G.R. No. 88979. February 7, 1992Lydia O. Chua, petitioner, vs. The Civil Service Commission, The National Irrigation

Administration, The Department of Budget and Management, respondents.

Facts: Petitioner Lydia Chua believing that she is qualified to avail of the benefits of the program provided in Republic Act No. 6683, being of permanent status and having rendered 15 years of continuous service, filed an application with respondent National Irrigation Administration (NIA) which, however, denied the same.

The Early Retirement Law, R.A. No. 6683 provides for benefits for early retirement and voluntary separation due to reorganization. Section 2 of said act provides that the program covers all “regular, temporary, casual and emergency employees, regardless of age, who have rendered at least a total of two (2) consecutive years of government service as of the date of separation.”

The Civil Service Commission and NIA denied Chua’s application claiming that she is not qualified due to the fact that she is a co-terminous employee and non-career civil servant which does not fall under the categories of regular, temporary, casual and emergency employees, which the act covers. Issue: Whether or not Lydia Chua is qualified to avail of the benefits under R.A. No. 6683. Held: Chua is qualified to avail of the benefits under R.A. No. 6683.

A co-terminous employee is a non-career civil servant, like casual and emergency employees that are covered by the act. Following the doctrine of implication, wherein it is said that so-called gaps in the law develop as the law is enforced, the gap of not covering civil servants that should logically be covered is implied in effect of this statute. The denial by the respondents NIA and CSC of petitioner’s application for early retirement benefits under R.A. No. 6683 is unreasonable, unjustified and oppressive, as petitioner had filed an application for voluntary retirement within a reasonable period and she is entitled to the benefits of said law.

No. L-2207. Januray 23, 1951Trinidad Gonzaga de Cabauatan, Lucio Cabauatan, Maria Cabauatan, Constancio Eusebio, Antonio Cabauatan, Primo Cabauatan, Carmen Cabauatan, Evangelino

Nuesa and Trinidad Cabauatan, plaintiffs and apellants, vs Uy Hoo, By Siat, Siy Hong and the Register of Deeds of the City of Manila, defendants and apellants.

Facts: Plaintiffs sold to defendants, all Chinese citizens, two parcels of residential land. In reaction to the case of Krivenco vs Register of Deeds wherein the Court held that a conveyance of a residential land to aliens infringes Section 5, Article XIII of the Constitution, plaintiffs demanded from the defendants to restore to them the lands on the ground that the sale they made thereof to the defendants was null and void, but the latter refused to do so.

Article 1306, paragraph 1 of the Civil Code provides that, “when both parties are guilty, neither of them can recover what he may have given by virtue of the contract, or enforce the performance of the undertaking of the other party.”

Issue: Whether or not the deed of sale executed by the plaintiffs can be declared null and void.

Held: The deed of sale executed by the plaintiffs cannot be declared null and void.

A party to an illegal contract cannot come into a court of law and ask to have his illegal objects carried out. The law will not aid either party to an illegal agreement; it leaves the parties where it finds them.

No. L-5127. May 27, 1953 Pedro Batungbakal, plaintiff and appellee, vs. National Development Company and Manuel Agregado, as Auditor General of the Philippines, defendants and apellants.

Facts: Civil service employee Pedro Batungbakal was suspended and later dismissed without cause as shown by the fact that after investigation he was exonerated and found guiltless of the charge of gross negligence filed against him and was even recommended for reinstatement by the government committee that investigated him. Hence, Batungbakal claims to be reinstated and to be paid his back salary from the time he was suspended up to the time that he would be reinstated.

Article XII, section 4, of the Constitution provides that “no officer or employee in the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law.” Section 694 of the Administrative Code has a similar provision.

Issue: Whether or not Batungbakal could claim to be reinstated and to be paid his back salary.

Held: Yes, Batungbakal could claim to be reinstated and to be paid his back salary.

A civil service official may not be removed from office except for cause. His suspension and removal were illegal and in violation not only of the Administrative Code but of the Constitution itself. Hence, Batungbakal should be reinstated and be paid his back salary to remedy the evil and wrong committed. When a citizen after due hearing establishes his right in court, said right is paramount and must be given effect.

Nos. 53581-83. December 19, 1980.Mariano J. Pimentel, Benjamin R. Ramos, Amando Ambulan, Sabino Ancheta, Jose

Apolonio, Edna Cabanilla, Gaudencio Cariño, Esmenio Tacadena, Rosalinda Samoy and Delfin Vagular, Jr., petitioners, vs Commission on Elections, Hon. Presiding

Judge, Court of First Instance of Quirino, Silverio L. Pascua, Faustino S. Tatac, Jose Cabanero, Maria Valencia, Reynaldo Dupa, Alfredo Ladao, David Garnace, Domingo

Casia, Mateo Gervacio, and Paula Villacorta, respondents.

Facts: CFI of Quirino ordered the opening of the ballot boxes and the counting of the votes as reflected in the ballots and not in the election returns.

COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9592, which temporarily restrained the Court of First Instance of Quirino from enforcing said order, and to limit the counting of votes cast in favor of petitioners-contestants to those reflected in the election returns.

Petitioners allege, that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by the herein private respondents questioning an interlocutory order issued by the CFI of Quirino, much less to restrain said court from enforcing said order. Private respondents contend that since election cases cognizable by CFI are appealable to the COMELEC under Sec 196 of the 1978 Election Code, said Commission, therefore, has jurisdiction to take cognizance of petitions for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus involving said cases in aid of its appellate jurisdiction over the same.

Issue: Whether or not the Commission on Elections had jurisdiction to issue Resolution No. 9592.

Held: The Commission on Elections did not have jurisdiction to issue Resolution No. 9592.

Settled is the rule that jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or the law. Thus, it cannot be conferred by the Rules of Court which are neither constitutional provisions nor legislative enactments but mere procedural rules promulgated by this Court in the exercise of its power to prescribe “rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts.” It results therefore, that Resolution No. 9592 was issued by the COMELEC without authority to do so.

No. L-55230. November 8, 1988.Hon. Richard J. Gordon, in his capacity as City Mayor of Olongapo, petitioner, vs.

Judge Regino T. Veridiano II and Spouses Eduardo and Rosalina Yambao, respondents.

Facts: A joint team composed of agents from the FDA and narcotics agents from the Philippine Constabulary conducted a “test buy” at San Sebastian Drug Store and was sold 200 tablets of Valium, 10mg. worth P 410.00 without a doctor’s prescription.

Olongapo City Mayor Richard J. Gordon, revoked their Mayor’s Permit No. 1954 for rampant violation of R.A. 5921, otherwise known as the Pharmacy Law and R.A. 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. San Sebastian Drug Stores was later own announced permanently closed.

Yambao requested permission from the FDA to exchange locations of the San Sebastian Drug Store and the Olongapo City Drugstore for reasons of “business preference.” Mayor Gordon, when informed of this action, disapproved of the transfers and suspended Mayor’s Permit No. 1955 for the Olongapo City Drug Store.

Mayor Gordon traces his authority to the charter of Olongapo City, R.A. No. 4645 which inter alia empowers the city mayor under Section 10 thereof: “to grant or refuse municipal licenses… and to revoke the same for violation of the conditions which upon they were granted…”

Issue: Whether or not it was appropriate for Gordon as City Mayor of Olongapo to revoke the Mayor’s permits 1954 and 1955

Held: The petitioner acted invalidly in revoking Mayor’s Permit No. 1954 after the FDA had authorized the resumption of operations of the San Sebastian Drug Store following the enforcement of penalties upon it. The power to approve a license includes by implication, even if not expressly granted, the power to revoke it. By extension, the power to revoke it is limited by the authority to grant the license from which it is derived in the first place.

However, it was competent for him to suspend Mayor’s Permit No. 1955 for the transfer of the Olongapo City Drug Store in violation of the said permit. Such suspension should nevertheless be effective only pending the return of the drugstore to its authorized original site or the eventual approval by the mayor of the requested transfer if found to be warranted.

No. L-6782. 25 July 1953 Dominador Jover, petitioner, vs. Juan Borra, respondent.

Facts: Dominador Jover was appointed Mayor of City of Iloilo on 26 March 1953. On 27 June 1953 Jover was relieved from his office as mayor and Juan Borra was put in his place by the President of the Philippines.

The President of the Philippines invokes Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution of the Philippines stating that: “Appointments in the Civil Service, except as to those which are policy-determining, primarily confidential or highly technical in nature, shall be made only according to merit and fitness, to be determined as far as practicable by competitive examination.”

Issue: The legality or illegality of the removal of the petitioner and the designation of the respondent by the President of the Philippines through Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution.

Held: The President cannot derive from this constitutional provision the authority to relieve or remove the petitioner from office, because his power is merely one of general supervision over all local governments and such supervision is to be exercised “as may be provided by law.” The above-quoted constitutional provision does not say that officers appointed under the exception are removable at pleasure.

G.R. No. 96422. February 28, 1994.Francisco S. Tantuico, Jr., petitioner, vs Hon. Eufemio Domingo, in his capacity as

Chairman of the Commission on Audit, Estelito Salvador, Margarita Silot, Valentina Eustaqio, Anicia Chico and Germiniano Pasco, respondents.

Facts: Petitioner Francisco S. Tantuico was appointed Chariman of the Commission on Audit (COA) to serve a term of seven years. He was issued an initial clearance during his tenure. All the required signatures were present. It also bore a certification that petitioner “is cleared from money, property and/or other accountabilities by this commission.” Petitioner also obtained a second clearance, which had been signed by all the officials, except the Chairman. Respondent Chairman Eufemio Domingo indorsed petitioner’s application to the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), certifying, that petitioner was cleared of money and property accountability.

In a letter dated December 21, 1989, respondent Chairman informed petitioner of the approval of his application for retirement under R.A. 1568 with an additional note that, “payment of only one-half (1/2) of the money value of the benefits due you by reason of such retirement will be allowed.”

Under Section 4, of R.A. No. 1568, the benefits granted by said law to the Auditor General and the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Elections shall not be subject to garnishment, levy or execution.

Petitioner filed this petition praying for full payment of his benefits.

Issue: Whether or not respondent chairman may withhold half of petitioner’s retirement benefits.

Held: Respondent chairman may not withhold half of petitioner’s retirement benefits.

Whatever infirmities or limitations existed in said clearances were cured after respondent Chairman Eufemio Domingo favorably indorsed petitioner’s application for retirement to the GSIS and recommended its approval.

Well-settled is the rule that retirement laws are liberally interpreted in favor of the retiree because the intention is to provide for the retiree’s sustenance and comfort, when he is no longer capable of earning his livelihood. Wherefore, the petition is granted insofar as it seeks to compel respondent Chairman of the COA to pay petitioner’s retirement benefits in full and his monthly pensions.

No. L-33052. August 31, 1981.Angel R. Quimpo, petitioner, vs. Leoncia Mendoza, as Treasurer for the City of

Cagayan de Oro, and in his personal capacity, and Judge Bernardo Teves, as Presiding Judge of Branch IV of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental,

respondents.

Facts: Angel Quimpo, as owner of a building located in Cagayan de Oro City, pays a realty tax for the building amounting to P400.00 yearly, payable in four equal installments. Quimpo paid on time the first three installments, but with respect to the last installment of P100.00, which was to be paid on or before December 31, it was only on August 27, 1970 that he tendered the amount of P124.00. The City Treasurer of Cagayan De Oro refused the payment insisting that petitioner ought to pay the last installment of P100.00 plus the penalty of P96.00 or a total of P196.00.

City Treasurer insists that the penalty of 2% be based on the original tax due whereas petitioner maintains that it should be the amount of the installment due and not paid. While R.A. 521 among others, provides that the real property tax is “due and payable annually on the first day of June”, subsequent to that charter, R.A. 5447 declares that the same tax (including the additional tax) “shall be due and payable in four equal installments.”

Issue: The basis for the computation of the tax penalty in case of delinquency.

Held: We rule for the petitioner, following the general rule in the interpretation of tax statutes that such statutes are construed most strongly against the government and in favor of the tax-payer. Since R.A. 5477 amended R.A. 521, in making the basic and additional property tax to be due and payable in four equal installments, the court holds that the penalty provision of R.A. 521, Sec 42 is deemed modified by implication. Accordingly, petitioner’s total liability will amount to P116.00 only.

No. L-9124. July 28, 1958.Bernardo Hebron, petitioner, vs Eulalio D. Reyes, respondent.

Facts: Petitioner discharged the duties and functions of mayor continuously until he was informed through a letter from the Office of the President of the Philippines that he was suspended due to an investigation of administrative charges against petitioner. The Vice-Mayor has been directed to assume the office of Acting Mayor during the period of suspension.

The suspension of petitioner remained until his term was about to expire so he instituted the present action for quo warranto, upon the ground that respondent was illegally holding the Office of Mayor of Carmona, and had unlawfully refused to surrender said office to petitioner, who claimed to be entitled thereto.

The appropriate procedure for the removal or suspension of municipal officers is provided in Sections 2188 to 2191 of the Revised Administrative Code. Issue: Whether a municipal mayor, not charged with disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines, may be removed or suspended directly by the President of the Philippines, regardless of procedure set forth in sections 2188 to 2191 of the Revised Administrative Code. Held: A municipal mayor, not charged with disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines, may NOT be removed or suspended directly by the President of the Philippines, regardless of procedure set forth in sections 2188 to 2199 of the Revised Administrative Code.

It is well settled that laws governing the suspension or removal of public officers especially those chosen by the direct vote of the people, must be strictly construed in their favor. Accordingly, when the procedure for the suspension of an officer is specified by law, the same must be deemed mandatory and adhered to strictly, in the absence of express or clear provision to the contrary – which does not exist with respect to municipal officers.

Under the present law, the procedure prescribed in sections 2188 to 2191 of the Revised Administrative Code, for the suspension and removal of the municipal officers therein referred to, is mandatory; that in the absence of a clear and explicit provision to the contrary, relative particularly to municipal corporations – and none has been cited to us – said procedure is exclusive.

Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that the suspension of herein petitioner was null and void, for non-compliance with the provisions above referred to.

No. L-38728. September 30, 1982.Conrado V. Macatangay, petitioner, vs. The Chairman of Commission on Audit,

respondent.

Facts: Petitioner filed with the Department (Ministry) of Local Government and Community Development an application for commutation of his alleged ten (10) months terminal leave as former Municipal Mayor of Calaca, Batangas. Respondent Chairman of Commission on Audit refused to allow in audit the claim of petitioner.

Petitioner contends that he, as a former municipal mayor of Calaca, Batangas is entitled to leave privileges pursuant to Section 286 and 2187 of the Revised Administrative Code and Section 12(c) of Commonwealth Act No. 186, as amended by Republic Act No. 1616.

Respondent Commission on Audit, in denying petitioner’s claim for commutation of his alleged terminal leave, contends that there is no law expressly and categorically granting them leave privileges or a commutation thereof, that the aforementioned laws invoked by petitioner are unavailing. Issue: Whether or not herein petitioner is entitled to leave privileges. Held: Herein petitioner is not entitled to leave privileges.

Indeed, there is no specific provision of law authorizing leave privileges, nor commutation thereof, for elective officials, in general, and municipal mayors in particular, as in the instant case. No mention is made in the laws cited by petitioner about the mayor having to apply for leave of absence to enjoy his right to receive full salary. Neither does this provision of law authorize accumulation of such leave. Such pecuniary privilege would depend on the existence of a law expressly and categorically granting them leave privileges. Any claimant must first show undoubtedly under what provision of law he has earned and accumulated leave before he can be entitled to the commutation thereof.