian Fleet, and the

crossing of that Sea, opens up the whole of the large question of Central

Asia.5

General Smuts is also under the impression that control of the Caspian Sea via control of

the Caspian Fleet is the main military necessity. In a secret War Cabinet memorandum

written by Lt. General Smuts on 16 September 1918, two days after the fall of Baku, but

seemingly unaware that the city had fallen to Turkish forces, and entitled, ‘The Military

Command in the Middle East, he asserts that,

[f]rom this point of view our holding of the Baghdad-Hamadan-Enzeli line

and denial of the Caspian to the enemy is a matter of cardinal importance.

Baku is almost certain to be lost, but that does not mean the loss of the

Caspian. If we can hold on to Enzeli and Krasnovodsk and contain control

at any rate of a portion of the Caspian fleet, while our friends in Russia

hold Petrovsk and Astrachan, an enemy advance across the Caspian and

towards the centre of Persia and the border of Afghanistan will be

prevented.6

He basically says in a straightforward manner that Baku had no military or strategic

importance. Instead he highlights the necessity of maintaining the East Persia Cordon,

something they had weakened in the first place by approving Dunsterville’s request to aid

in Baku’s defence. It is, therefore, hard to conceive why the Eastern Committee would

have allowed for Dunsterville’s mission to defend Baku if not for any other objective

5 CAB 23/43: Imperial War Cabinet Minutes, 25 June 1918.

6 CAB 24/63: Secret War Cabinet Memoranda on the Military Command in the Middle East, 16 September

1918.

131

than to obtain for the British Empire one of the world’s largest oil producing centres. This

is an action which can only be defined by one word, imperialism.

The other amazing consideration that needs to be taken into account is the means

by which the Eastern Committee attempted to create a majority consensus for defending

Baku, by suggesting that its fall to the enemy would allow for their rapid advance across

the Caspian and to the gates of India. This notion is absurd when put into context. The

Eastern Committee was advocating acquiring access to the Caspian Fleet, which they

agreed would stop such an enterprise. Moreover, the Committee had numerous reports

concerning the potential of the Central Powers ability to penetrate across the Caspian and

threaten India. All the reports unmistakably point to the contrary, that even with the aid

of the resources that the Central Powers could gain from the Caucasus their ability to

threaten India in the near future was highly unlikely, in fact, nearly impossible. The

Germans or the Turks simply did not have the troops or the resources to make it a reality

and as shown the threat of the Germans and Turks linking up with the POWs in Central

Asia was also a far cry from reality. Moreover, the Germans alone had over a million

troops serving occupation duty in the recently acquired Russian annexations and needed

to transfer troops to the Western Front to meet the anticipated American arrival. As Sir

Henry Wilson wisely made aware in a secret document from 30 April 1918 to the C-in-C

of India,

[i]t is also clear that neither the German nor Turk can take the offensive in

all theatres at the same time, neither can either country concentrate against

India without giving us at least many months warning… To sum up, it is

considered: (a) That India is unreasonably alarmed for her security (b)

That no attack other than Afghan or tribal is possible except in the remote

future, and that there is at present no indication of Afghan attack. (c) That

reinforcements for India are available now and always will be when the

occasion for their use arises, (d) That the forces now in India are sufficient

132

for her security to-day and until a new situation arises (e) In any case, the

security of India or of any other subsidiary theatre must not weight against

the successful prosecution of the War at the decisive point - in France.7

The British perception that the Turks and Germans could advance on India was ill-

founded. The Emir of Afghanistan and the Germans both knew that it was highly

unlikely. Why did the British think that it was not? “Finally he informed the Germans

that even if India were to go up in flames he could not consider joining the Holy War

unless a Turco-German force of at least 20,000 men first came to his assistance – a

logistical feat which both he and the Germans knew to be all but impossible.”8 This feat

was even more unlikely to happen in light of recent Turkish and German conflict and

misunderstanding in Transcaucasia. How could they work together to invade India when

they could not even agree on policy with regard to Transcaucasia? Coincidentally, it was

not until 18 October 1918, after Dunsterville’s failed mission, that Lord Curzon admitted

to his fellow colleagues that the Turco-German threat of an advance into Central Asia and

on to India was no more a possibility.9 The reality of the situation was that the British had

tried to conjure a threat, which might justify intervening at Baku, even though it was not

a military exigency.

The issue of self-determination also serves to demonstrate British imperialism.

The enthusiastic recognition of self-determination by the British government would have

only countermanded British imperial interests in the East. Through recognition of self-

determination various ethnic groups in the Middle East, Transcaucasia, Central Asia, as

well as areas already within the British Empire, would have demanded similar claims.

These claims would have been detrimental to Imperial British interests in the region as a

7 CAB 24/50: Secret War Cabinet Memoranda on the Security of India, 4 April 1918.

8 Hopkirk, 193.

9 Rothwell, 189.

133

whole, stripping the crown of the possibility of acquiring them. In fact, the British were

keen to only support issues of self-determination when they seemed advantageous to their

interests and when all other options had been exhausted, such as supporting the cause of

the Arabs or the Armenians because they could help defeat the Turks. However, in places

where indigenous aid was not required for the success of British ventures, in areas like

Afghanistan, Central Asia, and Persia, notions of self-determination were swept aside, so

as to not lose the possibility of acquiring more imperial possessions. Persia is a unique

case in that the British nominally recognized the autonomous status of the Persians.

Nevertheless, when it was deemed necessary the British merely ignored the sovereign

rights of the Shah, as was the case when out of military necessity they broke Persian

neutrality and filled the void left by Russian troops in their respective sector. This was

done in order to meet a possible threat from the Turco-German alliance or even one from

the Bolsheviks to that of their Persian oil interests.

The other threat that the British had to consider in the latter half of 1917 was that

of the Bolsheviks. The British had originally found an ally in the Provisional

Government, however, with the Bolshevik takeover they were encountered with yet

another enemy in the region. The Bolsheviks inherent anti-Imperialism only served to

give the British a larger initiative for intervention in Central Asia and Transcaucasia. The

need to combat a new enemy justified military intervention in both regions and when

viewed from such a perspective the British response cannot be classified as premeditated

imperialist intent, as the Soviets after the war tried to demonstrate. Yes, it is true that the

British moved in immediately and began taking territory that formerly belonged to the

Tsar and was now considered by the Bolsheviks to be theirs. However, such a response

134

by the British should not have been seen by the Bolsheviks as surprising and can easily

be defended by the British as the intention to secure their military position against a

power that was openly hostile. Except for Dunsterville’s change in orders to advance to

Baku, there is little evidence that the other actions carried out by the British had any

imperialistic nature whatsoever.

Dunsterville’s mission to Baku should be seen as a reactionary imperialistic

gamble aimed at snatching an opportunity to aggrandize the empire during the context of

a war. As it has been shown his mission had little, if any, strategic or military

justification. Instead it was aimed at acquiring former Tsarist Russia’s “goose that lays

the golden eggs,” at the expense of the anti-Imperialist Bolsheviks who now laid claim to

it. It must be remembered that Dunsterville’s original orders were to proceed to Tiflis and

when that proved impossible he was ordered to hold his position in northern Persia and

maintain the East Persian Cordon. It was not until British agents in Baku had succeeded

in influencing a coup d’état that Dunsterville and his men were invited to come. The

Eastern Committee members were wary of committing anything to Baku at the expense

of weakening their Persian position. However, with much insistence upon the situation

Dunsterville had urged the Committee members into thinking the “Baku gamble” was

worth the risk. After all, the Committee had only to worry about losing Dunsterforce, a

mere 1,200 men, and nothing more in order to come into possession of Baku. The

importance of the city was great, as Dunsterville commented that, “[i]ts importance was

enormous and any risk was justified in our endeavour to secure it.”10

Baku could be used

at the negotiating table to acquire other possessions for the empire that had been taken

during the course of the war, places that the enemy might be willing to concede in return

10

Dunsterville, 141.

135

for Baku. Or, if held on to, Baku could simply be tallied up after the war as another

imperial possession. The thinking behind approving Dunsterville’s mission to Baku was

more of a cost-benefit analysis than having to do with strategic or military concerns and

if the mission proved unsuccessful the policy-makers involved could simply place the

blame on the army and its commander. If an advance to Baku had in fact been considered

a militarily strategic necessity instead of an imperialistic gamble, why else would the

Eastern Committee have contemplated for so long with regard to Dunsterville’s urgings

to proceed to Baku, rather than granting him permission to proceed immediately?

Dunsterville justified the mission after the fact in terms of what was lost and

gained. As he points out only 180 men of all ranks were killed, wounded, or missing,

about twenty percent of his force. Moreover, the loss in war matériel was not great either;

two aeroplanes were destroyed and some thirty or so Ford cars and armored vehicles

were left to the Turks, albeit in sketchy condition.11

While on the opposite side total

Ottoman casualties amounted to 1,645; the 38th

and 107th

regiments suffering heavily.12

Dunsterville also felt that the British government had lucked out in that his force was

paid for by the Baku government and he had even borrowed money from them that he

never paid back, also purchasing thousands of gallons of petrol which was not paid for

either. The three steamers used to transport his troops were not paid for by the British

government and he had actually returned to Enzeli with more ammunition and guns than

he had left with due to the pillaging of Baku’s arsenal by Lt.-Colonel Rawlinson.13

All of

this, coupled with the missions tactical success of depriving the enemy of oil for six

weeks made the attempt worthwhile in Dunsterville’s eyes. “Though depressed by a

11

Ibid, 313. 12

Reynolds, Shattering Empires, 234. 13

Arslanian, 212.

136

sense of failure, we knew that, apart from our work in Persia, in keeping the Turks out of

Baku for six weeks at that period of the war and denying him the use of the valuable oil,

our efforts had not been in vain.”14

This view of the Baku mission prompted Sir Henry

Wilson to acknowledge that, “[t]he despatch of a small force at Baku has been

sanctioned, admittedly as a gamble, but the stakes involved are so valuable as to make the

hazard justifiable.”15

In a military perspective Dunsterforce had been able to achieve the

security of northern Persia, lay defeats upon the Jangalis and Bolsheviks, and had held a

Turkish advance from Tabriz and thus, secured the British Mesopotamian Army’s right

flank.16

However, all of these successes were prior to the Baku mission and stand apart

from its apparent imperialist failure. In the end it proved to be a hollow victory for the

Ottomans, who were forced to evacuate Transcaucasia, Daghestan, and Azerbaijan and to

hand Baku over to the British with the coming of the Armistice at the end of October

1918.

As for the policy-makers of the Eastern Committee and the officials in the

Imperial War Cabinet, they decided to place the blame for the imperialist gamble on

Dunsterforce and its commander. In London the failure of the mission was seen as an

embarrassment and Dunsterville was used as a scapegoat.17

“The retreat from Baku

proved to be a major setback for the British in its Asian policy and failure to hold the

Caspian Sea caused near panic among policy-makers in London. The members of the

Eastern Committee blamed the Army for having missed the point of the Caucasian

14

Dunsterville, Baghdad to the Caspian in 1918, 164 15

Winegard, 105. 16

Hay, 390. 17

Pierre Comtois, “World War I: Battle for Baku,” HistoryNet.com (June 2006).

http://www.historynet.com/world-war-i-battle-for-baku.htm (accessed May 5, 2011).

137

mission.”18

In a memorandum from 1 September 1918, just after the failed mission,

General Smuts of the Eastern Committee even seems to disavow sanctioning the mission

to Baku, implying that Dunsterville’s orders were for another matter entirely. “The

misfortune is that our commanders in that area are either incompetent or will not or

cannot grasp the situation. Dunsterville was sent to Baku to obtain control of the Caspian

fleet, but his efforts have mostly gone to waste in another direction.”19

It was asserted

back in London that both the War Office and the military command in Baghdad had

originally opposed the mission from the beginning and it was only due to Dunsterville’s

persistent urgings of the value of the situation that they had agreed to consent in the end.

Dunsterville was accused of putting himself into the difficult situation that the War

Office had foreshadowed.20

Millman even suggests that, “[w]here he had been sent to

observe, Dunsterville moved to the position of becoming a principal player in the game.

Thus, if the question were put, why did the British intervene in Persia and the Caucasus

in 1918?, then the answer could be given that Britain did not intervene – Dunsterville

did.”21

Here, Millman is implying that this was not what the policy-makers had

envisioned from Dunsterville’s defensive position in northern Persia. “Observation, that

is, had become intervention, the Cabinet an often baffled and sometimes horrified

godfather and the army a parent sometimes embarrassed by the actions of this overly

precocious child.”22

However, on the contrary, it was exactly what they were seeking; a

low risk plan requiring little investment, which ultimately might achieve spectacular

18

Sareen, 76. 19

CAB 24/63: Secret War Cabinet Memoranda on the Military Command in the Middle East, 16

September 1918. 20

Arslanian, 211. 21

Millman, The Problem with Generals, 300. 22

Ibid, 303.

138

results. In retrospect it was Malleson, the commander of the British mission to Turkestan,

who characterized the imperial system correctly. “If things went well, ‘then some

gentlemen in easy chairs 2,000 miles away would claim the credit’. But if they went

badly, and there was criticism in press or Parliament, then one would be ‘thrown

remorselessly to the wolves’.”23

Malleson was correct in the end. Dunsterville was

relieved of his command upon his return to Enzeli and Dunsterforce became Norperforce;

essentially the same thing, but under a different commander, General W. M. Thomson.

Norperforce assumed Dunsterville’s old mission of holding the East Persian Cordon.

With the coming of the Armistice the British continued their imperial conquests by

surging forward and gobbling up Bolshevik territory around the Caspian Sea and in the

Caucasus.24

The British were to reoccupy Baku on 16 November 1918 with the coming

of the Armistice. They withdrew from the oil city in August 1919 as the Treaty of Sevres

– 10 August 1920 – was being negotiated

From the information available it is easy to see how the perceived threats that

emanated from the Germans, the Turks, and later, the Russians, helped to influence

policy-making with respect to Transcaucasia. There is no doubt that the British response

to the Turkish invasion of the Caucasus and the later arrival of the Germans in force as

well, prompted the British to formulate some form of military action that might slow

down or even, however unlikely, stop the Central Powers in acquiring the whole of

Transcaucasia, due to imperial Russia’s collapse into revolution. The British assembly of

Dunsterforce, the sending of political and intelligence officers, participation in a pro-

Allied propaganda campaign, the breaking of Persian neutrality, as well as hiring counter-

23

Hopkirk, 370. 24

Millman, The Problem with Generals, 303.

139

revolutionary units to fight on the Allied side, cannot all be looked in the perspective of

imperialistic intent. All of these reactions were to compensate for military force in a

region where a fractional amount of troops could be spared or dispatched quickly. The

war was continuing unabated by the year 1917 and it was far from conclusive who the

victors would be. Any resources or benefits that the Central Powers could profit from the

acquisition of Transcaucasia would prove detrimental to the overall Allied war effort.

Therefore, a prompt response in any way possible was obligatory for the British.

Nevertheless, the British had managed to secure the Caspian Sea and the regions of

northern Persia and Central Asia that had been vacated by the imperial Russian troops

and thus, protecting the invasion routes that might enable the Germans and their Turkish

ally the possibility of threatening the British Crown Jewel, India. From this perspective

the approval for General Dunsterville’s mission to Baku had meager logic behind it,

except that it might deprive the enemy of oil. However, the facts available in the archives

show that this was not the real intent of the mission, but instead Dunsterforce’s mission to

Baku represented an imperial gamble. This was a gamble that if executed successfully

would have seen the attachment of Baku to the already excessive domains of the British

Empire. After all, acquiring a province through conquest gives more weight to its

retention when the conflict is over, more so than merely occupying an area after the fact.

This can explain why the British were unsuccessful in holding onto the oil city after the

Armistice. As for Dunsterville, he would have gone down in Imperial British history as a

hero, acknowledged for his superb command and gallantry. Instead, he was disgraced and

few remember his name or his part in the First World War. It is possible to defend British

actions with respect to Baku as non-Imperialistic in nature, however, the British Empire

140

was to grow from its participation in World War I and its earlier attempt at dividing the

Ottoman possessions among the Allied powers should not go unremembered. Why

should Baku serve as the exception to the already documented and proven imperialistic

ambitions of the British during the course of the Great War?

141

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APPENDIX A

148

APPENDIX B

149

APPENDIX C

150

APPENDIX D

151

APPENDIX E

152

APPENDIX F

153

APPENDIX G

154

APPENDIX H