Diverging Trajectories of Trust in Northeast Asia: South Koreas Security Relations With Japan China,...

7/31/2019 Diverging Trajectories of Trust in Northeast Asia: South Koreas Security Relations With Japan China, by Leif-eric Easley

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Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies2012

Volume 23

Editor-in Chief:Gilbert Rozman, Princeton University


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Regional Community Formation:

National Identity, Migration,and the Rise of China


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150 | Joint U.S. Korea Academic Studies

Most studies of contemporary Northeast Asian security focus on the U.S.interac on with China, Japan or South Korea and are concerned withaspects of na onal power. 1 The present chapter takes a more intra-regional andsociological approach, examining trends in mutual trust within Beijing and Tokyossecurity rela ons with Seoul. 2 Focusing on ROK-China and ROK-Japan rela onshas advantages in addi on to covering new ground. 3 These rela onships presentinteres ng points of comparison as they address similar security environmentsin di erent ways.

In the universe of bilateral rela ons, Seoul-Beijing and Seoul-Tokyo es could beunderstood as middling cases for mutual trust (in contrast to the high trust rela onsof the U.S.-ROK and U.S.-Japan alliances, the low level of mutual trust betweenJapan and China, and the near zero trust that South Korea and the United Stateshave with North Korea). 4 However, while mutual trust in ROK-China and ROK-Japanrela ons might be categorized as moderate, the willingness of these governmentsto rely on each other on ma ers of na onal security exhibits di erent trajectoriesin recent years. Trust between Seoul and Beijing has decreased, whereas someincrease in mutual trust is apparent between Seoul and Tokyo. That varia on issomewhat puzzling given the widely observed post-Cold War trends of closer ROK-China rela ons and o en strained ROK-Japan rela ons. 5

The space of a chapter is not su cient for tracing year-on-year varia on in mutualtrust in two bilateral rela onships since the end of the Cold War. The present goalis to account for di erent levels of trust in ROK-China and ROK-Japan rela onsin 2006 and 2010. Without me to watch the en re movie of bilateral rela ons,these two snapshots are examined as crisis points during which levels of trustwere tested and, hence, readily observable. The 2010 Cheonan and Yeonpyeongincidents shone a spotlight on the extent to which policymakers believe othergovernments can be counted on for security coopera on. A diploma c crisis in2005-2006 also tested governments willingness to work together on securityma ers. However, unlike the 2010 military ac on, the mid-decade crisis involvedhistorical controversies such as that surrounding Yasukuni Shrine. 6

Con ic ng na onalisms, wrapped up with contested history and territory, are o endiscussed in rela on to distrust in Northeast Asia. 7 Analyses of military coopera onand con ict tend to iden fy trust as important (and a lack of trust as problema c), butdo not opera onalize or measure trust and explain its varia on. Meanwhile, there isgrowing interest in idea onal approaches for understanding the interna onal rela onsof East Asia, calling for more cross-na onal studies and systema c analysis of compe ngcausal factors. Two new volumes cover iden ty issues in unprecedented depth fromvarious regional perspec ves. 8 Korean scholars, long focused on historical and territorialdisputes, 9 are inves ga ng other factors of distrust, including racial prejudice. 10 Publicopinion research in Northeast Asia is becoming increasingly sophis cated with theavailability of more reliable cross-na onal and cross-temporal polls. 11

The present chapter, concerned as it is with the mutual trust between governments,focuses on the percep ons of foreign policy elites (rather than media images orpublic opinion). Explaining the level of trust within ROK-China and ROK-Japan


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Trust can be approached in many ways depending on the research ques on athand. 15 For the purposes of this research on bilateral security rela ons, mutualtrust is opera onalized as the shared willingness of two states to assume therisks of reliance on ma ers of na onal security, based on expecta ons that bothsides will ful ll their obliga ons. Data on willingness for security reliance drawsprimarily on o cial doctrine regarding the provision of military capabili es anddefense mechanisms and its applica on in various con ngencies.

Data on expecta ons about the bilateral security rela onship can be drawn frompolicymaker assessments concerning whether security commitments will be met andthe probability of military con ict. To accurately trace varia on in mutual trust over me,one would code the en re range of willingness and expecta ons indicators and performcontent analysis on all available trea es and amendments, bilateral agreements, jointstatements, minutes from security consulta on mee ngs, government reports, na onalsecurity strategies, budgetary alloca ons, internal government memos, policy reviews,intelligence assessments, and policymaker pronouncements. It would also be helpful toreview developments for coopera on and con ict in bilateral security rela ons. 16

In the interest of space, this chapter assesses change in mutual trust by comparing thedefense white papers of each country in 2006 and 2010. Defense white papers shouldbe a reliable source of policymakers willingness and expecta ons to rely on othergovernments on ma ers of na onal security for several reasons. First, they are fairlycomprehensive about a na ons security environment, what military capabili es a na onmaintains and plans to develop and for what con ngencies, and how a na on assessesthe capability and inten ons of other states. Second, they are not the product solelyof a na ons defense establishment. Whereas some documents may only representa par cular view within part of the government (the administra on, the legislature,the diploma c bureaucracy, the military or intelligence services), defense white paperstend to be circulated for approval by the various departments that deal with na onalsecurity and foreign policy. Finally, defense white papers tend to be regularly updated,and hence should be responsive to developments in bilateral rela ons.

MUTUAL TRUST BETWEEN SOUTH KOREA AND CHINAThe leaderships in Seoul and Beijing con nuously stress the importance of their bilateral coopera on in diploma c mee ngs. 17 However, some decrease isobservable in the level of willing reliance and shared expecta ons for the securityrela onship by comparing the defense white papers of 2006 and 2010. There isa certain asymmetry when viewing the white papers of the ROK and PRC side-by-side, as the South Korean documents devote more space to China than theChinese documents devote to Korea. This is not a measurement problem fortrust, however, because the present exercise is not about contras ng the Koreanand Chinese documents. At issue is change in mutual trust, so the task at handinvolves comparing the documents of both sides in 2006 and 2010.

The 2006 Chinese defense white paper reports that, China has set up bilateralconsulta on mechanisms on the law of the sea with the Republic of Korea. 18 It, thus,


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MUTUAL TRUST BETWEEN SOUTH KOREA AND JAPANIn contrast, the level of mutual trust between Seoul and Tokyo, assessed via thedefense white papers of 2006 and 2010, showed improvement. Interes ngly, the

level of mutual trust in ROK-Japan rela ons appears to have crossed that of ROK-China rela ons as Seouls mutual trust with Tokyo was less than that with Beijing in2006, with the situa on reversed by 2010. It must be said, however, that ROK-Japanrela ons were improving from a low baseline, given bilateral strains at mid-decade. 22

The Japanese defense white paper of 2006 focuses on North Koreas nuclearand missile threats to Japan, and on U.S.-ROK coopera on, with virtually nomen on of Japan-ROK coopera on, except for several allusions to frank talksand a sentence sta ng that it is important for Japan and the ROK to establish abasis for coopera on and to coordinate more e ec vely. 23 As is pro forma for

Japanese defense white papers, the report men ons a territorial dispute withSouth Korea (asser ng that Takeshima is an integral part of Japanese territory)and notes o cial protests by each side over the others oceanographic surveys inwaters claimed as an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).

For its part, the ROK defense white paper of 2006 speculated that developments inJapans defense posture and ac ve strengthening of the U.S.-Japan alliance may elicita compe ve response from China and Russia. The document stated that Japansposi ons on historical issues, territory, and EEZs are detrimental to the improvementof peace in Northeast Asia. That is fairly strong language indica ve of trust problems,

but the level of mutual trust could s ll be described as on the low end of moderate, asthe Korean document stresses that Japan and South Korea are important neighborsbetween whom bilateral defense exchanges should be increased. 24

By 2010, the trust indicators of willingness and expecta ons for the ROK-Japanbilateral security rela onship appear no ceably improved. The 2010 Japanesedefense white paper shows detailed concern for South Koreas na onal securityand states that South Korea is one of the countries that has maintained the closestrela ons with Japan in economic, cultural and other areas and that South Koreais extremely vital to Japan from a geopoli cal perspec ve. 25 It goes on to saythat Japan and the ROK share fundamental values such as democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights, and capitalist economies and share many strategicinterests as allies of the United States. 26 The report claims that the two countriescollaborate closely on security issues, have successes in promo ng mutualunderstanding and trust, and are expanding defense exchanges and areas of func onal coopera on including mari me security. There is then an en re sec ondevoted to Japans e orts to support the ROK a er the sinking of the Cheonan. 27

Impressively, the 2010 South Korean defense white paper indirectly refers toJapan as a military ally: Solidifying security es with major Asia-Paci c alliances,the ROK, Japan, Australia, and the United States have been trying to establish amore e ec ve mul lateral security system within the region based on alliances. 28 The report goes on to devote an en re sec on to Exchange and Coopera on withJapan focused on working together to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue


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and to ensure regional security and peace. 29 The document explicitly men onsROK-Japan-U.S. trilateral coopera on, Korea-Japan mari me search and rescueexercises, and even expanding combined training of military forces.

The level of mutual trust between Seoul and Tokyo would s ll be coded asmoderate (certainly not yet at the level of full- edged military allies), but aposi ve trajectory for trust is apparent in comparisons of the 2006 and 2010 defensedocuments. Mutual trust can only be as high as the least common denominatorof a dyads willingness and expecta on for security coopera on, and it is worthno ng that South Koreans demonstrated slightly less willingness than Japanese.Japanese strategists, who used to be resistant to a role for the U.S.-Japan allianceand Japanese security policy beyond Japan, are now speaking of providing publicgoods relevant to regional security in coopera on with South Korea. 30 The nextgenera on of strategic thinkers in Japan even write about Japan-ROK con ngencyplanning for securing North Korean nuclear weapons. 31 While there is increasingrealiza on among policymakers in both Tokyo and Seoul that Japan and SouthKoreas futures are intertwined, 32 Japanese recogni on of South Koreas securityrole and willingness to engage in defense reliance with Seoul appears slightlygreater than that in Seoul. Hence, the level of mutual trust, while improved rela veto 2006, is s ll not as high as it could be.

COMPETING EXPLANATIONS FOR MUTUAL TRUSTAND SECURITY RELATIONS

How can we explain these di erent trajectories for mutual trust between 2006 and2010decreasing in ROK-China rela ons and increasing in ROK-Japan rela ons?This sec on considers three compe ng explana ons drawn from interna onalrela ons theory. As exis ng explana ons are unable to account for the abovevaria on, a new explana on based on percep ons of iden ty is elaborated inthe subsequent sec on. That explana on suggests that when power balance,economic interdependence, and public opinion over historical antagonisms a ectmutual trust, they do so via percep ons of iden ty.

A balance of power explana on would expect that given three states A, B andC if the power of C is signi cantly increasing, states A and B will feel threatenedand trust C less and less. The rise of State C will drive states A and B together,helping trust to increase between A and B. Over the past two decades, Chinasmaterial power has been growing substan ally rela ve to that of Japan and SouthKorea. 33 A power balance explana on would thus predict that Seoul and Beijingshould have decreasing mutual con dence and Seoul and Tokyo should havemore, as South Korea and Japan cooperate to balance China. 34

Defense white papers in 2006 and 2010 indicate such trajectories for trust. No

doubt changes in material capabili es ma er, but the problem for a balance of power explana on is ming. China has been rising for some me, so why did ROK-China trust not go down and ROK-Japan trust not increase earlier, and why dowe not observe ac ve balancing behavior as realists would expect? 35 One realist

Easley: Diverging Trajectories of Trust


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defense is that South Korea and Japan do not collec vely balance China becauseeach has the United States as an ally. But this is not a convincing explana onbecause Washington ac vely encourages trust and coopera on between SouthKorea and Japan, and leaders in both states remain concerned about the capacityand commitment of the United States in Asia. 36 Another realist defense is theinfamous me lag explana on, but if a balance of power explana on cannotpredict (e.g. it has to wait forever to be proven correct) the ming of change,then it is not the most useful explana on.

Another explana on predicts that if the rela ve economic interdependenceof states B and C is going up while that between A and B is going down, thenmutual trust between B and C should increase as that of A and B decreases.Related to Chinas economic rise, ROK-China economic interdependence hasbeen increasing, but ROK-Japan interdependence, while s ll high, is becomingrela vely less so. 37 An interdependence explana on would, thus, predict thatROK-China trust should be going up and ROK-Japan trust going down. However,the trajectories in mutual trust observed above are in fact the opposite.

Interdependence theorists might o er their own me lag defense by arguingthere is a disconnect between economic and poli cal actors, i.e., poli cians mayget caught up with issues of ideology or diplomacy, but eventually their thinking willconform to those of domes c poli cal interest groups good at making money. Theproblem with this argument is that it is possible to make money (hot economics)despite low trust between governments (cold poli cs). 38 Meanwhile, there is noguarantee that poli cal leaders will take their cues from the business lobby. Traderela ons are in many ways subs tutable, whereas hard security issues o en cannotbe pushed aside by pro t poten al. Interdependence theorists might counter thatwith greater interac on, there are bound to be some trade and social fric ons, andgeopoli cal crises may occasionally present overpowering shocks. Observa onsof trends in mutual trust support such conten ons, but then we are le wan nga theory that incorporates such fric ons and shocks that an interdependenceexplana on considers exogenous.

A third explana on a ributes the lack of trust between states to nega ve publicopinion associated with incomplete historical reconcilia on. Historical memoriesare very powerful in the popular consciousness as they are derived from pastwars and di erent development paths that people use to understand the varyingfortunes of states in the interna onal system. If two countries, B and C, have similarhistorical grievances against country A, historical are-ups can be expected to lowerthe level of trust with A, and possibly result in solidarity between B and C. SouthKorea and China both hold historical grievances against Japan, and public opinionpolls regularly show nega ve opinions of Japan in both countries. 39

A public opinion explana on would, thus, predict increasing ROK-China trust anddecreasing trust between South Korea and Japan. Yet, despite historical are-ups over the war me sexually exploited comfort women, Yasukuni Shrine, andhistory textbooks with con ic ng territorial claims, the level of trust between


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Seoul and Tokyo was observed to improve between 2006 and 2010. This is notto say that historical antagonisms do not ma er they almost certainly do butthe trust exhibited by governments in bilateral security rela ons may not closelytrack public opinion. Public opinion can, of course, a ect elite percep ons, butpolicymakers are just as likely to use historical issues for instrumental purposesor otherwise a empt to shape public opinion.

The transmission belt for e ects on and from public opinion tends to be the media.Media coverage can be important in in uencing the iden ty percep ons discussedbelow, but iden ty percep ons are s cky or less vola le than the headlines. Asfar as using the intensity of historical antagonisms to explain varia on in mutualtrust, the level of trust between governments appears not to be driven by publicopinion. I argue below that policymakers assessments about another countrysreliability on ma ers of security depend on deeply-held beliefs about the othersna onal iden ty, speci cally concerning na onal values and interna onal roles.

PERCEPTIONS OF IDENTITY EXPLAINTRAJECTORIES OF TRUST

Trends in power, economic interdependence, and public opinion are all relevantto mutual trust, but none of these variables o ers su cient explana on for thedi erent trajectories of trust in ROK-China and ROK-Japan rela ons. To the extentthat these factors a ect the level of mutual trust, their causal force is mediated

through changes in elite percep ons of na onal iden ty, according to theexplana on below. In other words, change in iden ty percep ons is a necessaryand su cient condi on for change in mutual trust. The greater di erence elitesperceive between two countries na onal iden es, the less trust; while the lessdi erence elites perceive between the two na onal iden es, the more trustrelevant for security coopera on we expect to observe.

This sec on asks in what ways the decision-making elite in one state di eren ates thena onal iden ty of another state in areas germane to foreign policy. Policymakers inStates A and B compare na onal iden es in terms of interna onal roles and na onal

values and perceive iden ty di erence as a result. This perceived iden ty di erenceis the distance between how policymakers see the interna onal role and na onalvalues of their country versus those of another. It exists because of a sociologicalprocess in which policy elites engage, where in-group/out-group comparisons aremade for purposes of in-group pride, posi ve dis nc veness, legi macy, and senseof self-purpose in an uncertain interna onal environment. 40

How elites in each country see the na onal iden ty of relevant other states iswrapped up with views of the other countrys interna onal role. 41 The other majordimension considered in perceived iden ty di erence involves what elites in one

na on think about the domes c poli cal values of the other country (concerninghuman rights, type of governance/ins tu ons, cultural sophis ca on, etc.).Perceived iden ty di erence is measured by iden fying the main di erencesraised by na onal leaders and policymakers in their domes c debates about the



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roles. The posi ve gains for iden ty percep ons drove increasing mutual trust a erthe end of the Cold War. But ROK-China percep ons of iden ty di erence widened,comparing views on interna onal roles and na onal values in 2010 to those of 2006. 46

In 2010, author interviews with Chinese policymakers revealed what might bedescribed as annoyance with South Koreas interna onal role. It was seen asdemanding dispropor onate recogni on from and showing inadequate deferenceto its much larger neighbor. Analysts considered the peninsula poten ally vola le and not just because of Pyongyang such that the situa on must be controlled andstability maintained. 47 In the view of some, South Koreas problem is that it blindlyfollows Washingtons policy and expects too much of China given its limitedin uence on North Korea. 48 Meanwhile, South Korean na onal values were alsoviewed more nega vely. Some Chinese interviewees lamented that South Koreahad lost its moral focus on economic growth and had instead become polarized overissues of inequality and redistribu on. 49 Some Chinese observers cri cized SouthKorean poli cs as na onalis c and emo onal, while others claimed that Koreanstend to excessively talk up Chinese na onalism. 50 Yet, some Chinese na onalists,long proponents of resis ng Americaniza on, also started to argue that Chinaneeds cultural security from hallyu , the pop-culture wave from South Korea. 51

South Korean percep ons of Chinese iden ty also markedly worsened by 2010.Chinas Northeastern History Project was very controversial in Korea and raisednega ve percep ons of Beijing. 52 What is more, the o ense that o cials (not just the public) expressed toward China aggravated nega ve percep ons thatChinese held about South Korea. 53

South Korean hopes for Chinas posi ve interna onal role were dashed during thisperiod. As recently as 2006, many saw the road to Pyongyang as going through Beijing,but Chinas betrayal of expecta ons for evenhanded diplomacy between North andSouth Korea, and its perceived insensi ve handling of the Cheonan and Yeonpyeongincidents changed those percep ons. In 2010, South Koreans saw less benevolenceand more brazen self-interest in Chinas interna onal role. Percep ons of iden tydi erence also widened with more nega ve views about Chinese na onal values.

Beijings heavy-handed response to internal poli cal-economic challenges a er the2008-09 global nancial crisis drew the a en on of South Koreans to the lack of democracy and human rights in China. 54 Beijings policy on North Korean refugees,with occasional repatria on of people to su er harsh punishment by Pyongyang, alsowidened the perceived gap on human rights with China. 55

These changes in perceived iden ty di erence predict a nega ve trajectory formutual trust between Seoul and Beijing. By comparing the two countries defensewhite papers in 2006 and 2010, precisely such a reduc on in trust was observed.A more lengthy analysis would process-trace (with a detailed narra ve, year-

by-year) how policymakers increasing percep on of di erence between SouthKorean and Chinese interna onal roles and values drove down mutual willingnessand shared expecta ons for security coopera on in the bilateral rela onship. Thecausal chain linking iden ty percep ons to trust beliefs is summarized below.



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Table 1. Worsening of ROK-China Perceived Iden ty Di erence, 2006-2010

Interna onal Role Na onal Values

Beijings viewof South Korea

Over-reaching for a countryof its size, failing to showappropriate deference

From shared focus on economicdevelopment to divergentdemocracy

Seouls viewof China

From hopes for a benevolentinterna onal role to brazenself-interest

From single-minded economic developmentto calculated repression

Lower willingness in Beijing to rely on Seoul for coopera ve management of regionalsecurity was based on Chinese percep ons of South Korea as impetuous and notshowing due deference to Chinese interests for stability on the Korean peninsula. TheLee Myung-bak administra on projected a di erent interna onal role for the ROK(a Global Korea that demands reciprocity in dealings with the North), an iden tythat Chinese policymakers saw as pu ng principle over pragma sm (i.e., stability)in a way that could not be trusted. Meanwhile, lower Chinese expecta ons for thebilateral security rela onship followed from a Chinese percep on of value divergencewith South Korea. From a Chinese point of view, Seoul transgressed away from an

East Asian development model priori zing economics over poli cs. As a result, SouthKorean iden ty poli cs were seen as injec ng uncertainty into diplomacy, loweringChinese expecta ons of future security es.

Similarly, more nega ve percep ons of Chinese iden ty among South Koreanpolicymakers pushed down ROK-China mutual trust. Lower willingness in Seoul torely on Beijing for dealing with North Korea was based on South Korean percep onsof Chinas interna onal role becoming dominated by parochial interests. Suchnega ve percep ons built up over me, a er Chinas failure to bring North Koreaback to the Six-Party Talks, its weak response to North Koreas second nuclear test

in 2009, its unhelpful stance a er the Cheonan sinking, and its diploma c shieldingof Pyongyang a er the Yeonpyeong shelling. On the dimension of na onal values,South Koreans ques oned whether an undemocra c China could be a trustworthypartner, as suspicions rose over its economic involvement in North Korea andresentment grew over its support of the regime in Pyongyang.

The decline in mutual trust between Seoul and Beijing from 2006 to 2010 is, thus,explained by prior and propor onal change in perceived iden ty di erence. The nextsec on inves gates whether changing iden ty percep ons between Seoul and Tokyocan explain the modest increase in mutual trust between South Korea and Japan.


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PERCEIVED IDENTITY DIFFERENCE BETWEENSOUTH KOREA AND JAPAN 56

Percep ons of iden ty di erence between policy elites in Seoul and Tokyo were

within a moderate range in 2006. Japan and the ROK experienced comparablepaths of rapid economic development, were on the same side of the Cold War, andcon nue to share the United States as their main ally. However, rela ons betweenSeoul and Tokyo did not exhibit the sustained improvement that ROK-China rela onsdemonstrated a er the Cold War. Some South Korean policy elites had a complexregarding Japan because of its colonial past, and many policy elites in Tokyo wereslow to recognize Seoul on equal foo ng. For these reasons, an outsider might haveseen more similari es between South Korean and Japanese na onal iden es in2006 than Koreans and Japanese chose to see in themselves.

Interviews with Japanese policymakers about their percep ons of South Korea in2006 revealed they were somewhat apathe c toward Korean democracy. WhileJapanese were not fond of the dictatorial leaders of Koreas past, they were dismayedby the waves of an -Japanese sen ment in South Koreas liberated civil society. Somepolicymakers viewed South Korea as well behind Japan in terms of development, andpreoccupied with history as a way to de ect a en on from Korean failings. Japanesestrategists did not speak much of a construc ve interna onal role for South Korea;in their view, Seoul was almost completely focused on the peninsula and ac ons thatmight a ect its rela ons with North Korea.

Likewise, South Korean policymakers percep ons about Japan were somewhatambivalent in 2006. Modern Korean na onalism developed in opposi on toJapanese imperialism and retains a focus on a perceived lack of Japanese atonementfor past misdeeds. 57 The issue of distorted Japanese textbooks (even if such textsare not widely used in Japan) in uences percep ons of Japanese iden ty. 58 Views of Japanese na onal values were also darkened by stories about the poor treatment of Zainichi Koreans in Japan, a ributed to the Japanese obsession with ethnic purity.Despite Japans strongly posi ve economic development in the post-war era, manyelites saw its interna onal role through the lens of historical imperialism, viewing

Japanese interna onal trade and nancial coordina on, investment and aid asso er tools of Japanese expansionism. By 2006, such concerns began to wane asJapans economic growth had leveled o for years, but policymakers in Seoul s lldid not welcome an interna onal role for Japans Self-Defense Forces.

Compared to the ROK-China case, percep ons of iden ty di erence betweenSeoul and Tokyo were on the more nega ve end of the moderate range.Improvement in ROK-Japan iden ty percep ons between 2006 and 2010 followedposi ve developments in how policymakers on both sides perceived each othersinterna onal roles and na onal values.

Author interviews with Japanese policymakers in 2009-2010 revealed notableimprovement in views of South Koreas place on the global stage. Seoul was seen asan important interna onal economic player, not just because of the leading market



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share of several South Korean companies, but also because of Seouls produc veinvolvement in various policy fora including the G-20. Japanese strategists nowrecognized South Koreas robust involvement in the interna onal arena involvingsecurity issues beyond the peninsula. 59 Rather than consider South Korea catching-up, Japanese policymakers began to talk about how Japan should not be le behind,in view of posi ve developments for Korean trade such as the KORUS FTA, and deepersecurity coopera on in the U.S.-ROK alliance. South Korean na onal values were alsoviewed more posi vely in Tokyo. The ow of people and cultural products betweenJapan and South Korea had grown substan ally in the 2000s, and Japanese admiredthe popularity of hallyu and the technological compe veness of South Koreancompanies. Frustrated with deadlock in their own poli cal system, some Japanesepolicymakers spoke of South Koreas dynamic democracy in a more posi ve light.

South Korean percep ons of Japanese iden ty also showed improvement by 2010.Resentment over Japans past ac ons were mi gated by Japanese e orts to showrespect for historical sensi vi es. 60 Growing Korean con dence was also a large partof this change. Japans economic stagna on and poli cal deadlock made clear thatJapan is not invincible, 61 just as con dence was increasing in Seoul about South Koreasplace in the world. 62 From a posi on of greater na onal con dence, South Koreanpolicymakers were more likely to see Japanese poli cs (and iden ty) as coping withinternal challenges rather than being hijacked by right-wing revisionists. 63 O cialsincreasingly saw Japans regional security role as posi ve and important, so muchso that some policymakers expressed concern when rela ons between Tokyo and

Washington appeared strained over basing issues in 2009-2010, because they believethe U.S.-Japan alliance helps stabilize East Asia.

Changes in leadership in Tokyo and Seoul had much to do with these improvingpercep ons. 64 Members of the Lee Myung-bak administra on came to o ce in2008 with more posi ve views of Japanese iden ty, and post-Koizumi Japanesecabinets and policymakers ac vely sought to close percep on gaps between Tokyoand Seoul. The ROK-Japan case thus provides evidence for how the con gura onand decisions of leaders can a ect long-held percep ons about iden ty withimplica ons for the level of mutual trust. 65

These changes in perceived iden ty di erence between Seoul and Tokyo predictan increase in mutual trust, which was indeed observed by comparing thetwo countries defense white papers in 2006 and 2010. The percep on amongJapanese policymakers that South Korea is increasingly a capable and contribu ngglobal player increased Japanese willingness to rely on and cooperate withSeoul on ma ers of regional security, par cularly dealing with North Korea andengaging China. The growing recogni on among policymakers in Seoul that Japanis a construc ve contributor to interna onal peace and stability (rather than arevisionist power) increased South Korean willingness to incorporate Japan as apartner into the ROK na onal security strategy.

Meanwhile, expecta ons both in Seoul and Tokyo about the future of bilateralrela ons were bu ressed by converging percep ons about na onal values. Eachside showed increasing apprecia on for the others democra c governance


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Table 2. Improvement in ROK-Japan Perceived Iden ty Di erence, 2006-2010

Interna onal Role Na onal Values

Tokyos viewof South Korea

Increasingly outward- looking, capable andwilling to contribute

Shared universal values(less par cular/Confucian)and more dynamic than Japan

Seouls viewof Japan

From stealth expansionist tosuppor ve of interna onalpeace and stability

From driven by right-wingrevisionists to coping withinternal challenges

and cultural strengths. Converging percep ons of South Korean and Japaneseinterna onal roles and values, thus, made possible greater mutual willingness andshared expecta ons for security coopera on in the bilateral rela onship. South

Korean concerns about historical issues (and hence Japanese iden ty) lingered,however, explaining why it may be somewhat less enthusias c than Tokyo forfurther expanding security coopera on based on mutual trust. Nonetheless, ROK-Japan mutual trust improved from 2006 to 2010, a modest yet s ll signi cantincrease accounted for by lower percep ons of iden ty di erence.

CONCLUSIONTrust is not an all or nothing phenomena it is not miraculously realized or lost.Instead, trust between na onal governments concerning their bilateral security

rela onship varies with developments in domes c and interna onal poli cs. Theming, direc on, and magnitude of change in mutual trust confound exis ngexplana ons based on power balance, economic interdependence, and publicsen ment over historical grievances. A more sociological explana on, focused oniden ty percep ons, is needed. The present research used changing percep onsof iden ty di erence to account for decreasing ROK-China trust and increasingROK-Japan trust between 2006 and 2010. The above ndings about mutual trustin Northeast Asia o er a number of foreign policy implica ons, as well as severalcau ons about changing circumstances.

The observed and explained trajectories of ROK-China and ROK-Japan mutualtrust as of 2010 suggest that trilateral security coopera on among China, Japanand South Korea will be di cult to advance. Despite various drivers of communitybuilding in Northeast Asia, 66 it is hard to expect much poli cal and securityintegra on in the region while trust remains at such modest levels. However, itwill be important to chart progress made by ROK-Japan-China trilateral summitsand working mee ngs.

Considering the poten al upsides of ROK-Japan iden ty percep ons (sharedpoli cal values, similar goals contribu ng to the interna onal community), theoutlook for trust between Seoul and Tokyo is rela vely favorable. Compared toBeijing, Tokyo is more likeminded with Seoul in dealing with North Korea a er thedeath of Kim Jong-il. Japan can also be expected to engage in less ROK passing.Considering the poten al downsides of ROK-China iden ty percep ons (human



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rights, democracy, di erent role expecta ons dealing with North Korea), theoutlook for trust is not favorable. The greater extent to which posi ve interna onalroles and na onal values are contrasted with those of China, that is, the greaterextent to which China is a nega ve relevant other, the less trust we can expect theSouth Korean or Japanese governments to have with Beijing.

Two cau onary notes about changing circumstances are in order. Although SouthKorea and Japan have accomplished modest improvement in mutual trust, that trustremains fragile. There are several regular irrita ng events (Japanese Educa on Ministrytextbook approvals, Defense Ministry white papers men oning the Dokdo/Takeshimaisland dispute, Shimane Prefecture celebra ng Takeshima Day, and so on) as well asoccasional revisionist comments by Japanese poli cians about history. Developmentsthat aggravate percep ons of iden ty di erence send the trajectory of mutual trustdownward, especially if na onalist poli cians seize on an issue for electoral advantageand then rile up na onalists in the other country, se ng up an iden ty-trust spiral.The Lee Myung-bak administra on and the DPJ leadership have been mindful to avoidsuch spirals, but future leaders might have di erent priori es. 67

The present study also points to several avenues for future research. While thischapter focuses on trust between foreign policy decision makers of di erentcountries, society-to-society rela ons are not insigni cant for state-to-staterela ons. Even if poli cal elites manage to close perceived iden ty di erences andbuild trust, public opinion may not follow as posi ve a trajectory. This could be inpart because the biases of the public may lag those of the elite, but it could alsobe due to public distrust of the elite in their own country. 68 An important ques onfor future research is, thus, how public and elite percep ons of another countryco-vary, depending on state-society rela ons within the na on doing the perceiving.

Another task for a future study would be to compare ROK-Japan and ROK-Chinamutual trust over a longer period of varia on to see if and how the two are correlated.Mutual trust within these two bilateral security rela onships are clearly not directlycorrelated, but they exhibited some inverse correla on, at least from 2006 to 2010.While there is no reason to believe that ROK-Japan trust and ROK-China trust are zero-

sum, their respec ve iden ty percep ons are likely sensi ve to changing orienta onsvis-a-vis North Korea and the United States. This is a complicated geometry thatdeserves further analysis from an iden ty perspec ve.

Based on the present research, while diploma c rhetoric about building trust isprevalent in East Asia, much of it is cheap talk. Defense white papers are be ergauges of trust than poli cal speeches, and real trust is built with meaningfulchanges to percep ons of na onal iden ty. This is di cult to achieve and requiresconcerted and sustained e orts by poli cal, military, and diploma c leaders not just for be er understanding interna onal roles and na onal values, but alsotoward improving the very content of these contested dimensions of iden ty.

[Authors note: The author would like to thank In-young Park at Ewha University for excellent research assistance.]


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REFERENCES1. For good examples that take stock of stronger U.S.-ROK rela ons and more troubled Sino-U.S.

rela ons since the 2010 a acks, see Mark E. Manyin, Emma Chanle -Avery, and Mary BethNiki n, U.S.-South Korea Rela ons, Congressional Research Service, Report R41481, November

2011; Benjamin Schreer and Brendan Taylor, The Korean Crises and Sino-American Rivalry,Survival, Vol. 53, No. 1 (March 2011), pp. 13-19. For a Chinese ar cle viewing East Asian securityas a func on of U.S. alliances and Sino-U.S. rela ons, see Zhu Feng, Zhongmei guanxi yu Dongyaanquan zhixu, Guoji zhengzhi yanjiu , 2011.

2. There is a growing literature in Japanese, Korean and Chinese about various legs of the NortheastAsian triangle in which a lack of trust between governments in the region is well documented,but its varia on has not been compara vely and systema cally explained. See Nam Ki-Jeong,Jungil guggyo jeongsanghwa wa Hanil gwangye: Jiyundoen galdung, Korean Journal for

Japanese Studies, Vol. 33 (2011), pp. 29-64; Huan Tian, ed., Post-war History of Sino-JapaneseRela ons: 1945-1995 (Beijing: Zhongguo shehuikexue chubanshe, 2002); Mori Kazuko, Nitchukankei: Sengo kara shinjidai e (Tokyo: Iwanami Publishing, 2006).

3. The importance of U.S. military engagement for South Korea and Japan is well documented.An unanswered ques on is whether the rise of China will push Seoul and Tokyo closer thandid Cold War fears of U.S. abandonment. Victor Cha, Alignment Despite Antagonism: The United States-Korea-Japan Security Triangle (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000); KimJae-cheol, Mijung gwangye ui byeonhwa wa Hanguk ui oegyo jeonlyag (Seoul: Hanyangdaehaggyo Atae jiyeog yeongu senta), Vol. 35, No. 3 (2011), pp. 147-74.

4. On cases of high mutual trust (U.S.-Japan, U.S.-ROK) and low trust (U.S.-China, China-Japan)in East Asia, the author has a book manuscript in prepara on.

5. Jae Ho Chung, Between Ally and Partner: Korea-China Rela ons and the United States,(New York: Columbia University Press, 2008); Tal-chung Kim and Chung-in Moon, eds.,History, Cogni on and Peace in East Asia, (Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 1997).

6. John Breen, ed., Yasukuni, the War Dead and the Struggle for Japans Past (New York: ColumbiaUniversity Press, 2008); Tsuyoshi Hasegawa and Kazuhiko Togo, eds., East Asias Haunted Present:Historical Memories and the Resurgence of Na onalism (Westport, CN: Praeger, 2008).

7. Roh Moo-hyun, History, Na onalism and Community, Global Asia, Vol. 1, No. 2 (Spring 2007),pp. 10-13; Chung-in Moon and Chun-fu Li. Reac ve Na onalism and South Koreas ForeignPolicy on China and Japan, Paci c Focus, Vol. 25, No. 3 (2010), pp. 331-55; Lim Hyung-taekand Kim Jae-kwan, eds.. Dongasia minjokjuui ui jangbyeok eul neomeo (Seoul: SungkyunkwanUniversity Press, 2005); Peter Hays Gries, et al., Historical beliefs and the percep on of threatin Northeast Asia: colonialism, the tributary system, and China-Japan-Korea rela ons in thetwenty- rst century, Interna onal Rela ons of the Asia-Paci c, Vol. 9, No. 2 (2009), pp. 245-65; Gi-Wook Shin and Daniel C. Sneider, eds., Cross Currents: Regionalism and Na onalism inNortheast Asia (Washington, DC: Brookings Ins tu on Press, 2007).

8. Gilbert Rozman, ed., East Asian Na onal Iden es: Common Roots and Chinese Excep onalism,(Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press,2012); Gilbert Rozman, ed., Na onal Iden es and Bilateral Rela ons: Widening Gaps in East

Asia and Chinese Demoniza on of the United States (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson CenterPress and Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012).

9. Jae Ho Chung, Chinas So Clash with South Korea: The History War and Beyond, AsianSurvey , Vol. 49, No. 3 (2009), pp. 468-83; Min Gyo Koo, Island Disputes and Mari me RegimeBuilding in East Asia: Between a Rock and a Hard Place (New York: Springer, 2010); Ralf Emmers,Japan-Korea Rela ons and the Tokdo/Takeshima Dispute: The Interplay of Na onalism andNatural Resources, RSIS Working Papers, No. 212, 2010.

10. Il Hyun Cho and Seo-Hyun Park, An -Chinese and An -Japanese Sen ments in East Asia:The Poli cs of Opinion, Distrust, and Prejudice, Chinese Journal of Interna onal Poli cs, Vol. 4, No. 3 (Autumn 2011), pp. 265-90.

11. See for example, Asian Barometer, h p://www.asianbarometer.org; East Asia Ins tute, h p://www.eai.or.kr/type/p1.asp?catcode=1410000000; Yomiuri-Gallup, h p://www.mans eldfdn.org/backup/polls/polls_lis ng.htm; Jung-Yeop Woo and Leif-Eric Easley, Yellow Sea TurningRed: Darker Views of China among South Koreans, Asan Issue Brief, No. 15, December 16,2011; h p://www.asaninst.org/upload_eng/board_ les/ le1_597.pdf.



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12. The present study does not a empt to explain all aspects of bilateral rela ons, onlymutual trust on security issues. Some coopera on need not be trust-based, and somecon ict need not result from lack of trust, but given the importance of trust (or the lackof trust) in Northeast Asias security rela ons, explaining varia on in mutual trust is farfrom a purely academic ques on.

13. Robert Jervis, Percep on and Mispercep on in Interna onal Poli cs (Princeton, NJ:Princeton University Press, 1976).

14. Gilbert Rozman, Northeast Asias Stunted Regionalism: Bilateral Distrust in the Shadow of Globaliza on (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

15. On various approaches to studying trust, see Reinhard Bachmann and Akbar Zaheer, eds.,Handbook of Trust Research (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2008).

16. For detailed coverage of bilateral rela ons, see David Kang on Japan-Korea and Sco Snyderon China-Korea rela ons in the quarterly journal, Compara ve Connec ons published byPaci c Forum CSIS and available at h p://csis.org/program/compara ve-connec ons

17. Zhang Yushan, Zhonghan quanmian hezuo huoban guanxi de huigu yu zhanwang, Yafei zongheng, No. 4, 2007, pp. 1-7; Heeok Lee, Chinas Policy Toward (South) Korea: Objec ves

of and Obstacles to the Strategic Partnership, Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol. 22,No. 3 (September 2010), pp. 283-301; Lee daetonglyeong: Hanjung sugyo, Dongbugapyeonghwa e jungyo yeoghal, Yonhap, January 10, 2012.

18. Chinas Na onal Defense in 2006, Peoples Republic of China Informa on O ce of the StateCouncil, December 2006; h p://www.china.org.cn/english/features/book/194421.htm

19. 2006 Defense White Paper, Republic of Korea Ministry of Na onal Defense, December 29,2006; h p://www.mnd.go.kr/cms_ le/Focus/06_Defense_White_Paper.pdf

20. Chinas Na onal Defense in 2010, Peoples Republic of China Informa on O ce of the StateCouncil, March 31, 2011; h p://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node_7114675.htm

21. ROK 2010 Defense White Paper, Republic of Korea Ministry of Na onal Defense, December31, 2010; h p://www.mnd.go.kr/cms_ le/info/mndpaper/2010/2010WhitePaperAll_eng.pdf

22. A depressed level of trust in 2005-06 was linked to the strategic implica ons of the Dokdo-Takeshima territorial dispute between Seoul and Tokyo; see Youngshik Bong, Dokdo munjereul tonghaeseo bon Hanil gwangye EAI nonpyung, No. 11 (August 2010), pp. 1-4; h p:// www.eai.or.kr/data/bbs/kor_report/201008121445720.pdf

23. Defense of Japan 2006, Japan Ministry of Defense, August 2006; h p://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/2006.html

24. 2006 Defense White Paper, Republic of Korea Ministry of Na onal Defense, December 29,2006; h p://www.mnd.go.kr/cms_ le/Focus/06_Defense_White_Paper.pdf

25. Defense of Japan 2010, Japan Ministry of Defense, September 2010; h p://www.mod.go. jp/e/publ/w_paper/2010.html

26. Defense of Japan 2010, Japan Ministry of Defense, September 2010

27. Defense of Japan 2010, Japan Ministry of Defense, September 201028. ROK 2010 Defense White Paper, Republic of Korea Ministry of Na onal Defense, December

31, 2010; h p://www.mnd.go.kr/cms_ le/info/mndpaper/2010/2010WhitePaperAll_eng.pdf.

29. ROK 2010 Defense White Paper,

30. Hiraiwa Shunji, Daigoshoko kyozai to shite no Nichibei domei to Nihon no yakuwari - Chosenhanto kankei, in Nichibei kankei no kongo no tenkai to Nihon no gaiko (Tokyo: Japan Ins tute of Interna onal A airs, March 2011); h p://www2.jiia.or.jp/pdf/resarch/h22_nichibei_kankei/all.pdf

31. Mori Satoru, Sahashi Ryo, Ito Shoichi, Kotani Tetsuo and Yasaki Yoshihiko, Ruru suishin kokka:Nihon no kokka anzen hosho senryaku, Sasakawa Peace Founda on, October 2011); availableat h p://www.horizonproject.jp

32. Ajia taiheiyo no chiiki anzen hosho akitekucha, The Tokyo Founda on, August 2010; h p://www.tkfd.or.jp/admin/ les/2010-08.pdf

33. For data on na onal material capabili es, see the Correlates of War dataset, availableat h p://www.correlatesofwar.org. For analysis, see C. Fred Bergsten, et.al., Chinas Rise:Challenges and Opportuni es, Peterson Ins tute, 2009; Sco Snyder, Chinas Rise and theTwo Koreas: Poli cs, Economics, Security, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2009).


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34. John J. Mearsheimer, The Gathering Storm: Chinas Challenge to U.S. Power in Asia, Chinese Journal of Interna onal Poli cs, Vol. 3 (2010), pp. 38196.

35. The present chapter does not have space to review earlier white papers, but those are availableon the ministry webpages cited above. On the issue of South Koreas delayed or non-balancingof China, see David Kang, China Rising: Peace, Power, and Order in East Asia (New York: ColumbiaUniversity Press, 2007).

36. Yang Hyun Cho, Dtente cheje jeonhwangi ui Hanil gwangye, Gukje jiyeok yeongu, Vol. 20, No.1(2011), pp. 61-87.

37. For data on bilateral trade ows, see the Correlates of War dataset. For background on themicro-processes of various interdependence explana ons, see Edward Mans eld and BrianPollins, eds., Economic Interdependence and Interna onal Con ict: New Perspec ves on anEnduring Debate, (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2003).

38. There is extensive discussion in academic and policy communi es about zhengleng jingre (cold poli cs, hot economics), o en in the context of China-Japan rela ons but also relevantto Chinas rela ons with South Korea; Dick K. Nanto and Emma Chanle -Avery, The Rise of China and Its E ect on Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea, CRS Report RL32882, January 2006.

39. See, for example, the BBC World Service polls (in coopera on with GlobeScan and the Programon Interna onal Policy A tudes) detailing posi ve/nega ve views of various countries;h p://worldpublicopinion.org.

40. This approach draws insights from social iden ty theory, which has become an expansiveresearch program since its development in the late 1970s; see Michael A. Hogg, Social Iden tyTheory, in Peter James Burke, ed., Contemporary Social Psychological Theories (Stanford, CA:Stanford University Press, 2006).

41. Higashi Ajia shin chitsujo e no dotei, Kokusai seiji, Vol. 158 (December 2009), pp. 1-164; KoharaMasahiro, Higashi Ajia kyodotai: Kyodaika suru Chugoku to Nihon no senryaku (Tokyo: Nihonkeizai shinbunsha, 2005); Choi Yeon-sik, Talnaengjeongi Jungguk ui minjokjuui wa Dongbuga jilseo, 21 Segi jeongchi hakhoebo Vol. 14, No. 1 (2004), pp. 245-67; Park Soo-myung, Shinasiaoegyo byunhwa wa minjokjuui ui banghyang, Tongil jeonlyag, Vol. 10, No.1 (2010), pp. 191-219;

Yu Hyun-seok, Dongasia gondongche noneui wa Hanguk ui jeonlyag, Hangug jeongchi oegyosanonchong, Vol. 32, No. 2 (2011), pp. 157-87.

42. Certain types of contrasts (e.g. hegemonic ambi ons, human rights abuses) are indica veof higher percep ons of iden ty di erence than others (e.g. inadequate burden sharing,di erent cultural preferences).

43. This sec on is based on author interviews of Korean and Chinese policymaking elites (poli cal,diploma c, and military o cials) between 2006 and 2011. Interviews were semi-structured,face-to-face, and not-for-a ribu on. For details, contact the author. For further coverage of mutual percep ons between Seoul and Beijing, see Sook-Jong Lee, South Korean So Powerand How South Korea Views the So Power of Others, in Public Diplomacy and So Power inEast Asia (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).

44. Yun Hwi-tak, HanJung yeoksa nonjaeng gwa yeoksa hwahae, Jungguksa yeongu , Vol. 51 (2007).

45. Nam Jeong-hyu, Jungguk geundae gukga hyeongseong gwajeong eul tonghae seobon Junggukui minjokjuui, Hanguk Dongbuga nonchong , Vol. 37 (2005), pp. 79-101.

46. Many of the issues of nega ve percep ons are detailed in Dong Xiangrong, Wang Xiaolingand Yong Chun, Hanguoren xinmuzhong de Zhongguo xingxiang (Beijing: Shehui kexuechubanshe, 2012).

47. Zhang Liangui, 2010 nian de Chaoxian bandao, Shijie zhishi, 2011.

48. Wang Junsheng, Dont ignore DPRKs concerns, China Daily, January 5, 2012.

49. In other words, there was beli ling of and even disdain in China for Korean public opinion anddemocracy. See for example, Zhonghan guanxi gai tan di huisheng le Huanqiu shibao, January10, 2012. On how some Chinese views of poli cal culture denigrate Korean-style democracy,see Daniel C. Lynch, Envisioning Chinas Poli cal Future: Elite Responses to Democracy as a

Global Cons tu ve Norm, Interna onal Studies Quarterly, Vol. 51 (2007), pp. 701-22.50. Wang Yiwei, Jungguk ui saeroun jeongcheseong eul chajeseo: Jungguk minjokjuui ui sinhwa,

Bigyo munhwa yeongu , No. 11 2007, pp. 79-106.



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51. On the an - hallyu or hate- Hallyu movement in China, see Lisa Leung, Media ng Na onalismand Modernity: The transna onaliza on of Korean dramas on Chinese (satellite) TV, in BengHuat Chua and Koichi Iwabuchi, eds., East Asian Pop Culture: Analysing the Korean Wave (HongKong: Hong Kong University Press, 2008), pp. 53-70. The most important o cial statement oncultural security in China was by the Sixth Plenum of the Central Commi ee, Zhonggong

zhongyang guanyu shenhua wenhua tizhi gaige tuidong shehuizhuyi wenhua dafazhandafanrong ruogan zhongda wen de jueding, October 18, 2011, h p://news.xinhuanet.com/poli cs/2011-10/25/c_122197737.htm.

52. Chinese studies of the Koguryo kingdom prompted debate in South Korea about Koreanna onal iden ty; see Dong-Jin Jang, et. al., Chinas Northeast Project and ContemporaryKorean Na onalism, Korea Journal , Vol. 49, No.1 (Spring 2009), pp.120-53; Ahn Byung-woo,Jungguk ui Goguryeosa Waegok gwa Dongbuk gongjeong, Gukje jeongchi yeongu, Vol. 7,No. 2 (2004), pp. 46-66; Cho Young-chul and Min In-young, Minjogjuui wa gugga iig: JunggugDongbug gongjeong e daehan Hanguk jeongbu ui jeoljedoen daeeung, Hanguk Asia haghoe

Asia yeongu, Vol. 14, No. 1 (2011), pp. 37-69.

53. On how this nega ve interac on of na onal iden es slightly preceded the downturn in Sino-Korean security rela ons, see Peter Hays Gries, The Koguryo Controversy, Na onal Iden ty,and Sino-Korean Rela ons Today, East Asia, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Winter 2005), pp. 3-17; DingdingChen, Domes c Poli cs, Na onal Iden ty, and Interna onal Con ict: the case of the Koguryocontroversy, Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 21, No. 74 (March 2012), pp. 227-41.

54. Jae Ho Chung, ed., Junggug eul kominhada: Hanjung gwangye ui dillema wa haebeop,Samsung Economic Research Ins tute, 2011. Chinas crackdown on domes c dissent a erthe 2010-11 Arab Spring has likely deepened this percep on.

55. Dong-ho Han, The Clash between Interest and Responsibility: Chinas Policy toward NorthKorean Escapees, Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol. 23, No. 4 (December 2011), pp. 443-55.

56. This sec on is based on author interviews of Korean and Japanese policymaking elites between2006 and 2011. For further coverage of mutual percep ons between Seoul and Beijing, seeTaku Tamaki, Deconstruc ng Japans Image of South Korea: Iden ty in Foreign Policy (New York:

Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).57. Jennifer Lind, Sorry States: Apologies in Interna onal Poli cs (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University

Press, 2008).

58. Lee Sin-cheol, Ilbon gyogwaseo yeoksa waegok gwa 21segi Asia pyeonghwa, in Hanil geunhyeondae yeoksa nonjaeng (Seoul: Seonin Publishing; Center for Informa on onKorean Culture. 2007); Minjokjuui wa yeoksa gyogwaseo. (Seongnam: Academy of KoreanStudies, 2006); Sin Ju-bak, Dongasia geunhyeondaesa eseo jeonjaeng gwa pyeonghwae daehan gieok ui chai, geurigo yeoksa gyoyuk, Yeoksa gyoyuk, Vol. 83, 2002.

59. Na onal Ins tute for Defense Studies, East Asian Strategic Review, (Tokyo: NIDS, 2011), p. 104.

60. A er the DPJ came to power, the Japanese government increased e orts to return culturalar facts taken from Korea during the colonial period. Despite these e orts, historical issuesremained an irritant in the bilateral rela onship, as the South Korean judicial system andKorean civil society groups renewed e orts to secure greater Japanese apology/repara ons forwar me sexual exploita on of Korean ci zens euphemis cally referred to as comfort women.

61. This sen ment likely increased with Japans March 11, 2011 triple disaster, which raisedsympathy for Japan in South Korea.

62. Woosang Kim, Korea as a Middle Power in Northeast Asian Security Environment, and Chung-inMoon and Seung-won Suh, Iden ty Poli cs, Na onalism, and the Future of Northeast AsianOrder, in G. John Ikenberry and Chung-in Moon, eds., The United States and Northeast Asia:Debates, Issues, and New Order, (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Li le eld, 2008), pp. 123-43, 193-230.

63. Concern among Korean policymakers about conserva ve revisionists in Japan was greaterwhen Prime Minister Koizumi was in o ce. The controversy over the Yasukuni Shrine reacheda new peak just as Tokyo was making e orts to upgrade its defense posture.


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A SIA AT A TIPPING POINT: KOREA, THE RISE OF CHINA, AND THE IMPACT OF LEADERSHIP TRANSITIONS

1800 K Street, NW

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Leadership Changes and South Koreas China Policy Jae Ho Chung

North Korean Poli cs and ChinaJack Pritchard and L. Gordon Flake

Japanese Poli cs, the Korean Peninsula, and China

Kazuhiko Togo

Chinese Poli cs and the Korean PeninsulaGilbert Rozman

Security Challenges and the ChangingBalance on the Korean Peninsula

The View from ChinaAndrew Scobell

The View from RussiaStephen Blank

Japans Response to Nuclear North KoreaNarushige Michishita

The View from South KoreaTaeho Kim

Sociological Processes and Regional CommunityForma on Incorpora ng South Korea

South Korean Na onal Iden ty Gaps withChina and JapanGilbert Rozman

Diverging Trajectories of Trust in Northeast Asia:South Koreas Security Rela ons with Japan and ChinaLeif-Eric Easley

A Cogni ve Approach to Ethnic Iden ty Construc on in the Korean Enclave in BeijingSharon Yoon

TPP or ASEAN+3: Alterna ve Plans for AsianRegionalism and Free Trade Pacts

The U.S. Approach to Regional Trade AgreementsInvolving East Asia

Edward J. LincolnSouth Korea: Which Way Will It Go on Asian Integra on? Hyung-Gon Jeong

Compe ng Templates in Asia Pacic Economic Integra onPeter A. Petri

EDITOR-IN-CHIEF: GILBERT ROZMAN, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

Diverging Trajectories of Trust in Northeast Asia: South Koreas Security Relations With Japan China,...

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