CASE DIGESTS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IIDUE PROCESS: Judicial Proceedings, (2) Administrative and Quasi-Judicial Proceedings, (3)Academic Discipline, (4)Deportation Proceedings, (5)Fixing Rates and Regulation of Profession, (6)Closure Proceedings, (7) Termination ProceedingsBANCO ESPANOL VS PALANCA2JUAN CARVAJALVS.CA,ET AL.3STATE PROSECUTORS V MUROS4WEBB V DE LEON5PEOPLE VS. CLAUDIO TEEHANKEE, JR.6THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. MAYOR ANTONIO L. SANCHEZ, GEORGE MEDIALDEA, ZIOLO AMA, BALDWIN BRION, LUIS CORCOLON, ROGELIO CORCOLON, AND PEPITO KAWIT, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS9PEREZ V. ESTRADA10PEREZ V. ESTRADA11ANG TIBAY, REPRESENTED BY TORIBIO TEODORO, MANAGER AND PROPIETOR, AND NATIONAL WORKERS BROTHERHOOD VS. THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND NATIONAL LABOR UNION, INC.12OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR V. PASCUAL13ATTY. NAPOLEON S. VALENZUELA V. JUDGE REYNALDO BELLOSILLO16LUMIQUED VS. EXEVEA17FABELLA V. COURT OF APPEALS18SUMMARY DISMISSAL BOARD V. TORCITA19OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN V CORONEL20JUSTICE SECRETARY V. LANTION22GOV'T. OF THE USA VS. PURGANAN23GOVERNMENT OF HONGKONG V. OLALIA27GUZMAN VS. NATIONAL UNIVERSITY28ALCUAZ V. PSBA29NON V. DAMES30ATENEO DE MANILA UNIVERSITY VS. HON. JUDGE IGNACIO CAPULONG 222 SCRA 644; G.R. 99327; 27 MAY 199331UP VS. LIGOT-TELAN33LAO GI V CA (1989)35PHILCOMSAT VS ALCUAZ36RADIO COMMUNICATIONS V NTC37GLOBETELECOMVSNTC39CORONA VS. UHPAP40CENTRAL BANK VS. CA41RURAL BANK VS. CA42PHILIPPINE MERCHANT VS. CA43AGABON VS. NLRC44JAKA FOOD PROCESSING CORPORATION, VS. DARWIN PACOT, ROBERT PAROHINOG, DAVID BISNAR, MARLON DOMINGO, RHOEL LESCANO AND JONATHAN CAGABCAB.45

BANCO ESPANOL VS PALANCA

37 Phil. 921

FACTS: Engracio Palanca was indebted to El Banco and he had his parcel of land as security to his debt. His debt amounted to P218,294.10. His property is worth 75k more than what he owe. Due to the failure of Engracio to make his payments, El Banco executed an instrument to mortgage Engracios property. Engracio however left for China and he never returned til he died. Since Engracio is a non resident El Banco has to notify Engracio about their intent to sue him by means of publication using a newspaper. The lower court further orderdd the clerk of court to furnish Engracio a copy and that itd be sent to Amoy, China. The court eventually granted El Banco petition to execute Engracios property. 7 years thereafter, Vicente surfaced on behalf of Engracio as his administrator to petition for the annulment of the ruling. Vicente averred that there had been no due process as Engracio never received the summons.

ISSUE: Whether or not due process was not observed.

HELD: The SC ruled against Palanca. The SC ruled that the requisites for judicial due process had been met. The requisites are;

1. There must be an impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and decide the matter before it.

2. Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the property subject of the proceedings.

3. The defendant must be given the opportunity to be heard.

4. Judgment must be rendered only after lawful hearing.

JUAN CARVAJALvs.CA,et al.

280 SCRA 351

FACTS: This is a petition seeking the nullification of two Resolutions issued by the Court of Appeals on August 3, 1999 and May 25, 2000. On October 9, 1997, the Supreme Court promulgated a decision,In G.R. No. 98328, penned by Justice Artemio V. Panganiban. denying Juan C. Carvajal's petition to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals. The latter court upheld the trial courtLRC Case No. 414(-A), LRC Record No. N-60084 filed before Regional Trial Court, Antipolo City, Branch 71. in dismissing petitioner's application for registration of title of a parcel of land in Antipolo City. The Court recognized respondent Solid Homes, Inc. as the registered owner of a parcel of land covered by TCT No. N-7873, situated in Antipolo City. On May 13, 1998, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court, Antipolo City a complaint for annulment of title with damages against private respondent. Petitioner allegedly acquired portions of the parcel of land covered by TCT No. N-7873 by inheritance from his father Felix Carvajal who came to possess the unregistered land in 1938, continuously, openly, adversely and peacefully in the concept of an owner up to the time of his death. On August 12, 1998, the trial court dismissed petitioner's complaint. On August 3, 1999, the Court of Appeals issued the questioned resolution. The decretal portion reads:

"WHEREFORE, for being insufficient in form and substance, the petition for certiorari should be, as it is hereby, DENIED DUE COURSE and accordingly DISMISSED."

The petition revealed that petitioner failed to comply with Rule 46, Section 3, par. 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requiring the statement of the material dates showing when notice of the judgment or final order or resolution subject thereof was received, when a motion for the new trial or reconsideration, if any, was filed, and when notice of the denial thereof was received.

On May 25, 2000, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

Hence, this Petition filed on July 7, 2000.

HELD: The court ruled on denying the petition because the issues raised are factual.

This Court is not a trier of facts.Blancovs.Quasha, G.R. No. 133148, November 17, 1999. Well-settled is the rule that the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are entitled to great weight and respect, and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of any clear showing that the trial court overlooked certain facts or circumstance which would substantially affect the disposition of the case.

There would be no end to litigations if parties who unsuccessfully availed themselves of any of the appropriate remedies or lost them through their fault would still be heard.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED.

The Court further Resolves to:

(a)GRANTthe motion of private respondent for a second extension of five (5) days from September 5, 2000 within which to file a comment on the petition for review on certiorari; and

(b)NOTEthe said comment thereafter filed.

State Prosecutors v Muros

236 SCRA 505, 19 September 1994

Facts: The stateprosecutors who are members of the DOJ Panel of Prosecution filed acomplaint againstrespondent Judge Muro on the ground of ignorance of the law, grave misconduct and violation of the provisions in the Code of Judicial Conduct. The case at bar involves the prosecution of the 11 charges against Imelda Marcos in violation of the Central Bank Foreign Exchange Restriction in the Central Bank Circular 960. Therespondentjudge dismissed all 11 cases solely on the basis of the report published from the 2 newspapers, which the judge believes to be reputable and of national circulation, that the Pres. of the Philippines lifted all foreign exchange restrictions. Therespondents decision was founded on his belief that the reported announcement of the Executive Department in the newspaper in effect repealed the CB 960 and thereby divested the court of its jurisdiction to further hear the pending case thus motu propio dismissed the case. He further contends that the announcement of the President as published in the newspaper has made such fact a public knowledge that is sufficient for the judge to take judicial notice which is discretionary on his part.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in taking notice on the statement of the president lifting the foreign exchange published in the newspaper as basis for dismissing the caes?

Ruling: The Supreme Court held therespondentjudge guilty for gross ignorance of the law. It cannot comprehend his assertion that there is no need to wait for the publication of the circular no. 1353 which is the basis of the Presidents announcement in the newspaper, believing that the public announcement is absolute and without qualification and is immediately effective and such matter becomes a public knowledge which he can take a judicial notice upon in his discretion. It is a mandatory requirement that a new law should be published for 15 days in a newspaper of general circulation before its effectivity. When the Presidents statement was published in the newspaper, therespondentadmitted of not having seen the official text of CB circular 1353 thus it was premature for him to take judicial notice on this matter which is merely based on his personal knowledge and is not based on the public knowledge that the law requires for the court to take judicial notice of.

For the court to take judicial notice, three material requisites should be presented:

(1) The matter must be one of common and general knowledge;

(2) It must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain;

(3) It must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court.

The court ruled that the information he obtained from the newspaper is one of hearsay evidence. The judge erred in taking cognizant of a law that was not yet in force and ordered the dismissal of the case without giving the prosecution the right to be heard and of due process. The court ordered for the dismissal of the judge from service for gross ignorance of the law and grave abuse of discretion for dismissing the case motu proprio and for erring in exercising his discretion to take judicial notice on matters that are hearsay and groundless with a reminder the power to take judicial notice is to be exercised by the courts with caution at all times.

WEBB V DE LEON

247 SCRA 652

Facts: On June 19, 1994, the National Bureau of Investigation filed with the DOJ a letter-complaint charging petitioners Hubert Webb, Michael Gatchalian, Antonio J. Lejano and 6 other persons with the crime of Rape and Homicide of Carmela N. Vizconde, her mother Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde, and her sister Anne Marie Jennifer in their home at Number 80 W. Vinzons, St., BF Homes, Paranaque, Metro Manila on June 30, 1991.

Forthwith, the DOJ formed a panel of prosecutors headed by Asst Chief State Prosecutor Jovencio R. Zuno to conduct the preliminary investigation.

The DOJ Panel for its finding of probable cause. The credibility of Jessica Alfaro was assailed as inherently weak and uncorroborated due to her inconsistencies between her April 28, 1995 and May 22, 1995 sown statements. They criticize the procedure followed by the DOJ Panel when it did not examine witnesses to clarify the alleged inconsistencies.

Petitioners charge that respondent Judge Raul de Leon and respondent Judge Amelita Tolentino issued warrants of arrest against them without conducting the required preliminary examination.

Complain about the denial of their constitutional right to due process and violation of their right to an impartial investigation. They also assail the prejudicial publicity that attended their preliminary investigation.

ISSUES:

(1) Did the DOJ Panel gravely abuse its discretion in holding that there is probable cause to charge accused with crime of rape and homicide?

(2) Did respondent judges de Leon and Tolentino gravely abuse their discretion when they failed to conduct a preliminary examination before issuing warrants of arrest against the accused?

(3) Did the DOJ Panel deny them their constitutional right to due process during their preliminary investigation?

(4) Did the DOJ Panel unlawfully intrude into judicial prerogative when it failed to charge Jessica Alfaro in the information as an accused?

HELD:

(1) NO. Valid determination -- A probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not, a crime has been committed and was committed by the suspects. Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt.

(2) NO. Valid arrest -- In arrest cases, there must be a probable cause that a crime has been committed and that the person arrested committed it.

Section 6 of Rule 112 provides that upon filing of an information, the RTC may issue a warrant for the accused.

Clearly then, our laws repudiate the submission that respondent judges should have conducted searching examination of witnesses before issuing warrants of arrest against them.

(3) NO. There is no merit in this contention because petitioners were given all the opportunities to be heard.

The DOJ Panel precisely requested the parties to adduce more evidence in their behalf and for the panel to study the evidence submitted more fully.

(4) NO.

Petitioner's argument lacks appeal for it lies on the faulty assumption that the decision whom to prosecute is a judicial function, the sole prerogative of courts and beyond executive and legislative interference.

In truth, the prosecution of crimes appertains to the executive department whose principal power and responsibility is to see that our laws are faithfully executed. A necessary component of this right is to prosecute their violators.

People vs. Claudio Teehankee, Jr.

249 SCRA 54

Facts: In 1991, Jussi Olavi Leino was taking Maureen Hultman to her home at Campanilla Street, Dasmarinas Village, Makati. Roland John Chapman went with them. When they entered the village, Maureen asked Leino to stop about a block away from her house, as she wanted to walk the rest of the way for she did not want her parents to know that she was going home that late. Leino offered to walk with her while Chapman stayed in the car and listened to the radio.

While Leino and Maureen were walking, a light-colored Mitsubishi box-type Lancer car, driven by accused Claudio Teehankee, Jr., came up from behind them and stopped on the middle of the road. Accused alighted from his car, approached them, and asked: Who are you? (Show me your) I.D. When Leino handed his I.D., the accused grabbed and pocketed the I.D., without bothering to look at it.

Chapman saw the incident. He stepped down on the sidewalk and asked accused: Why are you bothering us? Accused pushed Chapman, dug into his shirt, pulled out a gun and fired at him. Chapman felt his upper body, staggered for a moment, and asked: Why did you shoot me? Chapman crumpled on the sidewalk. Leino knelt beside Chapman to assist him but accused ordered him to get up and leave Chapman alone. Accused then turned his ire on Leino. He pointed gun at him and asked: Do you want a trouble? Leino said no and took a step backward.

The shooting initially shocked Maureen. When she came to her senses, she became hysterical and started screaming for help. She repeatedly shouted: Oh, my God, hes got a gun. Hes gonna kill us. Will somebody help us? All the while, accused was pointing his gun to and from Leino to Maureen, warning the latter to shut up. Accused ordered Leino to sit down on the sidewalk. Leino obeyed and made no attempt to move away. Accused stood 2-3 meters away from him. Maureen continued to be hysterical. She could not stay still. She strayed to the side of accuseds car. Accused tried but failed to grab her. Maureen circled around accuseds car, trying to put some distance between them. The short chase lasted for a minute or two. Eventually, accused caught Maureen and repeatedly enjoined her to shut up and sit down beside Leino. Maureen finally sat beside Leino on the sidewalk.

For a moment, the accused turned his back from the two. He faced them again and shot Leino. Leino was hit on the upper jaw, fell backwards on the sidewalk, but did not lose consciousness. Leino heard another shot and saw Maureen fall beside him. He lifted his head to see what was happening and saw accused return to his car and drive away. Leino struggled to his knees and shouted for help. He noticed at least 3 people who saw the incident.

As a result of the incident, 3 separate criminal cases were filed against accused Claudio Teehankee, Jr. Initially, he was charged with: MURDER for the killing of ROLAND CHAPMAN, and two (2) FRUSTRATED MURDER for the shooting and wounding of JUSSI LEINO and MAUREEN HULTMAN. When Hultman subsequently died after 97 days of confinement at the hospital and during the course of the trial, the Information for Frustrated Murder was amended to MURDER.

Defense: Accused relied on the defense of denial and alibi. Accused claimed that during the shooting incident, he was not anywhere near the scene of the crime, but in his house in Pasig. Accused averred that he only came to know the 3 victims in the Dasmarinas shooting when he read the newspaper reports about it. Accused admitted ownership of a box-type, silver metallic gray Mitsubishi Lancer, with plate number PDW 566. He, however, claimed that said car ceased to be in good running condition after its involvement in an accident. Until the day of the shooting, his Lancer car had been parked in the garage of his mothers house in Dasmarinas Village. He has not used this car since then. Accused conceded that although the car was not in good running condition, it could still be used.

Ruling : The accused was convicted on the strength of the testimonies of 3 eyewitnesses who positively identified him as the gunman. However, he vigorously assails his out-of-court identification by these eyewitnesses.

He starts by trying to discredit the eyeball account of Leino, the lone surviving victim of the crimes at bar. Appellant urges: First, that Leinos identification of him outside an unoccupied house in Forbes Park was highly irregular; Second, that Leino saw his pictures on television and the newspapers before he identified him; Third, that Leinos interview at the hospital was never put in writing; Fourth, that the sketch of appellant based on the description given by Leino to the CIS agents was suppressed by the NBI. It is surmised that the sketch must have been among the evidence turned over to the NBI when the latter assumed jurisdiction over the investigation; and, lastly, that Leino could not have remembered the face of the accused. The shooting lasted for only five (5) minutes. During that period, his gaze could not have been fixed only on the gunmans face. His senses were also dulled by the five (5) bottles of beer he imbibed that night.

Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is done thru show-ups where the suspect alone is brought face to face with the witness for identification. It is done thru mug shots where photographs are shown to the witness to identify the suspect. It is also done thru line-ups where a witness identifies the suspect from a group of persons lined up for the purpose. Since corruption of out-of-court identification contaminates the integrity of in-court identification during the trial of the case, courts have fashioned out rules to assure its fairness and its compliance with the requirements of constitutional due process. In resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court identification of suspects, courts have adopted the totality of circumstances test where they consider the following factors, viz: (1) the witness opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and the identification; and, (6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure.

Using the totality of circumstances test, the alleged irregularities cited by the accused did not result in his misidentification nor was he denied due process. There is nothing wrong in Leinos identification of the accused in an unoccupied house in Forbes Park. The records reveal that this mode was resorted to by the authorities for security reasons.

The SC was also not impressed with the contention that it was incredible for Leino to have remembered the accuseds face when the incident happened within a span of 5 minutes. Five minutes is not a short time for Leino to etch in his mind the picture of the accused. Experience shows that precisely because of the unusual acts of bestiality committed before their eyes, eyewitnesses, especially the victims to a crime, can remember with a high degree of reliability the identity of criminals. The natural reaction of victims of criminal violence is to strive to see the appearance of their assailants and observe the manner the crime was committed. Most often, the face end body movements of the assailant create an impression which cannot be easily erased from their memory. In this case, there is absolutely no improper motive for Leino to impute a serious crime to the accused. The victims and the accused were unknown to each other before their chance encounter. If Leino identified the accused, it must be because the accused was the real culprit.

(1) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide for the shooting of Roland John Chapman. He was sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum, and to pay the heirs of the said deceased the following amounts: P50,000 as indemnity for the victims death; and, P1,000,000 as moral damages.

(2) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, qualified by treachery, for the shooting of Maureen Navarro Hultman. He was sentenced to suffer imprisonment of reclusion perpetua, and to pay the heirs of the said deceased the following amounts: P50,000 as indemnity for her death; P2,350,461.83 as actual damages; P564,042.57 for loss of earning capacity of said deceased; P1,000,000 as moral damages; and P2,000,000 as exemplary damages.

(3) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Frustrated Murder, qualified by treachery, for the shooting of Jussi Olavi Leino, and sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 8 years of prision mayor as minimum, to 14 years and 8 months of reclusion temporal as maximum, and to pay the said offended party the following amounts: P30,000 as indemnity for his injuries; P118,369.84 and equivalent in Philippine Pesos of U.S.$55,600.00, both as actual damages; P1,000,000 as moral damages; and, P2,000,000 as exemplary damages.

(4) In all three cases, to pay each of the 3 offended parties the sum of P1,000,000, or a total of P3,000,000, for attorneys fees and expenses of litigation; and

(5) To pay the costs in all 3 cases.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MAYOR ANTONIO L. SANCHEZ, GEORGE MEDIALDEA, ZIOLO AMA, BALDWIN BRION, LUIS CORCOLON, ROGELIO CORCOLON, and PEPITO KAWIT, accused-appellants

G.R. No. 121039-45 October 18, 2001

FACTS: This is a review on the Pasig City Regional Trial Courts decision on the Allan Gomez-Eileen Sarmenta rape-slay case that drew strong condemnation from an outraged populace in the middle of 1993. After a protracted and grueling 16-month trial, all those charged appellants herein were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide on seven counts and sentenced each one of them to suffer the maximum penalty of reclusion perpetua for each of the seven offenses or a total of seven reclusion perpetua for each accused. In addition, the Court ordered all the accused to jointly and severally pay the victims respective families by way of civil indemnities.

ISSUE: Whether or not the publicity given to this case impaired their right to a fair trial of the appellants?

HELD: No. The Supreme Court cannot sustain their claim that they were denied the right to impartial trial due to prejudicial publicity. It is true that the print and broadcast media gave the case at bar pervasive publicity, just like all high profile and high stake criminal trials, but the right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press. Responsible reporting enhances an accuseds right to a fair trial. The press does not simply publish information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism. Our judges are learned in the law and trained to disregard off-court evidence and on camera performances of parties to a litigation. Their mere exposure to publications and publicity stunts does not per se fatally infect their impartiality. To warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced by the barrage of publicity. Records herein do not show that the trial judge developed actual bias against Mayor Sanchez, et. al., as a consequence of the extensive media coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his case.

Perez v. EstradaAM No. 01-4-03-SC June 29, 2001

FACTS: On March 13, 2001, the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas (KBP), an association representing duly franchised and authorized television and radio networks throughout the country, sent a letter requesting the Supreme Court to allow live media coverage of the anticipated trial of the plunder and other criminal cases filed against former President Joseph E. Estrada before the Sandiganbayan in order "to assure the public of full transparency in the proceedings of an unprecedented case in our history." The request was seconded by Mr. Cesar N. Sarino in his letter of 5 April 2001 to the Chief Justice and, still later, by Senator Renato Cayetano and Attorney Ricardo Romulo. On 17 April 2001, the Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez formally filed the petition.

ISSUE:Whether or not media coverage be allowed to air Estradas trial to the public.

HELD: No. InEstes v. Texas,US SC held that television coverage of judicial proceedings involves an inherent denial of due process rights of the criminal defendant: "Witnesses might be frightened, play to the cameras, become nervous. They are then subject to extraordinary out-of-court influences that might affect their testimony. Telecasting increases the trial judge's responsibility to avoid actual prejudice to the defendant. For the defendant, telecasting is a form of mental harassment and subjects him to excessive public exposure and distracts him from an effective presentation of his defense. Finally, the television camera is a powerful weapon which intentionally or inadvertently can destroy an accused and his case in the eyes of the public."

The right of people to information does not prescribe that TV cameras be installed in the courtroom. This right might be fulfilled by less distracting, degrading and more judicial means. In a criminal case, a life is at stake, and the due process rights of the accused shall take precedence over the people's right to information. The accused has the right to a public trial, and the exercise of such a right is his to make, because it is his life and liberty that is in the balance. A public trial is not the same as a publicized trial.

IBP: "TV coverage can negate the rule on the exclusion of the witness intended to ensure a fair trial...could allow the 'hooting throng' to arrogate upon themselves the task of judging the guilt of the accused...will not subserve the ends of justice, but will only pander to the desire of publicity of a few grandstanding lawyers."

Court is not unmindful of the recent technological advances but to chance forthwith the life and liberty of any person in a hasty bid to use and apply them, even before ample safety nets are provided and the concerns heretofore expressed are aptly addressed, is a price too high to pay.

Perez v. Estrada

A.M. No. 01-4-03-SCSeptember 13, 2001

FACTS: This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision denying petitioners request for permission to televise and broadcast live the trial of former President Estrada before the Sandiganbayan.The motion was filed by the Secretary of Justice, as one of the petitioners, who argues that there is really no conflict between the right of the people to public information and the freedom of the press, on the one hand, and, on the other, the right of the accused to a fair trial; that if there is a clash between these rights, it must be resolved in favor of the right of the people and the press because the people, as the repository of sovereignty, are entitled to information; and that live media coverage is a safeguard against attempts by any party to use the courts as instruments for the pursuit of selfish interests.

On the other hand, former President Joseph E. Estrada reiterates his objection to the live TV and radio coverage of his trial on the ground that its allowance will violate thesub judicerule and that, based on his experience with the impeachment trial, live media coverage will only pave the way for so-called "expert commentary" which can trigger massive demonstrations aimed at pressuring the Sandiganbayan to render a decision one way or the other.Mr. Estrada contends that the right of the people to information may be served through other means less distracting, degrading, and prejudicial than live TV and radio coverage.

ISSUE: Whether or not television and radio coverage of plunder case be allowed.

HELD: No. The Court has considered the arguments of the parties on this important issue and, after due deliberation, finds no reason to alter or in any way modify its decision prohibiting live or real time broadcast by radio or television of the trial of the former president. By a vote of nine (9) to six (6) of its member, the Court denies the motion for reconsideration of the Secretary of Justice.

In lieu of live TV and radio coverage of the trial, the Court, by the vote of eight (8) Justices, has resolved to order the audio-visual recording of the trial for documentary purposes.Seven (7) Justicesvote against the audio-visual recording of the trial. Considering the significance of the trial before the Sandiganbayan of former President Estrada and the importance of preserving the records thereof, the Court believes that there should be an audio-visual recording of the proceedings.The recordings will not be for live or real time broadcast but for documentary purposes.Only later will they be available for public showing, after the Sandiganbayan shall have promulgated its decision in every case to which the recording pertains.The master film shall be deposited in the National Museum and the Records Management and Archives Office for historical preservation and exhibition pursuant to law.

ANG TIBAY, represented by TORIBIO TEODORO, manager and propietor, and NATIONAL WORKERS BROTHERHOOD vs. THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and NATIONAL LABOR UNION, INC.

G.R. No. 46496 February 27, 1940

FACTS: Toribio Teodoro, the manager and proprietor of Ang Tibay, laid off 89 laborers, who were members of the National Labor Union (NLU), due to alleged shortages of leather materials. The National Labor Union filed a complaint for unfair labor practice against Ang Tibay, alleging therein, among others, that Toribio dominates the National Workers Brotherhood (NWB) of Ang Tibay, another union in the company, and that Toribio discriminated against the NLU and unjustly favoring the NWB, which he allegedly dominated. The Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) ruled in favor of NLU, due to the failure of Ang Tibay to present records of the Bureau of Customs and Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather and thus to disprove NLUs allegation that the lack of leather materials as a scheme to discharge NLU members. The Supreme Court, however, reversed the decision, finding no substantial evidence that the 89 workers were dismissed due to their union affiliation or activities. Thus, the Solicitor General, in behalf of the Court of Industrial Relations filed a motion for reconsideration, while the NLU filed a motion for new trial, praying that the case be remanded to the Court of Industrial Relations.

ISSUE: Whether the CIRs freedom from the rigidity of procedural requirements prescribe special requirements of due process in administrative cases.

HELD: The Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and the Act requires it to "act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable." The fact, however, that the CIR may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in justifiable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative character. There are cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this character:

(1) the right to a hearing, which includes the right to present ones cause and submit evidence in support thereof;

(2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;

(3) The decision must have something to support itself;

(4) The evidence must be substantial;

(5) The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing; or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected;

(6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate;

(7) The Board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reason for the decision rendered.

The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to the parties adversely affected by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should be, and the same is hereby granted, and the entire record of this case shall be remanded to the CIR, with instruction that it reopen the case receive all such evidence as may be relevant, and otherwise proceed in accordance with the requirements set forth.

Office of the Court Administrator v. Pascual

259 SCRA 604

Facts: Sometime in February, 1993, a certain Ceferino Tigas wrote a letter, addressed to Hon. Reynaldo Suarez of the Office of the Court Administrator of the Supreme Court, charging that irregularities and corruption were being committed by the respondent Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Angat, Bulacan.

On March 10, 1993, the letter was referred to the National Bureau of Investigation in order that an investigation on the alleged illegal and corrupt practices of the respondent may be conducted. Ordered to conduct a discreet investigation by the then NBI Director Epimaco Velasco were: SA Edward Villarta, team leader, SI Reynaldo Olazo, HA Teofilo Galang, SI Florino Javier and SI Jose Icasiano. They proceeded to Angat, Bulacan, in order to look for Ceferino Tigas, the letter writer. Tigas, the NBI team realized was a fictitious character. In view of their failure to find Tigas, they proceeded to the residence of Candido Cruz, an accused in respondents sala.

In his affidavit executed on March 23, 1993 before SA Edward Villarta, Cruz declared that he was the accused in Criminal Case No. 2154, charged with the crime of Frustrated Murder. Respondent judge, after conducting the preliminary investigation of the case, decided that the crime he committed was only physical injuries and so, respondent judge assumed jurisdiction over the case. Cruz believed that he was made to understand by the respondent that, in view of his favorable action, Cruz was to give to respondent the sum of P2,000.00. Respondent judge is believed to be a drunkard and, in all probability, would need money to serve his vice.

In view of this statement, the NBI agents assigned to the case caused respondent judge to be entrapped, for which reason, the judge was thought to have been caught in flagrante delicto. NBI agents Villarta and Olazo filed the following report:

On 25 March 1993, at about 4:00 in the afternoon, CANDIDO CRUZ met with Judge PASCUAL at the Colegio de Sta. Monica, near the Municipal Building of Angat, Bulacan, where Subject is attending the graduation of his daughter. CANDIDO CRUZ told Judge PASCUAL that he already had the P2,000.00 which he (Judge PASCUAL) is asking him. However, Judge PASCUAL did not receive the money because according to him there were plenty of people around. He then instructed CANDIDO CRUZ to see him (Judge PASCUAL) at his office the following day.

At about 8:30 in the morning of the following day (26 March 1993), CANDIDO CRUZ proceeded to the office of Judge PASCUAL at the Municipal Trial Court of Angat, Bulacan, and thereat handed to him four (4) pieces of P500.00 bills contained in a white mailing envelope previously marked and glazed with fluorescent powder.

In the meantime, the Undersigned stayed outside the court room and after about 15 minutes, CANDIDO CRUZ came out of the room and signaled to the Undersigned that Judge PASCUAL had already received the marked money. The Undersigned immediately entered the room and informed Subject about the entrapment. Subject denied having received anything from CANDIDO CRUZ, but after a thorough search, the marked money was found inserted between the pages of a blue book on top of his table.

Subject was invited to the Office of the NBI-NCR, Manila wherein he was subjected to ultra violet light examination. After finding Subjects right hand for the presence of fluorescent powder, he was booked, photographed and fingerprinted in accordance with our Standard Operating Procedure (S.O.P.).

On even date, the results of our investigation together with the person of Judge FILOMENO PASCUAL was referred to the Inquest Prosecutor of the Office of the Special Prosecutor, Ombudsman, with the recommendation that he be charged and prosecuted for Bribery as defined and penalized under Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines.

Issue: Whether or not the evidences presented against Judge Filomeno Pascual were strong enough to convict him.

Held: We find that the evidence on record does not warrant conviction. We note that the only bases for the Report and Recommendation submitted by Executive Judge Natividad G. Dizon consist of: The Complaint, the Answer, the Memorandum of the respondent, and the transcript of stenographic notes of the hearing of the bribery case of respondent judge at the Sandiganbayan. The respondent was, therefore, not afforded the right to open trial wherein respondent can confront the witnesses against him and present evidence in his defense.

This lapse in due process is unfortunate. The Rules, even in an administrative cases, demand that, if the respondent judge should be disciplined for grave misconduct or any graver offense, the evidence against him should be competent and should be derived from direct knowledge. The Judiciary to which respondent belongs demands no less. Before any of its members could be faulted, it should be only after due investigation and after presentation of competent evidence, especially since the charge is penal in character.[7] The above-quoted Report and Recommendation of the investigating judge had fallen short of the requirements of due process.

The evidence aforesaid admits of irreconcilable inconsistencies in the testimonies of principal witness, Candido Cruz, and NBI Agent SI Reynaldo Olazo on several material points.

It will be remembered that the charge was intimated by someone who must have had an ax to grind against the respondent judge but who, by reason of cowardice or lack of evidence to put up a righteous case, did not come out in the open and instead wrote an anonymous letter. The letter-writer, naming himself as Ceferino Tigas, did not specify crimes committed or illegal acts perpetrated but charged respondent with anomalies in general terms. Respondent judge could not have been expected to make a valid answer or to otherwise defend himself from such vague accusations.

While then NBI Director Epimaco Velasco, upon being apprised of the Tigas letter, ordered the NBI investigating team to make a discreet investigation of respondent, the NBI team had instead caused an instigation or the entrapment of respondent judge. Not having found letter-writer Tigas and concluding that no such person exists, they sought out an accused before respondents court who could possibly be respondent judges virtual victim. Approached by the NBI team was Candido Cruz, a person who had been brought before the Municipal Trial Court of Angat, Bulacan, for preliminary investigation on the charge of Frustrated Murder. Respondent judge gave judgment to the effect that the crime committed by Candido Cruz was that of physical injuries merely. He declared then that he had original jurisdiction to try the case.

But, respondents action in this regard was perpetrated some time before Candido Cruz was persuaded to participate in what they (the NBI agents) called entrapment operation. The opportune time to bribe the respondent should have been before he acted in reducing Cruz criminal liability from Frustrated Murder to Physical Injuries. No bribe was asked then. It was unlikely that respondent would ask for it on the date of the entrapment on March 26, 1993, the favorable verdict having been rendered already.

It is significant to note that NBI Agent Olazo admitted[8] that, despite the fact that he scoured the table of the respondent in search of the envelope, with marked money in it, no envelope was found and so he had to call Candido Cruz who was already outside so that Cruz can locate the envelope.

In view of these antecedents, we find reason to favorably consider the allegations of respondent judge in his defense that, at around 9:30 oclock in the morning of March 26, 1993, Candido Cruz, along with the NBI agents, went to the Municipal Building of Angat, Bulacan. Candido Cruz, alone, went inside respondent judges chambers, located thereat, and placed before respondent judge an envelope containing marked money. Respondent judge thought that what was placed before him was a pleading for filing and so, he told Candido Cruz to file it with the Office of the Clerk of Court, that is, in a room adjacent to his chambers. Candido Cruz replied that it was the money the judge was asking for. Upon hearing this reply, respondent judge suddenly erupted in anger. He grabbed the envelope on the desk and hurled it at Candido Cruz. The envelope fell on the floor. Respondent judge then picked it up and inserted it inside the pocket of Cruz polo shirt and drove him out of his chambers. NBI Agents Villarta and Olazo immediately entered the door of the judges chambers, introduced themselves, and told respondent judge that the money that Cruz gave him was marked. Respondent judge told them that he did not receive or accept money from Candido Cruz. After respondent judge said this, the NBI Agents nevertheless proceeded to search the room, examined tables, drawers, and every nook and cranny of respondents chambers, and the pockets of the pants of respondent judge. Even after rigid search of the chambers of respondent, the NBI Agents failed to find the envelope containing marked money allegedly given by Candido Cruz to respondent judge.

Atty. Napoleon S. Valenzuela v. Judge Reynaldo Bellosillo

A.M. No. MTJ-00-1241 January 20, 2000

Facts:Respondent Judge is being charged with gross violation of the constitutional right of subject accused to assistance by counsel of her own choice, gross misconduct, oppression, partiality and violation of the Code of Judicial Ethics.

In a BP 22 case, Judge allegedly granted bail to the accused despite not being accompanied and represented by her counsel at that time. It appears that Judge granted bail without the assistance of the counsel of record, Atty. Valenzuela and he even suggested that the latter should be replaced by another counsel. Aghast by such decision, Atty. V filed his Notice of Withdrawal, in conformity with his clients decision, Meriam Colapo. Subsequently, he filed the instant administrative complaint against respondent Judge. To support his position, he attached an Affidavit allegedly executed by his client Colapo. However, during the hearing of the case, he failed to present Colapo as Witness as she was allegedly out of the country although she was willing to testify at that time.

Held:NOT GUILTY. On the issue of granting bail without the assistance of counsel, the Court held that it was valid and sufficiently based on the Manifestation filed by Atty. Valenzuela. With regard to the alleged act of respondent Judge suggesting to the accused that she should change her counsel (complainant Atty. V) and recommending a different lawyer, the Court found that the evidence adduced by the complainant was insufficient to substantiate the charges against him. The only evidence offered by complainant was the Affidavit of his client Meriam Colapo, and it cannot be the basis of a finding of guilt even in an administrative case. The complainants failure to present his principal witness, in the absence of other evidence to prove his charges was fatal and said Affidavit cannot be given credence and is inadmissible without the said affiant being placed on the witness stand.

The employment or profession of a person is a property right within the constitutional guaranty of due process of law. This applies also to Judges. Respondent judge cannot therefore be adjudged guilty of the charges against him without affording him a chance to confront the said witness, Meriam Colapo. Otherwise, his right to due process would be infringed.

Lumiqued vs. Exevea

G.R. No. 117565.November 18, 1997

FACTS: Lumiqued was the Regional Director of DAR-CAR. He was charged by Zamudio, the Regional Cashier, for dishonesty due to questionable gas expenses under his office. It was alleged that he was falsifying gas receipts for reimbursements and that he had an unliquidated cash advance worth P116,000.00. Zamudio also complained that she was unjustly removed by Lumiqued two weeks after she filed the two complaints. The issue was referred to the DOJ. Committee hearings on the complaints were conducted on July 3 and 10, 1992, but Lumiqued was not assisted by counsel. On the second hearing date, he moved for its resetting to July 17, 1992, to enable him to employ the services of counsel. The committee granted the motion, but neither Lumiqued nor his counsel appeared on the date he himself had chosen, so the committee deemed the case submitted for resolution. The Investigating Committee recommended the dismissal of Lumiqued. DOJ Sec Drilon adopted the recommendation. Fidel Ramos issued AO 52 dismissing Lumiqued.

ISSUE:Does the due process clause encompass the right to be assisted by counsel during an administrative inquiry?

HELD:The SC ruled against Lumiqued. The right to counsel, which cannot be waived unless the waiver is in writing and in the presence of counsel, is a right afforded a suspect or an accused during custodial investigation. It is not an absolute right and may, thus, be invoked or rejected in a criminal proceeding and, with more reason, in an administrative inquiry. In the case at bar, petitioners invoke the right of an accused in criminal proceedings to have competent and independent counsel of his own choice. Lumiqued, however, was not accused of any crime in the proceedings below. The investigation conducted by the committee created by Department Order No. 145 was for the purpose of determining if he could be held administratively liable under the law for the complaints filed against him. The right to counsel is not indispensable to due process unless required by the Constitution or the law.

Fabella v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 110379, 28 November 1997, 282 SCRA 256.

FACTS:

On September 17, 1990, DECS Secretary Carino issued a return-to-work order to allpublic school teacherswho had participated in walk-outs and strikes on various dates during the period of September to October 1990. The mass action had been staged to demand payment of 13th month pay, allowances and passage of debt cap bill in Congress.On October 1990, Secretary Carino filedadministrativecases against respondents, who are teachers of Mandaluyong High School. The charge sheets required respondents to explain in writing why they should not be punished for having taken part in the mass action inviolationof civil service laws.Administrativehearings started on December 1990. Respondents, through counsel assailed the legality of theproceedingson the following due process grounds: first, they were not given copies of the guidelines adopted by the committee for the investigation and denied access to evidence; second, the investigation placed the burden of proof on respondents to prove their innocence; third, that the investigating body was illegally constituted, their composition and appointment violated Sec.9 ofthe Magna CartaforPublic School Teachers. Pending the action assailing the validity of theadministrativeproceedings, the investigating committee rendered a decision finding the respondents guilty and ordered their immediate dismissal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not private respondents were denied due process?

HELD:

YES.Inadministrativeproceedings, due process has been recognized to include the following: (1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the institution ofproceedingswhich may affect a respondents legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in ones favor, and to defend ones rights; (3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration duringthe hearingor contained in therecordsor made known to the parties affected. The legislature enacted a special law, RA 4670 known asthe Magna CartaforPublic School Teachers, which specifically coversadministrativeproceedingsinvolving public schoolteachers. Section 9 of said law expressly provides that the committee to hear public schoolteachersadministrativecases should be composed of the school superintendent of the division as chairman, a representative of the local or any existing provincial or national teachers organization anda supervisorof the division. In the present case, the various committees formed by DECS to hear theadministrativecharges against private respondents did not include a representative of the local or, in its absence, any existing provincial or national teachers organization as required by Section 9 of RA 4670. Accordingly, these committees were deemed to have no competent jurisdiction. Thus, allproceedingsundertaken by them were necessarily void. They could not provide any basis for the suspension or dismissal of private respondents. The inclusion of a representative of a teachers organization in these committees was indispensable to ensure an impartial tribunal. It was this requirement that would have given substance and meaning to the right to be heard. Indeed, in any proceeding,the essenceof procedural due process is embodied in the basic requirement of notice and a real opportunity to be heard.Other minor issues: Petitioners allege that Sec 9 of RA 4670 was complied with because the respondents are members of Quezon City Teachers Federation. We disagree. Mere membership of said teachers in their respective teachers organizations does not ipso facto make them authorized representatives of such organizations as contemplated by Section 9 of RA 4670. Under this section, the teachers organization possesses the right to indicate its choice of representative to be included by the DECS in the investigating committee. Such right to designate cannot be usurped by thesecretary of educationor the director of public schools or their underlings. In the instant case, there is no dispute that none of the teachers appointed by the DECS as members of its investigating committee was ever designated or authorized by a teachers organization as its representative in said committee. Sec 9 of RA 4670 was repealed by PD 807. Statcon principle, a subsequent general law cannot repeal a previous specific law, unless there is an express stipulation. Always interpret laws so as to harmonize them.

Summary Dismissal Board v. Torcita

[GR 130442, 6 April 2000]

Facts: On 26 April 1994, a red Cortina Ford, driven by C/Insp. Lazaro Torcita, with his aide, PO2 Java, in the front seat and his wife with two ladies at the backseat, were overtaken by a Mazda pick-up owned by

Congressman Manuel Puey and driven by one Reynaldo Consejo with four (4) passengers in the persons of Alex Edwin del Rosario, Rosita Bistal, Carmen Braganza and Cristina Dawa. After the Mazda pick-up has overtaken the red Cortina Ford, and after a vehicular collision almost took place, it accelerated speed and proceeded to Hacienda Aimee, a sugarcane plantation owned by the congressman. The red Cortina Ford followed also at high speed until it reached the hacienda where Torcita and Java alighted and the confrontation with del Rosario and Jesus Puey occurred. Torcita identified himself but the same had no effect.

PO2 Java whispered to him that there are armed men around them and that it is dangerous for them to continue. That at this point, they radioed for back-up. Torcita,upon the arrival of the back-up force of PNP Cadiz City, proceeded to the place where Capt. Jesus Puey and Alex Edwin del Rosario were. On 6 July 1994, 12 verified administrative complaints were filed against Torcita for Conduct Unbecoming of a Police Officer, Illegal Search, Grave Abuse of Authority and Violation of Domicile, and Abuse of Authority and Violation of COMELEC Gun Ban. The 12 administrative complaints were consolidated into 1 major complaint for conduct unbecoming of a police officer. The Summary Dismissal Board, however, did not find sufficient evidence to establish that Torcita threatened anybody with a gun, nor that a serious confrontation took place between the parties, nor that the urinating incident took place, and held that the charges of violation of domicile and illegal search were not proven. Still, while the Board found that Torcita was "in the performance of his official duties" when the incident happened, he allegedly committed a simple irregularity in performance of duty (for being in the influence of alcohol while in performance of duty) and was suspended for 20 days and salary suspended for the same period of time. Torcita appealed his conviction to the Regional Appellate Board of the Philippine National Police (PNP, Region VI, Iloilo City), but the appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Whereupon, Torcita filed a petition for certiorari in the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City (Branch 31), questioning the legality of the conviction of an offense for which he was not charged (lack of procedural due process of law). The Board filed a motion to dismiss, which was denied. The RTC granted the petition for certiorari and annulled the dispositive portion of the questioned decision insofar as it found Torcita guilty of simple irregularity in the performance of duty. The Board appealed from the RTC decision, by petition of review to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the same for the reason that the respondent could not have been guilty of irregularity considering that the 12 cases were eventually dismissed. The Board filed the petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether Torcita may be proceeded against or suspended for breach of internal discipline, when the original charges against him were for Conduct Unbecoming of a Police Officer, Illegal Search, Grave Abuse of Authority and Violation of Domicile, and Abuse of Authority and Violation of COMELEC Gun Ban.

Held: Notification of the charges contemplates that the respondent be informed of the specific charges against him. The absence of specification of the offense for which he was eventually found guilty is not a proper observance of due process. There can be no short-cut to the legal process. While the definition of the more serious offense is broad, and almost all-encompassing a finding of guilt for an offense, no matter how light, for which one is not properly charged and tried cannot be countenanced without violating the rudimentary requirements of due process. Herein, the 12 administrative cases filed against Torcita did not include charges or offenses mentioned or made reference to the specific act of being drunk while in the performance of official duty. There is no indication or warning at all in the summary dismissal proceedings that Torcita was also being charged with breach of internal discipline consisting of taking alcoholic drinks while in the performance of his duties. The omission is fatal to the validity of the judgment finding him guilty of the offense for which he was not notified nor charged. Further, the cursory conclusion of the Dismissal Board that Torcita "committed breach of internal discipline by taking drinks while in the performance of same" should have been substantiated by factual findings referring to this particular offense. Even if he was prosecuted for irregular performance of duty, he could not have been found to have the odor or smell of alcohol while in the performance of duty because he was not on duty at the time that he had a taste of liquor; he was on a privatetrip fetching his wife.

Office of the Ombudsman v Coronel

G.R. No. 164460, June 27, 2006

In administrative cases, a finding of guilt must be supported by substantial evidence. In the present case, an unauthenticated photocopy of an alleged receipt does not constitute substantial evidence to show that respondent is guilty of dishonesty. In fact, absent any authentication, the photocopy is inadmissible in evidence; at the very least, it has no probative value.

Facts: Carmencita D. Coronel is a Senior Accounting Processor of the Linamon Water District, Lanao del Norte. Board of Directors of Linamon Water District, by virtue of Resolution No. 056, Series of 1997, designated [respondent] as Officer-in-Charge, effective October 1, 1997 until a General Manager shall have been appointed. In the morning of October 14, 1998, [respondent] called for a meeting the officers of the different Water Districts in Lanao del Norte and Lanao del Sur. Since it was nearing lunchtime, the group opted to continue their meeting the luncheon meeting, attended by more or less ten (10) persons. [respondent] paid for the lunch in the amount of [P]esos (P1,213.00), as shown in cash Invoice No. 0736 dated October 14, 1998.[respondent] claimed for reimbursement of her expenses covered by Voucher No. 98-11-23, chargeable against the representation and entertainment account of her office. That very same day, the voucher was approved and [respondent] got her reimbursement in the amount of One Thousand Two [H]undred Thirteen [P]esos (P1,213.00). Pedro C. Sausal, Jr. was appointed General Manager of Linamon Water District filed with the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao a sworn letter-complaint against herein Coronel for dishonesty. The complaint alleges that [respondent] falsified the cash invoice she submitted for reimbursement by making it appear that the (P1,213.00) when in fact, it was only (P213.00), as reflected in the photocopy of the original duplicate of cash invoice No. 0736 dated October 14, 1998.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this office finds and so holds that respondent CARMENCITA D. CORONEL is guilty of DISHONESTY and is hereby DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all leave credits and retirement benefits, pursuant to Section 22 (a) in relation to Sec. 9 of Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987. She is disqualified from re-employment in the national and local governments, as well as in any agency, including government-owned or controlled corporations. Let a copy of this decision be entered in the personal records of respondent.

Issue: Whether or not Coronel was deprived of due process

Whether or not the administrative proceedings of the Ombudsman erred in the decision rendered.

Held: The notation does not deny respondent of her right to due process. In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process lies simply in the opportunity to explain ones side or to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. What is proscribed is the absolute lack of notice or hearing. In this case, respondent was given every opportunity to be heard. Significantly, her intelligible pleadings before the CA and this Court indicate that she knew the bases for the ombudsmans Decision. In fact, she very ably pinpointed its alleged errors that she thought would merit our review. Not having been left in the dark as to how it was reached, respondents insistence on a denial of due process has no legal leg to stand on.

In administrative cases, the quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt is substantial evidence;that is, such relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. In the instant case, the complainant did not present evidence to support his theory that the photocopy of the original duplicate reflected the true amount, or that OR No. 0736 had indeed been falsified. That oversight was fatal to the discharge of his burden of proof. A reasonable mind will not carelessly jump to the conclusion that respondent is the guilty party.

The complainants evidence to prove falsification consisted of an unauthenticated45 photocopy of the original duplicate. He could have obtained an affidavit from the restaurant proprietor or employee who had issued the receipt, in order to attest to its due execution and authenticity. Absent any proof of due execution and authenticity, the alleged photocopy of the original duplicate of OR No. 0736 does not convince us that it is an accurate reflection of the actual bill incurred.

While this Court adheres to a liberal view of the conduct of proceedings before administrative agencies, it also consistently requires some proof of authenticity or reliability as a condition for the admission of documents.

Absent any such proof of authenticity, the photocopy of the original duplicate should be considered inadmissible and, hence, without probative value.

Given the flimsy charge and the paucity of the evidence against respondent, there is no need for her to present additional evidence to vindicate herself. The Office of the Ombudsman should have dismissed the Administrative Complaint against her in the first place. Clearly, her guilt was not proven by substantial evidence.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. Respondent Carmencita D. Coronel is hereby EXONERATED of the charge against her for lack of substantial evidence. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

Justice Secretary v. Lantion

[GR 139465, 17 October 2000]

Facts: On 13 January 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree 1069 "Prescribing the Procedure for the Extradition of Persons Who Have Committed Crimes in a Foreign Country". On 13 November 1994, then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon, representing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed in Manila the "Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United States of America. "The Senate, by way of Resolution 11,

expressed its concurrence in the ratification of said treaty. It also expressed its concurrence in the Diplomatic Notes correcting Paragraph (5)(a), Article 7 thereof (on the admissibility of the documents accompanying an extradition request upon certification by the principal diplomatic or consular officer of the requested state resident in the Requesting State). On 18 June 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U. S. Note Verbale 0522 containing a request for the extradition of Mark Jimenez to the United States. Attached to the Note Verbale were the Grand Jury Indictment, the warrant of arrest issued by the U.S. District Court, Southern District of Florida, and other supporting documents for said extradition. Jimenez was charged in the United States for violation of (a) 18 USC 371 (Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United States, 2 counts), (b) 26 USC 7201 (Attempt to evade or defeat tax, 4 counts), (c) 18 USC 1343 (Fraud by wire, radio, or television, 2 counts), (d) 18 USC 1001 (False statement or entries, 6 counts), and (E) 2 USC 441f (Election contributions in name of another; 33 counts). On the same day, the Secretary issued Department Order 249 designating and authorizing a panel of attorneys to take charge of and to handle the case. Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition documents, Jimenez (on 1 July 1999requested copies of the official extradition request from the US Government, as well as all documents and papers submitted therewith, and that he be given ample time to comment on the request after he shall have received copies of the requested papers. The Secretary denied the request. On 6 August 1999, Jimenez filed with the Regional Trial Court a petition against the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, for mandamus (to compel the Justice Secretary to furnish Jimenez the extradition documents, to give him access thereto, and to afford him an opportunity to comment on, or oppose, the extradition request, and thereafter to evaluate the request impartially, fairly and objectively); certiorari (to set aside the Justice Secretarys letter dated 13 July 1999); and prohibition (to restrain the Justice Secretary from considering the extradition request and from filing an extradition petition in court; and to enjoin the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the NBI from performing any act directed to the extradition of Jimenez to the United States), with an application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction. The trial court ruled in favor of Jimenez. The Secretary filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court. On 18 January 2000, by a vote of 9-6, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition and ordered the Justice Secretary to furnish Jimenez copies of the,extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant him a reasonable period within which to file his comment with supporting evidence. On 3 February 2000, the Secretary timely filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration.

Issue: Whether Jimenez had the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of an extradition process.

Held: Presidential Decree (PD) 1069 which implements the RP-US Extradition Treaty provides the time when an extraditee shall be furnished a copy of the petition for extradition as well as its supporting papers, i.e., after the filing of the petition for extradition in the extradition court (Section 6). It is of judicial notice that the summons includes the petition for extradition which will be answered by the extraditee. There is noprovision in the Treaty and in PD 1069 which gives an extraditee the right to demand from the Justice Secretary copies of the extradition request from the US government and its supporting documents and to comment thereon while the request is still undergoing evaluation. The DFA and the DOJ, as well as the US government, maintained that the Treaty and PD 1069 do not grant the extraditee a right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of an extradition process. It is neither an international practice to afford a potential extraditee with a copy of the extradition papers during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. Jimenez is, thus, bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the extradition process evaluation stage. Further, as an extradition proceeding is not criminal in character and the evaluation stage in an extradition proceeding is not akin to a preliminary investigation, the due process safeguards in the latter do not necessarily apply to the former. The procedural due process required by a given set of circumstances "must begin with a determination of the precise nature of the government function involved as well as the private interest that has been affected by governmental action." The concept of due process is flexible for "not all situations calling for procedural safeguards call for the same kind of procedure." Thus, the temporary hold on Jimenez's privilege of notice and hearing is a soft restraint on his right to due process which will not deprive him of fundamental fairness should he decide to resist the request for his extradition to the US. There is no denial of due process as long as fundamental fairness is assured a party.

Gov't. of the USA vs. Purganan

G.R. No. 148571, Sept. 24, 2002

In the case ofGovernment of the United States v. Hon. Purganan the court had the occasion to resolve the issue as to whether or not extraditees are entitled tothe right to bail and provisional liberty while the extradition proceedings are pending. Private respondent (extraditee) invoked the constitutional provision under the 1987 Constitution, that persons are entitled to bail except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua or death when evidence of guilt isstrong. The court, in rejecting the claim of private respondent held that said constitutional provision is applicable only in criminal casesbut not to extradition proceedings.Again, the court reiterated its pronouncement in the Lantion case that the Ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings in court isonly to determine whether theextradition request complies with the Extradition treaty, and whether theperson sought is extraditable.

Equally important, is the pronouncement that the courtof the requested state has the discretion to grant or deny bail and that as a rule bail is not a matter of right in extradition cases. But the court enunciated that thereare exceptions to this rule if only to serve the ends of justice, (1) once granted bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or danger to the community; (2) that thereexist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances. Having no statutory basis the applicant bears the burden of proving theseexceptions with clarity andprecision. Unfortunately, the court exercised its discretion in denying bail to private respondent who considered him as a flightrisk when he fled theUnited Statesafter learning of the criminal charges filed against him.

FACTS:

Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, the US Government requested the extradition of Mark Jimenez.A hearing was held to determine whether awarrant of arrest should be issued.Afterwards, such warrant was issued but the trial court allowed Jimenez topost bail for his provisional liberty.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not extraditee is entitled to notice and hearing before issuanceof warrant of arrest

2. Whether or not the right to bail is available in extradition proceedings

RULING:

Held:

Five Postulates of Extradition

1. Extradition Is a Major Instrument for the Suppression of Crime.First, extradition treaties are entered into for the purpose of suppressing crime by facilitating the arrest and the custodial transfer of a fugitive from one state to theother.With the advent of easier and faster means of international travel, the flight of affluent criminals from one country to another for the purpose of committing crimeand evading prosecution has become more frequent. Accordingly, governments are adjusting their methods of dealing with criminals and crimes that transcendinternational boundaries.Today, a majority of nations in the world community have come to look upon extradition as the major effective instrument of international co-operation in thesuppression of crime. It is the only regular system that has been devised to return fugitives to the jurisdiction of a court competent to try them in accordancewith municipal and international law.xxxIndeed, in this era of globalization, easier and faster international travel, and an expanding ring of international crimes and criminals, we cannot afford to be anisolationist state. We need to cooperate with other states in order to improve our chances of suppressing crime in our own country.

2. The Requesting State Will Accord Due Process to the Accused Second, an extradition treaty presupposes that both parties thereto have examined, and that both accept and trust, each others legal system and judicial process.More pointedly, our duly authorized representatives signature on an extradition treaty signifies our confidence in the capacity and the willingness of the other stateto protect the basic rights of the person sought to be extradited. That signature signifies our full faith that the accused will be given, upon extradition to therequesting state, all relevant and basic rights in the criminal proceedings that will take place therein; otherwise, the treaty would not have been signed, or wouldhave been directly attacked for its unconstitutionality.

3. The Proceedings Are Sui Generis Third, as pointed out in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, extradition proceedings are not criminal in nature. In criminal proceedings, the constitutional rights of theaccused are at fore; in extradition which is sui generis -- in a class by itself -- they are not.An extradition proceeding is sui generis. It is not a criminal proceeding which will call into operation all the rights of an accused as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.To begin with, the process of extradition does not involve the determination of the guilt or innocence of an accused. His guilt or innocence will be adjudged in thecourt of the state where he will be extradited. Hence, as a rule, constitutional rights that are only relevant to determine the guilt or innocence of an accused cannotbe invoked by an extradite. There are other differences between an extradition proceeding and a criminal proceeding. An extradition proceeding is summary in nature while criminalproceedings involve a full-blown trial. In contradistinction to a criminal proceeding, the rules of evidence in an extradition proceeding allow admission of evidenceunder less stringent standards. In terms of the quantum of evidence to be satisfied, a criminal case requires proof beyond reasonable doubt for conviction while afugitive may be ordered extradited upon showing of the existence of a prima facie case. Finally, unlike in a criminal case where judgment becomes executory uponbeing rendered final, in an extradition proceeding, our courts may adjudge an individual extraditable but the President has the final discretion to extradite him. TheUnited States adheres to a similar practice whereby the Secretary of State exercises wide discretion in balancing the equities of the case and the demands of thenations foreign relations before making the ultimate decision to extradite.Given the foregoing, it is evident that the extradition court is not called upon to ascertain the guilt or the innocence of the person sought to be extradited. Suchdetermination during the extradition proceedings will only result in needless duplication and delay. Extradition is merely a measure of international judicial assistancethrough which a person charged with or convicted of a crime is restored to a jurisdiction with the best claim to try that person. It is not part of the function of theassisting authorities to enter into questions that are the prerogative of that jurisdiction. The ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings in court is only to determinewhether the extradition request complies with the Extradition Treaty, and whether the person sought is extraditable.

4. Compliance Shall Be in Good Faith.Fourth, our executive branch of government voluntarily entered into the Extradition Treaty, and our legislative branch ratified it. Hence, the Treaty carries thepresumption that its implementation will serve the national interest.Fulfilling our obligations under the Extradition Treaty promotes comity with the requesting state. On the other hand, failure to fulfill our obligations thereunder paintsa bad image of our country before the world community. Such failure would discourage other states from entering into treaties with us, particularly an extraditiontreaty that hinges on reciprocity.Verily, we are bound by pacta sunt servanda to comply in good faith with our obligations under the Treaty. This principle requires that we deliver the accused to therequesting country if the conditions precedent to extradition, as set forth in the Treaty, are satisfied. In other words, the demanding government, when it has done all that the treaty and the law require it to do, is entitled to the delivery of the accused on the issue of the proper warrant, and the other government is underobligation to make the surrender. Accordingly, the Philippines must be ready and in a position to deliver the accused, should it be found proper.

5. There Is an Underlying Risk of Flight Fifth, persons to be extradited are presumed to be flight risks. This prima facie presumption finds reinforcement in the experience of the executive branch: nothingshort of confinement can ensure that the accused will not flee the jurisdiction of the requested state in order to thwart their extradition to the requesting state.The present extradition case further validates the premise that persons sought to be extradited have a propensity to flee. Indeed, extradition hearings would noteven begin, if only the accused were willing to submit to trial in the requesting country. Prior acts of herein respondent -- (1) leaving the requesting state right beforethe conclusion of his indictment proceedings there; and (2) remaining in the requested state despite learning that the requesting state is seeking his return and thatthe crimes he is charged with are bailable -- eloquently speak of his aversion to the processes in the requesting state, as well as his predisposition to avoid them at allcost. These circumstances point to an ever-present, underlying high risk of flight. He has demonstrated that he has the capacity and the will to flee. Having fled once,what is there to stop him, given sufficient opportunity, from fleeing a second time?

Due Process

Is an extraditee entitled to notice and hearing before the issuance of a warrant of arrest?It is significant to note that Section 6 of PD 1069, our Extradition Law, uses the word immediate to qualify the arrest of the accused. This qualification would berendered nugatory by setting for hearing the issuance of the arrest warrant. Hearing entails sending notices to the opposing parties, receiving facts and argumentsfrom them, and giving them time to prepare and present such facts and arguments. Arrest subsequent to a hearing can no longer be considered immediate. Thelaw could not have intended the word as a mere superfluity but, on the whole, as a means of imparting a sense of urgency and swiftness in the determination of whether a warrant of arrest should be issued.By using the phrase if it appears, the law further conveys that accuracy is not as important as speed at such early stage. The trial court is not expected to make anexhaustive determination to ferret out the true and actual situation, immediately upon the filing of the petition. From the knowledge and the material then availableto it, the court is expected merely to get a good first impression -- a prima facie finding -- sufficient to make a speedy initial determination as regards the arrest anddetention of the accused.

Even Section 2 of Article III of our Constitution, which is invoked by Jimenez, does not require a notice or a hearing before the issuance of a warrant of arrest. It provides:

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for anypurpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge afterexamination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons orthings to be seized.

To determine probable cause for the issuance of arrest warrants, the Constitution itself requires only the examination -- under oath or affirmation -- of complainantsand the witnesses they may produce. There is no requirement to notify and hear the accused before the issuance of warrants of arrest.

At most, in cases of clear insufficiency of evidence on record, judges merely further examine complainants and their witnesses. In the present case, validating the actof respondent judge and instituting the practice of hearing the accused and his witnesses at this early stage would be discordant with the rationale for the entiresystem. If the accused were allowed to be heard and necessarily to present evidence during the prima facie determination for the issuance of a warrant of arrest,what would stop him from presenting his entire plethora of defenses at this stage -- if he so desires -- in his effort to negate a prima facie finding? Such a procedurecould convert the determination of a prima facie case into a full-blown trial of the entire proceedings and possibly make trial of the main case superfluous. Thisscenario is also anathema to the summary nature of extraditions.

That the case under consideration is an extradition and not a criminal action is not sufficient to justify the adoption of a set of procedures more protective of theaccused. If a different procedure were called for at all, a more restrictive one -- not the opposite -- would be justified in view of respondents demonstrated predisposition to flee.

Right to Bail

Extradition Different from Ordinary Criminal Proceedings

We agree with petitioner. As suggested by the use of the word conviction, the constitutional provision on bail quoted above, as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of theRules of Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings,because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal.

Moreover, the constitutional right to bail flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as hereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt. It follows that the constitutional provision on bail will not apply toa case like extradition, where the presumption of innocence is not at issue.

The provision in the Constitution stating that the right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended does notdetract from the rule that the constitutional right to bail is available only in criminal proceedings. It must be noted that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus finds application only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion. Hence, the secondsentence in the constitutional provision on bail merely emphasizes the right to bail in criminal proceedings for the aforementioned offenses. It cannot be taken tomean that the right is available even in extradition proceedings that are not criminal in nature.

That the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be extradited are bailable in the United States is not an argument to grant him one in the present case. To stress,extradition proceedings are separate and distinct from the trial for the offenses for which he is charged. He should apply for bail before the courts trying the criminalcases against him, not before the extradition court.

Exceptions to the No Bail Rule

The rule, we repeat, is that bail is not a matter of right in extradition cases. However, the judiciary has the constitutional duty to curb grave abuse of discretion andtyranny, as well as the power to promulgate rules to protect and enforce constitutional rights. Furthermore, we believe that the right to due process is broad enoughto include the grant of basic fairness to extraditees. Indeed, the right to due process extends to the life, liberty or property of every person. It is dynamic andresilient, adaptable to every situation calling for its application.

Accordingly and to best serve the ends of justice, we believe and so hold that, after a potential extraditee has been arrested or placed under the custody of the law,bail may be applied for and granted as an exception, only upon a clear and convincing showing (1) that, once granted bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or adanger to the community; and (2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances including, as a matter of reciprocity, those cited by the highestcourt in the requesting state when it grants provisional liberty in extradition cases therein.

Since this exception has no express or specific statutory basis, and since it is derived essentially from general principles of justice and fairness, the applicant bears theburden of proving the above two-tiered requirement with clarity, precision and emphatic forcefulness. The Court realizes that extradition is basically an executive,not a judicial, responsibility arising from the presidential power to conduct foreign relations. In its barest concept, it partakes of the nature of police assistanceamongst states, which is not normally a judicial prerogative. Hence, any intrusion by the courts into the exercise of this power should be characterized by caution, sothat the vital international and bilateral interests of our country will not be unreasonably impeded or compromised. In short, while this Court is ever protective of the sporting idea of fair play, it also recognizes the limits of its own prerogatives and the need to fulfill international obligations.

Bail is a Matter of Discretion on the part of Appellate Court.

Government of Hongkong v. Olalia, 521 SCRA 470April 19, 2007)

Facts

Private respondent Muoz was charged before Hong Kong Court. Warrants of arrest were issued and by virtue of a final decree the validity of the Order of Arrest was upheld. The petitioner Hong Kong Administrative Region filed a petition for the extradition of the private respondent. In the same case, a petition for bail was filed by the private respondent.

The petition for bail was denied by reason that there was no Philippine law granting the same in extradition cases and that the respondent was a high flight risk. Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration and was granted by the respondent judge subject to the following conditions:

1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the condition that accused hereby undertakes that he will appear and answer the issues raised in these proceedings and will at all times hold himself amenable to orders and processes of this Court, will further appear for judgment. If accused fails in this undertaking, the cash bond will be forfeited in favor of the government;

2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this Court;

3. The Department of Justice is given immediate notice and discretion of filing its own motion for hold departure order before this Court even in extradition proceeding; and

4. Accused is required to report to the government prosecutors handling this case or if they so desire to the nearest office, at any time and day of the week; and if they further desire, manifest before this Court to require that all the assets of accused, real and personal, be filed with this Court soonest, with the condition that if the accused flees from his undertaking, said assets be forfeited in favor of the government and that the corresponding lien/annotation be noted therein accordingly.

Petitioner filed a motion to vacate the said order but was denied by the respondent judge. Hence, this instant petition.

Issue

WON a potential extraditee is entitled to post bail

Ruling

A potential extraditee is entitled to bail.

Ratio Decidendi

Petitioner alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting priva