Distinction Between Private Law and Public Law

8/3/2019 Distinction Between Private Law and Public Law

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DISTINCTION BETWEEN PRIVATE LAW AND PUBLIC LAW

Private law is also known as civil law. It involves relationships between individuals, or

private relationships between citizens and companies.

Public law is a theoryof law that governs the relationship between the state and the

individual, who is considered to be either a company or a citizen.

They both aim to create social order, but have a number of distinct differences. Within

public law, different categories exist. These include criminal law, constitutional law,

administrative law, social welfare law and all deal with matters relating to the wholecountry. Private law is concerned with the law enforced between individuals. This can

include contract law, family law and other areas which deal with intellectual property

rights (copyrights, designs and patents), land law (and the way in which it is

transferred), probate (dealing with wills and how property is distributed after someone

dies) and company law (which deals with the ways in which companies are created and

rules regulating how they operate their business).

A. PRIVATE LAW

1. CIVIL LAW

Civil law is the branch of law dealing with disputes between individuals or

organizations, in which compensation may be awarded to the victim.It seeks to resolvenon-criminal disputes such as disagreements over the meaning of contracts, property

ownership, divorce, child custody, and damages for personal and property damage.

a. Persons and Family Relations is one of the subjects covered in Civil Law. Itmainly deals with the issues of Family Matters such as Marriage, Annulment and


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Voiding of Marriages, Adoption, Property Settlements between Spouses,

Parental Authority, Support for Spouses and Children, Emancipation, Legitimes

(inheritance) of children from their parents and between relatives.

Legal Provisions:

1. Article 1 of the Family Code of the Philippines. Marriage is a specialcontract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in

accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the

foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature,

consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation,except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the

marriage within the limits provided by this Code.

2. Article 10 of the Family Code of the Philippines. Marriages betweenFilipino citizens abroad may be solemnized by a consul-general, consul or vice-

consul of the Republic of the Philippines. The issuance of the marriage license

and the duties of the local civil registrar and of the solemnizing officer with

regard to the celebration of marriage shall be performed by said consular official.

3. Article 17 of the Family Code of the Philippines. The local civil registrarshall prepare a notice which shall contain the full names and residences of the

applicants for a marriage license and other data given in the applications. The

notice shall be posted for ten consecutive days on a bulletin board outside the

office of the local civil registrar located in a conspicuous place within the

building and accessible to the general public. This notice shall request all persons

having knowledge of any impediment to the marriage to advise the local civil

registrar thereof. The marriage license shall be issued after the completion of the

period of publication.

4. Article 26 of the Family Code of the Philippines. All marriages solemnizedoutside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country


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where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this

country, except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 3637 and

38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebratedand a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse

capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to

remarry under Philippine law.

5. Article 28 of the Family Code of the Philippines. If the residence of eitherparty is so located that there is no means of transportation to enable such party to

appear personally before the local civil registrar, the marriage may be

solemnized without necessity of a marriage license.

Case:

Provision No. 4

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III,

Respondent.

G.R. No. 154380, October 5, 2005

Facts:

Cipriano Orbecido III was married with Lady Myros Villanueva on May 24, 1981

at the United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Ozamis City. They had a son

and a daughter named Kristoffer and Kimberly, respectively. In 1986, the wife

left for US bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Orbecido

discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen and learned

from his son that his wife sometime in 2000 had obtained a divorce decree and

married a certain Stanley. He thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for

authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code.


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Issue:

Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code.

Ruling:The court ruled that taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying

the rule of reason, Article 26 Par. 2 should be interpreted to include cases

involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino

citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and

obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to

remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of

the marriage.Hence, the courts unanimous decision in holding Article 26 Par 2 be interpreted

as allowing a Filipino citizen who has been divorced by a spouse who had

acquired a citizenship and remarried, also to remarry under Philippine law.

b. Propertyis anything that is owned by a person or entity. Property is divided intotwo types: "real property" which is any interest in land, real estate, growing

plants or the improvements on it, and "personal property" (sometimes called

"personalty") which is everything elseor any right or interest that an individualhas in movable things.

Legal Provisions:

1. Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Real property as well aspersonal property is subject to the law of the country where it is stipulated.

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order

of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic

validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the


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person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of

the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.

2. Article 420 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The following things are

property of public dominion:(1) hose intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and

bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar

character;

(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are

intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth.

3. Article 423 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The property of provinces,

cities, and municipalities is divided into property for public use and patrimonialproperty.

4. Article 424 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Property for public use, in

the provinces, cities, and municipalities, consist of the provincial roads, city

streets, municipal streets, the squares, fountains, public waters, promenades, and

public works for public service paid for by said provinces, cities, or

municipalities.

All other property possessed by any of them is patrimonial and shall be

governed by this Code, without prejudice to the provisions of special laws.

5. Article 425 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Property of privateownership, besides the patrimonial property of the State, provinces, cities, and

municipalities, consists of all property belonging to private persons, either

individually or collectively.


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Case:

Provision No. 2

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. TEODORO P. RIZALVO, JR.,

Respondent.G.R. No. 172011, March 07, 2011

Facts:

On December 7, 2000, respondent Teodoro P. Rizalvo, Jr. filed before the MTC of

Bauang, La Union, acting as a land registration court, an application for the

registrationof a parcel of land referred to in Survey Plan Psu-200706, located in

Bauang, La Union and containing an area of 8,957 square meters. Respondentalleged that he is the owner in fee simple of the subject parcel of land, that he

obtained title over the land by virtue of a Deed of Transfer dated December 31,

1962, and that he is currently in possession of the land. In support of his claim,

he presented, among others, Tax Declaration No. 22206 for the year 1994 in his

name, and Proof of Payment of real property taxes beginning in 1952 up to the

time of filing of the application.

Issue:

Whether or not his application should be granted.

Ruling:

No because Petitioner failed to prove that he and his predecessor have been in

possession of the land since 12 June 1945. Neither can be qualify under the 30-

year prescription period rule since the land was declared alienable less than 30

years from the date of his application.

Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public

dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the development

of the national wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial.


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Without such express declaration, the property, even if classified as alienable or

disposable, remains property of the public dominion, pursuant to Article 420 (2),

and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription. It is only when such alienable

and disposable lands are expressly declared by the State to be no longer intendedfor public service or for the development of the national wealth that the period of

acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such declaration shall be in the form of

a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where

the President is duly authorized by law.

c. Succession is the statutory rules of inheritance of a dead person's estate when theproperty is not given by the terms of a will.

Legal Provisions:

1. Article 712 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Ownership is acquired byoccupation and by intellectual creation.

Ownership and other real rights over property are acquired and transmitted by

law, by donation, by testate and intestate succession, and in consequence of

certain contracts, by tradition.

They may also be acquired by means of prescription.

2. Article 843 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The testator shalldesignate the heir by his name and surname, and when there are two persons

having the same names, he shall indicate some circumstance by which the

instituted heir may be known.

Even though the testator may have omitted the name of the heir, should he

designate him in such manner that there can be no doubt as to who has been

instituted, the institution shall be valid.


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3. Article 888 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The legitime of legitimatechildren and descendants consists of one-half of the hereditary estate of the

father and of the mother.

The latter may freely dispose of the remaining half, subject to the rights ofillegitimate children and of the surviving spouse as hereinafter provided.

4. Article 891 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The ascendant whoinherits from his descendant any property which the latter may have acquired by

gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to

reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the

benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and who belong to the line

from which said property came.5. Article 902 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The rights of illegitimate

children set forth in the preceding articles are transmitted upon their death to

their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate.

Case:

Provision No. 3

REGINA FRANCISCO AND ZENAIDA PASCUAL, Petitioners, vs. AIDA

FRANCISCO-ALFONSO, Respondent

G.R. No. 138774. March 8, 2001

Facts:

Respondent Aida Francisco-Alfonso is the only daughter of spouses Gregorio

Francisco and Cirila de la Cruz, who are now both deceased. Petitioners, on the

other hand, are daughters of the late Gregorio Francisco with his common law

wife Julia Mendoza, with whom he begot seven (7) children. Gregorio Francisco

owned two parcels of residential land, situated in Barangay

Lolomboy, Bocaue, Bulacan. When Gregorio was confined in a hospital in 1990,

he confided to his daughter Aida that the certificates of title of his property were


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in the possession of Regina Francisco and Zenaida Pascual. After Gregorio died

on July 20, 1990, Aida inquired about the certificates of title from her half sisters.

They informed her that Gregorio had sold the land to them on August 15, 1983.

After verification, Aida learned that there was indeed a deed of absolute sale infavor of Regina Francisco and Zenaida Pascual. Thus, on August 15,

1983, Gregorio executed a Kasulatan sa Ganap na Bilihan, whereby for

P25,000.00, he sold the two parcels of land to the same. By virtue of the sale, the

Register of Deeds of Bulacan issued TCT No. T-59.585 to Regina Francisco and

TCT T-59.586 to Zenaida Pascual. On April 1, 1991, Aida filed with the Regional

Trial Court, Bulacan a complaint against petitioners for annulment of sale with

damages. She alleged that the signature of her late father, Gregorio Francisco, onthe Kasulatan sa Ganap na Bilihan dated August 15, 1983, was a forgery. In their

joint answer to the complaint, petitioners denied the alleged forgery or

simulation of the deed of sale. After due proceedings, on July 21, 1994, the trial

court rendered a decision dismissing the complaint. In time , respondent Alfonso

appealed to the Court of Appeals. After due proceedings, on April 30, 1999, the

Court of Appeals promulgated its decision reversing that of the trial court. The

main issue raised is whether the Supreme Court may review the factual findings

of the appellate court. The jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought before it

from the Court of Appeals under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court is limited

to review of pure errors of law. It is not the function of this Court to analyze or

weigh evidence all over again, unless there is a showing that the findings of the

lower court are totally devoid of support or are glaringly erroneous as to

constitute grave abuse of discretion. We affirm the decision of the Court of

Appeals because:

First: The kasulatan was simulated. There was no consideration for the contract

of sale. Felicitas de la Cruz, a family friend of the Franciscos, testified

that Zenaida Pascual and Regina Francisco did not have any source of income in


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1983, when they bought the property, until the time when Felicitas testified in

1991.

As proof of income, however, Zenaida Pascual testified that she was engaged in

operating a canteen, working as cashier in Mayon Night Club as well as buyingand selling RTW (Ready to Wear) items in August of 1983 and prior thereto.

Zenaida alleged that she paid her father the amount of P10,000.00. She did not

withdraw money from her bank account at the Rural Bank

of Meycauayan, Bulacan, to pay for the property. She had personal savings other

than those deposited in the bank. Her gross earnings from the RTW for three

years was P9,000.00, and she earned P50.00 a night at the club.

Regina Francisco, on the other hand, was a market vendor, selling nilugaw,earning a net income of P300.00 a day in 1983. She bought the property from the

deceased for P15,000.00. She had no other source of income.

We find it incredible that engaging in buy and sell could raise the amount of

P10,000.00, or that earnings in sellinggoto could save enough to pay P15,000.00,

in cash for the land.

The testimonies of petitioners were incredible considering their inconsistent

statements as to whether there was consideration for the sale and also as to

whether the property was bought below or above its supposed market value.

They could not even present a single witness to the kasulatan that would prove

receipt of the purchase price.

Since there was no cause or consideration for the sale, the same was a simulation

and hence, null and void.

Second: Even if the kasulatan was not simulated, it still violated the Civil Code

provisions insofar as the transaction affected respondents legitime. The sale was

executed in 1983, when the applicable law was the Civil Code, not the Family

Code.

Obviously, the sale was Gregorios way to transfer the property to his

illegitimate daughters at the expense of his legitimate daughter. The sale was


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executed to prevent respondent Alfonso from claiming her legitime and rightful

share in said property. Before his death, Gregorio had a change of heart and

informed his daughter about the titles to the property.

Issue:

Whether or not a legitimate daughter be deprived of her share in the estate of her

deceased father by a simulated contract transferring the property of her father to

his illegitimate children.

Ruling:

According to Article 888, Civil Code:The legitime of legitimate children and descendants consists of one-half of the

hereditary estate of the father and of the mother. The latter may freely dispose of

the remaining half subject to the rights of illegitimate children and of the

surviving spouse as hereinafter provided.

Gregorio Francisco did not own any other property. If indeed the parcels of land

involved were the only property left by their father, the sale in fact would

deprive respondent of her share in her fathers estate. By law, she is entitled to

half of the estate of her father as his only legitimate child.

The legal heirs of the late Gregorio Francisco must be determined in proper

testate or intestate proceedings for settlement of the estate. His compulsory heir

cannot be deprived of her share in the estate save by disinheritance as prescribed

by law.

d. Obligations and Contracts. Any legally binding agreement such as contracts voluntarily entered into by two or more parties that places an obligation on each

party to do or not do something for one or more of the other parties and that gives

each party the right to demand the performance of whatever is promised to them by

the other parties. To be valid, all parties must be legally competent to enter a


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contract, neither the objective nor any of the obligations or promised performances

may be illegal, mutuality of the agreement and of its obligations must exist, and there

must be consideration.

Legal Provisions:

1. Article 1159 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Obligations arising fromcontracts have the force of law between the contracting parties and should be

complied with in good faith.

2. Article 1163of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Every person obliged togive something is also obliged to take care of it with the proper diligence of a

good father of a family, unless the law or the stipulation of the parties requires

another standard of care.

3. Article 1167 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.If a person obliged to dosomething fails to do it, the same shall be executed at his cost.

This same rule shall be observed if he does it in contravention of the tenor of the

obligation. Furthermore, it may be decreed that what has been poorly done be

undone.4. Article 1170 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Those who in theperformance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay, and

those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages.

5. Article 1177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The creditors, afterhaving pursued the property in possession of the debtor to satisfy their claims,

may exercise all the rights and bring all the actions of the latter for the same

purpose, save those which are inherent in his person; they may also impugn theacts which the debtor may have done to defraud them.


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Case:

Provision No. 4

JOSEPH SALUDAGA, Petitioner, vs. FAR EASTERN UNIVERSITY and

EDILBERTO C. DE JESUS in his capacity as President of FEU, Respondents.G.R. No. 179337, April 30, 2008

Facts:

It is the obligation of any college institution to provide a safe and secure

environment for every student. As for the students, they have the obligation to

give back the respect for their respective colleges and to excel and do well with

the institutions goals. Far Eastern University failed to comply with theirobligation when a student of theirs, whose name is Joseph Saludaga was shot

inside the campus by their security guard named Alejandro Rosete. The victim

petitioned a case against FEU and Edilberto C. De Jesus, president of FEU. The

University also failed to check the qualifications of the security guards hired

through Galaxy, the third party which hires security guards for the university.

From there, there are also complaints for Galaxy being the first employers of

Rosete. It is also said that the safety of the university should not only be within

the hands of the security guards. Damages are taken by Saludaga by surprised

including physical and moral damages obtained from the said accidental

shooting by Rosete who claimed that it was an accident.

Issues:

Whether Far Eastern University failed to comply with their obligation in

implementing a safe and secure learning environment.

Ruling:

Article 1170 of the Civil Code provides that those who are negligent in the

performance of their obligations are liable for damages. Accordingly, for breach


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of contract due to negligence in providing a safe learning environment,

respondent FEU is liable to petitioner for damages. It is essential in the award of

damages that the claimant must have satisfactorily proven during the trial the

existence of the factual basis of the damages and its causal connection todefendant's acts. The court dismissed the petitioners complaints for Edilberto C.

De Jesus as well as the counterclaims of the respondents. The Regional Trial

Court of Manila found FEU to be liable for the damages and a breach of their

obligation to the petitioner. FEU was ordered to pay actual damage of 35,298.25,

plus 6%interest per annum from the filing of the case until the finality of

decision. After the execution, the rate shall be 12& per annum until its

satisfaction. FEU was ordered to pay temperate damages in the amount ofP20,000.00. Moral damage for P100,000.00, attorneys fees and litigation expense

for 50,000.00. Galaxy was and its presidents were ordered to jointly and severely

pay the respondent FEU damages equivalent to the amount awarded to

Saludaga.

e. Special Contracts is a contract that is signed and has the (wax) seal of the signerattached. Special contracts encompass several classes of contracts

as sales, agency, and partnership.

Legal Provisions:

1. Article 1471 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. If the price is simulated,the sale is void, but the act may be shown to have been in reality a donation, or

some other act or contract.

2. Article 1475 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The contract of sale isperfected at the moment there is a meeting of minds upon the thing which is the

object of the contract and upon the price.


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From that moment, the parties may reciprocally demand performance, subject to

the provisions of the law governing the form of contracts.

3. Article 1915 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. If two or more personshave appointed an agent for a common transaction or undertaking, they shall besolidarily liable to the agent for all the consequences of the agency.

4. Article 1916 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. When two personscontract with regard to the same thing, one of them with the agent and the other

with the principal, and the two contracts are incompatible with each other, that

of prior date shall be preferred, without prejudice to the provisions of article

1544.

5. Article 1920 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The principal may revokethe agency at will, and compel the agent to return the document evidencing the

agency. Such revocation may be express or implied.

Case:

Provision No. 3

CONSTANTE AMOR DE CASTRO and CORAZON AMOR DE CASTRO,

Petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and FRANCISCO ARTIGO, Respondents.

G.R. No. 115838. July 18, 2002

Facts:

Appellants were co-owners of four (4) lots located at EDSA corner New York

and Denver Streets in Cubao, Quezon City. In a letter dated January 24, 1984

(Exhibit "A-1, p. 144, Records), appellee was authorized by appellants to act as

real estate broker in the sale of these properties for the amount of P23,000,000.00,

five percent (5%) of which will be given to the agent as commission. It was

appellee who first found Times Transit Corporation, represented by its president

Mr. Rondaris, as prospective buyer which desired to buy two (2) lots

only, specifically lots 14 and 15. Eventually, sometime in May of 1985, the sale of


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lots 14 and 15 was consummated. Appellee received from appellants P48,893.76

as commission.

It was then that the rift between the contending parties soon emerged. Appellee

apparently felt short changed because according to him, his total commissionshould be P352,500.00 which is five percent (5%) of the agreed

price ofP7,050,000.00 paid by Times Transit Corporation to appellants for the two

(2) lots, and that it was he who introduced the buyer to appellants

and unceasingly facilitated the negotiation which ultimately led to the

consummation of the sale. Hence, he sued below to collect the balance of

P303,606.24 after having received P48,893.76in advance.

On the other hand, appellants completely traverse appellee's claimsand essentially argue that appellee is selfishly asking for more than what he truly

deserved as commission to the prejudice of other agents who were more

instrumental in the consummation of the sale. Although appellants readily

concede that it was appellee who first introduced Times Transit Corp. to them,

appellee was not designated by them as their exclusive real estate agent but that

in fact there were more or less eighteen (18) others whose collective efforts in

the long run dwarfed those of appellee's, considering that the first negotiation for

the sale where appellee took active participation failed and it was these other

agents who successfully brokered in

the second negotiation. But despite this and out of appellants' "pure

liberality, beneficence and magnanimity", appellee nevertheless was given

the largest cut in the commission (P48,893.76), although on the principle of

quantum meruit he would have certainly been entitled to less. So appellee should

not have been heard to complain of getting only a pittance when he actually got

the lion's share of the commission and worse, he should not have been allowed

to get the entire commission. Furthermore, the purchase price for the two lots

was only P3.6 million as appearing in the deed of sale and not P7.05 million as


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alleged by appellee. Thus, even assuming that appellee is entitled to the entire

commission, he would only be getting5% of the P3.6 million, or P180,000.00.

Private respondent Francisco Artigo ("Artigo" for brevity) sued petitioners

Constante A. De Castro ("Constante" for brevity) and Corazon A. De Castro("Corazon" for brevity) to collect the unpaid balance of his broker's commission

from the De Castros. The Trial Court finds defendants Constante and Corazon

Amor de Castro jointly and solidarily liable to plaintiff.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC.

Issue:

Whether the complaint merits dismissal for failure to implead other co-owners asindispensable parties.

Ruling:

The De Castros argue that Artigo's complaint should have been dismissed for

failure to implead all the co-owners of the two lots. The De Castros claim that

Artigo always knew that the two lots were co-owned by Constante and Corazon

with their other siblings Jose and Carmela whom Constante merely

represented. The De Castros contend that failure to implead such indispensable

parties is fatal to the complaint since Artigo, as agent of all the four co-owners,

would be paid with funds co-owned by the four co-owners.

The De Castros' contentions are devoid of legal basis.

An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected by the court's action

in the litigation, and without whom no final determination of the case can

be had. The joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory and courts cannot

proceed without their presence. Whenever it appears to the court in the course of

a proceeding that an indispensable party has not been joined, it is the duty of the

court to stop the trial and order the inclusion of such party. However, the rule on

mandatory joinder of indispensable parties is not applicable to the instant case.


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There is no dispute that Constante appointed Artigo in a handwritten note dated

January 24, 1984 to sell the properties of the De Castros for P23 million at a 5

percent commission. The authority was on a first come, first serve basis.

Constante signed the note as owner and as representative of the other co-owners.Under this note, a contract of agency was clearly constituted between Constante

and Artigo. Whether Constante appointed Artigo as agent, in Constante's

individual or representative capacity, or both, the De Castros cannot seek

the dismissal of the case for failure to implead the other co-owners as

indispensable parties. The De Castros admit that the other co-owners are

solidarily liable under the contract of agency, citing Article 1915 of the Civil

Code, which reads:Art. 1915. If two or more persons have appointed an agent for a common

transaction or undertaking, they shall be solidarily liable to the agent for all the

consequences of the agency.

The solidary liability of the four co-owners, however, militates against the De

Castros' theory that the other co-owners should be impleaded as indispensable

parties. When the law expressly provides for solidarity of the obligation, as in

the liability of co-principals in a contract of agency, each obligor may

be compelled to pay the entire obligation. The agent may recover the whole

compensation from any one of the co-principals, as in this case.

f. Torts and Damages. Tort is a term applied to a miscellaneous and more or lessunconnected group of civil wrongs, other than breach of contract, for which a

court of law will afford a remedy in the form of an action for damages. The law

of torts is concerned with the compensation of losses suffered by private

individuals in their legally protected interests, through conduct of others which

is regarded as socially unreasonable.


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Legal Provisions:

1. Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Whoever by act or omission

causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay forthe damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual

relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the

provisions of this Chapter.

2. Article 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Responsibility for fault or

negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the

civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff

cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.3. Article 2180 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.The obligation imposed by

article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for

those of persons for whom one is responsible.

The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for

the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company.

Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons

who are under their authority and live in their company.

The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise

responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches

in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions.

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and

household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though

the former are not engaged in any business or industry.

The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but

not when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done

properly pertains, in which case what is provided in article 2176 shall be

applicable.


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Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for

damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they

remain in their custody.

The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons hereinmentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family

to prevent damage.

4. Article 2181 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Whoever pays for the

damage caused by his dependents or employees may recover from the latter

what he has paid or delivered in satisfaction of the claim.

5. Article 2182 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.If the minor or insane

person causing damage has no parents or guardian, the minor or insane personshall be answerable with his own property in an action against him where a

guardian ad litem shall be appointed.

Case:

Provision No. 3

DELSAN TRANSPORT LINES, INC., Petitioner, vs. C & A CONSTRUCTION,

INC., Respondent

G.R. No. 156034, October 1, 2003

Facts:

C & A construction, construct a deflector wall at the Vitas reclamation Area in

Tondo, Manila it was not formally turnover to National Housing Authority

though it was completed in1994. On 12:00 midnight of October 20, 1994, Captain

Demetrio T. Jusep of M/V Delsan Express receive a report that that a typhoon

was going to hit Manila after eight (8) hours. At 8:35 a.m., he tried to seek shelter

but it was already congested. At 10:00 a.m. Capt. Jusep drop the anchor at the

vicinity of Vitas mouth, the waves were already reaching 8 to 10 feet. The ship

was dragged by the wind toward the Napocor power barge. Capt. Jusep ordered


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a full stop of the vessel to avoid the collision but when the engine was re-started,

it hit the deflector wall constructed by the respondent. P456,198.24 was the

damaged cause by the incident. C & A construction demanded payment of

the damages from Capt. Jusep but the latter refused to pay due to the cause ofthe incident was by a fortuitous event. The trial court ruled that Captain Jusep

was not guilty of negligence in applying the emergency rule because it had taken

necessary precautions to avoid accident. The Court of Appeals reversed & set

aside the decision of the trial court. Captain Jusep was found guilty of negligence

in transferring the vessel only at 8:35 a.m. of October 21, 1994 and held liable for

damages in waiting until 8:35 a.m. before transferring the vessel to sought

shelter.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not Capt. Jusep was negligent.

(2) Whether or not the petitioner is solidarily liable under Art. 2180 of the Civil

Code for Quasi-Delict.

Held:

(1) The court finds Captain Jusep guilty of negligence, the failure to

take immediate and appropriate action under the circumstances, despite the

knowledge that there is typhoon but he waited for the lapse of eight (8) hours

instead. Captain Jusep showed an inexcusable lack of care and caution which an

ordinary prudent person would have observed in the same situation.The trial

court erred in applying the emergency rule because the danger where Captain

Jusep found himself was caused by his own negligence.

(2) The court finds the petitioner liable for the negligent act of Capt. Jusep.

Whenever an employees negligence causes damage to another, it instantly arise

a presumption that the employer failed to exercise the care and diligence of

supervision of his employee. In


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Fabre , Jr. vs. Court of Appeals held that due diligence requires consistent

compliance of rules & regulations for the guidance and actual implementation of

rules. But the petitioner fails to give any evidence that its rule are strictly

implemented and monitored in compliance therewith petitioner is thereforeliable for the negligent act of Capt. Jusep. The amount of P 456, 198.27 due earn

6% interest per annum from October 3, 1995 until the finality of the decision.

B. PUBLIC LAW

a. Constitutional Law is a body of law dealing with the distribution and exercise ofgovernment power. More particularly, it is the sum of the interpretations ofconstitutional questions rendered by the Supreme Court and subsidiary courts in

their written and published decisions.

Extradition Treaty

An extradition treaty is an international agreement in which the Requested State

agrees, at the request of the Requesting State and under specified conditions, to

turn over persons who are within its jurisdiction and who are charged with

crimes against, or are fugitives from, the Requesting State.

Case:

BAYAN MUNA, as represented by Rep. SATUR OCAMPO, Rep. CRISPIN

BELTRAN, and Rep. LIZA L. MAZA, Petitioner, vs. ALBERTO ROMULO, in his

capacity as Executive Secretary, and BLAS F. OPLE, in his capacity as Secretary

of Foreign Affairs, Respondents.

G.R. No. 159618 February 1, 2011


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Facts:

Petitioner Bayan Muna is a duly registered party-list group established to

represent the marginalized sectors of society. Respondent Blas F. Ople, now

deceased, was the Secretary of Foreign Affairs during the period material to thiscase. Respondent Alberto Romulo was impleaded in his capacity as then

Executive Secretary. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Having a

key determinative bearing on this case is the Rome Statute establishing the

International Criminal Court (ICC) with the power to exercise its jurisdiction

over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern and shall be

complementary to the national criminal jurisdictions. The serious crimes

adverted to cover those considered grave under international law, such asgenocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and crimes of aggression. On

December 28, 2000, the RP, through Enrique A. Manalo, signed the Rome Statute

which, by its terms, is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval by the

signatory states. As of the filing of the instant petition, only 92 out of the 139

signatory countries appear to have completed the ratification, approval and

concurrence process. The Philippines is not among the 92.

Issue:

Whether or not the RP-US Non Surrender Agreement is void ab initio for

contracting obligations that are either immoral or otherwise at variance with

universally recognized principles of international law.

Held:

No. Petitioner urges that the Agreement be struck down as void ab initio for

imposing immoral obligations and/or being at variance with allegedly

universally recognized principles of international law. The immoral aspect

proceeds from the fact that the Agreement, as petitioner would put it, leaves

criminals immune from responsibility for unimaginable atrocities that deeply


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shock the conscience of humanity; it precludes our country from delivering an

American criminal to the ICC. The above argument is a kind of recycling of

petitioners earlier position, which, as already discussed, contends that the RP,

by entering into the Agreement, virtually abdicated its sovereignty and in theprocess undermined its treaty obligations under the Rome Statute, contrary to

international law principles. The Court is not persuaded. Suffice it to state in this

regard that the non-surrender agreement, as aptly described by the Solicitor

General, is an assertion by the Philippines of its desire to try and punish crimes

under its national law. The agreement is a recognition of the primacy and

competence of the countrys judiciary to try offenses under its national criminal

laws and dispense justice fairly and judiciously. Petitioner, we believe, laborsunder the erroneous impression that the Agreement would allow Filipinos and

Americans committing high crimes of international concern to escape criminal

trial and punishment. This is manifestly incorrect. Persons who may have

committed acts penalized under the Rome Statute can be prosecuted and

punished in the Philippines or in the US; or with the consent of the RP or the US,

before the ICC, assuming, for the nonce, that all the formalities necessary to bind

both countries to the Rome Statute have been met. For perspective, what the

Agreement contextually prohibits is the surrender by either party of individuals

to international tribunals, like the ICC, without the consent of the other party,

which may desire to prosecute the crime under its existing laws. With the view

we take of things, there is nothing immoral or violative of international law

concepts in the act of the Philippines of assuming criminal jurisdiction pursuant

to the non-surrender agreement over an offense considered criminal by both

Philippine laws and the Rome Statute.

b. Administrative Law is a body of law that governs the activities of administrativeagencies of the government. It ensures that justice is done between the state and

the individual by restraining arbitrary or wrong decision making by the state.


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Administrative Code of 1987

Administrative Code incorporates in a unified document the major structural,functional and procedural principles and rules of governance and provides

optimum benefit to the people and Government officers and employees as it

embodies changes in administrative structures and procedures designed to serve

the people.

Case:

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Petitioner, vs. AICHI FORGINGCOMPANY OF ASIA, INC., Respondents.

G.R. No. 184823, October 6, 2010

Facts:

Petitioner filed a claim of refund/credit of input vat in relation to its zero-rated

sales from July 1, 2002 to September 30, 2002. The CTA 2nd Division partially

granted respondents claim for refund/credit.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, insisting that the

administrative and the judicial claims were filed beyond the two-year period to

claim a tax refund/credit provided for under Sections 112(A) and 229 of the

NIRC. He reasoned that since the year 2004 was a leap year, the filing of the

claim for tax refund/credit on September 30, 2004 was beyond the two-year

period, which expired on September 29, 2004. He cited as basis Article 13 of the

Civil Code, which provides that when the law speaks of a year, it is equivalent to

365 days. In addition, petitioner argued that the simultaneous filing of the

administrative and the judicial claims contravenes Sections 112 and 229 of the

NIRC. According to the petitioner, a prior filing of an administrative claim is a

condition precedent before a judicial claim can be filed.


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The CTA denied the MPR thus the case was elevated to the CTA En Banc for

review. The decision was affirmed. Thus the case was elevated to the Supreme

Court.

Respondent contends that the non-observance of the 120-day period given to theCIR to act on the claim for tax refund/credit in Section 112(D) is not fatal because

what is important is that both claims are filed within the two-year prescriptive

period. In support thereof, respondent cited Commissioner of Internal Revenue

v. Victorias Milling Co., Inc. [130 Phil 12 (1968)] where it was ruled that if the

CIR takes time in deciding the claim, and the period of two years is about to end,

the suit or proceeding must be started in the CTA before the end of the two-year

period without awaiting the decision of the CIR.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the claim for refund was filed within the prescribed period

2. Whether or not the simultaneous filing of the administrative and the judicial

claims contravenes Section 229 of the NIRC, which requires the prior filing of an

administrative claim, and violates the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative

remedies

Ruling:

1. Yes. As ruled in the case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Mirant

Pagbilao Corporation (G.R. No. 172129, September 12, 2008),the two-year period

should be reckoned from the close of the taxable quarter when the sales were

made.

In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Primetown Property Group, Inc (G.R.

No. 162155, August 28, 2007, 531 SCRA 436), we said that as between the Civil

Code, which provides that a year is equivalent to 365 days, and the

Administrative Code of 1987, which states that a year is composed of 12 calendar


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months, it is the latter that must prevail being the more recent law, following the

legal maxim, Lex posteriori derogat priori.

Thus, applying this to the present case, the two-year period to file a claim for tax

refund/credit for the period July 1, 2002 to September 30, 2002 expired onSeptember 30, 2004. Hence, respondents administrative claim was timely filed.

2. Yes. We find the filing of the judicial claim with the CTA premature.

Section 112(D) of the NIRC clearly provides that the CIR has 120 days, from the

date of the submission of the complete documents in support of the application

[for tax refund/credit], within which to grant or deny the claim. In case of full

or partial denial by the CIR, the taxpayers recourse is to file an appeal before the

CTA within 30 days from receipt of the decision of the CIR. However, if after the120-day period the CIR fails to act on the application for tax refund/credit, the

remedy of the taxpayer is to appeal the inaction of the CIR to CTA within 30

days.

Subsection (A) of Section 112 of the NIRC states that any VAT-registered

person, whose sales are zero-rated or effectively zero-rated may, within two

years after the close of the taxable quarter when the sales were made, apply for

the issuance of a tax credit certificate or refund of creditable input tax due or

paid attributable to such sales. The phrase within two (2) years x x x apply for

the issuance of a tax credit certificate or refund refers to applications for

refund/credit filed with the CIR and not to appeals made to the CTA.

The case ofCommissioner of Internal Revenue v. Victorias Milling, Co., Inc. is

inapplicable as the tax provision involved in that case is Section 306, now Section

229 of the NIRC. Section 229 does not apply to refunds/credits of input VAT.

The premature filing of respondents claim for refund/credit of input VAT

before the CTA warrants a dismissal inasmuch as no jurisdiction was acquired

by the CTA.


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c. Criminal Law is the body of law that relates to crime. It might be defined as thebody of rules that defines conduct that is not allowed because it is held to

threaten, harm or endanger the safety and welfare of people, and that sets out the

punishment to be imposed on people who do not obey these laws.

Revised Penal Code of the Philippines

The Revised Penal Code contains the general penal laws of the Philippines. First

enacted in 1930, it remains in effect today, despite several amendments thereto. It

does not comprise a comprehensive compendium of all Philippine penal laws.

The Revised Penal Code itself was enacted as Act No. 3815, and some Philippinecriminal laws have been enacted outside of the Revised Penal Code as separate

Republic Acts.

Case:

EVANGELINE LADONGA VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 141066, February 17, 2005

Facts:

In 1989, spouses Adronico and Evangeline Ladonga became Alfredo Oculams

regular customers in his pawnshop business. Sometime in May 1990, the

Ladonga spouses obtained a P9,075.55 loan from him, guaranteed by United

Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) Check No. 284743, post dated to July 7, 1990

issued by Adronico; sometime in the last week of April 1990 and during the first

week of May 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained an additional loan of

P12,730.00, guaranteed by UCPB Check No. 284744, post dated to July 26, 1990

issued by Adronico; between May and June 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained

a third loan in the amount of P8,496.55, guaranteed by UCPB Check No. 106136,


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post dated to July 22, 1990 issued by Adronico; the three checks bounced upon

presentment for the reason CLOSED ACCOUNT; when the Ladonga spouses

failed to redeem the check, despite repeated demands, he filed a criminal

complaint against them. While admitting that the checks issued by Adronicobounced because there was no sufficient deposit or the account was closed, the

Ladonga spouses claimed that the checks were issued only to guarantee the

obligation, with an agreement that Oculam should not encash the checks when

they mature; and, that petitioner is not a signatory of the checks and had no

participation in the issuance thereof. The RTC rendered a joint decision finding

the Ladonga spouses guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating B.P. Blg. 22.

Petitioner brought the case to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appealsaffirmed the conviction of petitioner.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner who was not the drawer or issuer of the three

checks that bounced but her co-accused husband under the latters account could

be held liable for violations of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 as conspirator.

Held:

The conviction must be set aside. Article 8 of the RPC provides that a

conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning

the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. To be held guilty as a co-

principal by reason of conspiracy, the accused must be shown to have performed

an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. The overt act or acts of

the accused may consist of active participation in the actual commission of the

crime itself or may consist of moral assistance to his co-conspirators by moving

them to execute or implement the criminal plan. In the present case, the

prosecution failed to prove that petitioner performed any overt act in furtherance

of the alleged conspiracy. Apparently, the only semblance of overt act that may


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be attributed to petitioner is that she was present when the first check was

issued. However, this inference cannot be stretched to mean concurrence with

the criminal design. Conspiracy must be established, not by conjectures, but by

positive and conclusive evidence. Conspiracy transcends mere companionshipand mere presence at the scene of the crime does not in itself amount to

conspiracy. Even knowledge, acquiescence in or agreement to cooperate, is not

enough to constitute one as a party to a conspiracy, absent any

active participation in the commission of the crime with a view to the furtherance

of the common design and purpose.

d. International Law is the set of rules generally regarded and accepted as bindingin relations between states and nations.

Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA)

Visiting Forces Agreement is an agreement between a country and a foreign

nation having military forces visiting in that country.

Case:

SUZETTE NICOLAS y SOMBILON, Petitioner, vs. ALBERTO ROMULO, in his

capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs; RAUL GONZALEZ, in his capacity as

Secretary of Justice; EDUARDO ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary;

RONALDO PUNO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Interior and Local

Government; SERGIO APOSTOL, in his capacity as Presidential Legal Counsel;

and L/CPL. DANIEL SMITH, Respondents.

G.R. No. 175888, February 11, 2009


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Facts:

On the 1st of November 2005, Daniel Smith committed the crime of rape against

Nicole. He was convicted of the said crime and was ordered by the court to

suffer imprisonment. Smith is a US serviceman convicted of a crime against ourpenal laws and the crime was committed within the countrys jurisdiction. But

pursuant to the VFA, a treaty b/n the US and RP, the US embassy was granted

custody of Smith. Nicole, together with the other petitioners appealed before the

SC assailing the validity of the VFA. Their contention is that the VFA was not

ratified by the US senate in the same way our senate ratified the VFA.

Issue:Is the VFA void and unconstitutional & whether or not it is self-executing.

Ruling:

The VFA is a self-executing Agreement because the parties intend its provisions

to be enforceable, precisely because the VFA is intended to carry out obligations

and undertakings under the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty. As a matter of fact,

the VFA has been implemented and executed, with the US faithfully complying

with its obligation to produce Smith before the court during the trial.

The VFA is covered by implementing legislation inasmuch as it is the very

purpose and intent of the US Congress that executive agreements registered

under this Act within 60 days from their ratification be immediately

implemented. The SC noted that the VFA are not like other treaties that need

implementing legislation such as the Vienna Convention. As regards the

implementation of the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty, military aid or assistance

has been given under it and this can only be done through implementing

legislation. The VFA itself is another form of implementation of its provisions.

Distinction Between Private Law and Public Law

Documents

Transcript of Distinction Between Private Law and Public Law