‘ASEAN’S ROLE ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA: AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THE

FUTURE?’ Er-Win Tan

Department of International and Strategic Studies, University of Malaya

Introduction

1) N Korea’s Pyongjin Strategy 2) What is ASEAN? 3) ASEAN and Capacity Building for N. Korean Economic / Social

Reform N. Korean Interest in Đổi Mới N. Korean, Singapore and the Choson Exchange

4) ASEAN and Capacity Building for N. Korean Political /Security CSBMs

5) Conclusion

1. Analysis of Pyongyang’s Pyongjin strategy

Consider the period since the death of Kim Jong Il and the succession of Kim Jong Un: Note the abrogation of Leap Year Agreement 2012; Taepodong

missile tests of April and December 2012; February 2013 nuclear test; April 2013 closure of Kaesong; threats of war

But, ‘June 28’ Policy in 2012: Kim Jong Un announced increased autonomy to factories to raise the peoples’ living standards; also call to permit North Korean farmers to keep a larger share of their crop.

Pyongjin: ‘Parallel Track’ Strategy: simultaneously seeking economic development as well as nuclear missiles

1. Analysis of Pyongyang’s Pyongjin strategy

Rationale: regime survival: Arab Spring has demonstrated to Kim Jong Un that continued repression alone cannot guarantee regime survival Evidence that N Korean soldiers have started to defect too (food

shortages affecting the military?) But note also the danger of rapid economic reform –N Korea fears

what happened in Eastern Europe. Hence, Pyongjin: tightly controlled economic reform to ensure regime

security, whilst ensuring the continued loyalty of the Old Guard conservatives

2. Why ASEAN?

Consider the ‘ASEAN Way’: Strict interpretation of the Westphalian norm of state sovereignty Focus on political order enabled a stable political environment

conducive to foreign investment, economic growth and industrialisation

Within the ASEAN Regional Forum, the ‘ASEAN Way’ has meant a diplomatic culture based on personal ties, trust, consultation and consensus without media scrutiny of potentially controversial issues.

3. North Korea’s Starting Point

Decades of economic and industrial output skewed towards armaments at the expense of consumer goods.

Juche ideology: has also led to N Korea’s shunning participation and ties to the international community

Nuclear and missile programs have also ostracised N Korea in the eyes of international community

Note also Beijing and Moscow distancing themselves from Pyongyang N Korea in turn wary of PRC-styled economic reform

3 Capacity Building for N. Korean Economic / Social Reform: Vietnam and Đổi Mới

Shared ideological affinity Note Vietnam’s 1980s isolation 1986: unveiling of the Đổi Mới (‘Renovation’)

Agricultural reform Econ modernisation under govt control: State-Owned Enterprises

(SOEs) directed investment Later stages: Govt support for SMEs and increased production of

consumer goods 2010, 2nd fastest growing economy in Asia; a ‘CIVETS’ economy

Possible that N Korea also attracted by the symbolism of Vietnam’s ousting of the US during Vietnam War

3. Capacity Building for N. Korean Economic / Social Reform: Vietnam and Đổi Mới

Massive increase in numbers of N Korean trade delegations to Hanoi since 2007;

note also N Korean Prime Minister Kim Yong Nam’s statement in Hanoi in August 2012: ‘the achievements [Vietnam] had made in socioeconomic development and national construction were an encouragement to [North Korea] in its national construction and development process’.

3 Capacity Building for N. Korean Economic / Social Reform: Singapore

and Asian Values Note Singapore’s 1960s difficulties: isolation, small size, scarce natural

resources, yet succeeded in building a strong export-oriented economy Note also the political dominance of the People’s Action Party as an

entity that set the economic modernisation agenda N Korean references to Rason SEZ as the ‘next Singapore’, and

increasing upgrades to infrastructure – may enable N Korea to build new trade routes linking Japan, N Korea’s east coast and Russia

N Korean interest in moving financial assets to Singapore after the Banco Delta Asia affair

Michael Fay episode and Lee Kuan Yew’s assertion of ‘Asian Values’: strong symbolic appeal given N Korea’s desire to hedge against US interference in internal affairs (like Vietnam’s ousting of the US from its soil?)

3 Capacity Building for N. Korean Economic / Social Reform: Singapore

and the Choson Exchange Since 2012, the Choson Exchange in Singapore has been involved in

organising workshops to help ‘North Korea integrate with the rest of the world’ (Geoffrey See) – particularly crucial given N Korea’s deeply internalised siege mentality and very limited experience in international commerce and business management.

Choson Exchange has focused running programs for potential entrepreneurs from N Korea – eg, workshops in Pyongyang, overseas trips to study other countries’ business models

‘we look for initiative, leadership skills, a track record and entrepreneurial ambitions among our interviewees.’ – Geoffrey See

Like Vietnam’s Đổi Mới, focus on Small and Medium Enterprises, alongside SOEs: ‘This sector will provide the basis for North Korea’s transition into a mixed economy, and will help absorb the labor that will come from layoffs at inefficient state enterprises.’ - Geoffrey See

4 ASEAN and Capacity Building for N. Korean Political /Security CSBMs

Potential for ASEAN to adopt an expanded role? Note the extent of ASEAN members’ commercial relations with Seoul, and hence interest in Korean Peninsula stability.

But note also ASEAN members’ good relations with Pyongyang: ASEAN Way helps assuage North Korean fears of foreign interfering in its domestic affairs; note also the presence of North Korean communities in various parts of ASEAN.

Continuity of ARF provides opportunities for sustained diplomatic contact between North Korea and the other members of the 6PT – hence ASEAN’s potential role as an ‘honest broker’ ie a neutral mediator.

4 ASEAN and Capacity Building for N. Korean Political /Security CSBMs

Hence, an opportunity for ASEAN to raise its diplomatic profile in assisting in North Korean capacity building to initiate and sustain internal reform, in line with the December 2008 adoption of the ASEAN Charter in promoting a ‘genuinely people-oriented community.’

Eg, building on forays similar to the Choson Exchange in promoting social enterprise and education projects – key in promoting the emergence of a new generation of N Korean economic reform technocrats

5 Conclusion

Need qualify the extent of ASEAN’s potential role on the Korean Peninsula:

1) ref ASEAN’s lack of a centralised policy decision-making mechanism (hence difficulty in reaching consensus)

2) Vietnam and Singapore have had various factors which helped economic growth; these factors do not favour N Korea: Vietnam: improving relations with US since 1995; no nuclear weapons program Singapore: geostrategically located port; skilled, literate population; good relations with

UK and US

ASEAN: neither dominant role on Korean Peninsula, nor is it insignificant. May be seen as a ‘facilitator’ through which business skills can be imparted to N Korea in helping the emergence of SMEs and an improvement in living standards; ASEAN can also function as a neutral diplomatic mediator that complements the 6PT